Mrs G Gharabli v Cedar Hope Care Services Ltd: 6009247/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6009247/2024
Between
Mrs G GharabliClaimantCedar Hope Care Services LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge McCooeyIn person for claimantDate 3 December 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaint of direct race discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.[2]The complaint of direct religious discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.[3]The complaint of indirect race discrimination is well-founded and succeeds.[4]The complaint of indirect religious discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.[5]The complaint of victimisation is not well-founded and is dismissed.[6]The complaint of being subjected to detriment for making protected disclosures is well-founded and succeeds.
REASONS
[1]This was the hearing of a claim of direct discrimination on the grounds of race and/or religion; indirect race and/or religious discrimination; victimisation and protected disclosure detriment (whistleblowing).[2]The claim form was presented on 22 August 2024. Early conciliation took place between 8 July 2024 and 7 August 2024. The response form was received on 24 September 2024, defending the claims. Procedural history[3]On 23 January 2025, a case management hearing took place before Employment Judge Anstis, where an agreed list of issues was formulated and the case set down for a final hearing to determine liability and remedy. The hearing was initially listed for two days.[4]It became apparent, when answering the first question in her oral evidence on Day 1, that the claimant thought the current list of issues did not accurately reflect her claims. She ultimately applied to extend the list of issues to include her whistleblowing complaint; her indirect religious discrimination complaint and expand her direct discrimination complaint. It was agreed that the facts of the additional complaints were in the ET1 and its attached chronology so did not require an amendment to the claim itself, but rather to the list of issues itself.[5]The respondent, though objecting to the application, wished to proceed with the final hearing rather than adjourn for more time to prepare its case, in the event the application was allowed. This is because it had knowledge of the complaints from the claimant’s witness statement and so had an opportunity to take instructions from its witnesses about them.[6]The claimant’s application was allowed for the oral reasons given on Day 1. That matter is dealt with more fully in my Case Management Order dated 29 October 2025.[7]The final version of the now expanded list of issues was agreed at the outset on Day 2 as being accurate. It is annexed to the bottom of this Judgment.[8]The evidence consisted of a bundle of 256 pages. The bundle was not accurately paginated. I allowed some additional document produced by the claimant to be admitted into evidence which she said had not been included in the bundle, for reasons given orally in the hearing. These included WhatsApp messages sent between Mr Abdelaziz and the respondent’s director, Mr Chenyika, and the claimant’s resignation letter.[9]Witness statements were received from the following witnesses, all of which gave oral evidence on Day 2: The claimant (36 pages); Mr Abdelaziz, former Deputy Team Manager (claimant’s witness); Ms Quinn, HR Officer (by CVP) (respondent’s witness); Mr Abdalore Bakare, Support Worker (respondent’s witness); 2 of 40 September 2023[10]Oral evidence concluded at 4.45pm on Day 2. Both parties preferred to send in written submissions, rather than attend to make oral submissions on another day, and to be sent a Reserved Judgment. The matter was listed for a part-heard third day for me to consider those written submissions and deliberate. General approach[11]In this case, as in others, not everything that was brought up in evidence was relevant to my decision-making.[12]My overall impression of the witnesses was as follows. The claimant had a clear recollection of events and did not overly embellish her account. Overall, she was answering questions honestly to the best of her recollection. When she referred to something being in a document, that tended to be accurate when taken to it. She appeared forthright in her opinions about her treatment and standards in the workplace. This sometimes caused friction between her and colleagues.[13]Mr Abdelaziz was trying to assist the Tribunal. He did not appear overly invested in the claimant’s case and was trying to answer honestly about matters in his knowledge. It was not put to him that he was being untruthful about events, but rather that he was not fully aware of the Home Office requirements around overseas support workers, which he accepted.[14]The respondent’s witnesses were generally trying to assist the Tribunal and acting in good faith. However, I found that overall, the credibility of their evidence was impacted by the following:[15]Ms Quinn, on her own case, could not remember a great deal. She had been told about what happened in connection with the claimant mostly by others. She could not assist with matters such as why the claimant was investigated on two occasions and who made that decision.[16]Ms Quinn also made some criticisms of the claimant that were not supported by evidence before me, such as the claimant’s unwillingness to engage in community work or her refusal to accept meetings/support offered by the respondent. Ms Quinn acknowledged being aware of an email in which the claimant raised her concerns about pay discrepancies, despite saying in her witness statement she had not been aware of any formal complaints about that. She also said she did not consider the claimant’s resignation letter to be necessarily relevant when considering documents to include in the bundle, despite it mentioning the claimant’s discrimination complaints. None of these things were deliberate omissions but it did limit the weight I attached to her evidence on points of factual dispute between the parties.[17]Mr Bakare’s witness statement focused solely on the facts of one allegation (out of three) connected to the claimant’s first investigation. Whilst I accept that evidence was relevant to the extent it could show a real, rather than minor, reason for investigating the claimant, we did spend a disproportionate amount of time on this topic. Mr Bakare’s animosity towards the claimant was clear and he seemed keen to disparage her, for instance, referring to medication issues that were no part of this case and for which the claimant never faced investigation. 3 of 40 September 2023[18]This degree of animosity made it difficult to treat his evidence as impartial and created the impression that, overall, the purpose for calling him was to discredit the claimant generally. He did, however, give helpful evidence connected to the claim for indirect religious discrimination, these matters being not directly linked to the claimant herself. Factual background[19]The respondent is a business which provides supported living and associated care to service users, which include young adults. It says it employs 35 people in the UK.[20]The claimant was employed by the respondent as a Support Worker from 5 February 2023. She was tasked with assisting with the daily living needs of clients.[21]She then was promoted to Senior Support Worker from 21 May 2023 with a new salary of £12.50 per hour. This was set to increase to £13.50 per hour upon successful completion of 6 months’ probation in November 2023. Salary for domestic and overseas workers[22]The claimant’s salary as a support worker was initially £10.50 when she joined in February 2023. At this time, support workers from overseas on “Skilled Worker” sponsorship visas (“overseas workers/Visas”) were paid £12.31, unlike the £10.50 she and the other domestic support workers were paid.[23]The claimant gave unchallenged evidence that around 80% of all of the respondent’s total staff were working under these visas. I therefore accept that a significant proportion of staff had that visa status.[24]It was agreed that the pay for overseas workers is stipulated by Home Office provisions for skilled workers on such visas. The sole document relied on by parties here is a quote from a website, possibly gov.uk but the name of the site is not cited. It reads: “The standard Skilled Worker Visa minimum salary is now £38,700, and £15.88 per hour, where no salary discounts are applicable. This threshold was increased for applications submitted on or after 4 April 2024. Previously, the minimum salary threshold was £26,200, which itself was an increase from £25,600 in March 2023.”[25]The claimant says in her witness statement that domestic and overseas support workers were in the same role and had the same responsibilities: “Local Support Workers were being paid £10.50 or £11 per hour, while overseas Support Workers received £12.31 per hour — despite all of them performing the same duties.” “The reality was that the overseas colleagues who came with sponsorship for the role of Senior Care Worker were, in reality, all working as Support Workers. 4 of 40 September 2023[26]She points to screenshots of the description of such workers as ‘support worker’ not ‘senior support worker’ on the respondent’s website.[27]Despite it being part of its justification defence regarding indirect race discrimination, the respondent’s witness statements do not address whether the roles were the same or different.[28]It was however suggested in cross-examination that overseas workers did have additional responsibilities, for example, completing community work and social reports for court proceedings. Ms Quinn said this was the case when asked directly in oral evidence.[29]There is also an email sent on 17 June 2024 from Ms Quinn to Dr and Mrs Chenyika regarding new banding structures that were due to be implemented She writes: “Would you be able to speak to all the seniors this week about the new banding which we are implementing. I need them to speak to all the staff to explain the new structure and tell the overseas they will receive a contract variation letter explaining their additional responsibilities (which they are already doing in their roles).”[30]This is the only documentary evidence from the respondent to suggest that overseas workers did have additional responsibilities. However, this banding structure was implemented just prior to the claimant’s grievance, which included her complaint about the pay discrepancy.[31]The claimant gave clear and consistent evidence that overseas support workers were performing the same role as domestic support workers during the time of her complaints. Community Work[32]In reference to one of the additional responsibilities cited by the respondent, namely performing community work, the respondent said this was available to the claimant, but she refused to do it, despite receiving training. This implies it was part of both domestic and overseas support workers’ role.[33]Regarding any refusal, I prefer the claimant’s account which was that she strongly refuted this and said the opportunity was not offered to her, despite training. Her account was clearer than the respondent’s, which contained no specifics and was not in their witness evidence. It also seems likely, given their willingness to investigate other matters of concern, such as training discrepancies, that they would have mentioned this refusal to the claimant.[34]I therefore find that whilst some overseas support workers may have had additional responsibilities on occasion prior to 17 June 2024, I prefer the claimant's evidence that the reality on the ground was during the time of her complaints, the role of the domestic support worker and overseas support worker was essentially the same.[35]It was later from 17 June 2024 that changes began to be implemented in terms 5 of 40 September 2023 of how the pay bands were structured according to roles. It may well be the responsibilities and roles changed from that time, but that post-dates these complaints. Family and Zimbabwean connections[36]There was a factual dispute about many of the overseas workers being family members of Dr Chenyika and/or a disproportionate amount of them being Zimbabwean, which the respondent acknowledges is Dr Cheniyika’s race. It was suggested by the claimant that preferential treatment was given generally to overseas workers on those two grounds.[37]On this Mr Abdelaziz’s writes: “With the overseas workers, the Director would contact me directly to ask that I give them shifts, allow them to have leave. He did not do this for other workers, only for those related to him or his wife or who said they were related.”[38]The WhatsApp messages relied on between Mr Abdelaziz and Dr Chenyika are: “Hi Alim Nyasha is available for work over the summer holidays From 2 July to 23 september she can do any hours.” 9 June 2023 “Alim some of the Zimbabwe crew will attend an easter religious event as part of their settling into UK an I have asked them to find people to swap with shifts on Friday night and Saturday daytime if they are working on those days” 12 March 2023” “I hope you travel well today ...just wanted to check if the new starters Joclyn Nothando and Demi have a programme for the week I think they need to be allocated shadowing and Co working shifts with an experienced worker as shift leader...they were asking I don't think they can just pick up shifts on rota cloud” 22 January 2023[39]The respondent said Mr Abdelaziz was contacted about all staff members, not just overseas, as and when required, which was refuted by Mr Abdelaziz; he gave credible evidence to say he was not contacted about staff more generally once the respondent developed a more established HR function.[40]I accept Mr Abdelaziz’s evidence that Dr Chenyika would reach out about certain overseas workers as indicated by the messages and ask him to allocate the additional hours to certain overseas support workers of his preference.[41]Only some family connections were admitted by the respondent. Dr Chenyika’s niece, Nyasha, who was contracted to work on a Student Visa; it says there was nothing untoward about this as she was not on a sponsorship visa. The respondent also accepts Mr Justin Hove is brother of Dr Chenyika but works as a contractor.[42]Ms Quinn gave oral evidence that there had been an internal whistleblower in December 2023 (not the claimant) who complained about the family connections between staff and Dr Chenyika and/or his wife. This led to an internal review 6 of 40 September 2023 which did not reveal family links. She accepted the Director should not be closely connected to staff on sponsorship visas or showing preferential treatment.[43]The claimant said Tanaka Hove is nephew to the Director, being Justin Hove’s son. The respondent denied this and said having the same surname’s and being Facebook friends did not prove this. In oral evidence, Ms Quinn accepted that when Tanaka Hove was recovering from a traffic accident, Dr Chenyika, Mrs Chenyika and Justin Hove were at his bedside in hospital supporting him. She suggested that the same would have been done for any ill employee. I do not accept that and I do find on the balance of probabilities that Dr Chenyika is uncle to Tanaka.[44]I also prefer the claimant and Mr Abdelaziz’s consistent evidence that Demi, Jocyln, and Rejoice are related to Dr Chenyika.[45]I do not find that Dr Chenyika favoured Zimbabwean overseas staff generally based on the single reference to the ‘Zimbabwean crew’ alone.[46]I similarly have insufficient evidence before me to find as a fact that overseas support workers were disproportionately recruited on the basis of their race and/or family connection to Dr Chenyika and therefore enjoyed the benefit of the higher salary afforded by the Home Office for overseas staff on that ground. 24th August 2023- Pay discrepancy (Alleged Protected Act)[47]On 24 August 2023, whilst reviewing work schedules on Rota Cloud, the claimant became aware of a pay discrepancy between overseas support workers on visas and domestic support workers; the former was being paid £12.31 per hour and the latter, including the claimant £10.50 per hour. She was in her Senior Support Worker (“Senior”) role at the time so earning £12.50. This was £0.19 more, she says despite having more responsibilities as a Senior.[48]The respondent says due to changes in national minimum wage, the salary for domestic support workers was increased to £11 in April 2023 and to £12 in April 2024.[49]The claimant raised her concern about pay with her then Line Manager, Ms Baker, the same day via WhatsApp at 18.13pm, saying: “Hi Kiri…I am shocked…SG, Jocy, Demi are paid £12.31?? I am 12.50 with all the responsibilities [emoticon]”[50]The claimant’s pay was then increased to £13.50, backdated to take effect from 21 August 2023.[51]Officially, the claimant’s pay was only set to increase upon completion of her probation in November 2023.[52]I find that the claimant’s pay was increased by Ms Baker a direct result of her complaint as expressed in the text, because of its proximity to her complaint and because her probationary period had not yet ended.[53]Further, I accept the claimant’s evidence that the two other Seniors at the time 7 of 40 September 2023 were not given the same pay increase, as she gave a credible account of her conversation with them both at the time about that. Step down to Support Worker[54]On 25 December 2023, the claimant told Mrs Chenyika, Wife of Dr Chenyika, and Ms Quinn, that she wished to step down from her role as Senior to a Support Worker, as she had been before.[55]The reasons for that step-down were disputed between parties. The respondent, via Ms Quinn, said it was because she was not allowed to directly manage her sons, and they would often pick up overtime in the service she was responsible for, creating a conflict of interest.[56]The claimant strongly denied the allegation about her sons and said her reasons for stepping down were her husband’s ill health and his care needs at the time, as well as her own health.[57]I prefer the claimant’s account when she says her sons paid no part in her decision. Ms Quinn acknowledged the allegation had been told to her by other unnamed individuals and she could not remember whether it was by email or verbally. The claimant’s flexible hours request form, a contemporaneous document, cites her husband’s ill health. Further, no documentary evidence was presented by the respondent to support that allegation, for example, internal concerns, and they were not investigated, unlike other concerns.[58]On 9 January 2024, Mrs Chenyika asked the claimant to reconsider her resignation from the Senior role, to which the claimant replied she would not.[59]The claimant’s step-down from Senior was confirmed in writing in a letter dated 11 January 2024 and that her salary would accordingly reduce from £13.50 to £11 per hour, effective from 25 January 2024. First investigation meeting on 11 January 2024[60]On 10 January 2024 (the day after speaking to Mrs Chenyika), the claimant was invited at 4.52pm to a formal investigation meeting the following day at 11am on 11 January 2024.[61]The meeting was to explore a verbal altercation that happened two months previously involving a colleague on 11 November 2023 at 227 Basingstoke Road.[62]The respondent also explored an additional two matters which they did not give the claimant advance notice of: i. Misuse of a company vehicle. ii. Completing reports for others/giving out her work password.[63]The investigation concluded with no findings being made against the claimant and no further action being taken, “we did not take any further action as we did not feel we had sufficient evidence of any wrongdoing.” 8 of 40 September 2023[64]Much discussion was had about the events of 11 November 2023. I find that both the claimant and ‘Sandra’ raised their voices at various points. I do not find that the claimant pushed Sandra, as suggested by Mr Bakare, as Sandra herself did not say that in the statement about it in the bundle; she describes being “tapp[ed] on the shoulder”. the claimant accepts tapping her in her own account. Mr Bakare describes the physical contact as “Gabriela grabbed Sandra’s shoulder and pulled her”. This reduced his credibility given it is at odds with Sandra’s own account.[65]I find that the two events making up that incident were appropriate topics for investigation, as the latter involved raised voices in the home of potentially vulnerable service users and was loud enough to bring them downstairs.[66]It was said that in the course of investigating that incident it was alleged the claimant misused a company car which the claimant said was disproved by the vehicle log and the respondent did not uphold this allegation.[67]Little was said about the completion of reports/password issues, that too was not taken further.[68]I find that the decision to investigate the claimant was more likely than not materially influenced by the claimant refusing Mrs Chenyika’s request to remain a Senior. This is because that conversation happened the before and Mrs Chenyika was in a position of influence and seniority, being Wife of the Director.[69]Further there was no evidence of any intention to investigate prior to that. The respondent chose not to call Mrs Chenyika or Dr Chenyika as witnesses and provided no evidence as to who took decisions to investigate. I draw an inference that, as the most senior people in the business, the decision to investigate came from one or both of them. Ms Quinn confirmed that it was not from her or HR, and said she “did not know” who decided.[70]The outcome of the decision was communicated five and a half months later in June 2024. This delay was excessive and caused the claimant unnecessary stress during her annual leave.[71]From 25 January 2024, the claimant’s step-down to support worker was made effective and she was informed her salary would be £11 per hour. The salary of overseas colleagues on visas in the support worker role remained £12.31 at that time. ‘Locked in’ incident[72]On 30 January 2024, there was an incident whereby a service user referred to as, ‘MP’, was accidentally locked in his home by Tanaka Hove. This happened following the claimant’s handover to him from her shift which finished that day at 8am.[73]The claimant informed the Senior of that house, Mr Ussmane, via WhatsApp at 8.57am of the incident, saying: “Good Morning MP was closed in the placement, I left the placement 9 of 40 September 2023 before them, Tanaka Locked the door and on my way home remembered to ask him if he checked the guys. he did not and locked the house, Nadim [the claimant’s son], went back to open the door, I inform you and now it is in your hands.”[74]Mr Balde responded with a ‘thumbs up’ emoticon. No further steps were taken by him about this.[75]On 13 February 2024, in an email, the claimant informed the interim manager, Ms Borlace, of MP being locked in the property and that her report to Mr Balde, the Senior, had not been actioned by him.[76]I accept that there was some conversation in which Mr Balde voiced his disapproval to the claimant for escalating this concern. The claimant says Mr Balde explicitly mentioned the reason why he would not have done this as being because Tanaka Hove is nephew of the Director.[77]However, given that this detail was not mentioned in the second investigation meeting nor in the claimant’s grievance, based on the minutes, I am unable to conclude that part this was in fact said.[78]Ms Borlace forwarded the email to the second interim manager, Ms Moss, and Mrs Chenyika.[79]Ms Moss responded the same day thanking her for raising the concern and offering support; she requested availability to meet to write a statement.[80]The claimant responded that she could not attend the two offered dates and asked for further dates.[81]No response from Ms Moss appears to have been sent and things came to a standstill regarding that complaint.[82]The claimant says that from this time, her usual supervision sessions with the Director were cancelled, one on 20 February 2024, and a second session that month. Rubbish disclosure[83]On 20 March 2024 at 6.24am, the claimant emailed Ms Borlace and Ms Moss, copying in Dr and Mrs Chenyika, about her concerns regarding rubbish bags being left loose in the garden of a home, without a black bin to put them in.[84]She describes services users smoking near the rubbish bags and rats potentially appearing, “so in my opinion is a real danger.”[85]She says: “Many times, I raised my concern to the HOH and was said from January that the black bin was ordered but still nothing…I am really not happy doing this, but I prefer rather than to be careless. This is one of the things that needs your attention.”[86]Dr Chenyika then replied in an email at 9.22am saying: 10 of 40 September 2023 “Gabriella – these issues you are raising are issues within your control as a support worker you can address this with the young people - and could you follow the protocol and raise issues with Ussumane the senior of the house before writing to everybody. I have copied in HR I see that you have written emails before regarding different things and could you put all your issues formally with HR in one email and state if you want this to be handled as a formal grievance, otherwise as has been happening we don't want issues which we have not been given a chance to deal with going to external bodies as this is against both our complaints policy and grievance and whistle blowing policy. The overgrown garden nothing can be done now due to the rain. Have you sighted rats on premises? we can get landlord to call in pest control. Also, could you direct your emails to Ussumane and copy in only Leona and Sharon.”[87]The claimant replied at 9.46am saying, “You misunderstand me. I did not mentioned the grass. I followed the protocol and asked many times Usmmanne how to deal with this rubbish. From January we have no black bin for placement and this is not under my control.”[88]On 21 March 2024 at 11.03am, Mrs Chenyika replied by email to say, “we now have a temporary black bin which we can use, we are awaiting a permanent one estimated delivery from the council is 8 weeks.”[89]Later at 3.39pm, Dr Chenyika replied again advising the claimant to put all issues she has to HR for advice on next steps if she wants to raise a grievance or complaint. He adds: “the black bin has been ordered and if this had been brought up with management this would have been completed. All other issues are within all support workers responsibility and remit to deal with.”[90]He also expressed a concern that matters such as this may be sent to external bodies, “as has been happening over the last few months, shall I remind that any issues which need redress need to be raised internally first being going external as per our complaints and whistleblowing policies.”[91]I find that Dr Chenyika was irritated by the claimant raising this concern and copying in the recipients that she did. He was concerned that by doing so, there may be unwarranted external involvement and likely had in mind the previous whistleblowing incident from another staff member in December 2023, mentioned above. Request to be Key Worker[92]A week or so before, on 15 March 2024, the claimant had been asked to be Key Worker for an Arab-speaking resident, MY, by Mr Balde. She refused as she was working part-time for two 12-hour night shifts and felt she could not complete her duties adequately for MY on this pattern. 11 of 40 September 2023[93]This refusal was later considered by the respondent to be a potential failure to comply with a reasonable management request.[94]On or around, 19 or 21 March 2024 the claimant was asked to attend two meetings during the breaking of the fast in Ramadan at 6pm; one with the Director and one with Nr Nasan. The claimant was not cross examined about this and I accept those requests were made. Grievance[95]On 22 March 2024, Tanaka Hove telephoned the claimant in an 8-minute call, accusing her of contacting the CQC with a complaint about him, which she denied.[96]On 25 March 2024, the claimant lodged a formal grievance against Tanaka Hove about that call. She did this by email to Ms Quinn, copying in Mrs and Dr Chenyika. She mentioned that Mr Hove was disrespectful, laughing at her; using an intimidating tone and blaming her for the ‘locked in’ incident. She also described experiencing isolation from other colleagues and feeling stress and anxiety about raising future concerns and attending work.[97]The grievance meeting was due to go ahead on 2 April 2024 but was postponed so that the claimant’s Trade Union support could attend.[98]On 25 March 2024, Dr Chenyika, asked the claimant to complete reports as MY’s Key Worker; his email does not suggest he knows the claimant had declined the appointment.[99]The same day, the claimant replied to that email confirming she did not accept the appointment and outlining her reasons why. 1-1 meeting/training during Ramadan[100]On 5 April 20224 Ms Moss emailed the claimant setting up a mandatory 1-1 meeting with a note-taker to take place on 8 April 2024 at 10am.[101]On 7 April 2024 the claimant told Ms Moss she could not attend due to family commitments, it being the final week of Ramadan and the lead up to Eid. She also mentions a training session due to take place in that period and feeling disappointment at the lack of cultural recognition surrounding that.[102]She also queried the purpose of the meeting and requirement for a notetaker, as well as mentioning her concern about unequal payment regarding the overseas workers. She mentions this may be discriminatory.[103]On 9 April 2024, the claimant was required to work a shift the day before Eid.[104]Mr Bakare gave oral evidence that he would request time off in advance to accommodate Eid and was never refused. He would also step out of meetings if there was a clash with any religious day, for example, a meeting during the breaking of the fast at Ramadan or make it known he cannot attend. 12 of 40 September 2023[105]The claimant accepts she did not book off annual leave for Muslim special occasions and did not give advance warning of any conflict with days. She felt the respondent should take the initiative and be sensitive to the religious needs of its staff, without her needing to ask for time off. Blocked from Birdie[106]Around this time, the claimant was blocked from Birdie, the app used to view service users and tasks, so that she could see four out of a possible twelve cases. The claimant implies this is part of a pattern of unfair treatment and exclusion.[107]The respondent accepts blocking her but says it was for her own wellbeing as she was off sick. This point was not mentioned in the respondents’ witness statements. I do not accept the respondent’s version of events about Birdie, as the claimant was off sick later in May 2024, at least one month prior to her being blocked. It seems therefore more likely that they did not want her accessing the app and accessing information in light of the complaints she had recently been making as outlined in her grievance. Particularly, given Dr Chenyika’s irritation at the claimant’s approach regarding her concerns above. Second investigation[108]On Tuesday 30 April 2024, the claimant was invited by Mr Granade (Community Manager) to attend a second investigation with a planned date of Friday 3 May 2024.[109]She replied the same day indicating that she wished to bring a Trade Union representative for support but was unsure whether that would be possible due to the late notice and requesting to reschedule if they were unavailable.[110]On 1 May 2024, Mr Granade replied saying: “At this stage you will not need a colleague or representative as it is only an investigation - meaning this is only a fact-finding meeting. Following on from the investigation, if the decision is made to proceed to subsequent hearings, then you can bring a colleague or trade union representative.”[111]The claimant then emailed back saying: “I would appreciate clarification on why I am being asked to attend this investigation meeting unaccompanied, contrary to our established procedure”.[112]She was then permitted to attend the meeting with her Trade Union representative.[113]On 1 May 2024 the claimant was signed off sick with work-related stress, confirmed by a GP’s a fit note. The claimant cites lack of sleep, crying, anxiety and panic attacks at that time.[114]The claimant completed an Occupational Health assessment, the report being produced on 4 June 2024, which confirmed the claimant was unfit to work.[115]The investigation meeting was postponed to 12 June 2024 (remotely), due 13 of 40 September 2023 to the claimant being on sick leave and also to enable her to be supported by her Trade Union representative.[116]The second investigation was to explore the following: i. Refusal of reasonable instruction from management (being MY’s key worker); ii. Safeguarding breach (locked in incident); iii. Training discrepancies.[117]Following the meeting, the claimant was informed on 14 June 2024 by letter from Ms Quinn that there was no case to answer and the matter was now closed. Grievance meeting[118]On 18 June 2024, a meeting took place to consider the claimant’s grievance regarding Mr Hove’s call and the locked in incident and how it was handled. This took place whilst the claimant was still on sickness absence, with her agreement.[119]The claimant also mentioned her concerns about the rubbish being left in the garden in the meeting.[120]The claimant had initially been required to attend in person by Ms Quinn, until the claimant’s Trade Union representative clarified this was not appropriate in light of her being on sick leave. Ms Quinn acknowledged in oral evidence that was correct, believing that she had offered a remote platform.[121]On 28 June 2024, the claimant was informed that the outcome of the grievance was that the matter between her and Tanaka Hove was now resolved and no further steps would be taken.[122]On 28 June 2024, at her request, the claimant was informed by Ms Quinn the outcome of the first investigation on 13 January 2024 was that it was closed with no further action in respect of all complaints. Resignation[123]On 28 June 2024 the claimant emailed Dr Chenyika her resignation with immediate effect. Her reasons included discrimination on the basis of pay and gender; being made to feel ‘difficult or uncooperative’ when raising safeguarding concerns; and being investigated twice which made her feel ‘punished’.[124]Her resignation was accepted with immediate effect.[125]Ms Quinn confirmed that the claimant’s sick leave was until 14 July 2024 and three fit notes were on file.[126]The resignation letter in the bundle and the one sent as an additional document on Day 1are slightly different, for instance, mentioning ‘gender’ in one 14 of 40 September 2023 version. I have treated the letter in the bundle as the correct version. That difference was not explored by either party. The Law Direct discrimination
The Law
[127]Employees are protected from discrimination by Section 39 Equality Act 2010 (EqA) which reads: “(2) An employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's (B)— (a) as to B's terms of employment;(b) in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service;(c) by dismissing B;(d) by subjecting B to any other detriment.”[128]Direct discrimination is rendered unlawful by Section 13(1) EqA: “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.”[129]In order to succeed in a claim of direct discrimination under section 13, a claimant must have been treated less favourably than a comparator who was in the same, or not materially different, circumstances as the claimant. In Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337, HL, Lord Scott explained that this means that, “The comparator required for the purpose of the statutory definition of discrimination must be a comparator in the same position in all material respects as the victim save only that he, or she, is not a member of the protected class”.[130]The definition of the comparator is at s23 EqA: “(1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14, 19 or 19A there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.” “Because of”: reason for less favourable treatment[131]It is for the Tribunal to objectively determine, having considered the evidence, whether treatment is “less favourable”. While the claimant’s perception is, strictly speaking, irrelevant, their subjective perception of their treatment is likely to inform the Tribunal’s conclusion as to whether, objectively, the impugned treatment was less favourable.[132]The test to determine whether less favourable treatment is “because of” the protected characteristic is not a simple “but for” test. In other words, it is not 15 of 40 September 2023 sufficient that, but for the protected characteristic, the treatment would not have occurred, James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] IRLR 288.[133]The correct approach is to determine whether the protected characteristic, had a “significant influence” on the treatment, Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572.[134]The ultimate question to ask is “what was the reason why the alleged perpetrator acted as they did? What, consciously or unconsciously, was the reason?”, Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] UKHL 48. This is a question of fact for the Tribunal and is different to the question of motivation, which is irrelevant. The Tribunal can draw inferences from the behaviour of the alleged perpetrator as well as taking surrounding circumstances into account.[135]If there is more than one reason for the treatment complained of, the question is whether the protected characteristic was an “effective cause” of the treatment, O’Neill v Governors of ST Thomas More Roman Catholic Voluntary Aided Upper School [1996] IRLR 372. Burden of proof under the Equality Act 2010[136]The burden of proof for discrimination claims is set out in s136 EqA: “(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision”.[137]Laing v Manchester City Council and anor [2006] ICR 1519 held: “the onus lies on the employee to show potentially less favourable treatment from which an inference of discrimination could properly be drawn”.[138]This requires the Tribunal to consider all the material facts without considering the Respondent’s explanation at this stage. However, this does not mean that evidence from the Respondent undermining the Claimant’s case can be ignored, Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd 2021 ICR 1263.[139]It is not enough for the claimant to show that there has been a difference in treatment between him and a comparator, there must be “something more”. In Madarassy v Nomura International plc 2007 ICR 867, Lord Justice Mummery held: “The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, 16 of 40 September 2023 sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination”.[140]In Virgin Active Ltd v Hughes 2023 EAT 130, it was highlighted by the Employment Appeal Tribunal that the consideration of whether there are material differences in the circumstances of an actual comparator compared to those of the Claimant needs to take place before applying the shift in the burden of proof.[141]Regarding a hypothetical comparator, the claimant must provide evidence consistent with the position that the comparator would have been treated more favourably. This requires the Tribunal to be able to draw inferences of likely treatment of a hypothetical comparator from the evidence before it.[142]It is only if the initial burden of proof is reached that the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove that the conduct in question was in “no sense whatsoever” based on the protected characteristic, Igen Ltd (formerly Leeds Careers Guidance) and ors v Wong and other cases 2005 ICR 931.[143]The word “detriment” has been construed broadly by Courts and Tribunals. In the leading case of Shamoon, the House of Lords held that it is only necessary for the claimant to show some disadvantage. He or she need not show any material physical or economic consequence that was materially to their Indirect discrimination[144]The statutory definition of indirect discrimination is found in section 19A(1) of EqA as follows:(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.[145]Religion and race are both listed as protected characteristics in Section 19(3).[146]Baroness Hale here captures the intention behind indirect discrimination 17 of 40 September 2023 law in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police and anor v Homer [2012] IRLR 601 at paragraph 17: “The law of indirect discrimination is an attempt to level the playing field by subjecting to scrutiny requirements which look neutral on their face but in reality work to the comparative disadvantage of people with a particular protected characteristic.”[147]The Tribunal must ask itself four questions when determining indirect discrimination cases: i. What is the neutral PCP that the employer applies (or would apply)? ii. Does that PCP put people of the claimant’s race or religion at a particular disadvantage when compared with those not of that race or religion? iii. Has the claimant experienced that particular disadvantage? iv. Has the employer shown that the PCP is justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? Burden of proof[148]The burden lies on the claimant to establish the first three elements of this claim and if this is done, it falls to the respondent to then justify the PCP in question, Dziedziak v Future Electronics Ltd EAT 0271/11; confirmed in Essop v Home Office; Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27.[149]The PCP means the respondent’s way of doing things and there is no strict definition. They can be written or unwritten workplace rules.[150]The key is to identify what it is about the employer’s management of employees or its operation that causes the particular disadvantage, Ishola v Transport for London 2020 ICR 1204, CA.[151]The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Code of Practice on Employment (‘EHRC Code’) says: “[The term PCP] should be construed widely so as to include, for example, any formal or informal policies, rules, practices, arrangements, criteria, conditions, prerequisites, qualifications or provisions. A provision, criterion or practice may also include decisions to do something in the future – such as a policy or criterion that has not yet been applied – as well as a ‘oneoff’ or discretionary decision.” (Paragraph 4.5)[152]The PCP should be neutral and applied regardless of race/religion. It is not necessary for it to be actually applied to others but that it would have been applied to others in the same circumstances, British Airways Plc v Starmer [2005] IRLR 862, EAT. Timing 18 of 40 September 2023[153]In Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton 1989 IRLR 8, CA the point in time at which the claimant’s ability to comply with the PCP should be judged is the date on which the PCP had to be complied with by the claimant. This is the point under section 19 EqA at which the claimant suffers the particular disadvantage. Group disadvantage[154]A disadvantage does not have to be quantifiable and the claimant does not have to experience actual loss (economic or otherwise). It is enough that the worker can reasonably say that they would have preferred to be treated differently in the work context.[155]The EHRC Code says: “It could include denial of an opportunity or choice, deterrence, rejection or exclusion.” It is therefore similar to a detriment: “something that a reasonable person would complain about…[an] unjustified sense of grievance would not qualify.”[156]Indirect discrimination cases require comparisons between groups of employees. Section 23(1) EqA requires that when comparisons are made, “there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case”. This applies to indirect discrimination claims.[157]The claimant must show a ‘particular’ disadvantage when compared with other people who do not share the characteristic in question, Homer,[158]A statistical approach is not always appropriate, particularly where the sample is small. The claimant’s oral evidence and that of others in the groups involved can suffice in cases where meaningful conclusions about the group picture may be drawn, Dobson v North Cumbria Integrated Care NHS Foundation Trust 2021 ICR 1699, EAT[159]The focus is on whether the PCP is a cause of the disadvantage and not why it is, Essop. [2017] UKSC 27, [2017] IRLR 558. The reasons why one group may find it harder to comply with a PCP than others are many and various and, “the reason for the disadvantage need not be unlawful in itself or be under the control of the employer.” (paragraph 26). Justification[160]Unlike direct discrimination, indirect discrimination is capable of being justified. This means the respondent can show there is a good reason for the particular PCP, the burden of proof lying on them. Concrete evidence is not always required, but justification cannot be based on impression or assumption.[161]Armstrong v Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Trust [2006] IRLR 124 (CA) stresses the need for rigorous justification, not mere assertion. 19 of 40 September 2023[162]It is for the Tribunal to decide whether justification has been established and its findings should not be interfered with unless they could be said to be perverse.[163]The respondent must: i) identify the aim the PCP was a means of achieving; ii) show the aim was legitimate; and iii) show the PCP was proportionate. The latter requires asking whether the same aim could have been achieved by less discriminatory means.[164]In order to be proportionate, an indirectly discriminate PCP needs to be both an appropriate means of achieving a legitimate aim and ‘reasonably necessary,’ Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz 1987 ICR 110, ECJ[165]Tribunals must guard against substituting their own legitimate aims rather than analysing the ones put forward by respondents, XC Trains Ltd v CD and Others [2016] IRLR 748, EAT). Public Interest Disclosure “Whistleblowing”[166]Section 43B (1) ERA defines a protected disclosure as: “any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more” of different types of wrongdoing.[167]This includes, (b) “that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject” and, (d) “that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered” or (f) “that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.”[168]A qualifying disclosure must be made to the worker’s employer under Section 43C.[169]The Tribunal must consider what the claimant herself reasonably relieved at the time of making the disclosure. The belief must be that i) their disclosure tends to show a relevant failure and ii) their disclosure is made in the public interest.[170]In Chesterton Global Limited v Nurmohamed [2018] ICR 731 the Court provided guidance as follows:(a) The Tribunal first has to decide whether the worker subjectively believed at the time that the disclosure was in the public interest; and(b) if she did, whether that belief was objectively reasonable.[171]In Kilraine v Wandsworth LBC [2018] ICR 1850 the Court of Appeal clarified that “allegation” and “disclosure of information” are not mutually exclusive categories. What matters is the wording of the statute; some “information” must be “disclosed” and that requires that the communication have sufficient “specific factual contents”. 20 of 40 September 2023[172]The Court of Appeal in Chesterton Global and another v Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979[2018] ICR 731 set out relevant criteria against which to assess the existence of the public interest to include: i. the numbers in the group whose interest the disclosure served; ii. the nature of the interest affected and the extent to which they are affected by the wrongdoing disclosed; iii. the nature of the wrongdoing disclosed; and iv. the identity of the alleged wrongdoer. Whistleblowing - Detriment - s47B (1A) ERA[173]“A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, done – (a) By another worker of W’s employer in the course of that other worker’s employment, or (b) By an agent of W’s employer with the employer’s authority” on the ground that W has made a protected disclosure.[174]A detriment is something that a reasonable worker would consider to be a disadvantage in the circumstances in which they work. Something may be a detriment even if there are no physical or economic consequences for the worker, but an unjustified sense of grievance is not a detriment: see Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003[ UK HL 11, ICR 337.[175]The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove (on balance of probabilities) that they made a protected disclosure and that they suffered a detriment. The respondent then has the burden to prove (on balance of probabilities) the reason for the treatment (s48(2) ERA).[176]The test for whether a detriment was on the ground of the protected disclosure (s47B (1) ERA 1996), involves an analysis of the mental processes (conscious or unconscious) of the employer when it acted as it did.[177]In NHS Manchester v Fecitt and others [2012] IRLR 64, the Court of Appeal held that the test is whether the protected disclosure “materially influences” (in the sense of being more than a trivial influence) the employer's treatment of the whistleblower. Victimisation[178]Under s27 EQA, it is victimisation for a respondent to subject a claimant to a detriment because they have done a protected act. A ‘protected act’ includes making an allegation (whether or not express) that someone has contravened the EqA. 21 of 40 September 2023[179]An act is only protected if it relates expressly to a contravention of the EqA; complaints about general unfairness or an unjustified sense of grievance are not protected Shamoon. The protected act must take place earlier in time than the detrimental treatment complained of: Beneviste v Kingston University EAT 0393/05.
Discussion
[180]I must now apply the law to the findings I have made in this case and reach conclusions. I cross-reference the List of Issues (LoI) using its paragraph numbers. Direct race and/or religious discrimination[181]The claimant describes her race as White European and compares her treatment with Black African or Zimbabwean support workers. In evidence, she more often compared her treatment with the more general term, overseas workers, by which it was meant, those on the visa described above.[182]Did the respondent do the following things? i. Pay the claimant a lower rate of pay compared to Black African or Zimbabwean support workers, namely £11 compared to £12.31 from 25 January 2024.[183]It is agreed that the respondent paid overseas support workers on visas the higher rate stipulated. The respondent’s case is this is purely because the Home Office sets this rate and there is nothing more to it. They are not legally required to match the rate across all workers.[184]The claimant’s named comparators are Joclyn who is Zimbabwean; Demi who is Nigerian; Tanaka Hove who is Zimbabwean. Regarding Wesley, I have no note of race. All are agreed to be Christian.[185]It was accepted that these workers were all on overseas visas. The respondent implied they were potentially more skilled than the claimant, and by extension, not in materially the same circumstances. I had no evidence about workers’ respective qualifications and did not find that as a fact.[186]Tanaka Hove was a Senior Support worker at the time of 25 January 2024 onwards, so not in materially the same circumstances so I disregard him a a comparator. The others were agreed to be support workers and I accept they were in materially the same circumstances as the claimant.[187]Being paid less for doing the same work is less favourable treatment. The key issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to infer that this was because of race and/or religion. 22 of 40 September 2023 Race[188]Mr Abdelaziz’s evidence was that preferential treatment was given to overseas workers who were or claimed to be family members of Dr Chenyika. This contradicts the assertion it was because of their race.[189]In light of my findings at paragraphs 36-45, I do not consider that the choice to recruit, and therefore pay, Zimbabwean or Black African support workers a higher wage was because of their race.[190]It seems some preferential treatment was shown to a particular group of Zimbabweans, namely the ‘Zimbabwean crew’ in terms of attending an Easter event. However, that is insufficient evidence to allow me to conclude the payment disparity itself was because of race, particularly where other examples concern a family member (Nyasha) meaning that relationship was more likely to be the material influence.[191]I also reach this conclusion as there was no corroborating evidence about the recruitment process and the race of overseas workers as a whole to allow me to draw a particular link with Zimbabwean or Black African staff.[192]The claimant has therefore proven insufficient facts from which to draw inferences to shift the burden of proof. Religion[193]There was insufficient evidence linking the comparators’ religion to their status as overseas workers and therefore to their higher pay.[194]The evidence relied on was: i. the Director and named comparators being Christian, and ii. the text referring to the ‘Zimbabwean crew’ and Easter, as above.[195]Taken together, this is not the ‘something more’ required to establish that those comparators were on overseas visas, and therefore paid more, because they were Christian like the Director.[196]The claimant has therefore not established that the issue of the pay discrepancy was because of either race and/or religion. iii. Not offer the claimant the community work referred to in para 25 of the respondent’s response, whereas black African (or Zimbabwean) Christian support workers were.[197]The claimant did not expressly say that Joclyn, Noni, Demi, Tanaka or Wesley were offered community work and so, given that lack of clarity, I applied a hypothetical comparator here, namely, someone otherwise in the claimant’s position except that they were Zimbabwean or Black African, instead of White European. 23 of 40 September 2023[198]I accept Mr Abdelaziz’s evidence that Dr Chenyika would offer community work generally to all staff, then contact him to allocate the additional hours to certain overseas support workers.[199]I therefore find it more likely that not that this happened.[200]Turning once more to the reason why, Mr Abdelaziz’s evidence leads me to believe that the main reason for this was the family connections between Dr Chenyika and those named staff; their race was incidental to this, and therefore cannot be said to be a material influence.[201]As above, I had insufficient evidence before me to draw a connection between the failure to offer community work being on the grounds of religion, namely the claimant being Muslim not Christian, particularly in light of Mr Abdelaziz’s evidence to the contrary.[202]For these reasons the claim of direct discrimination fails. Indirect race discrimination[203]The respondent accepts it has the PCP of paying employees on the visa a higher hourly rate than support workers not on that visa.[204]It is also agreed that the respondent applied the PCP equally to domestic and overseas support workers. This includes the claimant in that she got a lower wage as a domestic support worker. She was paid £11, rather than £12.31 from 25 January 2024 onwards.[205]In its current wording, the list of issues refers more narrowly to support workers on visas from Zimbabwe or Black Africa as a group. However, throughout the evidence both parties referred more broadly to overseas workers (referring to those on the visas) and domestic workers, referring to those not on visas, as above. The claimant also described the pay disparity by reference to overseas workers in her grievance.[206]I consider ‘overseas workers’ to be the more accurate description of the relevant groups. Whilst the respondent described each of the named comparators in the direct discrimination claim as Zimbabwean or Black African, there was no further evidence before me with the analysis or breakdown of race of the overseas workers. The claimant suggested the majority were from Zimbabwe or were Black African but it was not clear in what proportion. However, as mentioned, it has been accepted by the respondent throughout, that overseas support workers and domestic support workers were paid different amounts as already outlined.[207]I therefore compare the group of overseas support workers on the visa already identified to domestic support workers not on that visa.[208]As accepted by the respondent, I find the PCP applied equally to domestic and overseas support workers. 24 of 40 September 2023[209]I find that domestic support workers were at a disadvantage compared to overseas workers because the national minimum wage sets a lower rate of pay for them than the higher rate set by the Home Office.[210]I have found that the role and responsibilities were the same as between domestic and overseas support workers. Therefore, it is a disadvantage to be paid less for performing the same work.[211]The claimant also experienced that particular disadvantage when she returned to work as a support worker from January 2024.[212]In light of this, the burden of proof now shifts to the respondent to show that the PCP is justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.[213]The respondent, firstly, relies on the Home Office minimum pay requirements for overseas workers. Its key argument is that the pay rates are set as they are to comply with their legal obligations. The pay disparity is incidental to that.[214]It also relies on overseas workers having additional responsibilities, which I have rejected as a finding of fact at paragraphs 25-31. Whilst the overseas staff may well have greater qualifications than those of domestic staff, I have found in practice their work to be the same at the time of these complaints.[215]The respondent, via cross-examination of the claimant, implied it could not afford to match the pay of its domestic workers to that of overseas workers when suggested by her as an alternative to the PCP.[216]In its submissions about justification the respondent says, “the respondent business paid every worker what it was legally entitled to” and “the only foreseeable action for the respondent business was not to hire overseas staff at all.”[217]However, I had no analysis or evidence before me from the respondent to show why it would be financially prohibitive to match the domestic support workers’ pay to those of overseas support workers. Particularly in circumstances where they were doing the same work and where the majority of total staff were on the higher salary as overseas support workers.[218]Legal compliance is a legitimate aim. However, I consider bare legal compliance is not by itself enough to establish that the PCP is appropriate for achieving that aim and reasonably necessary where there is a disparity in pay for the same work.[219]Proportionality requires assessing alternatives such that the respondent must show that no less discriminatory alternative would achieve compliance, Bilka. Further, Armstrong points to the need for evidence to support that conclusion, rather than assumption. 25 of 40 September 2023[220]With this in mind, the respondent should have at least considered less discriminatory alternatives and presented evidence of the financial ramifications for its business if it were to adjust its current PCP.[221]The fact that the respondent did increase the claimant’s pay as a Senior when she specifically complained about the pay disparity, does suggest it had flexibility to do so, and does indicate some acknowledgment that the claimant’s sense of grievance about this was justified.[222]The increase of the claimant’s pay only when challenged also indicates a degree of arbitrariness in that pay could be adjusted in certain circumstances but only for those domestic workers who asked for it.[223]The respondent gave inconsistent evidence in response to this, suggesting both that i. Ms Baker acted unilaterally in increasing the claimant’s pay (Ms Quinn’s evidence confirmed that would not have been possible); and ii. that the pay rise was applied to the other Seniors in the role as a national minimum wage increase.[224]For these reasons, I do consider the indirect race discrimination claim is made out on the grounds that the respondent has not discharged its burden regarding justification of the PCP. Indirect religious discrimination[225]Here the PCP is identified as: “a procedure which meant that Muslim employees were required to work, such as attend meetings, during their religious holidays and/or times when they might ordinarily pray.”[226]It is agreed that this PCP was applied to all employees, including the claimant, who is Muslim.[227]In particular, it was undisputed that the claimant was asked to attend two meetings around 21 March 2024 at 6pm during Ramadan, this is at the time of the breaking of the fast.[228]She was also required to work a shift the day before Eid during April 2024.[229]I must next consider whether the PCP put Muslim support workers at a particular disadvantage when compared to non-Muslim support workers. Here the claimant referenced Christians being in a better position due to their holidays being automatically remembered and commemorated in the working calendar. She pointed to Dr Chenyika protecting the right of the ‘Zimbabwean crew’ to celebrate Easter but not those of other faiths, Muslims in her case.[230]Mr Bakare’s oral evidence was clear that, as a Muslim, he did not consider Muslims to be at a disadvantage in the respondent’s workplace as he would make his needs known around his personal religious practice and they would be accommodated. For example, he would step out of meetings; say he was unavailable or book out religious holidays in advance as annual leave. 26 of 40 September 2023[231]The claimant accepts she did not make her needs known at the time of the meetings or shift allocation, only retrospectively, and expected the respondent to take the initiative and effectively pre-empt her needs, for example, by not setting meeting times for 6pm.[232]I do not consider that the PCP put Muslim employees at a particular disadvantage in circumstances where they have not made their needs known regarding the accommodations required to meet their personal religious observances.[233]This is particularly the case where personal practice varies across members of the same religion, here Islam, so could not have been reasonably anticipated without the employer making assumptions. .[234]I consider the onus in this context, where round the clock care is provided to vulnerable service users, is for the individual to set out what their religious needs are and then to ask for them to be reasonably accommodated by their employer. I accept Mr Bakare’s evidence that those accommodations were made when expressed.[235]To answer the claimant’s point that Christian holidays appeared to have greater recognition within the respondent, there was insufficient evidence to say this was because Dr Chenyika and Mrs Chenyika were Christians, rather than being because Christian holidays generally attract a greater degree of automatic recognition as they are reflected in the UK’s annual bank holidays.[236]For these reasons, the indirect religious discrimination claim fails. Victimisation[237]The protected act is said to be making a complaint on 24 August 2023 about a discrepancy in pay between overseas support workers and local support workers to Ms Baker.[238]It was undisputed that the claimant made this complaint by way of a WhatsApp text and that her pay was increased to £13.50. the respondent said this was not because of her complaint, the claimant says it was, and that it was backdated to 21 August 2024.[239]The WhatsApp message reads: “Hi Kiri…I am shocked…SG, Jocy, Demi are paid £12.31?? I am 12.50 with all the responsibilities [emoticon]”[240]I do not consider the sending of this message to be a protected act. There is an insufficient link to a breach of the EqA conveyed in this message; no protected characteristic or implicit reference to discrimination is made; what is communicated from the words of this message is a sense of unfairness about 27 of 40 September 2023 pay at this stage. The connection to discrimination came later arguably in the claimant’s grievance and more clearly in the claimant’s resignation letter.[241]In any event, I do not consider that that first investigation was because of the claimant’s complaint about pay on the 24 August 2024; rather it appears to be significantly influenced by the claimant reiterating to Mrs Chenyika that she would not reconsider her decision to step down from being a Senior. The first investigation took place the day after that with no documentary evidence to suggest it had been planned in advance of that.[242]The second investigation was significantly influenced by other matters, not the pay complaint made on 24 August 2024, as set out below. Whistleblowing - Protected disclosures (s.43B ERA 1996)[243]The claimant must first establish that her disclosures were “protected” for the purpose of s43B of the ERA.[244]There was no factual dispute about the events of the disclosures themselves at paragraph 5.1.1. They are as follows:5.1.1.1 On 30 January 2024 the claimant informed Ussmanne Balde via WhatsApp that a service user, MP, got locked in their home that day by Tanaka Hove, who did not first check that the home was empty.5.1.1.2 On 13 February 2024 the claimant emailed Samatha Borlace to say MP had been locked in the property and her report to Ussmanne Balde had not been actioned.5.1.1.3 In January 2024 in a verbal conversation to Ussmanne Balde the claimant informed him that bags of rubbish were being left in the garden by the designated smoking area which was a pest and fire hazard.5.1.1.4 On 20 March 2024 in an email to managers, Samantha Borlace and Leona Moss, copying in Sharon Chenyika and Tawana Chenyka, the claimant reiterated these same concerns about the rubbish.[245]I consider that each of the disclosures are sufficiently precise in identifying what was said, to whom and when.[246]Each disclosed information, rather than mere allegation; they were instances of what happened and what the claimant was concerned about in connection to the health and safety of service users.[247]I accept the claimant’s evidence that she believed that she was making the disclosures in the public interest. The rubbish disclosures, both subjectively and objectively raise a legitimate concern about the fire hazard and pest risk posed by having loose rubbish in the garden of a particular home of service users. Though related to one house, the concern is that the rubbish is an ongoing 28 of 40 September 2023 issue that has not been actioned. It could therefore affect others in the respondent’s care. Though not necessarily a numerically large group, these are vulnerable young adults for whom the respondent’s staff are particularly responsible to protect from such dangers, as they need help with daily living.[248]The nature of the wrongdoing is also within the scope of the public interest by virtue of the vulnerable status of service users and their having little recourse to ensure their safety other than rely on the respondent’s staff to safeguard it.[249]At the time of making the disclosure, the claimant subjectively believed the responsibility for bin replacement lay in the hands of her senior colleagues; this is supported by the fact that, once escalated, Mrs Chenyika was able to obtain a temporary bin and order a replacement bin from the Council swiftly.[250]Objectively, regarding the service user being locked in, I consider that these disclosures were also made in the public interest; the claimant wished to comply with requirements to report matters connected to the safety of service users and certainly in respect of 5.1.1.2 believed the health and safety of future service users was jeopardised by the respondent’s failure to adequately deal with the concern raised by her first disclosure to Mr Ussmanne.[251]As above, the service users were vulnerable adults and being locked in without a key, or way to get out, was a clear fire hazard and concern to them and other users. This is a clear connection to health and safety.[252]Each disclosure was made to either the claimant’s Senior, Mr Ussmanne, or more senior colleagues, namely her acting managers, copying in the respondent’s Director and Wife.[253]For these reasons, the disclosures were qualifying disclosures within the meaning of 43B of the ERA 1996. Whistleblowing – Detriment s.48 ERA 1996[254]A detriment is something that a reasonable worker would consider to be a disadvantage. I will first consider whether the events occurred and, if so, whether they are detriments. The second stage will be for me to consider whether any of the detriment were ‘because of’ one or more of the protected disclosures above.[255]The detriments alleged by the claimant are connected to the two themes of her disclosures; the rubbish (5.1.1.3 & 5.1.1.4) and MP being locked in (5.1.1.1 & 5.1.1.2). They are as follows: “Rubbish” disclosure i. Received an email from Takwana Chenyika telling the claimant the rubbish was her responsibility. 29 of 40 September 2023[256]It is agreed that a number of emails were sent from Dr Chenyika, as at paragraphs 86-90, following this disclosure, in which it was said that the rubbish issues were the claimant’s responsibility.[257]Given the inconsistency here with the other suggestion, which is to escalate the matter to her Senior (which she had already done), I do not accept that it was her responsibility. If it was, I consider Mr Ussmanne would have made that clear to her when she first raised the concern in January 2024.[258]Further, the issue appears to have only been resolved by Mrs Chenyika ordering a temporary bin, and then a replacement bin from the Council to follow 8 weeks later.[259]In these circumstances, I consider being told the rubbish was the claimant’s responsibility, to be a detriment. ii. In February 2024, the claimant was denied supervision twice with the Director.[260]I accept the claimant’s evidence that her supervision which was planned with Dr Chenyika did not take place. The claimant was not challenged otherwise and no evidence was presented to show that it did take place.[261]The claimant perceived this as negative treatment and whilst her personal experience is not determinative, I do consider not attending planned supervision would create a sense of avoidance, particularly where the person involved is of influence, namely the Director.[262]This is therefore a detriment. iii. The respondent failed to respond adequately to the claimant’s grievance raised on 7 March 2024, regarding her two disclosures.[263]The ‘locked in’ disclosure was initially received well by Ms Moss who thanked the claimant for escalating the concern. She offered to meet with the claimant to discuss the matter further and provide support.[264]After the claimant said she could not do the date offered, it appears that no alternative was offered and nothing further was done. Ultimately, she was investigated in respect of the locked in incident five months after it happened and three months after raising the respondent’s handling of it in her grievance.[265]I therefore consider that the respondent did fail to adequately respond to her disclosure about the locked in service user. It appears no further action would have been taken to escalate the matter if the claimant had not persisted in following it up.[266]Regarding the rubbish disclosure, it was unchallenged that Mr Ussmanne did not escalate the concern. The email exchange between the claimant, Dr Chenyika and Mrs Chenyika suggests that there was a misunderstanding about whether the claimant had first raised the matter with Mr Ussmanne and a 30 of 40 September 2023 criticism of her copying in the recipients she had, citing the need to avoid involvement with external bodies.[267]Because it was clear that the claimant had already attempted to resolve the rubbish concern with Mr Ussmanne two months earlier, as per the procedure, this response does seem inadequate; it suggests more of a concern with how the company may be perceived, than an appreciation that it is right for employees to escalate genuine concerns where a matter of health and safety is in issue.[268]I do consider that 6.1.3 is made out on the facts and is a detriment. iv. Management ignored the claimant’s concerns about the rubbish.[269]This is a duplication of 6.1.3 and I do not consider it to be a separate v. From 5 April 2024, Ms Moss started to ask the claimant to attend 1-1 meetings with a note-keeper.[270]On 5 April 2024 itself the claimant was required to attend a 1-1 meeting with a note-keeper. I have not found there were other requests beyond that meeting.[271]However, in the context of the disclosures having been made; the email responses to them; the confusion around the claimant being allocated to be a Key Worker and the fact that the purpose of the 1-1 meeting was not explained to the claimant, despite her request, I do consider this request to be a detriment. vi. From 20 April 2024 the claimant was blocked from Birdie.[272]It was accepted by the respondent in oral evidence (there was no mention in the respondent’s written evidence) that the claimant was blocked from Birdie; the reason for this was contested. I did not accept the respondent’s account that this was for her own well-being whilst she was on sick leave, as she was blocked prior to taking that sick leave.[273]I therefore consider it more likely that the claimant was blocked from Birdie to prevent her having access to information held by the respondent as they did not trust her and how she might use that information.[274]This is because the blocking comes after her grievance is raised; after the 1-1 meeting request and in the context of irritation at multiple events, i) the rubbish disclosure on 20 March 2024 and ii) refusing to be a Key Worker as requested by Mr Ussmanne and later Dr Chenyika, which became characterised as a failure to obey a managerial instruction, one of the focuses of the second investigation.[275]The blocking caused the claimant practical difficulties in accessing what she needed to complete her work for 8 out of 12 service users and I do find it was a detriment. 31 of 40 September 2023 vii. The claimant was initially discouraged from being accompanied at the second investigation on 18 June 2024.[276]The claimant was initially discouraged to bring her Trade Union representative, as was her right, because it was suggested one was not necessary at this stage. That was incorrect as its own policies permitted employees to be accompanied to investigation meetings.[277]There is no evidence to suggest this was deliberate discouragement but, given the claimant’s previous experience of the investigation process, and not having the benefit of a representative despite wanting one on that occasion, I do consider this initial discouragement amounted to a detriment. The claimant went off sick the same day, indicating it contributed to her feelings of stress and anxiety at that time. viii. Held an investigation meeting against the claimant on 18 June 2024.[278]I do consider attending an investigation amounts to a detriment; the claimant was facing three accusations for which she had to answer, and which most employees would consider a stressful process. “Locked in” disclosure[279]The remaining factual events that have not already been dealt with are raised in connection to the ‘locked in’ disclosure as follows: i. Mr Ussmanne failed to escalate her concerns as Tanaka Hove is the director’s nephew.[280]This was hearsay evidence based on an oral conversation between the claimant and Mr Ussmanne. No statement from Mr Ussmanne was before me. The claimant did not mention this concern in her grievance or in the second investigation, according to the minutes taken.[281]I therefore consider I have insufficient evidence to find that this took place as described, though I do accept Mr Ussmanne failed to action the claimant’s concern, leading to her escalating it on 13 February 2024. ii. On 22 March 2024, Tanaka Hove was unpleasant in a phone call to the claimant, accusing her of complaining about him to CQC.[282]It is accepted that a telephone call was made by Mr Hove and the subject matter was his belief that the claimant complained about him to CQC regarding the locked in incident, which the claimant denied doing. Given the nature of Mr Hove’s concern I find it probable that he was perceived as unpleasant in that call by the claimant and is likely to have used an accusatory tone.[283]I have accepted that Mr Hove was the respondent’s relative, and in any event certainly believed by the claimant to be at the time the call was received. 32 of 40 September 2023 Given the claimant felt concern that the locked in incident had not been adequately resolved by this stage, I do consider receiving a call in these circumstances to be a detriment. iii. Ms Moss did not provide the support for her concerns offered to the claimant in her email dated 13 February 2024.[284]This is a duplication of 6.1.10 and I do not consider it to be a separate “On the ground that”[285]I now ask myself whether the claimant has established facts from which I could conclude that that any one or more of the detriments I have identified were done on the ground that the claimant made any of the protected disclosures at 5.1.1.[286]The disclosure(s) need not be the sole or principle reason for the detriment but must have materially influenced the respondent’s decision or action. The disclosures need to have been an operative cause for the detriment.[287]Here the facts I consider to be relevant are: i. Dr Chenyika’s email thread, as it clearly conveys a sense of disapproval and irritation at the claimant escalating her concerns about the rubbish. ii. Dr Chenyika writes: “I have copied in HR I see that you have written emails before regarding different things and could you put all your issues formally with HR in one email and state if you want this to be handled as a formal grievance, otherwise as has been happening we don't want issues which we have not been given a chance to deal with going to external bodies as this is against both our complaints policy and grievance and whistle blowing policy.”[288]This conveys firstly a sense of his concern about whistleblowing more widely and of such internal concerns being passed on to external bodies.[289]It also shows he is aware of, and has in mind, the “different things” and “all your issues” of what has gone before. Looking at the chronology, the other issues raised at this point is the locked in incident and potentially the pay discrepancy, though the latter took place further back in time. iv. The claimant’s refusal to be MY’s Key Worker was not appreciated by the respondent and felt to be a refusal of a management order. It is more likely than not, given that Dr Chenyika himself was asking the claimant to prepare reports in connection to this role, that he felt irritated and inconvenienced by the claimant’s refusal to be a key worker, expressed one week before this. v. The timing of the first investigation with the claimant’s refusal to Mrs Chenyika to remain a Senior Support Worker does suggest the 33 of 40 September 2023 respondent is capable of retaliating by way of investigation where the claimant refuses a management request or desire. vi. Mr Hove called the claimant two days after the email exchange saying he believed CQC had received a complaint about him regarding the ‘locked in’ incident and that he believed the claimant made the complaint. If correct, it is likely that he would have informed Dr Chenyika about this at the time received, and Dr Chenyika would therefore have been aware of this also. vii. Ms Quinn confirmed HR would not make the decision about who to investigate. She said she did not know who did. On the balance of probabilities this is likely to have been the most senior management staff Dr Chenyika, in discussion with Mrs Chenyika. Any HR staff or admin staff, such as Ms Moss would be acting under their direction.[290]I reiterate the disclosures were not the sole cause of the detriments that followed – indeed the actions were significantly influenced also by the claimant’s refusal to be MY’s key worker.[291]The detriments I exclude from this are 6.2.7 and 6.1.15: I do not consider the initial discouragement from being accompanied at the second investigation meeting to be on the grounds of either disclosure; it is equally likely to be a misunderstanding of the internal process by Denzil rather than a deliberate discouragement.[292]The burden of proof now shifts to the respondent to show that the detriments were for a wholly unrelated reason.[293]The phone call from Mr Hove is clearly connected to the disclosure about rubbish.[294]Regarding the others, the respondent chose not to call Dr Chenyika or Ms Moss to give evidence about its reasons.[295]Ms Quinn’s evidence and Mr Bakare’s evidence could not assist on any of the detriments at 6.1.3-6.1.8 and 6.1.10 - 6.1.16.[296]Regarding the second investigation on 12 June 2024, the cited reasons were the refusal to be Key Worker; the locked in incident and the claimant’s role in that; and training discrepancies.[297]There was no evidence to suggest this investigation was planned prior to 20 March 2024 when the ‘triggering’ email was sent by the claimant regarding the rubbish.[298]I consider that the topics for investigation were in themselves legitimate. However, the decision to investigate the claimant just five days after she raised her formal grievance on 25 March 2024 suggests a clear temporal link with the grievance, and the concerns mentioned in the email thread of 20 March 2024. 34 of 40 September 2023[299]There was no evidence to suggest the decision to investigate was taken prior to this.[300]Therefore, the respondent has not established that its decision to investigate the claimant for a second time was wholly unrelated to the disclosures.[301]For these reasons, I consider the respondent had not discharged its evidential burden to establish that the detriments from 20 March 2024 (save where excluded) were not materially influenced by the clamant making the two disclosures.[302]The public disclosure detriment claim therefore succeeds.
Conclusion
[303]In conclusion, the claim for direct race and/or religious discrimination fails; the claim for victimisation fails as does the claim for indirect religious discrimination.[304]The claims for indirect race discrimination and whistleblowing (public disclosure detriment) succeed.[305]A remedy hearing will need to be listed; a separate case management order will be promulgated about that. Parties are free to settle the matter if able in the meantime. Approved by: Employment Judge McCooey 3 December 202505/12/2025 Annex – List of Issues 1. The issues the Tribunal will decide are set out below. 35 of 40 September 2023[306]Direct race and/or religion discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13) - The claimant describes her race as White European and compares her treatment with black African or Zimbabwean support workers. - The claimant describes her religion as Muslim and compares her treatment with Christian support workers. i. Pay the claimant a lower rate of pay compared to black African or Zimbabwean support workers, namely £11 compared to £12.31 from 25 January 2024. ii. Not offer the claimant the community work referred to in para 25 of the respondent’s response, whereas black African (or Zimbabwean) Christian support workers were. - Was that less favourable treatment? The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether they were treated worse than someone else would have been treated. The claimant says they were treated worse than Jocelyn, Noni, Demi, Tanaka and Wesley. - If so, was it because of race and/or religion - Did the respondent’s treatment amount to a detriment?[307]Indirect race discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 19) - A “PCP” is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the following PCP: i. Paying employees on a “support visa” a higher hourly rate than support workers not on a visa. - Did the respondent apply the PCP to the claimant? - Did the respondent apply the PCP to black African or Zimbabwean support workers or would it have done so? 36 of 40 September 2023 - Did the PCP put White European support workers at a particular disadvantage when compared with black African or Zimbabwean support workers - Did the PCP put the claimant at that disadvantage? - Was the PCP a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were: i. Staff on sponsorship visas are on a higher salary. That higher salary is set at a minimum level by the Home Office. Sponsorship staff [Enhanced Support Staff] have additional responsibilities in comparison to regular staff. Their additional responsibilities are factored into their roles due to their salary being higher. - The Tribunal will decide in particular: i. was the PCP an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims; ii. could something less discriminatory have been done instead; iii. how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced?[308]Indirect religious discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 19) - A “PCP” is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the following PCP: i. A procedure which meant that Muslim employees were required to work, such as attend meetings, during their religious holidays and/or times when they might ordinarily pray. - Did the respondent apply the PCP to the claimant? The claimant says this was applied to her on: i. On or around 21 March 2024 where she was required to attend two meetings at 6pm during Ramadan, one with the Director and one with Mr Nasan. ii. 19 April 2024 where she was required to work a shift the day before Eid; - Did the respondent apply the PCP to non-Muslim support workers or would it have done so? - Did the PCP put Muslim support workers at a particular disadvantage when compared with non-Muslim support workers. - Did the PCP put the claimant at that disadvantage? 37 of 40 September 2023 - Was the PCP a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were: i. [TBC] - The Tribunal will decide in particular: i. was the PCP an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims; ii. could something less discriminatory have been done instead; iii. how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced?[309]Victimisation (Equality Act 2010 section 27) - Did the claimant do a protected act as follows: i. Make a complaint on 24 August 2023 about a discrepancy in pay between overseas support workers and local support workers to Kira Baker Kent (her Line Manager). She says overseas colleagues were paid £12.31 and local support workers were paid £10.50. Her pay was then increased to £13.50, backdated from 21 August 2023. i. Require the claimant to attend two investigation meetings for minor issues on:
Conclusion
[1]First investigation meeting on 11 January 2024 regarding i) an incident that took place on 11 November 2023 at 227 Basingstoke Road; ii) misuse of a company vehicle and iii) completing reports for others/giving out her work password.[2]Second investigation meeting on 18 June 2024 regarding i) refusal of a reasonable instruction from management ii) safeguarding breach relating to Tanaka Hove iii) Training discrepancies. - By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment? - If so, was it because the claimant did the protected act on 24 August 2023? 310. Protected disclosure 38 of 40 September 2023 - Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide: i. What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant says they made disclosures on these occasions:
Conclusion
[1]On 30 January 2024 the claimant informed Ussmanne Balde via WhatsApp that a service user, MP, got locked in their home that day by Tanaka Hove, who did not first check that the home was empty.[2]On 13 February 2024 the claimant emailed Samatha Borlace to say MP had been locked in the property and her report to Ussmanne Balde had not been actioned.[3]In January 2024 in a verbal conversation to Ussmanne Balde the claimant informed him that bags of rubbish were being left in the garden by the designated smoking area which was a pest and fire hazard.[4]On 20 March 2024 in an email to managers, Samantha Borlace and Leona Moss, copying in Sharon Chenyika and Tawana Chenyka, the claimant reiterated these same concerns about the rubbish. ii. Did they disclose information? iii. Did they believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest? iv. Was that belief reasonable? v. Did they believe it tended to show that: 1. the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered; vi. Was that belief reasonable? - If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer. 311. Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 48) “Rubbish” disclosure i. Received an email from Takwana Cheryal telling the claimant the rubbish was her responsibility; ii. In February 2024, the claimant was denied supervision twice with the Director. 39 of 40 September 2023 iii. The respondent failed to respond adequately to the claimant’s grievance raised on 7 March 2024, regarding her two disclosures. iv. Management ignored the claimant’s concerns about the rubbish. v. From 5 April 2024, Ms Moss started to ask the claimant to attend 1-1 meetings with a note-keeper. vi. From 20 April 2024 the claimant was blocked from Birdie. vii. The claimant was initially discouraged from being accompanied at the second investigation on 18 June 2024. viii. Held an investigation meeting against the claimant on 18 June 2024. “Locked in” disclosure ix. Mr Ussmanne failed to escalate her concerns as Tanaka Hove is the director’s nephew. x. The respondent failed to respond adequately to the claimant’s grievance raised on 7 March 2024, regarding her two disclosures. xi. On 22 March 2024, Tanaka Hove was unpleasant in a phone call to the claimant, accusing her of complaining about him to CQC. xii. From 5 April 2024, Ms Moss started to ask the claimant to attend 1-1 meetings with a note-keeper. xiii. Ms Moss did not provide the support for her concerns offered to the claimant in her email dated 13 February 2024. xiv. From 20 April 2024 the claimant was blocked from Birdie. xv. The claimant was initially discouraged from being accompanied at the second investigation on 18 June 2024. xvi. Held an investigation meeting against the claimant on 18 June 2024. - By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment? - If so, was it done on the ground that they made a protected disclosure? 40 of 40 September 2023 Case Number: 6009247/2024 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mrs G Gharabli Respondent: Cedar Hope Care Services Ltd Heard at: Reading in public by CVP On: 3 March 2026 Before: Employment Judge McCooey Appearances For the claimant: In person For the respondent: Mr Aimufua, Litigation Consultant REMEDYJUDGMENT
Conclusion
[1]Liability in this case was determined at a final hearing in October and November 2025.[2]The claimant succeeded in complaints of whistleblowing detriment and indirect race discrimination.[3]This hearing was listed to consider and determine remedy. The Tribunal awards compensation as set out below. i. An award for injury to feelings of £10,000. ii. Financial losses of £2,236.54 net, incurred over a period of February 2023 to June 2024 iii. Interest on injury to feelings of £1,937.76 calculated at a rate of 8% (midway point of October 23, the total period being 2 years, 5 months and 2 days)[4]Total award payable (including interest) is £14,174.30. This award is payable within 14 days of the date that this Judgment is sent to the parties. Approved by: