Ms X Zhang v Aztec Financial Services (UK) Ltd: 6003369/2026
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6003369/2026
Between
Ms X ZhangClaimantAztec Financial Services (UK) LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge YallopIn person for claimantMr R Dennis (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 7 March 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s application for interim relief brought under section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]This was a summary procedure. As is usual in the case of applications for interim relief, I did not hear oral evidence. Chronology based on the Claimant’s account[2]The Claimant commenced employment on 6 March 2023. She worked for the Respondent as a Systems Support Manager. She resigned with notice on 9 December 2025. At the time of the hearing, she was on gardening leave, and her notice was due to expire on 4 March 2026.[3]The Claimant says that she was bullied by a senior manager at work, Rafal Szatkowski (Senior Portfolio Manager, and her line manager) from June 2025. She says that she tried unsuccessfully to resolve this informally, so on 19 September 2025, she made a Safecall report (i.e. a call to the Respondent’s external whistleblowing hotline). She confirmed at the hearing that she relies on the following information in that report as constituting protected disclosures:a. On 17 July 2025, Mr Szatkowski had asked her to share a password with all staff working on the Medius dashboard, which was against company policy and a breach of GDPR. The Claimant reported this to Steve Pickett (Head of Security), who confirmed sharing of passwords was not permitted. Mr Szatkowski subsequently withdrew his request.b. On 5 September 2025, in relation to a sub dashboard for the Extract project called Power BI, Mr Szatkowski asked the Claimant to, ‘re-invent the wheel’, by using a different platform for data calculations. The Claimant raised concerns about this with Samantha Dean (Company Director), who agreed with the Claimant. Mr Szatkowski was informed and stood down from the suggestion.c. On 11 September 2025, during a Teams meeting for the Extract dashboard, Mr Szatkowski requested that systems went live without a compliance test, in breach of the Respondent’s User Acceptance Testing (UAT) policy.d. On 11 September 2025 during the 'Go live' meeting, Mr Szatkowski challenged everything, attacking both her and her team, and offering no support at all.[4]The Claimant says the investigation into her Safecall report was inadequate and that HR tried to cover it up and blame the bullying on the Claimant.[5]When the bullying happened again, the Claimant says that she reported this to the relevant managers and stakeholders for the project. She confirmed at the hearing that this report, which she says was a protected disclosure, was made in an email on 8 December 2025 regarding the Medius dashboard project. In her email, the Claimant stated that Mr Szatkowski had been making stuff up without evidence and bullying her.[6]On 9 December 2025, the Claimant says she had a meeting with Amanda Miles (Associate Director – HR) and her new line manager, Luke Neill. She said it was clear at that meeting that not only were they not going to investigate the bullying the Claimant was experiencing, but that they had decided her email was a threat to Mr Szatkowski. She says the conversation was intimidating and made her physically sick, and that having received no support from her manager and HR after being bullied and unfairly treated after whistleblowing, she felt she had no option but to resign. Respondent’s case[7]This application was put in at a stage before the Respondent has presented its ET3, because of the expedited procedure. However, based on its written and oral submissions I understand that the Respondent’s case is that on 11 September 2025, Mr Szatkowski raised concerns with the Claimant about her conduct and performance. This prompted the Claimant to complain to Ms Miles about Mr Szatkowski, and the Respondent believes it also prompted her Safecall report on 18 September 2025.[8]Whilst the Respondent accepts that the Claimant made the comments set out in the Safecall report, it argues that these did not constitute protected disclosures as the Claimant did not disclose information and:a. The Claimant’s concern about sharing a password did not tend to show a relevant failure, as following the Claimant raising the issue, action was taken so that any breach was avoided. It also argues that the Claimant did not have a reasonable belief that disclosure was in the public interest. It notes that the Claimant waited until September to report the incident even though it occurred in July, and that she reported it not long after Mr Szatkowski raised conduct and performance concerns with her. The Respondent says that the Claimant was motivated to make the report by her personal grievance with Mr Szatkowski, rather than having made it in the public interest.b. The other alleged disclosures in the Safecall report do not tend to show a breach of a legal obligation, and there was no public interest in the Claimant raising those concerns. The Claimant was motivated by her own personal grievance.[9]In relation to the Claimant’s email dated 8 December 2025, the Respondent says the Claimant reacted badly to Mr Szatkowski’s email of 5 December 2025 in which he said: ‘That advice from Medius was also rejected by you…’ and wrongly perceived this as bullying. Her response was to tell Mr Szatkowski not to make stuff up, and to accuse him of bullying her. The Respondent says that alleged disclosure does not tend to show a breach of a legal obligation or a health and safety breach. It also argues that there was no public interest in the matter being raised by the Claimant, and that she was motivated out of animosity towards Mr Szatkowski. Even if the Claimant did believe she was making a disclosure in the public interest, the Respondent says her belief was not reasonable, as there was no suggestion anyone else was being affected by Mr Szatkowski.[10]In relation to the Claimant’s resignation, the Respondent says Mr Szatkowski did not bully the Claimant from June 2025, and HR did not try to cover any bullying up. It says the allegations made by the Claimant were thoroughly investigated by Ms Miles, who interviewed the Claimant, Mr Szatkowski and five other employees before producing a detailed investigation report. There was then a hearing before an independent panel that concluded there was no evidence of bullying and that the substance of the issue was that the Claimant was not receiving feedback in a constructive manner.[11]In relation to incident on 5 and 8 December 2025, the Respondent says that there was nothing in Mr Szatkowski’s email that could reasonably be perceived as bullying or a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. If it was not true that the Claimant had rejected advice from Medius, the most likely explanation for Mr Szatkowski saying she had, was that he had been mistaken.[12]When Ms Miles and Mr Neill met with the Claimant to discuss her email of 8 December 2025, the Respondent says they did nothing to breach the implied term of trust and confidence. The call was arranged to discuss the fact that the Claimant had claimed in an email copied to 13 people that Mr Szatkowski was making stuff up and bullying her, and that if it continued she would report him to HR and ‘everyone copied in this email can be witness’. The Respondent says it was reasonable for the Respondent to try to sort the matter out informally and to say that there would need to be an investigation when it became clear the matter could not be resolved informally. The Respondent’s reason for dismissal[13]The Respondent notes that the main factors the Claimant claims caused a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence appear to be alleged bullying by Mr Szatkowski, that HR did not uphold her allegations against him, and that Ms Miles allegedly sided with him over their email exchange of 5/8 December 2025. The Respondent argues that the Claimant has not even suggested that the reason in the Respondent’s mind for any of those matters was an alleged disclosure. It also suggests that the Claimant made the Safecall report in response to Mr Szatkowski’s alleged bullying, so even on the Claimant’s case the bullying cannot have been motivated by the disclosure. Proceedings[14]On 24 January 2026, the Claimant presented an ET1 that included an application for interim relief pursuant to s128 ERA on the basis that she was constructively dismissed and that the sole or principle reason for her dismissal was that she had made a protected disclosure. Law Interim relief applications
Law
[15]Section 129(1) ERA provides that an application for interim relief should be granted if ‘it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find’ that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was one of the statutory automatically unfair reasons.[16]The EAT has held that ‘likely’ in this context means that the Claimant must show that his or her case has “a pretty good chance” of success, which means that something better than likelihood on the balance of probability (i.e. better than a 51% chance): Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068, as approved and followed in London City Airport Ltd v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610 at para 10 and His Highness Sheikh Bin Sadr al Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17 (22.12.17, unreported).[17]The Tribunal must be satisfied that the Claimant is ‘likely’ to succeed on each necessary aspect of his or her claim (Robinson para 11), applying that high threshold, before relief can be granted. This means the Tribunal needs to find that it is ‘likely’ the Claimant made a protected disclosure within the statutory definition, and that it is ‘likely’ it was the sole or principal reason for dismissal.[18]The Employment Appeal Tribunal in Chacko gave guidance on the approach to be taken by the Tribunal at paragraph 23: ‘In my judgment the correct starting point for this appeal is to fully appreciate the task which faces an employment judge on an application for interim relief. The application falls to be considered on a summary basis. The employment judge must do the best he can with such material as the parties are able to deploy by way of documents and argument in support of their respective cases. The employment judge is then required to make as good an assessment as he is promptly able of whether the claimant is likely to succeed in a claim for unfair dismissal based on one of the relevant grounds. The relevant statutory test is not whether the claimant is ultimately likely to succeed in his or her complaint to the Employment Tribunal but whether “it appears to the tribunal” in this case the employment judge “that it is likely”. To put it in my own words, what this requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance employment judge as to how the matter looks to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at the full hearing of the claim.’[19]The summary assessment of the material before it to determine this question, is described by HHJ Eady QC in Robinson as a necessarily ‘broad-brush approach’ and ‘very much an impressionistic one’. Protected disclosures[20]The ERA provides: ‘43B Disclosures qualifying for protection. (1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, … (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, …’[21]In Kilraine v Wandsworth London Borough Council 2018 ICR 1850, the Court of Appeal held that, in order for a disclosure to be a ‘qualifying disclosure’ within the meaning of s43B(1) ERA, the disclosure had to have sufficient factual content and specificity. The Court stressed that the word ‘information’ in s43B(1) has to be read with the qualifying phrase ‘tends to show’ — i.e. the worker must reasonably believe that the information ‘tends to show’ that one of the relevant failures has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur. Accordingly, for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure, it must have sufficient factual content to be capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in s43B(1)(a)–(f). Constructive dismissal[22]Section 95 of the ERA 1996 provides: ‘(1) For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and, subject to subsection (2) …, only if) – … (c) The employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct.’[23]The term as to trust and confidence was authoritatively formulated by the House of Lords in Malik and Mahmud v BCCI [1997] ICR 606 as being an obligation that the employer shall not: “Without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated [or] likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee.” Conclusions
Discussion
[24]It is not the role of an Employment Judge hearing an application for interim relief to make findings of fact. I am reliant on the parties to set out the material facts for each side highlighting their strongest points. There has not been any oral evidence.[25]I have considered whether there is a “pretty good chance” that the Tribunal at the final hearing will find six things:(1) that the Claimant had made a disclosure to her employer;(2) that she believed that that disclosure tended to show one or more of the things itemised at (a)–(f) under s43B(1) ERA;(3) that she believed that the disclosure was made in the public interest(4) that those beliefs were reasonable;(5) that she was constructively dismissed; and(6) that the disclosure was the principal reason for that dismissal. Whether disclosures were made[26]The claim is based on protected disclosures having been made on two occasions: in the Safecall report on 18 September; and in the Claimant’s email of 8 December 2025. The Respondent admits that the report was made and the email was sent.[27]In relation to the concern about passwords, I consider that there is a pretty good chance the Tribunal would find the Claimant provided enough factual content for her report to amount to a disclosure of information, as it is clear what she alleges happened and that she considered this was a relevant failure because it was in breach of the GDPR. I also consider there is a pretty good chance the Tribunal would find the Claimant’s concern about Mr Szatkowski requesting that systems went live without a compliance test amounted to a disclosure, as it is clear what she alleges occurred and that she was concerned about the consequences given the breach of the UAT policy.[28]In relation to the allegation that on 5 September 2025, Mr Szatkowski asked the Claimant to, 're-invent the wheel', by using a different platform for data calculations, I consider that a Tribunal is unlikely to find that the report amounted to a disclosure of information. It is not apparent why asking the Claimant to do something different might constitute some form of wrongdoing.[29]In relation to the Claimant’s concern that on 11 September 2025 during the 'Go live' meeting, Mr Szatkowski challenged everything, attacking both her and her team, and offering no support at all, I do not consider there to be a pretty good chance that the Tribunal would find the concern amounted to a disclosure. There is specific date of the meeting. However, the allegation itself comprises of no more than unparticularised allegations or expressions of opinion, and does not convey factual information of sufficient detail and specificity to amount to a disclosure.[30]In relation to the email of 8 December 2025 (in which the Claimant stated that Mr Szatkowski had been making stuff up without evidence and bullying her) I consider there is a pretty good chance the Tribunal would find there was a disclosure, as it is clear what the Claimant is alleging Mr Szatkowski did that she considered to be bullying behaviour (i.e. there is specific information about what the Claimant says he made up about her), and a senior manager bullying the Claimant could constitute a relevant failure.[31]The Claimant suggests that the fact that Mr Szatkowski was making stuff up also counted as a separate disclosure, as what he made up related to compliance data. I consider that a Tribunal is unlikely to find that that report amounted to a disclosure of information separately from the allegation that it constituted bullying. There are insufficient particulars to tend to show a breach of a legal obligation relating to compliance requirements. Whether the Claimant believed that disclosure tended to show a relevant failure[32]I have only dealt here with the three disclosures that I have found the Claimant has a pretty good chance of establishing that she made.[33]Considering whether the Claimant believed that the disclosures tended to show the alleged failures, I bear mind that a belief for these purposes may be mistaken yet nevertheless genuinely held.[34]In relation to sharing the password, I consider it to be unlikely that the Claimant will succeed in establishing she believed the disclosure tended to show a relevant failure. Although a breach of GDPR requirements would constitute a breach of a legal obligation, on the Claimant’s own case, at the time she made the disclosure in September, the concern about the password had already been resolved without the password being shared. The Claimant says that in July, when Steve Pickett confirmed the sharing of passwords was not permitted, Mr Szatkowski had withdrawn his request. I therefore consider it to be unlikely that a Tribunal would find the Claimant believed in September that the information she was providing tended to show a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with GDPR.[35]In relation to the disclosure that on 11 September 2025, Mr Szatkowski requested that systems went live without a compliance test, it is in dispute that the Claimant believed her disclosure tended to show the breach of a legal obligation. In the Claimant’s submissions she said that going live without a systems test meant there was a high risk of providing inaccurate information to clients, which they would then use to support them in capital market investment. The Respondent argues that the breach of a policy is not the same as a breach of a legal obligation, and that the Claimant was only raising this issue because Mr Szatkowski had spoken to her on 11 September 2025 about her own performance and conduct. The Claimant may succeed in establishing that she believed her disclosure tended to show a relevant failure, but it is difficult to say on the material before me that there is a pretty good chance of this part of the claim succeeding.[36]In relation to the allegation that Mr Szatkowski had been making stuff up without evidence and bullying the Claimant, I consider there to be a pretty good chance that the Tribunal would find the Claimant genuinely believed this disclosure tended to show a relevant failure. The Respondent asserts that the Claimant wrongly believed Mr Szatkowski was bullying her and that was what motivated her email of 8 December 2025. The Respondent also suggests that it was the conversation Mr Szatkowski had with the Claimant about her conduct and performance that motivated her to make her Safecall report on 18 September 2025. The disclosures on both of those dates refer to bullying. I therefore consider that there is a pretty good chance of the Claimant establishing her own contemporaneous belief that the disclosure on 8 December 2025 tended to show that Mr Szatkowski had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with a legal obligation, and/or that the Claimant’s health or safety had been, was being or was likely to be endangered. Whether the Claimant believed the disclosures were made in the public interest[37]I have only dealt here with the one disclosure that I have found the Claimant has a pretty good chance of establishing she believed tended to show a relevant failure.[38]I have borne in mind that following the case of Chesterton Global Ltd & Anor v Nurmohamed & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 979, this is not a particularly difficult hurdle for a Claimant to satisfy. Chesterton made clear that a sub-category of colleagues who are affected might be enough to satisfy the public interest requirement.[39]There is nothing specific in the disclosure of 8 December 2025 about other people being bullied. That email appears from the contemporaneous chain provided by the parties to have been sent by the Claimant in direct response to an email from Mr Szatkowski dated 5 December 2025. Mr Szatkowski writes ‘That advice from Medius was also rejected by you’. The Claimant’s response says: ‘I would like to request you not to make up stuff without evidence by saying “That advice from Medius was also rejected by you”.’ The email goes on to say: ‘If Rafal continues to bully me by his hidden tactic of making up stuff without evidence, I will report to HR again and will not keep silence. Everyone copied in this email can be witness.’[40]The words ‘in the public interest’ prevent a worker from relying on a breach of his or her own contract of employment where the breach is of a personal nature and there are no wider public interest implications. In relation to this disclosure itself, there is nothing to suggest that the Claimant believed her disclosure engaged the interests of colleagues.[41]The Respondent’s case is that there was no wider concern about Mr Szatkowski and that the isolated difficulty between him and the Claimant arose because Claimant did not receive feedback in a constructive manner. The contemporaneous documents provided by the parties (including the outcome from the Safecall investigation), support that the Respondent believed this. However, the Claimant refer in her Safecall report that on 11 September 2025 during the 'Go live' meeting, Mr Szatkowski had attacked her team. I therefore consider that there is a pretty good chance of the Claimant establishing her own contemporaneous belief that her disclosure was made in the public interest. Whether the Claimant’s beliefs were reasonable[42]I have only dealt here with the one alleged belief in a protected disclosure which I find the Claimant has a pretty good chance of establishing, i.e. that of 8 December 2025. I consider there to be a pretty good chance that the Tribunal will find it to be reasonable that the Claimant believed her disclosure tended to show a relevant failure, as bullying by a senior manager would be likely to constitute failure to comply with a legal obligation, and/or endanger the victim’s health or safety.[43]In relation to the public interest element, the Claimant may be able to establish at the final hearing that it was reasonable for her to believe Mr Szatkowski’s behaviour was a risk for other staff. However, there is very little reference to other staff in the contemporaneous documents I have seen, and the Respondent argues that the Claimant’s difficulty with Mr Szatkowski was an isolated issue between two colleagues resulting from the Claimant not accepting feedback in a constructive manner. I therefore cannot say on the material before me that there is a pretty good chance of this part of the claim succeeding.
Conclusion
[44]I do not find at this stage based on the material before me that the Claimant has a pretty good chance of showing that she made protected disclosures. It therefore follows that I do not find the Claimant has a pretty good of chance of establishing that the principal reason for any constructive dismissal was a protected disclosure.[45]The Claimant’s application for interim relief is dismissed.