Ms Z Dancer v HC-One Ltd: 6003525/2025 and 6000814/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6003525/2025, 6000814/2025

Between

Ms Z DancerClaimant

HC-One LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Maidment

In person for claimant

Ms L Quigley (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 3 December 2025

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s application for interim relief is refused.

REASONS

In an application for interim relief, the test is whether it appears to the tribunal that the relevant claim is likely to succeed. This requires the tribunal to carry out a summary assessment on the material available, doing the best it can without hearing evidence and making factual findings. In the case of Taplin v C Shippam Ltd

1978 ICR 1068

, it was said that the correct test to be applied is whether the claimant has a “pretty good chance of success” at the full hearing. That is not a low bar. The claimant brings a complaint of automatic unfair dismissal based on her being a whistleblower. On discussion, the claimant identified that she was relying on complaints in her email of 13 December 2024 to a director as being a protected qualifying disclosure. The document, on its face, purports to be an act of whistleblowing, but that in itself is insufficient to make it a protected disclosure. There must be a provision of information tending to show, on the claimant’s case here, a breach of health and safety. The communication in fact provides very little in terms of specific information. The tribunal is likely to be required to consider the overall context of the complaint and other communications previously made by the claimant to the respondent to understand whether sufficient information can be said to have been provided in this case. There is also the question of whether the claimant had a reasonable belief, in the context of her not having herself particular knowledge of health and safety in this industry and relying on information she says she was provided with by the CQC of which the tribunal is unaware at this point in time. Despite identifying the communication of 13 December 2024 as the sole disclosure to be relied on, the claimant, in her representations, did refer to earlier verbal disclosures. She did not, however, identify those being relied upon. Whilst the grounds of complaint do refer to a range of communications, the tribunal is not in a position to evaluate whether any other communication was likely to amount to a protected qualifying disclosure. The claimant’s greater difficulty is on the question of causation. Given her short length of service, she will bear a burden of proof in terms of the reason or, if more than one, the principal reason for her dismissal. The claimant does not appear to be raising any matter which might obviously have caused the respondent to be worried or angry or certainly to retaliate by dismissing her. Her case seems more to be that she might have been viewed as a nuisance raising a lot of concerns or repeating the same concerns. That is against a background of significant evidence of there being concerns about the claimant’s behaviour and performance from indeed an early stage in her employment. Those concerns appear to come from a range of sources including people not involved in the claimant’s line management or in respect of whom she was raising potential protected disclosures. Concerns arise from July 2024 and are discussed with the claimant in meetings and at probationary reviews. The claimant was invited on 3 December 2024 to her final probation review meeting, prior to her purported protected disclosure of 13 December and in circumstances where, on receipt of that invite, it must have been viewed by the claimant as likely that this would result in her dismissal. Mr Iles will certainly give evidence that he had determined to take that course of action by the time of the invitation. A delay in actioning the dismissal appears to result from periods of annual leave and sickness absence. The claimant obviously had short service and therefore limited employment protection rights. The question here is not whether the respondent acted reasonably, but whether it dismissed her because it genuinely believed that her behaviour/performance was not satisfactory or because she had raised a protected disclosure. It is likely on the documents before the tribunal that the claimant’s behaviour/performance will be found to be the reason for dismissal, not her protected disclosures. Certainly, there is not the required likelihood of the claimant succeeding which would make it appropriate to make an order for interim relief. Employment Judge Maidment Date 28 March 2025 Recording and Transcription Please note that if a Tribunal hearing has been recorded you may request a transcript of the recording, for which a charge may be payable. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings, and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice- directions/ JUDGMENT The claimant’s application for reconsideration of its decision on her application for interim relief dated 28 March 2025 is refused. REASONS The tribunal considers there to be no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked. In an application for interim relief, the tribunal carries out a summary assessment in order to gain an impressionistic feel of the case and the balance of prospects. The tribunal is satisfied that it was able to do so and the claimant is essentially seeking to re-argue her case. The tribunal had the claimant’s bundle before it, which she accepted contained some information which was duplicated in the respondent’s own bundle. The claimant had an opportunity to refer the tribunal to any material she wished. The claimant expressly confirmed that the sole protected disclosure she was relying upon was that made to a director and copied to others on 13 December 2024. In any event, the tribunal did give consideration to the fact that other potential disclosures of information were contained within the grounds of complaint. A lack of experience in health and safety was raised relating to the reasonableness of any belief held by the claimant in the context of her not working as a frontline care provider. The reference to length of service was to the burden of proof on the claimant which is different to that applying to an employee who also can bring a claim of ordinary unfair dismissal. 10.2 Judgment - rule 61 March Case No: 6003525/2025 & 6000814/2025 If the claimant does not believe that she was viewed as a nuisance for making her disclosures, her case on causation is weakened. The tribunal doubted that it would be considered likely that the respondent retaliated towards the claimant arising out of concern at the subject matter being raised by the claimant in her disclosures. As explained to the claimant, the hurdle is set high for a tribunal to be persuaded that an application for interim relief ought to be granted, not least given the consequences of making such an order. On the tribunal’s review of the material before it and to which it was referred, the prospects of success were well short of those required for an order to be made. JUDGMENT The Claimant was at the material times a disabled person within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. REASONS

[1]I am dealing with the first of the preliminary issues identified by Employment Judge Jaleel for consideration at this public hearing. That is the disputed issue of whether the claimant Ms Zoe Dancer meets the definition of disability within the Equality Act 2010.

[2]There are two medical conditions relied upon, dilated cardiomyopathy and primary hyperthyroidism. It is accepted that both of those constitute physical impairments and that they are long-term, though I do note that the claimant has now had the surgical intervention in respect of the hyperthyroidism which potentially may be a cure for that condition. But the dilated cardiomyopathy is a lifelong condition and has now been fairly recently diagnosed as potentially related to her having the genetic SEN58 variant gene, which she shares with other members of her family, an inherited condition.

[3]The question that I have had to determine is whether those long-term impairments have in fact have a substantial adverse effect upon the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities. I am looking at the period of her employment which was short from June 2024 to January of this year.

[4]I have not found this an easy decision to make, not least because unfortunately the way the claimant has presented the evidence has not been entirely satisfactory. The impact statement ordered by Employment Judge Maidment at an earlier hearing is not easy to follow and digresses into matters that do not relate to these particular issues. Also matters have been amplified at this hearing that are not fully explored within that statement.

[5]However, on balance I have come to the view that the claimant is a disabled person, though on limited grounds.

[6]Essentially the claimant’s conditions have been stable. Throughout her history of reported observations made to the various medical practitioners- either to her own specialists or to the occupational health consultant- she has maintained that she does not suffer, for instance, from palpitations, breathlessness or respiratory problems and is generally able to carry out normal day to day activities.

[7]However those conditions, even though they are for the most part managed, (and managed without medication particularly in relation to the heart condition because the claimant’s low blood pressure means that she cannot take the usual medication to minimise the risk of heart failure, which is a potential consequence of her impairment because that would reduce her blood pressure even lower) by means of diet, by abstinence from various substances, by exercise, are not completely controlled.

[8]She is able to control that condition for the most part and therefore, quite properly, Ms Quigley has referred me to the guidance on the definition of disability from 2011 at paragraph B7. That of course reminds me that I should take account of how far a person can realistically be expected to modify their behaviour so as to potentially mean that they are not within the definition of disability.

[9]But the claimant cannot properly account for all the potential situations that may exacerbate her conditions, and in particular she refers to stress. She cannot necessarily avoid stressful situations – whether or not they may properly be held to have been caused by the actions of other people or simply arise from by her own perception (and those may be matters that fall for determination in the course of these Tribunal proceedings). But if she does suffer a stress reaction it may exacerbate her condition and, in particular, affect her blood pressure.

[10]In that regard the claimant has recounted -as she set out very briefly in her impact statement -that she is affected in the way which she is able to carry out the normal day to day activity of getting up in the morning as that is when her blood pressure is particularly low as a result of her underlying impairments. Therefore that is a more than minor or trivial adverse effect upon the ability to carry out that every day occurrence. Also, she refers in the course of her statement from August 2024, to avoiding going shopping except by using the internet. Ms Quigley is quite right to point out that there is no corroborative medical evidence to suggest a deterioration in condition at that time, but in the course of this hearing the claimant has explained that that decision is partly a result of increased tiredness and that again is one of those external factors which she cannot properly be expected to take into account when seeking to manage her condition.

[11]I should say the course of coming to these decisions on that ground, even though I do not have explicit medical evidence it is quite clear that Ms Dancer is very knowledgeable about her own medical conditions, understandably so as she tells me that this is a very rare combination of medical impairments. She has obviously taken great trouble to familiarise herself with the information available to her.

[12]When she tells me of the knock-on effects of external factors such as stress upon her condition I am prepared to accept that evidence. Though I do note Ms Quigley’s observations that this has come somewhat late in the day.

[13]However in other regards essential elements of the claimant’s argument I do not accept. The guidance on the definition of disability gives illustrative examples of what is not to be treated as normal day to day activity. So where the claimant complains of her difficulties in carrying heavy boxes and equipment to the homes that she was working at, that appears to me to fall very readily within the exception that inability to move heavy objects without assistance or mechanical aids such as moving a large suitcase or heavy piece of furniture without a trolley is not ordinarily regarded as a normal day to day activity: and that certiasnly does appears to be what the claimant is describing.

[14]Similarly, the experiencing of some discomfort as a result of travelling for example by car or plane for a journey lasting more than two hours is also not ordinarily to be regarded as a normal day to day activity. And the claimant, of course, accepted that she took on this role expecting to have to travel over a large area. Long distance driving was not ordinarily an issue and of course in the course of her employment she also voluntarily undertook extensive foreign travel, flying to Cambodia and Vietnam and travelling between those countries.

[15]Also I observe that where the claimant did in the course of her period of employment suffered one episode of heart palpitations whilst driving as from 23 October she attributes to that, both in the 111 triage call and also in her subsequent appointment with her GP, to have been induced by stress and said that it was of a short duration. That it was not as serious as previous heart palpitations she experienced, and it does appear to be related to the stress of her immediate situation, which is not uncommon, rather than particularly attributable to the underlying cardiac problems.

[16]But those matters aside, it still leaves the fact that there are situations where the claimant is not reasonably to be expected to manage her conditions by the coping and avoidance strategies that she ordinarily carried out. When exposed to particular external stressors, most especially occurrences of stress or anxiety, however occasioned, she cannot control the symptoms.

[17]Also I should say at that point that I also accept her evidence that the hyperthyroidism -which results in an excess of calcium in the bloodstream and therefore affects the bones - had an impact upon her when she was undertaking some activities particularly crawling under desks to retrieve or install objects. It is no part of my decision today to determine whether that was actually part of her job description or if there is anything wrong in her doing that, but it is a normal day to day activity that somebody should on occasions have to get down to floor level. Soif as a result of an underlying medical impairment, in this case the excessive calcium in the bloodstream however caused, and if it is exacerbated by stress or otherwise, and if the claimant then has difficulty in getting up, that is more than a minor or trivial adverse effect upon that normal activity. As I say that normal activity is of getting down and doing something at ground level is incorporated within the alleged requirement that she had to do that excessively in the course of her duties.

[18]So for those limited reasons, having regard to the effects of lowered blood pressure and the impact upon the speed with which she would carry out normal day to day activities and the exacerbating tiredness, and also in relation to the effect upon her joints in relation to the excess of calcium, I find that she does meet the definition of disability.

[19]On that latter point I have also noted that the appointment in February of this year, shortly after she left employment but sufficiently close in time to give me a good indication what was happening in the relevant period, indicates that she was reporting to her specialist then that she had problems with her limbs. That accords with the account she has given to me today. Approved by