Mr S Pinto v The Stepstone Group UK Ltd: 6005922/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6005922/2024

Between

Mr S PintoClaimant

TheRespondent

Before

Tribunal Judge G D Davison sitting as a Judge of the Employment Tribunal

In person for claimant

Ms C Ashiru (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 17 November 2025

REASONS

[1]The claimant appeared to have misunderstood the nature of a “private” hearing. He had sent to the Tribunal two annexes (A and B). These contained a submission on why the without prejudice documentation should be admitted and the without prejudice documentation that he wished to have considered. The hearing before the Tribunal was listed as a Public Preliminary Hearing. The without prejudice documentation that the claimant was seeking to rely upon had not been disclosed to the respondent. There is a DRA hearing listed in January 2026 and the final hearing for this matter is listed in February 2026 for 20 days. The respondent invited the Tribunal to consider the documentation and assess whether the threshold of “unambiguous impropriety” had been met. Although the respondent was unsure exactly which documentation the claimant had annexed in the application having reviewed, in general terms, some of the without prejudice correspondence within the respondent’s solicitor’s files, the respondent’s counsel was confident that there was no documentation that would reach the relevant threshold. The claimant was content for the application and documentation annexed thereto to be assessed in this manner. Given the upcoming hearings and the overriding objective I saw no unfairness in proceeding to decide the application in the manner suggested. The only prejudice would be to the respondent in not having had sight of the documents / submission. Garrod (appellant) v Riverstone Management Ltd (respondent) [2023] IRLR “….the without prejudice rule will not be applied if the exclusion of the evidence would “act as a cloak for perjury, blackmail or other unambiguous impropriety”: Unilever plc v Proctor & Gamble Co

[1999] EWCA Civ 3027

. From the review of the authorities at paragraph [22] of Mezzoterro it can also be seen that the rule will be disapplied only in “the very clearest of cases” or “in truly exceptional and needy circumstances”, the latter per Rix LJ in Savings & Investment Bank Ltd v Fincken

[2004] 1 WLR 667

at [57]. That is why the rule can be displaced only by very clear and very serious wrongdoing. Making a settlement offer which could, on one view, provide a clue to a party’s discriminatory attitudes falls far below that threshold.”

[2]The claimant has sought to rely upon various matters such as an agenda or list of issues not being provided in a timely manner, Data Protection requests not being complied with properly (a complaint not upheld by the ICO), time pressure being placed upon the claimant to make decisions regarding possible settlement. This is not a complete list but representative of the types of issues raised by the claimant. As can be seen from the above extracts the rule can only be displaced by very clear and very serious evidence of wrongdoing. Perjury or blackmail are mentioned. Having reviewed the submission and the documents relied upon in support I find the claims advanced fall a very long way short of this elevated threshold. I therefore refused the application to have the without prejudice correspondence included.

[3]The implications of this finding were made clear to the claimant. All references to without prejudice communications must be removed and any without prejudice correspondence that he seeks to rely upon must not be included in the final bundle. The claimant was put on notice that a failure to abide by this decision may lead to cost implications, particularly if a final hearing has to be vacated due to the service of without prejudice correspondence. Reputational harm post-dismissal

[4]The claimant made no further application to amend any of his claims. The respondent skeleton argument (paragraph 19) confirms that this was the claimant’s position at the last Preliminary Hearing. His application to have postdismissal reputational harm added has been phrased as a Rule 41 application. At the time of the dismissal the claimant was working on a 75% contract and so was paid proportionately. Sometime towards the end of March 2024 the respondent clawed back some of his salary paid in advance. Unfortunately, when this salary was clawed back it was done at a full or 100% contractual rate. The respondent has subsequently acknowledged this error and indicated to the claimant that any sums owed will be paid to him. The pleadings are dated 13 March 2024. The events that took place after this date, at the time of drafting, the claimant can have had no knowledge. The claimant has provided no jurisdictional basis for the Tribunal to admit a claim for postdismissal reputational harm when, as at the date of claim, no such harm had occurred. As noted the claimant made no other application to amend his claim. He did not wish to do so. In the circumstances I refuse the application to admit an anticipatory claim of post-dismissal reputational harm. Disability

[5]It was noted at the previous Preliminary Hearing that the issue of Disability may be left to the Final Hearing. However, it was also noted that should the parties be prepared to address the same it could be addressed at this Preliminary Hearing. The respondent indicated that there was to be no challenge to the evidence provided by the claimant in his impact statement and the medical evidence. In these circumstances, given there was to be no oral evidence, I saw no unfairness in proceeding to consider the issue of disability.

[6]It is not in dispute that the burden is on the claimant to establish that he was disabled at the relevant time. The applicable definition is in Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. The Tribunal cannot consider events after the date of the alleged discrimination, All Answers Ltd v W and another

[2021] IRLR 612

at [26].

[7]The claimant must therefore establish that: i) At the relevant time (June 2024 to 7 March 2025) he had a physical or mental impairment; ii) That impairment had a substantial adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities; and iii) That the substantial adverse effect was long-term. In considering whether the effect is long-term the assessment is whether it had lasted for at least 12 months, was likely to last for at least 12 months, or that it was likely to re-occur. “Likely” in this context means “could well happen” in the sense of being “a real possibility”: SCA Packaging Ltd v Boyle

[2009] ICR 1056

[8]As noted in the skeleton argument; ‘a reaction to adverse life events does not amount to an impairment for the purposes of s.6 of the EqA: see Herry v Dudley Metropolitan Council

[2017] ICR 610

, EAT; Igweike v TSB Bank Plc

[2020] IRLR 267

[9]The claimant was dismissed on 7 March 2025. Having considered all the evidence and submissions I find that the claimant at various times has suffered from stress, depression and/or anxiety. In May 2024 he was signed off work with “stress at work”. In June 2024 this became “work stress and anxiety”. In July 2024 his sign off from work was recorded as “stress at work”. By October 2024 it was described as “mixed anxiety and depressive disorder”. The claimant was prescribed various medications.

[10]The entry in his medical records from 7 October 2024 refers to him as having a “four-month history of work-related stress, low mood.” This would suggest his mental health issues began in around June 2024.

[11]Given the claimant was first signed off from work in May 2024 with stress at work, I find this is when his issues with his mental health started. This would accord with the other GP records and him being subsequently being started on a course medication.

[12]The Occupational Health Report of 25 September 2024 noted: “With the evidence presented to me today it is my opinion that Mr Pinto’s condition, without suitable treatment, is not likely to be classed as a disability because his current mental health impairment has not had a substantial impact on his daily activities for more than 12 months. However, as his symptoms are still ongoing it is possible that this could change, but it’s ultimately a legal rather than medical decision as to whether the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 apply in any particular case. Best practice would require discussion of reasonable adjustments prior to making deployment or employment decisions.”

[13]The report also notes that as at September 2024 the claimant is not yet “optimally treated”. It was anticipated that with prescribed medication it may take 4 to 6 weeks for his treatment to be effective.

[14]By January 2025 the claimant is taking medication. The consultation note from his GP of 8 January 2025 records that the claimant is feeling “much better on mirtazapine and feels sleep is corrected which was a major part of him feeling down.” It also notes he has made a partial return to work and that the mirtazapine may have been affecting his concentration. This is also noted in the claimant’s impact statement.

[15]By 26 March 2025 the GP notes that the claimant “feels better-wants to finish the mirtazapine and end it.” In the ‘comments’ section the GP notes that; “I feel he has progressed well and I don’t need to follow him up.”

[16]I find that the claimant was suffering from mental health issues from May 2024. I find that he received appropriate treatment for this. The medical evidence does not disclose that there was a substantial adverse effect on the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. If there was any suggestion that the claimant’s mental health had had such a substantial adverse effect, there is no indication that the effect lasted for 12 months or was likely to last for 12 months. On 30 January 2025 the claimant informed his GP that on the lower dosage of mirtazapine he had better concentration and was driving better. He also described his family life being more stable and this being a “better” situation. This medical note highlights that the claimant is to be made redundant yet despite knowing this his mental health appears to be improving. There is therefore some overlay between his family life and work conditions/position being the cause of his mental health issues. By March 2025 the claimant himself is wishing to end his medication. Stating he feels better and his GP was satisfied he had progressed well and did not need to follow him up. There was at this stage therefore no likelihood of re-occurrence of his mental health issues. The claimant was on a phased return to work he started at 50% and had moved to 75%.

[17]The claimant’s issues with his mental health I find were linked to life events. The claimant wishing to come off his medication and stating that he feels much better occurred approximately 3 weeks after the termination of his employment. I find that the claimant in the run-up to his employment ending was enduring a stressful period of time both at home and at work. His need for medical intervention was a reaction to these adverse life events rather than him suffering from an underlying mental impairment.

[18]In conclusion I find the claimant did not have a physical or mental impairment. I find the claimant was suffering from mental health issues linked to his life events. Even if I were wrong in this conclusion and the claimant was suffering from a, on his case, mental impairment, I find that the claimant has not established on balance that this impairment had a substantial adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities; nor do I find that the substantial adverse effects were long-term. I find by January, or at the very latest March 2025, the claimant was seeking to cease medication and there was no indication that he would require further medical intervention. He did not therefore meet the third limb of the test. For these reasons I find he is not a ‘disabled person’ under Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. Approved by: Tribunal Judge G D Davison sitting as a Judge of the Employment Tribunal 17 November 25 04/12/2025 For the Tribunal

[1]The claimant lists the applications as follows: ‘A1: Recusal Application – Employment Judge G D Davison A2. Reconsideration Application – Disability Judgment (s.6 EqA 2010) A3. Reconsideration Application – Section 108 EqA 2010 Issue’

[2]By rule 70 of Schedule 1 to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (“the Rules”) the Employment Tribunal may reconsider a judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the judgment may be confirmed, varied or revoked.

[3]An application for reconsideration shall be presented in writing (and copied to all other parties) within 14 days of the date upon which the written record of the original decision was sent to the parties. This application is in in time.

[4]Under Rule 70, a judgment will only be reconsidered where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. This allows an Employment Tribunal a broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration is appropriate in the circumstances. The discretion must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.

[5]The procedure upon a reconsideration application is for the Employment Judge that heard the case to consider the application and determine if there are reasonable prospects of the judgment being varied or revoked. This is a reviewing function in which the Judge must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked (rule 72). Reconsideration cannot be ordered simply because the applicant disagrees with the judgment.

[6]If the Judge considers that there is no such reasonable prospect then the application shall be refused. Otherwise, the Judge shall send a notice to the parties setting a time limit for any response to the application by the other party and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing (rule 72). My role, upon the considering of the application upon the papers initially, is therefore to operate as a filter to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked were the matter to be the subject of a reconsideration hearing.

[7]The Claimant’s application for Reconsideration under Section 108 EqA 2010 at paragraph 7 states, in extract: ‘As stated in my witness statement (section G, paragraphs 24 – 27), the application was expressly framed as a clarification, not as an amendment, and did not seek to introduce any new facts or detriments and caused no prejudice to the Respondent;’

[8]If the Claimant was not seeking to amend his claim in any way, then the decision to refuse to allow amendment, for the reasons set out in the Judgment, cannot have a reasonable prospect of success. The factual basis of the claim will be for assessment at the final hearing. The Claimant will be able to set out the factual narrative for the claims that have been made and accepted. If the Claimant were not seeking to amend his claims then the refusal to allow amendment was manifestly correct.

[9]The ‘Application for Reconsideration of Disability Judgment (s.6 EqA)’ I find to be an attempt to reargue the claims advanced. Findings have been made on the factual scenario posed which I am satisfied were open to me on the evidence provided. Adequate reasons were given for rejecting the argument’s advanced by the Claimant and finding he was not a disabled person, his attempt to reargue the same in the application for reconsideration do not, in my finding, lead to a reasonable prospect of success that the Judgment should be varied/ revoked. Relevant extracts of the medical evidence have been relied upon to support the findings made. The Judgment did not rely on a ‘single’ note from the GP, but from paragraphs 9 - 17 referred to several entries in the GP records and the Occupational Health report. In paragraph 5 of the Judgment I noted that the issue of Disability could be considered at the Preliminary Hearing. As the respondent was not challenging the evidence relied upon by the Claimant, I saw no unfairness in determining the issues. I find the application for reconsideration to be no more than a further attempt to reargue the claim.

[10]I am satisfied that I applied the law correctly and gave full reasons for the decision I reached. In my judgment, there are no reasonable prospects of the Judgment being varied or revoked. It is not necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the Judgment. Accordingly, the Claimant’s applications for reconsideration fail and are dismissed.

[11]I note that the matter is listed for a DRA on 15 January 2026 and a final hearing later in 2026. The Claimant has requested that I be recused from considering the application for Reconsideration (paragraph 2 of the ‘Application for Recusal of the Employment Judge.’) For the reasons given above the initial application comes to me as the Judge who made the decision to reconsider the matter. I therefore refuse the application to recuse myself from the reconsideration request. As a note of practicality I note that I am not due to sit on any of the future hearings that have been listed to date for this Claimant. Approved By Tribunal Judge G D Davison sitting as a Judge of the Employment Tribunal 30 December 2025 …………………………………………… 31 December 2025 For the Tribunal