Mr V Zoric v MOL Tankship Management Pte Ltd and MOL (Europe Africa) Ltd: 6009229/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6009229/2025

Between

Mr V ZoricClaimant

MOL Tankship Management Pte Ltd and MOL (Europe Africa) LtdRespondent

Before

Tribunal Judge R Overton

In person for claimant

Date 23 July 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s application for interim relief under sections 128-129 Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’) in relation to his claim for automatic unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A ERA fails and is dismissed.

REASONS

[2]Oral reasons having been given to the parties on 25 June 2025, written reasons were requested in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024. The following reasons are provided:

[3]The claimant has made an application for interim relief against two respondents. The claim was made within the appropriate time limits and the respondents were appropriately notified.

[4]The claim was made 17 March 2025 with the application for interim relief being made on 2 April 2025 which was within seven days of the effective date of termination of the claimant’s employment of 26 March 2025. The respondents resist the claimant’s application.

[5]The respondents provided me with a bundle of documents of 367 pages, four witness statements, a skeleton argument and a reading list. The respondents’ witness statements were from(1) Kerry Hawthorne, Fleet Personnel Manager of the 1st respondent and the claimant’s line manager;

(2) Juolroy Pereira, General Manager of the 1st respondent and the claimant’s line manager;

(3) Rin Nitta, Director - General Affairs and Human Resources of the 2nd respondent and Designated Whistleblowing Officer appointed to investigate the claimant’s complaints and

(4) Brian King, Senior Adviser of the 1st respondent, former line manager of the claimant and witness to the investigation into the claimant’s complaints. Mr Zoric provided a bundle of documents and his own witness statement with a supplementary statement.

[6]In addition to the witness statements, the skeleton argument and the documents identified in the Respondent’s reading list, I also read the documents the claimant referred me to at the outset of the hearing. I heard submissions from the claimant and the respondents.

[7]The Claimant relies in his claim on three alleged protected disclosures which he says are linked to his dismissal by the respondents by way of a repudiatory breach of contract which caused the claimant to resign. The claimant’s claim is brought under s.103A Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’) and I bear in mind that in order to succeed at a full hearing it will be necessary for the Claimant to prove that he made protected and qualifying disclosures and that additionally, the sole or principal reason for his dismissal was the making of one or more of the disclosures. He will also have to prove that one or other of the respondents had made a fundamental breach of the employment contract by reason of his protected disclosure, that the claimant was entitled to treat the contract as at an end and that he resigned in response to the breach and has not affirmed the contract.

[8]The test for the ET is whether the Claimant is ‘likely to succeed’ on all of the issues necessary to establish the claim – this is a high standard – requiring a significantly higher degree of likelihood than the “more likely than not” test. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

[9]I was not required to conduct a mini-trial and my task was to conduct a summary or review-type assessment of the materials available to me in reaching my decision, consistent with the approach suggested in Raja v SS for Justice

UKEAT/0364/09/CEA

:- “25. What a Tribunal has to do in an application for interim relief is to examine the material put before it, listen to submissions and decide whether at the final hearing on the merits “that it is likely that” that Tribunal will find that the reason or reasons for the dismissal is one or more of those listed in section 129(1).”

[10]As such, the witnesses did not give oral evidence and it was not tested in cross-examination, consistent with the purpose of sections 128-129 ERA 1996 and the authorities as to the Tribunal’s proper function in determining such applications.

[11]In assessing whether the Claimant was entitled to relief under sections 128-129 ERA 1996 the Tribunal must decide whether it appears, at this early stage, on the materials presented, that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in his s.103A ERA 1996 claim at a final hearing, which includes succeeding as to each of the constituent parts of that claim. See: Taplin v C Shippam Ltd

[1978] ICR 1068

, EAT, followed in Dandpat v University of Bath

UKEAT/0408/09

and London City Airport v Chacko

[2013] IRLR 61

, EAT.

[12]In London City Airport v Chacko the EAT tells us at paragraph 23 that “The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The employment judge must do the best he can with such material as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases. The employment judge is then required to make as good an assessment as he is promptly able of whether the claimant is likely to succeed in a claim for unfair dismissal based on one of the relevant grounds. The relevant statutory test is not whether the claimant is ultimately likely to succeed in his or her complaint to the employment tribunal but whether it ‘appears to the tribunal’ . . . ‘that it is likely’”.

[13]The claimant contends that he made qualifying and protected disclosures as follows: On 1 August 2024 by email to to Mr Quenton Robinson, Partner at Ashurst LLP, the Claimant stated, “I must report malpractices being done within the Company – MOL Tankship Management Pte (London Branch) as per below. 1. forgery of the Environmental Internal Audit 2023 2. retroactive editing of the report within Shipnet 3. Forgery of the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) Quarterly Report Q2 2023.”

[14]Looking at a whistleblowing claim, the claimant must show that it is likely or there is a pretty good chance the Tribunal hearing the substantive case will find that the claimant made the disclosure to the employer (in this case, that is accepted by the respondent), (2) that the claimant believed that disclosure tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged (3) that the claimant believed that the disclosure was made in the public interest, (4) that those beliefs were reasonable, and (5) that the disclosure was the principal cause of the treatment that caused the claimant to resign. The claimant must also show that the treatment complained of was a fundamental breach of contract sufficiently serious to amount to a repudiatory breach of contract.

[15]As well as the language of the statute itself, I reminded myself of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Kilraine v LB Wandsworth

[2018] ICR 1850

as to what amounts to a disclosure of information within the statutory language. A disclosure needs to have sufficient factual content and specificity as to be able to be deemed to be capable of showing one of the matters listed in section 43B(1) ERA 1996. I am entitled however to have regard to the relevant context in determining sufficiency, which may include other communications and industry or sector specific common knowledge.

[16]The disclosures which the Claimant says he made to the 1st respondent were in the context of regulation of the shipping industry and monitoring its environmental impact, which is a highly technical and specialised area.

[17]It is trite law that in order to have the requisite reasonable belief provided for in the statute, it is not necessary for the Claimant to be right or correct in what he believes: Babula v Waltham Forest College

[2007] ICR 1026

. However, the belief must be subjectively genuinely held and objectively reasonable: Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed

[2018] ICR 731

, CA. The Chesterton decision is also a clear reminder of the proper approach to be taken to the public interest element of the wording in s.43B(1) ERA 1996.

[18]As part of unfair dismissal law, an interim relief application may only be made by employees. I have been offered no evidence today as to the employment relationship between the claimant and the 2nd respondent and I note that the 1st respondent has accepted that the claimant was its employee. I therefore find that the claimant has failed to show that he is pretty likely to persuade the Tribunal that he was an employee of the 2nd respondent and his claim for interim relief against the 2nd respondent fails and is dismissed.

[19]On my summary assessment, looking at the key documents in the time I have had, I cannot say that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in establishing that he made qualifying and protected disclosures. Even if I were to take the Claimant’s case on having made the disclosures that he says he made to the respondents at its absolute highest, I am not satisfied that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in establishing that his disclosure of information tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be endangered or that he had a reasonable belief that his disclosures did so. The pretty good chance test applies to each and every element of the claim and so this would be fatal to an application for interim relief.

[20]I considered all of the arguments and submissions made, for which I was very grateful, and summarise the key reasons for my conclusion as follows:(i) The audit in allegation 1 was an internal audit drafted by the claimant and others which found no major issues of non- compliance by either respondent but which made ‘observations’ and suggested some measures for improvement. The audit was for the respondents’ knowledge and information, it had no legal standing. Changes were made to the audit report, but there was no indication that serious non-conformity or non-compliance was being hidden as the authors of the report (including the claimant) had not identified any such issues. There was no evidence that the disclosure made by the claimant tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged and objectively it appeared to me that the claimant had no reasonable belief that his disclosure did so.

(ii) Some of that internal audit/report referred to in (i) ‘disappeared’ for a period from the 1st respondent’s internal database (‘Shipnet’) - what the claimant refers to as ‘retroactive editing’ - although the original report had reappeared on the database by the time of the claimant’s disclosure. This disappearance of part of the report forms the information of the 2nd disclosure but I am not persuaded that the claimant will have a pretty good chance of showing that his disclosure tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged or that he had a reasonable belief that his disclosure did so.

(iii) The clamant did not disclose in what ways the SEEMP quarterly report had been ‘forged’. A Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) is a mandatory document recording the ship’s plan for improving its fuel efficiency and minimising the environmental impact. On the evidence I had before me I concluded that the SEEMP quarterly report was an internal document about the SEEMP. It was not the SEEMP itself. Based on the evidence I have seen during the hearing, I cannot say that the claimant has a pretty good chance of establishing that his disclosure that an internal report which may not be accurate in respects that were not specified in the disclosure, tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged and I was not persuaded that the claimant had a pretty good chance of persuading a Tribunal that he had a reasonable belief that his disclosure did so.

[21]Based on the evidence I had before me today, I cannot say that the prospects of success are so high that I can say he has a pretty good chance of establishing each and every one of the necessary elements of his claims and therefore the claimant does not meet the threshold to be granted interim relief and I dismiss the application.

[22]I have not made any binding findings of fact and it remains for the Tribunal which hears this claim to reach its own findings and conclusions independently of my summary assessment at this early stage. Approved by: Tribunal Judge Overton 23 July 2025 Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of the written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/ Case Number: 6009229/2025 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mr V Zoric Respondents:(1) MOL Tankship Management Pte. Ltd

(2) MOL (Europe Africa) Limited

[1]The claimant’s application dated 3 July 2025 for reconsideration of the judgment refusing the claimant interim relief, given orally at the hearing and sent with reasons to the parties on 11 August 2025, is refused.

[2]There is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked, because the claimant has not demonstrated that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. The judgment is confirmed.

[1]By Rule 69 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (‘the Procedure Rules’) the Employment Tribunal may reconsider a judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the judgment may be confirmed, varied or revoked.

[2]An application for reconsideration must be presented in writing (and copied to all other parties) within 14 days of the date upon which the written record of the original decision was sent to the parties. In this case the written record was the judgment and reasons dated 23 July 2025 which was sent to the parties on 11 August 2025. The claimant submitted an 11-page document setting out his application for reconsideration on 3 July 2025. The application was made in time.

[3]Under rule 68 of the Procedure Rules, a judgment will only be reconsidered where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. This gives an Employment Tribunal a broad discretion to determine whether Case Number: 6009229/2025 2 reconsideration is appropriate in the circumstances. The discretion must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.

[4]The procedure upon a reconsideration application is for the Employment Judge that heard the case to consider the application and determine if there are reasonable prospects of the judgment being varied or revoked. This is a reviewing function. Reconsideration cannot be ordered simply because the applicant disagrees with the judgment.

[5]My role, when considering the application on the papers initially, is therefore to operate as a filter to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked were the matter to be the subject of a reconsideration hearing.

[6]Having considered the application, I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being revoked or varied.

[7]Mr Zoric has given his grounds for reconsideration as: Ground 1: Prior Procedural Mismanagement and Interference by Respondents Ground 2: Failure to Consider Relevant Evidence and Procedural Irregularities During the Hearing Ground 3: Misapprehension of Regulatory Framework and Findings Made Without Supporting Evidence Ground 4: Relevant Additional Information: Detrimental Treatment Overlooked Ground 5: Additional Aspects of Employment

[8]Ground 1 is an argument about delay in the Employment Tribunal hearing the interim relief application. This does not impact upon the decision I had to reach at the interim relief hearing which was whether it is likely that, at a final hearing, the reason or principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal will be found to have been the making of a protected disclosure (s.129(1) Employment Rights Act 1996).

[9]Ground 2 relates to the evidence before me at the interim relief hearing. Mr Zoric argues that the respondent referred me to few of the claimant’s documents. However, at the outset of the interim relief hearing, the claimant referred me to the documents he wished me to read and I read the documents I was referred to by both parties.

[10]Mr Zoric argues that he had insufficient notice of the respondent’s skeleton argument. The parties had complied with the Tribunal’s directions. There had been no direction to the parties to produce or exchange skeleton Case Number: 6009229/2025 3 arguments, none the less, the respondent opted to produce one and shared it with the claimant on the morning of the hearing, before the hearing started. A skeleton argument is sometimes produced by one or both parties in the Employment Tribunal which, if used, should set out the relevant law for the benefit of the Tribunal and should then summarise the key points in that party’s case which are then elaborated on during oral submissions. Both parties made oral submissions and the skeleton argument allowed the claimant to know, some hours in advance, what the respondent’s position was so he could amend or add to his planned oral submissions accordingly. The claimant did not produce a skeleton argument so the first notice the respondent would have had of the claimant’s arguments was when he delivered them orally during the hearing. The sharing of the respondent’s skeleton argument was not a procedural irregularity and it did not disadvantage the claimant.

[11]Both parties had the opportunity to put forward the documents they wished me to consider and put forward witness statements they wished me to read. Both parties made oral submissions. It appears to me that Mr Zoric now seeks to give further evidence as to the respondent’s credibility and seeks to refer me to other documents in the bundle that he had not referred me to at the interim relief hearing. I have concluded that the claimant’s application, in part, seeks to re-open matters on which he had the opportunity to make submissions at the original hearing. Achieving finality in litigation is part of a fair and just process and that includes finality in respect of interim relief applications. Raising a question as to the respondent’s witnesses’ credibility and the other points made by the claimant under ground b) of his application for reconsideration does not impact upon my decision that “[e]ven if I were to take the Claimant’s case on having made the disclosures that he says he made to the respondents at its absolute highest, I am not satisfied that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in establishing that his disclosure of information tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be endangered or that he had a reasonable belief that his disclosures did so”.

[12]My task at the interim relief hearing was to make a broad summary assessment on the material available, doing the best I could with the untested evidence from both parties, to enable me to make a prediction about what was likely to happen at the full hearing. By its nature, an interim relief hearing is not designed to be a deep dive into each and every factual point of contention between the parties.

[13]Ground 3 concerns the claimant’s argument that I have misunderstood the legal obligation of maritime shipping companies to comply with the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). Mr Zoric states that his protected disclosure concerned non-compliance with SEEMP reporting obligations, which are not internal procedural preferences, but are mandatory international legal requirements. Mr Zoric here contradicts the witness statement of Mr King of the respondent’s witnesses, which states that the report which was the subject of the claimant’s disclosure was an internal report only. In reaching my decision, I considered Mr Zoric’s witness statements, the respondent’s witness statements and the relevant documents in the bundles. I also asked both parties for further information Case Number: 6009229/2025 4 to help me understand what the SEEMP was. On the evidence before me I concluded Mr Zoric did not have a pretty good chance of showing that his disclosure about the SEEMP report tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged and I was not persuaded that the claimant had a pretty good chance of persuading a Tribunal that he had a reasonable belief that his disclosure did so. Mr Zoric had the opportunity to bring evidence to persuade me otherwise but I preferred the contrary evidence. Disagreeing with my decision is not a ground for reconsideration.

[14]The claimant’s ground 4 concerns the detriments he says he experienced as a result of making protected disclosures. My decision concerning the interim relief application was that, upon my summary assessment of his ‘whistleblowing’ claim, Mr Zoric did not have a pretty good chance of showing that his disclosures tended to show that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged or that he had a reasonable belief that his disclosure did so. I did not need to proceed to look at the detriments. This ground is not relevant to my decision on the application for interim relief.

[15]Mr Zoric’s ground 5 also deals with detriments following Mr Zoric’s disclosures. For the same reasons as stated above, this ground is not relevant to my decision on the interim relief as my decision rests on my summary assessment of Zoric’s prospects of proving all the necessary elements of a protected, qualifying disclosure.

[16]As explained at the interim relief hearing, the sole question in an application for interim relief is whether it is likely that, at a final hearing, the reason or principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal will be found to have been the making of a protected disclosure (s.129(1) Employment Rights Act 1996). The Tribunal hearing an interim relief application must decide whether the Claimant has a ‘pretty good chance of success’ which is a significantly higher degree of likelihood than considering whether it is more likely than not that the claim will succeed (the standard of proof which applies at the final hearing).

[17]I find that Mr Zoric has not shown that it is necessary in the interests of justice for the judgment to be reconsidered. Approved by: Tribunal Judge Overton sitting as an Employment Judge Dated: 29 September 2025