Dr L Leonard v Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust: 6008417/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6008417/2024
Between
Dr L LeonardClaimantSurrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation TrustRespondent
Before
Employment Judge AbbottMr D Welch (instructed by counsel) for claimantMr P Smith (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 26 March 2026
JUDGMENT
The complaint of unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]This is the judgment of the Tribunal on the claim brought by Dr Lucy Leonard (“the Claimant”) following a final hearing on 24-25 February 2026. Judgment was reserved.[2]This claim was presented on 13 August 2024; early conciliation having taken place between 27 June and 26 July 2024. The sole complaint in the claim is one of constructive unfair dismissal.[3]The claim arises out of disciplinary proceedings brought against the Claimant by her employer, Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (“the Respondent”) from September 2023 culminating in her resignation on 10 April 2024 prior to the outcome of those proceedings. In her claim form, the Claimant detailed a series of issues with the way she had been dealt with by the Respondent that she argues, taken individually or cumulatively, amounted to a breach by the Respondent of the implied term of trust and confidence. Those issues are (my numbering added): “(1) Failing to give me the opportunity to respond informally to the allegations made against me. (2) Sending details of these defamatory, vexatious allegations to my regulatory body (HCPC) in October 2023 without any investigation or clarification of key facts having taken place and without me having seen the document sent. (3) Failing to make preliminary enquiries or establish key facts prior to launching the disciplinary process. (4) Recommending in September 2023 and again in October 2023 that I cease all additional (private) work. (5) The investigation officer who interviewed the complainant conducted his interview in an unfair manner, with leading questions asked of the complainant and the presence and interference of a chaperone which is in contravention of the disciplinary policy of the trust. (6) The investigation officer sought evidence confirming my guilt rather than that proving my innocence, selecting text messages (work to work mobiles) which he felt proved the vexatious allegations against me- and seeking from me no context to these - rather than the very many which directly disproved these complaints. (7) The text message evidence presented to the investigation officer and to the disciplinary panel was flawed in that it had been tampered with, with many text messages deleted from the full thread offered. (8) I was not offered this evidence used against me until I asked for it, which hampered my ability to prepare for the disciplinary hearing. (9) I was prevented from offering full unadulterated evidence, since my request for the trust to submit a court order to the trust's mobile phone provider access the full thread of text messages went ignored. (10) My grievance relating to disciplinary proceedings was left unresponded to for three months and when finally heard, dealt with in a matter of minutes at the end of my disciplinary hearing. (11) The disciplinary hearing was conducted in an unfair manner, taking just four hours in total to hear the case and preventing me from challenging or posing questions to the complainant on accusations she made which the investigation had in fact already disproven and yet the chair of the panel allowed the complainant to freely discuss and elaborate on these erroneous and damaging accusations. (12) No consideration was given to the significant mitigating factor that I saw the complainant as a colleague whom I admired at the time the relationship started and no consideration was given to dealing with this matter less formally to allow me to preserve my career, despite the fact that this was entirely remediable.”[4]After a short opening session to address administrative matters and applications under Rule 49 (addressed in a separate Order), the Tribunal took 45 minutes for reading, having had the opportunity to read the witness statements ahead of the hearing. The oral evidence of the Claimant lasted around 2.5 hours either side of lunch on day 1, followed by five witnesses for the Respondent: a) Dr Phil Anderson, the Claimant’s line manager (~1 hr, afternoon of day 1); b) Louise Wiggins, the Commissioning Manager for the disciplinary (~1.5 hrs, morning of day 2); c) Dennis Hockey, the Investigating Officer for the disciplinary (~1 hr, morning of day 2); d) Matthew Lamport, the Chair of the disciplinary panel (~1 hr, afternoon of day 2); e) Professor Helen Rostill, the Chair of the disciplinary appeal panel (~ 45 mins, afternoon of day 2). The parties’ counsel then provided oral closing submissions at the end of day 2.[5]In addition to the six witness statements, the Tribunal was provided with a 1168-page hearing bundle.
The relevant law
[6]Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Section 95 ERA defines what is meant by “dismissed” providing, insofar as is relevant, that: “(1) For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if … (c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.”[7]A claimant contending that they have been constructively dismissed must demonstrate:(1) that there was a fundamental breach of contract on the part of the employer;(2) that that breach caused the employee to resign; and(3) that they did not delay too long before resigning, such that they might be said to have affirmed the contract (per Lord Denning MR in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] ICR 221).[8]The fundamental breach of contract may relate to an express term of the contract or to an implied term, such as the implied term of mutual trust and confidence (see Malik v BCCI SA (in compulsory liquidation) [1997] ICR 606, HL), which requires that an employer shall not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or employer and employee.[9]In deciding whether there has been a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, an objective test must be used. All of the circumstances found proved are examined, to see whether the employer's conduct is likely to destroy or seriously damage trust and confidence. The issue is not decided on the basis of the subjective intentions of an employer, or the actual effect on a particular employee. It is a question of whether a reasonable person in the position of the employee would regard the behaviour of the employer as likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of mutual trust and confidence (Malik; Tullett Prebon Plc v BGC Brokers LP [2011] EWCA Civ 131).[10]A constructive dismissal is not necessarily an unfair one: Savoia v Chiltern Herb Farms Ltd [1982] IRLR 166, CA. Accordingly, if a constructive dismissal is made out, the Tribunal must go on to consider whether it is a fair or unfair dismissal, applying section 98 ERA.
The facts
[11]The role of the Tribunal is to consider all of the witness evidence, and the documentary materials referred to, and form a view as to what is most likely to be the true position on the balance of probabilities. It is important to say that, simply because I may disbelieve the evidence of a witness on a particular point, does not mean that I consider they are deliberately seeking to mislead – nor does it mean I must automatically disbelieve them on other points. Ultimately, I have to weigh up all the evidence on all different points and assess it on its merits.[12]I have only made findings of fact necessary for the disposal of the issues in this claim. I have not referred to every document I have read and/or was taken to during the hearing, but I have considered all such documents. I have not considered documents that were not referred to in the written or oral evidence or in submissions – given the size of the bundle it would be impractical to have done so.[13]The relevant facts are, I find, as follows. References to [x] are to pages in the hearing bundle.[14]The Claimant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 September 2017. From January 2020, she was employed as a Band 8c Consultant Clinical Psychologist, primarily based at Elmbridge Community Mental Health Recovery Service, working 3 days per week (Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday). Her role reported to an Associate Director of Therapies. Between September 2020 and December 2022 this role was filled by Dr Phil Anderson and from January 2023 (initially on an interim basis) by Dr Rebecca Andrew.[15]As a practitioner psychologist, the Claimant was regulated by the Health and Care Professions Council (HCPC). HCPC’s Standards of Conduct [1037-1052] include: “1.7 You must keep your relationships with service users and carers professional.” “9.4 You must declare issues that might create conflicts of interest and make sure that they do not influence your judgement.”[16]HCPC’s Standards of proficiency for practitioner psychologists [1053-1087] include: “2.1 maintain high standards of personal and professional conduct” “2.2 promote and protect the service user’s interests at all times” “2.11 recognise the power imbalance that comes with being a healthcare professional, and ensure they do not abuse this for personal gain” “2.12 understand the complex ethical and legal issues of any form of dual relationship and the impact these may have on service users” “2.13 recognise appropriate boundaries and understand the dynamics of power relationships”[17]In June 2021, the Claimant began treating Patient X, providing traumarelated therapy. Aside from being a service user, Patient X was also employed by the Respondent, holding a senior role in a lived experience team, albeit of less seniority than the Claimant. From January 2023 Patient X reported to Dr Anderson in his then-interim role as Director of Therapies.[18]In February 2022, Patient X (in her professional capacity) offered, and the Claimant agreed, for Patient X to support the Claimant on a project involving delivering training to staff working in Community mental health teams [71-75]. The project began in the third week of March 2022.[19]Towards the end of March 2022, the Claimant and Patient X began to exchange messages of a romantic nature. Treatment sessions continued between the two, and on occasions after these sessions the Claimant and Patient X sat together in Patient X’s car to speak about their feelings and embraced.[20]The Claimant discharged Patient X from her care on 21 April 2022 following completion of the planned therapy, though Patient X remained under the care of the Community Mental Health Recovery Service (CMHRS).[21]Thereafter the relationship between the Claimant and Patient X continued. It was conducted largely by text message, with both parties agreeing to delete messages passing between them in order to maintain confidentiality. There was a sexual encounter between the two during a weekend away in July 2022. The relationship came to an end in early-to-mid 2023.[22]On 15 September 2023, Patient X emailed Dr Anderson and Professor Helen Rostill, the Respondent’s Deputy Chief Executive and Chief Therapies Officer, to say that they wished to “raise a concern around safe patient care involving a member of staff” [132-133]. Patient X subsequently clarified by email that the concern related to experience she had as a service user and requested she be accompanied at any meeting to discuss the concern by her private psychologist, Dr Cheryl Cross [130].[23]Dr Anderson met with Patient X on 21 September 2023 [134-135]. Dr Cross joined the meeting for the purposes of reading a pre-prepared statement on behalf of Patient X. That statement disclosed Patient X and the Claimant’s relationship, that an intimate relationship had begun prior to the end of Patient X’s treatment and developed into a sexual relationship later. It was alleged that the Claimant had instigated Patient X’s discharge from the care of the CMRHS in April 2024 shortly after their relationship had ended, possibly in response to the end of the relationship. Patient X also alleged that the Claimant had controlled and manipulated her in the relationship. Dr Cross provided a corroborative statement on the following day [136-137].[24]On 22 September 2023, Dr Anderson discussed the allegations with the Respondent’s Deputy Director of HR, Victoria Bishop, and they agreed that an investigation would need to be carried out, that the Claimant should not work in clinical areas whilst the investigation was underway, that Dr Andrew be appointed as a point of contact and support for the Claimant, and that referrals to the Claimant’s regulator (HCPC) and the Respondent’s safeguarding team would need to be made.[25]The referral to the Respondent’s safeguarding team was made that day [185-188], in which Dr Anderson accurately conveyed the concerns that had been communicated to him by Patient X. I accept that Dr Anderson made the referral because he considered himself duty-bound to do so in compliance with the Respondent’s Safeguarding Adults Policy, which provides at 2.3 that [976]: “All Trust staff, volunteers and trainees have a responsibility to prevent and reduce the risk of harm/abuse of people who use our services and their carers and to act appropriately to report concerns or allegations of harm or abuse.”[26]On 25 September 2023, Dr Anderson requested the Claimant attend a meeting with him at the Respondent’s HQ in Leatherhead at 09:30 the following day to discuss “a concern that has been raised” [139-140].[27]The meeting took place on 26 September 2023 [147]. The specifics of the allegations were not discussed, but Dr Anderson informed the Claimant that a safeguarding concern had been raised and that there would be an investigation in due course. He also explained that the Claimant would be redeployed on a temporary basis onto non-patient-facing duties, working from HQ on Tuesdays and Wednesdays and from home (or another nonclinical site other than HQ) on Thursdays. Dr Anderson informed the Claimant that due to the nature of the concerns a referral would need to be made to HCPC. Details were provided of the support available to the Claimant. These matters were confirmed in writing the same day [143-145].[28]In the meeting, Dr Anderson also advised the Claimant that it may be unwise to continue with any private practice whilst an investigation is underway, and that they should check with the HCPC. I accept his evidence that he did so because he felt duty-bound to do so having regard to the well-being of any patients that might come into contact with the Claimant in view of the nature of the allegations that had been made. I also accept his evidence that this was advice and not an instruction.[29]Dr Anderson made the referral to HCPC on 6 October 2023 [152-161]. In the referral Dr Anderson accurately conveyed the concerns that had been communicated to him by Patient X. He attached Dr Cross’s statement. The referral also contained further evidence from a colleague of Patient X, who on 5 October 2023 had disclosed to Dr Anderson that she was aware that in October 2022 the Claimant had sent to Patient X a large bouquet of flowers.1 The referral noted that an internal investigation had not yet taken place and that a referral to the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) had also been made.[30]I accept that Dr Anderson made the referral to HCPC because he considered himself duty-bound to do so in compliance with HCPC Standards of Conduct. Indeed, the Claimant accepted during her own cross-examination that the Respondent did have to make a referral given the nature of the allegations.[31]Louise Wiggins, an (then-Interim) Associate Director for Therapies, was appointed as commissioning manager for the investigation in relation to the allegations against the Claimant. Ms Wiggins reported to Dr Anderson. Under the Respondent’s Disciplinary Policy, the role of the commissioning manager includes deciding whether the allegations require a formal investigation. The procedure provides, in relevant part, that [883]: “14.1.2 In order to decide whether formal disciplinary action is required it is generally necessary to carry out an investigation into all the circumstances of an allegation. The Designated Manager should satisfy themselves that there is good reason to instigate a formal investigation i.e. that there is sufficient substance to the allegation or sufficient evidence of an incident to require a formal investigation to substantiate the allegation or evidence of incident. The Designated Manager shall normally be a manager at least one level senior to the employee’s immediate line manager. 14.1.3 Managers should initially carry out informal checks to establish whether the allegation against an employee has substance. These informal checks will not take the place of a formal investigation but are merely to help clarify potential areas of concern. If the manager feels that, the matter warrants a formal investigation, the information they have collected at that point, should be shared with HR and advice sought from an HR Practitioner…”[32]Ms Wiggins did not herself make the decision to instigate a formal investigation (that decision had already been made by Dr Anderson in consultation with Ms Bishop, as noted earlier) nor did she carry out any informal checks of her own, relying instead only on the information that had been gathered by Dr Anderson. However, I accept her evidence that, given the nature of the allegations that had been made, she did not consider informal checks to be appropriate in these circumstances. Ms Wiggins was also not “a manager at least one level senior to the employee’s immediate line manager” but rather was at the same level as the Claimant’s line manager.[33]Ms Wiggins met with the Claimant on 18 October 2023 to set out the allegations that had been made, which were then confirmed in writing the following day [177-178]. As set out in the letter, those allegations were: “1. On or around March 2022 that you, Dr Lucy Leonard (Dr LL) entered into a personal relationship with your patient, [Patient X], who was attending therapy 1 This colleague subsequently provided a more detailed statement on 9 October 2023 [162-165]. However, there is no evidence this statement featured in the subsequent disciplinary investigation, and the Claimant’s evidence was that she was unaware of its existence until December 2024. sessions with you, when under the care of the Elmbridge Community Mental Health Recovery Service (CMHRS). 2. That you failed to declare the relationship to the Trust. 3. That you ended the therapeutic sessions prematurely and abruptly in April 2022 to allow the relationship between yourself and [Patient X] to continue. 4. That you did not follow agreed Trust protocols and NICE guidelines in the treatment of [Patient X]. 5. To ascertain whether you treated [Patient X] more favourably in her treatment / care pathway by providing more than the agreed number / frequency of therapy sessions per week. 6. That you manipulated [Patient X] into staying in the relationship by sending text messages and in verbal conversations. 7. That you sent [Patient X] flowers at the end of September / beginning of October 2022 for her birthday. 8. That you, Dr LL used your position within the CMHRS service to facilitate a premature discharge for [Patient X] from the service once your relationship had ended in March 2023. 9. To ascertain if you, Dr LL has breached the trust and confidence of Surrey & Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust. 10. To ascertain whether you, Dr LL has breached the HCPC standards of Conduct, performance, and ethics.”[34]The letter noted that Dennis Hockey, a Bank HR Business Partner, would be the investigating officer for the case and provided a link to the Disciplinary Policy and Procedure. There was also discussion of the position in respect of the Claimant’s private work, as to which the Claimant subsequently sought clarification. Ms Wiggins provided the following explanation by email on 20 October 2023 [180]: “The Trust’s advice is that you do not undertake any private patient facing activity due to the safeguarding concerns. However, if you do carry out private work then this cannot be done during normal working hours in the trust. If HCPC decide to put in place any temporary restrictions on practice than you would need to follow these.”[35]The letter also reiterated that the Claimant would remain on non-patient facing duties during the course of the investigation. By this time, the Claimant had been asked to work away from the Respondent’s HQ (at the request of Patient X [331]) and was therefore working on Tuesdays and Wednesdays from Farnham Road Hospital and from home on Thursdays.[36]In the course of her cross-examination, the Claimant was asked when she decided to resign. Her initial answer was to the effect that she made the decision in October 2023 (i.e. around the time of this meeting with Ms Wiggins) that she would have to resign at the end of the disciplinary process once she had had a chance to address the allegations. In her answers, she referred in particular to her feeling of unfairness at being removed from HQ that she said left her feeling isolated and written-off. She therefore began applying for other jobs, and gave evidence of being invited to an interview in November 2023 for a 3 days per week Band 8b workforce lead position in another NHS Trust that required registration as a psychologist but did not involve clinical work. She was offered the post later in November 2023 and commenced the role on 4 March 2024. Later in the cross-examination, the Claimant’s evidence shifted to indicating that it was not until much later, in March 2024, upon receipt of the investigation report, that she decided she would have to resign. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, I find that the Claimant’s initial answers are the more accurate and that, in her own mind, she had decided at around the time of this meeting on 18 October 2023, when the allegations were put to her, or very soon afterwards that she would ultimately have to leave the Respondent. She did so because, as is written in her “initial response” originally prepared in October 2023 (albeit updated later) [602-610], she accepted that as a consequence of her actions in entering into a relationship with Patient X and failing to declare it, she had breached the trust and confidence of the Respondent and had breached the HCPC code of conduct and ethics. She did not immediately resign because she wanted to defend the wider allegations that had been levelled against her.[37]In an email of 18 October 2023 sent following her meeting with Ms Wiggins, the Claimant sought clarification as to whether she would be able to access her clinical records relating to Patient X in preparation for the investigation meeting, and also what the timeframe would be for deleted text messages sent from her work mobile phone to Patient X to be recovered [196]. Following discussions between HR and the Respondent’s Information Security team, it was clarified to the Claimant on 30 October 2023 that the clinical records could be accessed under supervision, and that text messages between her and Patient X’s work phones could in principle be accessed, but messages between her work phone and Patient X’s personal phone would be subject to Patient X’s consent [194].[38]There was a delay in the commencement of Mr Hockey’s investigation due to the pendency of the safeguarding referral to MASH which may have led to a police investigation. Such a delay was consistent with paragraph 14.3.3 of the Disciplinary Policy [885], which provides that “…the Trust investigation may need to be delayed until the decision of the police is known or until the police advise that our Trust may begin its own investigation.” On 9 November 2023, it was confirmed that the investigation could proceed [207]. On 21 November 2023, Mr Hockey wrote to both Patient X and the Claimant seeking to arrange investigation meetings [216- 219].[39]Meanwhile there were various emails relating to the Claimant’s requests to access deleted text messages. The upshot of those exchanges was that, on 22 November 2023 [220], the Claimant was informed that historic messages (i.e. those deleted more than 30 days ago) cannot be retrieved locally and that the phone company would only release the content of those messages if a crime reference number was provided. The Claimant responded as follows the same day [220]: “Thank you for confirming this. I am extremely disappointed that these messages cannot be retrieved from the iCloud server because they hold vital evidence against malicious allegations. The number of messages is of no use. It is the content which directly challenges certain allegations: allegations which if upheld have grave consequences for my career. Given the serious nature of these allegations, can our legal department not submit a court order to Vodaphone to release the messages? Surely the trust has a duty to protect me as much as it has a duty to protect [Patient X].” This email was not responded to by the Respondent.[40]Mr Hockey met with Patient X on 4 December 2023. Dr Cross also attended the meeting as support for Patient X. It was put to Mr Hockey in crossexamination that this was contrary to the Disciplinary Policy which provides in Appendix D paragraph 3.4 [1030] that: “There is no right for witnesses to be accompanied by a work place colleague or trade union or staff organisation representative.”[41]I reject that on the basis that the fact there is “no right” to be accompanied is not the same as there being a prohibition on being accompanied. Moreover, paragraph 6.4.2 of the Disciplinary Policy [871] expressly provides that: “Witnesses, if they choose to, can be accompanied (not represented) at the interview.”[42]I accept Mr Hockey’s evidence that he permitted Dr Cross to attend because, Patient X being a patient of the Respondent, he considered it appropriate for them to have support at the meeting. Having considered the minutes of the meeting [234-247], which I accept to be accurate, I find that no support for the factual allegation that Dr Cross interfered with the interview or acted as a representative – her statements during the meeting were very limited and cannot in any credible sense be considered to be leading Patient X or acting as an advocate for her. I find that Mr Hockey did ask some leading questions of Patient X during the interview, but his questioning overall was open and non-leading.[43]Subsequent to the meeting, late on 5 December 2023, Patient X sent [258] to Mr Hockey screenshots of a (very limited) number of messages still present on her personal mobile phone, explaining that almost everything had been deleted a long time ago. In relation to messages on her work phone, she explained that she only still had messages on her device from February 2023 (and even those were incomplete) and had videoed herself scrolling through those messages. She also provided an approximate chronology of the times she met in person with the Claimant.[44]Mr Hockey met with the Claimant on 6 December 2023. The Claimant was accompanied at the meeting by a Staff Liaison Officer. The minutes of the meeting, which I accept to be accurate, are at [260-299]. Mr Hockey had not, prior to this meeting, had the chance to review the video of messages that Patient X had provided so they were not discussed, save that Mr Hockey described generally what messages (and for what time period) he had been sent. As was the case with Patient X, I find that Mr Hockey did ask some leading questions of the Claimant during the interview, but his questioning overall was open and non-leading. The Claimant was given a full and fair opportunity to put forward her version of events in response to the allegations that had been made to that point.[45]During the meeting Mr Hockey explained that the delay in the investigation beginning was due to the safeguarding and potential police investigation. There were the following exchanges: “LL: Of what could be a very long process. DH: I am hoping not, but obviously it has been complicated by the police and safeguarding involvement. It had to go through them first before we could investigate. LL: Police? DH: Safeguarding refers it to the Police because of the vulnerability issue LL: Oh my god, do they? DH: Yes, I thought you were aware of that, we are not allowed to do anything in these cases until they come back and say they are not actively pursuing it. From that I have to assume that there is nothing in it that interests them. LL: I hadn’t been told what Safeguarding had sent, no one has told me (Visibly upset by this). DH: I am sorry, I was not aware of that. LL: I have been terrified, the first month I thought the Police would turn up at my house to be honest, because of the safeguarding. DH: Well Safeguarding looked at it, it has to be referred there first because it involves a service user… LL: I, know DH: … and it was felt, I understand, the reason I am sitting here now is that it didn’t meet their thresholds. LL: No one told me that”[46]The Claimant provided Mr Hockey with further information she considered relevant to her response to the allegations by emails on 7 December 2023 [300] and 5 January 2024 [318].[47]On 11 December 2023, Dr Cross wrote a letter requesting that, following receipt of the notes of the meeting she had had with Mr Hockey, Patient X not be contacted again regarding the investigation until after 8 January 2024, on grounds of impact on Patient X’s mental health [302].[48]On 12 December 2023, the Claimant followed up the discussion regarding the safeguarding referral at her meeting with Mr Hockey with an email to Ms Wiggins seeking confirmation of the decision that Surrey safeguarding had concluded the referral did not meet the threshold for an enquiry [305-306]. Though acknowledged and passed on to HR, no substantive response was provided to the Claimant.[49]On 3 January 2024, Mr Hockey met with Dr Anderson via Teams. No notes of this meeting were provided – Mr Hockey’s timeline records that the subject matters was “to discuss supervision notes and initial meeting [with Patient X]” [339]. Mr Lamport was asked in cross-examination whether he considered it appropriate for Mr Hockey to be involving Dr Anderson in the process and answered that he felt it was appropriate for the investigating officer to speak to any member of staff if he considered it appropriate to do so. I find there was nothing inappropriate about Mr Hockey speaking to Dr Anderson as part of his investigation.[50]On 12 January 2024, the Claimant raised a grievance [319-322]. In it, she said the following: “I consider that Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation trust has breached the implied terms of trust and confidence which I am entitled to expect from my employer for the following reasons:-• Failing to establish the relevant facts before launching the disciplinary process• Offering a final notice of allegations letter which contained factual inaccuracies, as confirmed by [Patient X] herself• Failing to give adequate consideration to the motivations of [Patient X] and the role her private provider has taken in drawing up these allegations, given that he holds a significant role in [Patient X]’s ongoing financial security• Referring me for a formal safeguarding adults section 42 enquiry, despite the fact that the accuser [Patient X] has not been a service user of the trust for almost two years, was no longer in contact with me and was quite clearly at no risk of abuse• Advising me to cease my private practice and then offering conflicting advice in this regard after I had already ceased my additional work, causing a considerable reduction in my income, emotional distress to clients I was in the midst of treating and damage to my unblemished reputation• Removing me from all trust duties, including non-patient facing duties without notice, meaning my reputation with colleagues in the trust is now seriously damaged and reintegration back into my role would be wholly untenable• Failing to expedite my request for digital evidence, causing an unnecessary delay of almost five weeks, thereby extending my isolation and distress, for which I am now in receipt of ongoing medical attention• Failing to offer regular updates on the investigation process or reasons for the aforementioned delay• Failing to respond to my email sent on 22nd November 2023 enquiring whether the trust’s legal team could obtain a court order to access the above evidence• Not following up an email I sent on 12th December 2023, asking for confirmation that the local safeguarding team had not taken any action after I was told during my investigation interview that Safeguarding had rightly deemed the situation below their threshold• Indifference to the risk of actual or perceived bias in the conduct of the investigation in allocating as commissioning manager for the investigation someone who is supervised by the director of therapies; to whom the accuser [Patient X] and her private provider first reported the allegations and who line manages [Patient X]• Indifference to my right to dignity and confidentiality in allocating as commissioning manager for the investigation someone who I would be attending meetings with under the new organisational structure were I to remain in post• Allocating an associate director as commissioning manager and not someone one band above my supervisor, as per disciplinary policy”[51]As proposed outcomes, the Claimant asked for the Respondent to withdraw its safeguarding referral, carefully consider the standing of Dr Cross, properly explain why the Respondent could not obtain the totality of the text messages between herself and Patient X, and make Patient X aware of the gravity of the consequences of her accusations. She expressly did not want any sanction against Patient X, nor Ms Wiggins replaced as commissioning manager, nor any delay to the disciplinary process.[52]Though receipt of the grievance was acknowledged the same day [474] and passed on to the relevant HR team member to progress [319], no action was taken prior to the Claimant chasing up on 8 April 2024 [473], at which point the grievance was brought to the attention of Ms Bishop [471].[53]Around this time, Dr Andrew referred the Claimant for an Occupational Health assessment. A report was completed on 2 February 2024 [323-324] which recorded that the Claimant felt her mental wellbeing was being adversely affected due to the duration of the evidence gathering process, and also that her GP had identified a reactive depression due to the impact of the allegations, the disciplinary process as a whole, a feeling of isolation, all worsened by a lack of information regarding the status of the investigation and its timescales.[54]By 21 February 2024, Mr Hockey had completed his investigation report [333-359]. In respect of the 10 allegations he had been tasked with investigating (see paragraph 33 above), his findings were as follows: a) Allegation 1: “Evidence supports this allegation and (LL) admits it” b) Allegation 2: “(LL) Admitted this” c) Allegation 3: “(LL) Maintains planned patient notes refute this although [Patient X] contests this” d) Allegations 4 & 5: “(LL) admits that is was outside Trust protocols but states NICE guidelines do say for complex cases you should consider more sessions and produced Trauma UK guidelines to this effect.” e) Allegation 6: “There is evidence in the form of texts which could be seen to support this, clearly there is no record of verbal conversations.” It is important to record other points made by Mr Hockey in relation to this allegation and, particularly, the text messages provided by Patient X. Mr Hockey notes that “the video showed around 2,250 messages for the period 5.2.23 – 14.8.23 many of them were just what would be deemed to be normal conversation between two individuals with some pictures, emojis etc.”. He also notes that “these messages relate to the period where the relationship was in its latter stages and may not be typical of earlier communications”. He drew out examples of messages that appeared to support the allegation of coercion / manipulation in an Appendix (a total of 48 messages), acknowledging that “they are taken with no context” and that “these were sent towards the end of the relationship when (LL) admitted to feeling hurt and confused so may have been out of character with texts from earlier in the relationship that have not been available to the investigation”. f) Allegation 7: “[LL] Admits giving flowers, [Patient X] claims to be triggering, (LL) claims was not aware of this” g) Allegation 8: “This allegation has been withdrawn.” h) Allegation 9: “Evidence found would support this conclusion.” i) Allegation 10: “This would be an HCPC decision pending their investigation.”[55]On 27 February 2024, Ms Wiggins met with the Claimant to discuss next steps and informed the Claimant that on consideration of Mr Hockey’s report she had made the decision to refer the matter for a disciplinary hearing. A letter confirming this, and inviting the Claimant to a disciplinary hearing on 10 April 2024, was sent on 11 March 2024 [374-376]. The letter identified the allegations proceeding to the hearing – corresponding to original Allegations 1, 2, 6, 7, 9 and 10 – and noted, if proven, the allegations may amount to gross misconduct with dismissal a possible outcome.[56]As already noted, the Claimant started her new 3 days per week role at another NHS Trust on 4 March 2024. To facilitate that, she arranged with Dr Andrew to reduce her working days for the Respondent to 2 days per week (Monday and Friday), working from home.[57]Ms Wiggins produced the Management Statement of Case [385-400], which was sent to the Claimant on 20 March 2024 [402]. This Statement drew upon Mr Hockey’s report. It was put to Ms Wiggins in crossexamination that she rewrote various of Mr Hockey’s conclusions in a manner that was misleading; she denied that and, having considered the two documents, whilst I accept Ms Wiggins did reword certain points, it did not materially change the fundamental findings of Mr Hockey.[58]On 28 March 2024, the Claimant requested to have sight of the full thread of text messages that had been sent to Mr Hockey in video format [406]. Following the obtaining of consent from Patient X, the video was provided to the Claimant on 2 April 2024 [418]. In the limited time available between then and the hearing, the Claimant sought to draw out messages that she felt disproved the allegations of coercion / manipulation against her.[59]As well as those messages (sent to HR on 7 April 2024), the Claimant sent various other documents / written submissions to the disciplinary panel via HR on 4 April 2024 [435]. This included a “response to the management case” document [410-415] that opened with the following paragraph: “It is my intention to resign with immediate effect as soon as panel has concluded, regardless of the outcome. I recognise that I have breached trust and confidence of SABP and that it is not appropriate for me to remain in employment with the organisation. It is also clear what outcome [Patient X] is seeking and I wish to respect that. I fully intend to face panel and ensure that the unabridged truth is heard, however.”[60]On 3 April 2024, in response to a Subject Access Request she had made to the Respondent, the Claimant was informed that Vodafone could not provide the content of text messages as requested [429]. The Guidance Notes referred to in the email [549-552] indicate that the content of text messages is not recorded and retained at all.[61]The disciplinary hearing took place on 10 April 2024. It was chaired by Matt Lamport, Associate Director for Specialist Services, with the panel also comprising Dr Katherine May, Consultant Clinical Psychologist, and Ms Bishop, Deputy Director of HR. The Claimant was accompanied by her Staff Liaison Officer. Ms Wiggins attended to present the Management Case, and called Mr Hockey and Patient X as witnesses. The minutes of the meeting, which I accept are accurate, are at [494-533]. The Claimant and her representative had the opportunity to question the witnesses and to make submissions in relation to all of the allegations over the course of the hearing, which commenced at 10:30am and ended at 16:20pm. The decision was reserved to be provided in writing.[62]Upon the hearing ending, the Claimant handed the panel her letter of resignation [534]. The letter includes the following paragraphs: “I completely recognise and deeply regret my failings in this complex situation and referral to HCPC is just but you are only too aware of how devastated I have been by the deliberate misrepresentation of my personal and professional character. The consequences of my exclusion from duties for the past six months are considerable and reach far beyond me as an individual. I remain saddened and troubled that someone with such specific responsibility within this organisation has been allowed to prevaricate, mislead and aggravate the situation, seemingly without fear of sanction. As I made clear to you at the start of this process: I recognise that it would be inappropriate for me to remain in employment here in SABP, whatever the outcome of the disciplinary process. It was important to me that I face up to my responsibility and attend the hearing in order to ensure the truth is heard before I resigned from my position.”[63]Very early on in the hearing, Mr Lamport had informed the Claimant that the panel intended to deal with aspects of the Claimant’s grievance as part of the hearing. The Claimant’s Staff Liaison Officer emailed Ms Bishop on the day after the hearing, 11 April 2024, noting that “Lucy does not wish to have a separate meeting regarding her grievance and is happy for you to include the outcome of this in the disciplinary outcome letter”.[64]The disciplinary and grievance outcome letter was issued on 22 April 2024 [563-575].[65]In respect of the disciplinary, the panel upheld allegations 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, but did not uphold allegation 7. The panel concluded this amounted to gross misconduct and decided that, notwithstanding the Claimant’s prior exemplary record and the points the Claimant had raised about the difficulty posed by Patient X being both a senior member of staff and a service user, but for the Claimant’s resignation it would have summarily dismissed her. I accept the outcome letter faithfully records the true reasons, and matters considered, by the panel.[66]In respect of the grievance, the panel partially upheld the complaint relating to delay in dealing with the Claimant’s request for digital evidence, upheld the complaint of failure to provide regular updates on the progress of the investigation, partially upheld the complaint about the lack of a response to the Claimant’s email of 22 November 2023 regarding obtaining a court order, and did not uphold the remainder. Regarding the lack of regular updates, consistent with the grievance outcome, I find that Ms Wiggins did fall short of her obligation under paragraph 14.2.1 of the Disciplinary Policy [884] to: “…take responsibility for monitoring the progress of any police investigation, the Trust investigation and for overseeing any period of suspension. In particular, ensuring that any suspended employee is contacted regularly and informed of the progress of the investigation.” Rather, she took a very hands-off approach.[67]The Claimant appealed the disciplinary decision (but not the grievance outcome) on various grounds by a letter dated 2 May 2024 [596].[68]On 6 June 2024, following a virtual hearing, a HCPC Conduct and Competent Panel imposed interim restrictions on the Claimant’s ability to practice, including a prohibition on professional or therapeutic practice as a sole Practitioner Psychologist.[69]The Claimant’s appeal hearing took place on 13 June 2024 [735-765]. The appeal panel was chaired by Professor Rostill, Deputy Chief Executive, with the panel also comprising Bradley Platt, Associate Director for Adult Community Services, and Liz Case-Green, Head of Workforce Services. The Claimant was accompanied by her Staff Liaison Officer. Mr Lamport attended to present the Management Case.[70]The appeal outcome letter was sent on 26 June 2024 [770-775]. The panel upheld one ground of appeal, overturning the finding that allegation 6 (manipulation of Patient X to remain in the relationship) was made out. The panel also observed there were some aspects of the disciplinary panel’s findings lacked balance in that Patient X’s statement were treated as fact rather than opinion, and that there was evidence of confirmatory bias in the investigation in terms of the text messages selected. An apology was also provided for not sharing relevant documents (the text messages) earlier in the process. Notwithstanding these findings, the panel still considered the sanction of summary dismissal to have been the appropriate one.[71]The Claimant commenced ACAS Early Conciliation on 27 June 2024. This ended on 26 July 2024, and the claim was presented on 13 August 2024 [9- 10].[72]On 10 December 2024, following a virtual hearing, a HCPC Investigating Panel continued the interim restrictions on the Claimant’s practice in amended form, including a prohibition on therapeutic practice as a sole Practitioner Psychologist, but permitting her to undertake medico-legal work subject to certain conditions. The substantive HCPC fitness to practice investigation is ongoing. Application of the law to the facts[73]Having made my findings of fact, I must now move on to apply the law to those facts. I will begin by considering the various aspects of the Respondent’s conduct that the Claimant complains of in her ET1 claim form. Alleged breaches (1) Failing to give me the opportunity to respond informally to the allegations made against me.[74]It is correct that the Claimant was not given the opportunity to respond informally to the allegations before a disciplinary investigation was initiated. However, I do not consider this was a breach of the Respondent’s Disciplinary Policy, let alone conduct calculated or likely to destroy or employer and employee. Paragraph 13.2 of the Disciplinary Policy [881] provides that: “Unless formal disciplinary action is needed, every effort should be made by the employee’s line manager to resolve issues of concern using informal means such as additional 1:1 meetings or other informal processes, which allows the employee’s standard of conduct to be measured against reasonable objectives or standards. Many problems can be resolved by discussion, guidance and appropriate development and training, making formal disciplinary action unnecessary.”[75]The nature of the allegations against the Claimant were, however, so serious that, viewed objectively, this was a case where formal disciplinary action was going to be needed. It would not, in my view, have been appropriate for the Claimant’s line manager to seek to deal with the matters informally in the first instance and, certainly, the Claimant can have had no reasonable expectation of that approach being taken. (2) Sending details of these defamatory, vexatious allegations to my regulatory body (HCPC) in October 2023 without any investigation or clarification of key facts having taken place and without me having seen the document sent.[76]It is factually correct that the allegations were sent to HCPC prior to any investigation taking place and without the Claimant having sight of the referral. I have found that, in the referral Dr Anderson accurately conveyed the concerns that had been communicated to him by Patient X, Dr Cross and Patient X’s colleague. Dr Anderson did not present the allegations as facts: the referral noted that an internal investigation had not yet taken place and that a referral to MASH had also been made. He was not obliged to copy the Claimant on the referral and did not do so.[77]I find it was entirely reasonable for Dr Anderson to do as he did. These were very serious allegations that, on their face, demonstrated serious breaches of HCPC’s Standards of Conduct and Standards of proficiency on the part of the Claimant. It would have been remiss of Dr Anderson (or the Respondent more generally) to delay making a referral to HCPC and, as I have accepted, Dr Anderson in fact considered himself duty-bound to do so in compliance with HCPC Standards of Conduct.[78]The Claimant accepted during her own cross-examination that the Respondent did have to make a referral given the nature of the allegations. Her complaint was that he should have exercised some kind of value judgment, after initial investigation, on what allegations to refer and which not to spell out. However, I accept the Respondent’s argument that, in the circumstances, it would not have been reasonable for Dr Anderson to take that approach because of the need for him to be open and frank with his regulator. He simply conveyed the allegations as they were made to him, and there was nothing inappropriate in him doing so.[79]In these circumstances, the HCPC referral involved no breach of the Claimant’s contract and was not conduct calculated or likely to destroy or employer and employee. (3) Failing to make preliminary enquiries or establish key facts prior to launching the disciplinary process.[80]This allegation relies upon the requirement in paragraph 14.1.3 of the Respondent’s Disciplinary Policy that: “Managers should initially carry out informal checks to establish whether the allegation against an employee has substance. These informal checks will not take the place of a formal investigation but are merely to help clarify potential areas of concern. If the manager feels that, the matter warrants a formal investigation, the information they have collected at that point, should be shared with HR and advice sought from an HR Practitioner.”[81]One has to step back and look at the nature of the allegations. These were allegations made by a senior member of the Respondent’s staff, who was known to be a user of the Respondent’s services, against the Claimant in her capacity as (at the relevant time) a treating psychologist. These were objectively credible allegations; indeed, the fundamental allegations about the undeclared relationship were, in fact, true. They were so serious that, inevitably, a formal disciplinary process was going to be needed to investigate them.[82]In those circumstances, it is unreasonable to consider that some kind of pre-investigation should have been undertaken. It was entirely appropriate for a full investigation to be instigated having regard to the nature and substance of the allegations made. I do not consider this was a breach of the Respondent’s Disciplinary Policy, nor was it in any event conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. (4) Recommending in September 2023 and again in October 2023 that I cease all additional (private) work.[83]It is correct that both Dr Anderson and Ms Wiggins advised the Claimant to cease private practice whilst the investigation was ongoing. Whether the Claimant did so was a decision for her (at least until that decision was taken out of her hands by HCPC).[84]I have accepted Dr Anderson’s evidence that gave this advice because he felt duty-bound to do so having regard to the well-being of any patients that might come into contact with the Claimant in view of the nature of the allegations that had been made. I find that was a reasonable position for Dr Anderson to adopt; indeed, HCPC subsequently reached the same view in its initial interim restrictions.[85]The advice subsequently given by Ms Wiggins on behalf of the Respondent was slightly more nuanced, in that it was limited to advising the Claimant not to private patient-facing practice. Again, I find this was reasonable advice to give; it is consistent with the interim decisions later made by HCPC, and the Claimant even accepted in cross-examination that on reflection it would not have been appropriate for her to continue 1:1 patient work at that time.[86]In these circumstances, the advice given by the Respondent involved no breach of the Claimant’s contract and was not conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. (5) The investigation officer who interviewed the complainant conducted his interview in an unfair manner, with leading questions asked of the complainant and the presence and interference of a chaperone which is in contravention of the disciplinary policy of the trust.[87]This allegation fails on the facts.[88]I have found that there was no contravention of the Disciplinary Policy by permitting Dr Cross to be present with Patient X. I have also found no support for the allegation that Dr Cross interfered with the interview or acted as a representative – her statements during the meeting were very limited and cannot in any credible sense be considered to be leading Patient X or acting as an advocate for her. I have found that Mr Hockey did ask some leading questions of Patient X during the interview (as he did, subsequently, in his interview with the Claimant), but his questioning overall was open and non-leading and, in my judgement, did not amount to conducting the interview in an unfair manner. (6) The investigation officer sought evidence confirming my guilt rather than that proving my innocence, selecting text messages (work to work mobiles) which he felt proved the vexatious allegations against me- and seeking from me no context to these - rather than the very many which directly disproved these complaints.[89]I consider that there is a degree of substance to this allegation, as was recognised by the outcome of the appeal panel which “felt that there was evidence of confirmatory bias in terms of the investigation and texts selected which the panel relied on alongside your evidence”.[90]However, one has to step back and look at the totality of Mr Hockey’s report. Mr Hockey noted that “the video showed around 2,250 messages for the period 5.2.23 – 14.8.23 many of them were just what would be deemed to be normal conversation between two individuals with some pictures, emojis etc.”. He also noted that “these messages relate to the period where the relationship was in its latter stages and may not be typical of earlier communications”. Whilst he drew out examples of messages that appeared to support the allegation of coercion / manipulation in an Appendix (a total of 48 messages), he acknowledged that “they are taken with no context” and that “these were sent towards the end of the relationship when (LL) admitted to feeling hurt and confused so may have been out of character with texts from earlier in the relationship that have not been available to the investigation”.[91]One also has to look at the overall circumstances. Patient X and the Claimant had agreed to regularly delete the messages passing between them as part of their clandestine relationship, so what was available to Mr Hockey was never going to be a complete picture. He fully acknowledged the limitations of the evidence he had identified that supported the allegations, and noted that many of the messages were “normal conversation” and thus not supportive of the allegations.[92]In those circumstances, whilst some criticism can fairly be directed at Mr Hockey, I do not accept the submission that he was biased in the sense that he was intent to identify evidence supporting the allegations. Considered in its totality, his report was appropriately balanced. It was not, in my judgement, conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the (7) The text message evidence presented to the investigation officer and to the disciplinary panel was flawed in that it had been tampered with, with many text messages deleted from the full thread offered.[93]The Claimant accepted that this was a criticism of Patient X (since it was she who provided the thread of messages to the Respondent) and therefore it cannot amount to conduct on the part of the Respondent calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. (8) I was not offered this evidence used against me until I asked for it, which hampered my ability to prepare for the disciplinary hearing.[94]I consider that there is a degree of substance to this allegation, as was recognised by the outcome of the appeal panel which was critical of the fact that the full video of the messages provided by Patient X was not provided at the same time as Mr Hockey’s report.[95]Nevertheless, the video was provided to the Claimant more than a week prior to the disciplinary meeting, and the Claimant did work through it and was able to put forward examples of messages that she said undermined the allegations levelled against her. She, of course, had much longer (2.5 weeks) to address the 48 messages that Mr Hockey had pulled out as being supporting of the allegations.[96]Stepping back and considering the situation objectively, whilst it would have been better for the Claimant to have been provided the full thread earlier, in my judgement the delay does not reach the threshold of conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee. (9) I was prevented from offering full unadulterated evidence, since my request for the trust to submit a court order to the trust's mobile phone provider access the full thread of text messages went ignored.[97]It is right that the Claimant’s email of 22 November 2023 went unanswered, and I note her grievance was partially upheld on that basis. A response should have been sent to make the position as set out in earlier emails entirely clear.[98]However, I accept the Respondent’s submission that it was unrealistic (and unreasonable) of the Claimant to expect the Respondent to seek a Court order for the full thread of text messages. It would involve considerable expense and, no doubt, delay to the disciplinary process. Moreover, the information from Vodafone that was provided to the Claimant in April 2024 indicates that such an Order would have been futile anyway because the content of the historic deleted messages is not recorded by Vodafone.[99]Accordingly, the Claimant’s inability to offer full unadulterated evidence was as a consequence of her arrangement with Patient X to delete the messages passing between them. It was not a consequence of anything done by the Respondent.[100]Whilst the failure of the Respondent to reply to the Claimant’s email of 22 November 2023 is worthy of criticism, in my judgement it does not reach the threshold of conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the (10) My grievance relating to disciplinary proceedings was left unresponded to for three months and when finally heard, dealt with in a matter of minutes at the end of my disciplinary hearing.[101]It is correct that the Claimant’s grievance was not dealt with in a timely manner. There can be no doubt (and I accept) this was contrary to the applicable policy that requires a meeting to be held “without unreasonable delay”. In fact, no steps were taken even to arrange a meeting until the Claimant chased it up.[102]I do note, though, that the points raised in the grievance are closely related to the Claimant’s response to the disciplinary case and, therefore, it is not objectively unreasonable that they ended up being heard together (and the Claimant ultimately agreed that was an appropriate course). It is also notable that the Claimant did not, on the evidence before me, chase up progress of her grievance until fully 12 weeks after sending it in, just 2 days before the disciplinary hearing. The grievance was then dealt with by the disciplinary panel and an outcome provided (upholding some of the Claimant’s grounds) which the Claimant did not appeal.[103]Whilst the delay in dealing with the grievance is certainly worthy of criticism, looking at all of the circumstances I do not consider that a reasonable person in the position of the Claimant would regard the delay as likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of mutual trust and confidence. (11) The disciplinary hearing was conducted in an unfair manner, taking just four hours in total to hear the case and preventing me from challenging or posing questions to the complainant on accusations she made which the investigation had in fact already disproven and yet the chair of the panel allowed the complainant to freely discuss and elaborate on these erroneous and damaging accusations. (12) No consideration was given to the significant mitigating factor that I saw the complainant as a colleague whom I admired at the time the relationship started and no consideration was given to dealing with this matter less formally to allow me to preserve my career, despite the fact that this was entirely remediable.”[104]On the basis that the Claimant had communicated her intention to resign at the end of the disciplinary hearing to the panel in advance of the hearing, and attended the hearing with her resignation letter signed and ready to hand in at the end (as she then did), on no basis can it be said that anything that happened at the disciplinary meeting or was / was not accounted for in the disciplinary outcome can have caused the Claimant to resign.[105]In any event, having considered the detailed minutes of the disciplinary hearing, I do not accept the suggestion that the hearing was conducted in an unfair manner. The Claimant and her representative had the opportunity to question the witnesses and put forward the Claimant’s case. Viewed objectively, there is no sign of an unfair process at the day-long hearing. I also accept that consideration was given to the mitigating factors relied upon by the Claimant, as is recorded in the outcome letter. Breaches in totality[106]I have considered the alleged breaches individually above and have found that none, on their own, was a fundamental breach. It is also necessary to step back and consider them cumulatively. I have done so and conclude that, even looked at together, the course of conduct does not reach the threshold of conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the There were, as I have accepted, some imperfections and mistakes made along the way but even taken cumulatively those do not in my judgement come close to establishing a fundamental breach on the part of the Respondent. Causation[107]In case I am wrong in determining that there was no fundamental breach, I will nevertheless consider whether the Claimant’s resignation was caused by any breach on the part of the Respondent.[108]I find that this was not the case. From as early as October 2023, I have found that the Claimant had recognised that her position with the Respondent was untenable. This was because she accepted that, as a consequence of her actions in entering into a relationship with Patient X and failing to declare it, she had breached the trust and confidence of the Respondent and had breached the HCPC code of conduct and ethics. She did not immediately resign because she wanted to defend the wider allegations that had been levelled against her, but the decision to resign was already made.[109]I have not identified any breaches in the way the Claimant was treated up to the time of that initial meeting with Ms Wiggins when the Claimant made that decision ultimately to resign. Thus, the resignation cannot have been caused by any breach of contract on the part of the Respondent.[110]I find that any breaches arising out of the conduct of Mr Hockey’s investigation, failures to provide timely updates or responses to emails, delays in the provision of evidence, and delays in dealing with the Claimant’s grievance did not cause the Claimant to resign. She had made the decision to resign before any of those things happened.[111]The complaint would therefore fail on causation, even if (contrary to my findings) any of the matters I have identified as worthy of criticism amounted individually or cumulatively to a fundamental breach of contract by the Respondent.
Conclusion
[112]For the reasons set out above, the Claimant was not constructively dismissed. The complaint of unfair dismissal is therefore not well-founded and is dismissed. Approved by: