Employment Judge DawsonRepresenting herself For the respondents: Ms Dadd (instructed by counsel) for claimantDate 9 February 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s claims of harassment related to sex were presented within such period as the tribunal considers just and equitable.[2]The claimant’s claim for breach of contract arising from the first period of engagement, as defined in paragraph 34 of the order dated 23 November 2025, was presented after the period of three months beginning with the termination of the engagement and the tribunal is satisfied that it was reasonably practicable to present the claim within that period. Those claims are dismissed.[3]The claimant’s claim for breach of contract arising from the second period of engagement, as defined in paragraph 34 of the order dated 23 November 2025, were presented after the period of three months beginning with the termination of the engagement and the tribunal does not lack jurisdiction to determine them because of the effluxion of time.[4]The claims claim in respect of holiday pay arising from the first period of engagement, as defined in paragraph 34 of the order dated 23 November 2025, was presented after the period of three months beginning with the termination of the engagement and the tribunal is satisfied that it was reasonably practicable to present the claim within that period. Those claims are dismissed.[5]The claimant’s claim in respect of holiday pay arising from the second period of engagement, as defined in paragraph 34 of the order dated 23 November 2025, were presented after the period of three months beginning with the termination of the engagement and the tribunal does not lack jurisdiction to determine them because of the effluxion of time.[6]The question of whether any claims in respect of unauthorised deductions of wages were presented outside of the relevant limitation period is adjourned to the final hearing.[7]The respondent’s application for costs is dismissed.[8]Further directions are given in the separate document “Case Management Orders”
REASONS
[1]By a claim form presented on 24 February 2025 the claimant brought the following complaints;a. discrimination on the grounds of sex;b. for notice pay,c. for holiday payd. for arrears of pay.
The issues
[2]The issue which I am to determine was recorded in an order following a Case Management hearing which took place on 12 November 2025 as follows: The Preliminary Hearing issue will be whether the claims have been presented in time and if not whether time is to be extended.[3]That order also gave directions in respect of this hearing which included the provision of a witness statement from the claimant explaining why it was that she did not present the claim in this matter until 24 February 2025. No order was given in respect of the provision of evidence by the respondent. Conduct of the Hearing Reasonable Adjustments[4]Neither party required any adjustments for the hearing.
The evidence
[5]I was provided with a bundle running to 162 PDF pages. Except where otherwise stated, references to page numbers in this judgment are to the hearing bundle.[6]I heard evidence from the claimant. Preliminary observations[7]At the outset, I raised with the parties my concern in respect of the issue which had been listed in the context of the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in E v X L, Z (UKEAT//0080/20/RN).[8]My concern was that the case had not been listed for a strike out application but to determine time as a preliminary issue. In this case the claimant asserts, according to the list of issues, that she was sexually assaulted on a number of occasions between 28 January 2024 and 27 July 2024. It seemed to me that it might be necessary to consider whether that was conduct extending over a period within the meaning of section 123 Equality Act 2010. If time started to run from January 2024, rather than, say, July 2024, then any question of whether the case was presented within such period as the tribunal considered just and equitable might be answered differently. That would require me to make findings of fact as to whether the sexual assaults happened and if so on what date and whether they were a continuing act. However, I had been provided no evidence in respect of any such findings of fact.[9]Similarly, whether the claim in respect of unlawful deduction from wages was in time would depend upon whether there was a series of deductions. The claimant’s claim (at least according to the schedule of loss) goes back to December 2023 but the most recent deduction was in November 2024. If there was a deduction in December 2023 which was not part of a series of deductions, the question of whether the claim was presented in time or not would be answered (at least theoretically) differently to if the deduction was part of a series of deductions ending in November 2024. However, it was difficult to see how I could determine whether there was such a series without making findings of fact as to whether particular deductions had been made. Again, I was provided with no evidence.[10]Having raised my concerns, neither party asked me not to proceed with the hearing or to call further evidence and I have been left to do the best I can, on the evidence I have.[11]In the event, I have been able to resolve those difficulties as follows:a. In respect of the claim of harassment, I have decided whether the claim would have been presented within such period as I consider just and equitable, even if there was not a continuing act.b. In respect of the claim of deduction from wages, it seems to me that the way the claim has been put in the schedule of loss is different to the way the judge understood it at the hearing on 12 November 2025. In those circumstances there has been a material change of circumstances and I consider that I should not decide that point at this hearing. It will be a matter for the final hearing. The law on time limits in respect of presentation of claims Non Equality Act Claims Contract Claims[12]The Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 provide at article 7 “an employment tribunal shall not entertain a complaint in respect of an employee's contract claim unless it is presented—(a) within the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination of the contract giving rise to the claim, or(b) where there is no effective date of termination, within the period of three months beginning with the last day upon which the employee worked in the employment which has terminated, or …(c) where the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within whichever of those periods is applicable, within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable. Holiday claims 9. The following regulations are in the Working Time Regulations 1998 30 Remedies (1) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that his employer— (a) has refused to permit him to exercise any right he has under— … (b) has failed to pay him the whole or any part of any amount due to him under regulation 14(2) or 16(1). (2) [Subject to [regulations 30A and [regulation] 30B], an employment tribunal] shall not consider a complaint under this regulation unless it is presented— (a) before the end of the period of three months (or, in a case to which regulation 38(2) applies, six months) beginning with the date on which it is alleged that the exercise of the right should have been permitted (or in the case of a rest period or leave extending over more than one day, the date on which it should have been permitted to begin) or, as the case may be, the payment should have been made; (b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three or, as the case may be, six months. Claims in respect of wages[13]The Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 23.— Complaints to employment tribunals.(1) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal — (a) that his employer has made a deduction from his wages in contravention of section 13 (including a deduction made in contravention of that section as it applies by virtue of section 18(2)), (b) …(2) Subject to subsection (4), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with— (a) in the case of a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, or (b) in the case of a complaint relating to a payment received by the employer, the date when the payment was received.(3) Where a complaint is brought under this section in respect of— (a) a series of deductions or payments, or (b) a number of payments falling within subsection (1)(d) and made in pursuance of demands for payment subject to the same limit under section 21(1) but received by the employer on different dates, the references in subsection (2) to the deduction or payment are to the last deduction or payment in the series or to the last of the payments so received. Case law[14]The EAT made it clear in GMB v Hamm EAT 0246/00 that the words ‘not reasonably practicable’ are to be given the same meaning whenever they appear in an equivalent context in comparable legislation, so similar considerations will apply to all other statutory employment claims using the same formula.[15]The leading authority on “reasonably practicable” is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Palmer and Saunders v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] 1 All ER 945, In that case, May LJ stated ''[W]e think that one can say that to construe the words “reasonably practicable” as the equivalent of “reasonable” is to take a view that is too favourable to the employee. On the other hand, “reasonably practicable” means more than merely what is reasonably capable physically of being done—different, for instance, from its construction in the context of the legislation relating to factories: compare Marshall v Gotham Co Ltd [1954] AC 360, HL. In the context in which the words are used in the 1978 Consolidation Act, however ineptly as we think, they mean something between these two. Perhaps to read the word “practicable” as the equivalent of “feasible” as Sir John Brightman did in [Singh v Post Office [1973] ICR 437, NIRC] and to ask colloquially and untrammelled by too much legal logic—“was it reasonably feasible to present the complaint to the [employment] tribunal within the relevant three months?”—is the best approach to the correct application of the relevant subsection.''[16]Even if a claimant satisfies a tribunal that presentation in time was not reasonably practicable, that does not automatically decide the issue in her favour. The tribunal must then go on to decide whether the claim was presented ‘within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable’.[17]Lady Smith in Asda Stores Ltd v Kauser EAT0165/07 stated: ‘the relevant test is not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but to ask whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done’.[18]A claimant’s complete ignorance of his or her right to claim unfair dismissal may make it not reasonably practicable to present a claim in time, but the claimant’s ignorance must itself be reasonable. As Lord Scarman commented in Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd 1974 ICR 53, CA, where a claimant pleads ignorance as to his or her rights, the tribunal must ask further questions: ‘What were his opportunities for finding out that he had rights? Did he take them? If not, why not? Was he misled or deceived?’ In Porter v Bandridge Ltd 1978 ICR 943,CA, the majority of the Court of Appeal, having referred to Lord Scarman’s comments in Dedman, ruled that the correct test is not whether the claimant knew of his or her rights but whether he or she ought to have known of them.[19]Where the claimant is generally aware of his or her rights, ignorance of the time limit will rarely be acceptable as a reason for delay. A claimant who is aware of his or her rights will generally be taken to have been put on inquiry as to the time limit. In Trevelyans (Birmingham) Ltd v Norton 1991 ICR 488, Mr Justice Wood said that, when a claimant knows of his or her right to complain of unfair dismissal, he or she is under an obligation to seek information and advice about how to enforce that right.[20]In Rajabov v FCO,[2022] EAT 112 the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that "the tribunal was rightly sceptical of the legal proposition that not being sure of the merits of a claim was a sufficient impediment as to make presentation of the claim within time not reasonably practicable. It cited the well-known dictum of Brandon LJ in Wall's Meat Company Limited v Khan [1979] ICR 52, 60 whereby "the state of mind of the complainant in the form of ignorance of, or mistaken belief with regard to, essential matters" may be a sufficient impediment making it not reasonably practicable to present a complaint within the period of three months but only "if the ignorance on the one hand, or the mistaken belief on the other, is itself reasonable". Equality Act Claims[21]In respect of the Equality Act 2010 section 123 provides (1) Subject to sections 140A and 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable (3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it. Conduct extending over a period[22]In Hendricks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2003] IRLR 96, it was held that when considering whether an act extended over a period the focus should be on “the substance of the complaints that the Commissioner was responsible for an ongoing situation or a continuing state of affairs in which female ethnic minority officers in the Service were treated less favourably. The question is whether that is 'an act extending over a period' as distinct from a succession of unconnected or isolated specific acts, for which time would begin to run from the date when each specific act was committed” The Discretion to Extend Time[23]In Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston [2009] EWCA Civ 1298, [2010] IRLR 327, Sedley LJ stated : 'there is no principle of law which dictates how generously or sparingly the power to enlarge time is to be exercised' (para 31). In commenting on the case of Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434, Wall LJ stated “it is, in essence, an elegant repetition of well established principles relating to the exercise of a judicial discretion. What the case does, in my judgment, is to emphasise the wide discretion which the ET has – see the dictum of Gibson LJ cited above – and articulate the limited basis upon which the EAT and the court can interfere. Similarly, DCA v Jones [2008] IRLR 128 approves the Keeble guidelines, but emphasises that they are fact/case specific – see per Pill LJ at paragraph 50” (para 25).[24]In the EAT in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan UKEAT/0305/13 (18 February 2014, unreported), the EAT stated “Though there is no principle of law which dictates how sparingly or generously the power to enlarge time is to be exercised (see Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston [2009] EWCA Civ 1298 at para 25, [2010] IRLR 327, per Sedley LJ) a tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to do so, and the exercise of discretion is therefore the exception rather than the rule (per Auld LJ in Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] EWCA Civ 576, [2003] IRLR 434 (CA)). A litigant can hardly hope to satisfy this burden unless he provides an answer to two questions, as part of the entirety of the circumstances which the tribunal must consider. The first question in deciding whether to extend time is why it is that the primary time limit has not been met; and insofar as it is distinct the second is reason why after the expiry of the primary time limit the claim was not brought sooner than it was.” (para 52).[25]In Olufunso Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23 , Underhill LJ stated “It will be seen, therefore, that Keeble did no more than suggest that a comparison with the requirements of section 33 might help “illuminate” the task of the tribunal by setting out a checklist of potentially relevant factors. It certainly did not say that that list should be used as a framework for any decision. However, that is how it has too often been read, and “the Keeble factors” and “the Keeble principles” still regularly feature as the starting-point for tribunals’ approach to decisions under section 123 (1) (b). I do not regard this as healthy. Of course the two discretions are, in Holland J’s phrase, “not dissimilar”, so it is unsurprising that most of the factors mentioned in section 33 may be relevant also, though to varying degrees, in the context of a discrimination claim; and I do not doubt that many tribunals over the years have found Keeble helpful. But rigid adherence to a checklist can lead to a mechanistic approach to what is meant to be a very broad general discretion, and confusion may also occur where a tribunal refers to a genuinely relevant factor but uses inappropriate Keeble-derived language (as occurred in the present case – see para. 31 above). The best approach for a tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion under section 123(1)(b) is to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time, including in particular (as Holland J notes) “the length of, and the reasons for, the delay”. If it checks those factors against the list in Keeble, well and good; but I would not recommend taking it as the framework for its thinking. Prejudice[26]In Miller v Ministry of Justice, UKEAT/0003/15UKEAT, Laing J stated 12 .. There are two types of prejudice which a Respondent may suffer if the limitation period is extended. They are the obvious prejudice of having to meet a claim which would otherwise have been defeated by a limitation defence, and the forensic prejudice which a Respondent may suffer if the limitation period is extended by many months or years, which is caused by such things as fading memories, loss of documents, and losing touch with witnesses. 13…It is clear from para 50 of Pill LJ's judgment in DCA v Jones that it is for the ET to decide, on the facts of any particular case, which potentially relevant factor or factors is or are actually relevant to the exercise of its discretion in any case. DCA v Jones also makes clear (at para 44) that the prejudice to a Respondent of losing a limitation defence is “customarily relevant” to the exercise of this discretion. It is obvious that if there is forensic prejudice to a Respondent, that will be “crucially relevant” in the exercise of the discretion, telling against an extension of time. It may well be decisive. But, as Mr Bourne put it in his oral submissions in the second appeal, the converse does not follow. In other words, if there is no forensic prejudice to the Respondent, that is (a) not decisive in favour of an extension, and (b), depending on the ET's assessment of the facts, may well not be relevant at all. It will very much depend on the way in which the ET sees the facts; and the facts are for the ET.[27]In Adedeji Underhill LJ stated “[32]…Of course employment tribunals very often have to consider disputed events which occurred a long time prior to the actual act complained of, even though the passage of time will inevitably have impacted on the cogency of the evidence. But that does not make the investigation of stale issues any the less undesirable in principle. As part of the exercise of its overall discretion, a tribunal can properly take into account the fact that, although the formal delay may have been short, the consequence of granting an extension may be to open up issues which arose much longer ago.
Analysis
[28]I will deal with the claims in the order they appear in the List of Issues following the hearing on 12 November 2025. Harassment Related to Sex[29]In respect of the alleged assault in January 2024, any claim should have been bought by 28 April 2024. The claim form was presented on 24 February 2025 and was, therefore, nine months out of time.[30]The claimant has provided an explanation as to why she did not present the claims sooner than she did. In addition to those matters in her witness statement, in cross-examination that she felt unable to challenge the 2nd respondent given her position as a nanny when he was rich and powerful, she said that is why she did not bring a claim in July 2024. She also emphasised that between August and September 2024, she remained in contact with a third party believing that the situation could be resolved, which in one sense it was when she returned to engagement in October 2024. I accept that evidence (although I make no findings on how rich or powerful the second respondent was).[31]I accept the claimant’s evidence that, during 2024, she was worried about her financial position. She says that she had been forced to buy a sevenseater car (as set out in her Grounds of Complaint at page 17) which was purchased with finance and she had bills to pay. I find that she was financially insecure and, to that extent, needed work which had been and was being provided by the respondents.[32]The claimant told me and I accept that she knew that she could seek to enforce her rights in the courts but she felt unable to do so given the power imbalance between her and her employers until she went to the Citizens Advice Bureau in December 2024.[33]I accept that the claimant did not seek any advice until after her employment ended in November 2024. I accept that she spoke to the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) on 9 December 2024 who allocated her an adviser on 23 December 2024. I accept that was the first time she learned about the ACAS early conciliation process and also the time limits in the employment tribunal. She, therefore, contacted ACAS on 23 December 2024 (the day she saw the CAB adviser) and the conciliation period ended on 27 January 2025. The claimant presented a claim on 24 February 2025.[34]Given the ongoing relationship between the claimant and her employers, I accept that it was a combination of financial insecurity, the imbalance of power between her and her employers and lack of knowledge of the tribunal deadlines which led to the delay in presenting the claim. Although there was delay between 9 December 2024 and 24 February 2025 when the claim was presented (and if the claimant had been legally represented, she may well have been criticised for not presenting the claim in December 2024), given that the claimant was being guided by the CAB, the claimant can rely upon a credible reason for the delay during that time. The period of the delay is reasonably substantial but the respondents have not suggested that they have been caused any prejudice by the delay. There is no suggestion that a fair trial is not possible.[35]Weighing all of those matters, I consider that the claim was presented within such period as is just and equitable after the alleged assault in January 2024.[36]It follows (for the same reasons) that the claims in respect of the later alleged sexual assaults were also presented within such period as was just and equitable.[37]In those circumstances I have not had to decide whether there was a continuing act. Breach of Contract[38]Employment Judge Smail identified two periods of engagement by the respondents which are not substantially in dispute. The first was between 12 September 2023 and 29 July 2024 and the second between 24 October 2024 and 23 November 2024. The claimant, in her evidence, did not dispute that there were such periods and she accepted that she was not engaged in August and September 2024.[39]As is set out above, a claim in respect of breach of contract must be brought within three months of the effective date of termination or last day on which the employee worked or, if that is not reasonably practicable, in such period as the tribunal considers reasonable. This is a different time limit, to the time limit in discrimination claims.[40]I must consider the two periods of engagement separately. The primary time limit for any claims which arose in the first period of employment started to run from the claimant’s last day of work. The evidence establishes that was 29 July 2024, as identified by Employment Judge Smail. In those circumstances the primary three-month time limit expired on 28 October 2024.[41]The claimant’s explanation for the delay is the same as I have set out in relation to the harassment claim.[42]This is not a case where the claimant did not know that she had rights which she could enforce. The fact that the claimant did not know about time limits is a different point. Given that the claimant knew that she had rights which she could enforce in the courts or tribunals, it was reasonably practicable for her to find out how to go about presenting such a claim. The claimant had access to the Internet and could have contacted the CAB sooner than she did. I find that her reason for not presenting a claim by 28th October 2024 was because she wanted to preserve her relationship with the respondents. Whilst that may or may not be a good reason in itself, it was reasonably practicable to present the claim form in time.[43]Thus any contract claim in respect of the first period of employment is out of time and must be dismissed.[44]There is no dispute that in relation to any breach of contract claim arising out of the second period of engagement, the claim has been presented in time. The second period of engagement ended on 23 November 2024. Thus, the primary limitation period expired on 22 February 2025. The claimant had contacted ACAS on 23 December 2024 and as a result of the date of issue of the ACAS certificate the claim had to be presented by 26 February 2025. Thus the claim was in time. Holiday Pay[45]The List of Issues did not identify the issues in respect of holiday pay. However, the claimant has submitted a schedule of loss in which she seeks holiday pay and, at this hearing, she confirmed that she seeks holiday pay in respect of both periods of engagement.[46]The claim, the claimant clarified, is in respect of holiday which had accrued but not been taken at the date of termination. In those circumstances the claimant should have presented her claim within the period of three months beginning with the date on which payment should have been made or within a reasonable period if it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim within 3 months.[47]In respect of the initial period of engagement, the claim should have been presented by 28 October 2024 for the reasons set out above. For the reasons I have already given, the claim in respect of holiday pay in respect of the first engagement was not presented within the relevant time limit and will be dismissed.[48]For the reasons I have already given, the claim in respect of the second period of engagement has been presented in time. Non-payment of wages[49]For the reasons which I have set out above, whether there was a series of deductions can only be decided at the final hearing and this issue is adjourned until then. Costs[50]The tribunal did not consider that the claimant had no reasonable prospect of succeeding in her argument that the claims were presented in time and the threshold for an order for the payment of costs has not been passed.