Ms J Taylor v HM Revenue and Customs: 6009115/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6009115/2024

Between

Ms J TaylorClaimant

His Majesty’s Revenue and CustomsRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Holmes

In person for claimant

Mr A Tinnion (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 30 September 2025

JUDGMENT

It is the judgment of the Tribunal that : The claimant’s claims of race discrimination that a) in late 2019, Lisa Guppy said 'why can’t I say the N word, you hate all white people for what our ancestors did'; and b) on 18 December 2019 , David Kershaw shouted at the Claimant in an open plan office and then another manager Sarah Cooper summoned the claimant into a private room and then after they were both in a private room in a fit of rage Mr Kershaw walked out and threw his pass down at the table; were presented out of time , were not part of conduct extending over a period of time, and it would not be just and equitable to extend time for their presentation, so the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear them, and they are struck out.

REASONS

[1]By a claim form presented on 21 August 2024 the claimant, who is unrepresented, brought claims of race discrimination, disability discrimination, and unfair dismissal. The claims are resisted, and were discussed at a preliminary hearing held by 1 of 12 Employment Judge Serr on 4 June 2025. A List of Issues was produced, and it was identified that there were clear time limit issues in relation to two claims of race discrimination that the claimant was making. He therefore directed that a public preliminary hearing be held to determine these issues, saying this: “11. The Respondent did pursue its time limits arguments in respect of the harassment allegations listed as 7 (a) and (b) in the list of issues at Annex A. The Tribunal could not adjudicate on these issues due to lack of time and the fact that Mr Tinnion did not know whether Ms Guppy and Cooper and Mr Kershaw still worked for the Respondent and whether these alleged incidents were documented.

[12]The Tribunal noted that these were 2 of only 3 allegations of race discrimination brought by the claimant. The third allegation -7 (c) was in 2024 almost 5 years later. It is at least arguable that these claims were discrete, far out of time and maybe very difficult for the respondent to defend. Accordingly, on balance the Tribunal was satisfied that it furthered the overriding objective to have this issue determined as a preliminary issue. Accordingly the matter shall be listed for a public preliminary hearing to determine whether the claims of harassment listed at 7 (a) and (b) in Annex A are out of time and if they are whether it would be just and equitable to extend time to allow them to be considered by the Tribunal at the final hearing.” 3. The Tribunal accordingly listed this preliminary hearing. There was a bundle for use at this hearing (of which more later) , the claimant gave evidence , confirming the contents of her witness statement at pages 368 and 389 of the bundle, and the parties made submissions. 4. The basic facts are not in dispute, and having heard the claimant’s evidence, the Tribunal found the following relevant facts on the evidence from the claimant and contained in the bundle4.1 The claimant commenced employment with the respondent in February 2019 and she initially worked at the Leeds office of the respondent.

4.2 The claimant makes complaint of two incidents, both of which occurred whilst she was still working in Leeds, the first being an alleged, racially offensive, comment by Lisa Guppy. She could not, and had not previously, put a date on this, but it was pre 18 December 2019;

4.3 The second was a display of anger by David Kershaw towards the claimant, in which he threw his pass down, and walked out of the room he was in with the claimant. The claimant has dated this as occurring on 18 December 2029;

4.4 The claimant did report and make a complaint abut this latter incident. She did so in a formal complaint document that she submitted to her manager Mark Gore by email on 6 January 2020 (pages 627 to 632 of the bundle). In that document she sets out at some length what she says occurred (the claimant is dyslexic, so any errors reproduced in these extracts are how she wrote the document). In it she says this: “Being the only black person on the command I do feel targeted, especially as this is not the first time he has done this, and the first few times it was because the internet signal failed. Prior to this David Kershaw has accused me of shouting over banks of 2 of 12 desks when the only people left in on the late night were sat on the same bank of desks. He has approach me multiple times on my lunch for work purposes.” And: “Throwing the pass was a clear act of aggression, he has received complaints prior to this and has never acted in such a manor but because I’m a black female he clearly felt like my opinion is of less importance, the parts that flew off of when the badge was thrown down could have injured me.”

4.5 In this document the claimant also said this: “I have experience racial situations whilst in this role prior to this as a colleague deemed it acceptable to say that she should be allowed to say the N word in which I responded I don’t think anyone should say it. I was accused of being racist for only thinking it’s acceptable for one group of people to say it and she also said ‘you hate all white people for something they didn’t do’. This was reported by Kathryn Altas to Sarah Cooper, nothing was done about it, and I didn’t report it because I felt like making a big deal out of it will bring attention onto me.”

4.6 The claimant accepted that she did not then, and could not now, provide a date for when Lisa Guppy said what she is alleged to have said, save that it was before the incident with David Kershaw, but it was in 2019.

4.7 The formal complaint that the claimant made was not taken forward, and no investigation was carried out. The claimant says that she was told by Mark Gore not to pursue it, as it could be damaging for her career to do so. She did not press the matter, and it was left.

4.8 The claimant was off work in for various periods in 2020, then in 2021, in 2022 and in 2023. This was not, however, continuous, and she was able, between sickness absences to return to work, after, on some occasions, a phased return..

4.9 The claimant moved from the Leeds office to Manchester in December 2020. Her two claims of race discrimination at issue in this applications occurred when she was at Leeds, and the next claim of race discrimination that she makes is in May 2024 when she was working in Manchester,in the form of an alleged comment by Michelle McLaughlin about not helping people with their leave arrangements for Eid.

4.10 The claimant submitted a formal grievance on 21 October 2022 (pages 649 to 662 of the bundle). In it she raised complaints about racism, and the first three pages of this document do refer to the two incidents whilst she was working at Leeds, the subject matters of these claims, in some detail. The claimant goes no (page 652 of the bundle) to refer to, and indeed attach a copy of, the complaint that she had submitted on 6 January 2020. She makes reference to being told not to make a formal complaint of racism, as this could affect her chances of being transferred to Manchester.

4.11 The claimant’s grievance was dealt with by Kate Elliott, a Decision Manager. She made contact with the claimant , and on 23 March 2023 had a telephone conversation with her to discuss the grievances that the claimant had raised. 3 of 12

4.12 In that conversation, the claimant confirmed to her that , although she had included in her grievance details about her treatment in Leeds before she moved to the Manchester office , she did not want these matters investigated, they had been included only as background. The claimant only wanted the grievance to investigate the issues that she had raised following her move to Manchester in 2020. This discussion is referred to in Kate Elliott’s outcome letter of 18 September 2023 (pages 663 to 678 of the bundle) .

4.13 At some point , the claimant joined a union in 2023. Her grievance was not upheld, and the claimant was advised (page 678 of the bundle) of her right of appeal, which she did not exercise.

4.14 The claimant commenced early conciliation on 30 May 2024, and obtained a certificate on 11 July 2024 (page 2 of the bundle). She presented the claim form on 21 August 2024. The claimant attached to the claim form a considerable attachment, some 57 pages, in which she cites various legal cases and pieces of legislation, with, it seems, the assistance of AI.

4.15 Lisa Guppy and David Kershaw no longer work for the respondent. The Tribunal has been given no more information as to what, if any, efforts have been made to trace them. No investigation into the claimant’s complaints about them that she raised on 6 January 2020 has ever been carried out. 5. These are the relevant facts. The Submissions 6. Mr Tinnion submitted that the Tribunal should firstly determine whether the two claims in question were out of time, and, that would include, as a finding he invited the Tribunal to make, whether they amounted to conduct extending over a period of time, so could be linked to any in time claim of race discrimination that the claimant had made. He invited the Tribunal to find , as a finding, that these two claims did not form part of a course of conduct of that nature, not merely that the claimant had no reasonable prospects of successfully arguing that they were. He contended that this was effect of the wording of the orders made by Employment Judge Serr. If it was not, he fell back on the alternative of arguing that the Tribunal should find that the claimant indeed has no reasonable prospects of so contending. 7. The two claims were clearly presented out of time, and “massively”. Some 4.5 years was the period between the later claim, involving David Kershaw, more so in relation to the claim relating to Lisa Guppy, which the claimant could not even put a date on. 8. If the Tribunal agreed, then it should consider whether these acts did amount to conduct extending over a period of time , for the purposes (although he did not mention it) of s.123(6) of the Equality Act 2010. The claim to which the claimant was seeking to link these claims is that at para.7(c) of the List of Issues (page 601 of the bundle) in which the claimant claims that Michelle McLaughlin in May 2024 said something about the claimant helping people with leave for Eid, which was said to be an act of race discrimination. He submitted that this was not, in fact, a correct characterisation of this claim, as people of many races celebrate Eid, because they are mulsims, so this is not actually a race claim, but a claim of religious belief discrimination. Be that as it may, in 4 of 12 any even, this is an allegation of a wholly different type of conduct, in a different office, by a different person, some 4 years after the two incidents that form the basis of the claims at issue. That previous conduct cannot, therefore, be considered to be part of a course of conduct extending over a period of time, so as to save the earlier claims from being found to be out of time. 9. If that was the Tribunal’s view, then the next issue is whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to extend time for the presentation of the claims on the grounds that it would be just and equitable to do so. 10. In doing so the Tribunal should look at the length of and reasons for the delay. The length, had had previously submitted , was massive. In terms of reasons, whilst the claimant had cited her health as a reason why she could not submit these claims sooner, her medical and absence records show that whilst she did have periods of absence in each year if her employment, these were not extensive, and in between these absences the claimant was able to work, for most of the time , at full capacity. There was no medical reason why she could not present these claims either in time, or considerably sooner than she did. 11. In relation to the claimant’s contention that she had been “warned off” her initial complaint about (mostly) David Kershaw’s conduct in December 2019, the claimant had numerous opportunities to raise this, and, indeed, to make a further claim in these proceedings that the respondent had actively discouraged the claimant from pursuing this grievance, but she has not done so. 12. Further, and most importantly, the claimant was given that opportunity again in her grievance raised in October 2022, but had expressly agreed with Kate Elliott that these matters should not form part of her investigation, and so they were not.

[13]All this, finally, prejudiced the respondent. For whatever reason, no investigation into these two allegations has ever been carried out by the respondent, and it would now be too late to do so, especially in the light of their departure from the respondent’s employment.

[14]The prejudice to the claimant, by comparison, was minimal. He invited the Tribunal to strike out these claims. The claimant’s submissions

[15]After an early luncheon break to allow the claimant to consider Mr Tinnion’s submissions, and with the assurance from the Employment Judge that her self – representing status would not be any handicap, as he was obliged to raise and consider any points in her favour that she had failed to, the claimant had little to say. Discussion and ruling

[16]The relevant statutory provisions of the Equality Act 2010 are to be found in s.123 which provide :(1) Subject to section 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— 5 of 12 (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

(2) [Equal pay claims -N/a]

(3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.

(4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.

[17]The Tribunal’s first task is to determine whether the two claims in issue were presented in time. Clearly, at first blush, they were not, they were presented over 4 years out of time.

[18]The next issue , therefore , is whether the Tribunal should find that, notwithstanding this, these claims can be considered by the Tribunal as part of conduct extending over a period , for the purposes of s.123(3)(a), and are saved by claim 7(c), that which the claimant makes in relation to the conduct of Michelle McLaughln in May 2024, a claim that is in time.

[19]The first , rather technical , issue is how the Tribunal should approach this issue. Where a question arises at a substantive hearing as to whether there has been a series of acts extending over a period, this is to be dealt with by the ET hearing evidence and making findings of fact; it is not to be done merely on the pleadings: Caterham School Ltd v Rose

UKEAT/0149/19

. This, however, is not the substantive hearing, it is a preliminary hearing.

[20]For the procedure to be adopted where there is an application for striking out of a case raising a question of whether there were acts extending over a period, see E v X, L and Z

UKEAT/0079/20

. Particular care is to be taken if deciding this issue at a preliminary hearing, as this can take one of two forms:(1) a substantive decision under r 52 or

(2) a decision to strike out for no reasonable prospects; these are different procedures which must be kept separate and explained clearly, as was recently confirmed in the EAT judgment in Mesuria v Eurofins Forensic Services Ltd

[2025] EAT 103

. 6 of 12

[21]Whilst Mr Tinnion urged the Tribunal to make a substantive finding , i.e a substantive decision, and considers that the wording of para.12 of the Record of Preliminary Hearing warrants such an approach, the Employment Judge is not sure that it does.

[22]In any event, the claimant has not given any evidence about the incidents, nor has she been cross – examined as to whether they did, or did not , happen in the manner she has described in other documents, but not, be it noted, in her witness statement for this hearing. No point was raised by the respondent prior to the hearing that she needed to adduce evidence of the actual events in that witness statement, and so the Tribunal has no real basis upon which make any determination of fact as to what occurred, and hence cannot then go on to determine the s.123(3) point. Indeed, to do so, the Employment Judge considers would require the Tribunal also to hear evidence about the claim made at para. 7(c) in May 2024.

[23]For those reasons, the Tribunal will approach this matter from the point of striking out these claims as having no reasonable prospects of success, because the claimant will not, on the respondent’s case, be able to bridge the gap between the 2019 and 2024 claims.

[24]The law upon how a Tribunal should approach the determination of whether any incident should be considered to form part of an act (or now, in the Equality Act 2010, “conduct”) extending over a period goes back to the leading case of Hendricks v Metropolitan Police Comr

[2003] ICR 530

, and was reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Aziz v FDA

[2010] EWCA Civ 304

where Jackson LJ said this : “33. In considering whether separate incidents form part of "an act extending over a period" within section 68(7)(b) of the 1976 Act, one relevant but not conclusive factor is whether the same individuals or different individuals were involved in those incidents: see British Medical Association v Chaudhary, EAT, 24 March 2004 (unreported,

UKEAT/1351/01/DA

& UKEAT/0804/02DA) at paragraph 208.”

[25]Whilst that case was considering the issue in the context of the Race Relations Act 1996 (the “1996 Act” referred to) , which used the slightly different terminology of “act” rather than “conduct”, the Tribunal considers this is of no consequences, the principles are of equal applicability to s.123(3) of the Equality Act 2010.

[26]The Tribunal considers that this guidance is relevant. In considering the claims at issue and the in time claim made about the conduct of Michelle McLaughlin, the obvious points are that, quite apart from the consider time gap, the alleged perpetrators are wholly different, and the claimant was working in two different offices. There is no reasonable prospect whatsoever of the claimant persuading any Tribunal that , assuming the facts in her favour, that the two claims at issue could form part of conduct extending over a period of time for the purposes of s.123(3) of the 2010, and they are , and will remain, out of time. The just and equitable extension.

[27]This leaves the final, and indeed, central, issue of whether it would nonetheless be just and equitable to extend the time for presentation of these two claims. In deciding whether to exercise its discretion , the Tribunal takes into account the 7 of 12 guidance upon how it should approach this task set out in British Coal Corporation v.Keeble

[1997] IRLR 336

. In the event that these two claims as presented, are out of time, the Tribunal has to consider whether to extend time under s.123 above, on the basis that it would be just and equitable to do so. This discretion, of course, is the same as conferred by several other discrimination statutes, and caselaw has evolved as to how a Tribunal should approach the exercise of its discretion. One of the leading cases is Robertson v. Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link 2003 [IRLR] 434, a judgment of the Court of Appeal. Of particular note is the judgment of Auld L J, who made it clear that there was no presumption of extension, but rather the converse was the case, extension was the exception, not the rule, and an out of time claimant had to convince a Tribunal why an extension should be granted. In terms of the principles upon which a Tribunal should approach the exercise of the discretion, the EAT in Chohan v. Derby Law Centre

[2004] IRLR 685

endorsed the approach taken in British Coal Corporation v. Keeble to the effect that Tribunals should consider the factors listed in s.33 of the Limitation Act 1980 , which applies to the exercise of discretion to extend time in personal injury claims before the civil courts. Those factors are: The length of and reasons for the delay; The extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; The extent to which the party sued had co-operated with any requests for information; The promptness with which the claimant acted once he knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action;and The steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate advice once she knew of the possibility of taking action.

[28]Those factors, whilst useful, must not, however, be regarded as a checklist, or exhaustive. In London Borough of Southwark v. Afolabi

[2003] ICR 800

the Court of Appeal held that the s.33 factors were of utility, but that as long as no significant factor was left out of consideration, a failure to follow the express provisions of s.33 would not be an error of law. In that case, delay of 9 years was, exceptionally, not fatal to the application to extend time.

[29]In Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation [2021] ICR D5, the Court of Appeal repeated a caution against a practice which had grown up of tribunals relying on the checklist of factors found in s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 (a checklist which applies to extensions of time for late personal injury claims in the civil courts), when deciding whether it would be just and equitable to extend time. The Court of Appeal described that 'The best approach for a tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion under s 123 (1) (b) is to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time, including in particular (as Holland J notes) “the length of, and the reasons for, the delay”'.

[30]The overall effect of the caselaw is that although there is no fixed checklist of factors that should be considered when a tribunal is asked to exercise its just and equitable discretion, certain issues will commonly be relevant to that decision. These 8 of 12 factors, considered below, include:(1) the length of and reasons for the delay;

(2) the prejudice which each party would suffer as a result of granting, or refusing to grant, an extension; and

(3) the potential merits of the claim.

[31]Whilst no one factor has primacy, the Court of Appeal in Adedeji cited above did use the words “in particular” before the words “length of and reasons for” the delay. Length of delay is clearly a highly relevant factor. In some case it has been decisive as a sole factor.

[32]In this case, it is , of course, substantial, at over 4.5 years – over 15 times the 3 month time limit prescribed by Parliament for such claims.

[33]Turning to the reasons, the claimant has advanced a number. One of them is her health, which she says was not good in this period, and she has, as has been acknowledged to have the disabilities of dyslexia and anxiety, amongst others. The Tribunal takes this into account, but the claimant was, firstly, able, for much of this 4 year period, to attend work, and work normally. True there were absences, and she had health issues, but the Tribunal cannot see that these can be responsible for her failure to present these claims for the whole of that period.

[34]That is particularly so when one notes that, firstly, the claimant was able to, and did, raise an initial complaint in January 2020, and then, even more significantly, raised a further grievance in September 2022. That latter grievance was substantial, and actually raised the two issues that are the basis of these claims. Whilst still somewhat late in the day – almost 3 years after the events – the claimant was clearly able to raise those issues in that grievance. If she could raise a grievance, she could have brought a Tribunal claim about those issues.

[35]The claimant, however, did not do so, and indeed, chose not even to pursue those matters as part of her grievance, expressly agreeing to their exclusion from the scope of the investigation by Katie Elliott. Whilst the claimant has claimed (although this is untested) that she was “warned off” her original grievance about David Kershaw in January 2020, that was not the case in relation to this grievance, and indeed, the claimant included the respondent’s failure to progress her original grievance as part of this later one. That could, therefore , also have been investigated at that stage, even if it was somewhat late.

[36]The claimant , however, by declining this opportunity to have these old matters investigated thereby also deprived the respondent of the opportunity to investigate them at that time, almost some 2 years before these claims were actually presented to the Tribunal.

[37]If the claimant had second thoughts about whether she did or did not want to pursue any complaints about the 2019 incidents, she could have appealed the grievance outcome, but did not. Further, by 2023, the claimant had joined a trade union.

[38]Thus, the length of and reasons for the delay do not weigh in favour of the granting the extension that the claimant seeks.

[39]As to the other factors, there is, the Tribunal is satisfied, also greater prejudice to the respondent in granting the extension, than to the claimant in not doing so. That 9 of 12 is primarily because the relevant witnesses no longer work for the respondent, and the respondent has not ready access to them for them to give instructions or evidence. They may also be reluctant to do so, having now no “stake” in the claims. Whilst the Employment Judge notes that the respondent has not provided any information at all about when, and why, either of them ceased to be employed, or what efforts, if any, it has made to try to locate these witnesses, so these supposed difficulties in obtaining evidence from them may be more imagined than real, he does accept that since 2022, when the claimant declined to have these issues included in the investigation by Katie Elliott, the respondent could reasonably have considered these matters closed, with no need to raise them with these two employees.

[40]Any approach to them now, or even shortly after the claims were presented in August 2024 , would be to require them to recall, for the first time, matters that were over 4 years old. The value of their evidence in these circumstances would be highly questionable.

[41]That is the prejudice to the respondent, but what of the prejudice to the claimant? That would, of course, be her inability to pursue these two claims of race discrimination.

[42]That is, of course, not to be underestimated, but it must set in context. These two claims are only two of the three race claims that the claimant makes. The rest of her claims, which are substantial, are of disability discrimination. These two race claims give rise to no direct financial losses that are claimed by the claimant , whereas her disability discrimination claims do include financial losses claims arising from the disability discrimination she complains of. The value of these two claims is therefore very low, which is not to make light of them, but when set against the other claims that the claimant makes, and which will proceed to a final hearing, the loss of the chance to pursue is of relatively little prejudice to the claimant.

[43]Finally, on the merits, which can be taken into account, the Tribunal does not have any strong view, but can see how, particularly in the case of the claim in respect of the conduct of David Kershaw , the claimant may struggle to reverse the burden of proof , applying the principles of Madarrasy v Nomura International plc

[2007] IRLR 246

that require her to show more than just a difference in treatment and possession of a protected characteristic in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Conclusion

[44]That is not , however, a major consideration. The length of the delay is a major one, almost enough in itself to warrant refusal of the extension sought. The reasons for that delay are not convincing, certainly not for the whole of the extensive period of the delay, and there is prejudice to the respondent, contributed largely to by the claimant’s previous declining of the opportunity to have these matters investigated as part of her 2022 grievance. For these, and all the other reasons cited above, the Tribunal finds that the claims at paras.7(a) and 7(b) of the List of Issues were presented out of time, there is no reasonable prospect of the claimant establishing that they formed part of a course of conduct extending over a period of time, and it would not be just and equitable to extend time for their presentation . They are struck out. 10 of 12 Postscript – the bundle

[45]The Employment Judge wishes to raise one further matter, which was referred to in the hearing, and indeed, before it. In the Record of the Preliminary Hearing in which Employment Judge Serr listed this preliminary hearing he directed as follows, at para. 12 : “ The matter will be listed for a public preliminary hearing, 3 hours on 25 September 2025 by CVP to be heard by a Judge. The parties are to cooperate to produce an indexed paginated bundle solely limited to material necessary to determine this issue.”

[46]Prior to that, at para. 2, he had described the tasks facing the Tribunal in the 1 day preliminary hearing before him as “daunting”, and made reference to the 621 page bundle prepared for that hearing. He clearly intended that the bundle for this hearing would be considerably smaller. It was not, it has grown to 835 pages. That was clearly not what the Employment Judge intended, and flew in the face of his directions. The Tribunal was told that this bundle was “agreed”, but the claimant referred to Tribunal to very little in it.

[47]Fortunately , counsel for the respondent had been able, ahead of the hearing to provide the Tribunal with a reading list, to enable the Employment Judge to focus his reading on what documents would actually be relevant. That list ran to some 12 pages. In the hearing some more pages were actually referred to, but the Employment Judge doubts that it was necessary to read in total more than 30, at most, pages in the bundle. The disproportionality is obvious.

[48]Practitioners must pay more attention to the directions given by Employment Judges. It is hard to avoid the impression that little or no thought was given at all to the production of this bundle, for which the Employment Judge considers the respondent was largely responsible. It looks as if the 621 pages were simply added to for this hearing. It is, with respect, no answer to say that it was “agreed”, especially when the claimant is not legally represented. The Employment Judge seriously doubts that the bundle was 835 pages long because the claimant insisted that it should be.

[49]This is probably, the Employment Judge suspects, another product of the electronic age, where it is very easy simply to create electronic bundles with little or no physical or mechanical effort. Whilst it may be thought that this is an unnecessary and pedantic judicial grumble, there is a serious point, as without the guidance (as was thankfully provided) of what it is actually necessary to read, any Employment Judge preparing for a hearing such as this would have to work out for themselves what was , or what was not, required reading, potentially wasting what is already very pressured judicial time.

[50]The Employment Judge notes, appreciates , and accepts , the apology that was proffered through counsel at the conclusion of the hearing from the fee earner involved. He does not mean to be critical, but does wish to educate, and encourage better practice where possible.

[51]Whilst of last resort, legal representatives should not forget the rarely used , but nonetheless available, power in rule 79 that the Tribunal has in appropriate cases, to 11 of 12 make wasted costs orders against legal representatives in the form of disallowing their costs, or ordering repayment of any costs paid , as between them and their own client. Such instances, however, are, and will hopefully remain, rare, but should always be borne in mind. Approved by: