Mr S Harrison v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust: 6002604/2026

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6002604/2026

Between

Mr S HarrisonClaimant

Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS TrustRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Deeley

Miss C Souter (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 10 March 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s application for interim relief under s128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 fails and is dismissed. Approved by: Employment Judge Deeley 10 March 2026 Notes The Judge explained their summary reasons for the Judgment at the end of the hearing. Summary written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 52) and any full written reasons for the judgments are published online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mr S Harrison Respondent: Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust Heard at: Leeds Employment Tribunal Before: Employment Judge Deeley On: 10 March 2026 Representation Claimant: represented himself Respondent: Miss C Souter (Counsel) FULL WRITTEN REASONS

[1]I explained my summary reasons for rejecting the claimant’s application for interim relief under s128 and s129 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 at the hearing on 10 March 2026. The judgment relating to the claimant’s application was sent to the parties on 10 March 2026.The claimant emailed the Tribunal on 17 March 2026 and requested summary written reasons. However, I decided that it would be appropriate to provide full written reasons given the limited nature of the decision made in an interim relief application in accordance with Rule 60(4E) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

[2]The claimant has another existing Tribunal claim (case reference 6017406/25) which he presented to the Tribunal on 12 May 2025 relating to whistleblowing detriment, disability discrimination and other matters. This claim was considered at the preliminary hearing by Regional Employment Judge Davies on 19 November 2025 and is due for further consideration at the next preliminary hearing on 15 April 2026. The first four protected disclosures that the claimant relies on for his second claim (which is the subject of the interim relief hearing) overlap with those set out in his first claim.

[3]The task for the Tribunal on an interim relief hearing is to make a broad assessment on the material available to try to get an understanding of the evidence and to make a prediction of what is likely to happen at the eventual substantive hearing of these claims. In doing so, I am not making findings of fact relating to this claim. I must consider the documentary evidence that was made available to me during this hearing, together with the parties’ submissions.

[4]I also note that Rule 95 of the Employment Tribunal Rules makes it clear that the Tribunal shall not hear any oral evidence during an interim relief hearing unless it directs otherwise.

[5]The parties provided a considerable volume of documents to the Tribunal for my consideration (over one hundred pages from the claimant and over one thousand pages from the respondent). Both parties provided skeleton arguments and the respondent also provided a witness statement for Ms Rachel Lockwood. I did not read every page of the documents sent to the Tribunal – it would simply have been impossible to do so, given that the time estimate for this hearing was three hours.

[6]Both parties provided helpful oral submissions during the hearing today. The parties also referred me to legal authorities and the key legal points that I considered included:6.1 the well-known authority of Taplin v C Shipham Ltd

[1978] IRLR 450

, which requires the Tribunal to consider whether it is ‘likely’ that the claimant will establish that she was dismissed because of a protected disclosure;

6.2 ‘Likely’ has been interpreted to mean that the claimant has “a pretty good chance” of establishing that she was dismissed for that reason (see for example: Ministry of Justice v Safraz UK

EAT/0578/10

, London City Airport Ltd v Chacko

[2013] IRLR 610

). I note that the EAT in Sarfraz held that: “’Likely’ does not mean simply ‘more likely than not’ – that is at least 51% - but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood”.

6.3 Sarfraz also confirms that the test must apply to all elements of the claim.

6.4 the EAT’s decision in Dr C Hancock v Mr M Ter-Berg and NHS England Midlands and East (

UKEAT/0138/19/BA

) which concluded that the ‘likely to succeed’ test for interim relief applies to all elements of a claim that the claimant must prove, not just to the reason for dismissal. Mr Justice Choudhary held at paragraph 38 that: "The Tribunal will clearly need to consider the likely outcome of the eventual determination of the complaint. The provision [for interim relief does not preclude a] Tribunal from having regard to the merits of other elements of the claim aside from the reason for dismissal. Indeed, if it were not to have regard to such matters at the interim relief stage, then it would not be considering the likely outcome on determination of the complaint (but only part of it)...a full determination of employee status would require disclosure, witness statements and a substantive hearing at which witnesses would be questioned and cross-examined. To convene such a hearing, even on an expedited basis, would lead to substantial delays in the hearing of an interim relief application. Indeed, the intended interim nature of that hearing would be substantially undermined, particularly if the preliminary issue is itself the subject of any subsequent appeal."

[7]I concluded that the claimant did not meet the test required to grant his application for interim relief. The key reasons for my decision are set out below. Is it likely that the claimant make a protected disclosure or protected disclosures to the respondent under s43B ERA?

[8]The respondent accepted that the claimant had made the first four protected disclosures. They disputed that he had made a fifth protected disclosure on 14 May 2025. The claimant stated during the hearing that he did not rely on the fifth protected disclosure alleged in relation to his allegation of automatically unfair dismissal. He also stated that the key disclosures that he relied on for his dismissal-related claims were the second and third disclosures that he made in 2023. Is it likely that the C had reasonable belief that: a) Any qualifying disclosures made fell within categories set out in s43(B)(1); and b) Such disclosures were made in the public interest?

[9]I concluded that the claimant was likely to meet these tests in relation to the second and third protected disclosures that he relied on. These disclosures referred to matters which appeared to be either a breach of a legal obligation and/or health and safety matters. I also concluded that the claimant was likely to be able to show that the second and third protected disclosures were made in the public interest, given the subject matter of those disclosures (relating to breaches of research governance and of recruitment processes). If so: a) Did the claimant resign voluntarily or was he dismissed? b) If he was dismissed, is it likely that the reason or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal was such protected disclosure or protected disclosures under s103A ERA?

[10]The key question at the interim relief hearing was whether it was likely that the claimant’s resignation amounted to a dismissal. I noted that there was a significant factual dispute between the parties on this issue. In those circumstances, I could not conclude that it was likely or that there was a ‘pretty good chance’ that the claimant would succeed on a broad brush assessment of the material that I was able to review in the time available. In particular, I noted that:10.1 the second and third protected disclosures were made in July 2023, nearly two and a half years before the claimant’s resignation on 13 January 2026;

10.2 the respondent had considered the claimant’s three grievances raised during his employment and held a Freedom to Speak Up investigation. In addition, the respondent stated that they were commissioning an external review of the Freedom to Speak Up Investigation around the time of the claimant’s resignation;

10.3 there was a substantial factual dispute between the parties as to whether the claimant’s concerns had been handled properly and whether or not they had been sufficiently investigated;

10.4 the focus of the claimant’s resignation letter related to the handling of his concerns. The claimant stated that there was a failure to correct material factual inaccuracies in the formal outcome letters;

10.5 the claimant’s resignation letter concluded: I remained in post for a significant period in good faith following regulatory findings on 24 September 2025, a public apology, and commitments to organisational change. I was also assured that an external investigation would take place; it is now apparent that it will not. The prolonged failure to address my whistleblowing concerns and associated detriment has had a serious impact on my health, rendering my position untenable. I therefore consider the Trust to be in fundamental breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, the principal reason for which is my protected disclosures, leaving me with no reasonable alternative but to resign with immediate effect.

10.6 the claimant also stated in his Particulars of Claim that he felt it would be ‘unsafe’ for him to remain in employment with the respondent. Apparent contradiction between the claimant’s complaint of constructive dismissal and application for interim relief

[11]In any event, it appeared that the claimant’s application for interim relief undermined his claim that the respondent had acted in fundamental breach of contract, entitling him to resign and treat himself as dismissed. This is because:11.1 the claimant’s primary remedy if he were to succeed in an application for interim relief would be reinstatement or re-engagement. The Tribunal would only order a continuation of the contract if the respondent refused to ‘re-employ’ the claimant;

11.2 if the claimant were willing to return to work for the respondent, this would suggest that his resignation was either not because of any fundamental breach by the respondent or, alternatively, that he was willing to waive such breach;

11.3 however, the claimant reiterated during the hearing that his position was untenable and that it would be ‘unsafe’ for him to return to work for the respondent.

[12]Lord Justice Bean commented at paragraph 69 in the case of Steer v Stormsure

[2021] EWCA Civ 887

on this logical inconsistency: “I add this by way of footnote. One way in which the Appellant puts her case is that she was constructively dismissed – in other words, that the Respondent company’s conduct amounted to a repudiation of her contract of employment, and that she was entitled to accept that repudiation, terminate the contract and resign. It seems counter-intuitive that she should then be able to obtain an order from an ET that the same contract is to continue.”

[13]I rejected the claimant’s application for interim relief for the reasons set out above. Approved by: Employment Judge Deeley 24 March 2026 Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 52) and any full written reasons for the judgments are published online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant and respondent.