Dr J Faulkner v Alder Hey Children's NHS Foundation Trust: 6007785/2026
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6007785/2026
Between
Dr J FaulknerClaimantAlder Hey Children's NHS Foundation TrustRespondent
Before
Employment Judge ShotterMr S Harding (instructed by counsel) for claimantMr S Gorton (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 9 June 2026
JUDGMENT
ON INTERIM RELIEF APPLICATION The Judgment of the Tribunal is that:[1]The Claimant’s application for interim relief pending determination of complaint is refused.[2]A public preliminary hearing is listed to take place on 20 October 2026 starting at 10am or as soon as possible afterwards. The hearing will be a video hearing held remotely. The time estimate for the hearing is 1 day.[3]Having considered the Practice Direction issued by the Senior President of Tribunals on 29 October 2024, and the accompanying Presidential Guidance, this preliminary hearing will be heard by an Employment Judge sitting alone. Judge Shotter will not be the judge at the preliminary hearing. The issues to be decided are set out below. The Tribunal at the Preliminary Hearing may decide not to determine any of these issues if it appears to it to be in accordance with the overriding objective not to do so:[1]If satisfied on that summary assessment that the claim or part of it has no reasonable prospect of success the Tribunal can strike it out.[2]If satisfied that it has little reasonable prospect of success a deposit can be ordered of up to £1,000. Separate deposits can be ordered on separate allegations. It is important that the deposit is not set at a level which the claimant is simply unable to pay, so the Tribunal will take the financial position of the claimant into account if he so wishes in considering what level of deposit might be appropriate.[3]If, of course, the Tribunal is satisfied that the claim or part of it has a reasonable prospect of success there will be no strike out and no deposit will be ordered.[4]Further anonymisation of individuals..[5]Claimant’s application to amend, and[6]Case management to trial.
REASONS
[7]By A claim form presented on the 4 March 2026 the claimant, who was employed as a senior clinician perfusion scientist from 16 July 2011 to 28 February 2026 when he was dismissed for alleged gross misconduct, brings complaints of whistleblowing detriment under section 47B and automatic unfair dismissal under section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the ERA”) and disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 (“the EQA”).[8]The claimant maintains he made eight protected disclosures between the 1 March 2025 to 5 May 2025 and relies on five detriments which allegedly occurred between mid-April 2025 to 28 May 2025, including the disciplinary allegations and disciplinary process which the claimant maintains were retaliatory and “used as a pretext.”[9]The claimant’s application for interim relief is made on the “basis that I am likely to establish at trial that the principal reason for my dismissal was that I made protected disclosures about neonatal CPB safety and governance and I was targeted by the respondent and individuals working there.”[10]This interim relief application feels more like a trial than an application brought under section 126 of the ERA which requires an expedited and prompt determination. It is regretful that there was a delay in my determining this application, which was directly caused by the number of documents and time it took for the application to be heard. It is fortunate that I have been able to bring the hearing forward from the original date it was listed in order to expedite this Judgment. The hearing involved detailed oral submissions made on behalf of both parties. The way this application has been put by the claimant, who relies on a substantial number of documents and detailed arguments, coupled with the detailed responses made by the respondent points away from it being a suitable case for interim relief given there are clearly triable issues. I have before me the following documents:10.1 Claimant’s Skeleton Argument, chronology and dramatis personae which runs to 24 pages.10.2 Outer Chamber note on interim relief (undated).10.3 Claimant’s bundle which runs to 204 documents.10.4 Respondent’s note for interim relief application10.5 Respondent’s bundle of 380 pages.10.6 Transcripts 12 March 2025 to 14 May 202510.7 Written Submissions Simon Harding dated 5 May 2026 which run to 31 pages.10.8 Respondent’s chronology10.9 Respondent’s note for interim relief application prepared by Simon Gorton dated 5 May 2026 which runs to 10 pages.
The legal framework
[11]The parties agree as to the relevant law, and I have considered the legal principles set out both written submissions/skeleton arguments. 128.— Interim relief pending determination of complaint.(1) An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— (i) section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or (ii) paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, or (b) that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was the one specified in the opening words of section 104F(1) and the condition in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was met, may apply to the tribunal for interim relief.(2) The tribunal shall not entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination (whether before, on or after that date).(3) The tribunal shall determine the application for interim relief as soon as practicable after receiving the application.(4) The tribunal shall give to the employer not later than seven days before the date of the hearing a copy of the application together with notice of the date, time and place of the hearing.(5) The tribunal shall not exercise any power it has of postponing the hearing of an application for interim relief except where it is satisfied that special circumstances exist which justify it in doing so. Section 129 ERA provides that if: “on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find — (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in — (i) 103A… the tribunal shall (subject to prior procedural steps set out in subparagraphs 2-9) make an order for the continuation of the employee's contract of employment.”[12]On the meaning of “likely” the Tribunal should ask whether the applicant has established a “pretty good chance of succeeding” in the final application: Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068, EAT, at [23].[13]In Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562 at [16] the EAT explained that “likely” “does not mean simply 'more likely than not' — that is at least 51 per cent — but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood”.[14]In Al Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17/JOJ at [11] HHJ Eady QC (as she then was) said: “Where… interim relief is sought in a whistleblowing case under section 103A ERA, the Claimant must show that it is likely that the ET will find(1) that she made her disclosure to the employer,(2) that she believed that disclosure tended to show one or more of the things itemised in section 43B(1)(a)-(f),(3) that her belief was reasonable,(4) that the disclosure was made in good faith, and(5) that the disclosure was the principal cause of the dismissal” [my emphasis].[15]She continued at [59]–[60]: “I start by reminding myself of the exercise that the ET had to undertake on this application. By its nature, the application had to be determined expeditiously and on a summary basis… His task was thus very much an impressionistic one: to form a view as to how the matter looked, as to whether the Claimant had a pretty good chance and was likely to make out her case… The nature of interim relief also informs the approach the EAT has to take. An ET is charged with this summary assessment, precisely because it is best qualified to carry out this role; an Employment Judge will have the experience of having heard many similar cases at Full Hearing and will thus be able to bring that experience to bear in determining what is likely to be the outcome of the case thus presented on a summary basis.”[16]Interim relief orders are a draconian measure as was highlighted in Dandpat v The University of Bath UKEAT/0408/09/LA causing irretrievable prejudice to a Respondent and thus not one that should be “imposed lightly”, Underhill J.
Conclusion
[17]I am reminded that this is a summary application and I must do the best I can to make as good an assessment as possible on the material before me and be careful not to avoid findings that may tie the hands of the trial judge. This means that despite the arguments put before me, I cannot determine whether the claimant made the protected disclosures allegedly relied on and whether his detriment claims have any merit. I do not intend to explore the intricate detail involved in determining whether a protected disclosure was made or not. I have been referred to the legal principles required to assess whether one or all of the disclosures relied on by the claimant are qualifying disclosures that fall within section 43A ERA 1996 which provides: “in this Act a 'protected disclosure' means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.”[18]I am aware that the claimant must establish that he has a pretty good chance of succeeding in every element necessary to establish not only that each ingredient of each disclosure is protected and qualifying, together with the reason or principal reason for his dismissal is a protected qualifying disclosure.[19]There is one matter in this litigation that is beyond dispute, and that is the claimant’s admissions of gross misconduct relating to allegations that go back to May 2024 before the claimant made his first verbal disclosure orally on the 1 March 2025 about neonatal cases. The claimant’s case is that historic May 2024 allegations were re-activated a year later as retaliation and the principles set out in Royal Mail Group Ltd v Jhuti [2019] UKSC 55, [2020] ICR 731 (“Jhuti”) relied on by the claimant. Mr Harding in oral submissions accepted that “there is no doubt the claimant did something wrong, the claimant has made admissions.” The “something wrong” alleged against the claimant included complaints of sexual harassment which I do not intend to go into in any detail. In written submissions Mr Harding confirmed the claimant “accepts that there is a conduct case to answer at the substantive hearing. He accepts that the matters admitted by the claimant, on the face of the disciplinary panel's findings, engage the NHS Sexual Safety Charter. The narrower question for interim relief is not whether the conduct events occurred. The Claimant has admitted that some of them did. The question is whether the Claimant is likely to establish, on the documents now before the Tribunal, that the principal reason the dormant May 2024 matters were resurrected, formalised, expanded by the late addition of further allegations, and carried to summary dismissal.[20]Mr Harding submitted that the respondent's principal conduct allegations derive from a social event on 26 May 2024. Across the 12 months that followed, no formal step of any kind was taken. The Head of Theatre Services confirmed in writing on 14 January 2026 that as of March 2025 he was “not aware there was an issue” and that no manager other than the Claimant himself had mentioned the May 2024 falling out . The claimant’s line manager is relied on as the person (the Iago) orchestrating the claimant’s dismissal. The claimant’s line manager wrote critical documents about claimant. It is undisputed The claimant’s line manager was not the investigating, disciplinary or appeal officer hence the claimant’s reliance on the principles set out in Jhuti above. In short, the claimant’s line manager is the manipulator, there is a hidden motive (the disclosures), invented reasons (the allegations of sexual misconduct), decision maker manipulation by his line manager (who allegedly shaped the investigation) which resulted in the claimant’s dismissal. Mr Harding points to the investigation interview held on the 27 September 2025 with the claimant’s line manager where he records his dislike of the claimant, described him as “a narcissist.” The claimant’s case seems to be that the record of his line manager’s investigation interview was part of the investigation report bundle reflecting the “strong animus” held towards the claimant which “crystallised” when his line manager “learned” of the protected disclosures. Disciplinary hearings[21]I have been referred to the note taken at the disciplinary hearing held on 30 January 2026 which includes the following said by the claimant, who was represented by Unison: “I have been through hell. I will never, ever, ever again, and you can quote me and if you are gracious enough, I would never ever, you would never hear from me. I thought I was in a safe space with people I thought were my friends. I thought it was reciprocal. I did honestly think they were my friends. I admit I left myself wide open for it, and I have no one to blame but myself in terms of this. I know the consequences. I’m sorry I trusted these people and opened myself up to them. I’m sorry for how much time money and effort this has caused the locums they would need to bring to cover the service, it is not just a simple case of being off for nine months. I have cost Alder Hey big time. I know it is a gamble letting me back in, but I will tell you what, I will make sure I repay everything in terms of working behaviour. I am sorry.” I find this note undermines the claimant’s application for interim relief. Dismissal outcome letter dated 26 February 2026[22]I have considered the 32 page outcome letter dated 26 February 2026 following a disciplinary hearing held on 20, 22 and 30 January 2026 which refers to the “large amount of information presented within the investigation report, the number of witnesses, and its complex nature.” Three allegations involving sexual harassment dated June 2024, 28 November 2024, 6 and 11 March 2025 and various dates in April 2025, and there is a reference to the claimant’s colleagues feeling “vulnerable” and “uncomfortable” in his presence. Four witnesses (three female and one male) refused to attend the hearing because they felt intimidated by the claimant and gave written evidence. The claimant’s line manager was not one of those witnesses. The allegations were considered serious by the respondent. Ten witnesses gave evidence at the disciplinary hearing. It is notable the claimant’s line manager did not give evidence and nor was he called to give evidence by either party, including the claimant, despite the claimant’s argument today that his line manager was the “Iago” in his dismissal. The outcome letter records that the claimant had requested to put questions to several staff members in addition to the investigating officer. The claimant’s line manager was not mentioned.[23]The outcome letter included a detailed record of the claimant’s statement of case which makes no mention of the claimant’s line manager acting as the Iago in a whistleblowing situation, and the claimant’s allegations raised in these proceedings of detriment are not referenced although mention is made of disability discrimination and the EQA alleging he was being “punished” due to his mental health condition. The claimant made no reference to being “punished” for whistleblowing.[24]The outcome letter reflected the claimant’s denial to most of the allegations, and his admission to making a sexual comment to a colleague “you know where I am if you ever want to sit on my face” and to another female colleague saying she had her “f*uck off face on.”[25]A summary of responses made by witnesses was set out, including replies to questions put by the claimant’s trade union representative and the “significant number of questions” put to the investigating officer and her responses which recorded the following “…she stated as case investigator she and…HR advisor, were not aware of any protected disclosures apart from your comments that you classed yourself as whistleblower. You were given the opportunity to share information and documentation as you felt appropriate and decided not to do so.”[26]The dismissing officer concluded that the claimant had accepted making an inappropriate conversation on the 26 May 2024, and it breached the NHS Sexual Safety Charter; “it is my belief, based on your own admission, that you did make an inappropriate sexually explicit comment to a colleague and I therefore uphold this allegations.” The claimant was found to have caused female colleagues to feel intimidated in his presence following evidence given by “multiple witnesses” and “the breadth of these examples come from a number of colleagues in different areas, roles and banding and demonstrate a consistent theme which constitutes a serious breach of Trust, Values and Behaviours.” Reference was made to sexual language and sexualised comments and sexual harassment amounting to sexual misconduct at work and breaching the Sexual Safety Charter.[27]The claimant was also found to have caused female colleagues to feel vulnerable in his presence inside and outside work, including when picking up a child at the same school attended by the claimant’s children, and poor behaviour in a clinical setting towards female colleagues.[28]The claimant was found to have engaged in “inappropriate communication with a female colleague by the placement of crude and offensive messages via Postit notes” having admitted to the allegation in the third investigation “where you had reflected upon this behaviour…the impact your actions have had upon X (name redacted) are profound and you failed to recognise this or taken any ownership or accountability for your action, nor have you been apologetic to X.” The claimant’s behaviour was found to have breached the NHS Safety Charter and Code of Ethical Conduct, Standards of Practice and Code of Practice of the Society of Clinical Perfusion Scientists and the College of Clinical Perfusion Scientists.” The claimant’s employment was terminated with immediate effect and his professional body informed.[29]Mr Gorton submitted the outcome letter was a “real time insight” into what the disciplinary manager was saying, and the evidence of the claimant’s line manager was beside the point as the case was all about individual complaints brought by a number of the claimant’s colleagues about his conduct and inappropriate behaviour which had nothing to do with the line manager. On the evidence before me I agreed with this analysis, and it is difficult to discern some form of large scale conspiracy to exit the claimant because he had made disclosures. Appeal[30]The claimant appealed alleging whistleblowing detriment and automatic unfair dismissal. Conclusion[31]Mr Harding argued that it was superficially attractive” to conclude that the claimant made admissions and was dismissed for them and there is clearly enough behind the scenes which shows opposite position. I preferred the argument put forward by Mr Gorton that the conduct admitted to by the claimant was “reprehensible” and not one would expect to see from a forty year old male doctor towards a female healthcare assistant in her twenties. I have read the post it notes in question; a number of which were sexually explicit and offensive, for example, “X [name of employee redacted] has no genitals. She is smooth like Barbie,” “X’s face looks like a rabbit that’s been run over” and “X use[d] to have a winky but it fell off” with a downward smiley face.[32]Mr Gorton further submitted that there was “not a shred of evidence” that the claimant’s line manager had influence on the disciplinary process and conspired with other employees (who have not been named). I agree, and take the view that on the evidence before me it is apparent numerous employees raised serious complaints against the claimant over a period of time that was not limited to 2024 and the claimant was dismissed for a number of allegations ranging from offensive sexist remarks and comments to controlling and inappropriate behaviours towards females in breach of the respondent’s policies as recorded in the letter of dismissal.[33]Taking into account the information I have referred to above, particularly the claimant’s response to the allegations at the 30 January 2026 disciplinary hearing, I conclude that the claimant does not have a “pretty good chance” of establishing at the final hearing that that the true and principal reason for his dismissal was a series of alleged disclosures and not the gross misconduct the claimant admitted to and was found against him after numerous witnesses gave evidence and were questioned, including by the claimant and his representative, at a lengthy disciplinary process and hearing. The claimant does not have a “pretty good chance” of establishing there was either a wholescale conspiracy on the part of his colleagues and/or that his line manager had a retaliatory motive that somehow influenced the dismissing officer who heard a vast amount of evidence, from a range of colleagues making serious allegations about the claimant’s behaviour which formed the bedrock of the outcome letter from which it was clear that the dismissing officer took into account the claimant’s admissions to serious allegations and preferred the evidence of colleagues to that given by the claimant when it came to allegations he disputed had taken place.[34]The claimant does not have a “pretty good chance” of establishing the Jhuti point against a disciplinary process where the dismissing officer took into account direct evidence given by employees of the claimant’s behaviour towards them, particularly female colleagues.[35]I was referred to the analysis by HHJ Auerbach in Kong v Gulf International Bank [EAT 10092021] and agreed with Mr Gorton that the claimant’s section 103A claim was “hopeless” and I take the view the claimant had no or little reasonable prospect of succeeding in the automatic unfair dismissal claim: “[64] I start with the attribution ground, and, first, a brief review of some authorities. The starting point, recently reiterated by Underhill LJ in Beatt v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust [2017] ICR 1240 at [30], remains that, when considering a s 103A claim, as with any unfair dismissal claim, the “reason” for the dismissal “connotes the factor or factors operating on the mind of the decision-maker which causes them to take the decision.” [65] However, in The Co-Operative Group Limited v Baddeley [2014] EWCA Civ 658 at [42] (and though the scenario did not fit the facts of the case) Underhill LJ was prepared to contemplate that the net might be cast wider where the facts known to, or beliefs held by, the actual decision-maker “have been manipulated by some other person involved in the disciplinary process who has an inadmissible motivation … at least where he was a manager with some responsibility for the investigation.” In Royal Mail v Jhuti [2018] ICR 982 he essentially restated that formulation. In particular, he concluded that the earlier decision in Orr (above) precluded the exception being extended to the distinct factual scenario in that case. [66] In Cadent Gas Limited v Singh [2020] IRLR 86, a Mr Huckerby played a leading part in investigating an incident involving the employee. The EAT (Choudhury P and members) accepted, at [55], that, for the approach expounded by the Court of Appeal in Jhuti to be applicable, “some manipulation must be evident”. They observed, at [56], that manipulation could take many forms. “If a manager is as heavily involved in directing the investigation as Mr Huckerby clearly was and plays the kind of role that he did in steering the investigation towards a disciplinary hearing and dismissal, there is a much stronger case for attribution.” [67] In Jhuti in the Supreme Court Lord Wilson JSC (with whom the other Justices agreed) endorsed Underhill LJ’s formulation but also developed the exception. However, he did so in a manner closely tailored to the particular facts of the case. He observed at [40] that at first sight the question raised by the appeal “seems to be of wide importance”; but he continued at [41]: “On the other hand, as the company acknowledges, the facts of the present case are extreme:-(a) an employee on trial blows the whistle upon improper conduct on the part of her line manager’s team;(b) her line manager responds by deciding to pretend that the employee’s performance of her duties is inadequate and to secure a conclusion that she has failed her trial period;(c) over the next months he bullies and harasses her with targets, meetings and an improvement plan, by which he sets her up to fail;(d) he succeeds in creating, in emails and otherwise, a false picture of her inadequate performance;(e) the decision to dismiss the employee is made by an officer who, in her review of the evidence, fails to perceive the falsity of the picture which he has created; and(f) in particular the employee, in no condition to meet the decision-maker or otherwise to present her case clearly to her, fails to help her to understand the falsity of the picture. Instances of decisions to dismiss taken in good faith, not just for a wrong reason but for a reason which the employee’s line manager has dishonestly constructed, will not be common.” [68] This paved the way for the ultimate ratio, at [60]: “If a person in the hierarchy of responsibility above the employee (here Mr Widmer as Ms Jhuti’s line manager) determines that, for reason A (here the making of protected disclosures), the employee should be dismissed but that reason A should be hidden behind an invented reason B which the decision-maker adopts (here inadequate performance), it is the court’s duty to penetrate through the invention rather than to allow it also to infect its own determination. If limited to a person placed by the employer in the hierarchy of responsibility above the employee, there is no conceptual difficulty about attributing to the employer that person’s state of mind rather than that of the deceived decision-maker” [my emphasis]. [69] Importantly, he added, at [61]: “There is no need to overrule the decision in the Orr case [2011] ICR 704; by our decision we attach only a narrow qualification to it.” [70] In Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2021] ICR 695, Jhuti (which had at that point been decided by the Court of Appeal) was found by the EAT to have no application to the facts at hand. The EAT’s reasoning was later adopted by the Court of Appeal (by which point Jhuti had been decided the Supreme Court). Bean LJ, for the Court, observed (at [38]) that it did not make any difference whether the test was of “manipulation” of the person who decided to dismiss (per the Court of Appeal in Jhuti) or of the “construction of an invented reason to conceal a hidden reason” (per the Supreme Court). The alleged manipulators in the instant case had played no part in the disciplinary decision or any formal investigation. One of them had in fact for a long time pushed back against the possibility of Mr Simpson being dismissed. [71] In University Hospital North Tees & Hartlepool NHS Foundation Trust v Fairhall, UKEAT/0150/20, 30 June 2021 the EAT (HHJ James Tayler) observed, at [36] – [37] that, in a case where there is an overall plan to remove a whistle-blower from a large organisation, a number of managers may be in the know, and the overall circumstantial evidence may be found to support the conclusion that the decision-maker was acting in accordance with that plan. By contrast, the situation in Jhuti “where the decision maker is unaware of the machinations of those motivated by the prohibited reason, is probably quite rare. It is only in such cases that it is necessary to attribute a reason to the decision maker that was not, in fact, the reason operating in his or her mind when the decision to dismiss was taken.” [72] I note the following points. First, the general rule that the motivation that can be ascribed to the employer is only that of the decision-maker(s) continues to apply. Secondly, there is no warrant to extend the exceptions beyond the scenario described by Underhill LJ, which will itself be a relatively rare occurrence, and the surely highly unusual variation encountered in Jhuti. Thirdly, whether in the scenario contemplated by Underhill LJ, or in the variation described by Lord Wilson, two common features are that (a) the person whose motivation is attributed to the employer sought to procure the employee’s dismissal for the proscribed reason; and (b) the decision-maker was peculiarly dependent upon that person as the source for the underlying facts and information concerning the case. A third essential feature is that their role or position be of the particular kind described in either scenario, so as to make it appropriate for their motivation to be attributed to the employer – the Jhuti case.”[36]Turning to the two common features (a) and (b) it is apparent from the outcome letter that the investigation officer and the dismissing officer was not dependent on the claimant’s line manager and took into account evidence given by the female employees who went forward on 12 March 2025 and numerous others, With reference to the claimant’s line manager it is unlikely any motivation he may have for his witness evidence setting out his dislike of the claimant, will make it appropriate to be attributed to the dismissing officer and I take the view the claimant is unlikely to succeed in his claim that the line manager fed false information to get him dismissed taking into account all of the features in this case. I reiterate that in arriving at this decision I have not made findings that might tie the hands of the tribunal ultimately charged with the final determination of the merits of the points raised.[37]In conclusion, an order for interim relief is draconian and in this case were I to make such an order it would result in irretrievable prejudice to the respondent given the claimant does not have a pretty good chance in succeeding in any of his claims, in fact the reverse is the case. Having spent today considering the application and documents to which I was taken to, I am satisfied that a preliminary hearing should be listed to determine whether or not a deposit order should be made on the basis that the case has little or no reasonable prospect of success.[38]The respondent seeks a strike out and/or deposit order, the claimant seeks to amend his claim and objects to an anonymity order for a number of the individuals. I have listed it for the one hearing as set out above before a judge sitting alone by video. The parties have 14 days to apply for an adjournment providing cogent reasons and evidence. CASE MANAGEMENT ORDERS LEADING TO THE PUBLIC PRELIMINARY
HEARING.
[39]In preparation for the preliminary hearing, I have made the following case management orders Strike Out or Deposit Applications[40]At the next preliminary hearing the Tribunal will hear submissions from the respondent as to why the claims or part of them lack merit and then hear from the claimant in response. No evidence will be heard but the Tribunal will consider any key documents as part of considering the submission of each party.[41]If satisfied on that summary assessment that the claim or part of it has no reasonable prospect of success the Tribunal can strike it out.[42]If satisfied that it has little reasonable prospect of success a deposit can be ordered of up to £1,000. Separate deposits can be ordered on separate allegations. It is important that the deposit is not set at a level which the claimant is simply unable to pay, so the Tribunal will take the financial position of the claimant into account if he so wishes in considering what level of deposit might be appropriate.[43]If, of course, the Tribunal is satisfied that the claim or part of it has a reasonable prospect of success there will be no strike out and no deposit will be ordered.[44]Anonymisation of remaining witnesses including the line manager referenced above.[45]Claimant’s application to amend based on an Amended Grounds of Complaint to be sent to the respondent no later than 14 days after this Judgment and Reasons have been sent to the parties. If the application to amend is not set out in an amended Grounds of Complaint which is highlighted where amended, the Judge may not consider the application.[46]Case management leading to trial. Correspondence and co-operation[47]The Tribunal does not need to be copied into correspondence between the parties. A party should contact the Tribunal only if directed to do so, or if asking the Tribunal to make a case management order. However, if either side has to contact the Tribunal, rule 90 requires all correspondence to the Tribunal to be copied to the other side. Correspondence not copied to the other side might not be considered by the Tribunal. The only exception to this is where a party applies for an order compelling a witness to attend the hearing to give evidence.[48]The parties are also reminded of their obligation under rule 3 to assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective of dealing with the case fairly and justly, and in particular to co-operate generally with other parties and with the Tribunal. CASE MANAGEMENT ORDERS Made pursuant to the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure
HEARING.
[1]Preliminary Hearing Preparation1.1 By no later than 14-days from the date the Judgment is sent to the parties both parties must have provided to the other party a copy of any document in their control or possession which is relevant to any issue to be determined at the preliminary hearing listed for 20 October 2026 (“the Preliminary Hearing”).1.2 By no later than 56 days from the date the Judgment is sent to the parties the respondent must have put together a file containing those documents disclosed by the parties and required at the Preliminary Hearing (the “Preliminary Hearing Bundle”). The parties must cooperate with each other in assembling and agreeing the Preliminary Hearing Bundle contents and index. The agreed bundle will be limited to 300 pages.1.3 By no later than 56 days from the date the Judgment is sent to the parties the claimant will send to the respondent a signed statement or means (income and expenditure) and evidence attached such as bank statements, investments/savings and so on.1.4 No later than 14 days before the preliminary hearing the parties will exchange written submissions/skeleton arguments limited to 20 pages in length to which they will speak at the preliminary hearing for no longer than one hour each. Any case law relied on will be highlighted and copied to each other and for the Judge. Word versions of the submissions will be provided to the Judge.[2]Other matters2.1 Anyone affected by any of these orders may apply for it to be varied, suspended or set aside. Any further applications should be made on receipt of these orders or as soon as possible.2.2 You can appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal if you think a legal mistake was made in an Employment Tribunal case management order. There is more information here: https://www.gov.uk/appeal-employmentappeal-tribunal2.3 All judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case. Parties are encouraged to make a note of any oral judgment given by the Tribunal as it may not be necessary then for written reasons to be provided. If written reasons are requested they too will be published online and will be accessible to the public.2.4 Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings. You can access the Direction and the accompanying Guidance here: Practice Directions and Guidance for Employment Tribunals (England and Wales) - Courts and Tribunals Judiciary Approved by: