Miss H Massingham v The Haulage (Holdings) Organisation Ltd: 6005961/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6005961/2024

Between

Miss H MassinghamClaimant

The Haulage (Holdings) Organisation LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Aspinall

In person for claimant

Date 3 September 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s claim for public interest disclosure detriment is not well founded and fails. Whilst the claimant had made a protected disclosure and so was a whistleblower and had the protection of the law the respondent did not do those of the things she alleged that were in time because she had made disclosures.

[2]The claimant’s claim for public interest disclosure automatically unfair constructive dismissal is not well founded and fails. Those of the respondent’s actions that were in time were not breaches of her contract entitling her to resign.

[3]The claimant’s claim for breach of contract for the final instalment payment of a Finders Fee agreement is not well founded and fails. She was not able to establish a contractual right to receive that final instalment.

[4]The claimant’s claim for unlawful deductions from wages properly payable to her succeeds in part. Some of her deduction complaints were out of time but the last three formed part of a series of deductions the last of which was in time. The respondent unlawfully deducted £ 1784.19 from her wages. It is entitled to off-set a payment it had made to her following termination of employment of £ 303.90 The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant £ 1480.29 Approved for promulgation by JUDGMENT having been given orally on 3 September 2025 and written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 (4)(b) of the Employment Tribunals Procedure Rules 2024, the following reasons are provided

REASONS

[1]By a claim form dated 17 July 2024 the claimant brought complaints of automatically unfair dismissal (protected disclosure), public interest disclosure detriment, and a claim for monies due to her by way of(i) a finders fee that she says she was contractually entitled to and

(ii) unauthorised deductions taken from her pay.

Background

[2]The respondent had until 28 August 2024 to defend the claim and failed to do so. There was a case management hearing before Employment Judge Slater on 16 January 2025 at which a late Response was accepted. This final hearing was listed with the dates having been agreed by the parties and case management orders were made by consent to prepare for this hearing. Those case management orders were not complied with. On 10 April, 4 May and 6 June the Tribunal wrote to the parties telling them not to send their evidence to the Tribunal through the portal and reminding them of the Orders. On 8 July 2025 EJ Barker varied the Orders because there had been non compliance and 1 of 32 gave direction for the parties, who could not agree on the content of the bundle, to prepare 3 copies of a respondent’s bundle by 14 July 2025, 3 copies of a claimant’s bundle by 21 July 2025 and to exchange witness statements by 11 August 2025. Those Orders were not complied with. On 27 August 2025 the respondent wrote requesting a postponement on the grounds that pressure of work meant that Mrs Lowrey Group HR and Payroll Manager, to whom the preparation of the case had fallen, had been too busy to attend to it. The postponement application was opposed by the claimant and it was rejected by EJ Leach on Friday 29 August 2025. Preparation to proceed

[3]At the start of this hearing the case was not ready. There was no respondent bundle, no claimant bundle and witness statements had not been exchanged as ordered by EJ Barker. I raised concerns about non compliance, proper and proportionate use of time and whether it was going to be possible to proceed. Both parties were present and wanting to proceed.

[4]The respondent said it had two copies of 34 pages but they were not paginated. The claimant had a copy of those 34 pages but they were not in order and not paginated. The parties were sent out to collate 3 paginated clean copies of the respondent bundle. The claimant then said that she wished to include 35 pages of payslips and 7 more pages. It was agreed that the respondent would need to copy them and that the 7 pages could be added to the respondent bundle as pages 35-41. The respondent would attend on the second day with 3 copies of the payslips to be added as pages 42- 76 at the end of the bundle.

[5]The claimant said she also had video and photographic evidence on her laptop that would prove that the vehicle was defective and that the trailer incident had taken place on a slope. I explained that I did not need to make a factual finding about whether the vehicle was defective or not. The relevant law meant that I would be considering what the claimant reasonably believed when she made her disclosure and for her detriment and constructive dismissal arguments; what the respondent took into account when it convened a disciplinary meeting, failed to carry out a proper investigation and refused to postpone disciplinary proceedings whilst the claimant was off sick, whether those things were done because she had made disclosures and whether without proper and reasonable cause they were done in a way that was likely to seriously damage or destroy the relationship of trust and confidence between the claimant and respondent.

[6]I also explained that it appeared to be agreed that the incident had taken place on a slope. The respondent confirmed that was agreed. The claimant said then that she understood and did not need me to see the videos or photographs but had referred to them in her statement.

[7]The claimant had prepared a witness statement of 28 pages but only given it to the respondent on the first morning of the hearing. The respondent read it and said it did not contain anything new, nothing that it had not already understood the claimant to be saying from her emails. It had no objection to the claimant being allowed to give evidence. The claimant also had witness statements from her mother, C2 relevant to remedy and a Mr Benton, C3 who would not appear as his evidence was that he had previously been employed by the respondent and also had what he believed were 2 of 32 unlawful deductions taken from his pay. His previous experience would not be relevant to whether or not deductions had been made from the claimant’s wages. It was agreed that the Tribunal would attach such weight to the statements of C2 and C3 as it saw fit.

[8]The respondent said at the outset that Mr Graham Robinson to whom the alleged disclosure had been made was no longer with the business and Mr Roger Crabtree who had made the decision to discipline the claimant had not made a statement and would not be giving evidence.

[9]Mrs Lowrey herself as HR and Payroll Manager said she had relevant evidence to give about the finders fee issue, the damages deductions issues, the chronology of events in investigation and calling a disciplinary meeting and the decision not to postpone the disciplinary hearing when the claimant was ill. She also had potentially relevant evidence to give about when a decision had been made to move to disciplinary hearing, importantly before or after the alleged disclosures and when the respondent had felt the incident could amount to gross misconduct. Mrs Lowrey had not prepared her own witness statement and had not realized that she could not just come along and describe what had happened. The claimant had no objection to Mrs Lowrey preparing a written statement overnight and giving evidence on those points.

[10]I had regard to my general case management powers and powers to regulate procedure at final hearing. I considered the wholesale non compliance of the respondent with case management orders. I understood the claimant to be struggling to get documents together, she did not have access to a computer and printer and photocopying would involve expense that she could not meet. I considered that in light of the previous non compliance and interventions of other judges, an adjournment to allow for better preparation would be unlikely to result in a better prepared case.

[11]I explained the List of Issues and burden of proof to the parties. The respondent understood that with no evidence in chief other than Mrs Lowrey’s it may be in some difficulty but it would rely on the documents. The claimant accepted that I could look at the Response, look at the documents and hear from Mrs Lowrey. I explained the test for a qualifying protected public interest disclosure as set out in the List of Issues. I explained the relevant law on the claimant’s case that she resigned because of the respondent’s conduct in response to her alleged disclosures.

The Relevant Law

[12]A proposal for a fair hearing was put forward as follows: i. Reliance on the bundle as assembled, 76 pages in all. ii. Respondent’s Mrs Lowrey’s witness statement to be shared by 9am on second day. iii. Claimant to give evidence at 10am on the second day but only be cross-examined by Mrs Lowrey on the respondent’s case as in the Response, documents and Mrs Lowrey’s statement and only for up to one hour. The claimant was to give evidence first as she was very nervous. iv. Mrs Lowrey to give evidence late morning on the second day and be questioned by the claimant for up to one hour. 3 of 32 v. Each side to make a short closing submission. vi. The Tribunal to adjourn to apply the law and come back with a decision on Wednesday morning with remedy if appropriate on Wednesday late morning or afternoon.

[13]I gave guidance to both parties that if they agreed to go ahead with the hearing this week as proposed then they may not be credible if they later, if they did not get the result that they wanted, tried to say that they had not had a fair hearing. I adjourned at 12.30 to give the parties time to confer with their colleagues and instructed them to come back to me at 2pm to say if they wished to go ahead in accordance with the proposal. Submissions and decision to proceed

[14]At 2pm both sides said they wished to proceed on the basis set out above. The claimant was adamant that the case was taking its toll on her emotionally, everything she wanted me to see was in the bundle or her statement, she could not tolerate further delay, and that she wanted to proceed. Mrs Lowrey had spoken to her bosses and they said that they ought to have sent a solicitor along with her. I commented that if she had been legally represented then it is likely that I would not have allowed her to produce her own witness statement for the first time during the trial window. I would have expected a solicitor to have ensured compliance with case management orders. In that way the respondent was getting support from the Tribunal that it would not have had if it had been legally represented. That matched the support being given to the claimant whose own witness statement had only been produced on the morning of the hearing. The claimant and respondent both wanted to go ahead. Day 2 postponement application

[15]On the morning of the second day the respondent attended with the Head of HR Ms Savry and said that it had made a postponement application by email at 4.50pm on the first day. I had not seen that email. The claimant said she had seen it and opposed it on the basis of the emotional impact on her of a postponement. She said she had had a mental breakdown following the incident, that was why she had had to resign. She said she did not want delay, needed closure, that it would be detrimental to her health to delay (she had no medical evidence) and wanted to proceed. I gave each side 15 minutes to make the application and to respond. The respondent said it had only just realised during the trial window that this was a whistleblowing case and was serious. It wanted to instruct solicitors. I referred the parties to the Rules on postponement and explained what the Rules say.

[16]I rejected the postponement application as the respondent had not made out the exceptional circumstances required by the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. It had known the case was a whistleblowing case since the claim form, if not ACAS conciliation and it had attended a case management hearing on 16 January 2025 at which whistleblowing and the List had been agreed and it had agreed the hearing date. Adjustments

[17]No adjustments were needed though the claimant was visibly agitated at the outset. For that reason I proceeded very slowly, with her permission used her first name, 4 of 32 repeated the key word in each question I asked of her and enlisted the support of her friend Dave who attended with her to help with the ordering and pagination of documents. I structured the timetable with the claimant giving evidence first to help to settle her nervousness. With her permission I spoke to her in a direct, blunt way to her to help her focus. Throughout the hearing she was most appreciative of the support she was being given. She was clear that she wanted to proceed, that delay would make things worse for her. She calmed when she knew the hearing was going ahead. Her agitation was about delay.

[18]The parties were supported by the clerk in making copies of some documents.

List of Issues

[19]Judge Slater had set out the following list following her case management hearing. We talked through it on the first day and referred to it often during the hearing. Time limits

List of Issues

[1]Given the date the claim form was presented and the effect of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 13 April 2025 may not have been brought in time.

[2]Were the unauthorised deductions and protected disclosure detriment complaints made within the time limit in 23 and 48 respectively of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:(1) Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (allowing for any early conciliation extension) of the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made or of the detrimental act?

(2) If not, in relation to the complaints of unauthorised deductions, was there a series of deductions and was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (allowing for any early conciliation extension) of the last one?

(3) If not, in relation to the detriment complaints, was there a series of similar acts or failures and was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (allowing for any early conciliation extension) of the last one?

(4) If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?

(5) If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable? Protected disclosures

[3]Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:(1) What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant says she made the following disclosure: on 5 April 2025 in a conversation with her transport manager, Graham, telling him that she thought the wagon she had been driving on 4 April 2025 had an electrical fault and the respondent needed to check this. 5 of 32

(2) Did she disclose information?

(3) Did she believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest?

(4) Was that belief reasonable?

(5) Did she believe it tended to show that: (a) a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be committed; (b) a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation; (c) the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered; (d) the environment had been, was being or was likely to be damaged (by possible spillage of animal products); (e) information tending to show any of these things had been, was being or was likely to be deliberately concealed.

(6) Was that belief reasonable?

[4]If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer. Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 48)

[5]What are the facts in relation to the following alleged acts or deliberate failures to act by the respondent? D1 The respondent beginning disciplinary proceedings against the claimant on 5 April 2025. D2 The respondent failing to carry out a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident on 4 April 2025. D3 The respondent refusing to postpone disciplinary proceedings while the claimant was on sick leave.

[6]Did the claimant reasonably see that act or deliberate failure to act as subjecting her to a detriment?

[7]If so, was it done on the ground that she made a protected disclosure? Remedy for Detriment

[8]What financial losses has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant?

[9]Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace any lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

[10]If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated? 6 of 32

[11]What injury to feelings has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

[12]Has the detrimental treatment caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

[13]Is it just and equitable to award the claimant other compensation?

[14]Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

[15]Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it?

[16]If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%?

[17]Did the claimant cause or contribute to the detrimental treatment by their own actions and if so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation? By what proportion? Was any protected disclosure made in good faith?

[19]If not, is it just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation? By what proportion, up to 25%? Constructive s.103A Employment Rights Act 1996 Unfair dismissal (Whistleblowing)

[20]Was the claimant constructively dismissed?(1) Did the respondent do the following things: (a) Begin disciplinary proceedings against the claimant on 5 April 2025. (b) Fail to carry out a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident on 4 April 2025. (c) Refuse to postpone disciplinary proceedings while the claimant was on sick leave.

(2) Did that breach the implied term of trust and confidence? Taking account of the actions or omissions alleged in the previous paragraph, individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal will need to decide: (a) whether the respondent had reasonable and proper cause for those actions or omissions, and if not (b) whether the respondent behaved in a way that when viewed objectively was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent.

(3) Was the fundamental breach of contract a reason for the claimant’s resignation.

(4) Did the claimant affirm the contract before resigning, by delay or otherwise? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant’s words or actions showed that they chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach. 7 of 32

[21]Was the reason or principal reason for the constructive dismissal that the claimant made a protected disclosure? If so, the claimant will be regarded as unfairly dismissed. Remedy for unfair dismissal

[22]If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide:(1) What financial losses has the dismissal caused the claimant?

(2) Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

(3) If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

(4) Is there a chance that the claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?

(5) If so, should the claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much?

(6) Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

(7) Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it?

(8) If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%?

(9) If the claimant was unfairly dismissed, did they cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct?

(10) If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensatory award? By what proportion?

(11) Does the statutory cap of fifty-two weeks’ pay apply?

[23]What basic award is payable to the claimant, if any?

[24]Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent? Wrongful dismissal / Notice pay

[25]Was the claimant constructively dismissed (see issues in section on unfair dismissal)? What was the claimant’s notice period? Was the claimant paid for that notice period?

[28]If not, can the respondent prove that the claimant was guilty of gross misconduct which meant that the respondent was entitled to dismiss without notice? 8 of 32 Unauthorised deductions

[29]Did the respondent make unauthorised deductions from the claimant’s wages and if so, how much was deducted? [Claimant to provide a list of alleged unauthorised deductions with dates] Breach of Contract

[30]Did the respondent fail to pay the claimant the whole amount of the finder’s fee due for introducing a new driver who started in November 2023? The claimant says she was paid £250 but was entitled to be paid a further £750. Amendment20. During the discussion about the List of Issues the claimant said that she also had disclosures from September 2023 about broken and faulty equipment within the respondent’s vehicles. I explained the law on amendment to the claimant and asked did she wished to make an application to amend to include those earlier alleged disclosures. The claimant said that she did not. She relied only on the disclosure in the List of Issues but she wanted me to know about the background. The respondent made no comment. Oral evidence

21. During her evidence the claimant alluded to documents that she thought existed or must exist but which were not in the bundle that had been assembled despite her having been adamant that she wanted to proceed on the basis of that bundle alone. She sought to anchor her position that the truck had been defective by referring to documentary evidence that she thought must exist. I was satisfied that the documents she was alluding to related to her insistence on proving the truck was defective and not to the matters before me.

22. The claimant had alleged that the respondent had falsified documents about her having been involved in accidents so as to make the cost of damage to the vehicles match the deductions made.

23. Mrs Lowrey for the respondent said that she had not falsified any documents. She had been instructed by Transport department to make deductions and she made them. She could not say if the claimant had been involved in the instances of damage or not. She could say that there was a clause entitling her to make deductions from pay. She also alluded to documents, particularly an email that she had seen on the 4 April 2024, that was not in the bundle despite having also been adamant that she wanted the matter to proceed with the bundle we had assembled.

24. Mrs Lowrey gave her evidence in a helpful way. Where she did not know an answer she said so and did not speculate.

25. In her witness statement and oral evidence Mrs Lowrey attempted to give evidence as to the respondent’s reason for the decision to move to disciplinary hearing and about the investigation. She had not been a decision maker herself in those matters but she had spoken to the decision makers and had seen emails from them at the time, so it was explained that it was a matter for me as to how much weight to attach to her evidence about those things including the existence of emails that she said she had seen but she had not provided in disclsoure. She understood that to be the case and wanted 9 of 32 to proceed as did the claimant.

26. Mrs Lowrey was able to give direct evidence as to the chronology of events on 5 April. Importantly, she said that Mr Robinson had recommended disciplining the claimant for the incident on 4 April early on the morning of 5 April in an email to Mrs Lowrey, Mr Roger Crabtree and Mr Robin Tyler. That email was not in the bundle but I accepted Mrs Lowrey’s oral evidence that she knew that Mr Robinson recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the claimant to Mr Crabtree before the claimant was asked to meet with Mr Robinson and then met with him and made her alleged disclosures at around 2.30 pm that day. I accepted her evidence that Mr Robinson’s email that she had seen said that he thought there was a case for gross misconduct. She was credible because when she told me that sequence of events she did not appear to me to have appreciated its significance in detriment preceeding disclosure. The facts Background to the contract

27. The claimant was employed from 23 August 2023 as an HGV class 1 driver. She was paid £132.50 for an eight-hour night shift and was paid £163 for an eight-hour night shift at weekends. The claimant signed the schedule setting out the payments on 7 November 2023. The contract provided for bonus to be paid, £ 10 per shift, so £ 50 per week.

28. On 7 November 2023 she signed a contract of employment which included a clause that said If at any time during or on your termination of your employment you owe your employer money you agree and authorise your employer to deduct the sum or sums out of any payment due to you from your employer whether wages or salary all payment of any other kind. For example, this will cover deductions from your wages of overpayment, expenses, loans, and any other money due from you to your employment. This will also cover any damage to company property (including company vehicles) caused by you with a maximum deduction of £1000

29. The contract also contained a clause about notice. It said that after the first month of employment and up to 2 years of employment the respondent must give one week’s notice. The contract provided that the employer may dismiss without notice or payment in lieu of notice in cases of gross misconduct. 30. There were posters displayed in the workplace to the effect that anyone who introduced a new colleague to come and work for the respondent would be paid a Finders Fee of £1,000. The claimant introduced a new employee and was paid £250 first instalment of the Finders Fee on 29 October 2023. She received a further £ 250 after she brought the claim and she said that £ 500 remains outstanding.

The facts

[31]The following incidents took place such that the respondent alleged that the claimant owed the respondent the following amounts a) 7 September 2023, caught a boulder on the grass verge, left-hand side rail bent total cost £202, driver to pay £101. 10 of 32 b) on 17 October 2023 damage to the nearside bumper, total cost £307.44, driver to pay £153.72 c) on 18 January 2024 incident at Telford, total cost £494.30, driver to pay £247.15 d) on 6 February 2024 damage to the nearside step, total cost £192.60 with driver to pay £96.30 e) on 10 February 2024 damage to the nearside front panel total cost £437.34 with claimant to pay £218.67 f) on 19 February 2024 damage to the rear lens total cost £31.24 with claimant to pay £15.62 g) on 4 March 2024 damage to the nearside light total cost £264.40 with claimant by £132.20 h) on 28 March 2024 damage on the weighbridge in Penrith with total cost £272 04 and claimant to £136.02

[32]The respondent prepared vehicle operator deductions sheets for each incident of damage using the figures above. On each occasion the sheet recorded the day repayments would start and finish. In practice there was a deduction every month from the claimant’s pay.

Conclusion

[33]In total the claimant had £ £2429.61 deducted from her pay during her employment. That amount did not match the amount on the deductions sheets produced at the hearing when added up. The total cost on the deductions sheets added up to £ 2201.36. The total of the 50% proportion that the respondent says was due to be paid by the claimant added up to £ 1100.68. The respondent decided that it had deducted £303.90 too much in error and repaid that to the claimant on 7 March 2025. Even after £ 303.90 is taken into account the amounts in this deduction claim did and do not match up, other than as I have found them to be in the reasoning below.

[34]The respondent also prepared, at some point, notices of bonus deductions relating to occasions when the claimant had been speeding. They were not given to her at the time. They may have accounted for the different amounts alleged due and deducted, they may explain why the amounts claimed and deducted did not and do not match, but the Tribunal can make no finding on this as the documents about speeding were not all provided. The safety breach incident

[35]At around 12 noon on 4 April 2024 there was an incident that took place in a layby at junction 45 of the M6 motorway. The claimant and a colleague were to swap trailers. They would each continue to drive the same cab but pull a different trailer.

[36]The claimant’s colleague Steve Woods drove into the layby and uncoupled and parked his trailer on a downhill slope and drove his cab down to the bottom of the hill, leaving the trailer uncoupled and ready to connect to the claimant’s cab. The claimant 11 of 32 parked her trailer down on the flat and reversed her cab up the hill to couple with Mr Woods’ trailer. Going backwards, uphill in a motorway layby, she passed first an empty car then a car with a driver in it in the path of the trailer as she reversed. The claimant reversed up to the trailer.

[37]She got out of her cab and then climbed on to the trailer, without checking if it had brakes on it, to attach a red and then a yellow cable. She felt the trailer, now attached to the cab, move down the hill. She was immediately in terror that the cab and trailer would push the parked car into the car in front and potentially crush the driver. She leapt off the trailer and chased the cab as it rolled, pulling the trailer, downhill unmanned. She hauled herself up and into the driver’s space of the moving vehicle. The vehicle was still moving and had made contact with the parked car and was pushing it forwards. She was desperate to stop it to avert an accident. She righted herself into a driving position in the cab and used the foot brakes on her vehicle, pressing down hard. She brought the cab and trailer to a stop with the shunted car just inches from the other parked car. Through her courageous action in entering the moving cab and engaging the footbrake an accident was narrowly averted.

[38]The claimant immediately checked the safety of the parked car driver. She asked Steve Woods to get in her cab and reverse it, which he did. She phoned in to work to report the incident.

[39]She completed her shift, driving the vehicle for a further two and a half to three hours. She did not refuse to drive it on the basis that it was not safe on the road. When she got back to the depot, the claimant also completed an accident investigation report form. On that form she wrote, in full, maybe I did not pull brake hard enough to engage or it failed once redline was connected the vehicle started to move I was connecting my lines to the trailer I had connected red and was connecting yellow I felt the vehicle moving so jumped down and ran to catch the cab door to get in and stamp on breaks. There was a car in front stationary which my vehicle was pushing towards another vehicle luckily the truck was stopped before this happened

[40]On 5 April 2025 Graham Robinson sent an email to Caroline Lowrey, HR and Payroll manger and to Roger Crabtree and to Robin Tyler saying that he would get the vehicle checked, and that he thought the incident could amount to gross misconduct. He said he wanted to convene an investigatory interview. Mrs Lowrey saw that email early in the morning that day.

[41]On 5 April 2024 the respondent held a meeting between Steve Woods, Simon Sharp and a note taker Tyler Sharp. The notes were recorded in a template investigation document that the Tribunal saw. Steve Woods said at that meeting that 12 of 32 I noticed the other drivers unit and trailer started rolling down the hill, I started running towards the unit to try help, I saw the driver jumped off the back and fall over, they got up, by this time the unit had hit the bin and collided with a parked car with a man inside and started pushing it down the hill, she then finally got in the cab and put the handbrake on…. Once the handbrake was on and she then jumped out and asked me to reverse it off the car and check out the handbrake, so I got in and reversed off the car slowly and tried the handbrake which appeared to be working, finished the coupling up and whilst doing that I noticed the legs were already up and trailer brake off, all that was left was to attach Susie lines, to me this is the wrong sequence. I secured the vehicle and approached the driver and driver of the car to make sure okay and left. Once I was on the road I called Tyler and Simon to tell them what I’d seen

[42]After the email above and the meeting above, the claimant met with Graham Robinson around 2pm on 5 April 2024. She told him that she thought the vehicle she had been driving on 4 April 2025 had an electrical fault and the respondent needed to check this. She said that the truck should not be on the road, that there was something wrong with its electrics, that the handbrake may have failed to hold the vehicle, that it needed a plug-in fault finder test at least, that she believed the truck to be on the road on 5 April 2024, that she believed the truck to be dangerous, that she would report the organisation to VOSA.

[43]After his meeting with the claimant on 5 April 2024 Graham Robinson emailed Mrs Lowrey, Robin Tyler, Karen in HR and Roger Crabtree. He attached to the email the investigatory interview forms he’d seen from the meeting with Steve Woods and his own notes of the claimant’s meeting. He said he wanted the matter to proceed to a gross misconduct hearing. Mrs Lowrey advised that they didn’t need to do that because the claimant had under two years service. She advised they could move straight to a dismissal. Robin Tyler responded to say that he thought they should try and get all the facts and give the claimant a chance to answer. Robin Tyler decided that there should be a disciplinary hearing so that the claimant would have a chance to be heard. They agreed that Roger would chair the disciplinary hearing

[44]On 7 April the claimant saw a letter inviting her to a disciplinary meeting on 9 April to discuss the incident. She wanted to bring an external representative with her. The respondent did not allow this so Mrs Lowrey told her that she needed a workplace colleague and rearranged the meeting, allowing a postponement for the claimant to get a workplace colleague. The meeting was rearranged to 12 April 2024.

[45]On 10 or 11 April the vehicle was put on a diagnostic test. On 11 April 2024 the claimant saw her doctor and submitted a fit note saying she was not fit for work due to work related stress. She was due to return to work after 25 April 2024. The respondent decided not to go ahead with the disciplinary hearing while she was off sick.

[46]At some point between 12 and 25 April Mrs Lowrey discussed with her colleagues whether or not to have a disciplinary hearing now that the claimant was off sick. Mrs Lowrey advised again that there was no need to follow a full procedure as the claimant had less than two years service. Mr Robinson told Mrs Lowrey that he would prefer to hear what the claimant had to say and to go to a disciplinary meeting. Mrs Lowrey acted on that instruction. She checked what date the claimant’s fit note would expire. She saw that it would expire on 25 April 2024. She wrote to the claimant on 25 April 2024 13 of 32 convening a disciplinary meeting for 29 April 2024. The letter said that the hearing would go ahead in the claimant’s absence.

[47]The claimant saw that email convening a disciplinary hearing and resigned in response to it. She resigned by an email dated 25 April 2024 to Ms Lowrey. The resignation email was not in the bundle of documents for the tribunal hearing. The claimant said that the reason she gave was her own health. She did not refer to the truck being defective, being denied a fair hearing or feeling she was about to be dismissed.

[48]The claimant was deeply upset that someone could have been crushed and she was convinced in her own mind that there had not been a fair investigation and that there would not be a fair disciplinary process. She was firm in her belief that she had not done anything wrong and that the vehicle must have been defective.

[49]After her employment ended Mrs Lowrey worked out how much was still owed to the respondent for damages deductions, based on information provided to her by Transport Department, and what pay was due to the claimant. Mrs Lowrey did not send a payslip to the claimant from March to April because she was waiting for information from Transport about amounts outstanding

[50]Mrs Lowrey paid the claimant the second instalment of the Finders Fee.

[51]The claimant remained distressed about the accident for a long time afterwards. She saw her GP and was prescribed anti-anxiety medication and referred for CBT therapy. She had three sessions of CBT therapy in 2024. From June 2024 she was also prescribed 30 mg of fluoxetine and she stayed on that medication until March 2025. She no longer needs medication.

Relevant Law

[52]The law on whistleblowing that the claimant relied on is set out in Section 103A (dismissal) and Section 47B (detriment) Employment Rights Act 1996. The law about what is a protected disclosure is in Section 43. There is law about what is an unauthorised deduction from wages in Section 13 Employment Rights Act 1996. The law about constructive dismissal is in Section 95(1)(c) Employment Rights Act 1996 and there are some important cases about what entitles a claimant to resign and treat themselves as dismissed which I have included below. 103A Protected disclosure An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure. 47B Protected disclosures(1) A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure. (1A) A worker (“W”) has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, done— 14 of 32 (a) by another worker of W's employer in the course of that other worker's employment, or (b) by an agent of W's employer with the employer's authority, on the ground that W has made a protected disclosure. (1B) Where a worker is subjected to detriment by anything done as mentioned in subsection (1A), that thing is treated as also done by the worker's employer. (1C) For the purposes of subsection (1B), it is immaterial whether the thing is done with the knowledge or approval of the worker's employer. (1D) In proceedings against W's employer in respect of anything alleged to have been done as mentioned in subsection (1A)(a), it is a defence for the employer to show that the employer took all reasonable steps to prevent the other worker— (a) from doing that thing, or (b) from doing anything of that description. (1E) A worker or agent of W's employer is not liable by reason of subsection (1A) for doing something that subjects W to detriment if— (a) the worker or agent does that thing in reliance on a statement by the employer that doing it does not contravene this Act, and (b) it is reasonable for the worker or agent to rely on the statement. But this does not prevent the employer from being liable by reason of subsection (1B).

(2) This section does not apply where— (a) the worker is an employee, and (b) the detriment in question amounts to dismissal (within the meaning of Part X).

(3) For the purposes of this section, and of sections 48 and 49 so far as relating to this section, “worker”, “worker’s contract”, “employment” and “employer” have the extended meaning given by section 43K. 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection (1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 15 of 32 (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is immaterial whether the relevant failure occurred, occurs or would occur in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and whether the law applying to it is that of the United Kingdom or of any other country or territory. (3) A disclosure of information is not a qualifying disclosure if the person making the disclosure commits an offence by making it.

(4) A disclosure of information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege (or, in Scotland, to confidentiality as between client and professional legal adviser) could be maintained in legal proceedings is not a qualifying disclosure if it is made by a person to whom the information had been disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice. In this Part “the relevant failure”, in relation to a qualifying disclosure, means the matter falling within paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (1).

[53]The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) (HHJ Eady QC) summarised the case law on section 43B(1) as follows in Parsons v Airplus International Ltd

UKEAT/0111/17

, a decision of 13 October 2017: “23. As to whether or not a disclosure is a protected disclosure, the following points can be made: 23.1. This is a matter to be determined objectively; see paragraph 80, Beatt v Croydon Health Services NHS Trust

[2017] IRLR 748

CA. 23.2. More than one communication might need to be considered together to answer the question whether a protected disclosure has been made; Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw

[2014] ICR 540

EAT. 23.3. The disclosure has to be of information, not simply the making of an accusation or statement of opinion; Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld

[2010] IRLR 38

EAT. That said, an accusation or statement of opinion may include or be made alongside a disclosure of information: the answer will be fact sensitive but the question for the ET is clear: has there been a disclosure of information?; Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth

[2016] IRLR 422

EAT.”

[54]The decision of the EAT in Kilraine was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal at

[2018] EWCA Civ 1436

. The concept of “information” used in section 43B(1) is capable of covering statements which might also be characterised as allegations.

[55]The worker need only have a reasonable belief that the information tends to show the matter required by Section 43B(1) and that the disclosure is made in the public interest. A subjective belief may be objectively reasonable even if it is wrong, or formed for the wrong reasons. In Chesterton Global Ltd and anor v Nurmohamed [2017[ IRLR 837 the Court of Appeal approved a suggestion from counsel as to the factors normally relevant to the question of whether there was a reasonable belief that the disclosure was made in the public interest.

[56]In Chesterton Underhill LJ addressed the question of the motivation for the disclosure in paragraph 30, saying that: 16 of 32 “… while the worker must have a genuine (and reasonable) belief that the disclosure is in the public interest, that does not have to be his or her predominant motive in making it: otherwise, as pointed out at paragraph 17 above, the new ss.49(6A) and 103(6A) would have no role. I am inclined to think that the belief does not in fact have to form any part of the worker's motivation - the phrase 'in the belief' is not the same as 'motivated by the belief'; but it is hard to see that the point will arise in practice, since where a worker believes that a disclosure is in the public interest it would be odd if that did not form at least some part of their motivation in making it."

[57]The law on unauthorised deductions is at section 13 Employment Rights Act 1996. 13 Right not to suffer unauthorised deductions(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless— (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or (b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction.

(2) In this section “relevant provision”, in relation to a worker’s contract, means a provision of the contract comprised— (a) in one or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question, or (b) in one or more terms of the contract (whether express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing) the existence and effect, or combined effect, of which in relation to the worker the employer has notified to the worker in writing on such an occasion.

(3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions), the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion.

(4) Subsection (3) does not apply in so far as the deficiency is attributable to an error of any description on the part of the employer affecting the computation by him of the gross amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion.

(5) For the purposes of this section a relevant provision of a worker’s contract having effect by virtue of a variation of the contract does not operate to authorise the making of a deduction on account of any conduct of the worker, or any other event occurring, before the variation took effect.

(6) For the purposes of this section an agreement or consent signified by a worker does not operate to authorise the making of a deduction on account of any conduct of the worker, or any other event occurring, before the agreement or consent was signified.

(7) This section does not affect any other statutory provision by virtue of which a sum payable to a worker by his employer but not constituting “wages” within the meaning of this Part is not to be subject to a deduction at the instance of the employer.

[58]Section 95(1)(c) Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that an employee is dismissed by his employer if: 17 of 32 “the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct.”

[59]The principles behind such a “constructive dismissal” were set out by the Court of Appeal in Western Excavating (ECC) Limited v Sharp

[1978] IRLR 27

. The employee is entitled to treat himself as constructively dismissed only if the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract.

[60]The term of the contract upon which the claimant relies in this case was the implied term of trust and confidence. In Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

[1997] ICR 606

the House of Lords considered the scope of that implied term and approved a formulation which imposed an obligation that the employer shall not: “…without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated [or] likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee.”

[61]The test is an objective one in which the subjective perception of the employee can be relevant but is not determinative. Lord Nicholls said at page 611A: “The conduct must, of course, impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at objectively, it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer. That requires one to look at all the circumstances.”

[62]The objective test also means that the intention or motive of the employer is not determinative. An employer with good intentions can still commit a repudiatory breach of contract.

[63]In Frenkel Topping Limited v King

UKEAT/0106/15/LA

21 July 2015 the EAT chaired by Langstaff P put the matter this way (in paragraphs 12-15): “12. We would emphasise that this is a demanding test. It has been held (see, for instance, the case of BG plc v O’Brien

[2001] IRLR 496

at paragraph 27) that simply acting in an unreasonable manner is not sufficient. The word qualifying “damage” is “seriously”. This is a word of significant emphasis. The purpose of such a term was identified by Lord Steyn in Malik v BCCI

[1997] UKHL 23

as being: “… apt to cover the great diversity of situations in which a balance has to be struck between an employer’s interest in managing his business as he sees fit and the employee’s interest in not being unfairly and improperly exploited.”13. Those last four words are again strong words. Too often we see in this Tribunal a failure to recognise the stringency of the test. The finding of such a breach is inevitably a finding of a breach which is repudiatory: see the analysis of the Appeal Tribunal, presided over by Cox J in Morrow v Safeway Stores

[2002] IRLR 9

14. The test of what is repudiatory in contract has been expressed in different words at different times. They are, however, to the same effect. In Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd

[1981] IRLR 347

it was “conduct with which an employee could not be expected to put up”. In the more modern formulation, adopted in Tullett Prebon plc v BGC Brokers LP & Ors

[2011] IRLR 420

, is that the employer (in that case, but the same applies to an employee) 18 of 32 must demonstrate objectively by its behaviour that it is abandoning and altogether refusing to perform the contract. These again are words which indicate the strength of the term.

[64]Section 95(1)(c) provides that the employee must terminate the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. The question is whether the repudiatory breach played a part in the dismissal. It need not be the sole factor but can be one of the factors relied on. If, however, there is an underlying or ulterior reason for the employee’s resignation, such that he or should would have left anyway irrespective of the employer’s conduct, then there has not been a constructive dismissal. Applying the Law

[65]I am going to go slowly through each section to fully explain how I reached my decision. First, I am looking at the unauthorised deduction from wages complaint. This is tricky because not all of the amounts that the respondent said it was entitled to charge and take, damages and speeding fines, were shown in documents and because the amounts were taken at a maximum of £ 50 per pay date so it is difficult to marry up deduction to damage and or speeding. It is further complicated because the respondent then decided for itself it had got the deductions wrong and in March 2025 repaid the claimant £ 303.90 Unauthorised deductions

[66]The claimant has established and respondent accepted through provision of copy payslips and I find as a fact that the following deductions were made from her pay on 12 May 2024 £1684.19 on 7 April 2024 £50 on 31 March 2024 £50 on 24 March 2024 £50 on 17 March 2024 £50 on 10 March 2024 £50 on 3 March 2024 £50 on 25 February 2024 £50 On 24 December 2023 £3.72 on 17 December 2023 £50 on 10 December 2023 £50 on 3 December 2023 £50 on 26 November 2023 a bonus deduction of £50 on 12 November 2023 £41.70 on 5 November 2023 £50 on 29 October 2023 £50 on 22 October 2023 £50 the total deductions amounted to £2429.61 19 of 32

[67]A claim for an unlawful deduction must be made within three months less one day of the date of the deduction or last deduction in a series. The claimant went to ACAS on 12 July 2024 so that any complaint in respect of a deduction made before 13 April 2024 may have been out of time, unless it was part of a series of deductions.

[68]The deductions in respect of incidents at paragraph 31 above are dealt with in order. The deduction for incident a) formed part of a series because although it related to one incident the money was not all taken out in one go and because it was joined up with other money owing for other incidents. I find as a fact that the claimant was overcharged for those deductions by £ 90.70. That amount was not challenged at the time. The last of the deductions for the incident at a) which took place in September 2023 must have been taken out of the claimant’s pay by 5 November 2023 at the latest. The claimant was out of time in respect of the £ 90.70 unauthorised deduction.

[69]The claimant said the reason she could not have challenged the deduction at the time was because she was so overworked that she did not look at her payslips. This was not credible because even if she did not look at payslips she would know her pay was short. She contacted the respondent when an attachment of earnings order was made and deducted from her pay in February 2024. This does not meet the test of it not having been reasonably practicable for her to have brought the complaint in time. I therefore find that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the unauthorised deduction of £90.70 made from the claimant’s pay in relation to the series of deductions for incident a).

[70]Incident b) related to deductions on 10 December 2023 and 17 December 2023 and 24 December 2023 totalling £153.72. Those deductions together amounted to a series. The last in the series was made on 24 December 2023. The claimant did not bring her complaint within three months less one day of the last of those deductions. The claimant said the reason she could not challenge the deduction at the time was because she was so overworked that she did not look at her payslips. Again, this does not meet the test of it not having been reasonably practicable for her to have brought the complaint in time. I therefore find I have no jurisdiction to deal with the unauthorised deduction of £153.72 made from the claimant’s pay in relation to the series of deductions at incident b).

[71]In relation to the deductions for incident c), an alleged incident at Telford on 18 January 2024 the series of deductions were made on 25 February 2024, 3 March 2024, 10 March 2024, 17 March 2024 and 24 March 2024. The last of those deductions being made on 24 March 2024 was out of time. The claimant had not gone to ACAS within three months less one day of that date. For the same reasons as set out above, that the claimant did not show that it was not reasonably practicable for her to have brought the complaint in time, I have no jurisdiction to deal with those series of deductions.

[72]In relation to the deductions attributable to incident d) for which the respondent says the claimant owed £96.30, The respondent deducted £50 on 31 March 2024, £50 on 7 April 202. The last of those deductions being made on 31 March 2024 was out of time. The claimant had not gone to ACAS within three months less one day of that date. For the same reasons as set out above, that the claimant did not show that it was not reasonably practicable for her to have brought the complaint in time, I have no jurisdiction to deal with those series of deductions. 20 of 32

[73]In respect of incidents e), f), g) and h) and the incident on 4 April 2024 a total deduction of £1684.19 was made on 12 May 2024. The respondent’s paperwork does not match the deductions made. The respondent said the claimant’s damage for incident e) was £218.67, for incident f) was £15.26, for incident g) was £132.20 and for incident h) was £136.02 and for the incident on 4 April 2024 was £1000 together they total £1502.15 this does not match the total amount deducted on 12 May 2024. It appears that deductions for incidents e), f), g) and h) and the incident on 4 April 2024 were rolled together across a series that ran from 31 March 2024 until 12 May 2024.

[74]I find that the deductions of £1684.19 on 12 May 2024 form part of a series of deductions with those made on 7 April 2024 (£50) and 31 March 2024 (£50) so that the later deduction brought the earlier deductions into time as part of the same series totalling £ 1784.19 . They were part of a series because they were rolled up together and taken on different dates. Accordingly, I have jurisdiction to deal with those deductions because the claimant did go to ACAS within time of the last of those deductions made on 12 May 2024.

[75]In relation to the in time series of deductions I accept the claimant’s assertion that £1784.19 was deducted from wages properly payable to her.

[76]Once jurisdiction was established I had to decide if the deductions of £ 1784.19 were lawful or not. It was the respondent’s case that where damage had been sustained to a vehicle whilst being driven by the claimant the Transport department get a costing from a repairer owned by the same group of companies as the respondent. The respondent then attributed half the cost of that repair to the claimant and deducted it at a maximum of £ 50 per week from the pay. The respondent had a clause in the contract allowing for deductions for damages. The claimant had signed that contract on 7 November 2024. The respondent provided a series of documents labelled “vehicle operator deductions” which set out the costs of parts, the costs of labour and the total due for the incident and then the 50% to be paid by the driver. It set out an agreed weekly payment amount, date repayments will start and the date repayments will finish and a signature clause. There was a document for each of the eight incidents. None of the documents were signed though they provided space for signature by the driver. The respondent’s evidence at its highest was Ms Lowrey’s expression of belief that these documents would have been provided to the driver at the time of the incident by someone in the transport department. The claimant’s evidence was that she had never seen these documents until disclosure in this case. It was her case that these documents had been created by Mrs Lowrey or someone else for the purposes of this hearing.

[77]Next, I had to decide what was the more credible or believable evidence. I did this by listening to the claimant’s evidence on oath, Mrs Lowrey’s evidence on oath and thinking about what had happened at the time, how people had behaved and what documents from the time showed.

[78]The claimant was credible because she made partial admissions, albeit in relation to an out of time deduction. The claimant accepted in relation to one incident on 7 September 2023 that she had caused the damage and that the respondent could lawfully deduct from her £101. This showed me that she was not someone who just said, I don’t owe anything. When she had caused damage she accepted it and acknowledged that she owed money. 21 of 32

[79]Otherwise, she said in relation to the other incidents that she cannot be sure that she was the driver, that the damage was incurred, that if incurred the cost of the repair was as set out in these documents. She commented that the respondent owns the company that provides the repair itself so that it is an in-house repairer. Again, this showed me she was credible. She did not over state. She did not say, I didn’t do it. What she said in submission was, in effect, I can’t know if I did or not because I didn’t see the proof at the time and I don’t trust their figures now.

[80]On the respondent’s side no invoices were provided, no worksheets were provided to prove that it was the claimant driving at the time of the incidents, no evidence was given to prove that the sheet had been given to the claimant at the time of the incidents. The respondent’s evidence was sadly lacking. Mrs Lowrey did her best in explaining that as payroll manager she simply received an instruction from the transport manager to make the relevant deductions which she then made. What the claimant did say was that even if she hadn’t looked at her payslips she would have known her pay was short. Again, she was credible here. The claimant accepts that she failed to challenge the deductions at the time they were made from her pay because she did not regularly look at her payslips and she was overwhelmed with working and with keeping track of her finances.

[81]In relation to one of the incidents on 18 January 2024 which is alleged to have taken place at Telford with the claimant driving, the claimant told me that her phone showed her that she was at Colne that day not Telford. I saw no evidence as to the whereabouts of the claimant on that date, whether or not she was driving the vehicle involved in the accident, whether or not an accident occurred and what the cost of repair of that accident might have been. Deductions in respect of that incident were out of time but again this showed me that the claimant was credible, that she tried to be as accurate as she could and that she had cause to doubt the respondent’s claims that she did the damage.

[82]For those reasons relating to her credibility I find the claimant to be a credible witness as to the fact that the vehicle operator deductions forms for the in time deductions were not provided to her at the time of the deductions on 31 March 2024, 7 April 2024 or 12 May 2024. In the absence of evidence at this hearing to link the vehicle to the incident, the claimant as driver to the vehicle on that date, and an invoice to prove the cost to the respondent for each of those incidents, and particularly the incident on 4 April 2024 in respect of which the respondent has asserted that £1000 worth of damage was incurred, I find that the in time deductions in the sum of £1784.19 were amounts that were unlawfully deducted from the wages properly payable to the claimant. Those complaints succeed.

[83]The respondent said that it had already realised that its figures were not accurate and the claimant agreed that it had in March 2025 repaid to the claimant £ 303.90 I accept Mrs Lowrey’s oral evidence of this. The law allows a respondent to off-set money it has paid against unlawful deductions so I take £ 303.90 off the £ 1784.19 for the in time deductions money due to the claimant and order the respondent to pay £ 1480.29 The protected disclosure detriment complaints and time 22 of 32

[84]I had to consider did the claimant bring her complaints in time for each of the detriments complained of ? During the hearing we worked together to prepare a timeline so that the following chronology of events became agreed facts for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction on time: Agreed factual chronology for whistleblowing• The claimant started work on 23 August 2023

• There was an incident involving a trailer on 4 April 2024

• The claimant completed an accident report form on 4 April 2024

• The claimant spoke to Graham Robinson about the incident on 5 April 2024 (alleged protected disclosures)

• The claimant became aware that she was being invited to a disciplinary hearing on 7 April 2024.

• The potential period of detriment in relation to the allegation of failure to investigate the incident was from 4 April 2024 until the claimant’s resignation on 25 April 2024.

• A disciplinary hearing was convened for 10 April 2024 but did not go ahead.

• The claimant went off sick on 11 April 2024.

• A disciplinary hearing was convened for 19 April 2024 but did not go ahead.

• The claimant provided a fit note from 12 April 2024 to 25 April 2024.

• A disciplinary hearing was convened for 29th of April 2024.

• The claimant’s fit note was extended from 25 April 2024 until 7 May 2024.

• The claimant resigned on 25 April 2024.

[85]Detriment D1 was the respondent beginning disciplinary proceedings against the claimant on 5 April 2025. This actually took place on 7 April 2024 when the claimant became aware that disciplinary proceedings were commenced against her. The claimant went to ACAS on 12 July 2024. The claimant did not go to ACAS within three months less one day of the detriment complained of. The claimant says that the reason she did not bring the complaint in time was because she had previously contacted ACAS, in May 2024, and obtained a certificate but against the wrong company. When she was made aware of this she contacted ACAS with the requisite information against the right respondent on 12 July 2024. The claimant adduced no evidence as to any previous contact with ACAS nor why it was not reasonably practicable for her to have contacted ACAS in relation to the correct company within time. During that time she had a fit note that expired on 7 May 2024. She did not explain what happened after 7 May 2024 that meant it was not reasonably practicable for her to have contacted ACAS. She had a smart phone and told me that she was able to look things up and use AI to find out things about vehicle defects and about what amounts to a constructive dismissal. I find it was reasonably practicable for her to have brought her claim in time.

[86]I have no jurisdiction to deal with the claimant’s allegation that she was put to the detriment of being disciplined because she was a whistleblower. This is disappointing 23 of 32 to the claimant. I have gone on below to set out what my findings would have been if I had had jurisdiction to deal with D1 as a detriment.

[87]Detriment 2 took place between 4 April and 25 April 2024. The claimant went to ACAS on 12 July 2024, therefore contacting them within the three months less one day of the last date upon which she says she was subject to a detriment. This complaint is in time.

[88]Detriment 3, the respondent refusing to postpone disciplinary proceedings whilst the claimant was off sick is alleged to have taken place on three occasions, in the convening of a disciplinary hearing on 10 April 2024, in the rearranging of that hearing to 19 April 2024 and in the rearranging of the hearing to 29th of April 2024. The claimant said that the detriment was the alleged ongoing state of affairs in which the claimant says the respondent was determined to have a disciplinary hearing while she was off sick. Mrs Lowrey accepted that she was trying to arrange a hearing throughout that period, though she personally had advised that a hearing was not necessary, and was put off only by the fit notes. I find that it was course of conduct extending over that period. The detriment continued until 25 April 2024, the claimant went to ACAS within three months less one day of that date on 12 July 2024. Accordingly, I find that detriment 3 is in time.

[89]Next, I had to decide did the claimant make one or more qualifying protected disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The claimant says she made the following disclosure: on 5 April 2025 in a conversation with her transport manager, Graham, telling him that she thought the truck she had been driving on 4 April 2025 had an electrical fault and the respondent needed to check this.

[90]The law says that the claimant has to have disclosed information. I am satisfied that in saying that there may be an electrical fault and the vehicle may need checking the claimant disclosed a mixture of information and allegation. I had regard to the Kilraine case. I accept the claimant’s oral evidence, unchallenged by the respondent as it had no witness to the conversation that she gave the following information to Graham Robinson on 5 April 2024

• that the truck should not be on the road

• that there was something wrong with its electrics

• that the handbrake may have failed to hold the vehicle

• that it needed a plug-in fault finder test at least

• that she believed the truck to be on the road on 5 April 2024

• that she believed the truck to be dangerous

• that she would report the organisation to VOSA

[91]Next I considered did she reasonably believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest? I find that her belief was mixed. She wanted both to be able to soothe her own conscience and know to what extent if any she had been responsible for the incident, and she disclosed so as to protect her colleagues and the 24 of 32 public. I accept her oral evidence that she was particularly concerned for her colleague driver Amy. She was worried that Amy might be driving an unsafe vehicle. She knew Amy to be a mother and thought that there could be a risk to life in driving that vehicle. The claimant was reasonable in believing that she was disclosing in the public interest because she did not know on 5 April 2024 when she made the disclosure what had caused the truck to roll down the hill the previous day. She did not know to what extent if any she may be at fault in not having fully engaged the electrical handbrake. She did not know if the electrical handbrake may be faulty. She had climbed into the cab on 4 April 2024 and had to bring it to a stop using the foot brake. Her belief that there may be something wrong with the electrical handbrake even if and when engaged fully, was reasonable and I find that she reasonably believed she was telling Graham this so as to prevent harm to others. That was in the public interest.

[92]Next I had to consider did she reasonably believe it tended to show any of the matters in section 43B(1) that is; a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be committed; a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation; the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered; the environment had been, was being or was likely to be damaged, information tending to show any of these things had been, was being or was likely to be deliberately concealed.

[93]She reasonably believed that the truck being on the road could put the health and safety of the driver and other road users at risk. She also reasonably believed that the truck being on the road could be in breach of some legal obligation to VOSA. She may or may not have been right about that. It doesn’t matter. The claimant can still have made a qualifying disclosure even if that turned out not to be right, so long as she reasonably believed it at the time. I accept the claimant’s evidence that she said that she thought the truck ought to have been taken off the road and thoroughly tested as evidence of her reasonable belief.

[94]I was concerned that the claimant’s actions immediately after the incident were not entirely consistent with a reasonable belief that the truck was a health and safety issue. She continued to drive it for 2 – 3 hours. I accepted the claimant’s evidence, on the balance of probabilities, that she was shocked immediately after the incident and just wanted to finish her shift. I find that she continued to drive it despite having a fear which amounted to a reasonable belief that it may not be safe. At the time the claimant made the disclosure on 5 April I find she reasonably believed that the truck was on the road and had not been thoroughly tested and may be unsafe.

[95]I had to consider to whom the disclosure was made and there was no disagreement here. It was made to the claimant’s employer.

[96]For the reasons set out above I find that the claimant reasonably believed that the truck may be unsafe and that she disclosed information that she reasonably believed was in the public interest and tended to show a breach of a legal obligation under section 43B(1)(b) and a health and safety issue under 43B(1)(b). Having made that disclosure 25 of 32 she had the protection in law of having been a whistleblower in relation to her detriment complaints D2 and D3.

[97]If D1 had not been out of time I would have found as follows. I accepted Mrs Lowrey’s evidence about the email she saw that Graham Robinson wanted to begin disciplinary proceedings on 4 April 2024 before any disclosure was made to him by the claimant and that he believed this to be potential gross misconduct. The decision maker in relation to disciplinary proceedings being commenced was Roger Crabtree. The email from Graham Robinson was sent to him before the disclosure was made. Beginning disciplinary proceedings meets the legal definition of detriment. It is something generally to the claimant’s disadvantage because it was putting her job at risk. If this complaint had not been out of time I would have found that the claimant was subjected to detriment by the respondent on 5 April 2024 when it decided to convene disciplinary proceedings, that detriment took effect when the claimant became aware of it on 7 April 2024.

[98]The next alleged detriment was the respondent failing to carry out a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident on 4 April 2025. The claimant phoned Graham Robinson from the roadside on 4 April 2024 immediately after the incident. She reported it to him verbally then. She returned to the workplace and completed an Incident form at the end of her shift on 4 April 2024 this was a most important document in this case because it was the closest to a contemporaneous account of the incident. I paid great attention and attached weight to what the claimant wrote at the time. It is set out above.

[99]The claimant reported on the incident report form the narrative above and drew a diagram showing her vehicle touching that third party vehicle and pushing it towards a parked car. She wrote on the form another driver from the company was present but did not witness much was my crossover at 45. That other driver was Steve Woods. The Tribunal accepts the oral evidence of Mrs Lowrey that on 5 April 2024 the respondent’s Graham Robinson had seen the incident report form and had told Mrs Lowrey that he was going to fully investigate the matter. The Tribunal saw documentary evidence in the agreed bundle in the form of notes of a meeting that reported a manager called Simon Sharp met with Steve Woods at 1135 on 5 April 2024. I had regard to what Steve Woods said as set out in the investigatory interview notes above.

[100]I accept the claimant’s evidence that Mr Robinson met with the claimant on 5 April 2024 and asked her about the incident. She made her disclosure. She became angry and upset. Peter Lund intervened at that meeting saying that of course respondent would check the vehicle and fully investigate. The respondent produced a document dated 10 April 2024 entitled “final quick test log!”. It was of little if any help to me as it did not state the vehicle, did not show what the claimant thinks it showed, ie that the truck was faulty. The respondent produced no evidence to suggest that document showed anything at all in relation to the safety and functionality of the handbrake on that truck at that time. The claimant says that she used an artificial intelligence chat on her phone to help her interpret that document and that it shows that the truck had faults that contributed to stability issues. I attach no weight whatsoever 26 of 32 to what the claimant says the AI on her phone says that the document proves about the cause of the incident.

[101]In relation to the detriment of failure to investigate I find that the complaint fails factually. The respondent did investigate. The claimant has an unjustified sense of grievance, borrowing words from a case, about this so that it did not amount to a detriment in law.

[102]I had regard to the fact that there was no note of the conversation with the claimant on 5 April 2024 though the notes of the conversation with Steve Woods were produced.

[103]So, D1 was out of time but would have got this far as a detriment. D2 fails on the facts. The respondent did not fail to investigate and it was not a detriment.

[104]Detriment 3 was the respondent refusing to postpone disciplinary proceedings while the claimant was on sick leave. The respondent postponed on 10 April to allow the claimant to bring an appropriate representative with her. It then had a sick note and did schedule a hearing for 19 April during the currency of that fit note but it responded, the claimant accepted, to her protestations that a hearing should not take place while she was off sick, by cancelling that 19 April hearing. Mrs Lowrey then looked at the sick note and saw that the claimant was due to return on 25 April 2024 and so on that date told the claimant that there would be a hearing on 29 April 2024. The respondent did not as a fact refuse to postpone hearings whilst the claimant was on sick leave. On 10 April she was not on sick leave, it was postponed. On 19 April she was on sick leave and it was postponed. On 29 April, when the hearing was booked, she was not due to have been on sick leave. The claimant resigned before a hearing could take place. Detriment 3 fails on the facts.

[105]If it had got this far D3 would have amounted to a detriment as it would have been detrimental in this case to refuse to postpone a disciplinary hearing while the claimant was off sick.

[106]Finally, I had to consider in relation to each detriment, and so far each has failed for other reasons already D1 is out of time, D2 and D3 did not happen the way the claimant says they did, whether they happened to the claimant, using ordinary words, because she was a whistleblower. I find that even if the complaints had got this far they would have failed on this point; was it done on the ground that she made a protected disclosure? The Tribunal finds it was not. None of the detriments were done on the ground that the claimant had made a protected disclosure.

[107]In relation to Detriment 1 I accepted the oral evidence of Mrs Lowrey that Mr Robinson had decided to investigate and that there was potential gross misconduct before the claimant made her disclosure at 2.30pm on 5 April. The decision had been made and communicated by Mr Robinson in the morning. I reject the claimant’s submission that she was disciplined because of the disclosure notwithstanding lack of 27 of 32 direct evidence from the respondent as to reason for disciplinary. I had regard to the claimant’s oral evidence, Mrs Lowrey’s oral evidence and the respondent’s Response.

[108]At one point during the hearing the claimant alleged that in response to her disclosure Graham Robinson had said “oh you want to go down that route” and that those words were evidence of him being angered by a disclosure so that he was disciplining her as a whistleblower. I reject that part of the claimant’s account of the meeting. I accept Mrs Lowreys evidence that Graham had recommended disciplinary before the disclosure. D1 can’t have been done on the grounds of her disclosure because it was done before the disclosure.

[109]In relation to detriment 2 I also find that the detriment was not done on the ground of the disclosure. The respondent did not fail to investigate. The claimant alleged that the investigation was inadequate because the claimant was a whistleblower. It was her case that the respondent failed to test the truck properly because it would exonerate her. I reject that submission. The incident report she filled in is significant. Mr Robinson saw that and the note of Steve Woods interview and decided there was sufficient to instigate disciplinary proceedings in them alone as he acted to tell Mrs Lowrey and others that before the disclosure. Even in the absence of evidence from Mr Robinson the chronology does not support the claimant’s contention that the issue was inadequately investigated because she was a whistleblower. There was investigation. Steve Woods had been spoken to before the disclosure. There was scope for her to have attended a hearing and said more.

[110]On detriment 3 the hearing was scheduled for 29 April, after expiry of the sick note. I accept Mrs Lowrey’s evidence that she had said the respondent did not need a hearing because the claimant had under two years’ service, that it could have gone straight to dismissal. I accept her evidence that Mr Robinson wanted there to be a hearing so that the respondent could hear what the claimant had to say. I cannot know why he wanted to hear from her as I did not have evidence from him but the fact of the hearing, of it being rearranged, lent support to the respondent’s position that the dismissal was not because of the disclosure. It could have dismissed without fixing and reconvening hearings if that was the case.

[111]Detriments 1, 2 and 3 would all have failed, if they had not failed sooner for other reasons, on the basis that they were not done on the ground that she was a whistleblower. Breaches of contract

[112]Were there breaches of contract, actions that were likely to seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence without reasonable and proper cause that entitled the claimant to treat herself as dismissed ?

[113]D1, alleged breach of contract, was out of time but if it had been in time I would have found that convening a disciplinary hearing in circumstances in which a cab and 28 of 32 trailer under the claimant’s care rolled down a hill into another vehicle and in which the claimant said in the incident form on the same day maybe I did not pull brake hard enough were not likely to seriously destroy or damage the relationship of trust and confidence. The respondent had good reason to want to hear from the claimant. The circumstances outlined above, the incident, and the claimant’s content of the incident form alone, were reasonable and proper cause for a disciplinary hearing.

[114]For D2, alleged breach about the alleged inadequacy of the investigation, it has failed on the facts. The respondent did not fail to investigate. The claimant, across the hearing, made powerful submissions on the inadequacies of investigation including: the cab went out the next day, it wasn’t tested until 10 April, Steve was not called to disciplinary, he may have been to blame as he had parked it on the incline, the respondent could not know who failed to engage trailer brakes, there was a lack of detail about handbrake operation, there were no notes of the claimant’s investigatory interview produced for the hearing whereas the notes of the meeting with Steve were produced.

[115]Those submissions were powerful because they showed me that there may have been a case that the claimant could have argued at a hearing if she had attended one but she did not. She resigned. The respondent’s failings did not meet the high standard of the breach of the Malik term. Her submissions were not sufficient to establish that the respondent had acted in a way that was likely to seriously damage a relationship of trust and confidence.

[116]Detriment 3, alleged breach about disciplining the claimant whilst off sick, failed on the facts. There was no refusal to postpone whilst the claimant was off sick. The facts are recited above. The respondent’s conduct in wanting to have a hearing and rearranging hearings does not meet the test of seriously damaging or destroying relationship of trust and confidence.

[117]The claimant has not established conduct by the respondent that entitled her to resign and treat herself as dismissed. The respondent did not breach the contract in convening a disciplinary, in an inadequate investigation and in refusing to postpone.

[118]Sometimes the test of fundamental breach of contract is described as the respondent behaving in such a way that it signals that it no longer treats the claimant as its employee. I find in this case there is clear evidence from the documents and the claimant’s evidence that it was continuing to treat her as its employee, looking into the incident, wanting to hear from her, arranging hearings and postponing them so she could be well and have someone with her because it wanted to hear from her. Automatically unfair dismissal for a protected disclosure

[119]The claimant’s employment ended by resignation in circumstances in which she was not entitled to resign in response to any conduct of the employer’s. There was no dismissal in law that she could rely on as an unfair dismissal. It was therefore 29 of 32 not relevant to consider what was the reason for dismissal. The claimant would have had the burden of proof in that regard and the evidence of Mrs Lowrey that the respondent had decided to move to disciplinary process and that the incident was a potential gross misconduct matter that could lead to dismissal before the disclosure would have been relevant. Even if the respondent had done something without reasonable and proper cause to seriously damage or destroy the relationship of trust and confidence, entitling the claimant to resign, if that had happened before the disclosure then it could not have been an automatically unfair dismissal. D1, the decision to move to disciplinary was before the disclosure so although the Tribunal did not have to decide this point, D1 even if it had been a constructive dismissal would, could not have been an automatically unfair dismissal because it preceded disclosure. The claim for constructive automatically unfair dismissal fails.

[120]I do not need to make any findings about the reason for resignation. It is enough that the claimant has not met her burden of proof in establishing a fundamental breach entitling her to resign and has not shown that that breach, if any, was on the ground of her protected disclosure. The claim fails.

[121]I note with empathy that the claimant has been preoccupied with wanting to exonerate herself from any wrongdoing in the incident. That is understandable. I reminded her throughout the hearing that I am not here to decide if there was anything wrong with the truck and whether and to what extent if any the accident was her fault. She resigned before the employer could conclude investigations let alone reach any conclusions about what her role (or Steve Woods’) was in the incident. She could have gone along to the hearing, when she was well enough to do so and made her points (points that she makes here) about the handbrake being faulty, about Steve Woods not helping, about the trailer brakes, that Steve Woods had parked, not being on, and even if the respondent had felt she was guilty of gross misconduct she could have made her points in mitigation about what she had done, courageously, to intervene and prevent harm, about continuing to work that shift after the incident. She could have argued to keep her job. She chose not to. She resigned.

[122]The claimant gave oral evidence that related to her not being responsible for the incident. The claimant said, at Tribunal, in relation to the incident on 4 April that the trailer had been parked, not by her, on a downward slope. She said she went to start putting air lines on and the trailer legs were off the ground. She said she did not note if the trailer brake had been applied by Steve Woods. She accepted that she didn’t check the trailer brake. She said she could not be sure that the handbrake was on. She said there was an electrical alarm that would have sounded if the handbrake had not been on and she did not hear it sound, so she thought it must have been on. She also said, and on this point she was not credible because she did not put it in the contemporaneous incident report form nor say that she had said this to Graham at the meeting on 5 April 2024, Steve Woods said it was weird that it drove with the handbrake on. The claimant was asked why she hadn’t put that on the incident form or told Graham that, and she could not explain that. 30 of 32

[123]The claimant said in oral evidence that she was being harassed; that the contact from the respondent about arranging a disciplinary hearing was incessant, she said. I reject that submission. There was no claim for harassment and from the documentation I saw and the agreed timeline, the respondent acted in a measured way to try to arrange a hearing. Breach of contract: the Finders Fee

[124]The claimant alleged that she should have had the full £1000 finders fee paid to her by the end of January 2024. She accepted that she had done nothing to pursue that in January 2024 despite being in difficult financial circumstances. She said the reason she had not pursued it was because she was exhausted from working shifts. She could not say why she had formed the view that she should have had the full £1000 within three months of the recruitment, just that that was the view she had formed. The claimant said there was a term in her contract that if she introduced a new driver and he was retained she would be paid £ 1000. She said she saw a poster saying she would get £ 1000 after three months. I accept her evidence about a total of £ 1000 being payable. I accept Mrs Lowrey’s evidence about the payments being made in instalments because the payslips showed that to be the case and the claimant accepted that was the case. She had done nothing in January 2024 to chase what she would now have me believe was hundreds of pounds due to her. Her own actions don’t support her case . The claimant introduced Chris Tomlison and he started work from 27 October 2023. She was paid £ 250 during employment

[125]At the three month mark she did not raise a concern about being paid the full amount. She told me she was in debt and struggling financially. I do not believe that if she had genuinely believed that she was owed £ 750 in January 2024 she would not have pressed for that money. I accept Mrs Lowrey’s statement that when an attachment of earnings order was applied to the claimant’s pay so that deductions were made she contacted payroll to query them. It is not credible that someone in dire financial straights would not pursue £ 750 due to them in January 2024.

[126]Mrs Lowrey for the respondent said that the payment terms were £ 250 on a ppointment, £ 250 three months later and the final £ 500 one year from appointment if the employees are both still working for the respondent. Mrs Lowrey acknowledged that the second instalment had not been paid at three months and that she had put that right after the case started by sending £ 250 to the claimant.

[127]I find there was a discretionary finders fee scheme, the terms of which were £ 250 on engagement, £ 250 after three months and £ 500 one year later. The respondent has met its obligations under its discretionary scheme The claimant has not met her burden of proof in establishing a term that she was entitled to be paid the full £ 1000 within three months.

[128]The claimant’s claim that failing to pay the £ 500 balance is a breach of contract fails. 31 of 32

Conclusion

[129]For the reasons set out above the unauthorised deduction complaint succeeded in part. The whistleblowing detriment complaints failed. The automatically unfair whistleblowing dismissal claim failed and the breach of contract claim failed.

[130]The claimant is due £ 1480. EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant Miss Hailey Massingham Respondent: R1 The Haulage (Holdings) Organisation Limited Reconsideration Request Refused

[1]The claimant’s application for reconsideration of the judgment dated 3 September 2025 and sent to the parties on 19 September 2025 is refused for the reasons set out below. Background

[2]The claimant’s complaints of automatically unfair dismissal (protected disclosure), public interest disclosure detriment, and a claim for monies due to her by way of(i) a finders fee that she says she was contractually entitled to and

(ii) unauthorised deductions taken from her pay were determined at a final hearing from 1 – 3 September 2025 in person at Carlisle. Oral judgment was given on 3 September 2025. The unauthorised deductions complaint succeeded in part. The other complaints failed.

[3]The claimant was dissatisfied with the outcome at oral judgment saying that it was not the Judge’s fault, that the Judge had got it wrong because the respondent had lied. The claimant was, whilst not a security risk, was so vocal and upset that the judge asked that the clerk ask security to attend the court room to accompany the claimant to vacate the court room.

[4]The claimant then wrote to the Tribunal on 4 September 2025 protesting about the outcome. The Tribunal acknowledged the request saying Dear Madam Thank you for your letter. Employment Judge Aspinall has seen it. The Tribunal understands that both parties have had the opportunity to give their evidence, ask questions and make submissions. Oral judgment was given yesterday and a written form of the judgment, together with information as to what to do if you disagree with a judgment will be sent out within two to three weeks. Yours faithfully

[5]The claimant continued to write to the Tribunal using the applications tab on the portal expressing her dissatisfaction with the decision requesting Reasons and Reconsideration. The clerk having responsibility for the administration of the case brought to Judge Aspinall’s attention the volume of correspondence and the disproportionate amount of resource that would be required to respond. On 11 September EJ Aspinall wrote to the claimant, who by that date, just five working days since oral judgment, had sent 17 long and detailed communications to the Tribunal, as follows Dear Claimant and Respondent, Request for Reconsideration acknowledged Opportunity for respondent to comment on request within 7 days Since oral judgment on Wednesday 3 September 2025, just a week ago, the claimant has contacted the Tribunal on the following 17 occasions: 17. 10 September 2025 at 08.26 covering email and attachment three sides of A4 entitled “confidential submission tribunal judge only” and contains an express request this is not to be copied to the respondent. 16. 9 September 2025 at 1237 email copied to respondent 15. 9 September 2025 at 1241 email copied to respondent 14. 7 September 2025 at 2238 copied to the respondent official request to reconsider attaching four pages of narrative submission requesting reconsideration 13. 7 September 2025 at 0839 email copied to the respondent 12. 6 September 2025 2259 copied to respondent calling for an independent review to restart all investigatory and revision of the case

[11]5 September 2025 at 1345 copied to the respondent 10. 5 September 2025 at 1148 email stating that all previous correspondences have been copied to the respondent. The Tribunal replied to the 0856 email at 11.41 stating all emails and applications to the Tribunal must be copied to the other party, otherwise they will not be considered. 9. 5 September 2025 at 0856 not copied to respondent email entitled reconsideration request, 8. 4 September 2025 at 20.06 email not copied to respondent one and ½ pages of A4 narrative “I am wishing to verify and check by an audit the correct rulings been applied not to challenge the judges conduct it was difficult for the judge… As you can see my mind has gone that way and I’d like to not suffer more believe in the system to be the same… Just to double check audit…. Need for clarity and peace of mind” 7. 4 September 2025 and 1843 - four images attached email sent to tribunal (one image appears to be AI guidance on the claimant’s arguments one image appears to be the claimant’s prompt to AI in response to the question “must describe what happened to you” and the claimant wrote two pages of A4) not copied to the respondent. The claimant refers to Ms Savry from the respondent as “ms sewage”. 6. 4 September 2025 and 1242 email request for reconsideration not copied to respondent The Tribunal responded to the 3 September request providing guidance on the process for applying for transcripts. 5. 3 September 2025 1739 request for the minutes and audio from the Tribunal not copied to the respondent 4. 4 September 2025 email at 1414 not copied to respondent 3. 4 September 2025 of 1401 email not copied to respondent 2. 4 September 2025 at 1110 email not copied to respondent’s 1. 4 September 2025 at 1830 reconsideration request This is an unacceptable volume of communication. The Tribunal acknowledges the claimant’s request for Reconsideration. The Tribunal will consider that request when the respondent has had time to(i) see all of the claimant’s 17 communications above arguing for a re-consideration which are now copied to it and

(ii) seven days from the date of this letter in which to comment in writing to the Tribunal and the claimant on whether or not they think it would be in the interests of justice to reconsider the decision. Any further correspondence from the claimant on this issue between now and the respondent’s response within 7 days will not be considered. The Tribunal rejects the claimant’s request on 10 September 2025 that her correspondence be kept confidential. The claimant was informed during case management, in case management orders, at the hearing and in writing on 5 September 2025 that all communication with the Tribunal must be copied to the other side. The Tribunal does not have resource to respond to this level of contact. The claimant must now wait for: 1) The written judgment 2) Any response from the respondent to her request for reconsideration and 3) the Judge’s decision as to whether it would be in the interests of justice to reconsider the case or not. The judge will take into account the claimant’s 17 communications and any response from the respondent. The claimant must not send any more information. If the Judge decides not to reconsider the case she will say why not. If she decides to reconsider she will make case management orders to prepare for any reconsideration. Employment Judge Aspinall has annual leave for the last two weeks of September and for one week in October and has a full list of cases to be heard. Her next opportunity to consider the request and any response from the respondent is likely to be at the end of October 2025 or early November 2025. Yours faithfully, 6. The claimant continued to write to the Tribunal. It is not clear whether her communications after 11 September 2025 were copied to the respondent or not. The above 17 items were copied by the Tribunal to the respondent. A further 4 communications from the claimant, 18. 11 September 2025 email at 09.24 requesting a transcript of the hearing and indicating an intention to report the respondent to regulatory bodies 19. 25 September 2025 attaching a photograph of a letter from Dr Webb at Birbeck Medical Group saying that the claimant has had a mental health breakdown as a result of the mental trauma of the accident she was involved in at work and has been unable to participate in meetings regarding gross misconduct during this time. 20. on 19 September 2025 a further Reasons request. 21. dated 19 September 2025 but received 25 September 2025 a request for Reconsideration setting out Grounds have been taken into account in considering the request for Reconsideration. No discourtesy is intended to the respondent but EJ Aspinall decided not to copy items 18,19,20 and 21 to the respondent and allow response time but to consider the request and reach a decision during the writing time allocated to the judge on 13 November 2025. The reasons for proceeding to consider the request today without providing all copies to the respondent are

a. There is no obligation in rule 69 for the claimant to copy reconsideration request grounds to a respondent.

b. The Rules require communications by a party to the Tribunal to be copied to the other party. The Tribunal did copy the 17 items as a courtesy but it was the claimant’s responsibility to have copied them to the respondent.

c. The respondent has not made written representations on the 17 items.

d. HMCTS administrative pressures mean that sending 18,19,20 and 21 would mean as much as a further eight week delay for that correspondence to go and a response to be awaited.

e. 18,19, 20 and 21 are largely repetitive of points already made by the claimant in seeking reconsideration.

f. EJ Aspinall may not have another day without a case until the new year and considered it proportionate to begin dealing with this request on 13 November 2025 (and completing the preparation of this detailed refusal whilst on annual leave on 24 November 2025) knowing that, as result of pressures on HMCTS administration, it will then take several weeks for the Reasons and Reconsideration outcome to be sent to the parties. The Relevant Law 7. Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides 68. Principles (1) The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. (2) A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked. (3) If the judgment under reconsideration is revoked the Tribunal may take the decision again. In doing so, the Tribunal is not required to come to the same conclusion. 69. Application for reconsideration Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of— (a) the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was (b) the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. 70. Process for reconsideration (1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application. (4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. (5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application. 8. A Tribunal dealing with an application for reconsideration must seek to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly contained within Rule 3 of the Regulations. This includes ensuring that the parties are an equal footing, dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings, avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and saving expense. 9. Consideration of whether reconsideration is “necessary in the interests of justice” allows the Tribunal a broad discretion which must be exercised judicially which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation, and to the public interest requirement that there should be so far as possible finality in litigation. 10. An application for reconsideration is an exception to the general principle that (subject to appeal on a point of law) a decision of an Employment Tribunal is final. The test is whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the judgment. 11. The importance of finality was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v Burton and anor

[2016] EWCA Civ 714

in July 2016 where Elias LJ said that: “the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board

[1975] ICR 395

) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily; and in Lindsay v Ironsides Ray and Vials

[1994] ICR 384

Mummery J held that the failure of a party's representative to draw attention to a particular argument will not generally justify granting a review.”

[12]Similarly in Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust

EAT/0002/16

the EAT chaired by Simler P said in paragraph 34 that: “a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or by adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered.” Application of law on reconsideration

[13]The claimant’s arguments are largely set out in the 19 September 2025 Grounds for Reconsideration (“GfR”) document. That document has been used to structure the reasoning on the decision not to reconsider below. The Judge has also gone back through documents 1-17, 18,19 and 20 to gather up any points made there, that are not in the GfR. The claimant’s GfR included the following headings for her submissions, which are labelled A – I for ease of reference here as follows:a. A. Material evidence being blocked from the Tribunal bundle

b. B. False testimony accepted regarding disciplinary timing

c. C. Admissions on the Tribunal portal contradicting the Respondent’s case

d. D. Failure to assess constructive dismissal independently of whistleblowing

e. E. Career detriment and reputational damage

f. F. A pattern of excuses and deflections amounting to procedural mockery

g. G. Prejudicial discrediting of genuine medical evidence

h. H. Improper participation and adjournment abuse during the hearing

i. I. Adjournment request revealing Respondent’s awareness of whistleblowing risk Ground A material evidence being blocked from the Tribunal bundle

[14]The claimant submitted that the Tribunal did not see key contemporaneous documents including emails that showed she was medically unfit to attend a disciplinary hearing in April 2024. The Tribunal refers the parties to paragraphs 3 to 14 of the Written Reasons which deal in detail with the consensual arrangements made to proceed with the final hearing. The Tribunal refers the parties to paragraphs 44 to 47 of the Written Reasons which make factual findings about the respondent having postponed disciplinary hearings until the claimant’s fit note expired. Even if the Tribunal had seen the emails showing the claimant was medically unfit to attend a disciplinary hearing, it would have made no difference to the outcome set out in the Written Reasons because the Tribunal knew and found that she had been unfit for work at the relevant time and the respondent accepted in the agreed chronology the dates of her fit notes.

[15]The claimant submitted that she was raising concerns about unlawful wage deductions in emails in 2021 and 2022 and that the Tribunal did not see those emails. The parties are again referred to paragraphs 3 to 14 of the Written Reasons. Even if the Tribunal had seen the emails protesting about deductions at the time it would not have changed the outcome in the case because the complaints were out of time. The claimant succeeded, in part, for those of her unauthorised deduction complaints that were in time.

[16]The claimant submitted that she had emails from 2021–2022 showing safety incident blame-shifting and disclosure failures (e.g. handbrake and hardware issues) with the respondent’s vehicles that the Tribunal did not see. Again, the parties are referred to paragraphs 3 to 14 of the Written Reasons. Even if there had been proof before the Tribunal of previous problems with the respondent’s vehicles it would not have affected the outcome in the case. The Written Reasons set out the focus on the List of Issues. The Tribunal cites the claimant’s lack of focus on the List of Issues before the Tribunal and her ongoing preoccupation with wanting to exonerate herself from any wrongdoing in the incident on 4 April 2024.

[17]The claimant submitted that there was a GP letter dated 31 March 2025, which was wrongly excluded from the bundle and that this evidence was blocked and not seen by the Tribunal, resulting in findings based on an incomplete and misleading record. The parties are again referred to paragraphs 3 to 14 of the Written Reasons. Even if the Tribunal had seen a letter saying the claimant was unable to participate in disciplinary proceedings, had suffered a mental health breakdown, it would have made no difference to the outcome. The Tribunal refers the parties to its reasoning at paragraphs 44 to 47 of the Written Reasons.

[18]Further, the claimant is reminded that she was not dismissed for gross misconduct. She has referred to this several times in her communications regarding reconsideration and she referred to gross misconduct dismissal during the hearing. The parties are referred to paragraphs 112 – 118 of the Written Reasons which deal with the law on fundamental breach of contract and constructive dismissal and to paragraphs 119 and 120 which set out why the claimant has failed to establish dismissal. Ground B false Testimony: Disciplinary Timing Misrepresented

[19]The claimant submitted in her GfR that evidence including emails showing the sequencing of events in relation to her fit notes and the convening and postponing of disciplinary hearings were blocked from inclusion in the bundle. The parties are again referred to paragraphs 3 to 14 of the Written Reasons on the basis upon which they agreed to proceed with the final hearing in circumstances in which neither side had complied with case management orders and both found themselves less than fully prepared at the start of the trial window. The Tribunal made findings of fact based on oral evidence from the claimant and Mrs Lowrey. There was recited in the Written Reasons at paragraph 84 an agreed factual chronology. Neither party was blocked or excluded from referring to documents in the agreed bundle and where a party referred to a document that was not in the bundle it was a matter for the Tribunal as to how much weight to attach to that reference. Ground C Lowery’s Admission on Tribunal Portal

[20]The claimant submitted that the respondent has admitted on the Tribunal portal that it had withheld medical fit notes from the Tribunal and that it initiated gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings despite the claimant’s incapacity. The claimant says that the admission confirms procedural unfairness and supports my claim that the disciplinary process was pre-determined and retaliatory. The parties are referred to the Written Reasons read in the round. This was not a case of ordinary unfair dismissal. The Tribunal’s findings on detriment in relation to convening a disciplinary hearing /refusing to postpone disciplinary proceedings while the claimant was on sick leave are set out at paragraphs 104 to 111 of the Written Reasons. The parties are referred to the reasoning about the detriment preceding the disclosure in relation to the decision to proceed to disciplinary. Ground D Constructive Dismissal Claim Stands Independently

[21]The claimant’s grounds for reconsideration repeat submissions that she made at the final hearing as to why the respondent’s treatment of her left her with no option but to resign. The Tribunal’s reasoning on fundamental breach and constructive dismissal is set out in the Written Reasons at paragraphs 112 to 118. Its reasoning on the automatically unfair dismissal complaint is set out at paragraphs 119 to 121. Despite focus on the List of Issues at the preliminary hearing for case management, at the outset of the Final Hearing and throughout the Final Hearing the claimant continues to conflate and misunderstand the law. She was not dismissed for gross misconduct. She did not have two years service. She was reliant on establishing an automatically unfair dismissal, that is to say that she was (constructively) dismissed because she made a qualifying protected public interest disclosure. Ground E Career Detriment and Ongoing Disclosure Burden

[22]The claimant made submissions in her GfR about the impact of her loss of employment on her ability to find work and her finances. She said “the Tribunal failed to consider this ongoing detriment, which is a direct consequence of the Respondent’s conduct and the flawed disciplinary process”. The parties are referred to the Written Reasons to be read in the round. There was no argument about financial detriment in the List of Issues. It would, if she had succeeded, have been a remedy point. There was no point about disciplinary process in the List of Issues. This was not an ordinary unfair dismissal complaint. It was explained to the claimant during the Final Hearing that in an automatically unfair dismissal complaint the burden of proof lies with the claimant and that if the reason for dismissal is not the whistleblowing then the complaint fails, if the reason for the dismissal is whistleblowing then the claimant wins unfair dismissal without the Tribunal having to consider the process that led to the dismissal, that’s what automatic means. Ground F: A Pattern of Excuses and Deflections: A Mockery of Procedural Fairness

[23]The claimant submitted in her GfR that From the outset, the Respondent engaged in a pattern of delaying tactics, contradictory excuses, and procedural evasion, including …. - Drip-feeding evidence the day before hearings, despite repeated requests for full disclosure. This conduct amounts to a mockery of procedural fairness and a breach of the Tribunal’s duty under Rule 2 to deal with cases justly. The parties are referred to paragraphs 3 to 14 of the Written Reasons and to the Written Reasons read in the round as to procedural fairness, and the fairness of the final hearing. In particular, the Tribunal cites the following extract from its Written Reasons at paragraphs 13 and 14 I gave guidance to both parties that if they agreed to go ahead with the hearing this week as proposed then they may not be credible if they later, if they did not get the result that they wanted, tried to say that they had not had a fair hearing. I adjourned at 12.30 to give the parties time to confer with their colleagues and instructed them to come back to me at 2pm to say if they wished to go ahead in accordance with the proposal. Submissions and decision to proceed At 2pm both sides said they wished to proceed on the basis set out above. The claimant was adamant that the case was taking its toll on her emotionally, everything she wanted me to see was in the bundle or her statement, she could not tolerate further delay, and that she wanted to proceed. Ground G Prejudicial Discrediting of Medical Evidence 23. The claimant submitted in her GfR that the respondent said that a letter the claimant had from a GP was fake and that this was a deliberate attempt to suppress medical evidence and undermined the claimant’s credibility. She said The Tribunal failed to investigate or admit the document, despite its relevance to my fitness to attend hearings, the timing of disciplinary action, and the constructive dismissal claim. This amounts to a procedural irregularity, a breach of the Tribunal’s duty under Rule 2, and a violation of my right to a fair hearing under

Article 6 ECHR

. The Tribunal rejects those submissions. It refers the parties to paragraph 17 of the Written Reasons and to paragraphs 13 and 14 and to the Written Reasons read in the round. The claimant was fit to proceed, adamant that she wished to proceed, consulted about adjustments and provided with support in accordance with the Equal Treatment Bench Book. Ground H Improper Participation and Adjournment Abuse

[24]The claimant submitted in her GfR that during the hearing, the Tribunal permitted the daughter of the Respondent’s director Ms Savry to sit beside the Respondent and actively participate, despite not being a listed party, representative, or witness. She interrupted my closing statement to correct the pronunciation of her name and later requested an adjournment to secure legal representation on Day 2. This conduct was improper and prejudicial. It breached the Tribunal’s duty under Rule 2 to ensure fairness, and violated my rights under

Article 6 ECHR

. The Respondent was afforded procedural advantages that I was denied, including informal representation and adjournment flexibility. The Tribunal’s tolerance of this behaviour created a perception of bias and undermined the integrity of the proceedings. The Tribunal wholly rejects this submission. Ms Savry chose to attend to accompany Mrs Lowrey on day 2. Ms Savry’s main engagement was to seek a postponement, her application was rejected. The respondent, as the claimant, was free to attend and represent itself as it wished, within the general power to regulate procedure exercised by the Tribunal. The Tribunal took place in an open court room. The Tribunal had regard to the principle of open justice and to the consideration of flexibility within the overriding objective in Rule 3 and its own power to regulate its own procedure. Both sides were litigants in person in this case. The claimant was accompanied herself during the hearing and friends of hers came to observe the hearing. Her friend Dave assisted her during part of the hearing. Her mum attended for emotional support too.

[25]The claimant submitted: The Respondent’s HR manager {Ms Savry}, who is professionally responsible for employment law compliance and tribunal procedure, excluded multiple critical documents from the bundle. These included: - Emails showing I was medically unfit to attend hearings. - Payroll correspondence confirming unlawful wage deductions. - Safety-related communications regarding mechanical failures. - My GP letter dated 31 March 2025, which was falsely branded “fake.” This exclusion was not accidental. It was carried out by a person with professional knowledge of tribunal obligations, including the duty to disclose relevant documents under the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure and the ACAS Code of Practice. The deliberate withholding of evidence by a trained HR professional: - Breached the overriding objective under Rule 2 to deal with cases fairly and justly. - Undermined the Tribunal’s ability to assess the facts. - Contributed directly to a judgment based on false testimony and incomplete records. The Tribunal has addressed the issue of the content of the bundle and the GP letter and again refers the parties paragraphs 3 – 14 of the Written Reasons, the factual findings, the List of Issues and the relevance of the allegedly withheld documents to the matters on the List of Issues that were determined at the final hearing. Ground I: Adjournment Request Revealed Respondent’s Awareness of Whistleblowing Risk

[26]The claimant submitted that the respondent’s postponement request was prejudicial to her. The Tribunal refers the parties to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Written Reasons. The claimant opposed the application and succeeded. There was no postponement. Miscellaneous Grounds from documents other than GfR

[27]At item 2 of 17 the claimant includes content such as “Could you please ask if the breach of gross misconduct without being suspended with full pay and not investigated which cancelled out the timeline of constructive dismissal due to whistle blowing has also been addressed as in closing statement the respondent did say I had acted in a way that had stopped a further consequence so in my opinion unfounded gross misconduct breeches by working during time between accident and first date scheduled for meeting and still in file…” that has been covered in the Written Reasons. The claimant also raises in repetitive and overlapping ways in her communications the disciplinary action whilst off sick point, the bundle contents point and the request for postponement by respondent point that are addressed in GfR and above. She is referred to the Written Reasons.

[28]In item 11 the claimant says obvious and clear error the resubmitted ET3 jan 2025 backs that the employer still believed I had left handbrake off was negligent this over rides any doubt I was to be dismissed their admission of that actually I had not and had prevented a terrible consequence shows they did not investigate it. The claimant’s argument about failure to adequately investigate is directly relevant to the List of Issues and is addressed in the Written Reasons. This email shows the claimant’s ongoing focus of wanting the Tribunal to exonerate her of blame for the incident on 4 April 2024.

[29]At item 13 the claimant said the judge allowed second hand evidence of a person not present and not as a document as oral evidence. The Tribunal assumes this refers to the Tribunal accepting the oral evidence of Mrs Lowrey as to the sequence of events in the respondent deciding to discipline before the disclosure was made. Her evidence led to a significant finding of fact. The Tribunal’s awareness of the source (Mrs Lowrey saying what Mr Robinson believed) and calibre (Mrs Lowrey alluding to an email she said she had seen) of the evidence and the weight to be attached to it is set out in the Written Reasons at paragraphs 25 and 26. The relevant factual findings are at paragraphs 40 – 43.

[30]At items 15 and 16 the claimant says I can provide evidence via the person that the second hand evidence of the person not present to be false. The Tribunal takes this to mean that the claimant can show that the respondent had not recommended disciplining the claimant before she made her disclosure. The parties are referred to the Written Reasons. The Tribunal accepted the direct first hand oral evidence of Mrs Lowrey as to what she saw and when she saw it on 5 April 2024. It sets out in its at paragraph 26 of the Written Reasons why that evidence was credible. The claimant, knowing who would be called by the respondent and who would not, knowing what was in the bundle and what was not, was adamant that she wished to proceed with the final hearing.

[31]At item 17 the claimant writes directly to Employment Judge Aspinall saying I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the care and understanding you showed me during the hearing, particularly in recognising the impact the process had on my emotional wellbeing. As someone who is ordinarily strong and resilient, I was, by that stage, emotionally unstable and exhausted after sixteen months of proceedings simply to reach court. Your acknowledgement of that was both noticed and valued. But goes on to say I am also concerned that the Tribunal’s assessment of my credibility and the proportionality of the Respondent’s actions may have been influenced, even unintentionally, by the amount of care to protect my well being during the hearing. As such this may have obscured the objective evaluation of the evidence and the legal issues at hand.

[32]The Tribunal refers the parties to the paragraph on adjustments at paragraph 17 of the Written Reasons. The Tribunal does not consider that its provision of support and guidance to both litigant in person parties during the hearing has affected its decision. In the Written Reasons the parties will see the impartiality of the Tribunal’s reasoning, for example it found the claimant to be credible in relation to the damage to the vehicle. It described her as courageous in her actions to avert an accident on 4 April 2024. Elsewhere, it did not accept her evidence for example, that Steve Woods had told her the handbrake was faulty on 4 April 2024. The Tribunal has set out its reasoning for those findings in full in the Written Reasons.

Conclusion

[33]The claimant’s grounds, some of which appear to have been written by her and some with support from someone else so that they have been repetitive and overlapping, at times coherent and other times incoherent and internally inconsistent relate to matters that were before the Tribunal and have been determined. Employment Judge Aspinall has been through them all, providing ongoing support to the claimant as a litigant in person, to ensure nothing has been missed.

[34]The majority of the points raised by the claimant are attempts to raise issues that did not fall within the List of Issues or to re-open issues on which the Tribunal heard evidence and made a determination. In that sense they represent a “second bite at the cherry” which undermines the principle of finality.

[35]The other points raised by the claimant are about the fairness of the September hearing itself. The parties are directed to relevant sections of the Written Reasons that address procedural issues.

[36]There is nothing new here, no new evidence, that would affect or have affected the outcome. The law is clear that matters that have been determined cannot be reopened in this way for further discussion or persuasion.

[37]It was never the role of the Tribunal to decide who if anyone was responsible for the accident on 4 April 2024. The complaints failed (apart from some of the unlawful deduction complaints) for the reasons set out in the Written Reasons.

[38]In reaching the decision not to reconsider the Tribunal has had regard to the importance of finality in litigation for both parties and has considered the impact of a reconsideration determination either on paper or in person for the parties and the cost to which that would put both parties.

[39]The Tribunal rejects the request for reconsideration on the ground that it is not necessary in the interests of justice as there is no reasonable prospect that any one of the grounds set out in the claimant’s application, or all of them taken together, could lead to the original decision being varied or revoked.

[40]In so far as the claimant says that she has not had a fair hearing, that there has been perversity or an error of law, she can of course appeal and must be careful about her time limits to do so.