Miss A. SquelchClaimantMizzling LimitedRespondentDate 26 February 2026
JUDGMENT
The response is struck out.
REASONS
[1]By a letter dated 6 August 2025 the Tribunal gave the respondent an opportunity to make representations or to request a hearing, as to why the response should not be struck out because• the respondent had not complied with the Order of the Tribunal dated made on 21 January 2025 to provide a counter schedule of loss and state its position on disability and/or• it has not been actively pursued.[2]The respondent has failed to make representations in writing, or has failed to make any sufficient representations, why this should not be done or to request a hearing. The response is therefore struck out.[3]The respondent will be entitled to notice of any hearings and decisions of the Tribunal but will only be entitled to participate in any hearing to the extent permitted by the Employment Judge. Approved by:[1]The respondent is to pay to the claimant the total sum of £48846.99, calculated as set out below.[2]The claimant was at the time of her complaints a disabled person within the meaning set out in s6 Equality Act 2010 and the respondent had knowledge of the same.[3]The complaints of direct sex discrimination are well-founded and succeed.[4]The complaints of harassment related to sex and disability are well-founded and succeed.[5]The respondent is to pay to the claimant compensation for financial losses arising out of the discrimination of £20524.15 plus interest of 8% which is £1471.00.[6]The respondent is to pay to the claimant compensation for injury to feelings arising out of the discrimination of £20,000 plus interest of 8% which is £2967.67.[7]The complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages is well-founded. The respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the claimant's wages in the pay period from 11 May 2025. The respondent shall pay the claimant £114.78, which is the gross sum deducted. The claimant is responsible for the payment of any tax or National Insurance.[8]The complaints of direct age discrimination are not well-founded and are dismissed.[9]The total compensation is £45077.59. This will be subject to the payment of income tax on any amount over £30,000, that is £15077.59.[10]Grossing up of the award: the claimant is currently unemployed, and her tax rate will be 20%. £15077.59 grossed up by 20% is £18846.99.[11]The claimant’s total award is therefore £30000 plus £18846.99 = £48846.99. When the excess over £30000 is taxed at 20%, she will be left with her original award of £45077.59.[12]The Recoupment Regulations do not apply to this award of compensation.
Findings of Fact
[13]However, she said that it took several further conversations with Mr Watkins about this before he paid her, and she was paid late. Other staff were paid at the end of March, but she was paid several weeks later. She was then paid weeks late again in May instead of at the end of April, with no explanation.[14]She considers these conversations and the consistent late payment by Mr Watkins to be acts of harassment on the ground of her disability. She had already had a conversation with him in her interview about the physical limitations of her condition. She had not asked to be paid for days on which she had not worked. He had left the members of staff to carry out the work between themselves, and she had adjusted her role to accommodate her condition, with the agreement of Gaz, the other de facto supervisor.[15]At the start of April, a few days before the opening to the public, at a staff meeting, the staff were told that Gaz had been promoted to general manager. He had no management experience. The claimant had supervisory and management experience. There had been no consultation with the claimant, and she had not been given the opportunity to apply for the role, despite having expressed her interest in it to Mr Watkins.[16]On 3 April 2024 the claimant was in the building talking to a member of staff, Jazz, when Mark interrupted their conversation to ask what they had been talking about. He assumed they had been talking about him and objected to this. The claimant told him they hadn’t been, and he accused her of being childish. A row ensued. During the row, Mark made derogatory comments to the claimant about the work that she had been doing, making allegations that she had not been “pulling her weight like everyone else,” that she was “barely there” and “took trips to the Trafford Centre” instead of being at work like anyone else. The claimant told me that Mark was one of the staff members who she had told about her condition at the start of her employment, and the fact that she could not carry out heavy lifting. The claimant says that this conversation with Mark was an act of harassment on the ground of her disability.[17]She spoke to Mr Watkins about Mark’s treatment of her the following day, accompanied by Jazz, who had witnessed it. She told him that the conversation with Mark had really upset her and that he had been aggressive with her and raised his voice at her. Mr Watkins told the claimant that he could “see this coming” because of his conversations with her at the end of March about her capabilities, and that she needed to “see it from Mark’s point of view” and “try to be understanding of Mark’s side of the situation”. She told him that she wanted him to investigate the situation further, as she was not comfortable being on shifts with Mark due to his aggression and his comments about her disability. She told me that Mr Watkins had not wanted to listen to her, and she found her treatment by him to be degrading.[18]She did not have any confidence that Mr Watkins would investigate the matter or support her further. She considered resigning at this point, but decided to see whether Mr Watkins would, in fact, take her complaint about Mark seriously and address the matter with him. Her concerns about her safety when working with Mark were heightened when, on 6 April, she overheard him telling Jazz that he had been “jumped” by some men while on the street and that he had hit a female bystander who was with them.[19]Having asked Mr Watkins not to put her on shifts with Mark, he continued to do so. She said that he rostered her to work with Mark at least twice a week until her resignation and she was frequently rostered to work alone with Mark on a shift. She considers this to be an act of sex-based harassment by Mr Watkins.[20]On 3 May 2024, she discovered that Mark was promoted to the other managerial role. Again, she had not been consulted about this, and she had considerably more managerial and supervisory experience than Mark. Mark also had a complaint against him that he had acted in an aggressive and threatening way to her, that Mr Watkins had ignored.[21]On 11 May 2024, the claimant resigned. She had attempted to give her resignation directly to Mr Watkins, but he ignored her messages requesting a conversation and he avoided her when they were in the building at the same time. She therefore gave Gaz her resignation. She told me that Gaz had said “I was surprised that you didn’t resign as soon as you found out that Mark had been promoted and not you.”[22]Since leaving the respondent’s employment, the claimant has made at least a hundred job applications. She has disclosed her disability to prospective employers and considers this to have put her at a disadvantage for jobs in hospitality. She does not have experience for office or administrative jobs and has been unsuccessful in applying for these. She has therefore retrained as a beauty therapist. I find that the claimant has taken some steps to mitigate her losses. She has not yet found a job.[23]She told me that the impact of her treatment by the respondent on her confidence and resilience has been significant. She is a young woman at the start of her working life and has a disability. She disclosed it to her employer in good faith and in the expectation that her rights under the Equality Act to adjustments would be honoured, and they were not, and she was harassed as a consequence. She considered herself also to have been subject to sex discrimination. She has struggled to find alternative work and is now receiving treatment for depression. Is the claimant a disabled person? (Equality Act 2010 section 6)[24]In order to be a disabled person within the definition in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, the claimant must have:a. A physical or mental impairmentb. Which has a substantial adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day to day activitiesc. Which is long-term. This means that it has lasted for 12 months already at the date of the alleged discrimination or is likely to last for 12 months from the date of first onset. “Likely” is said to mean that it “could well happen”.[25]The claimant must have been a disabled person at the time of the alleged discrimination.[26]I accept that the claimant was a disabled person at the time she was employed by the respondent. She had a physical impairment, hypermobility, which had a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day to day activities. She could not lift or carry heavy objects and often had to put up with being in a significant amount of pain. The condition is lifelong and the claimant had been experiencing symptoms since the age of 8.[27]The respondent knew that the claimant was disabled as she told him at her interview on 13 March 2024 and told the rest of the respondent’s staff when she started working there two days later. Harassment related to disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)[28]I accepted the claimant’s evidence that the respondent did the following things:a. That between 25 and 30 March 2024 Mr Watkins asked her if she was really working whilst on shift or if she was not putting in as much effort as the other staff;b. Between 25 and 30 March 2024 Euan Watkins told her wouldn’t pay her for hours that she’d completed if she wasn’t actually working at those times and the claimant was then paid late;c. On 3 April 2024, Mark shouting that the claimant was childish, was not pulling her weight like everyone else, that everyone else has been putting in a lot of effort and working hard and she was barely there and took trips to the Trafford centre.d. On 4 April 2024, when the claimant spoke to Mr Watkins about Mark’s comments, Mr Watkins told her that he “could see this coming” because of previous conversations about her capabilities on shift and asked the claimant repeatedly to see it from Mark’s point of view and try to be understanding of Mark’s side of the situation.[29]I accept that this was that unwanted conduct related to the claimant’s disability and that it had the effect of violating her dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her. I have taken into account the claimant’s perception and the other circumstances of the case and I have concluded that it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. The comments made were directly related to the claimant’s disability, which the respondent had full knowledge of. Harassment related to sex (Equality Act 2010 section 26)[30]I accepted the claimant’s evidence that the respondent did the following things:a. On the 6 April 2024 the claimant overheard Mark telling Jazz that he has hit women before.b. Despite her request not to be put on shift with Mark, Mr Watkins put the claimant on shift with him on a frequent basis, at least 2 shifts per week until she left the respondent.[31]I accept that this was that unwanted conduct related to the claimant’s sex and that it had the effect of violating her dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her. I have taken into account the claimant’s perception and the other circumstances of the case and I have concluded that it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. It did not matter that the comments made about having hit a woman were not made directly to the claimant, as they contributed to creating a hostile environment for her in circumstances where she had recently had a confrontation with the same person who had been aggressive to her.[32]In relation to being put on the same shift has him, the claimant said that in fact the situation was more stressful again, as she was frequently alone on shift with him. Given that she had directly told Mr Watkins what the issue was and he had both failed to investigate and then again failed to accommodate the claimant’s request for a different shift pattern, the claimant reasonably concluded that she was being harassed by Mr Watkins’ actions on the basis of her sex. Direct Discrimination[33]Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010: A person(a) (A) discriminates against another(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.[34]The Tribunal is to make a comparison with an actual or hypothetical comparator in not materially different circumstances (section 23 EQA 2010). Ultimately, the Tribunal is considering what is the reason why the treatment occurred as it did.[35]It is possible to use the evidence of comparators in materially different circumstances to construct a hypothetical comparator and determine how such a hypothetical individual would be treated. However, a statutory comparator as per s23 Equality Act 2010 must be a comparator in the same position in all material respects of the victim save that he, or she, is not a member of the protected class (Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] IRLR 285).[36]Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 deals with the burden of proof in discrimination cases. Section 136(2) states that if there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person committed the act of discrimination, the court must hold that the discrimination occurred. This does not apply if that person shows that that they did not commit the act of discrimination. Case law guidance, including the leading case of Igen v Wong, states that the respondent’s explanation as to why they did not contravene the provision concerned must be “in no sense whatsoever” because of the claimant’s protected characteristic, in this case her sex.[37]I find that the claimant not being informed of managerial opportunities in March 2024 and May 2024 and not being offered the opportunity to take advantage of those opportunities that arose, was less favourable treatment. The claimant says she was treated worse than Gaz and Mark who are both male.[38]Was the reason why she was treated less favourably because she is female? I discussed with the claimant whether the treatment was connected with her disability instead of her sex. However, I consider that the claimant has established facts from which I could conclude, in the absence of an explanation from the respondent, that the treatment was because of her sex. These facts are her qualifications and experience being far greater than Mark and Gaz, and also because of Mr Watkins’ refusal to sanction or investigate Mark for having been aggressive towards the claimant in the workplace, and then putting her alone on shift with him. I note that even in the ET3 that was submitted late by the respondent and not accepted by the Tribunal, the respondent made no attempt to defend the allegations of discrimination, focussing only on the unpaid wages. The respondent has submitted no defence or explanation for the failure to promote the claimant and so cannot explain why her treatment was in no sense whatsoever to do with her sex. She succeeds in her direct discrimination complaints.[39]The claimant alleged in the alternative that the failure to promote her may have been age discrimination. However, other than a difference in age and a difference in treatment, she has not advanced any further evidence or argument to show that the treatment was because of her age. The age discrimination claim is therefore not well made out and is dismissed. Wages Claims[40]The complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages is well-founded. The respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the claimant's wages in the pay period from 11 May 2025. She was not paid £103 wages as owed. She also was not reimbursed expenses of £11.78. The respondent shall pay the claimant £114.78, which is the gross sum deducted. Remedy – financial loss as a result of discrimination[41]The claimant claims future loss of earnings at the rate of a bar manager in the Bury area. I accept that but for the sex discrimination, the claimant would have been promoted to a manager’s position at the respondent and so can claim future losses at a manager’s salary rate. She gives a figure of £23,314 net per year for this, which I accept.[42]She claims loss of earnings to the date of the hearing and future loss of earnings. Although I accept that the claimant has applied for a number of jobs, she has not secured alternative employment. She has taken courses in beauty therapy and wants to open her own business but is saving the money to do so. As an alternative to saving up for her own business, she could have taken more steps to find work as a beauty therapist. In the circumstances I find that a period of future loss of earnings of one year at £23,314 net, minus Universal Credit payments of £2790.86, plus interest, is an appropriate period of future losses.[43]She has £20524.14 losses and interest is charged at 8% for half of the period of loss. The period of loss from the date of dismissal to the date of the hearing is 654 days, divided by 2 is 327 days. 8% interest for a period of 327days at 8% on £20524.14 is £1471.[44]The claimant’s total compensation for future loss of earnings is therefore £21995.14.[45]The claimant claims £20,000 for injury to feelings, in the middle of the middle Vento band. In the case of Prison Service and ors v Johnson 1997 ICR 275, EAT the Tribunal set out the general principles that underlie awards for injury to feelings:a. awards for injury to feelings are designed to compensate the injured party fully but not to punish the guilty partyb. an award should not be inflated by feelings of indignation at the guilty party’s conductc. awards should not be so low as to diminish respect for the policy of the discrimination legislation. On the other hand, awards should not be so excessive that they might be regarded as untaxed richesd. awards should be broadly similar to the range of awards in personal injury casese. tribunals should bear in mind the value in everyday life of the sum they are contemplating, andf. tribunals should bear in mind the need for public respect for the level of the awards made.[46]The scope of possible awards for injury to feelings are referred to as “Vento bands” and Tribunals are to consider the Presidential Guidance on Employment Tribunal Awards for Injury to Feelings and Psychiatric Injury. The relevant Guidance for the period of the claimant’s claims is the Seventh Addendum. In respect of claims presented on or after 6 April 2024, the “Vento” bands are: a lower band of £1,200 to £11,700 (less serious cases); a middle band of £11,700 to £35,200 (cases that do not merit an award in the upper band); and an upper band of £35,200 to £58,700 (the most serious cases), with the most exceptional cases capable of exceeding £58,700.[47]Considering the claimant’s involvement with the respondent as a whole, she has suffered considerable injury to feelings from their conduct towards her. Even though her period of employment was relatively short, she was subjected to disability-related harassment, sex-related harassment and direct discrimination on the basis of her sex during that time. This means that an award in the middle band may be appropriate.[48]In relation to the sex discrimination, the claimant told me that this had made her very angry. She was 22 at the time and this was the first time she had experienced sex discrimination at work. She was angry, surprised and disappointed that she was treated in this way by Mr Watkin and by Mark. Mr Watkin retracted the promotion opportunities that had been discussed with her at the start of her employment.[49]In relation to the disability discrimination, I accept that her confidence was very significantly undermined by her treatment by the respondent, as she was newly diagnosed at the time and was coming to terms with having a lifelong condition when she was subjected to the humiliating treatment by the respondent. This was the first time she had told an employer that she was disabled and had hoped to be treated with dignity and respect, but this was not the case. The respondent, for reasons directly linked with her disability, questioned her work rate and commitment in a manner that the claimant found humiliating and did not support her when another member of staff carried out similar acts of harassment. The claimant now needs medication and therapy for her mental health when she did not before starting work at the respondent.[50]I find that an award of £20,000 is appropriate, in the middle of the middle Vento band. This is subject to interest on the whole period since the discrimination. The discrimination happened from 25 March to 11 May, and I have taken the mid-point in the course of discriminatory conduct as 18 April 2024. The number of days between then and the date of the hearing is 677 days at 8% multiplied by £20,000, which is interest of £2967.67. the total award for injury to feelings is therefore £22967.67. Taxation of the award – grossing up[51]The award is taxable as it is for losses arising on termination of employment (s401 Income Tax Earnings and Pensions Act 2003.). Any sums over £30000 are subject to income tax. Awards will be ‘grossed up’ by a tribunal where the sum to be received by the claimant will be taxed. The purpose is to place in the claimant’s hands the sum she would have held had she not been treated unlawfully, i.e. to compensate for the true net loss.[52]The total compensation is £45077.59. This will be subject to the payment of income tax on any amount over £30,000, that is £15077.59. 53. £15077.59 must be grossed up by the amount of income tax the claimant would have to pay on it. the claimant is currently unemployed, and it is assumed therefore that her tax rate will be 20%. £15077.59 grossed up by 20% is £18846.99.[54]The claimant’s total award is therefore £30000 plus £18846.99 = £48846.99. When the excess over £30000 is taxed at 20%, she will be left with her original award of £45077.59. Approved by: