Miss A Mondal v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust: 6007366/2024 and 6019143/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6007366/2024, 6019143/2024

Between

Miss A MondalClaimant

Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation TrustRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Ramsden

Date 3 November 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant worked for the Respondent from 16 April 2021 until 30 June 2024. She held various positions during that time, latterly the role of Programme Management Office Analyst.

[2]The Claimant was dismissed by the Respondent on 30 June 2024, by reason of redundancy.

[3]After a period of ACAS Early Conciliation that began on 18 July 2024 and ended on 22 July 2024, the Claimant presented a Claim Form to the Tribunal on 1 August 2024, given the case number 6007366/2024 by the Tribunal (Claim 1). In Claim 1 the Claimant complained that she had suffered race and sex discrimination at the hands of the Respondent, and victimisation, contrary to the Equality Act 2010 (the 2010 Act). The Claimant’s complaints: 1 of 54 a) Of direct race discrimination, numbering 27, are alleged to have occurred over the period 2012 to May 2024; b) Of direct sex discrimination, a single allegation, relating to conduct from 2012 to 2014; c) Of harassment related to race, numbering 14, from 3 May 2012 to March 2021; d) Of harassment related to sex, numbering 15, from 2012 to December 2023; and e) Victimisation, numbering three detriments, in 2013, November 2023 and on 30 June 2024.

[4]After commencing ACAS Early Conciliation on 18 November 2024, the Claimant presented a further Claim Form to the Tribunal on 19 November, given the case number 6019143/2024 by the Tribunal (Claim 2), before ACAS Early Conciliation completed on 21 November 2024. In Claim 2 the Claimant complained that: a) She had suffered age and disability discrimination at the hands of the Respondent contrary to the 2010 Act; b) She had been unfairly dismissed, contrary to section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 Act); and c) She had made a protected disclosure was then subjected to a capability process by way of detriment on the grounds of having done so, contrary to section 47B of the 1996 Act.

[5]A Preliminary Hearing for the Case Management of Claim 1 and Claim 2 (together, the Claims) took place on 24 July 2025 before EJ Burge. At that hearing: a) EJ Burge determined that the Claims would be heard together; b) The Claimant withdraw her age and disability discrimination, and protected disclosure detriment, complaints, which EJ Burge proceeded to dismiss; c) A list of issues was drawn up pertaining to the remaining complaints in the Claims; and d) This hearing was listed.

[6]EJ Burge also made various Orders for preparatory steps to be taken in anticipation of this hearing, including: a) The Claimant was to prepare a witness statement to the Tribunal about:(i) Why she put in her claim when she did, and why not earlier;

(ii) What she knew about her rights and when;

(iii) Whether she was aware of any time limits which applied;

(iv) How and when she became aware of those time limits; 2 of 54

(v) What advice she received about her claim, such as from ACAS, the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB), or other bodies (not revealing legal advice); and

(vi) What research she undertook into the issue, whether online or elsewhere; b) The Claimant was to disclose to the Respondent documents relevant to why she put her Claims in when she did; c) The Claimant was to disclose diary entries relating to the alleged protected acts from 2012 and 2013; and d) Each side was permitted to make written submissions about the issues to be decided in this hearing.

[7]Those Orders were complied with by the parties.

[8]In addition, and not anticipated at the Case Management hearing, the Claimant has since made four express applications to amend her Claims, on each of: a) 8 August 2025; b) 11 August 2025; c) 3 October 2025; and d) 10 October 2025.

[9]The Respondent objected to all those applications. The matters to be determined at this hearing

[10]EJ Burge listed this Public Preliminary Hearing to decide the following matters: a) Whether the discrimination and victimisation complaints (which were brought in Claim 1) were made in time; b) If not, whether it is just and equitable for time to be extended; c) Whether the Claimant’s unfair dismissal complaint (brought in Claim 2) was brought in time; d) If not, whether it not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to put in the claim on time, and if it was put in within such further reasonable period; e) Whether or not all or any of the allegations of discrimination or victimisation should be struck out, as the Claimant has “no reasonable prospects of success” in showing the allegations form part of “conduct extending over a period” for the purposes of section 123(3) of the 2010 Act, pursuant to Rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 (the ET Rules); f) Whether the Claimant has no reasonable prospects of succeeding in her contention that, in respect of the discrimination and victimisation 3 of 54 complaints brought outside the primary time limit, it is “just and equitable” for time to be extended for the Tribunal to hear and determine them, and whether, if so, those complaints should be struck out pursuant to Rule 38(1)(a) of the ET Rules; and g) Whether the Claimant’s first complaint of victimisation has “no reasonable prospects of success” because she has “no reasonable prospect” of persuading the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that the only averred “protected acts” (for section 27(2) of the 2010 Act purposes) that had taken place by that time – being complaints she made in 2012 and 2013 – were protected acts, and if so, whether that complaint should be struck out pursuant to Rule 38(1)(a) of the ET Rules. The hearing

[11]The Respondent was represented in the hearing by Miss Sharp. The Claimant presented her own case, and gave oral evidence to the Tribunal.

[12]The parties had agreed a hearing bundle of 230 pages.

[13]Each of the Claimant and the Respondent made oral submissions to supplement their written ones in support of their respective positions. Clarification

[14]Upon questioning by the Employment Judge, the Claimant provided some dates for those complaints in the list of issues which did not have dates: a) The direct race complaint at paragraph 6(19): between May 2019 until around November 2022; b) The harassment related to sex complaint at paragraph 19(2)v: between 9 and 13 March 2020; and c) The harassment related to sex complaint at paragraph 19(2)ix: between late June 2020 and December 2020.

[15]While the list of issues referred to the Respondent seeking Deposit Orders, the Respondent confirmed that it was not in fact asking the Tribunal to impose Deposit Orders.

[16]Ms Sharp for the Respondent sought clarification as to whether the Claimant was pursuing the same matters raised by her as direct race discrimination as direct sex discrimination as well (there was some thought that this had been said in the Case Management Hearing before EJ Burge, although not referred to in EJ Burge’s List of Issues) – the Claimant confirmed she was not. Withdrawal

[17]The Employment Judge noted that the Final Hearing of this matter is listed for five days in July 2026. With that in mind, she urged the Claimant to give some 4 of 54 meaningful consideration to which amendments she wished to pursue, and whether there were any complaints she wished to withdraw (noting that the consequence of any withdrawal would be the dismissal of those complaints by the Employment Judge, so those complaints could not be resurrected). The Employment Judge noted that the London South Employment Tribunal is now listing long cases – of ten days of more – in 2029. The number of allegations currently pursued by the Claimant could not be heard and determined in the existing listing, and so either: a) The number of allegations would need to be reduced sufficiently that those could be heard and determined in five days (by withdrawal by her, or if they are found to be out of time, or struck-out by the Employment Judge); or b) The Final Hearing would need to be relisted for a later date.

[18]The Claimant withdrew her reliance on one protected act – being the complaint she made about HS in September 2012 (at paragraph 27(1) of the list of issues). That part of the Claimant’s Claims is hereby dismissed upon its withdrawal.

[19]In addition, the Claimant confirmed that she wished to withdraw the complaints listed at paragraph 6(2) and 6(11) of the list of issues, i.e., the direct race complaints pertaining to: a) What was said on 15 April 2013 by TW; and b) The failure of WC on 8 June 2014 to offer the Claimant a phased return to work after she had been off sick for a month. Those complaints are dismissed upon their withdrawal by the Claimant. Applications to amend

[20]The Employment Judge enquired of the parties whether they considered it sensible to first deal with the Claimant’s amendment applications, as it seemed illogical to deal with the listed preliminary issue of whether matters within the scope of the Claims were presented in time but leave amendment applications seeking to raise matters that cover a similarly wide time-span to be dealt with subsequently. The Respondent agreed, and the Claimant did not express a firm view.

[21]Some significant time (around two hours of the hearing) was spent going through five documents which were or may have been applications to amend made by the Claimant on each of: a) 11 August 2025 (in a document labelled “Amendment to claim, to add to further particulars of claim”); b) A second application from 11 August 2025 (in a document set out in the form of a letter to EJ Burge and the Respondent’s legal advisers about 5 of 54 why the Claimant wishes to maintain her victimisation complaints, which in fact sought to expand those complaints); c) 3 October 2025 (an email labelled as an application to amend), which was confirmed by the Claimant to repeat the second application; d) 10 October 2025, by email entitled “6007366/2024 – Amendment to claim”; and e) The Claimant’s “Summary of key issues” document, prepared for this hearing by her on 17 October 2025, to work out:(i) What was already part of the Claims;

(ii) What was included in those documents by the Claimant by way of narrative background (not requiring an amendment to the Claims);

(iii) What was an amendment that had been sought at the time the application was made but is no longer pursued by her; and

(iv) What was an amendment sought at the time the application was made and is pursued as an amendment.

[22]This exercise produced the following list of amendments sought to be made by the Claimant: a) An amendment to add a new allegation that, in October 2020, “SG” was hostile towards the Claimant when she challenged her regarding the new line management by “TA”, which was said by her to be direct race discrimination; b) An amendment to add a new allegation that “SS” was hostile towards the Claimant when the Claimant had a Teams meeting with her in October 2021 when the Claimant raised concerns about a comment made by “ST” about a car being stolen, which was said by her to be direct race discrimination; c) An amendment to add a new protected act, being an oral discussion between the Claimant and SS in October 2021, both because the Claimant says she raised concerns about:(i) A racist comment made by ST about “IC”’s number plate in March 2021 (that comment, said by the Claimant to have been made in March 2021, already appears in the list of issues as an allegation of harassment related to race at paragraph 15(9)(vi)); and

(ii) “CL” referring to national orgasm day (that comment, said by the Claimant to have been made on 3 August 2021, already appears in the list of issues as an allegation of harassment related to sex at paragraph 19(3)(i), and an allegation of sexual harassment at paragraph 23(1) of the list of issues); 6 of 54 d) The addition of a new protected act on 25 November 2021, when she says she sent a timeline in the form of a grievance to SS, which was said to refer to issues of race discrimination, harassment, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and victimisation; e) A new act of detriment on the grounds that the Claimant had done a protected act, being the reduction of the Claimant’s role by (i) removing her from working on the Cora PPM tool (said to have been done by “DR”), and reducing the number of meetings the Claimant was invited to, both of which she says occurred in 2022; f) A new act of detriment on the grounds that the Claimant had done a protected act, being the failure to appoint her to the Band 8A role advertised in both April and November 2023, and the failure to provide the Claimant with feedback on her November 2023 application; and g) A new act of detriment on the grounds that the Claimant had done a protected act, being the failure of “BS” to move the Claimant to work on the Optimisation of the IT system in October 2023 when that system went “live”.

[23]Each party made submissions in relation to these amendments sought to be made by the Claimant. a) The Claimant said that the balance of injustice and hardship should be seen as weighing in favour of permitting the amendments because:(i) They formed part of a continuous act with the other events that already form part of her Claims;

(ii) She would be severely disadvantaged were the amendments not to be permitted;

(iii) Although these matters all relate to matters that are, on-the-faceof-it, out of time, it is just and equitable to extend time to include them; and

(iv) These do not widen her Claims, but rather presented a fuller picture of what happened. They were not significant changes, but just relabelling of existing matters already within the scope of the Claims. b) The Respondent disagreed with the Claimant’s conclusion, asserting that the balance of injustice and hardship lies firmly in rejecting the amendments because: (i) The Claimant had not sufficiently particularised them (British Gas v Basra

UKEAT/0194/14/DM

). She did so today, only with the enquiries of the Tribunal; 7 of 54 (ii) The Claimant has repeatedly sought to expand and expand the scope of the Claims. This is contrary to case authority such as that of Chandhok v Tirkey. A line needs to be drawn – it is not proportionate for the Claimant to seek to amend and expand her Claims repeatedly; (iii) The amendments sought relate to historic matters. The Respondent would be significantly prejudiced by granting them. If the Claimant had raised these matters timeously, the Respondent could have taken steps to investigate them and create contemporaneous records of what the people involved with them had to say about the matters complained of; (iv) While the Claimant has presented the amendments as “just relabelling”, that is not the case. An entirely new occurrence has been raised in the putative protected act of 25 November 2021, three entirely new victimisation detriments, and matters which were raised as complaints of sex or race matters are now said to have formed the basis for a protected act which was the reason for detriments. This adds to the enquiries the Respondent would have to make, but it is hampered in doing so by the passage of time. Some of the personnel involved have since left the Respondent’s employ (such as the Claimant’s line manager ), and others will be impeded in resisting these matters because of the inevitable memory fade;

(v) The delay in raising these matters was entirely avoidable. They all relate to matters which were in the Claimant’s knowledge at the time they occurred, and she is only raising them now because she has recently sought legal advice – which is something she could have done at the time of presenting the Claims. Moreover, the Claimant sought legal advice in July 2024 ahead of presenting Claim 1, and was advised that out-of-time claims were still considered. She could and should have sought advice about the matters that form the basis for these amendments at that time;

(vi) The Respondent has already expended much in time and costs on these Claims already, it is not reasonable for it to come under a significant amount more investigating an expansion of the Claims with some very historic matters;

(vii) The Tribunal should take account of merits. For example, the Claimant will not only have to prove that she did a protected act when she spoke to Mrs Storey in October 2021, she will need to prove that the person who subjected her to the alleged detriments knew of that conversation and subjected her to those detriments 8 of 54 because of that conversation. The Claimant faces a significant hurdle in doing so; and

(viii) The Respondent is concerned that if the five-day Final Hearing will be insufficient, there will be further delay to already stale allegations.

[24]The Employment Judge rejected all of the Claimant’s sought-after amendments, concluding that the balance of injustice and hardship falls very significantly in favour of rejection. a) The timing of the applications: The Employment Judge noted that Parliament has determined that the nature of these complaints make it appropriate that they are presented within three months of the act complained of. The oldest of these amendments (dating back to October 2020) was nearly five years old when the Claimant raised it for the first time, and the most recent (the failure to provide interview feedback in November 2023) was nearly two years old when raised. These time considerations are not an automatic bar to permitting the amendments (Safeway Stores), but they mean it is appropriate for greater scrutiny and an increased reluctance to be applied to their being permitted (Basra) because of the inevitable memory fade and the lost opportunity to preserve evidence. Moreover, the Respondent has pointed to tangible prejudice caused by the delay, because DR is no longer employed by it, and whilst that might not make his evidence impossible to bring to bear on that amendment, it adds a challenge that could have been avoided had DR been made aware of the Claimant’s complaint at the time it occurred. The Employment Judge considered the timing of the applications to be a weighty consideration against permitting the amendments because of the difficulty they will cause the Respondent in meeting those amendments (as the Blackburn case makes clear is relevant). In addition, this is not a situation where the Claimant has subsequently learned of new facts – these matters were within her knowledge at the time they occurred, and at the time that each of the Claims were presented. The timing of these applications was of her own making, and every amendment now sought could have been brought within the scope of Claim 1. There is still the issue of time to consider in relation to the Claimant’s pre-existing 60 complaints, and in truth those 60 could not be heard in the five day Final Hearing window allocated to those case, but seven new complaints with additional witnesses likely being called by the Respondent would add to the length of the Final Hearing, which makes it more likely that that hearing could not be accommodated within this Tribunal’s pressured list until 2029. These are all matters which the Traynor case indicates are relevant to consider and weigh. 9 of 54 b) The manner of the applications: It is noteworthy, and weighs in the Respondent’s favour when it comes to where injustice and hardship would lie, that there are five amendment applications, after the Claimant has already had three attempts at articulating her claim (Claim 1, Claim 2 and the Case Management Hearing before EJ Burge). Moreover, it took the best part of two hours to understand what those amendments were, as the Claimant had not delineated new facts from existing ones, or new complaints from existing ones where she wished to add more detail. As the Respondent says, a line does need to be drawn – and this is consistent with the approach in the Carozzi case. Even in her summary representations as to why the amendments should be permitted, the Claimant characterised the changes she sought to make as “relabelling”, but in truth four of the seven requested amendments relate to four entirely new acts, and two others refer to a new conversation the Claimant had with SS about matters that are already complaints of race and sex discrimination seven months after those matters arose, with the 25 November 2021 putative protected act having been included in Claim 1 but not identified as a protected act when the Claims were discussed with EJ Burge or in the 14-day window of time after those Orders were sent by the Tribunal to the parties when the Claimant could have said there was error in omitting it. The Claimant was not accurate in her description of the amendments she sought to make. c) The nature of the proposed amendments: As above – the amendments sought were to add seven new complaints, four entirely new acts, a new conversation in October 2021 (upon which two of the other amendments depend) that the Claimant says she had with SS about matters that are already complaints of race and sex discrimination, and another that was included in the 17-pages of particulars in Claim 1 but not identified as a protected act in the Case Management stage. These are significant amendments. As Abercrombie shows, that significance is not just in the new of new complaints (in the context of there already being 60 which the Claimant has brought), but the evidential challenges and new areas of enquiry about four entirely new acts and a new conversation, adds new Respondent personnel to the apparently discriminatory actors, and their ability to challenge the Claimant’s factual assertions or her position on their reasons for acting will be hampered by the passage of time. The nature of the amendments becomes more significant because of the context in which those new complaints are sought to be raised. d) Other matters:(i) If the Claimant is successful in any of her discrimination/victimisation complaints, it is likely to be difficult for the Tribunal to distinguish between which acts caused which 10 of 54 degree of injury to her feelings – i.e., these seven new complaints might not be expected to affect the compensation that would be available to her, even if upheld.

(ii) As for merits, these are difficult to assess at this preliminary stage, but given they relate to matters which the Claimant did not think of when she presented Claim 1 or Claim 2, or when she discussed her Claims with EJ Burge, they are unlikely to be considered by her to be the most meritorious of the allegations she brings.

[25]While the case law points to the public interest of discrimination allegations being aired and determined, it is absolutely evident that permitting these amendments would not be fair or just in the circumstances. There has been no reason offered by the Claimant for why she did not raise these sooner (she has merely pointed to the apparent harm she would suffer by not being able to pursue matters she thinks she should be able, which the Tribunal does not accept). Moreover, there would be a considerable risk of the Claimant succeeding in these allegations because the Respondent is unable to defend them due to the passage of time and the likely loss of records of meetings and the loss of personnel, rather than on their true merits. When the Claimant so clearly could and should have raised these matters as part of Claim 1 (or Claim 2), considerations such as proportionality and saving expense (in the Respondent’s case, investigating these new matters), and avoiding delay (adding seven new complaints to those to be considered in the Final Hearing, even if a sufficient number of those are found to be out-of-time in this hearing to enable the Final Hearing window to be retained, would likely necessitate the postponement of that Final Hearing for a longer listing window), have great weight, and vastly outweigh the interest in having allegations of discrimination aired.

[26]Permission for all seven requested amendments was therefore firmly refused by the Tribunal. Facts

[27]The Claimant commenced work for the Respondent on 16 April 2021.

[28]The Claimant was dismissed by the Respondent on 30 June 2024, by reason of redundancy.

[29]ACAS Early Conciliation in respect of Claim 1 began on 18 July 2024 and ended on 22 July 2024.

[30]The Claimant presented Claim 1 on 1 August 2024.

[31]ACAS Early Conciliation in respect of Claim 2 commenced on 18 November 2024.

[32]The Claimant did not wait for that ACAS Early Conciliation process to conclude, and presented Claim 2 on 19 November 2024. 11 of 54

[33]ACAS Early Conciliation in respect of Claim 2 concluded on 21 November 2024.

[34]A Preliminary Hearing for the Case Management of the Claims took place on 24 July 2025. Law Amendments

[35]As observed by Mr Justice Langstaff (President) in Chandhok v Tirkey

[2015] IRLR 195

: “The claim, as set out in the ET1, is not something just to set the ball rolling, as an initial document necessary to comply with time limits but which is otherwise free to be augmented by whatever the parties choose to add or subtract merely upon their say so. Instead, it serves not only a useful but a necessary function. It sets out the essential case. It is that to which a respondent is required to respond.”

[36]The Tribunal has the power, in Rule 30 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the ET Rules) to: “On its own initiative or on application of a party, make a case management order…”.

[37]This includes the power to permit a party to amend its Claim or Response, but that power should be exercised in accordance with the Overriding Objective in Rule 3 of the ET Rules: “(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. (2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable-(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing,

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues,

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and

(e) saving expense. (3) A Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it- (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or 12 of 54 (b) interprets any rule or practice direction. (4) The parties and their representatives must- (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.”

[38]The seminal cases on the proper approach to exercising the power in Rule 30 in relation to amendment applications are Selkent Bus Co Ltd t/a Stagecoach Selkent v Moore

[1996] IRLR 661

, Vaughan v Modality Partnership

UKEAT/0147/20/BA

(V), Abercrombie v Aga Rangemaster

[2013] EWCA Civ 1148

, Transport and General Workers Union v Safeway Stores Ltd

UKEAT/0092/07/LA

and Ladbrokes Racing Ltd v Traynor

UKEAT/0067/06

[39]It is clear from those authorities that when answering the question of whether the discretion in Rule 30 should be exercised to permit the amendment, the assessment is ‘what does the overriding objective require?’, or to put it another way, ‘in which party’s favour does the balance of injustice and hardship sit?’.

[40]The burden of satisfying the Tribunal that the amendment application is one that should properly accepted sits with the applicant.

[41]The case law offers some suggested factors that may be relevant to consider when assessing how the scales weighing the balance of injustice and hardship tip, though of course the actual assessment will be fact-dependent, and there may be other matters that are important to that analysis: a) The nature of the proposed amendment, for example, the adding of factual details to existing allegations; the addition or substitution of other labels for facts already pleaded; the making of entirely new factual allegations. Would the amendment sought be a minor matter, or a substantial alteration pleading a new cause of action? This should be considered both in terms of the legal effect of the amendment sought, and the evidential implications of making it – is it likely, for example, that the facts relied upon in the sought-to-be-added complaint involve substantially different areas of enquiry than those in the old? (Abercrombie) As HHJ Serota QC said in British Gas v Basra

UKEAT/0194/14/DM

, “A significant matter will be whether the applicant seeks to add a new claim especially one that is out of time, in which greater scrutiny and reluctance to agree may be applied rather than allowing an amendment which arises out of facts already pleaded.” b) The applicability of time limits. If the amendment would add a new cause of action, is that out of time; if so, what is the legal test for extending time applicable to that cause of action; and should the time limit be extended by allowing the amendment. The fact that an amendment would introduce an out-of-time claim is not an automatic bar to accepting the amendment 13 of 54 application (Safeway Stores). Underhill LJ in Abercrombie noted that the relevance of whether fresh proceedings would have been out of time depends on the circumstances: “Where the new claim is wholly different from the claim originally pleaded the claimant should not, absent perhaps some very special circumstances, be permitted to circumvent the statutory time limits by introducing it by way of amendment. But where it is closely connected with the claim originally pleaded – and a fortiori in a re-labelling case – justice does not require the same approach”. As HHJ Serota QC put it in Basra: “Although delay itself is not a ground for refusing an amendment, it is always highly relevant.” c) The timing and manner of the application. The Tribunal should seek to understand why the application was not made earlier, and why it is now being made. For example, is it because new information has come to light, or was the relevant information in the possession of the party now seeking the amendment at a much earlier point. The lateness of making application for amendment does not necessarily mean that other party is prejudiced - it depends on whether there is any difficulty in meeting the claim and what it is (Blackburn v Aldi Stores Ltd [2013] ICR D37, EAT). In Ladbrokes Racing Ltd v Traynor EATS 0067/06 the EAT gave some guidance as to how a tribunal may take account of the timing and manner of the application in the balancing exercise. It will need to consider:(i) why the application is made at the stage at which it is made and why it was not made earlier (Selkent);

(ii) Whether, if the amendment is allowed, delay will ensue and whether there are likely to be additional costs because of the delay or because of the extent to which the hearing will be lengthened if the new issue is allowed to be raised, particularly if these are unlikely to be recovered by the party that incurs them; and

(iii) Whether delay may have put the other party in a position where evidence relevant to the new issue is no longer available or is rendered of lesser quality than it would have been earlier.

[42]Other that could be relevant when conducting this weighing exercise include: a) The merits of the amendment; b) The compensation available; and c) The real, practical consequences of allowing the amendment.

[43]When considering the real, practical consequences of the amendment, cases such as Vaughan encourage tribunals to look at the practical consequences of (in the case of an amendment sought by a claimant) the respondent resisting it, 14 of 54 e.g., additional counsel fees, witnesses having left the respondent’s organisation because of time gone past, papers lost, CCTV tapes recorded over, etc. This must be considered alongside the prejudice to the claimant if the amendment is not permitted.

[44]The party seeking to make the amendment must set out terms of proposed amendment, really in writing, so that they present a properly particularised and articulated claim (Basra). It is not for the tribunal to do the drafting (Magarot Forrest Care Management v Kennedy

UKEATS/0023/10

[45]“It is regrettable that in many claims the core issues become obscured because so many subsidiary allegations are made. It is often best to focus on the strongest points, If the strongest complaints fail, it is unlikely that the less promising will succeed. Even in claims of discrimination, where it generally is important to consider overall treatment, it is important to concentrate on the most significant events.” (Carozzi v (1) University of Hertfordshire, (2) Lucas

[2024] EAT 169

) Time limits – victimisation and discrimination, section 123 of the 2010 Act

[46]Complaints of victimisation and/or discrimination pursuant to the 2010 Act are subject to a time limit stipulated in section 123(1) of that Act, namely that such a claim: “may not be brought after the end of—(a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.”

[47]The three month limitation period in section 123(1)(a) is extended by reason of early conciliation pursuant to section 140B of the 2010 Act to facilitate early conciliation between the parties where at least Day A fell within the primary lookback period of the relevant act or omission. Where Day A fell later than the three-month period after the relevant act or omission, ACAS Early Conciliation does not affect the primary time limit.

[48]Time limits for filing discrimination complaints are set by Parliament in the legislation, and the starting point is that those time limits should be observed. However, the Court of Appeal in Bexley Community Centre (t/a Leisure Link) v Robertson

[2003] EWCA Civ 576

[2003] IRLR 434

made it clear that the Employment Tribunal has a wide discretion to extend time on just and equitable grounds (as recently emphasised by HHJ Tayler in the EAT decision of Jones v Secretary of State for Health & Social Care

[2024] EAT 2

[49]As observed by Leggatt LJ (as he then was) in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

[2018] EWCA Civ 640

[2018] ICR 1194

: 15 of 54 “it is plain from the language used (“such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable”) that Parliament has chosen to give the employment tribunal the widest possible discretion”.

[50]In order to exercise its discretion to extend the primary time period on “just and equitable” grounds, the Tribunal must have material on which to properly exercise that discretion (Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston

[2010] IRLR 327

[51]The burden sits with the claimant seeking to rely on those apparently-out-of-time acts to satisfy the tribunal that they presented their claim within such other period as is just and equitable. There is no presumption that the discretion to extend time will be exercised (Miller v Ministry of Justice EAT 0003/15). However, this does not mean that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the applicant will succeed (Pathan v South London Islamic Centre EAT 0312/13).

[52]There is no prescriptive list of factors specified in the legislation as being relevant to the exercise of the tribunal’s discretion as to whether to extend the primary time period on “just and equitable” grounds. The matters of relevance to whether any additional the period, beyond the primary lookback period, is “just and equitable” for the claim to be brought will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, but: “factors which it is almost always relevant to consider when exercising any discretion whether to extend time are:(a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay, and

(b) whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh)” (Morgan).

[53]That “prejudice” could be: a) The general prejudice of having to meet a claim which would otherwise have been defeated by a limitation defence; and /or b) The forensic prejudice that a respondent may suffer if the limitation period is extended by many months or years, which is caused by things such as fading memories, loss of documents, and losing touch with witnesses (Miller and ors v Ministry of Justice and ors EAT 0003/15).

[54]If there is forensic prejudice, that will be “crucially relevant” in the exercise of the discretion, and may well be decisive (Miller).

[55]Any argument before the tribunal that the quality or cogency of the evidence will be diminished by the passage of time should be supported by evidence (Daly v Northumberland and Tyne and Wear NHS Foundation Trust

UKEAT/0109/16

). A tribunal can bring its own experience to bear when determining whether it accepts that forensic prejudice is likely to occur (Peixoto v British Telecommunications plc

UKEAT/0222/07

and McMahon v AXA ICAS Ltd

[2025] EAT 8

[56]The question for the Tribunal is not simply whether time will cause forensic prejudice, but the extent of that prejudice, and whether it is so severe that a fair trial is no longer possible (Daly). 16 of 54

[57]The EAT in McMahon suggested that the tribunal may be aided in that assessment by considering a number of questions: a) What, precisely is the claimant’s case? b) Who are the witnesses needed by the respondent to answer that case? c) What recollection of the material events do these witnesses have? d) What contemporaneous documents or other sources of evidence are available which bear upon the case the respondent’s defence of it?]

[58]The case law in relation to the “not reasonably practicable” test for extending time in relation to unfair dismissal (and some other employment rights) takes a fairly strict line that awaiting the outcome of an internal process generally does not render it “not reasonably practicable” for a claimant to present a claim to the Employment Tribunal. However, the fact that an internal procedure is ongoing is capable of being taken into account when a tribunal is deciding whether it is “just and equitable” to extend time for complaints of unlawful discrimination to be presented as a factor that could push in favour of an extension – the appropriate weight to be given to it depends on the facts and circumstances (Robinson v Post Office

[2000] IRLR 804

[59]Other factors relevant may include: a) The extent to which the other party has cooperated with any requests for information from the applicant; b) The promptness with which the claimant acted once they knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and c) The steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate advice once they knew of the possibility of taking action (taken from section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980); d) If the claimant is ignorant of their rights, and the reasonableness of that ignorance; e) Whether the claimant felt able to complain about the incident to someone within the respondent organisation (an example of where this approach was taken is the Employment Tribunal case of Keenan v Benugo Ltd ET Case No.2203590/12); f) The reaction the claimant received to raising the matter internally (Burden v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary ET Case No.3100659/14); g) The claimant’s state of health (Burden), though this must be evidenced (Thompson v Ark Schools

[2019] ICR 292

); and h) The strength of the claim (e.g., Kumari v Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust

[2022] EAT 132

). 17 of 54

[60]Tribunals must weigh up the relative prejudice that extending time would cause to the respondent on the one hand and to the claimant on the other, and determine on which side the balance of prejudice lies (Pathan). Continuing acts

[61]In the case of a number of different acts of discrimination which do not amount to continuing discrimination, each distinct act will need to satisfy the time limit in section 123(1) in order for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction to consider them. Where, instead, the acts represent continuing discrimination, the series will be within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction if the last of the series is “in time” (section 123(3)).

[62]Whether acts should properly be regarded as distinct or continuing is a question of fact. It is for a claimant who asserts that that there has been a continuing act to prove, either by direct evidence or by inference from primary facts, that the alleged incidents of discrimination are linked to one another – “that they are evidence of a continuing discriminatory state of affairs”, or “an ongoing situation”, as opposed to “isolated and unconnected acts” (Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Hendricks

[2003] ICR 530

). The tribunal must examine how the claimant has put their case to understand what has been alleged.

[63]There is a distinction to be drawn between a continuing act, and a single act with continuing consequences (Barclays Bank plc v Kapur

[1991] ICR 208

[64]The continued operation of a policy, rule or practice over time can be a continuing act (Owusu v London Fire and Civil Defence Authority

[1995] IRLR 574

]).

[65]The examination undertaken by the tribunal should be of the substance of the complaints in question made by the claimant, as opposed to the existence of a policy or regime (Lyfar v Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals Trust

[2006] EWCA Civ 1548

[66]The EAT observed in South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust v King

[2020] IRLR 168

that when a claimant wishes to show that there has been conduct extending over a period they will usually allege a series of acts, each of which is connected with the other, either: a) because they are instances of the application of a discriminatory policy, rule or practice; or b) because they are evidence of a continuing discriminatory state of affairs. If any of those acts are not established by the facts, or found not to have been discriminatory, they cannot form part of the series. “Reliance cannot be placed on some floating or overarching discriminatory state of affairs without that state of affairs being anchored by specific acts of discrimination occurring over time.” Time limits – unfair dismissal, section 111 of the 1996 Act

[67]Section 111 of the 1996 Act governs the bringing of complaints under section 98 for unfair dismissal, and that section stipulates: 18 of 54 “(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months. (2A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (2)(a).”

[68]As subsection (2) clearly shows, time limits are not a mere formality – the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear a complaint unless the condition(s) in either subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) is (are) satisfied.

[69]As noted in subsection (2A), section 207B of the 1996 Act may extend the limitation period for bringing an unfair dismissal so as to facilitate conciliation between the parties before institution of proceedings where the limitation period for bringing an unfair dismissal complaint would otherwise expire during a period of ACAS early conciliation. The test

[70]Where the three month time limit (as extended by early conciliation if appropriate) has expired, in order for the Tribunal to hear the complaint it must be satisfied both that: a) it was not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to bring their claim within the time limit; and b) it was presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

[71]The starting assumption is that, in passing the 1996 Act in the terms it did, Parliament has set an expectation that the primary time limit is the period within which, in the ordinary course of events, it is reasonably practicable for would-be litigants to meet. There is also a strong public interest in claims being brought promptly.

[72]The burden of proof is on the claimant to show the reason or reasons which rendered it not reasonably practicable to meet the limitation period (Porter v Bandridge Ltd

[1978] IRLR 271

). Ignorance of rights

[73]Where the claimant is ignorant as to his rights, the Court of Appeal decision in Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd

[1974] ICR 53

, as 19 of 54 considered in Porter, indicates that the tribunal is to ask whether the claimant’s ignorance was reasonable in the circumstances. Presentation within reasonable further period

[74]The second condition, that the tribunal be satisfied that the claim was “presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable”, does not require the tribunal to be satisfied that it was presented as soon as reasonably practicable after the expiry of the time limit (University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust v Williams EAT 0291/12).

[75]What amounts to the “further period as the tribunal considers reasonable” is a question of fact on the circumstances of the case, and involves consideration of both: a) the factors causing the delay; and b) the period that should reasonably be allowed in those circumstances, in the context of the primary time limit set by Parliament and the strong public interest of claims being brought promptly (Cullinane v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Ltd EAT 0537/10). The impact on the employer may also be relevant, for example in cases where the delay is substantial and that may prejudice the employer’s ability to resist it (Biggs v Somerset County Council

[1996] ICR 364

). Strike-out

[76]Rule 38 of the ET Rules provides: “(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds-(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;

(d) that it has not been actively pursued;

(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing. 20 of 54 (3) Where a response is struck out, the effect shall be as if no response had been presented, as set out in rule 22 (effect of non-presentation or rejection of response, or case not contested). (4) Where a reply is struck out, the effect is as if no reply had been presented, as set out in rule 22, as modified by rule 26(2) (replying to an employer’s contract claim).”

[77]The effect of a strike-out is to terminate the claim or the part of the claim that is the subject of the order. It is a draconian jurisdiction, and the relevant case authorities underlie its exceptional nature (e.g., James v Blockbuster

[2006] EWCA Civ 684

). This is particularly so where the substantive case features allegations of unlawful discrimination or whistleblowing, as it is “a matter of high public interest” that such cases are heard (as per Lord Steyn in Anyanwu v South Bank Students’ Union

[2001] IRLR 305

, and Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust

[2007] EWCA Civ 330

). No reasonable prospect of success

[78]In relation to the argument that a claimant’s claims have “no reasonable prospect of success” under paragraph (1)(a) of Rule 38, plainly on its wording, the threshold for strike-out is a high one.

[79]The cases of Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust

[2007] EWCA Civ 330

and Tayside Public Transport Co Ltd (t/a Travel Dundee) v Reilly

[2012] IRLR 755

indicate that tribunals should exercise caution before striking-out where there is a dispute on the facts that needs to be determined at trial.

[80]As HHJ Eady put it in Mbuisa at [20]: “Such an exceptional case might arise where it is instantly demonstrable that the central facts in the claim are untrue or there is no real substance in the factual assertions being made, but the ET should take the Claimant's case, as it is set out in the claim, at its highest, unless contradicted by plainly inconsistent documents, see Ukegheson v London Borough of Haringey

[2015] ICR 1285

at para 21 per Langstaff J at para 4” (my emphasis).

[81]Taking a party’s case at its highest means assuming, for the purpose of the strikeout determination only, that that party’s account of the disputed facts are resolved in their favour (White v HC-One Oval Ltd

[2022] IRLR 576

[82]However, taking the claimant’s case its highest does not mean that there is no burden on the claimant at this stage. Lord Justice Underhill in the Court of Appeal case of Ahir v British Airways

[2017] EWCA Civ 1392

at [19] observed that “where there is an ostensibly innocent sequence of events leading to the act complained of, there must be some burden on a claimant to say what reason he or she has to suppose that things are not what they seem and to identify what he or she believes was, or at least may have been, the real story, albeit (as I emphasise) that they are not yet in a position to prove it.” 21 of 54

[83]If a claim as pleaded has no reasonable prospect of success, that gives an Employment Judge the discretion as to whether to strike it out, not an obligation to do so (H M Prison Service v Dolby

[2003] IRLR 694

). Application to the claims here The first question: Were the discrimination and victimisation complaints in Claim 1 presented within the primary time limit set out in section 123(1)(a)?

[84]Given the date Claim 1 was presented, and the dates of Day A and Day B for ACAS Early Conciliation purposes, the earliest date within the primary time limit set out in section 123(1)(a) (taking account of the adjustment made for Easly Conciliation by section 140B) was 19 April 2024.

[85]Of the 60 complaints raised by the Claimant in Claim 1, only two - the complaint of direct race discrimination identified at paragraph 6(23) of the list of issues, and one of victimisation identified at paragraph 28(3) of the list of issues - were presented within the primary time limit for 2010 Act purposes. The second question: If the discrimination and victimisation complaints in Claim 1 were not presented within the primary time limit, is it just and equitable for time to be extended?

[86]This question applies to the other 58 discrimination/victimisation complaints raised by the Claimant in Claim 1. These complaints relate to matters which occurred over a 12 years period, beginning in 2012 and ending in December 2023.

[87]The Claimant’s statement of why she presented her Claims late relies on 11 reasons for not presenting those Claims within the primary time limits: a) There was a culture of silence and fear of repercussions within the Respondent organisation; b) The Claimant did not understand that she could present a claim whilst in the Respondent’s employment; c) The Claimant did not understand that she could present a claim in respect of individual incidents, rather than the overall pattern of treatment; d) Embarrassment about bringing a claim; e) The Claimant’s father’s terminal illness, death, her subsequent related depression, and the burden of dealing with his affairs “well into 2015”; f) A belief, in 2010, that her concerns were being dealt with internally; g) She did not know that internal processes did not need to be concluded before presenting a claim; h) Significant emotional strain and uncertainty about her employment status, while looking for a new role; 22 of 54 i) A lack of understanding of her rights regarding the dismissal process and the reason for her selection for redundancy; j) Lack of awareness of the strict three-month time limit for presentation of complaints; and k) She was told by ACAS that she could not pursue an unfair dismissal complaint because she had received redundancy pay.

[88]In oral submissions to the Tribunal the Claimant added: a) She is a litigant-in-person; b) Some of the complaints do go back in time, but they relate to a pattern of behaviour which can only be seen if all are included; c) Even though some of the allegations are against different people, they are all part of the same Respondent organisation; and d) Any prejudice caused to the Respondent by people having left its employment could be overcome by appropriate Tribunal Orders.

[89]The Respondent has sought to cast doubt on the Claimant’s reasons, and has offered reasons of its own as to why it says it is not just and equitable for time to extend to include any of the apparently out-of-time discrimination or victimisation complaints.

[90]In response to the Claimant’s reasons the Respondent says: a) The Claimant’s contention of a culture of silence and fear of repercussions does not ‘hold water’ when the Claimant’s evidence is that she made complaints to:(i) TW in September 2012;

(ii) TW, HS and NR in January 2013;

(iii) TW in April 2013;

(iv) BB in 2020;

(v) TA, Acting Manager, in 2020 at the beginning of the pandemic;

(vi) SS in a verbal meeting in 2021;

(vii) In November 2021 the Claimant raised a “long grievance” about WC (the person the Claimant accuses of four acts of sexual harassment and harassment related to sex); and

(viii) To BB in the form of a grievance on the Claimant’s last day of employment with the Respondent; b) In relation to reasons b), c), d) and f), the Claimant did feel able to bring complaints during her employment internally, and given the number and time period over which she did so, and her feeling that they were not being 23 of 54 sorted out as they should have been, she should have acted upon that feeling and brought these matters to the attention of the Tribunal; c) The Claimant’s father passed away in 2014 – that does not excuse a ten year delay in presenting her claims; d) The Claimant’s assertion that she believed she was required to conclude internal processes before coming to the Tribunal should not be accepted – she did go to ACAS before her June 2024 grievances were concluded (as they did not conclude until August 2024), and she presented Claim 1 ahead of that internal outcome; e) Every person who could be a claimant by reason of unlawful work-related discrimination is in circumstances of considerable emotional strain. Parliament must be taken to have factored this into its thinking when it determined that three months was an appropriate period of time within which people should generally present complaints. Emotional strain of the same kind as would be expected to be experienced by all such claimants does not, on its own, make it just and equitable to extend time for the presentation of complaints; f) While the Claimant has said that she did not understand the redundancy process or the reasons for her selection, those were clear in March 2024. It does not provide a reason for delay until 19 November 2024 when Claim 2 was presented; g) While the Claimant is a litigant-in-person, she had sufficient skills and capability to carry out minimal research into her claim and the time limits that applied to its presentation to the Tribunal; h) There is no evidence to support what the Claimant says about her discussion with ACAS, but in any event, ACAS clearly states that it does not provide legal advice, and she should have checked the position by her own research; i) The complaints can not be regarded as a pattern of behaviour – they relate to many different people, over an extensive period, as part of a large organisation. The only allegations that could be regarded as linked are those that relate to dismissal. The others are completely separate allegations; and j) Tribunal Orders cannot overcome the significant prejudice caused to the Respondent by the passage of time since the matters complained of.

[91]As for other matters, the Respondent says: a) Many of the reasons put forward by the Claimant to explain or justify the delay are illogical; b) The extent of the delay for most of the allegations is extreme; and 24 of 54 c) (Related to the last point) The prejudice that would be suffered by the Respondent were time to be extended to include all of the Claimant’s complaints would be “exceptional” given:(i) Some of the complaints are 13 years old, and most are many years old. This brings into question what evidence will and will not be available about what happened at the time with which the complaint is concerned, and what would have been available at that time had the Claimant presented the complaint then;

(ii) As the Claimant did not raise grievances at the time of these matters, there is no contemporaneous investigation into them, and not captured near-contemporaneous evidence from the people involved;

(iii) This lack of contemporaneous evidence, given most of the matters relate to things that were said or done, not things that were written, will need to be explored with the numerous people involved, relying on the cogency of both the Claimant’s allegations (which are not always clear) and their memories, which will undoubtedly have faded;

(iv) The volume of the allegations is such that this exercise would take considerable resources from a publicly-funded organisation;

(v) A number of the individuals accused of things by the Claimant are no longer employed by the Respondent (HS, SG, EMcA, CL, BB and TW); and

(vi) Even where the individuals accused of wrongdoing or said to have witnessed it remain in the Respondent’s employment, there will be significant cogency issues with their evidence, and some of the allegations (e.g., the sexual harassment ones) are of such seriousness that it would be extremely prejudicial for those individuals to face them now.

[92]EJ Burge left it open to the Tribunal to not answer this second question – i.e., not to determine whether it is “just and equitable” to extend time definitively, but instead to consider the question in the context of the strike-out test of whether the Claimant has any reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that it is “just and equitable” to extend time in respect of these complaints. For reasons that are described below, the Employment Judge has felt able to determine the “just and equitable” question definitively, and so the strike-out question need not be addressed.

[93]The Tribunal finds that the Claimant has not discharged the burden, which sits with her, of satisfying it that it is just and equitable to extend time to apply to the 58 complaints of unlawful discrimination and victimisation that were presented outside the three-month primary time limit. 25 of 54

[94]In relation to the factors that are said to weigh in favour of it being just and equitable to extend time: a) The Claimant’s understanding of the law relating to the presentation of her complaints (reasons b), c), g), and i)) may have applied for a time, but that ignorance cannot possibly be said to have reasonably remained over the length of delay involved in the vast majority of the complaints of discrimination and victimisation she has raised. The Claimant is an intelligent woman, who was employed in a relatively senior position. She was tech-savvy, and she should have taken steps to educate herself about her legal rights. The Tribunal finds these reasons add nothing to the Claimant’s contention that it is just and equitable to extend time. b) Similarly, the Claimant is a litigant-in-person, but Parliament expects her, and others, to present discrimination and victimisation complaints within the primary time limit unless it is just and equitable to extend time. The mere fact she is a litigant-in-person does not weigh in favour of extending time – she needs to show why in her case her continued ignorance of her rights, in many cases over a long period of time, meant that it was just and equitable for time to be extended. (55 of the 60 discrimination and victimisation complaints relate to matters said to have occurred between 2012 and November 2021.) She has not done so here. c) The Claimant’s contention that she was relying on internal processes to resolve her concerns is entirely at odds with her contention that one of the reasons for her delay in bringing these matters to the Tribunal’s attention was that there was a culture of silence and fear of repercussions within the Respondent’s organisation. Her position on that culture was entirely uncredible, and is not accepted by the Tribunal. d) On the other hand, pursuing internal complaints in the hope of resolving them could (when it comes to whether it is “just and equitable” to extend time) weigh in favour of a time extension (Robinson), but here the Claimant’s complaints seemed to largely significantly pre-date the presentation of Claim 1. The Claimant says she raised complaints in September 2012, January 2013 and April 2013, and then there was a long gap before the next one in 2020, 2021 and November 2021. The next sets of complaints were raised by her in June 2024. Given these gaps in time between the clusters of complaints made by the Claimant, it is not credible that she delayed presenting complaints to the Tribunal about those matters in the hope of internal processes resolving them – save possibly for the dismissal-related discrimination and victimisation complaint - otherwise the earliest complaints would have come to the Tribunal’s attention some years before they did. This also does not apply to the latest discrimination and victimisation complaints about her dismissal, because the Claimant in fact presented Claim 1 (which is the source of all her sex and race 26 of 54 discrimination complaints) before the outcome of those complaints was given to her. e) Reason k) is not relevant to the Claimant’s discrimination and victimisation complaints. f) While the Tribunal accepts that grief, grief-related depression and the practical matters that the Claimant needed to deal with after the death of her father in 2014 could well have made it just and equitable to extend time for the complaints that arose before and at that time, on the Claimant’s own evidence those matters applied “well into 2015”, and so they ceased to operate as reasons for it being just and equitable to extend time for those matters years prior to the presentation of Claim 1.

[95]The case law indicates that other relevant factors may include: a) The steps taken by the Claimant to obtain appropriate advice once she knew of the possibility of taking action, but the Claimant has been unclear about when she sought advice from organisations other than ACAS; b) Whether the Claimant felt able to complain about the incidents internally, and the reaction to any such internal complaints. Here, the Claimant did feel able to complain about at least some of the matters she raises as part of the Claims, but none of those complaints were upheld. These matters are not weighty considerations here, given the complaints were either long-since concluded or still outstanding when the Claimant presented Claim 1; c) The Claimant’s state of health. There is no medical evidence of any poor health on the part of the Claimant at any time. The Claimant’s witness evidence is that she was in poor health at the time of her father’s death and into the next calendar year, but there is no suggestion from her that any other poor health (rather than natural emotional distress brought about by a redundancy process and dismissal) caused delay in the presentation of her Claims; d) The strength of the complaints. There are so many complaints here, and this hearing took place over a single day, that this was not practical to consider – save in relation to one allegation, and that is described below.

[96]Taking first the matters said to have occurred between 2012 and November 2021, i.e., 55 of the Claimant’s 60 complaints of unlawful discrimination and victimisation, the Tribunal does not accept any of the reasons given by the Claimant for why it is just and equitable to extend time in relation to these matters actually.

[97]On the contrary, the prejudice pointed to by the Respondent in respect of these matters is hefty. The Claimant is correct that the Tribunal could be asked to make witness orders to compel witnesses-no-longer-employed-by-the-Respondent to give evidence, but the real difficulty is the quality of evidence that they, and the 27 of 54 Claimant, could be expected to give in relation to these 55 allegations that predate the presentation of Claim 1 by 2.5 years minimum and possibly 12 years maximum – and this is a weighty consideration when assessing what justice and equity requires (Miller). As the Respondent rightly says, this is in the content of the Claimant proffering no good reason at all why she did not present those complaints earlier. The Respondent has provided no evidence as to the forensic prejudice it will suffer, but the Tribunal’s own experience supports the Respondent’s contention that the fair hearing of complaints of discrimination/victimisation that were between 12 and 2.5 years old at the time they were presented to the Tribunal will be impaired by the passage of time (Peixoto, McMahon).

[98]The Tribunal acknowledges that there is a deep public interest in allegations of discrimination being aired (Anyanwu, Ezsias), but where those allegations cannot be aired fairly because the quality of evidence in relation to them will be so unreliable given the passage of time that they cannot be fairly heard, it is plain that it is not just and equitable to extend time in respect of these 55 complaints. It is because none of the Claimant’s reasons in fact weigh in favour of extending time – there is no argument made by her upon which the discretion to extend time can be based (Caston) - and because of the prejudice to the Respondent caused by the extent of the delay, that the Tribunal feels it is appropriate to determine the question of whether it is “just and equitable” to extend time in relation to these complaints definitively.

[99]This leaves the three complaints from November and December 2023. In respect of those matters, the witness evidence that could be gathered in respect of those must have been less likely to be stale at the time they were presented than for the earlier matters. It is possible, therefore, that what justice and equity require in respect of them is different.

[100]Those allegations: a) Pertain to the Claimant’s selection for redundancy – said to be an act of direct race discrimination (the complaint described at paragraph 6(22) of the list of issues) and an act of victimisation (described at paragraph 28(2) of the list of issues); and b) Include the December 2023 complaint of harassment related to sex and sexual harassment described at paragraph 19(2)x o the list of issues.

[101]The latter complaint – 19(2)x – is that the Claimant entered a lift with two colleagues and KP, and that KP’s “body language looked shifty whilst [he] looked the other way”. This is said to have occurred at some point in December 2023. Even though the delay in presenting this complaint is less dramatic than for many of the other complaints, this allegation is so unspecific, combined with the unspecified date in a month in which people could have used the lift in the office on numerous occasions in any given work day, that the prejudice to the Respondent again outweighs the public interest in that allegation being aired. It 28 of 54 is difficult to see how any of the Claimant, KP or the two other witnesses could bring useful evidence to bear on whether KP’s “body language looked shifty”, or why that amounted to harassment related to sex or sexual harassment (which can be a relevant consideration as to what justice and equity requires Kumari). The public interest cannot favour such an allegation being aired. Again, the Tribunal finds that the Claimant has simply not satisfied it that it is just and equitable to extend time for that complaint to be presented to 1 August 2024.

[102]As for the former complaints about the Claimant’s selection for redundancy, the Tribunal concludes that none of the Claimant’s reasons for why it is just and equitable to extend time apply. It is noteworthy that in relation to these complaints, the Respondent has pointed to much less concrete prejudice in relation to these matters. When questioned, it could not say who was responsible for the Claimant’s selection, so no comment could be made on the availability of that person’s evidence. Moreover, this is a matter which would be expected to have been documented contemporaneously, by business rationale, the results of scoring exercises, etc. However, it is for the Claimant to satisfy the Tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend time in relation these matters, and she has not done so – there is no material on which to exercise its discretion (Caston) besides the general argument that there is a public interest in discrimination complaints being aired, which is judged by the Tribunal to be far outweighed by the prejudice to the fair airing of those allegations caused by the Claimant’s extreme delay in presenting them. The Tribunal therefore also concludes that these complaints were presented out of time. The third question: Was the Claimant’s unfair dismissal complaint in Claim 2 presented within the primary time limit in section 111(2)(a) of the 1996 Act?

[103]Given the date Claim 2 was presented (Early Conciliation makes no difference here, because it was not completed before the Claim Form was presented), the earliest ‘in time’ date for section 111(2)(a) purposes was 20 August 2024.

[104]The Claimant’s dismissal occurred before that date, on 30 June 2024.

[105]Looking at the question from the opposite angle, the Claimant was dismissed on 30 June 2024. Early Conciliation in respect of that matter did not begin until 18 November 2024, so outside the three month primary time limit in section 111(2)(a) of the 1996 Act. The Claimant should have presented her complaint of unfair dismissal by no later than 29 September 2024. She in fact presented Claim 2 seven weeks and two days later than that date. The fourth questions: If the Claimant’s unfair dismissal complaint in Claim 2 was not presented within that primary time limit,(a) was it not reasonably practicable for it to be presented within that time limit, and if so,

(b) was it presented within such further reasonable period?

[106]Of those reasons, the following do not apply to Claim 2: 29 of 54(i) Reasons a) and b) – the Claimant was not working within the Respondent organisation in the three months following her dismissal;

(ii) Reason c) – dismissal was the chronologically last act the Claimant seeks to complain about, and by this point in time, and by 1 August 2024 – still well within the primary time limit to present an unfair dismissal complaint - she had presented Claim 1, complaining of the individual incidents of discrimination that form the other 59 complaints she asks the Tribunal to adjudicate, so by this time she did understand that individual complaints could be presented;

(iii) Reason d) – as for c), the Claimant brought Claim 1 on 1 August 2024, so she had overcome any embarrassment about bringing a claim within the primary time limit for presenting an unfair dismissal complaint;

(iv) Reason e) – the Claimant’s father passed away in 2014, so this reason would not still have applied at the time the Claimant was dismissed in June 2024; and

(v) Reasons f) and g) – this had long-since expired. The Claimant had presented Claim 1 on 1 August 2024, and therefore in respect of Claim 2, the Tribunal understands the Claimant to be relying on the remaining reasons listed at h) to k).

[107]The question for me, therefore, is whether any of the reasons at h) to k), alone or collectively, demonstrate that it was not reasonable practicable for the Claimant to present Claim 2 to the Tribunal by 29 September 2024.

[108]The Tribunal finds that reason h) does not. Every person who considers they have been unfairly dismissed might reasonably be expected to find that their dismissal caused them emotional strain, and uncertainty about next steps and new employment. Parliament, in determining that unfair dismissal complaints should be brought within three months of dismissal, must be assumed to have taken account of that in alighting on that three month limitation period. Moreover, in this case the Claimant had a longer a period of being ‘on notice’ that she was at risk of redundancy, because she, along with all other members of staff ‘at risk’ of redundancy, was given notice to terminate her employment on 27 March 2024. Although it was not known whether the Respondent would withdraw that notice until her dismissal was confirmed in May 2024, the Claimant knew from 27 March 2024 that dismissal was a significant risk. Reason h) did not render it not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to present Claim 2 by 29 September 2024.

[109]Reason i) is a reason commonly cited by claimants who presented their complaints outside the primary time limit. As per the Dedman case, the relevant question for the Tribunal is whether the Claimant’s ignorance was reasonable in 30 of 54 the circumstances. Here, the Tribunal finds that ignorance was not reasonable. By 1 August 2024 the Claimant had presented Claim 1 – she knew of the time limits that applied to the presentation of complaints to the Employment Tribunal by that time. She had been seeking advice from ACAS from June 2024. Moreover, the Claimant was employed in a relatively senior role, in a technologyrelated position. It is implausible that she could not conduct some basic research into her employment rights using the internet over such a long period of time from the earliest of her allegations (which relates to matters which are said to have occurred in 2012).

[110]Reason j) – being lack of awareness of the strict three-month time limit for presentation of complaints – may mean it is not reasonably practicable for a person to present a claim, but it depends whether the person’s (i.e., the Claimant’s in this case) ignorance was reasonable in the circumstances. On the facts here, the Claimant was aware of the time limits. She knew that claims needed to be presented within three months less one day in July 2024 (according to her witness statement) – well before the deadline for the presentation of her unfair dismissal complaint. The Claimant was not ignorant of that time limit at the time the primary time limit for her unfair dismissal complaint expired.

[111]The Claimant says that, when in September 2024 she contacted ACAS about her dismissal, ACAS told her that she could not pursue that claim because she had received redundancy pay (reason k)). Besides the Claimant’s witness evidence on this point, there is no evidence to support it – no email correspondence from ACAS to that effect, and no email correspondence from the Claimant to ACAS where she summarises that advice. Moreover, it is not credible that ACAS advised her to this effect. The ACAS website clearly states that ACAS does not give legal advice.

[112]Consequently, the Claimant has failed to satisfy the Tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable to present her unfair dismissal complaint within the time limit – and the burden to do so sits with her (Porter v Bandridge). This complaint was therefore presented out of time, and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider it. The fifth questions:(a) Is there any reasonable prospect of the Claimant showing that the discrimination and victimisation complaints form part of “conduct extending over a period” with any in time act?

(b) If so, should those complaints be struck out?

[113]The Claimant says that all her complaints of discrimination and harassment should be seen as a continuing pattern of behaviour that began in 2012 and only concluded with her dismissal on 30 June 2024. She acknowledges that some of her complaints involve different people acting, but says that the Tribunal should regard it as significant that this all occurred within the management team of the same department of the Respondent organisation. 31 of 54

[114]The Respondent acknowledges that there is some link between the November 2023 selection of the Claimant for redundancy and her dismissal for redundancy, but besides those linked acts it says the Claimant’s complaints are allegations of distinct and separate acts, done by different people.

[115]The key case on whether conduct amounts to a continuing act is that of Hendricks (as regularly cited by the Claimant). The Tribunal notes that that case made it plain that: a) The burden of satisfying the Tribunal that the allegations the Claimant says formed part of “conduct extending over a period” sits with her; b) The Claimant must point to evidence of a continuing state of affairs, or an ongoing situation; c) The Tribunal must look at how the Claimant has put her case to understanding what has been alleged (this is also emphasised in Lyfar).

[116]Here, the Tribunal is not looking at the evidence that either side will or would rely upon at the Final Hearing, but rather whether the Claimant has any reasonable prospect of establishing at the Final Hearing that the apparently-out-of-time complaints formed part of conduct extending over a period with either of the intime complaints.

[117]The two complaints made by the Claimant that were presented in time were: a) That in May 2024 the Claimant was not treated as a serious candidate when applying for the newly-created 8A Governance Manager role (the direct race discrimination complaint at paragraph 6(24) of the list of issues). This is said to have been done by GW; and b) That on 30 June 2024 she was made redundant as an act of victimisation (the complaint at paragraph 28(3) of the list of issues). The Respondent has not identified any individual decision-makers involved in the selection of the Claimant for redundancy. Rather, the Respondent says that it was an automatic process if the persons identified for redundancy were not successful in their applications for vacant roles.

[118]While the case law does not require that acts said to form part of conduct extending over a period were all done by the same actor, that is one way that could be used to suggest that acts are linked and represent a continuing discriminatory state of affairs. GW is not said by the Claimant to be responsible for any of the other complaints she makes besides the in-time complaint from May 2024. The Respondent could be regarded as saying that GW is also the actor, or one of the actors, in relation to the other in-time complaint, because it says the Claimant’s redundancy came about because the Claimant was unsuccessful in applications she made for vacancies – and one of four roles we know she made at least one application that was unsuccessful for which GW is identified as the decision-maker. Significantly, though, the Claimant has not identified anyone who she says decided she was responsible for her redundancy, 32 of 54 so she has not made a positive case linking the complaint at paragraph 28(3) to any of her out-of-time complaints by reason of the same person being responsible, and the Tribunal must examine how the Claimant has put her case.

[119]The Tribunal notes that most of the discrimination/victimisation matters which were presented out of time by the Claimant are said by her to have been done by the following people in the following time periods: a) HS, who was the Claimant’s line manager for a time, is said to be responsible for:(i) The direct race discrimination complaints at paragraphs 6(1), 6(2) (now withdrawn and dismissed), 6(3), 6(4), 6(5), 6(6) (also said to involve TW), 6(7), 6(9) (also said to involve WC and TW from the Claimant’s department, and LW in HR), 6(24), and 6(25);

(ii) The direct sex discrimination complaint at paragraph 11(1); and

(iii) The harassment related to race complaints at paragraphs 15(1), 15(3), 15(9)I, 15(9)ii, 15(9)iii, 15(9)iv and 15(9)v; and all of which are said to have occurred in the period 2012 to 2014; b) TW, who managed HS, who is said to have been responsible for: (i) The direct race discrimination complaints at paragraphs 6(2) (now withdrawn and dismissed), 6(3), 6(6), 6(8), 6(9) and 6(25); and (ii) The direct sex discrimination complaint at paragraph 11(1), all of which are said to have occurred in the period 2012 to 2014; c) WC, who was HS’s successor as the Claimant’s line manager, is said to be responsible for: (i) The direct race discrimination complaints at paragraphs 6(9), 6(10) (now withdrawn and dismissed), 6(11), 6(12) and 6(13); (ii) The harassment related to race complaints at paragraphs 15(2), 15(4), 15(5), 15(6), 15(7), 15(8) and 15(9)v; and (iii) The harassment related to sex complaints at paragraphs 19(1)i to iv (inclusive), and the identical factual complaints also said to have been sexual harassment at paragraph 23(1), all of which are said to have occurred in the period 2012 to September 2018; d) SG is said to be responsible for the direct race discrimination complaints at paragraphs 6(14), 6(15), 6(16), 6(17), 6(18), 6(26) and 6(27), which are said to have occurred in 2019 and 2020; e) ST, who is said to be responsible for the harassment related to race complaint at paragraph 15(9)vi, said to have occurred in March 2021; 33 of 54 f) KP, who is said to be responsible for the harassment related to sex complaints at paragraphs 19(2)i to x (inclusive), and the identical factual complaints also said to have been sexual harassment at paragraph 23(1), said to have occurred in 2019 and 2020, and then the last act (when his body language is said to have looked shifty whilst he looked the other way) in December 2023; g) CL, who is said to be responsible for the harassment related to sex complaint at paragraph 19(3)i, and the identical factual complaint is also said to have been sexual harassment at paragraph 23(1), which is said to have occurred in August 2021; h) LW (from the Respondent’s Human Resources team), who is said to be responsible for an act of direct race discrimination described in paragraph 6(9), and is said to have occurred in May to June of 2014; and i) NR, who is said to be responsible for: (i) The act of direct race discrimination described at paragraph 6(25); and (ii) The act of direct sex discrimination described at paragraph 11(1), both of which are said to have occurred in 2012 to 2014.

[120]Seven other acts are not assigned to particular individuals by the Claimant – those described at paragraphs 6(19), 6(20), 6(21), 6(22), 28(1), 28(2) and 28(3) of the list of issues.

[121]The complaints ascribed to HS and SG, and some of the complaints ascribed by WC, pertain to line-management-related matters or communications, such as the conduct of 1:1s, assignment of work, allocation of responsibilities, management of capability concerns and complaints about the Claimant. The complaints ascribed to TW relate to the Claimant’s complaints about HS.

[122]The complaints ascribed to TW pertain to his response to HS’s actions, or the Claimant’s complaints about HS’s actions.

[123]The complaints raised about the conduct of ST, CL and LW appear to relate to specific, one-off, incidents, and those to NR relate to complaints about his behaviour over a two-year period but confined to 2012 to 2014 (a confined window in the context of Claims raising complaints covering a period of 12 years).

[124]Some of the complaints brought against WC relate to comments said to have been made by him to the Claimant or in the Claimant’s presence.

[125]The allegations made against KP are of a different character – that KP flirted with and sexually harassed the Claimant.

[126]For these assigned-to-specific-individuals complaints, the time periods in which the acts giving rise to these out-of-time complaints occurred, the actors involved, and the nature of the acts, are of a distinct character to the two in-time complaints, 34 of 54 which relate to the Claimant’s treatment in an application for a vacancy to avoid redundancy, and her dismissal as redundant. The Claimant has made broad assertions that the in-time acts represent a continuing course of conduct with all of the out-of-time acts, but she has entirely failed to be specific about why she says that, besides that there is a common respondent, and that she was treated badly by management and HR in the course of her employment and at its termination.

[127]The Tribunal considers that, despite the paucity of argument about why these matters are linked from the Claimant, the facts indicate that the complaints of direct race discrimination and victimisation at paragraphs 6(22) and 28(2) of the could be part of a continuing course of conduct with the in-time complaints at 6(23) and 28(3). This is because the complaints at paragraphs 6(22) and 28(2) are about the Claimant’s selection for redundancy in November 2023, and 6(23) is about the treatment of the Claimant’s application for a vacancy during the restructuring process, and 28(3) is about the Claimant’s being made redundant in June 2024. This act of selection for redundancy, on-the-face-of-it, has reasonable prospects of being found to be part of an “ongoing situation” (Hendricks) with her subsequent redundancy, which came about because she was unsuccessful in her application for the vacancy referred to at 6(23). These have reasonable prospects of succeeding as not being characterised as “isolated and unconnected acts”.

[128]The Tribunal fails to see how the Claimant has any reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that any of the other out-of-time complaints form part of conduct extending over a period with the in-time complaints given the total lack of argument as to why, and therefore that argument is struck-out as having no reasonable prospect of success. While the case law cautions against striking out complaints of unlawful discrimination at this stage given evidence has not been heard, particularly where there are disputes of fact (such as the reason why a person acted as they did) involved (Anyanwu, Ezsias), the Claimant has made no real argument as to why there was a continuing course of conduct between the in-time acts which occurred in May 2024 and June 2024 with the acts said to have taken place in the period 2012 to November 2021. Taking the Claimant’s case at its highest (White) does not mean assuming that she will make an effective argument to this effect at the final hearing. There is a burden on the Claimant to make some kind of argument at this stage – given the Respondent’s strike-out application - as to why they are linked (Ahir v British Airways), and she has been long apprised of the Respondent’s application to strike-out any argument she would make that there was conduct extending from a time earlier than the primary time limit into the time within it. This burden should be discharged.

[129]This is particularly so when the consequence of not striking out would be to place on the Respondent a burden to investigate very historic allegations which the Respondent would be significantly prejudiced in resisting because of the passage 35 of 54 of time. The protection that would be afforded the Respondent by the time limit provisions would be significantly undermined if it still had to undertake all the preparation of those matters for Final Hearing to face an unarticulated argument as to why those matters were part of conduct extending over a period sought to be made by the Claimant at the Final Hearing. It is not in accordance with the overriding objective and its principles of fairness, justice, proportionality and avoiding delay so far as is compatible with proper consideration of the issues, to do otherwise – and therefore the Tribunal finds not only that its discretion to strikeout is engaged on the facts here, but also that it is appropriate to exercise it to do so (Dolby).

[130]Accordingly, the Tribunal finds the Claimant has no reasonable prospect of succeeding in her argument that all the out-of-time complaints - save for those at paragraphs 6(22) and 28(2) – should properly be regarded as conduct extending over a period with the in-time complaints at paragraphs 6(23) and 28(3) of the list of issues, and that argument in respect of those complaints is struck-out. The sixth questions:(a) Is there any reasonable prospect of the Claimant showing that, in respect of any of the discrimination and victimisation complaints presented outside the primary time limit, it is just and equitable to extend time?

(b) If not, should those complaints be struck out?

[131]These questions need not be answered, as the substantive question of whether it is “just and equitable” to extend time has been answered. The seventh questions:(a) Is there any reasonable prospect of the Claimant showing that the averred protected acts of complaints she made in 2012 and 2013 were “protected acts” for section 27(2) purposes?

(b) If not, should that complaint be struck out?

[132]The Claimant has withdrawn the first averred protected act from 2012, so this question only applies to the 2013 communication which is said by her to be a protected act – the 15 April 2013 complaint the Claimant says she made to TW about HS.

[133]The Tribunal notes what the Respondent says about the Claimant’s shifting position on what she said to TW about HS in the conversation between the Claimant and TW on 15 April 2013. However, absent hearing evidence on this, the Tribunal cannot conclude that the Claimant has no reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal at that Final Hearing that that conversation did not amount to a protected act. That is properly a matter to be determined upon hearing evidence at the Final Hearing. Conclusions

[134]The Claimant’s withdrawn: 36 of 54 a) Reliance on the complaint she made about Helen Stanger in September 2012 (at paragraph 27(1) of the list of issues) as a protected act; and b) Complaints listed at paragraph 6(2) and 6(11) of the list of issues, i.e., the direct race complaints pertaining to: what was said on 15 April 2013 by Trevor Witcher, and the failure of Wayne Camp on 8 June 2014 to offer the Claimant a phased return to work after she had been off sick for a month, are hereby dismissed.

[135]For all of the above reasons: a) The Claimant’s application to amend the scope of the Claims was refused; b) It is not just and equitable to extend time for any of the Claimant’s 58 apparently out-of-time complaints of unlawful discrimination or victimisation. Those complaints were presented out-of-time, and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear them as standalone complaints; c) The Claimant’s unfair dismissal complaint was presented outside of the primary time limit, and she has failed to satisfy the Tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable to do so. That complaint therefore is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider; d) The Tribunal has declined to find that the Claimant has no reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that the complaints described at paragraphs 6(22) and 28(2) of the list of issues (that her selection for redundancy was an act of direct race discrimination and/or victimisation) amounted to conduct extending over a period with the two standalone in-time complaints at paragraphs 6(23) and 28(3) of the list of issues. Whether these matters did amount to conduct extending over a period with the in-time complaints is a matter that remains in issue to be determined at the Final Hearing; e) The Claimant has no reasonable prospect of persuading the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that any of the other out-of-time discrimination or victimisation complaints amounted to conduct extending over a period with either or both of the two standalone in-time complaints at paragraphs 6(23) and 28(3) of the list of issues, and that argument is consequently struckout pursuant to Rule 38(1)(a) of the ET Rules; and f) The Tribunal has declined to find that the 2013 communication has no reasonable prospect of succeeding as a “protected act” for the purposes of section 27 of the 2010 purposes when the Claims come before the Tribunal for Final Hearing. Whether it was a “protected act” or not is a matter properly for evidence and argument before the Tribunal at the Final Hearing. 37 of 54

[136]Consequently, the Claimant’s surviving standalone complaints that will proceed to be determined at the Final Hearing are as follows: a) Her complaint of direct race discrimination, identified in paragraph 6(23) of the list of issues; and b) Her third complaint of victimisation, identified in paragraph 28(3) of the list of issues (which she avers was a detriment done on the ground of one or both of two putative protected acts she relies upon, described at paragraph 27(2) and 27(3) of the list of issues), and the Claimant may seek to persuade the Tribunal at the Final Hearing that the complaints described at paragraphs 6(22) and/or 28(2) of the list of issues (that her selection for redundancy was an act of direct race discrimination and/or victimisation) amount to conduct extending over a period with the two standalone in-time complaints at paragraphs 6(23) and 28(3) of the list of issues.