P Loughlin v Arc Hospitality Recruitment Solutions Ltd and Wembley National Stadium Ltd: 6009133/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6009133/2024
Between
P LoughlinClaimantArc Hospitality Recruitment Solutions Ltd and Wembley National Stadium LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge IllingIn person for claimantDate 22 July 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaint of direct disability discrimination against the first respondent is not well-founded and is dismissed.[2]The complaint of unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability against the first respondent is not well-founded and is dismissed[3]The complaint of harassment related to disability is not well-founded and is dismissed.[4]The claimant was not an employee or worker of the second respondent at the relevant time. The second respondent was not a principal to the Claimant nor an agent of the principal. The claims of Direct Disability Discrimination, Discrimination for something arising out of disability and Harassment because of the protected characteristic of disability are therefore dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine them. Approved by:[1]The complaint of direct disability discrimination against the first Respondent is not well-founded and is dismissed.[2]The complaint of unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability against the first Respondent is not well-founded and is dismissed[3]The complaint of harassment related to disability is not well-founded and is dismissed.[4]The claimant was not an employee or worker of the second respondent at the relevant time. The second respondent was not a principal to the Claimant nor an agent of the principal. The claims of Direct Disability Discrimination, Discrimination for something arising out of disability and Harassment because of the protected characteristic of disability are therefore dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine them. JUDGMENT with summary reasons was given at the hearing on 22 July 2026 and written summary reasons were requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules on 28 July 2026. However, the Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to provide written full reasons and the following written full reasons are therefore provided: All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written full reasons for judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s). If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/
REASONS
[1]Early conciliation for this claim began on 27 June 2024 and ended on 08 August 2024 in relation to the first respondent.[2]Early conciliation for this claim began on 31 July 2024 and ended on 12 August 2024 in relation to the second respondent.[3]The claim was issued on 21 August 2024 against both respondents.[4]The Claimant was engaged between 15 May 2023 and 14 June 2024 and states, in her ET1, that her role was cannon fodder. She was engaged to provide hospitality services, and she worked up to 10-hours per week.[5]There was a disability impact statement ordered in the Case Management Orders of 22 August 2025. Further particulars of the claim and details of the Claimant’s impairments in response to these Orders were received by the Tribunal on 11 September 2025.[6]A preliminary hearing for case management was listed before Employment Judge Chudleigh on 30 January 2026 and the case management orders, including the list of issues was sent to the parties on 24 March 2026.[7]Employment Judge Chudleigh permitted the amendment of the claim to include the following issue as an allegation of direct disability discrimination, being issue 3.1.1.7: When the Claimant was crying and talking to medical staff, one of the two team leaders said that she had seen the Claimant before, and the Claimant was “not all there”[8]This issue 3.1.1.7 remained subject to a decision in relation to whether it was just and equitable to extend the time limit for this complaint.[9]At this hearing, whilst it is not recorded in the case management orders, I have been informed that the Claimant was given the opportunity to add a third respondent, being Delaware North Companies (UK) Limited, but decided not to do so.
The hearing
[10]The bundle amounted to 176 pages and I heard evidence from the following witnesses: 10.1. The Claimant; 10.2. Mr Paul Marcinkowski Director and co-owner for the first respondent; and 10.3. Mr Paul Scannell (Head of Experiences) for the second respondent.[11]The Claimant’s claim is for disability discrimination. There are also issues in relation to her employment status and whether the complaint that was added to this claim on 30 January 2024 is within time. Conduct of the Hearing[12]The hearing was conducted by video.[13]At the outset of the hearing, adjustments were discussed and the hearing would proceed on the basis that there would be regular breaks and, if required, the Claimant could ask for additional breaks. Additionally, the Claimant asked for her to be addressed by her first name, which everyone did.[14]The list of issues as detailed by Employment Judge Chudleigh in the Case Management Orders as sent to the Parties on 30 January 2026 were confirmed and amended to include the issue of time limits for the additional complaint.[15]The respondents accepted that the Claimant had the impairment, which is Autistic Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), but denied that she was a disabled person. Date of knowledge also remained an issue for this hearing to determine.[16]At the beginning of the hearing, the Parties confirmed that they had the bundles. The Claimant asked for some additional documents to be included in the bundle as she said that they were relevant. These were included at the back of the bundle.[17]Written reasons having been requested, the Claimant will be referred to as the Claimant throughout this document.
Findings of fact
[18]I make my findings of fact on the balance of probabilities taking into account all of the evidence, both documentary and oral, which was admitted at the hearing. I do not set out in this judgement all of the evidence which I heard but only my principal findings of fact, those necessary to enable me to reach conclusions on the remaining issues. Where it was necessary to resolve conflicting factual accounts, I have done so by making a judgment about the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses I have heard based upon their overall consistency and the consistency of accounts given on different occasions when set against contemporaneous documents where they exist.[19]The following subheadings are for ease of reference only.
Background
[20]The first respondent is an event staffing agency. It supplies workers on a casual basis to venues and operates in the hospitality, retail, sport, and tourism sectors. Mr Marcinkowski explained that the first respondent does not supply workers to the second respondent, it supplies workers to a third party, Delaware North Companies (UK) Limited. (“Delaware North”)[21]The first respondent recruits, engages and pays the workers supplied to Delaware North. Under the agreement with Delaware North, it is responsible for the day-to-day management of workers during events at any specific location, which in this case is at the second respondent’s location, being Wembley Stadium.[22]The first respondent denies providing any management of the team at the concession area in which the Claimant was working on the date of the incident being 18 May 2024. This area was the 509 Bar and Kitchen Kiosk (“the Kiosk”). I accept this evidence.[23]The first respondent engages workers by first requiring them to complete an induction form. Once the individual is accepted, they are provided with access to details of shifts on an app on a platform called Ubeya. Whilst the Claimant had access to the app, she was free to apply for shifts and free to decline shifts. I accept this evidence.[24]It is not disputed that the first respondent paused the Claimant’s access to the Ubeya app on a date following the incident on the 18 May 2024.[25]The second respondent is Wembley National Stadium, which is owned by the governing body of English football, the Football Association (“the FA”). When Wembley Stadium opened, it entered into a 25-year agreement with Delaware North for the provision of hospitality services for the events that it operates.[26]The agreement with Delaware North is governed by a commercial agreement and this company is paid a fee by the second respondent for the provision of hospitality services.[27]The second respondent seeks hospitality services from Delaware North, but Delaware North seeks its workers from a range of employment businesses, one of which is the first respondent.[28]Mr Cannell explained in evidence that at any one event, Delaware North could provide workers from several employment businesses at the same time. I accept this evidence.[29]The first respondent states that the Claimant was engaged by them as a casual worker in accordance with terms of a Casual Worker Agreement from the 15 May 2023. Within the ET1 the Claimant states that she worked, on average, 10 hours per week and that her employment ended on 14 June 2024.[30]The first respondent denies that the Claimant’s employment has ended, the access to the Ubeya app has been paused following a call with the Claimant after the incident on 18 May 2024, which is discussed in more detail below. Findings of fact in relation to employment status[31]The Claimant is engaged under a casual worker contract with the first respondent, which was signed on 15 May 2023. The contract states that the Claimant is an Agency Worker and that the first respondent is operating as an Employment Business.[32]The Claimant could apply for shifts and accept shifts as she chose. Once accepted she could drop from a shift, but there was no right to send anyone in her place.[33]Whilst working at the second respondent’s location, the Claimant was required to wear a uniform, being a shirt and waistcoat as provided to her at the venue. The first respondent denied that it had a requirement for the Claimant to wear a uniform. The second respondent also denies this and asserted that the uniform was required by Delaware North and provided by them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I accept this evidence.[34]The Claimant was required to complete an onboarding process with the first Respondent, within which she disclosed that she had autism and that she was not suffering from a medical condition that might affect her ability to perform her duties. The form also records that the Claimant states that she is “fine”.[35]Once recruited and onboarded, Mr Marchinkowski explained that it was for the individuals to apply for shifts and then be accepted for those shifts. I accept this[36]In accepting a shift, the Claimant would then travel to the location of the end user, in this case the second respondent, to fulfil her duties.[37]The first respondent, Mr Marchinkowski, explained that it has a contract with Delaware North for the provision of staff for its events. He explained that there was no contractual relationship between the first and second respondent. The contract was between the first respondent and Delaware North. The contract between them being for the provision of agency workers and no more. The reason for this was to enable Delaware North to fulfil its own contractual obligations with its own clients.[38]I accept the first Respondent’s description of its relationship with Delaware North.[39]The second respondent, Mr Scannell, stated that there is no provision in its licence agreement with Delaware North to require them to provide specific individuals or to enable the second respondent to refuse specific individuals for shifts, i.e. the second respondent does not have control over the manning of its hospitality events. Additionally, he explained that as part of the licence agreement, Delaware North operated the hospitality and catering, including the Kiosk where the Claimant was engaged. It was for Delaware North to provide management and control on a day-to-day basis.[40]The second respondent states that it engages several service companies, such as Delaware North, to provide the thousands of staff required to operate large scale events. Whilst Delaware North had the licence to provide catering and hospitality staff, other companies provided staff for matters such as security and crowd control.[41]The second respondent stated that it does not directly engage any hospitality or casual staff. The licence to Delaware North means that this company provides the staff to man the events and the products to sell at those events. Whilst Delaware North paid the second respondent a rent / commission in accordance with the licence, the profit from any sales at any event were for the benefit of Delaware North.[42]In the absence of evidence or any explanation to the contrary, I accept the second respondent’s description of its relationship with Delaware North.[43]Both respondents stated that the management of the shift was carried out by Delaware North and that this company was responsible for the provision of workers to fulfil their contractual obligations. The second respondent stated that Delaware North could provide workers from different employment businesses at the same time to ensure that there were sufficient workers available. Neither the first nor second respondent were responsible for the makeup of the team on the day. I accept this evidence. Findings of fact in relation to disability and something arising from disability[44]The Claimant has a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder, including a previous diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome. She also has a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).[45]In day-to-day life the Claimant explained that her autism is debilitating. She explained that she avoids surprises as she does not like the unknown and she endeavours to work where she can mitigate unforeseen circumstances. Additionally, she explained that she does not like physical contact. She stated in her further particulars from the 11 September 2025 that she finds it challenging to interpret non-verbal cues and social conventions and that she can struggle with conversations, especially in large groups or when faced with unexpected social demands.[46]The Claimant explained that there was no medical treatment for her autism. She has had therapy to provide coping strategies previously, but she can still become overwhelmed and emotional when she can no longer cope.[47]With regards to her ADHD, the Claimant explained that she takes medication to help the symptoms of it. She explained that the ADHD was more in relation to the impairment it causes to her executive function, and she finds it very difficult to switch between tasks once she has started, particularly where she has achieved a flow state. The ADHD is about focus.[48]The Claimant explained that because of her autism and ADHD, particularly where she takes instructions literally and can struggle to read social cues, this means that she can become frustrated and show this in the form of outbursts, such as the dropping of drinks to the floor or the hanging up of the telephone. She also explained that her senses become overloaded and that this can lead to her becoming emotional and tearful. She also struggles to deal with large groups of people and lots of noise. All of these can cause her a sensory overload.[49]I accept the Claimant’s evidence as to her impairment, the impact of it on her dayto-day life and the circumstances that might arise because of this.[50]With regards to the knowledge that the Claimant was an autistic person, this had been declared by the Claimant in her application form to the first respondent. The Claimant had also ticked the box to indicate that she did not require assistance to fulfil any duties. Findings of fact in relation to knowledge of disability[51]The Claimant completed the induction form as part of her onboarding to the first respondent and replied to the questions as follows: Do you have any medical conditions? No …. Do you suffer from any injury, illness, medical condition or allergy that might affect your ability to perform your duties? No Do you have a registered disability? Yes If yes, please give details Autism If employed would you need to be accompanied by a carer or supporter? No … Please provide further details as relevant I’m fine[52]In evidence Mr Marchinkowski stated that the employee record for the Claimant included the initial M, which meant that she had declared a medical condition. He also stated that he had not informed Delaware North of this declaration by the Claimant, as the form also stated that the Claimant did not believe that the condition would affect her ability to perform her duties. I accept this explanation.[53]Both Mr Marchinkowski for the first respondent and Mr Scannell for the second stated that the companies did not have any direct dealings with one another. In Mr Marchinkowski confirming that he had not told Delaware North of the Claimant’s declaration, I am satisfied that he did not tell the second respondent either.[54]In evidence the Claimant stated that whilst she was in the back of the Kiosk, as described below, that she told the managers about her disability. She accepted that may have referred to “a condition” but agreed that she did not say autism. The Claimant explained that she uses disability or condition rather than autism as, in her experience, individuals don’t necessarily understand the impact of autism on her, hence the use of the word disability.[55]The Claimant also states that she said that she was hot and overly emotional and that crowds make her anxious.[56]It is also the Claimant’s evidence that this prompted the response from the manager of “that’s no excuse, my daughter is disabled.”[57]I find that the Claimant did make reference to her having a condition at this time but did not refer to autism. I also find that she referred to being emotional and anxious in crowds. Findings of fact in relation to discrimination because of the protected characteristic of[58]Turning to the 18 May 2024: The Claimant was engaged by the first respondent to fulfil a catering shift at the second respondent’s premises. This had been booked via the Ubeya app.[59]The Claimant states that she had been told to “talk amongst yourselves” by a team leader. The Claimant explained that she is uncomfortable and fidgets when she does not have work to do. She took the instruction literally and was reading a book as she did not want to use her phone for fear of it being confiscated. I accept this[60]Whilst the Claimant was reading, she says that a male team leader (name unknown) hit her on the back, sufficiently to cause discomfort, and told her to put her book away.[61]Following this incident, the Claimant states that she was uncomfortable but continued to work. She says that she was restocking the fridge and had settled into this task. The Claimant states that whilst she was fulfilling this task, she was approached by another male team leader and told to “get back to her till”.[62]The Claimant states that she was frustrated by this change in task and the manner in which she was given these instructions, which had been compounded by the hit to the back earlier. Because of this frustration, the Claimant states that she threw the box of drinks to the floor. In evidence she stated that she knew that they wouldn’t be broken and they would have to be poured in any event prior to serving. Additionally, she stated that she was prone to this type of outburst of rage.[63]Shortly after this, the Claimant states that she was approached by 2 female team leaders and a female manager because, she believed, that the male team leader had complained about her. The Claimant states that she was taken to the back of the kiosk and told that she was being removed from her shift and was being signed out from work.[64]The Claimant says that she became overly emotional and was sobbing. She says that she was overheating and asked to leave the kiosk to cool down. She states that she was told that she could not leave. Despite this, the Claimant ran out of the kiosk and was, she says, chased by the female managers in suits who then grabbed her.[65]The Claimant says that she was then made to wait for “ages” whilst the crowd from the match left. The tribunal was told that this was a play-off match and over 60,000 spectators had attended the stadium.[66]The Claimant says that she told the 2 female managers that she was anxious and could she go somewhere quieter, she also asked to go to the toilet. She was allowed to go to the toilet and the Claimant states that a manager followed her into the restroom area.[67]The Claimant states that she was the prevented from leaving until “profit protection” had arrived. When the Claimant left the toilet, a pair of medics had arrived and the Claimant, from her evidence, was taken to a small room. She was encouraged to remove her waistcoat and cool down. The medic also took her blood pressure.[68]Whilst in the room, the managers were outside with the other medic. The spectators were still leaving and the Claimant stated that it was noisy and the managers were speaking to the other medic outside the room. The Claimant states that one of the 2 team leaders had said that she had seen the Claimant before and that the Claimant was “not all there”.[69]Throughout her description of what happened, the Claimant identifies the first male team leader as he was the one who gave the talk at the start of the shift. She identifies the other by the fact that they are permitted to have their phones. Management are identified by the wearing of suits.[70]The Claimant is consistent with her description as to what has happened throughout and with contemporaneous documents, however, she has never identified any person involved. Whilst, on balance, I accept the Claimant’s description of the events of the 18 May 2024, I can make no findings as to who was involved as no evidence has been provided by the Claimant.[71]The second respondent has provided the names of all those on shift at Kiosk 509 on the 18 May 2024. They state that all of those people were contracted to work through Delaware North or by the first respondent. The Claimant and one team leader were the only individuals engaged from the first respondent, all of the others, including the managers, were engaged from Delaware North. I accept this[72]After the incident on the 18 May 2024, at 7pm the Claimant emailed Delaware North at the WS Concessions email address and detailed her complaint, which is in line with the detail above. This also included a statement that she says that whilst she was in the kitchen / back of the kiosk, the Claimant told the woman that she had a disability and says that the women replied, “that’s no excuse, my child is disabled.”[73]The Claimant closed her complaint by stating that she would completely understand if Wembley didn’t wish to welcome her back, however with the right manager, she could be an asset to any team.[74]On 14 June 2024 at 12.35pm, the Claimant raised the same complaint directly with the second respondent using its automated help desk system. A request for further information was made by the second respondent and the original ticket was closed down. The Claimant provided additional information at 5.18pm, but the second respondent says that this was closed down as an agent had believed it to be resolved because the first ticket had been closed.[75]In this second ticket the Claimant states “Wembley stadium have told the hospitality agency I am contracted to that I’m lying about these events”. The second respondent denies stating this to the first Respondent.[76]In evidence, Mr Marchinkowski accepted that he had suspended the Claimant’s account on 14 June 2026. The reasons he gave were as follows: 76.1. That he had received a call from Delaware North, specifically Vicky Fearn on 14 June 2024, during which he was informed that the Claimant had called someone at the FA stating she “hopes a bomb drops on us.” 76.2. That in this call, he was informed that the Claimant had said “if Wembley stadium did get bombed then she wouldn’t be upset.” 76.3. He also recorded that the Claimant had said “I know that we see us all as cannon fodder” and “that Arc always talks to her like crap”.[77]Following this call Mr Marchinkowski called the Claimant. In evidence he stated that this was a difficult call. The focus on the call had been in relation to her being struck on the back and how the female manager had mentioned her disabled child but not provided more details.[78]The Claimant asserted that in this call Mr Marcinkowski was facetious and sarcastic in that he asked the Claimant if she had reported the hitting in the back incident to the Police.[79]Mr Marchinkowski asserted that his genuine concern was that the Claimant had been hit in the back and his concern and question were genuine. I find that Mr Marchinkowski had a genuine concern for the Claimant as he details.[80]The Claimant asserts that in the call, Mr Marchinkowski stated that the second respondent denied that the incident occurred. Mr Marchinkowski denies stating this. On balance, and in accepting that the second respondent did not say to Mr Marchinkowski that the events did not happen, I find that Mr Marchinkowski did not tell the Claimant that the second respondent had denied that the incident had occurred.[81]The Claimant became frustrated by the call and hung up on Marcinkowski.[82]I am satisfied that the call with Mr Marcinkowski was between the two tickets sent to Wembley.[83]On 18 June 2024, the Claimant emailed the first respondent and asked if she had been sacked. She was informed that her Ubeya account was inactive until further notice and that she should make direct contact with Paul Marchinkowski. Prior to this, the account shows activity and the Claimant had booked shifts but had dropped from them without working.[84]With regards to the Ubeya app and any further investigation, Mr Marchinkowski stated that he was waiting for the Claimant to come back to him so that they could move forward. He was wanting more information from her about what had happened and was also concerns at the comments the Claimant had made in relation to Wembley Stadium. He accepted in evidence that he should have carried out further enquiries at the time. I accept this evidence.[85]I find that whilst the Claimant may have been frustrated, she did make the comments as alleged and that Mr Marchinkowski placed a temporary pause on her account because of this. The Claimant did not, however, contact Mr Marchinkowski further. Findings of fact in relation to time limits[86]The alleged discriminatory incident occurred on the 18 May 2024.[87]The Claimant initiated early conciliation with the first Respondent on 27 June 2024, which ended on 08 August 2024.[88]Early conciliation for this claim began on 31 July 2024 and ended on 12 August 2024 in relation to the second respondent.[89]The claim was issued on 21 August 2024 against both respondents.[90]On 22 August 2025, in Case Management Orders from the Tribunal, the Claimant was ordered to provide further information regarding her claim and to provide documents and an impact statement in regard to her disability. This included an order as follows: Brief details of what you say happened to you because of disability, including in respect of each event:a. The date when the event happened;b. The name of the person doing it;c. What that person did to you;d. Where they did it[91]The Claimant responded to this order on 11 September 2025. Within this document, the Claimant raises the new allegation of overhearing a manager saying, “she’s not all there”.[92]At a case management hearing before Employment Judge Chudleigh, as sent to the parties on 30 January 2026, the Claimant was given permission to amend her claim to include this new allegation, but that amendment remained subject to the issue of time limits.[93]When asked why this allegation was not in her original claim, the Claimant could not explain why. She is a litigant in person and, she says, she didn’t know what she needed to do.[94]The names of those involved in this incident have not been provided by the Claimant. The Claimant says that she did not know the names of those involved.[95]When questioned, Mr Marcinkowski accepted that he did not make enquiries of the team on the date of the alleged incident. He stated that the focus of the conversation with the Claimant was in relation to the hit on the back and the assertion that the manager had allegedly said that she had a disabled daughter, but when asked by the Claimant, this person said it was none of her business. This person also refused to give her name. The law Time Limits
The law
[96]The relevant legislation is s.123 Equality Act which states: 123 Time limits (1) Subject to section 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. … (3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.[97]In Bexley Community Centre (t/a Leisure Link) v Robertson [2003] EWCA Civ 576 the court held that: “It is also of importance to note that the time limits are exercised strictly in employment and industrial cases. When tribunals consider their discretion to consider a claim out of time on just and equitable grounds there is no presumption that they should do so unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. Quite the reverse. A tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time. So, the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule.” This was followed by the Court of Appeal in Department of Constitutional Affairs v Jones [2008] IRLR 128 and is consistent with the decision in Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2024] EAT 2; [2024] IRLR 275[98]HSBC Bank Plc v Chevalier-Firescu [2024] EWCA Civ 1550. This case summed up the requirements for the consideration of whether it is just and equitable to extend time, stating: The ET's reasons would have been adequate if, in sum, it had described the following: The claims, When the claimant knew they had an arguable claim or claims, and What did the ET make of her explanation for not having brought her claims earlier than she did. Employment Status[99]Section 120 Equality Act 2010 states: (1) An employment tribunal has, subject to section 1211, jurisdiction to determine a complaint relating to— (a) a contravention of Part 5 (work); (b) a contravention of section 108, 111 or 112 that relates to Part 5.[100]It is thus incumbent on a claimant to show that the ET has jurisdiction under s. 120 of the Equality Act.[101]Part 5 of the Equality Act contains the following relevant sections in respect of which the ET has jurisdiction pursuant to s. 120.[102]Section 39(2) Equality Act provides as follows: “(2) An employer (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's (B)— … (d) by subjecting B to any other detriment.”[103]Section 40(1)(a) Equality Act provides: “(1) An employer (A) must not, in relation to employment by A, harass a person (B)— (a) who is an employee of A's…[104]“Employment” for those purposes is defined in s. 83(2)(a) Equality Act as including: “employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work”.[105]Section 41 Equality Act provides as follows: “(1) A principal must not discriminate against a contract worker— … (b) by not allowing the worker to do, or to continue to do, the work; …. (d) by subjecting the worker to any other detriment. (2) A principal must not, in relation to contract work, harass a contract worker. … (5) A “principal” is a person who makes work available for an individual who is—(a) employed by another person, and(b) supplied by that other person in furtherance of a contract to which the principal is a party (whether or not that other person is a party to it). (6) “Contract work” is work such as is mentioned in subsection (5). (7) A “contract worker” is an individual supplied to a principal in furtherance of a contract such as is mentioned in subsection (5)(b).”[106]The Tribunal must satisfy itself of the following: 106.1. That the Claimant is an employee of the either respondent pursuant to s.39 Equality Act; or 106.2. That the Claimant was a contract worker and, in this case, whether the second respondent was her principal, for the purposes of s. 41 Equality Act.[107]Harrods Ltd v Remick and ors [1998] ICR 156, CA, and Leeds City Council v Woodhouse [2010] IRLR 625, CA are the cases referred to for guidance to determine contract worker and principal status. In Harrods at 161A the Court of Appeal identified two key questions in deciding whether a case fell within those provisions, namely:(1) Is the work done by the alleged contract worker work done “for” the alleged principal; and(2) Is the alleged contract worker someone who their employer supplies under a contract made with the alleged principal?[108]The Court of Appeal also provided guidance for the consideration of these questions. This includes: 108.1. It is not necessary to show that the alleged principal had managerial control of the worker (Harrods and Leeds), but control or influence will support the claim that they are contract workers. (Leeds and Jones (see below)) 108.2. Consider the closeness of the relationship as this is relevant. (Leeds) 108.3. It will not be enough for the alleged contract worker to show that the work they did inured to the benefit of the alleged principal (Jones v Friends Provident Life Office [2004] IRLR 783, NICA, Leeds at [22]); 108.4. The fact that the alleged principal has a right to approve who does the work (and to withdraw that approval) will support a claim of contract worker status (Harrods); 108.5. The fact that the worker is indistinguishable to the public eye from the alleged principal’s employees will support a claim of contract worker status (Harrods). 108.6. It is inherent in the concept of supplying workers under a contract that it is contemplated by the employer and the principal that the former will provide the services of employees in the course of performance of the contract (Jones at [17], cited in Leeds at [17]).[109]The liability of employers is s.109 Equality Act, which states: 109 Liability of employers and principals(1) Anything done by a person (A) in the course of A's employment must be treated as also done by the employer.(2) Anything done by an agent for a principal, with the authority of the principal, must be treated as also done by the principal.(3) It does not matter whether that thing is done with the employer's or principal's knowledge or approval.(4) In proceedings against A's employer (B) in respect of anything alleged to have been done by A in the course of A's employment it is a defence for B to show that B took all reasonable steps to prevent A— (a) from doing that thing, or (b) from doing anything of that description.[110]The Court of Appeal considered the meaning of “agent” for the purposes of s. 109(2) Equality Act in Ministry of Defence v Kemeh [2014] ICR 625. In that case, at [40] the Court of Appeal rejected a submission that the term “agent” simply described someone who performs work for the benefit of a third-party employer/principal. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the scope of the concept of “agency” for these purposes goes further and must at least reflect the essence of the legal concept of agency, i.e. that the purported agent was acting on behalf of the employer/principal with their authority. That is to say that the alleged discriminator was standing in the employer/principal’s shoes in relation to third parties, at [44]. The question, therefore, is whether those committing the alleged discriminatory acts were agents of the second respondent.[111]Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 (“The Act”) provides: 6 Disability(1) A person (P) has a disability if— (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.(2) A reference to a disabled person is a reference to a person who has a disability.(3) In relation to the protected characteristic of disability— (a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a person who has a particular disability; (b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a reference to persons who have the same disability.(4) This Act (except Part 12 and section 190) applies in relation to a person who has had a disability as it applies in relation to a person who has the disability; accordingly (except in that Part and that section)— (a) a reference (however expressed) to a person who has a disability includes a reference to a person who has had the disability, and (b) a reference (however expressed) to a person who does not have a disability includes a reference to a person who has not had the disability.[112]For completeness, s.212(1) of the Act defines substantial as follows: 212 General interpretation In this Act— “substantial” means more than minor or trivial;[113]Furthermore, paragraph 5A(1) of Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010: Disability: Supplementary Provision: Part 1 Determination of Disability provides: (“Schedule 1”) 5A(1) This paragraph has effect for the purposes of the application to the protected characteristic of disability of— (a)Part 5 (work); ….(2) References in the relevant provisions to a person’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities are to be taken as including references to the person’s ability to participate fully and effectively in working life on an equal basis with other workers.(3) The “relevant provisions” are— 114. section 6 (disability);[115]The Equality Act Guidance (“The Guidance”) provides two long lists giving circumstances of where it would be reasonable to regard a person as suffering a substantial adverse effect and one, where it would not. These lists are illustrative.[116]This Guidance provides for the meaning of “likely” when considering whether an impairment has a long-term effect and / or whether it has a recurring effect. For completeness, it also provides that likely is relevant when considering whether the adverse effects of a progressive condition will become substantial.[117]The Guidance guides the reader to consider that likely should be interpreted as that it could well happen.[118]Schedule 1 also provides for the meaning of “long term effects” as follows: Long-term effects 2(1) The effect of an impairment is long-term if— (a)it has lasted for at least 12 months, (b)it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or (c)it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected. If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur.[119]The EAT has recently determined Stedman v Haven Leisure Ltd [2025] EAT 82 (Stedman). This case provides a helpful summary of the key principles that apply in assessing disability and I summarise: 119.1. A single activity suffices. The test does not require multiple activities to be impacted. 119.2. The assessment of the impact on day-to-day activities is not a balancing exercise weighing up what a person can or cannot do. 119.3. That the correct comparator is between the claimant as they are and how they would be without the impairment, not against a generalised standard.[120]Whilst Stedman is a case regarding an impairment related to neurodiversity, its consideration of clinical assessment and the reliability of clinical judgment is relevant to any and all disability considerations.[121]Stedman confirms the protective purpose of the Equality Act and emphasises the requirement that in all cases, including where there are clinical judgments such as a diagnosis, the Tribunal must evaluate the impairment to determine substantial and long-term effect by applying the principles outlined above as required by The Act.[122]Whether an adverse effect is 'substantial' or not may vary according to the time at which the assessment is made and the period over which it is considered.[123]In All Answers Ltd v Wes, [2021] IRLR 612 the question was the assessment of the likelihood of the adverse effect lasting for 12 months. The Court of Appeal relied on McDougall v Richmond Adult Community College [2008] IRLR 227, [2008] ICR 431 to hold that this assessment must be made as at the date of the alleged discrimination and must not take into account anything only known or occurring after that time. Therefore, whether the issue under consideration is if a condition is 'recurring' or 'long term', or if there is a substantial adverse effect, the approach must be the same, namely, to assess what would have been the position as understood at the date of the alleged discrimination. This seems also to be consistent with the approach of the House of Lords in London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm [2008] UKHL 43, [2008] IRLR 700.[124]When the severity of an impairment is in issue, the tribunal will be faced with conflicting evidence and will have to exercise its judgment in deciding what is, essentially, a question of fact and degree. In Paterson v CoMr. of Police of the Metropolis [2007] IRLR 763, [2007] ICR 1522, EAT, Elias J (at para 68) formulated the correct approach for deciding on the severity of a disabling condition as involving inquiry as to 'how the individual carries out the activity compared with how he would do it if not suffering the impairment. If that difference is more than the kind of difference one might expect taking a crosssection of the population, then the effects are substantial.'[125]In making my decision, I have also had regard to Schedule 1 Disability: Supplementary Provision, Part 1 and 2 in relation to Determination of Disability and Guidance. I have also regarded the Equal Treatment Bench Book 2024 and the Secretary of State’s Guidance on Matters Related to the Statutory Definition of Disability. I have also considered Disability: Equality Act 2010 - Guidance on matters to be taken into account in determining questions relating to the definition of disability.[126]When considering the guidance in relation to “substantial”, the following is provided: B1. The requirement that an adverse effect on normal day-to- day activities should be a substantial one reflects the general understanding of disability as a limitation going beyond the normal differences in ability which may exist among people. A substantial effect is one that is more than a minor or trivial effect. This is stated in the Act at S212(1). This section looks in more detail at what ‘substantial’ means. It should be read in conjunction with Section D which considers what is meant by ‘normal day-to-day activities’. B7. Account should be taken of how far a person can reasonably be expected to modify his or her behaviour, for example by use of a coping or avoidance strategy, to prevent or reduce the effects of an impairment on normal day-today activities. In some instances, a coping or avoidance strategy might alter the effects of the impairment to the extent that they are no longer substantial and the person would no longer meet the definition of disability. In other instances, even with the coping or avoidance strategy, there is still an adverse effect on the carrying out of normal day-to-day activities. B10. In some cases, people have coping or avoidance strategies which cease to work in certain circumstances (for example, where someone who has dyslexia is placed under stress). If it is possible that a person’s ability to manage the effects of an impairment will break down so that effects will sometimes still occur, this possibility must be taken into account when assessing the effects of the impairment.[127]When considering the guidance in relation to day-to-day activities, the following is provided: Meaning of ‘normal day-to-day activities’ D2. The Act does not define what is to be regarded as a ‘normal day- to-day activity’. It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of day- to-day activities, although guidance on this matter is given here and illustrative examples of when it would, and would not, be reasonable to regard an impairment as having a substantial adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities are shown in the Appendix. D3. In general, day-to-day activities are things people do on a regular or daily basis, and examples include shopping, reading and writing, having a conversation or using the telephone, watching television, getting washed and dressed, preparing and eating food, carrying out household tasks, walking and travelling by various forms of transport, and taking part in social activities. Normal day-to-day activities can include general workrelated activities, and study and education- related activities, such as interacting with colleagues, following instructions, using a computer, driving, carrying out interviews, preparing written documents, and keeping to a timetable or a shift pattern. D4. The term ‘normal day-to-day activities’ is not intended to include activities which are normal only for a particular person, or a small group of people. In deciding whether an activity is a normal day-to- day activity, account should be taken of how far it is carried out by people on a daily or frequent basis. In this context, ‘normal’ should be given its ordinary, everyday meaning.[128]This meaning is not to be read in isolation but must be considered together with guidance as to the legal definition of disability, the meaning of substantial and also the meaning of long-term. Burden of Proof for discrimination[129]The burden of proof provisions are contained in section 136 of The Equality Act. Although they apply to all forms of prohibited conduct.[130]S.136 The Equality Act states as follows: If there are facts from which the [tribunal] could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the [tribunal] must hold that the contravention occurred. But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene that provision.[131]Section 136 prescribes two stages to the burden of proof: Stage 1 (primary facts) and Stage 2 (employer’s explanation). These are analytical stages.[132]At Stage 1, there must be primary facts from which the tribunal could decide – in the absence of any other explanation - that discrimination took place. At this stage, the burden is on the claimant and the employer’s explanation is disregarded. I.e. if this conduct has happened and there is no explanation for them, could we find discrimination? There must be something more than just a difference in protected characteristic and a difference in treatment.[133]If made out, the burden shifts to the employer in Stage 2 and the Tribunal considers the employer’s explanation. Has the employer proved on the balance of probabilities that the treatment was not for the proscribed reason?[134]The Igen guidance from Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] EWCA Civ 142 makes two points in particular about Stage 2: 134.1. The employer must prove that the less favourable treatment was “in no sense whatsoever” because of the protected characteristic. (direct discrimination is made out if the protected characteristic significantly influenced the decision.) 134.2. Because the evidence in support of the explanation will usually be in the possession of the employer, tribunals should expect “cogent evidence” for the employer’s burden to be discharged.[135]In considering Discrimination; At Stage 1, there must be primary facts from which the tribunal could decide – in the absence of any other explanation - that discrimination took place. At this stage, the burden is on the claimant and the employer’s explanation is disregarded. Knowledge[136]With regards to knowledge of disability, I refer to Cunningham v British Broadcasting Corporation [2026] EAT 92 which gave guidance as to the correct approach to assess whether a respondent has actual or constructive knowledge of the three elements of the statutory definition of disability, i.e. 136.1.(i) a physical or mental impairment, which has 136.2.(ii) a substantial and long-term adverse effect on 136.3.(iii) the individual’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. Submissions[137]I have taken into consideration the oral and written representations from all parties.
Evidence
[138]In Matondo v Kingsland Nursery Ltd [2024] EAT 123 the EAT allowed the appeal where the ET had required the claimant’s oral evidence, based on her recollection, to be corroborated by other evidence such as independent documentary records. There is no such rule of evidence. The EAT summarised that the ET should have appraised all of the different sources of evidence, as to their reliability and credibility, including the Claimant’s oral testimony, contemporary (though not independent) communications reflecting what was said during employment, work records as relied on by the respondent and the respondent’s evidence. The findings of fact should be determined based on the overall picture. Conclusions[139]I now set out my conclusions on the issues, applying the law as set out above to the facts which I have found. I do not repeat all of the facts here since that would add unnecessarily to the length of the judgment, but I have them all in mind in reaching those
Conclusions
[140]The issues the Tribunal will decide were set out in the case management orders following the hearing on the 30 January 2026 as sent to the parties on 24 March 2026. These are the issues to be decided with the addition of the consideration of time limits in relation to the complaint added by the application to amend. This is the complaint that a manager allegedly said, “she is not all there”.[141]I will consider each issue but will start with the issues in relation to jurisdiction, i.e. employment status and time limits. This is specifically in relation to the second respondent. Time limits[142]The issue for which the Tribunal must consider for time limit was set out in the case management orders following the hearing on the 30 January 2026. This consideration of time limits in relation to the complaint added by the application to amend of conduct on 18 May 2024 is as follows: 3.1.1.7 When the Claimant was crying and talking to medical staff, one of the two team leaders said that she had seen the Claimant before, and the Claimant was “not all there”[143]This claim was issued on 21 August 2024 and the application to amend the claim was brought by the Claimant on 11 September 2025 and granted, subject to time limits, on 30 January 2026.[144]This claim was not made within 3-months of the alleged act and was limited to conduct on the 18 May 2023. There is no continuing act.[145]The complaint was not made to the Tribunal in time, and I must therefore consider whether it is just and equitable to extend time.[146]I am satisfied that the Claimant knew that she had an arguable claim in relation to those she had worked with at the time she issued this claim on 21 August 2024. The Claimant has provided no explanation for the late submission of the claim other than she is a litigant in person and offers no suggestion as to why it might be just and equitable to extend time.[147]In these circumstances, I do not consider that it is just and equitable to exercise my discretion to extend time in relation to this issue. Employment status[148]The first question I must ask is, was the Claimant an employee of the second respondent within the meaning of section 83(2) of the Equality Act 2010?[149]For the Claimant to be an employee of the second respondent, I must consider facts such as the degree of control and mutuality of obligation between them.[150]I have found that the contractual relationship is between the Claimant and the first respondent only. The Claimant was at work at the premises of the second respondent.[151]The booking of shifts was between the first respondent and the Claimant in accordance with a contract between the first respondent and Delaware North.[152]The engagement of the Claimant at the second respondent’s premises was in accordance with a contract between the second respondent and Delaware North. As part of this contract, I have found that Delaware North retained the management and control responsibilities within the day to day working relationship with those persons working the shifts.[153]I am satisfied that given the remoteness between the Claimant and the second respondent, the Claimant was not an employee of the second respondent.[154]I turn then to the question of whether the Claimant was a contract worker and whether the second respondent was her principal pursuant to section 41 of the Equality Act 2010?[155]The facts as I have detailed above remain relevant. The contract held by the Claimant is between the Claimant and the first respondent. Any shifts were applied for and booked between the Claimant and the first respondent to enable the first respondent to meet its obligations to its client, Delaware North.[156]I have found that Delaware North provided day to day management on shifts, and I have also found that Delaware North provided a uniform for the Claimant to wear.[157]I have found that there was no contractual relationship between the Claimant and the second respondent was not involved in the booking of work or management of work.[158]I have found that the products sold by the Claimant were for the financial benefit of Delaware North.[159]I am satisfied that the Claimant was a contract worker for the first respondent, who supplied her services personally to Delaware North.[160]I am satisfied that the principal, i.e. the party who made work available to satisfy its own contractual obligations, was Delaware North.[161]I have concluded that the Claimant was not a contract worker for the second respondent, and that the second respondent was not the principal. I must now ask myself whether the respondents are liable to the Claimant pursuant to sections 109 or 110 of the Equality Act 2010?[162]I have concluded that the Claimant is not an employee of either the first or the second respondent.[163]The Claimant is a contract worker for the first respondent.[164]The principal is liable to the Claimant. I have concluded that whilst working, the Claimant’s principal, on this occasion, was Delaware North.[165]I ask myself whether either respondent was acting as agent for the principal in relation to the incident on 18 May.[166]I have found that the individuals engaged at the kiosk on 18 May 2024 were all Delaware North workers, except for the Claimant and one other, a male team leader.[167]I have found that the second respondent had a 25-year licence in place for Delaware North to provide hospitality services for the second respondent and that the second respondent required Delaware North to provide the day-to-day management and control within that licence agreement. I am satisfied that the second respondent did not step into the shoes of the principal and was not therefore acting as an agent. I therefore conclude that the second respondent was neither the principal nor an agent of the principal at any time. I therefore determine that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear complaints against the second respondent and all complaints against the second respondent are dismissed.[168]I have concluded that the Claimant was a contract worker for the first respondent. I have concluded that the principal whilst the Claimant was working was Delaware North. I have found that the persons present on shift on 18 May were Delaware North employees, except for the Claimant and one other. I am satisfied that the first respondent did not step into the shoes of the principal and was not therefore acting as agent at this time.[169]With regards to the first respondent for complaints not on the 18 May 2024, the Claimant remained a contract worker for it and at this time, the first respondent was also the principal.[170]I revert back to the statute of the Equality Act to assist me in relation to the first Respondent: 109 Liability of employers and principals (1) Anything done by a person (A) in the course of A's employment must be treated as also done by the employer. 110 Liability of employees and agents (1) A person (A) contravenes this section if— (a) A is an employee or agent, (b) A does something which, by virtue of section 109(1) or (2), is treated as having been done by A's employer or principal (as the case may be), and (c) the doing of that thing by A amounts to a contravention of this Act by the employer or principal (as the case may be).[171]I conclude that the first respondent was neither principal nor an agent of the principal on the 18 May 2024 whilst the Claimant was providing her services to Delaware North. I therefore determine that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear complaints against the first respondent in regard to the complaints on 18 May 2024 whilst the Claimant was working at the Kiosk.[172]I conclude that the Claimant was a contract worker for the first respondent and that the first respondent was also principal when the Claimant was not providing her services to the first respondent’s clients, in this case, Delaware North.[173]Irrespective of the employment status of the Claimant there is a fundamental difficulty with regards to liability for the complaints of the 18 May 2024 as the acts alleged were carried out by persons unknown. I cannot determine exactly who person A was or who they were employed or engaged by. I have found that the persons at the Kiosk on the 18 May 2024 were all engaged by Delaware North with the exception of the Claimant and one male team leader. However, on balance of probability, I cannot determine which team leader did what.[174]Whilst on shift on 18 May 2024, the Claimant was a contract worker of the first respondent, and the principal was Delaware North. The Equality Act provides the following definition for employment: s.83(2)(a) Interpretation and exceptions (2) Employment means – (a) employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work;[175]I am satisfied that this definition provides the Claimant with the protection of the Equality Act in relation to the first respondent for the allegations that did not occur on 18 May 2024. In moving forwards to consider these complaints, the lack of knowledge of the identity of the alleged perpetrators and my finding that they were, except one, engaged by Delaware North, will be taken into consideration.[176]Did the Claimant have a disability as defined in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 at the time of the events the claim is about? The Tribunal will decide: 176.1. Did she have a physical or mental impairment: namely Autism Spectrum Disorder and/or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder?[177]The Claimant has produced medical evidence to confirm her diagnosis, which I accept. The Claimant does have the mental impairments of Autistic Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.[178]Did it have a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities?[179]I have reviewed the Equal Trreatment Bench Book (“ETBB”) which explains that autistic people may have difficulties with social communication and integration and that they may have difficulties because of their literal interpretation of language and a difficulty with unexpected and sudden change. I have found that this is how the Claimant has described herself and the impact of this impairment on her day-to-day life.[180]With regards to ADHD, again I have reviewed the ETBB which explains that persons with ADHD may have symptoms including mood swings, irritability or quick temper and an inability to deal with stress. Again, this is how the Claimant has described herself and the impact of this impairment on her day-to-day life.[181]The Claimant also described herself as a person who looks like she is disabled. I have no medical reference from the Claimant or details in the ETBB that indicate that this is a symptom of the impairments as pleaded. This has not been pleaded before and this is not a claim for the perception of disability. This is why I do not address this assertion further.[182]The Claimant has participated in therapy to develop coping strategies and takes medication to moderate her ADHD.[183]The Claimant has explained the impact of her impairments as detailed here without the treatment or other measures.[184]Both impairments are considered to be life-long and are therefore long term.[185]Stedman provides guidance in the evaluation of impairments related to neurodiversity. The clinical judgment provided by the diagnosis of the impairments indicates that there must be some degree of adverse effect on the Claimant’s dayto-day life, the question is whether it is substantial. I am directed by this case to consider key principles including: 185.1. A single act suffices. The Claimant has described difficulties with communication and interactions with others, which are also referenced in the Equality Act guidance. 185.2. This is not a balancing exercise of what the Claimant can and cannot do. This is about what she cannot do. I have accepted her evidence in relation to this as detailed above. 185.3. I must consider the impact of the impairment between the Claimant as they are and how they would be without the impairment, not against a generalised standard. I am satisfied that without the impairments the Claimant would be able to communicate fully and engage with others without the emotional outbursts and the inability to deal with stress.[186]Having considered the above, I conclude that the effect of both impairments on the Claimant’s day-to-day life are substantial, i.e. more than minor or trivial and as such I conclude that the Claimant is a disabled person as defined by the Equality Act.[187]Having concluded that the Claimant is a disabled person, I address date of knowledge.[188]In determining date of knowledge, actual or constructive knowledge is when a respondent has actual or constructive knowledge of the three elements of the statutory definition of disability, i.e. 188.1. A physical or mental impairment, which has 188.2. A substantial and long-term adverse effect on 188.3. The individual’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities.[189]Turning to the first respondent; this respondent was aware from the onboarding process that the Claimant had been diagnosed with autism, however, this was caveated by the Claimant ticking the box that confirmed that she did not need any assistance to carry out her work and that she was “fine”.[190]I have not had any evidence of any issues in relation to the Claimant’s performance or indications of any adverse effect being reported back to the first respondent until after the incident on the 18 May 2024. I must conclude that the first Respondent did not have actual knowledge of the impact of the impairment on the Claimant until after this date.[191]With regards to constructive knowledge, i.e. when the first respondent should reasonably be expected to know, without any evidence from the Claimant that she informed the first respondent of any difficulty or any effect, I cannot conclude that the first respondent could have known before the incident from the 18 May 2024 being reported to it by Delaware North.[192]Given that I have found that the first respondent did not have knowledge of the Claimant’s disability until after the incident of 18 May 2024 was reported to Mr Marchinkowski on 14 June 2024, the allegations of the 18 May do not proceed as I have determined that the remaining respondent, i.e. the first respondent, had no knowledge of disability at that time.[193]I will continue in relation to the complaints after the date of knowledge only, being 14 June 2024. Direct disability discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)[194]Due to my findings in relation to the date of knowledge of disability and, alternatively, that the alleged perpetrators are unknown but, on balance engaged by Delaware North who is not a respondent in these proceedings, the consideration of this complaint is in relation to the following direct discrimination complaints only: (Issue 3.1.2) Since 18 May 2024 the first respondent has blocked the Claimant from booking shifts and/or “paused” her and/or messaged her saying the only way she can work for the first respondent again is if she speaks to the company director; (Issue 3.1.3) In response to the Claimant’s email concerning this alleged incident on 18 May 2024, the second respondent has denied it took place.[195]At Stage 1 of the evaluation of this complaint, there must be primary facts from which the tribunal could decide – in the absence of any other explanation - that discrimination took place. At this stage, the burden is on the Claimant, and the employer’s explanation is disregarded.[196]With regards to the blocking of shifts by Mr Marchinkowski: From the evidence available, the Claimant was permitted to book shifts following the incident of the 18 May 24 but cancelled them shortly after booking. In the absence of any explanation from the first respondent, where the Claimant has been paused from using the app, this is evidence from which I could decide that discrimination took place and therefore I am satisfied that the burden shifts.[197]I next consider the first respondent’s explanation, which is that on 14 June 2024, Mr Marchinkowsi received a call from Delaware North which included details of the remarks made by the Claimant in relation to hoping that a bomb was dropped on Wembley and other similar comments. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that, on balance of probabilities, this receipt of this call was the reason for the pausing of the Claimant’s access to the app. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied that this was not less favourable treatment because of the Claimant’s disability.[198]With regards to the respondent denying that the alleged incident on the 18 May took place, the primary facts provided by the Claimant is her word and the Wembley ticket where the Claimant makes reference to this. This is evidence from which I could decide that discrimination took place and therefore I am satisfied that the burden of proof therefore shifts.[199]I next consider the respondent’s explanation, which is that during the conversation with the Claimant, Mr Marchinkowski did not say this, i.e. the incident on the 18 May was not denied by the second respondent. I am satisfied from the evidence that Mr Marchinkowski did not say this. I have accepted that this was a difficult conversation, and the Claimant has accepted that she became upset and hung up. I am satisfied that, on balance of probabilities, that Mr Marchinkowski did not say that the second respondent was denying that the incident occurred, and, for the avoidance of doubt, if it did, it was not less favourable treatment because of the Claimant’s disability.[200]The claim of direct discrimination therefore is not well founded and is dismissed. Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)[201]Due to my findings in relation to the date of knowledge of disability and, alternatively, that the alleged perpetrators are unknown but, on balance engaged by Delaware North who is not a respondent in these proceedings, the consideration of this complaint is in relation to the following complaints of discrimination for something arising from disability only: (Issue 3.2.1) Since 18 May 2024 the first respondent has blocked the Claimant from booking shifts and/or “paused” her and/or messaged her saying the only way she can work for the first respondent again is if she speaks to the company director; (Issue 3.1.2) In response to the Claimant’s email concerning this alleged incident on 18 May 2024, the second respondent has denied it took place.[202]I have asked myself whether the following things arise in consequence of the Claimant’s disability, specifically, the Claimant’s responses to the events of 18 May 2024 and in particular: 202.1. The Claimant threw a box of drinks she was restocking to the floor in rage; The Claimant has identified that mood swings and frustration are how the Claimant’s impairment manifests itself. I am satisfied that this arose because of her disability. 202.2. The Claimant’s response to being forced to stand arguing in a hot kitchen in front of colleagues and customers, was to sob and beg to be let go; Again, becoming emotional is how the Claimant’s impairment manifests itself. 202.3. When the first respondent’s company director called the Claimant and told her that the second respondent are saying the incident didn’t occur and asked if she went to the police, the Claimant hung up in rage; Again, this act of frustration is how the Claimant’s impairment manifests itself. 202.4. The Claimant found the events in question to be sensory overload nightmare. Again, this is how the Claimant’s impairment manifests itself.[203]I then ask myself, was the unfavourable treatment because of any of those things?[204]Turning to the blocking of the access to the app; I have found that the access to the app was blocked following the first respondent receiving a call from its client, Delaware North, regarding the Claimants comments in relation to bombs at Wembley. Whilst the temporary pause for access to the app is unfavourable treatment, I conclude that this treatment was not because of the Claimant’s responses to the events of the 18 May as detailed above, but because of the Claimant’s conduct and the content of her call to Delaware North regarding the bombs and Wembley.[205]Turning to the denial that the events took place; I have found that this did not occur. That being said, even if it had, this would not have been unfavourable treatment if it had taken place.[206]The claim of discrimination arising from disability is not well founded and is dismissed. Harassment related to disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)[207]I have found that the first Respondent did not have knowledge of disability until after the events of the 18 May 2024. Additionally, I have found that the alleged perpetrators are engaged by Delaware North, not the first or second respondent.[208]This complaint of harassment is therefore not well founded and is dismissed. Approved by: