D Lloyd v Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service: 6007265/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6007265/2025
D LloydClaimantMid and West Wales Fire and Rescue ServiceRespondent
Employment Judge S PoveyIn person for claimantMR LEWIS-BALE (instructed by COUNSEL) for respondentDate 14 August 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The complaint of unfair dismissal has no reasonable prospects of success and is struck out Order posted to the parties on 31 August 2025 Kacey O’Brien For Secretary of the Tribunals Approved by: EMPLOYMENT JUDGE S POVEY Dated: 14 August 2025 Note Reasons for the judgment were given orally at the hearing. Written reasons will not be provided unless a party asked for them at the hearing or a party makes a written request within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.

REASONS

[1]On 14 April 2024, the Respondent applied to strike out the claim of unfair dismissal on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success, under Rule 38 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (‘the Procedure Rules). In the alternative, the Respondent applied for a deposit order on grounds that the claim had little reasonable prospects of success (per Rule 40 of the Procedure Rules).[2]This was the hearing of those applications, during which I was provided with a bundle of documents (‘the Bundle’) and I received submissions from the parties (which included written subs from Mr Lewis-Bale for the Respondent).[3]The applicable legal provisions regarding applications to strike out a claim was accurately set out in Mr Lewis-Bale’s written submissions but, in summary, the key points are as follows: Case No: 6007265/2025 - 2 - 3.1. Whether to strike out a claim (or any part of a claim) is a two-stage test. First, does the claim have no reasonable prospects of success? Even if that threshold is met, stage two requires the Tribunal to consider whether to exercise its discretion to strike out the claim. 3.2. Strike out should be reserved only for the clearest of cases, as it is an inherently draconian measure. 3.3. In deciding whether the claim has no reasonable prosects of success, the Claimant’s pleaded case is taken at its highest (that is, what the Claimant alleges is accepted to have happen as he claims, even when the basis for his claim is resisted and not accepted by the Respondent). 3.4. Proper allowance must be made for the fact that the Claimant prepared and is pursuing his claim without legal advice or assistance.[4]The claim for unfair dismissal arises from the Claimant’s dismissal for gross misconduct by the Respondent with effect from 9 December 2024. I spent time going through the Claimant’s particulars of claim and the basis, as pleaded, for why he says his dismissal was unfair. Mindful that the Claimant is a litigant in person, I also had regard to an additional ground of his claim, arising out of the appeal against dismissal (which post-dated his ET1 claim form). Although not currently pleaded as there has been no application to amend the claim, I had regard to this additional complaint in assessing whether the claim has no reasonable prosects of success.[5]I was also mindful of the following, relevant factors.[6]The conduct which the Claimant was dismissed for was not, and has never been, disputed by the Claimant.[7]The Claimant was dismissed for accessing and storing pornographic images on his work laptop and downloading and/or storing racist and sexist WhatsApp messages from his phone onto his work laptop.[8]The legal test for fairness in conduct dismissals requires the following: 8.1. Did the Respondent have a genuine belief, based upon reasonable investigation, that the conduct for which the Claimant was dismissed had been committed; 8.2. Was dismissal in those circumstances within a range of reasonable responses; and 8.3. Was the decision to dismiss fair (which includes consideration of the procedures followed by Respondent). Case No: 6007265/2025 - 3 - 8.4. It is not a rehearing of the disciplinary process and the Tribunal must not substitute its own decision or view as to whether it would have dismissed the Claimant for that of the Respondent.[9]The Claimant’s pleaded case raised a number of complaints about aspects of the procedure followed by the Respondent, including the impartiality of the investigating officer and one of the members of disciplinary panel. I explored each in detail with the Claimant and concluded as follows: 9.1. None of the Claimant’s allegations, even when taken at their highest, could reasonably have had any material impact on whether the Respondent had a genuine belief based on a reasonable investigation that the Claimant had engaged in the conduct for which he was dismissed or that dismissal for that conduct was within a range of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employer. 9.2. None of the Claimant’s allegations, even when taken at their highest, changed the fact that the content for which he was dismissed was found on his work laptop or that the Claimant admitted to accessing pornographic material, downloading pornographic material (running into thousands of images) and storing pornographic material on his laptop and, by extension, on the Respondent’s OneDrive. 9.3. None of the Claimant’s allegations, even when taken at their highest, changed the fact that the Claimant’s conduct constituted clear, numerous and repeated breaches of the Respondent’s Information Security Policy. 9.4. None of the Claimant’s allegations, even when taken at their highest, changed the fact that the Claimant was in a leadership role (as a Station Manager) or that the Respondent was and is a public authority and requires the public to have trust and confidence in it.[10]Even if the Claimant were able to prove all the grounds he raised in his pleaded case (including his additional issue with the status of the appeal officer, which, as yet, is not part of his pleaded case), there is no reasonable prospects that the legal tests that render a conduct dismissal fair will be undermined. Put another way, even on his case at its highest, he does not have a reasonable prospect of showing that his dismissal, for the reasons he was dismissed and in the circumstances in which he was dismissed, was anything other than fair in law.[11]I appreciate that the Claimant is unhappy that he was dismissed, with the implications that has for his livelihood in the short, medium and long term. However, the basis for his concerns and complaints, even when taken at their highest, do not sufficiently support a claim of unfair dismissal, given the facts which are not disputed in this case. Disagreeing with the decision to dismiss does not render the dismissal unfair in law. Case No: 6007265/2025 - 4 -[12]For those reasons, the Claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal has no reasonable prospects of success. In my judgment, this is a case where it is in the interests of justice and consistent with overriding objective to exercise my power, allow the Respondent’s application and strike out the complaint of unfair dismissal. To not do so would cause unnecessary time and expense to the Respondent, would take up Tribunal time and resources and delay meritorious claims reaching trial, and would give the Claimant false hope that his complaint of unfair dismissal will be successful, in circumstances where it has no reasonable prospects of being so.[13]As such, the complaint is struct out on grounds that it has no reasonable prospects of success. Order posted to the parties on 23 March 2026 Miriam Drake For Secretary of the Tribunals Approved by: