Miss L Campbell v The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Merton: 6006807/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6006807/2024

Between

Miss L CampbellClaimant

The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of MertonRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Liz Ord

In person for claimant

Mr Cyril Adjei (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 17 November 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal was presented out of time and it was reasonably practicable for it to have been presented within the time limit. Therefore, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint and it is dismissed.

[2]The claimant’s complaints of disability discrimination and failure to make reasonable adjustments were presented out of time and it is not just and equitable to extend time. Therefore, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaints and they are dismissed.

REASONS

[1]Oral judgment was given to the parties at the hearing and, upon the claimant’s request for written reasons, these reasons are provided.

Evidence

[2]The tribunal had before it a documents bundle of 81 pages, the claimant’s late documents of 26 pages, a five-page witness statement from the claimant and a letter dated 7 October 2025 from the respondent.

[3]The claimant chose not to give oral evidence and to only rely on submissions and her written statement. Law Statutory provisions

[4]Section 111 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) - Complaints to [employment tribunal] (1) A complaint may be presented to an [employment tribunal] against an employer by any person that he was unfairly dismissed by the employer. (2)– [subject to the following provisions of this section], an [employment tribunal] shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal- (a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or (b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.

[5]Section 123 Equality Act 2010 (1) Subject to section 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[6]Section 207B ERA Extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings(1) This section applies where this Act provides for it to apply for the purposes of a provision of this Act (a “relevant provision”).

(2) In this section- (a) Day A is the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned complies with the requirements in subsection (1) of section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (requirement to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings) in relation to the matter in respect of which the proceedings are brought, and (b) Day B is the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned receives or, if earlier, is treated as receiving the certificate issued under subsection (4) of this section.

(3) In working out when a time limit set by a relevant provision expires the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted.

(4) If a time limit set by a relevant provision would (if not extended by this subsection) expire during the period beginning with Day A and ending one month after Day B, the time limit expires instead at the end of that period.

(5) Where the employment tribunal has power under this Act to extend a time limit set by a relevant provision, the power is exercisable in relation to the time limit as extended by this section.

[7]In other words, Day A being the day of notification and Day B being the day of the certificate, in working out when a time limit expires, the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted. The first date on the certificate stops the clock. Case

Law

[8]Reasonably practicable Palmer and anor v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

1984 ICR 372

, CA The Court of Appeal concluded that “reasonably practicable” does not mean reasonable, which would be too favourable to employees, and does not mean physically possible, which would be too favourable to employers, but means something like “reasonably feasible”. The fact that an employee is pursuing an internal appeal does not, of itself, mean that it is not reasonably practicable to submit a claim within the applicable time limit, even if this means submitting the claim before an appeal has concluded.

[9]Just and equitable Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link

2003 IRLR 434

, CA - It is for the applicant to convince the tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend time. The exercise of the discretion is the exception rather than the rule. In Apelogun-Gabriels v Lambeth BC

[2002] ICR 713

, a race discrimination case, the Court of Appeal held that delay pending the resolution of internal grievance procedures was not a sufficient ground for allowing an application to be heard outside the statutory time limits. The two other cases cited by Mr Adjei of Drury v Car Phone Warehouse Limited and DHL Supply Chain Ltd v Fazakerley, in which time was extended where the claimants were misled, were also considered.

Discussion

[10]The claimant was employed as a Dispute Resolution and Compliance Legal Assistant in the South London Legal Partnership, which provides a range of legal services to a number of boroughs in London. She was dismissed with the effective date of termination being 12 March 2024. ACAS early conciliation started on 25 April 2024 and ended on 6 June 2024. The time period of 42 days of ACAS conciliation are therefore added to the 3 month time period for issuing proceedings. The claim was presented on 25 July 2024.

[11]Having regard to the issues in this case and, as explained by EJ Fowell at the preliminary hearing on 4 August 2025 and in the Amended Grounds of Resistance, time expired on 23 July 2024. This date is calculated by counting forwards from the effective date of termination by 3 months less a day, to bring the primary limitation date to 11 June 2024, and then adding 42 days to extend time to 23 July 2024. Consequently, the claim was presented 2 days late.

[12]The claimant submitted that the primary reason she thought her claim was in time was based on her initial understanding of communications with ACAS that time ran from the outcome of her internal appeal, which was on 5 April 2024. However, the claimant’s witness statement is vague and does not explain what exactly ACAS said to her or how the advice was given or when. Apart from saying the advice was by telephone, she did not provide any more detail at the hearing today, despite being given an opportunity to do.

[13]At paragraph 6 of her written statement the claimant said she contacted ACAS in March 2024 following the receipt of her appeal outcome and again in April 2024. At today’s hearing she suggested that this was wrong and she contacted ACAS in either February or March before the appeal outcome.

[14]At paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement the claimant said that she did not fully process the three-months “minus one day” requirement. She said her understanding was influenced by ACAS guidance, which emphasised the three month period without clearly highlighting the “minus one day” requirement. This, she said, contributed to her confusion.

[15]The claimant has not demonstrated from this evidence that ACAS misled her, because what she describes is too vague and unclear to make such a finding. Consequently, she cannot rely on the caselaw that deals with misleading advice. At its highest, the claimant, being a litigant in person, may not have properly understood the time limit for presenting her claim, although she never sought to research it or otherwise check the position, despite being familiar with the general existence of time limits in litigation through her employment.

[16]The claimant also referred to other multiple ongoing challenges impacting her executive functioning, task management and ability to process complex timelines. She cited her health conditions (type 1 diabetes, BPD, ASD and anxiety and depression), attending medical appointments, coping with the stress of dismissal, attempting to secure new employment, and managing her studies.

[17]However, these are general, vague statements and the claimant has not given any details of how or when her health conditions impacted her ability to present her claim on time. When she did present her claim, it was detailed and set out clearly what she was relying on.

Conclusion

[18]The burden of proof is on the claimant to convince the tribunal that time should be extended. Although the claim was only two days out of time, time limits are strict and there must be good reasons for extending them.

[19]On the evidence before the tribunal, it is not persuaded that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present her unfair dismissal claim on time. Neither is the tribunal persuaded that it would be just and equitable to extend time. Accordingly, all claims are out of time and the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear them.