Miss A J Leckie v Stichd Sportmerchandising UK Ltd and Others: 6003090/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6003090/2025
Between
Miss A J LeckieClaimantStichd Sportmerchandising UK Ltd and OthersRespondent
Before
Employment Judge J EnglandMiss P Mather (instructed by Counsel) for claimantMs R Kight (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 9 January 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The claim of unfair dismissal is dismissed because it was made out of time and the Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction.[2]The claims of discrimination (direct sex discrimination and harassment) are dismissed because they were made out of time and the Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction.
REASONS
Claims
[1]By a claim form dated 29 January 2025 the Claimant brought claims for unfair constructive dismissal and various forms of sex discrimination. The Particulars open by stating, “It is accepted that the Claimant’s claims are out of time”, continuing to then explain why time should be extended under the relevant legislation.[2]The Respondent defended those claims, although with scant detail as to the substance of its defence but emphasising that the claims should be dismissed for being out of time.[3]In terms of case management:a. There was no previous preliminary hearing.b. The hearing notice for this preliminary hearing set out that the question of jurisdiction (time limits) in relation to the discrimination claims would be considered. This included statements that, “The Judge will assume at the preliminary hearing that there was conduct over a period ending with the last alleged act of discrimination. The Judge will consider why the claim was not presented sooner and, in any event, whether it just and equitable to extend time.”.c. By a letter dated 06 January 2026 and in response to correspondence from the Respondent the parties were informed that, subject to the available time, this PH would also consider whether the claim of unfair dismissal was brought in time applying the test at s.112 Employment Rights Act (“ERA”) 1996 as well as a strike out/deposit order application regarding the Third Respondent.d. The letter of 06 January also requested a list of issues from the parties, but none was provided. This was unsurprising in light of the proximity of the hearing.e. The Respondents also made an application for a restricted reporting order by e-mail sent on 31 December 2025.f. At the beginning of the hearing, I explained I would primarily deal with the two time limit issues then other issues for which we had time. In the end, we heard evidence and submissions on the two time limit questions and I heard submissions about the restricted reporting order on the basis that it would be relevant to the production of this judgment. I indicated that a further preliminary hearing would be listed if necessary to deal with any remaining issues. Procedure[4]The papers the Tribunal received were a bundle of 128 pages compiled by the Claimant as well as two ACAS certificates against “Stichd” and from the Respondent 36 pages of Whatsapp messages, ACAS and website print outs, as well as a witness statements from the Claimant.a. As I informed the parties, I focused my reading on those documents that were highlighted in the witness statement or in CROSS EXAMINATION. In the end, this covered nearly all documents in any event.b. References within this judgment in square brackets are to pages of the bundle with a colon indicating a paragraph number. References to two letters followed by a number refers to a paragraph of a witness statement indicated by initials. References in the form [Rx] refer to page ‘x’ of the Whatsapp messages supplied by the Respondent.[5]The Claimant was called to give oral evidence and was cross examined.[6]Submissions:a. The Respondent produced an opening skeleton.b. At the end of the hearing, both Counsel provided oral submissions.c. Both Counsel were extremely helpful in their focused and very competent and persuasive presentation of their respective cases.
Findings of Fact
[7]The parties gave evidence about a number of matters and this judgment will not make findings on all. It is not the Tribunal’s function to record all of the evidence presented and this judgment does not attempt to do so. Although all evidence has been considered, the findings focus on those matters that are material to the issues.[8]At the outset I emphasise that this judgment is made at a preliminary hearing and not one where the full facts and evidence have been presented and considered. In particular, the underlying allegations of sex discrimination have not been determined. It is not my role today to decide if the matters complained about did or did not occur; my role is to decide if the claims were issued out of time or not. I discussed and agreed with both Counsel that my position could not be that the acts of discrimination did occur but that the claimant believed they had occurred.[9]The First Respondent’s businessa. “The First Respondent is a member of the PUMA group and designs and markets clothing products” [66].b. The Second Respondent is employed by the First Respondent as Teamsports Brand Manager, the Third Respondent is employed by the First Respondent as Head of Product.[10]The Claimant’s role a. “The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as Product Management Lead. The Claimant’s role entailed heading up the Product Management Team, which oversees all licensees.” [19][11]The Claimant claims that “in 2022” she started to work more closely with the Second Respondent and claims that the Second Respondent became her “dotted line manager” and “started to display sexual interest towards the Claimant from December 2022” [19]. The Respondents deny that the Second Respondent had any line management responsibility for the Claimant and in the context of what it labels its “skeleton response” does not directly address the allegation of sexual interest beyond a blanket denial of discrimination.[12]A list of acts of alleged discrimination are set out in the Particulars, ranging from the over generous purchase of a gift for Christmas 2022 to declarations of love. There are no ‘physical’ acts alleged. After December 2022 there is a 5 month gap of any incidents to May 2023 and then further alleged incidents (most commonly the sending of messages) culminating in unidentified number of messages sent “from 8 July 2023 onwards” [22].[13]The Claimant also claims “she was being bullied” by the Third Respondent. Again, a list of complaints is made, focusing on critical remarks and a lack of support. Incidents span from November 2022 to 12 September 2023 (6 days prior to resignation). The Respondent has made an un-determined application to strike out these allegations because they claim that they do not show any legal basis for a claim of discrimination.[14]Medical information:a. Understanding the exact medical history in this case has been difficult because the Claimant did not produce her full medical records and her witness statement does not always match the documentary evidence, as discussed below. I appreciate the recording of these details involves sensitive information but it is necessary to record because it is the Claimant’s primary case that she was unable to issue her claim in time because of these points.b. The Claimant “has a diagnosis of anxiety and depression” [76].c. The Claimant’s case as to the impact on her of the above alleged treatment was that in May 2023 she started self-harming by biting herself and reports taking anti-depressants (Sertraline) from June 2023 (her witness statement at AL16 reports this was an increase dosage but the ET1 states this was the first dosage at 29:24). Her prescription for anti-depressants remained until September 2024 [77; 78]. The ET1’s assertion that “In June 2024, the Claimant’s Sertraline was increased to 200mg” [29:28] is not what the evidence shows [77- 78] and in fact shows this medication ceasing at that point and instead a different drug prescribed for worsening symptoms until September.d. In June 2023 the Claimant also commenced acupuncture, which she explains as having “supplemented my antidepressant medication” [AL17], which I accept. Appointment records show appointments approximately every 3 weeks from June to September 2023. Her witness statement [AL17] states that she continues to receive acupuncture, which I accept, although note no further evidence or timescale of frequency is provided.e. On 11 August 2023 the Claimant was prescribed anti-anxiety medication as a one-off, lasting approximately one month [29:25, 78]f. “On or around 30 August 2023, the Claimant’s self-harming took a step up from biting to cutting” [29:26]. This, thankfully, appears to have been a one off incident according to the witness statement and I accept it occurred as there is no contrary evidence. No further self harm is reported.g. The Claimant did not miss any days of work due to sickness/ill health related to the impact on her of the alleged treatment. She worked her 2 month notice period in full.[15]The parties differ as to the date of resignation and end of contract:a. “On 18 September 2023, the Claimant handed in her notice, with her last day of employment being 17 November 2023” [ET1 at 28].b. “The Claimant resigned from her role on 20 September 2023 with her employment terminating on 19 November 2023” [ET3 at 66:20]c. I flagged this issue but neither party addressed me on it. The precise date is immaterial to my calculation give how far out of time the claims are but it appears the Claimant is most likely correct given the ET3 also states, “The Claimant resigned with effect from 17 November 2023” [63:3].[16]The Respondent produced the trail of whatsapp messages between the Claimant and the Second Respondent that followed the end of her employment. They begin on 24 November 2023 with a message from the Claimant and as they continue there are frequent instances of the Claimant instigating the contact. The messages remain constant until mid September 2024 and then a one off exchange about the Claimant’s DSAR in December 2024.[17]From approximately the end of January 2024 to mid April 2024 the Claimant went travelling around South East Asia. The messages between the Claimant and the Second Respondent continued throughout this time, again with the Claimant frequently instigating conversation despite the vast geographical and time difference.[18]As outlined across the WhatsApp messages, the Claimant’s witness statement and documents [section E], the Claimant was applying for various jobs from late April 2024 [18]. As demonstrated in the Second Respondent by comparing the WhatsApp messages, there were many more jobs the Claimant applied for than she accounts for in her witness statement, which she accepted.[19]On 16 October 2024, the Claimant entered employment on a freelance basis as Brand Consultant at IAG Loyalty Retail, working two days a week with her friend’s company [AL119]. A document filed late by the Respondent on 06/01/26 shows that the Claimant registered a company in her name 2 days prior.[20]“[the Claimant] began working with a life coach on 30 October 2024, as shown at pages 87-89” [AL121].[21]Two initial ACAS EC certificates were obtained for the period 28/10/24 – 29/10/24 [documents filed late by email on 06/01/26]. These were against “Stichd” at two different addresses and not now parties to these proceedings.[22]On 04 November 2024, the Claimant submitted a Subject Access Request to the Respondent, seeking various documentation, including in relation to the two named Respondents [101]. She was advised to do so by the friend with whom she worked [cross examination].[23]Around 17 December 2024, the Claimant contacted her solicitor about the current legal claims. [102] shows confirmation of payment and assurance to “start the drafting” on 20 December 2024 [102] and in cross examination the Claimant explained that she would have first spoken with the solicitor around 17 December 2024.[24]The ACAS Early Conciliation process with the named Respondents occurred on 14-20 January 2025 [1-2] and with the First Respondent on 22- 27 January [3].[25]On 29 January 2025, the ET1 (claim form) was issued [4-35], identifying claims of unfair constructive dismissal, direct discrimination and harassment (both on the grounds of sex).
The Law
[26]The law in this matter is well rehearsed and the parties were in agreement that it was set out correctly in the Respondents’ opening skeleton. I have copied where relevant below as well as added some of the general applicable principles, some of which were raised in oral closing submissions.[27]The burden for proving the claims are in time is on the Claimant [Marks & Spencer v Williams-Ryan [2005] IRLR 562].[28]Unfair dismissal:a. The relevant statutory provision is s.111(2) ERA 1996.b. The classic explanation of what ‘reasonably practicable’ means is that of May LJ in Palmer and Saunders v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119, who equated the test with “was it reasonably feasible” [particularly paras. 34 and 35]. This was further considered in Asda Stores Ltd v Kauser UKEAT/0165/07.c. Marks & Spencer v Williams-Ryan [2005] IRLR 562 highlighted the need to apply “a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee.”, as well as consider “not merely what the employee knew, but what knowledge the employee should have had had he or she acted reasonably in all the circumstances.”d. Cullinane v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Limited UKEAT/0537/10 (10 April 2011) provides useful analysis from Underhill J about the question of whether a further period is reasonable.[29]Discrimination complaints:a. As is pointed out in the Respondents’ opening skeleton, the test of what is just and equitable is very broad.b. §37 of the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23: “The best approach for a tribunal in considering the exercise of discretion under s.123(1)(b) is to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time, including in particular… “the length of and reasons for the delay””.c. The tribunal does not need to be satisfied there was a good reason for the delay (Abertawe Bro Morgannwy University Local Health Board v Morgan [2018] IRLR 1050 at §26) – what matters is that the tribunal weighs all relevant factors and does not automatically reject an application where no (good) reason is given or established.d. The balance of prejudice is “customarily” relevant but not determinative (Miller v Ministry of Justice UKEAT 0003/15 at §12/13).
Conclusions
[30]The following section addresses the Tribunal’s conclusions on the issues and makes further findings of fact where necessary. The length of the delay:[31]The starting point is that the delay to issuing proceedings is very lengthy. The deadline to contact ACAS, assuming as I do that there was a series of acts culminating in a discriminatory dismissal and applying the Claimant’s case on her last date of employment, would have been 16 February 2024. She therefore contacted ACAS and instigated her claim about 11 months late. This is, in my view, a lengthy period of time. The reason for the delay:[32]The claimant relies upon the effect on her mental health of what she had allegedly experienced as the cause of why she was unable to have issued a claim in time. I therefore consider the evidence as to what she was experiencing during the relevant time and the impact on her mental health.[33]Concerns about the Claimant’s evidence:a. As an overarching point relevant to the analysis of various issues and evidence outlined below, I had concerns about the accuracy of some aspects of the Claimant’s witness statement in terms of how accurately it reflected the documentary evidence and her answers in cross examination, as well as the evidence produced by the Claimant in the main bundle. In general terms the Claimant’s witness statement at times had the effect of describing various matters, including the impact on her, as different/more significant than they were, and the bundle was limited in what was provided.b. This was very ably demonstrated in cross examination and by way of example: i. The Claimant had produced extracts of WhatsApp messages but the full context was only shown by the full trail produced by the Respondent in response. The Claimant’s witness statement did not discuss these messages other than by reference to the handful of extracts in the Claimant’s bundle. ii. AL56-57, for example, provides the first mention of any messages and states, “Despite being out of employment with the Respondent for over a month, [the Second Respondent] instigated a conversation with me via WhatsApp over the Christmas period, asking whether I had any plans for New Year’s Eve... I wanted to put my employment with the Respondent in the past, and I was looking forward to a fresh start in the New Year.”, going on to explain how these messages “set me back”, Christmas “felt like a blur” and the Claimant during this period had to be encouraged to undertake her travelling plans. iii. In reality, there had been messages between the two since the Claimant left, starting and repeating often at the Claimant’s instigation, the exchange about New Year’s Eve occurred in circumstances in which the last message was on 22 December, then on 27 December the Claimant sent the Second Respondent a photo and Christmas greetings, the Second Respondent then replied the next day discussing football and asking if the Claimant had any plans for New Year’s Eve [R6]. The messages continue in friendly terms for months and, as above, the Claimant’s travelling plans had been at least considered since at least September and she had been looking forward to going away, as she explained to the Second Respondent in messages [R4]. iv. As another example, AL54 records, “On 1 December 2023, my sister was worried for my safety as I was living on my own and I moved into her family home, so I had a support network around me”. In cross examination it was clarified that the Claimant did not live on her own but, in her words, “with friends” and the move to her sister’s house had been planned in advance. The Claimant denied that the absence of an income and her travel plans for January 2024, were factors to moving in with her sister, but given the coincidence of these events, her explanation in cross examination that her travel plans had been in place since at least September 2023 and my concerns about the witness statement, I reject this evidence. v. Similarly, AL61 records, “During the trip, the physical and emotional distance from the source of my poor mental health gave me an uninterrupted time of reflection on my entire experience when being employed by the Respondent”. This is again totally at odds with the frequent communication from the Claimant to the Respondent when she was travelling, including photos sent from the airport [R10], offers to ‘have a call’ with the Second Respondent [R12] and openness to working again at the First Respondent “potentially reporting to [the Second Respondent]” [R16]. vi. When asked about the apparent contradictions, the Claimant’s answers were unconvincing. Her explanation emphasised, ‘trauma takes a long time to process, a lot of processing and it takes time to happen’, but there was no support for this as an explanation other than her assertion (including any medical evidence that she had suffered ‘trauma’) and moreover, this does not explain why the witness statement paints such a different picture to what I have found above did occur.c. I am far from finding that the witness statement is ‘a lie’ but the reality is the weight I can place on it as a whole and particularly its various un-supported statements is greatly diminished by the various examples of disconnect between what is presented as the impact on the Claimant and what appears to have actually happened. In overstating matters, the Claimant’s evidence has been undermined. I do not know how the witness statement was compiled and to what extent the Claimant herself drafted her witness statement rather than with other input.[34]Medical Evidence:a. Again as an overarching point, the medical evidence provided by the Claimant was lacking in depth, particularly in the context that the Claimant’s case was that due to a mental health issues she could not issue a claim for about 16 months after her decision to resign.b. When asked by myself at the end of her evidence, the Claimant said that she had received her full medical records only last week but did not pass them to her solicitor because she considered she was out of time. No application to rely upon this information had therefore ever been made.c. As above, I accept that the Claimant had a diagnosis of anxiety and depression and I accept that this would cause some difficulty in instigating a claim than without. The suggestion of “trauma” made by the Claimant is not supported by any medical evidence however and the main medical insight into the Claimant’s health is from two short GP letters, the second one having been obtained due to the insufficiency of the first [76-77], as explained to me by the Claimant in evidence. There are no reports, letters or any other document explaining the Claimant’s symptoms, impact upon her or ability to instigate a claim from any other medical practitioner. I accept she was having regular treatment in the form of acupuncture and psychotherapy but beyond that bare information I have no substantive further information relevant to the issues.d. The Claimant has never been signed off work due to her mental health since the alleged discriminatory conduct and she served the entirety of her notice.e. It was put to the Claimant in cross examination that there was no ‘medical evidence to support that your mental health stopped you from pursuing a claim’ and she answered, that, ‘it demonstrates that I was being treated for depression and anxiety’. As the Claimant then agreed, there is a ‘distinction of being treated for depression and anxiety and being prevented from being able to issue a claim’. I agree with this sensible concession by the Claimant and consider that as a whole the medical evidence shows the Claimant was being treated for depression and anxiety but does not support a suggestion that she was unable to issue a claim, particularly in light of everything else she was able to undertake at the relevant time.[35]What the Claimant was doing at the relevant time:a. In considering what the Claimant was doing other than starting ACAS EC and/or issuing a claim I of course accept the point made on the Claimant’s behalf in closing submissions that the activities are not the same as those she needed to do in order to issue a claim in time. Nevertheless, I consider them relevant because they paint a picture about what she was able to do and her general functioning.b. Travelling: the Claimant organised and then undertook a trip around Southeast Asia between January and April 2024. AL62 explains, “For the first time, I was able to open up to strangers, who had become friends during this trip, about what had happened over this past year”.c. Mitigation of loss: the Claimant made many attempts at securing an alternative job once she had returned from travelling. Again, her witness statement only provides a partial picture because she accepted in cross examination that there were other jobs applied for that were not discussed in the witness statement, only partial email chains had been included or un-evidenced statements [AL112, AL114-115] and the repeated statements about not feeling comfortable working with males was undermined by having met or spoken with various males alone and the reasons for employment not being realised did not match what the Claimant presented [for example AL106 vs p.116]. the Claimant incorporated her own company on 14 October 2024 in order to conduct work.d. Contact with the Second Respondent: as above, the Claimant engaged in frequent friendly ‘chat’ with the Second Respondent, often instigated by the Claimant first and including about the possibility of working with him again and raising issues overlapping with her claim about “you and me” directly to him in May 2022 [R23].e. Steps towards litigation: i. The Claimant contacted ACAS first at the end of October 2024; late but still 3 months prior to her later contact that started this claim. The Claimant denied she had intended to start a claim in October 2024 but had been advised by her friend to get on record that she had a complaint in case others complained in future. Even if this is correct, on her own account therefore, she was able to and had near enough done all she needed to do by this point in order to start the claim process. ii. In early November 2024, the Claimant made a formal DSAR requesting documentation relevant to the claims now pursued [98-101]. iii. By around 17 December 2024, the Claimant had contacted solicitors. Although I accept the Christmas period accounts for some delay, I am nevertheless surprised that after such a long delay, it still took until the end of January to finally issue the claim.f. Conclusion: again, accepting that issuing a claim takes a degree of mental strength to have to put in writing and/or articulate unpleasant experiences that the Claimant believed occurred, and that is a different exercise to those activities outlined above, I nevertheless consider that the evidence does not suggest the Claimant was so overwhelmed by mental health struggles that she was unable to have contacted ACAS and started a claim earlier than she did. The above activities demonstrate a heavy amount of ‘administrative’ work, engagement with the Second Respondent and that the Claimant was largely functioning well. Impact on the fairness of trial/balance of prejudice:[36]If I find that all claims are out of time then the Claimant will have lost her opportunity to bring these claims and I further accept they involve serious matters relating to forms of discrimination and the reason she left a job that she loved.[37]A trial is already listed for June 2027, although I did not gauge with the parties whether this listing is suitable in terms of availability and length. Assuming it is, it will require a trial of events from at least 4.5 years ago. This will inevitably affect the accuracy and ease of memory recall, which is particularly important about the verbal conversations alleged, and potentially some documentary retention. This prejudice for the Respondent is made worse because there was no complaint at the time of the relevant events and indeed the first that the respondent appears to have known of any such complaint was January 2024. I accept the point made by the Respondents’ skeleton that, “recall of highly relevant conversations not covered by WhatsApp messages and their context will be affected to some extent by the passage of time and the re-reading of subsequent messages”. Conclusion:[38]Unfair Dismissal:a. I do not accept that it was not reasonably practicable to have issued a claim in time during the primary time limit. For me, the evidence simply does not demonstrate it was not feasible for the Claimant to have issued a claim, even accepting it would have been made more difficult because of her mental health issues. The effect of disablement on the Claimant does not support this argument.b. As discussed in closing submissions, I had considered on a ‘best case scenario’ that it might be argued the Claimant was unable to issue a claim until around October 2024, coinciding with the ceasing of medication and more active steps taken towards litigation, outlined above. I do not accept the evidence shows this inability but even if it did, given how long had passed since the primary deadline expired, I do not consider that the claim was issued in a reasonable period thereafter and therefore this argument would not succeed in any event.[39]Discrimination complaints:a. For the reasons outlined above and even applying the much broader discretion I have regarding the Equality Act test, I do not think it is just and equitable to extent the time limit for the very lengthy time needed in order to bring these claims in time. Again, I simply do not think the evidence presents a persuasive argument that the Claimant was unable to issue a claim until so much later, nor in all the circumstances do I think it is just and equitable to allow an extra 11 months to the primary time limit.b. I accept my conclusion means that the Claimant will have lost her opportunity to have her claims about serious matters examined in a Tribunal but the deadlines are those set by Parliament and the legal tests do not in my view allow me to stretch the rules to the amount needed here. Restricted Reporting Order[40]By an email dated 31/12/25, the Respondents made a Restricted Reporting Application to prevent publication of the Second Respondent’s identity. The application argued that his Article 8 rights were engaged and, “The Second Respondent is innocent until proven guilty and, as determined in the case of A and Anor v X and ors (No 1) 2019 IRLR 620 the alleged preparator of any allegations of sexual misconduct, is entitled to protection as being a "person affected by the allegations" under s.11 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. It is submitted that the unproven allegations against him are of such a nature that they would damage his reputation both inside and outside of work and would materially impact upon his family life”. The opening skeleton and closing submissions reflected further these points and I have considered them in full.[41]Rule 49(1) provides power that: “the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, make an order with a view to preventing or restricting the public disclosure of any aspect of proceedings so far as it considers necessary in the interests of justice or in order to protect the Convention rights of any person.”. 42. r.49(2) reminds the Tribunal of the importance of open justice and I bear this in mind as the fundamental starting point. This has been emphasised in various cases, including by Simler J (as she was) in Fallows v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] ICR 801.[43]The importance of the common law principle of open justice was also emphasised and explained in Global Torch Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 2993, paras 13—14. Reference was made by Maurice Kay LJ to R v Legal Aid Board, Ex p Kaim Todner [1999] QB 966, 977 and Lord Woolf MR’s holding that the object of securing that justice is administered impartially, fairly and in a way that maintains public confidence is put in jeopardy if secrecy is ordered. Lord Woolf MR identified the ends served by open justice as follows: It is necessary because the public nature of the proceedings deters inappropriate behaviour on the part of the court. It also maintains the public’s confidence in the administration of justice. It enables the public to know that justice is being administered impartially. It can result in evidence becoming available which would not become available if the proceedings were conducted behind closed doors or with one or more of the parties or witnesses identity concealed. It makes uninformed and inaccurate comment about the proceedings less likely... Any interference with the public nature of court proceedings is therefore to be avoided unless justice requires it.[44]In BBC v Rolden [2015] IRLR 267 Simler J said: The proper approach for a tribunal to take was considered in particular at [41] and [48]-[50] of Fallows from which the following principles can be drawn: a.The power to grant RROs is not limited to the circumstances set out in ss. 11-12 of the ETA 1996. The Tribunal has a power to make an order in any case where it is necessary to do so to protect Convention rights or the administration of justice, and such orders may extend after judgment is given, and so may permanently restrict reporting information about the proceedings ([41]). b.The burden of establishing any derogation from the principle of open justice falls on the applicant and must be established by clear and cogent evidence ([48](i)). c. Where the Tribunal is satisfied that Article 8 is engaged on the facts of a particular case, it must conduct a balancing exercise, weighing the strength of that right against the correspondence rights of the press and public to impart and receive information about the proceedings [49].[45]I accept the summary from the skeleton, “The tribunal must first identify whether without a RRO there would be interference with a Convention right. If so, the tribunal must then conduct a balancing exercise between the principle of open justice enshrined in Article 6 ECHR and to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR against R2’s right to private life pursuant to Article 8 ECHR (see Clifford v Millicom Services UK Ltd [2023] EWCA 50)”.[46]I decline to make a restricted reporting order in this case:a. As above, my starting point is the importance of open justice and only granting such an order when “required” by justice.b. Applying the dicta of Rolden that the need for such restriction “must be established by clear and cogent evidence” and a point emphasised by the Claimant in closing submissions, there is a lack of evidence here provided. I accept there is potential for interference for the Second Respondent’s home and family life but no evidence at all has been produced, such as to demonstrate the effect on art.8 or even basics such as the ages of any children involved.c. The summary point made by the Claimant’s Counsel that, ‘the application made is unspecific and could be made in any case, there is nothing exceptional that would not apply to ever allegation of this kind, it is simply not sufficient info to support a derogation of open transparency’, is correct and persuasive.d. A further important point made in submissions was a criticism of the vagueness of the Respondents’ defence. They have chosen not to address the specifics of the allegations for seemingly tactical reasons but whatever the cause it means that I do not know what is the substance of the defence. Restricting open justice when it may be that much of the factual allegations are accepted, for example, seems perverse.e. Again, the Claimant’s submissions rightly pointed out, ‘there are no allegations of physical, sexual conduct, this mostly focuses on interaction and communications between parties, no intimacy of physical actions as is seen in other cases’. That is correct and again part of the balance in terms of potential harm caused to any art.8 rights.[47]Balancing up the various factors, I do not consider that the potential effect on the Second Respondent in terms of his Article 8 or any other rights outweighs other fundamental principles, in particular of Open Justice and Articles 6 and 10. Approved by: