Mr A Borisov v American International Group UK Ltd: 6002954/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6002954/2024
Between
Mr A BorisovClaimantAmerican International Group UK LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge NicolleIn person for claimantMs L Banerjee (instructed by counsel.) for respondentDate 12 September 2025
REASONS
[2]Oral reasons were given to the parties. Either party may request written reasons within 14 days of this judgment being sent to them. Claimant: Mr A Borisov Respondent: American International Group UK Limited FULL MERITS HEARING AT LONDON CENTRAL Heard on 12 September 2025 by CVP Before: Employment Judge Nicolle For the Claimant: in person. For the Respondent: Ms L Banerjee of counsel.[1]The entirety of the claim is struck out under Rule 38 (1) (b) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 on the ground that the manner in which the Claimant has conducted the proceedings has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious.[2]Oral reasons were given to the parties. The shortform judgment was sent to the parties on 17 September 2025 and the Claimant requested written reasons on 1 October 2025. These are set out below.
The Hearing
[3]The case had been listed for a full merits hearing and in the absence of available non-legal members I sat as a judge alone. The first day of the hearing was converted to CVP given the tube strike. The Claimant produced a 2 page witness statement and the Respondent had witness statements from Andrew Baynes, Global Head of Business Platform Development for Credit Lines, Mary Duffy, Global Head of Mergers and Acquisitions and Nina Sangha, Head of Employee Relations. There was a 508 page bundle of documents[4]For context I consider it appropriate to incorporate the written reasons which were previously sent to the parties on the evening of 11 September 2025 in respect of my earlier oral ruling refusing the Claimant’s application for witness orders, my oral reasons for my refusal of his application for me to recuse myself and for permission to record and publicise the proceedings. I consider it necessary to incorporate these rulings within the strikeout judgment as it is necessary context for the Claimant’s subsequent conduct which culminated in his claim being struck out. Ruling on the Claimant’s application for witness orders made on 11 September 2025[5]The Claimant’s application for witness orders compelling the attendance of 3 individuals employed by the Respondent was refused and oral reasons were given. As the Claimant was unwilling to accept the ruling I had made I advised him that he would have the ability to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and that I would provide my written reasons prior to the re-commencement of the hearing at 10 AM on 12 September 2025. Given the Claimant’s repeated assertion that notwithstanding my initial informal explanation as to circumstances in which witness orders will be granted, and my formal oral ruling, that he did not understand the basis upon which his application had been refused I have endeavoured to provide a slightly fuller explanation than in my oral ruling but substantively it remains unaltered. Reasons for refusing the claimant’s application for witness orders[6]At the opening of the hearing, the Claimant gave notice of his wish to call 3 potential witnesses. He said that he considered the process was inherently unfair whereby the Respondent had 3 witnesses and he did not have any. I provided an informal general indication that it would be very unusual for a Tribunal or any other judicial body to make witness orders on the opening day of the hearing. The Claimant’s view was that that this position was absurd. The potential witnesses[7]I gave the Claimant the opportunity to say why he considered certain individuals should be required to attend. He identified the following individuals:• Marianthi Stylianou, the Assistant General Counsel for EMEA Commercial Lines (Ms Stylianou). He says that her evidence is relevant as she conducted the initial investigation and raised various concerns regarding his conduct.• Paul Greensmith, Head of Global Speciality, (Mr Greensmith) and the overall head of the area in which he worked.• Helena Gibson, (Ms Gibson) who the Claimant worked with and whom he says would be able to rebut the contention that he behaved inappropriately and refused to comply with reasonable orders. The Respondent’s position[8]The Respondent’s position is that the Claimant would have been familiar with the process for obtaining witness orders. Ms Banerjee referred to a previous Tribunal process which the Claimant had been involved in, and whilst she correctly acknowledges that it does not have any binding impact on my conduct of this case, that it evidences that the Claimant had previous experience of witness applications. She referred to the fact that on day 3, he had requested witness orders for 30 individuals, and when that application was refused made a revised application for 5 witness orders, which was again refused.[9]She says that the case management order following the case management hearing before EJ Akhtar on 18 September 2024 clearly envisaged that any witnesses would have witness statements and these would be exchanged in advance.[10]Further, she says that the claim is based on the purported protected disclosures having been made to Mr Andrew Baynes, Global Head of Business Platform Development for the Respondent’s Credit Lines Business and in whose name a witness statement has been submitted. She says that the detriments relied on concern the alleged actions of Ms Mary Duffy, Global Head of Mergers and Acquisitions. She says that there is no obvious basis upon which the witnesses identified by the Claimant would be relevant and necessary to the hearing of the case.[11]Further, she says that the timing is such that it would in effect be impracticable for witness orders to be granted. She says that they are serious orders containing penal sanctions for non-compliance and subject to appropriate notice being provided of the hearing dates.[12]She indicated that if witness orders were to be granted, and the current hearing thereby not be effective, that the Respondent would be likely to make an application for its wasted costs. Presidential Guidance on General Case Management for England and Wales[13]For completeness I refer to relevant to revisions in the presidential guidance regarding witness orders. i. The Tribunal may order any person in Great Britain to attend a hearing to give evidence, produce documents or produce information (Rule 34 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024). ii. If a party believes that a person has relevant information or evidence to give, but that they might not attend the hearing voluntarily, that party can apply to the Tribunal for a witness order. A witness order requires the witness to attend the hearing. It can also be useful where the witness is willing to attend, but their employer will not release them to attend. iii. An application for a witness order may be made at a hearing or by an application in writing to the Tribunal. In order that the Tribunal can send the witness order to the witness in good time before the hearing, it is important to make any application as early as possible. A witness order might be refused if the attendance of the witness cannot be ensured in time. iv. The application will need to give the name and address of the witness; a summary of the evidence it is believed they will give (or a copy of their witness statement, if there is one); and an explanation as to why a witness order is necessary to secure their attendance. My decision[14]My decision is that it would be inappropriate in the circumstances to grant witness orders. I reach this decision for the following reasons.[15]First, it is exceptionally late in the process for such an application to be made. I take account of the fact that the Claimant is a litigant in person. Nevertheless, it is relevant that he has previous experience of a similar application being made in the course of a hearing and being refused. The Claimant confirmed that he had not approached these individuals, whether directly or indirectly via the Respondent’s solicitors, to ask if they would voluntarily attend as witnesses. Further, he did not raise the possibility of a witness orders at the case management hearing on 18 September 2024 or in correspondence with the Tribunal. He indicated that these individuals effectively came to his attention in his review of the Respondents’ witness statements in advance of today's hearing.[16]There is a very serious risk in the circumstances that if witness orders were to be granted that the hearing could be derailed and may need to be postponed.[17]I had previously explained to the Claimant but was there is no property in witnesses. These individuals would in all probability be hostile witnesses as far as he was concerned. It is at the Respondent’s prerogative, as is the case with any party in Tribunal proceedings, as to which individuals they wish to call. The Respondent may well have considered calling Ms Stylianou as a potentially relevant witness given her involvement. They may, but perhaps less obviously, have also considered calling Mr Greensmith. It is however their prerogative if they consider that only 3 witnesses are necessary to the issues to be determined. It is not a situation where a Claimant in those certain circumstances can say that he thinks the Respondent ought to have called these individuals as additional witnesses because I would like to put questions to them. Nor, as the Claimant asserts, is it a case of the Tribunal in effect levelling the playing field as to the number of witnesses. These are not proper for a witness order being granted.[18]I need to consider whether in the circumstances identified a witness order would be reasonable and necessary for the determination of the issues the Tribunal needs to decide. Witness orders are normally only granted where a witness would not otherwise be released by his or her employer. This position is unknown as the Claimant has not made any approach to the individuals he has identified. Whilst it is not necessary for an applicant to show that the intended witness blatantly refuses to attend voluntarily the applicant should always request attendance of the witness on a voluntary basis before applying for an order. If the witness refuses or equivocates, or simply does not reply and thereby leaves the applicant in doubt as to whether the individual will attend as a witness in the absence of an order, then an order may be appropriate subject to considerations of the relevance of the evidence they would give. A witness order may also be appropriate where, although the witness will attend voluntarily, it would be easier and less embarrassing for him or her to be subject to an order compelling attendance. This may be the case, for example, where the witness who is been called by the applicant is an employee of the Respondent. I take account as a relevant factor in refusing the application that the Claimant has not made any such approach and therefore there is no evidence as to what position the potential individual witnesses and the Respondent would have taken as to their attendance.[19]I also consider it relevant that the individuals identified by the Claimant, with the possible exception of Ms Gibson, and it is not known what her involvement and stance would be were she to give evidence, would be likely to be hostile to him. I consider that it would be extremely unusual for a employment judge to grant an order compelling the attendance of a self-evidently hostile witness such as Ms Stylianou and in all probability Mr Greensmith. In circumstances where witnesses are hostile a Claimant would not be able to cross examine them.[20]Ultimately my primary reason for rejecting the application for witness orders is that it is too late. Regardless of the specifics of the individuals identified a situation where witness orders are applied for and granted during the hearing would run counter to the overriding objective and the fair administration of justice. Further, I take account of the seriousness of witness orders particularly with the penal sanction contained in them for non-compliance. However, even had the application been made earlier I you are do not consider that the Claimant would have satisfied the criteria pursuant to which a Tribunal would consider that the exercise of its case management discretion to grant witness orders would be appropriate had been satisfied. The Claimant’s allegations regarding the hearing[21]On the afternoon of 11 September 2025 the Claimant made a series of concerning comments regarding the process. These comments being in response to my judicial determination to refuse his application for witness orders. This is not verbatim but it is a summary of the key accusations he made from my notes and should be seen in the context of his dissatisfaction with my refusal to grant his application for witness orders. He comments included:• it is not a fair process;• it is a circus;• it is an absurdity;• he does not trust the judge;• the process is skewed;• what is this nonsense; and• he made reference to a “lie” but did not specify exactly what or who was lying but I interpreted it as an allegation pertaining to me. The Claimant’s consumption of food during the hearing[22]On the afternoon of 11 September 2025 after I had refused the Claimant’s application for witness orders he very visibly and blatantly started to consume a meal during the hearing. This was despite the standard protocol given by a Tribunal clerk before a CVP hearing that there should be no drinking or eating during the hearing save for a glass of water. I would have been prepared to take a reasonably indulgent approach had the Claimant been consuming a cup of coffee or a bar of chocolate but he was eating a meal and when I asked him to desist he continued to eat in a very visible manner. It was a flagrant show of disrespect and a refusal to comply with my reasonable request for him to desist. He went on to say: “Why should I trust the process, why should I trust the judge”. Adjournment of the hearing at approximately 3:15 PM on 11 September 2025[23]Given the above situation and the serious contentions which the Claimant had made I considered it beneficial to adjourn earlier than normal so I could provide parties with written reasons for the refusal of the Claimant’s application for witness orders that evening but primarily so that the Claimant could reflect and hopefully calm down so that the hearing could proceed. I had given him warnings regarding his conduct and that if it persisted that I may reach a situation where it would be appropriate to consider the striking out of his claim. The second day of the hearing[24]I decided that given the way the Claimant had been conducting himself it would be more appropriate for the hearing to take place by CVP the following day and we could review that position later that day depending on how matters proceeded. We resumed at 10am on Friday 12 September 2025. The Claimant continued to make serious assertions regarding the integrity of the process and by implication my integrity as the judge. He said words to the effect of: “I know what is going on, I do not trust the Court, makes decisions without reasons, it’s a sham, and you want me to show respect for the process, not a truthful fair process, not right and not fair”. The Claimant’s application for my recusal/a change of judge made on 12 September 2025[25]On the morning of 12 September 2025 the Claimant made an application for my recusal and I gave an oral reason refusing this[26]The Claimant’s application was predicated on his belief that the ruling I had given the previous day refusing his application for witness orders did not make sense. He does not consider that any proper reasons have been given for that refusal. It is however relevant that I took the unusual step of providing written reasons for that refusal and it is not the case that no reasons were given. It is not my intention to set those reasons out in detail as the document is self-explanatory. In summary those reasons included those are set out below. Further explanation for the Claimant’s benefit of the reasons previously given for the refusal of his application for witness orders[27]Whilst I consider this to have been unnecessary, and repetitious of the written reasons given as above, it is included as it formed part of the oral ruling.[28]The Claimant had not approached any of his potential witnesses to ascertain whether they would voluntarily attend as witnesses on his behalf. That is particularly significant as that was one of the factors taken into account by a previous tribunal under case number 2201914/2019 when Employment Judge Burns set that out in the reserved liability decision is application for witness orders at paragraph 23.[29]The witnesses were unlikely to be relevant and necessary for the issues to be determined.[30]It was the Respondent’s prerogative as to which witnesses they chose to call.[31]The Claimant had not set out in an application why he considers those witnesses would be relevant and necessary.[32]I made reference to the Presidential Guidance on seeking witness orders which makes it very clear that applications should be in good time, and that a written application seeking the voluntary attendance of those individuals as witnesses should first be made.[33]At least 2 of the proposed witnesses would almost certainly be hostile to the Claimant. Whilst not impossible it would be unusual in those circumstances for a witness order to be made compelling their attendance.[34]Finally, and perhaps the most significant factor, the application for this was made very late given that there had been no attempt to make contact with the potential witnesses and the procedure for making an application for witness orders as set out in the Presidential Guidance had not been complied with.[35]There would be a very real risk that the effective timetabling of the hearing would be compromised and it may need to be postponed if the requested witness orders were to be granted.[36]I also made reference to the serious nature of witness orders with the penal sanction for non-attendance. It was therefore necessary for adequate notice to be given of the hearing date.[37]As such it is self-evidently not the case that the Claimant has not been given reasons. He contends that my written reason, which he says he looked at briefly, are four pages of irrelevant information He may, of course, not accept those reasons and I have explained to the Claimant that if he disputes the legal basis upon which I reached that determination it is at his discretion to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.[38]I had gone to unusually exhaustive efforts to explain the reasons for the refusal of the Claimant’s application for witness orders given his repeated assertion that he did not understand the reasons why his application had been refused. It was relevant that he had made a similar application during a in hearing 2021 (case number 2201914/2019) before Employment Judge Burns (the 2021 Hearing). She referred to his applications for witness orders having been refused in paragraphs 22 and 23 of her reserved judgment and that it had been made clear to the Claimant that he needed to contact the individuals and ask them if they would be willing to give evidence voluntarily before the Tribunal would give further consideration to any fresh application. No further applications were made. That is one of the significant factors I took into account in deciding that it would be inappropriate to grant witness orders. My decision on the Claimant’s recusal application[39]It would only be in the most exceptional circumstance, typically where it becomes apparent that a judge may have a potential conflict, whether real or perceived, that the threshold as set out in cases such as Porter v Magill [2001) UK HL 67 will be met in that there is a risk of bias, or the appearance of bias, in the conduct of the proceedings. It is not the case that any party in litigation who disagrees with, or dislikes any determination made, has the ability to change the judge. If that were the case justice would be untenable as every party could raise objection to any judge where a decision was made against them and that would be a potentially non-ending process. It would almost invariably result in the case being postponed and there would be significant prejudice to the Respondent with wasted costs. Further, there would be an inevitable risk at a subsequent hearing the same situation would arise. That would be an untenable situation and is not how the judicial system operate. Further, it would inevitably have enormous cost implications and delay the administration of justice which given the volume of outstanding tribunal complaints will be wholly disproportionate and inconsistent with the overriding objective. In any event I do not consider that there is any basis whatsoever for me to recuse myself and that application is therefore refused. The Claimant’s application for permission to record and publish the proceedings[40]In support of his application to record and publicise the proceedings he contended that the hearing was not fair and, again referring to my refusal of his application for witness orders that there was a perversion of justice. In effect the implication being that I as the judge was guilty of a criminal offence of perverting the course of justice.[41]Prior to giving my oral on his application to record the hearing I asked the Claimant whether he was recording the proceedings. My reason for asking him was that there had been a previous incident in other proceedings where he had covertly recorded proceedings. He refused to answer the question and responded by saying words to the effect of: “You refused to answer my questions I am not going to answer yours”. This was a further incident of concerning and disrespectful conduct.[42]The Claimant is fully aware that it is a contempt of court to record proceedings. There is a recording taking place on the tribunal’s recording system. He says that a “crime” is taking place in front of his eyes. When I asked him to expand on that he says the proceedings are not fair in relation to the refusal to grant the witness orders he applied for the previous day. He referred to perverting justice. This is a serious allegation because in effect what the Claimant is asserting is that I as the judge conducting the proceedings are perverting the course of justice.[43]The Claimant dislikes a ruling I have made and on this basis wanted me to recuse myself and to permit recording and publicity of the proceedings. That is a concerning situation given the previous history which has been drawn to my attention, to include significant material which the Claimant provided to the Respondent and which is a referred to in one of the Respondent’s witness statements, when the Claimant presented various documents to the Respondent (pages 172-185 in the bundle) which in part concern a previous incident of the Claimant covertly recording tribunal proceedings. My decision[44]The application is refused. There is no legitimate basis for the private recording of the proceedings. Members of the public, and there is a journalist in attendance, are not entitled to record the proceedings. The Respondent’s application to strike out the entirety of the claim given the manner in which the Claimant has conducted the proceedings[45]We adjourned at 10:45 and at 11:00 Ms Banerjee made an application for the strike out of the entirety of the claim. She had earlier that day submitted to the Tribunal and the Claimant a note of relevant case law on strike out. My decision as given orally to the parties[46]This is a ruling in an application made by the Respondent at 11 AM on 12 September 2025 for the striking out of the entirety of the claim pursuant to Rule 38 (1) (b) on the grounds that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by the Claimant has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious. Background and the Claimant’s conduct of the hearing[47]I will start by providing a summary of the background and relevant factors in this hearing. For completeness and chronological consistency this should be read in conjunction with the above summary of the applications made by the Claimant during the hearing, my decisions and summary of his conduct.[48]The case commenced on Thursday 11 September 2025. I spent the morning reading the witness statements, pleadings and other relevant documents. The actual hearing commenced by CVP at 2pm that afternoon with the expectation that the Claimant would give evidence first given the burden of proof. That did not take place. What happened is that the Claimant made an application for witness orders in relation to three named employees of the Respondent. I refused the application and gave an oral ruling as to the grounds of such refusal. I took the unusual step, given the Claimant’s repeated assertions that he did not understand the grounds upon which the application had been refused, to provide written reasons for that ruling which were sent to the Claimant by the Tribunal administrative staff at about 6pm on 11 September 2025. Nevertheless on the morning of 12 September 2025 are the Claimant continued to assert he did not understand the reason for the refusal of his
The Law
[49]Rule 38 (1) (b) provides: 1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a)… (b)that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious.[50]The authorities establish a three stage test in considering strike out of a claim. A summary of the approach to take was given by Elias LJ in the Court of Appeal in Abegaze v Shrewsbury College of Arts & Technology [2010] IRLR 236 at [15]: ''In the case of a strike out application brought under [r 38(1)(b)] it is well established that before a claim can be struck out, it is necessary to establish that the conduct complained of was scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct in the proceedings; that the result of that conduct was that there could not be a fair trial; and that the imposition of the strike out sanction was proportionate. If some lesser sanction is appropriate and consistent with a fair trial, then the strike out should not be employed'.'[51]The first stage is whether the conduct complained of was scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious.[52]The word 'scandalous' embraces both 'the misuse of the privilege of legal process in order to vilify others', and 'giving gratuitous insult to the court in the course of such process', Bennett v London Borough of Southwark CA [2002] IRLR 407at [27] per Sedly LJ.[53]As to unreasonable conduct, tribunals should have broad shoulders and 'the courts and tribunals of this country are open to the difficult as well as the compliant, so long as they do not conduct their case unreasonably', Blockbuster Entertainment Ltd v James [2006] IRLR 630, CA at [18].[54]Vexatious includes anything that is an abuse of process. In A v B UKEAT 00 42/19/0405 (unreported, 4 May 2021) Lord Summers said that witness intimidation is an obvious example of scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct in that it tends to subvert the process of justice and has the potential to impair the fairness of the trial.[55]The second stage is whether a fair trial is possible. I need to consider the question of whether there is a less drastic means to the end for which the strike out power exists.[56]In relation to Rule 38(1)(b), there is no requirement to conclude that a fair trial is not possible in absolute terms; the question is whether there is a 'significant risk' that a fair trial is no longer possible: Leeks v University College Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2024] IRLR 866, EAT, HHJ Tayler at para [22]-[23].[57]In Arrow Nominees v Blackledge [2000] 2 BCLC 167 where the court held that 'in this context, a fair trial is a trial which is conducted without an undue expenditure of time and money; and with a proper regard to the demands of other litigants upon the finite resources of the court' [55].[58]The purpose behind a strike out order is not punitive but rather to protect the other party, and the integrity of the judicial system, from such behaviour which results in it no longer being possible to do justice.[59]The third stage is whether strike out is proportionate.[60]The proportionality consideration requires an assessment by the tribunal of any alternative lesser sanctions for the conduct in question. This could include a costs order or a decision to strike out part, rather than all, of a claim or response.[61]In Chidzoy v British Broadcasting Corporation UKAEAT/0097/16 the EAT upheld the decision of the Tribunal that lesser orders such as striking out part of the claim or having the case heard by a differently constituted tribunal would not resolve the ongoing issues with credibility which the claimant’s conduct had created. It was therefore entitled to strike out the entirety of the claim see [46] and [47].[62]Any less sanction must be appropriate and consistent with a fair trial, Abegaze [15].[63]Mechkarov v Citibank NA [2016] ICR 1121 is authority for it should only being in the clearest case that a discrimination case should be struck out and that a tribunal should not conduct an impromptu mini trial of oral evidence to resolve core disputed facts.[64]I took account of the extremely well known passage in Anyanwu v South Bank Students’ Union [2001) IRLR305, HL per Lord Steyn at para 24 to the effect that it should be only in the most obvious and plainest cases that discrimination claim should be struck out and that such cases are generally fact sensitive.[65]Whilst this claim does not involve allegations of discrimination I nevertheless apply similar principles to a claim involving allegations of protected disclosures, detriments and automatically unfair dismissal.[66]The above cases concern striking out claims on the grounds that they have no reasonable prospect of success and are not directly relevant to the circumstances of this application. The Respondent’s oral submissions[67]Ms Banerjee’s principal oral submissions were as follows:[68]The Claimant’s conduct is well past the threshold for strike out given that there is a significant risk that would no longer be possible to have a fair hearing.[69]The Claimant has continued to insult with use of words such as “circus” and saying that his giving evidence would be a waste of his time and the Tribunal’s time.[70]Continually interrupting.[71]Refusal to follow my directions.[72]She says that the Claimant is adopting a deliberate ploy to disrupt the hearing and that the hearing would effectively become a mockery.[73]The need to respect the authority of the Court[74]Repetition would be highly likely given that he has ignored repeated warnings.[75]Any lesser sanction would be futile and inappropriate, for example, an unless order would not effective in dealing with the issue. She says that the egregiousness of the conduct is such that any alternative lesser sanction would be inappropriate.[76]Tribunals are in high demand. The Claimant’s 2021 Employment Tribunal case[77]I asked Ms Banerjee to want extent she considered the Claimant’s disclosed materials relating to the 2021 Hearing was relevant. Understandably she says that the application is predicated solely on his conduct in this case, which I consider to be entirely correct, but nevertheless there are striking parallels.[78]Following his previous claim the Claimant contacted various MPs. The Claimant in a manuscript note on a letter from Fleur Anderson, a Labour MP, dated 24 June 2021 refers to: “High Court Judges whom I accuse of corruption and conspiracy with SFO refused to open my claim. Access to justice? Fair trial? Public hearing?[79]He became involved in correspondence with Judge Barry Clarke, Head of the UK Employment Tribunals. Mr Clarke’s letter of 2 March 2022 referred to the Claimant having recorded a hearing held in London Central in November 2021 and says that the video recording implies that Employment Judge Burns is corrupt and it refers to a “nice fat envelope” heading her way.[80]In a letter written on the Claimant’s behalf by from Dominic Rabb MP to Gareth Davies MP dated 9 December 2022 he referred to the Claimant wishing to complain about Employment Judge Clarke who he says had made false allegations reporting the claimant to the police for contempt of court. It goes on to say that he also wishes to complain about the Employment Tribunal in general which he accuses of fraud and corruption.[81]Further in a letter from Mandy Godridge, Head of the Direct Communications Unit at 10 Downing Street the Claimant added annotation as follows: “Allegations of judicial corruption (with video evidence) and cover-up by Employment Tribunals President is not an individual case is it?”[82]I refer to the above for completeness and will consider to what extent they are relevant in my decision. My conclusions and discussion[83]I have carefully considered the application. I take note of the fact that it rightly a high bar to justify striking out the entirety of a claim as a result of unreasonable conduct. I have carefully considered whether there would be any appropriate lesser sanction and regrettably I have concluded that there would not be. The Claimant’s conduct has, as the Respondent asserts, crossed a threshold. This is despite my having given him multiple warnings that his conduct was close to reaching the threshold where I would have considered striking out his claim and had the Respondent not made such an application I would almost certainly have addressed this issue at my own volition.[84]Far from showing any element of consideration and contrition he in effect doubled down. I gave the opportunity to the Claimant to make a submissions as to why the claim should not be struck out but he said very little. His approach was to say that he did not understand why he should respond to such nonsense and that he does not see what is wrong with his conduct. He described Ms Banerjee’s written submissions as being “irrelevant nonsense” which was a virtually verbatim repetition of what he said regarding my written reasons for refusing his witness order[85]The approach adopted by the Claimant was in my view egregious, repeated and manifestly disrespectful to the tribunal, judicial process, me as the judge and other attending parties. He refused to accept my reasonable request to desist from eating and in my view showed utter contempt for the Tribunal process and those on the CVP hearing by eating in a very blatant and obvious way during the hearing despite my request for him to desist.[86]He refused to answer a very basic and reasonable question as to whether he was recording the proceedings and it is relevant that there has been a past history in that respect.[87]He made repeated and serious allegations as to the integrity of the Tribunal process and my role as a judge to include, but not limited to the process being a sham, a circus and a crime being committed. His multiple contentions were primarily because he disagreed with my decision to refuse his application for witness orders. He repeatedly asserted that he did not understand why I had made that decision. However I use my best endeavours, both orally and in writing, to ensure that he was aware of my reasons. Nevertheless he refused to accept that I had explained the reasons to him.[88]I did not consider that any realistic prospect existed that his approach would change. No lesser sanction appropriate[89]I have considered whether a lesser sanction would be appropriate. I consider that an unless order would be a futile exercise as there is no basis for believing that the Claimant’s behaviour would change. I consider that his conduct has become progressively more egregious as hearing has progressed. Rather than, as I hoped, reflecting on his conduct overnight he has doubled down on his assertions on day two and was reluctant to commence the process of giving his witness evidence. He said it would be a waste of his time and everyone else’s time. Therefore I consider that an unless order, only striking out of part of the claim or dealing with the matter as a cost application would be inappropriate and futile in the context of the very serious and repeated misconduct which has taken place.[90]I consider that the Claimant’s conduct has shown complete disrespect for the sanctity of the tribunal process. I as a judge I am not easily offended but the level of offence in Claimant’s repeated allegations pertaining to me as an individual judge, but more significantly the Tribunal process, are wholly unacceptable and there is no indication that he intends to desist from such conduct which would in my view make a fair trial an impossibility.[91]Further as Ms Banerjee asserts considerations of proportionality appropriate use of scarce judicial resources need to be taken into account. We have spent a day of a listed full merits hearing dealing with these issues without starting the evidence.[92]Whilst I have made reference to correspondence relating to the 2021 Hearing, my decision is made solely on the basis of the Claimant’s conduct before this Tribunal. Nevertheless, there are striking similarities in his multiple assertions of judicial corruption, judges accepting bribes, and alleged corruption both in relation to individual judges and the Tribunal system more generally. His previous conduct, as repeated in this hearing, are relevant factors as to whether there is any possibility that a less draconian sanction may have resulted in a change in his approach. I consider that no realistic prospect existed in this regard. The Claimant leaves the hearing[93]Whilst giving this oral judgment and when I was moving on to my conclusions the Claimant asked if he could ask a question and I told him he could not whilst as I was giving the judgment. He then immediately left the hearing. Final conclusion[94]The entirety of the claim is struck out under Rule 38(1)(b) as I consider that the manner in which the Claimant has conducted the proceedings has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious.