Mr M S Hussain v London Borough of Newham: 6002722/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6002722/2025

Between

Mr M S HussainClaimant

London Borough of NewhamRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Park

In person for claimant

Mr B Uduje (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 13 June 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal is not well founded and is dismissed. JUDGMENT having been given orally at the hearing on 13 June 2025 and sent to the parties and reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024.

REASONS

[1]The Claimant’s claims were for unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal. No other claim was pursued. The claimant had initially indicated in his ET1 that he was pursuing a claim for discrimination. This was unparticularised and subsequently withdrawn by the claimant. Procedure, documents and evidence heard

[2]The claimant appeared in person. The respondent was represented throughout proceedings and at the hearing.

[3]A joint bundle of documents had been prepared and was provided for use at the hearing.

[4]The claimant had prepared a witness statement and was cross examined on his evidence. The respondent called three witnesses, Khristie Obasola, Sheila Roberts and Michael Benn. All three had prepared witness statements and they were cross-examined at the hearing.

[5]At the end of the hearing both parties made oral submissions. I had flagged up with the parties that there may be issues in this case relating to human rights matters. This is because the allegations that triggered the claimant’s dismissal related to the claimant’s conduct outside of work. I also invited both parties to make any submissions on this before making my decision.

[6]While deliberating it became apparent that some documents that were referred to in statements were not in the bundle. This was not picked up sooner as the statements did not refer to specific page numbers, just to documents more generally. I called the parties back for submissions on this issue. It was broadly agreed that the missing documents related to background facts that were not disputed, although it meant I did not see the actual text of the relevant correspondence. The parties wished to proceed on the basis that all were aware I had not seen certain documents. I decided I was able to do so as those documents were not critical in understanding the key facts in the case.

Findings of fact

[7]The claimant was employed by the respondent in the role of Correspondence and Appeals Officer. He started work on 1 March 2023.

[8]I was provided with a copy of the claimant’s contract. There was a suggestion that this may not have been the signed version, which the claimant had but had not disclosed. During cross-examination it was accepted that it was the claimant’s contract.

[9]The claimant’s contract contains a provision about character enquiries. The initial offer was subject to satisfactory references. There were further provisions about background checks and re-checking in the future.

[10]There are also the following statement within the section: “Failure to have declared a conviction may result in dismissal”. “If you are accused and charged or convicted of any crime that would cast serious doubts on your suitability as an employee you must inform the Human Resources Manager immediately”.

[11]There is some ambiguity in this provision, as there are also references to checks being needed if “you are required to undertake work with children and other vulnerable groups”. However, the contract also refers to the respondent’s Code of Conduct and it expressly states that this applies.

[12]The Code of Conduct includes a number of provisions. These include the following: 12.1. A requirement to act with honesty and integrity. 12.2. A requirement to comply with reasonable management instructions. 12.3. A requirement not to deceive the respondent by withholding information. 12.4. Employees cautioned or convicted of any drug or alcohol related offences, even if committed outside work must report the matter to their manager immediately. 12.5. Employees must notify their Line Manager or HR of any caution, conviction or pending prosecution for any criminal offence during their employment with the Council whether committed at work or outside working hours.

[13]The claimant was required to undertake a DBS check at the beginning of his employment. This was a basic DBS check. At the time the claimant’s criminal record was clear.

[14]In late 2023 the claimant was subject to disciplinary proceedings and in November 2023 he was given a first written warning lasting 6 months. This was referred to in the ET3, but I was not able to locate any documents relating to this in the Bundle and it was not referred to in any evidence. I just note this as background.

[15]The respondent has a policy to seek updated DBS checks every 3 years. The claimant’s was due to expire in January 2024. In November 2023 the respondent started the process of obtaining an up to date DBS from the claimant.

[16]At the time the respondent’s HR function was handled by OneSource. My understanding is this was an entity set up by various local authorities to combine some of their back office functions. It was not entirely separate from the respondent in that respect.

[17]OneSource sent a first email to the claimant on 1 November 2023. It later transpired this had been sent in error. The email indicated that the claimant had already started his application for a DBS check and it was seeking ID verification.

[18]According to Ms Obasola’s evidence, which was not challenged, OneSource chased up on 13 November 2023 and there was correspondence between the claimant and his manager around 16 November 2023. These documents were not provided.

[19]The claimant did not respond to this immediately or raise any concerns. From the documents provided it looked like another email was sent to the claimant on 23 November 2023, though I could not locate the full email. The claimant responded to this on 24 November 2023. He said he had raised concerns “someone may be using my personal data in order to misrepresent me”. The claimant provided no evidence of having raised any concerns earlier. This appears to have been his first engagement in the process. In this email he also queried whether or not he needed to complete a DBS for his role.

[20]On 29 November 2023 OneSource wrote to explain that the DBS needed to be renewed and if he believed that he did not need to do so he would “need to get approval and confirm from your manager and director”. The claimant responded again saying he had concerns about his data as he had not completed a form.

[21]Later that day OneSource confirmed there had been an error and he should have been sent a different email asking him to start the process to compete an application. There was some further correspondence between the claimant and OneSource over the next few days. OneSource again said that he was required to do a DBS for his role and if he did not believe this is the case he needed to contact his manager and director.

[22]It is unclear if the claimant did speak to his manager at the time. The claimant suggested when asked in evidence that he raised it in a 1-2-1 but was very unclear about this. He also indicated if he had done this it would not have been until January 2024. My conclusion is that the claimant did not ask for any clear clarification from his manager about whether or not he needed to do a DBS check or which level of DBS check was required.

[23]The claimant did not complete the DBS application after receiving the emails from OneSource in November and December 2023. On 22 December 2023 OneSource chased again. Anthony Polston, who was a team leader in Parking Customer Relations, had been copied into these emails. He responded to OneSource to advise that the claimant was off until 2 January 2024.

[24]I have noted that at this point none of the emails indicated what level of DBS check was required. It just said that the claimant needed an updated DBS check. On 2 January 2024 the claimant responded to say that he had decided he could do a basic check himself and that was his right. He said he had started this and would forward when received.

[25]The claimant says he received a response to say that the respondent did not accept DBS checks that were completed externally. I have not seen this correspondence but have no reason to doubt that the claimant was informed this was the case.

[26]According to both the claimant and Ms Obasola the claimant was written to on 10 January 2024. Again, I did not see this correspondence. Both the claimant and Ms Obasola said that the claimant was told to complete the application by 18 January 2024. The claimant was off work sick from 14 January 2024 until 19 January 2024. The claimant says he returned on 22 January 2024 and at that point he completed the application. An acknowledgment email was sent by OneSource asking for his ID documents. This was chased up on 30 January 2024. By this point the claimant’s previous DBS had expired.

[27]On 31 January 2024 the claimant responded. He repeated similar comments about offering to do a DBS check himself and querying why it was necessary. There was further correspondence that day, with the claimant raising further issues about how his information would be processed. That day Rabina Iqbal also wrote to the claimant, though I did not have all of that specific email. The claimant corresponded with her raising further general issues about how his data would be handled.

[28]On 2 February 2024 the claimant was suspended pending an investigation into allegations he had failed to follow management instructions to complete a DBS check. For some reason this was without pay. This has not been addressed in evidence and does not appear to be something the claimant has complained about. However, it was unclear to me the basis on which the respondent could suspend the claimant without pay pending an investigation.

[29]The claimant completed the documentation that was needed to complete the DBS check and it was undertaken by OneSource. The result of the DBS check was provided at the end of February 2024. This was a standard level certificate and it showed the drink driving conviction.

[30]At this point the investigation was ongoing and being carried out by Ms Obasola. She appeared to have interviewed the claimant twice. She met with the claimant on 28 February 2024. In the investigation report that was subsequently prepared there were notes of a second meeting. These notes were undated but I was provided with an email dated 13 March 2024 from Ms Obasola asking to meet the claimant again. I have concluded it would have been around then. In these meetings the claimant reiterated his concerns about how his information would be handled. He also queried whether a standard check was required. He did not raise other concerns or explanations for why he had not completed the check when first asked.

[31]The suspension was lifted on 8 March 2024 and the claimant returned to work.

[32]It was unclear what happened then with the investigation. There was some delay but no explanation for the delay was provided by Ms Obasola or other witnesses. The report she produced was dated 8 July 2024, over 4 months after the investigation concluded. The claimant had chased Ms Obasola on 26 March 2024 for an update, so he knew a report was being prepared and he would be informed when it was complete.

[33]The claimant was sent a letter on 17 July 2024 inviting him to a disciplinary hearing on 1 August 2024. The letter included details of 2 allegations. It was alleged he had failed to follow management instructions. Secondly, it was alleged he had failed to disclose his conviction to the respondent. The claimant was informed of potential outcomes which included dismissal. The claimant was provided with a copy of the investigation report and informed he could be accompanied.

[34]The claimant attended the hearing on 1 August 2024. This hearing was chaired by Sheila Roberts. I was provided with the minutes of that meeting. The claimant did not challenge the veracity of these minutes and I accepted they were an accurate record.

[35]During the meeting the claimant queried why he needed a DBS check. There was some discussion about whether he actually required a driving licence. The claimant said he did not know he had to inform the respondent of his conviction and he did not consider it to be an offence. The claimant said he had followed instructions as he did eventually complete the check.

[36]Mrs Roberts did not make a decision on the day. She sent the claimant the outcome on 21 August 2024. She upheld the allegations and decided to dismiss the claimant. In the letter Mrs Roberts explained the reasons she had come to that decision. She summarised the evidence she had heard. She stated that she concluded it was not plausible that the claimant did not realise drink driving was a criminal offence, given that he worked in an area dealing with enforcement. She concluded that the claimant’s primary motivation of not completing the DBS check was because he knew his conviction would come to light.

[37]In evidence Mrs Roberts explained further why she reached this decision. I found Mrs Roberts explanation for her decision that she gave during her evidence clear and credible. I found she had clear concerns about the claimant’s integrity. The issue was not so much the claimant’s conviction itself. Her concern was that he had repeatedly failed to disclose the conviction it when he had multiple opportunities to do so. She then concluded the lack of integrity meant the claimant could

[38]The claimant appealed the decision to dismiss. The claimant appealed on a number of grounds. He said the decision was too severe, not all evidence had been considered, the proceedings themselves were unfair, the original finding was ‘against the weight of evidence’ and there were procedural errors.

[39]An appeal hearing was held on 24 October 2024, chaired by Mr Benn. Mr Benn sent the outcome to the claimant on 11 November 2024.

[40]This letter is detailed and he clearly went through all the points the claimant had raised thoroughly. Mr Benn specifically considered the need for a standard DBS rather than a basic one. He concluded that there was inconsistency and only a basic DBS was actually needed for the claimant’s role. However, he concluded that it would have made no difference as the conviction would still have shown.

[41]Ultimately Mr Benn accepted Mrs Roberts conclusions that the main reason the claimant had avoided completing the DBS check was to avoid the disclosure of his conviction. He noted that in terms of evidence, the claimant had not provided additional evidence for consideration. There was no evidence of procedural impropriety or bias by those involved.

[42]The claimant subsequently pursued this claim. In his claim and during these proceedings the claimant has advanced a new reason for his decision not to disclose his conviction. This relates to his colleagues being observant Muslims and his concerns that it may have affected his reputation if the conviction became known about in his team. This was not raised at any point during the disciplinary hearings, either at investigation, disciplinary or appeal.

The Law

[43]The right not to be unfairly dismissed is conferred by Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Where, as here, there is no dispute that an employee was dismissed, the question of whether any such dismissal was unfair turns upon the application of the test in Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The material parts of that section are as follows: “98 General.(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show – (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.

(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it – (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) relates to the conduct of the employee (c) is that the employee was redundant, or (d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that Case Number: 3202301/2019 26 of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment.

(3) ...

(4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer) – (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.”

[44]For the purposes of Section 98(2) ERA 1996 'conduct' means actions 'of such a nature whether done in the course of employment or outwit it that reflect in some way upon the employer/employee relationship': Thomson v Alloa Motor Co Ltd

[1983] IRLR 403

, EAT. It is not necessary that the conduct is culpable JP Morgan Securities plc v Ktorza

UKEAT/0311/16

[45]Where the reason, or principal reason, for the dismissal is established as conduct then it will usually, but not invariably, be necessary to have regard for the guidance set out in British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell

[1978] IRLR 379

, which lays down a three-stage test:(i) the employer must establish that he genuinely did believe that the employee was guilty of the misconduct;

(ii) that belief must have been formed on reasonable grounds; and

(iii) the employer must have investigated the matter reasonably. Following amendments to the statutory scheme the burden of proof is on the employer on point (i) (which goes to the reason for the dismissal) but it is neutral on the other two points Boys and Girls Welfare Society v McDonald

[1996] IRLR 129

[46]The correct test is whether the employer acted reasonably, not whether the tribunal would have come to the same decision itself. In many cases there will be a 'range of reasonable responses', so that, provided that the employer acted as a reasonable employer could have acted, the dismissal will be fair: Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones

[1982] IRLR 439

. That test recognises that two employers faced with the same circumstances may arrive at different decisions but both of those decisions might be reasonable.

[47]The range of reasonable responses test applies as much to any investigation and the procedure followed as it does to the substantive decision to impose dismissal as a penalty Sainsbury's Supermarkets Ltd v Hitt

[2003] IRLR 23

[48]In terms of the reasonableness of the investigation and the procedure that was followed, the “relevant circumstances” referred to in Section 98(4) include the gravity of the charge and their potential effect upon the employee A v B Case Number: 3202301/2019 27

[2003] IRLR 405

. A v B also provides authority for the proposition that a fair investigation requires that the investigator examines not only the evidence that leads to a conclusion that the employee is guilty of misconduct but also that which tends to show that they are not. However, where during any disciplinary process an employee makes admissions a reasonable employer might normally be expected to proceed on the basis of those admissions CRO Ports London Ltd v Mr P Wiltshire

UKEAT/0344/14/DM

[49]When considering a complaint of unfair dismissal under s.98(4) of the 1996 Act, where the employee has exercised a right of appeal in disciplinary proceedings the tribunal must consider the overall process Taylor v OCS Group Ltd

2006 ICR 1602

, CA.

[50]Section 207 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides that: “any Code of Practice issued under this Chapter by ACAS shall be admissible in evidence, and any provision of the Code which appears to the tribunal or Committee to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings shall be taken into account in determining that question.” The relevant code for present purposes is the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 2009. Human rights considerations

[51]The respondent in this case is public body so is directly bound by the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the HRA”). The provisions of the HRA must be taken into account in tribunal proceedings because of the following.

[52]Under section 2 of the HRA courts and tribunals must take into account any judgment, decision or opinion of the relevant institutions that is relevant to the proceedings.

[53]Section 3 of the HRA states that: So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.

[54]Section 6 of the HRA states that It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right .. In this section ‘public authority’ includes – a court or tribunal…

[55]The Employment Rights Act 1996 is legislation that is covered by section 3 of the HRA. The Employment Tribunal is a public authority falling under section 6. The Employment Tribunal must not act in a way that is incompatible with the HRA so it must ensure that the Employment Rights Act 1996 is read in a way that is not incompatible with the HRA.

[56]Schedule 1 of the HRA incorporates

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

(“the Convention”). This states as follows: Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

[57]In X v Y

[2004] IRLR 625

(“X v Y”) Mummery said: “Article 8 is not confined in its effect to relations between individuals and the state and public authorities. It has been interpreted by the Strasbourg court as imposing a positive obligation on the state to secure the observance and enjoyment of the right between private parties.”

[58]In relation to unfair dismissal, he held that: “(2) If the dismissal of the applicant was in circumstances falling within Article 8 and was an interference with the right to respect for private life, it might be necessary for the employment tribunal then to consider whether there was a justification under Article 8(2) for the particular interference. As explained below, Article 8 and Article 14 may have to be considered by tribunals in the case of a private sector employer, as well as in the case of a public authority employer, by virtue of s.3 of the HRA. Justification involves considering whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the legitimate aim of the interference, and the proportionality of the interference to the legitimate aim being pursued. (3) On questions of justification the tribunal should bear in mind the complexity of employment relationships. In addition to the right of the employee under Article 8 and Article 14, the employer, fellow employees and members of the public also have rights and freedoms under the Convention “

[59]In X v Y, Mummery suggested the following approach to Employment Tribunals when considering human rights dismissals: “(1) Do the circumstances of the dismissal fall within the ambit of one or more of the Articles of the Convention? If they do not, the Convention right is not engaged and need not be considered. (2) If they do, does the state have a positive obligation to secure enjoyment of the relevant Convention right between private persons? If it does not, the Convention right is unlikely to affect the outcome of an unfair dismissal claim against a private employer. (3) If it does, is the interference with the employee's Convention right by dismissal justified? If it is, proceed to (5) below. (4) If it is not, was there a permissible reason for the dismissal under the ERA, which does not involve unjustified interference with a Convention right? If there was not, the dismissal will be unfair for the absence of a permissible reason to justify it. (5) If there was, is the dismissal fair, tested by the provisions of s.98 of the ERA, reading and giving effect to them under s.3 of the HRA so as to be compatible with the Convention right?”

Conclusions

[60]A key feature of this case is that there is very little dispute of fact. I have set out my findings of fact above, but there was little really in dispute about what happened and much was documented, albeit I was missing some correspondence.

[61]I was satisfied that the respondent has established that the reason for dismissal was the claimant’s conduct which is a potentially fair reason. A situation arose in late November 2023 whereby the claimant was being asked by the respondent, via OneSource who were their HR function, to complete a DBS check because his was about to expire. The claimant did not do this and had to be chased repeatedly. This triggered an investigation into misconduct which ultimately lead to his dismissal. There is no evidence that there was any thing else underlying the dismissal and the claimant has not suggested any other potential reason.

[62]The underlying allegation here was that the claimant failed to follow a reasonable management instruction to undertake a DBS check via OneSource. The other allegation related to the claimant concealing the fact that he had a conviction. This was said to be in breach of the respondent’s Code of Conduct, specifically those requirements to disclose criminal convictions.

[63]It is on these points that rights under the HRA come into play. The requirement to disclose convictions related to conduct outside work, either by a direct obligation or via a DBS check, engages an individual’s Article 8 rights. Interference with those rights is permissible if the employer has a legitimate aim and it is proportionate to do so.

[64]An employer has a legitimate aim to ensure that they know of anything about their employee that may affect their ability to do the job, either practically or because it casts aspersions on their suitability to do any particular role. This does not mean an employer has an automatic right to know everything about an employee. What will legitimately be of concern will depend on the context such as the employer and the job.

[65]This means it can be legitimate for an employer to undertake enquiries on matters such as criminal convictions. The DBS scheme exists for that reason, including the different levels of disclosure. If an employer has a requirement to have a DBS carried out at the outset of employment it will also usually be legitimate for an employer to have a requirement that an employee discloses any new criminal charges or convictions that they receive subsequently. Otherwise they would not know about matters that may be relevant until a new DBS check was carried out.

[66]Therefore, the requirement for the claimant to disclose convictions could be a justified interference with the claimant’s Article 8 rights. Likewise, the requirement to carry out a DBS check, and repeat those checks regularly throughout the course of employment, could also be permissible.

[67]In this case the respondent worked for a local authority in enforcement, which was a position that involved an element of trust. There was a requirement for the claimant to carry out a DBS check when he was recruited, to which he did not object. In these circumstances the respondent was entitled to view the requirement to renew the DBS, as it was due to expire, as a reasonable management instruction.

[68]This links to the issue about whether a basic or standard check was required. I was not provided with clear evidence by the parties about the difference with these and whether a basic check would have shown the conviction in January 2024. The claimant says no, evidenced by one he provided at the time. The respondent says it would have shown the conviction. Either way, there was a requirement on the claimant to disclose his conviction when it happened. There is no dispute that he did not do so.

[69]Turning to the decision to dismiss the claimant, the questions for me to determine are whether Mrs Roberts genuinely believed that the claimant was guilty of the alleged misconduct and whether that belief was on reasonable grounds having carried out a reasonable investigation. I remind myself that I must not substitute my own views on these points for those of the respondent, the test is whether the respondent genuinely reached that conclusion based on reasonable grounds.

[70]Unfortunately, I did not see all of the documents that Mrs Roberts had at the time. However, the main timeline and facts were clear from the documents I did see and not disputed. These are as follows: 70.1. In April 2022 the claimant was convicted of an offence. He did not disclose this to anyone at the respondent. 70.2. In November 2023 he was instructed to undertake the process to renew his DBS check. There was a bit of a mix up with the initial emails, but the instruction was clear. 70.3. The claimant did not complete the application. He put forward various reasons, such as concern about how his data would be used and he queried whether he needed one in his role. He was advised to seek clarification on this from his manager but did not do so. 70.4. In January 2024 the claimant was given a clear instruction to complete the DBS check by 18 January 2024. I have not seen this correspondence but it is agreed something along this line was sent. 70.5. The claimant completed the application on 22 February 2024 but did not submit the ID verification immediately and his previous DBS expired. 70.6. On 2 February 2024 the claimant was suspended pending investigation into his failure to follow instructions. 70.7. The DBS came back and showed the conviction. This was a standard check. 70.8. The claimant was able to return to work but the investigation continued.

[71]An investigation had been carried out by the respondent. The claimant has suggested this was unfair. However, he has not indicated any substantive failings. Given that the events were documented and clear, in terms of the timeline, I cannot see what else could have been done that may have shed a different light on events. The main facts are as set out above, and not disputed.

[72]Mrs Roberts heard from the claimant. He was able to put forward his explanations. The claimant suggested that he did not know he needed to disclose convictions and he did not know that the drink driving had been a criminal offence. Mrs Roberts did not accept those explanations. She concluded that the claimant had been deliberately trying to avoid completing the DBS because he knew the conviction would be revealed.

[73]On this point it is not my role to decide if I would have come to the same conclusion or a different one. I am only deciding if it was reasonable for Mrs Roberts to reach that conclusion she did based on the evidence she had at the time and this was genuinely her belief. I was satisfied Mrs Roberts conclusions were genuine. I was also satisfied it was reasonable to reach that conclusion based on the evidence she had. There was no real dispute about the series of events in late 2023 and early 2024. Ultimately Mrs Roberts had to make a judgment on whether or not she accepted the claimant’s explanation for his actions as being genuine and a satisfactory explanation. Mrs Roberts did not accept the claimant’s explanation for his actions. Instead, she concluded that the claimant was trying to conceal his conviction as being the more likely explanation for why he did not complete the DBS when asked. It is not for me to substitute my own decision, on this. It is enough that I am satisfied that she had reasonable grounds for reaching that decision. In light of what had occurred, it was reasonable for her to decide that the claimant’s explanation was not credible.

[74]I must then consider whether dismissal was reasonable in the circumstances. Again, I must not substitute my own conclusions on this point but only decide if dismissal fell within the ‘range of reasonable responses’ in the circumstances. This does not mean dismissal will be unfair if other options are available. It means that dismissal must be within the range of possible options an employer reasonably could consider in the particular circumstances.

[75]I am satisfied that dismissal was reasonable in the circumstances for the following reasons. Mrs Roberts conclude that the claimant had not disclosed his conviction and then deliberately sought to conceal this by avoiding the renewed DBS check. She upheld allegations that relate to honesty and integrity. Trust and confidence are at the heart of the employment contract. Therefore, dismissal will often be a reasonable option if an employer concludes that an employee has acted in a way that is dishonest. In this case the respondent had a detailed code of conduct that stresses the importance of integrity and places an express obligation on employees to disclose certain information. It also highlights that it will be a breach of the code to withhold information. In these circumstances I am satisfied that dismissal was a reasonable option available to Mrs Roberts. Of her own volition, Mrs Roberts decided to dismiss the claimant with notice which was a less harsh option than summary dismissal. This also indicated that she approached the matter with an open mind about the final outcome.

[76]During this hearing the claimant has put forward new explanations for not wanting to disclose his conviction to this respondent. This was by way of mitigating circumstances. This was not something the claimant raised during the investigation. Neither did he raise it during the disciplinary or appeal.

[77]The consequence of this is Mrs Roberts could not take those additional explanations into account, either when deciding on the allegations themselves or when deciding on a sanction. This also means those additional explanations were not something I could take into account when deciding if dismissal was reasonable. I am not remaking the decision. I am only deciding whether Mrs Roberts’ decision was reasonable based on the information she had available at the time.

[78]Finally, I have considered the overall procedure that was followed. The claimant has suggested during this case that the procedure has been flawed. However, I have not been able to identify any significant flaws. There was a delay between the investigation and disciplinary. Given the largely undisputed factual background, this has no impact on the general fairness of the procedure. This is not a case where memories may have been affected or the process may have been unduly impacted. Overall, the procedure was sufficiently thorough with the claimant was advised what he was accused of and he was able to put forward his account at all stages.

[79]The appeal is part of the disciplinary procedure. This did not reveal anything new that cast doubt on the decision to dismiss. Mr Benn considered the level of disclosure. He decided it made no difference, based on his own understanding of what different levels of DBS checks show and the type of offence the claimant was convicted of.

[80]For these reasons I was satisfied that there was a potentially fair reason for dismissal and it was reasonable for the respondent to dismiss for that reason in the circumstances. The claim of unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed.

Conclusions

[1]Under Part 12 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 the Employment Tribunal may, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, reconsider a Judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the Judgment may be confirmed, varied or revoked.

[2]An application for reconsideration shall be presented in writing within 14 days of the later of the date of the Judgment being sent to the parties or the date the written reasons were sent, if sent separately. The Judgment in this case was sent to the parties on 23 June 2025. The claimant asked for written reasons and these were sent to the parties on 8 October 2025.

[3]On 22 October 2025 the claimant sent an email to the Employment Tribunal attaching his application for reconsideration. The claimant set out the following reasons why he sought reconsideration: 3.1. He said there were procedural irregularities. Within this allegation he set out various points he said the Tribunal had failed to take into account within his submissions or evidence. He also referred to delays in compliance with some directions before the hearing, which he said meant that the hearing was unfair. 3.2. He said that the Tribunal failed to consider key legal and internal procedural requirements. This relates to allegations the claimant made within his claim that the respondent failed to follow its own policies and procedures. 3.3. He said that there had been errors in law and misdirection. This is a general allegation and the claimant does not set out any details of what errors he says were made. 3.4. The claimant said in the application he was presenting new evidence that related to his role. No new evidence was attached to the reconsideration application. 3.5. The claimant generally asserts that the judgment had caused him harm and was “in a breach of my human rights to fair employment procedures”.

[4]Under Rule 68, a Judgment will only be reconsidered where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. This allows an Employment Tribunal broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration of a Judgment is appropriate in the circumstances. The discretion must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration, but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.

[5]The procedure upon a reconsideration application is for the Employment Judge that heard the case to consider the application and determine if there are reasonable prospects of the Judgement being varied or revoked. Essentially, this is a reviewing function in which the Employment Judge must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of reconsideration in the interests of justice. There must be some basis for reconsideration. It is insufficient for an applicant to apply simply because he or she disagrees with the decision.

[6]If the Employment Judge considers that there is no such reasonable prospect then the application shall be refused. Otherwise, the original decision shall be reconsidered at a subsequent reconsideration hearing. The Employment Judge’s role upon consideration of the application upon the papers initially is to operate as a filter to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked were the matter to be the subject of reconsideration hearing.

[7]The Employment Appeal Tribunal has given guidance as to the nature of a request for reconsideration: 7.1. Reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to re-argue matters in a different way or adopting points previously omitted. 7.2. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. 7.3. It is not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, or is it intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered. 7.4. Tribunals have a wide discretion whether or not to order reconsideration. Where a matter has been fully ventilated and properly argued, and in the absence of any identifiable administrative error or event occurring after the hearing that requires a reconsideration in the interests of justice, any asserted error of law is to be corrected on appeal and not through the back door by way of a reconsideration application.

[8]The claimant has asked that the Judgement is reconsidered for the reasons set out above. The claimant has not provided new evidence, as he has stated. The other reasons put forward are general allegations about flaws in Tribunal procedure and what he considers were failures by the Tribunal to consider aspects of his case. He has not identified any clear reason why it would be in the interests of justice for the Judgment to be reconsidered. His arguments all appear to be general expressions of dissatisfaction with the decision that was reached in his case.

[9]The Tribunal did consider all the evidence and arguments put forward carefully and then reached its own findings of fact. This included findings about the internal procedures, as far as they were relevant to the claims the Tribunal was determining. It was also noted that there had been some noncompliance with directions before the hearing and some documents appeared to be missing from the bundle. The possible impact of these issues were taken into account in reaching the decision. The claimant has not raised anything else potentially relevant that has not already considered by the Tribunal.

[10]I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to reconsider the Judgment. The claimant’s arguments are seeking to relitigate matters which have already been fully considered by the Tribunal following a fair hearing.