Mr J Johnson v PCS Services Ltd and Others: 6007855/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6007855/2025
Between
Mr J JohnsonClaimant(1) PCS services Ltd (2) Harrow Club (3) London Borough of BarnetRespondent
Before
Regional Employment Judge KhalilIn person for claimantDate 13 July 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The second and third respondents’ applications to strike out the claimant’s claims for having no reasonable prospect of success is not well founded and fails.[2]The Tribunal refuses to strike out the claims against any of the respondents under its own initiative.[3]However, Deposit Orders are made in respect of each claim of victimisation against each respondent. Details for the Deposit Order are set out in a separate private Case Management Order.
REASONS
Findings of fact proportionate and relevant to the public Preliminary Hearing[4]The claimant was employed by the first respondent until termination on 2 August 2024.[5]The claimant was employment by the second respondent between March 2020 to Feb 2022 as a Youth Worker in charge (ET3 para 16). The claimant pursued claims for Race Discrimination (Direct, Harassment & Victimisation) against the second respondent & several named respondents in case number 2204796-21 which were dismissed on 28 March 2023 (‘The London Central Harrow Club claim’).[6]In paragraphs 33 to 39 of that Judgment, there was consideration and review of the claimant’s previous litigation all of which had failed. This was in connection with 13 other discrimination claims against various unconnected respondents/employers.[7]The claimant’s appeal against that Judgment did not get past the EAT sift on 21 November 2024 a decision by HHJ Tayler. A Rule 3 (10) Hearing before the EAT took place on15 January 2026 and the appeal was dismissed by HHJ Russell.[8]The claimant was employed by the third respondent between 10 July 2023 and 14 Feb 2024 as a Residential Homes Manager, (paragraph 16 ET3).[9]The claimant has pursued other claims against the third respondent. Claim number 3300062-24 was heard in Watford Tribunal by EJ Anderson (‘The Watford claim against LB of Barnet’). The claims were for Sex Discrimination (Direct, Harassment & Victimisation) and for detriment for making protected disclosures. On 10 March 2025, some of those claims were struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success, other claims were the subject of Deposit Orders as the Judge assessed those claims as having little reasonable prospects of success. The deposits were fixed at £360 per claim. The Deposits were not paid, thus those claims also stood dismissed on 21 May 2025.[10]The claimant has appealed against those Judgments which did not get passed the EAT Sift. A Rule 3 (10) Hearing in the EAT has been fixed for January 2027.[11]In his claim form, the claimant says as follows (with added case references in bold reflecting and corresponding to case references above): Barnet gave me a bad and false reference linked with sex discrimination case no 3300062/2024 (‘The Watford claim against LB of Barnet’) Harrow gave me a bad and false reference linked with race discrimination case EA-2023-000354-LA Mr J Johnson v (1) The Harrow Club (2)Rosalind Oxley (3) Steve Davies (4) Michael Defoe (5) Philippe Chappatte (6) Micah Watkis (7) Christ Martin (8) Kay Brokenshire (ET Ref: 2204796/2021) (‘The London Central Harrow Club claim’) PCS gave me a bad and false reference linked with race discrimination case 2305948/24[12]No particulars were provided by the claimant about when the references were given, what they said (if given), whether they were oral or in writing, how the claimant had come to know about them and why they was alleged to be bad and false.[13]In its grounds of resistance, the second respondent says about the reference it provided: On 16 January 2025, Harrow Club received an email from a potential future employer of the Claimant which said the Claimant had given Harrow Club as a referee. The reference was sought notwithstanding the Claimant had been dismissed by the Second Respondent for gross misconduct and that the Claimant’s claims of harassment, victimisation and discrimination on grounds of race, brought against the Second Respondent, its trustees, staff and volunteers were all comprehensively dismissed by the Employment Tribunal. The Second Respondent considered carefully whether to provide a reference at all. It was anticipated that either providing the reference, or refusing to provide one, would result in another Employment Tribunal claim, as the Claimant’s pattern of behaviour is so well established. However, notwithstanding the risk of a further claim, the Second Respondent considered it was its duty to another organisation supporting young people to inform them of the fact safeguarding breaches for which the Claimant was responsible, occurred during the Claimant’s employment. The Second Respondent was also mindful of its tortious duty not to provide a misleading reference. The Second Respondent therefore provided a reference that merely stated: “Joseph was employed by Harrow Club from March 2020 to February 2022 as Youth Worker in Charge, Old Oak Seniors. There were safeguarding concerns and we parted company.”[14]In relation to the second respondent, the Tribunal has now seen (pursuant to its Order for disclosure) the dismissal letter dated 2 February 2022 (dismissing the claimant with immediate effect though paying the claimant 1 weeks’ salary in lieu of notice) for serious or gross misconduct and for a complete breakdown in confidence. The disciplinary charges against the claimant concerned allowing children into the club under the age of 11 for evening sessions, depriving children of food as a punishment and allowing children to travel in taxis without an accomying adult. The breakdown in confidence related to the claimant’s claims of harassment made to the police pursuant to matters of concerns raised with the claimant by the second respondent as his employer.[15]In relation to the third respondent, the Tribunal has now seen (pursuant to its Order for disclosure) the dismissal letter dated 16 February 2024 (dismissing the claimant with effect from 14 February 2024) for failure to successfully complete his probation period. This arose from alleged breach of confidentiality, bringing the respondent into disrepute by contacting the police unnecessarily and because pre-employment references were considered to be false - one of the references was provided by a company registered to the claimant’s home address which had been dissolved on 17 January 2012 but had been listed as the claimant’s place of work between August 1996 to August 2023. The third respondent had regard to two complaints from the claimant dated 14 and 15 September 2023 (said to be 600 pages) and had noted the claimant’s continuous sickness absence since 2 October 2023.[16]In relation to the provision of a reference, the third respondent has now provided (pursuant to its Order for disclosure), a copy of a written reference provided to Future Focus on 3 February 2025 and a separate response to a pro-forma reference request document provided on 28 January 2025. The former was a factual reference only and in the latter, the third respondent confirmed that the claimant was dismissed due to a failure to complete his probation period satisfactorily.[17]In relation to the first respondent, the Tribunal has now seen (pursuant to its Order for disclosure) the dismissal letter dated 2 August 2024. The claimant was dismissed for unauthorised absence stemming from the respondent’s intimation that the claimant’s salary would be reduced as Ofsted had confirmed that the claimant could not hold the position of a dually registered manager. In the dismissal letter the first respondent stated it was not clear why the claimant was not known to Ofsted and that it was a Statutory requirement that any dual registered children’s home manager must have been previously registered with Ofsted. Further that the claimant had refused to return keys to the respondent properties and had raised a grievance (citing race discrimination) but had refused to attend the grievance Hearing.[18]In relation to the provision of a reference, the first respondent accepts it provided an oral reference on an unspecified date in February or March 2025, it believes to Future Focus, broadly confirming the reason for termination as being the inability of the claimant being able to be dual registered as he had not previously been an Ofsted Registered Manger (as above) and he was not interested in doing registered one home instead. Applicable Law[19]The power to strike out a claim is set out in Rule 38 of the ET Rules of Procedure 2024. It says: Striking out – Rule 38 (1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a)that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; (b)that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c)for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d)that it has not been actively pursued; (e)that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out).[20]Under Rule 40, the tribunal is also empowered to make a Deposit Order: Deposit order- Rule 40(1) Where at a preliminary hearing the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim, response or reply has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party (“the depositor”) to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument (“a deposit order”).(2) The Tribunal must make reasonable enquiries into the depositor’s ability to pay the deposit and have regard to any such information when deciding the amount of the deposit.(3) The Tribunal’s reasons for making the deposit order must be provided with the order and the depositor must be notified about the potential consequences of the order.[21]In Xie v Equipe Japan ltd 2024 EAT 176, the EAT provided a reminder about the exceptional nature of striking out claims of discrimination, without hearing the evidence, citing the guidance of Lord Underhill in Ahir v. British Airways Plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1392: “Employment tribunals should not be deterred from striking out claims, including discrimination claims, which involve a dispute of fact if they are satisfied that there is indeed no reasonable prospect of the facts necessary to liability being established and also provided they are keenly aware of the danger of reaching such a conclusion in circumstances where the full evidence has not been heard and explored, perhaps particularly in a discrimination context. Whether the necessary test is met in a particular case depends on an exercise of judgment, and I am not sure that that exercise is assisted by attempting to gloss the well-understood language of the rule by reference toother phrases or adjectives or by debating the difference in the abstract between ‘exceptional’ and ‘most exceptional’ circumstances or other such phrases as may be found in the authorities. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the hurdle is high, and specifically that it is higher than the test for the making of a deposit order, which is that there should be ‘little reasonable prospect of success’[22]In Cox v Adecco UKEAT/0339/29[2021] ICR 1307, HHJ Tayler gave important guidance for when considering potential strike out (para 28). The EAT made it clear that no one gains by truly hopeless cases being pursued to a hearing, further that strike out is not prohibited in discrimination or whistleblowing cases. The EAT did note care and caution needed especially in being able to know what the claimant’s case is and taking it at its highest.[23]In Kaul v Ministry of Justice 2023 EAT 41, HHJ Swift held that the need for caution when considering a strike-out application does not prohibit realistic assessment where the circumstances of the case permit recognising in his conclusion: “…the clear tenor of the authorities, all of which identify the caution Tribunals must apply when dealing with Rule 37(1)(a) applications. However, that submission on its own, is not sufficient for his purpose: the strength attaching to it must be measured in the specifics of the case in hand”[24]Thus, there is no doubt that a discrimination claim may be struck out if the exceptional/high bar is met.[25]When considering whether to strike out a Tribunal must consider whether any of the grounds set out in rule 38(1)(a) to (e) have been established (first stage).[26]Having identified any established ground(s), the Tribunal must then decide whether to exercise its discretion to strike out, given the permissive nature of the rule (second stage).[27]The requirement for this approach was confirmed by the EAT in Hasan v Tesco Stores Ltd UKEAT/0098/16. Analysis & Conclusion[28]The Tribunal adopted a multi-factorial analysis when deliberating on this application: The ‘claims history’ of the claimant was not irrelevant. Whilst previous claims of the claimant cannot be determinative of or dictate the outcome of the applications in this claim, in the Tribunal’s conclusion, they were highly relevant to the assessment about how to proceed with the applications before the Tribunal. In the third respondent’s written submissions, Counsel had referred to 59 claims that the claimant had issued since 2016. Of those, 55 had been for discrimination, harassment and victimisation. All had been withdrawn, struck out or dismissed (for completeness, it is at least apparent from the Watford claim against the LB of Barnet, that where Deposit Orders were made, they had not been paid & the claims struck out). These submissions were not contested. Whilst the claimant is a litigant in person, he is not a regular litigant in person. In the light of the claimant’s voluminous litigation history, he knows full well the territory of strike out applications and Deposit Orders and why Tribunal’s make them The claimant had pleaded his claims without knowledge, sight or any assertion about what had or had not been said in relation to his previous employment with the respondents. It was thus a highly speculative pleading at the outset. He did not provide or volunteer the dismissal reasons when his employment with all three respondents ended. He has not commented on them after they were sent to the Tribunal pursuant to the Tribunal’s invitation to do so. The respondents, each of them, have a prima facie complete answer to the reason why the claimant was dismissed by the respondent. The Tribunal has now seen the dismissal letters and in relation to at least the second and third respondents, the challenge to the reason why for the alleged treatment of the claimant has been litigated and the claims struck out. The claimant’s appeals to the EAT have also failed (though the Tribunal notes there is an outstanding Rule 3(10 application in the EAT in January 2027). However, it remains the case that an EAT Judge has considered the appeal and thus far, it has been rejected. That is not a complete answer to the claimant’s subsequent victimisation complaints against the respondents, but it is highly relevant in assessing whether the claimant’s claims have no reasonable prospects of success or little reasonable prospects of success. The claimant did not comment or challenge at the Hearing or since, why the first respondent’s assertions were not accepted. Whilst that Tribunal claim is live, this Tribunal’s assessment has regard to the composite/holistic analysis herein in its assessment of the victimisation claim The Tribunal has also been provided with copies or details of the references provided by the respondent which mirror the reasons for dismissal. There is nothing before the Tribunal to indicate a causal connection to the doing of a protected act in that it had a significant influence on the respondent. Again, the claimant has not commented on the respondent’s references, now that he has seen or learned what was said. There is no basis advanced as to why it is said they were false. The claimant submitted a 74 page document one day before the Hearing at 18:10 (without copying any of the respondents). The document’s first 12 pages contained a list of names of 377 individuals including multiple ET and EAT Judges, legal practitioners, respondents, MPs, HMCTS administration staff and police officers any many unknown parties, which provided no context or relevance to the applications before the Tribunal in this case. The document also contained a number of complaints against various Judges. The claimant took the Tribunal to one page wherein the claimant said Future Focus had not provided the references obtained about the claimant (page 49) The Tribunal asked the claimant about his means, twice, in the event that the Tribunal was to consider making a Deposit Order if the Tribunal did not strike out the claims. The claimant’s response, twice, was to refuse to provide any response at all on his means and in fact expressly refused to do so. This was an unreasonable challenge to the Tribunal’s authority and disrespectful[29]The Tribunal considered carefully whether to strike out the claimant’s claims as having no reasonable prospects of success. The Tribunal stopped short of doing so, only just, as the Tribunal could not be satisfied absolutely, that the threshold was met. The Tribunal came very close to striking out the claimant’s claims. However, in pursuance of the foregoing analysis and findings and in particular the claims history pertaining to the London Central Harrow Club claim and the Watford claim against the LB of Barnet and the reasons for which the claimant was dismissed and the failed litigation since, the Tribunal had little hesitation in making a Deposit Order as the 3 claims for victimisation against each of the three respondents have little reasonable prospect of success. The reasons for the provision of the references by the respondents appear to be clearly linked to the reasons for dismissal and not to the doing of any protected act.[30]The Tribunal notes that the claimant has previously and relevantly recently (March 2025) been ordered to pay a deposit of £360 (per claim) to pursue his claims. The Tribunal sees no reason to depart from those amounts. Whether or not the claimant’s means may have changed since, is unknown because of the claimant’s refusal, twice, to provide information about his means. Thus pursuant to Rule 40 (2), the Tribunal has made a reasonable enquiry into the claimant’s means. Useful information[31]All judgments and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents.[32]There is information about Employment Tribunal procedures, including case management and preparation, compensation for injury to feelings, and pension loss, here: www.judiciary.uk/publications/employment-rulesand-legislation-practice-directions/[33]The Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure are here: www.gov.uk/government/publications/employment-tribunal-procedurerules[34]You can appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal if you think a legal mistake was made in an Employment Tribunal decision. There is more information here: www.gov.uk/appeal-employment-appeal-tribunal[35]Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings. You can access the Direction and the accompanying Guidance here: https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-andlegislation-practice-directions/ Approved by Regional Judge Khalil 28 May 2026[1]The claimant was ordered to pay a deposit in the sum of £360 in relation to the allegation of victimisation against each of the three respondents within 28 days of the sending of the Order to the parties following a hearing on 13 April 2026.[2]For the avoidance of doubt, the total amount of the Deposit Order was £1,080 in relation to all of the respondents.[3]The claimant has failed to pay the deposit within 28 days of the Orders being sent to the Claimant on 29 May 2026.[4]The claims are therefore dismissed under Rule 39 (1) against each of the respondents. Approved by