Mr D Jones v University for the Creative Arts: 6002245/2026
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6002245/2026
Between
Mr D JonesClaimantUniversity for the Creative ArtsRespondent
Before
Employment Judge FowellDate 4 February 2026
JUDGMENT
The application for interim relief is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]These written reasons are provided at the request of Mr Jones following oral reasons given earlier today. As usual some editing has taken place for the sake of clarity, and here and there some points are expanded, so these written reasons shall stand as the final version.[2]This is an application for “interim relief”, which is a term used for various orders a Tribunal can make shortly after someone is dismissed, the most common being that they are reinstated to their old job until a final hearing. If the employer refuses, they can even be ordered to carry on paying the employee’s wages until the final hearing, so it is a powerful remedy.[3]There are very limited circumstances in which such an order can be made. The application has to be made promptly i.e. within seven days of dismissal, and it is only available for some types of dismissal.[4]That includes dismissals under section 100 Employment Rights Act 1996 – for raising health and safety concerns – and section 103A, for whistleblowing, or more precisely. for making “a protected disclosure”. An application can also be 1 of 5 made where the dismissal is on grounds related to trade union membership or activities. That is set out at section 152 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. These are all examples of what is referred to as an automatically unfair dismissal - a dismissal for a particular, prohibited reason.[5]There was some confusion over whether Mr Jones intended to include his trade union activities as one of the reasons for this application but he has provided a trade union certificate so I prefer the view that it does form part of his case for today’s purposes. His skeleton argument at paragraph 11 refers to his various grievances (i.e. protected disclosures), a particular health and safety report from June 2024 and “ongoing trade union activities and representations under TULCRA.”[6]The relevant provisions governing the exercise of these powers is set out in section 128 to 132 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Section 128 states that an application can succeed where it is ‘likely’ that the Tribunal will ultimately find in favour of the employee. In applications with this sort that is usually the crux of the matter and the Judge has to do the best he or she can in the time available to form an assessment of that likelihood. However, on this occasion, Mr Brown opened with a more fundamental and legal objection to the application, which is that it is outside the scope of section 128, so in fact the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it.[7]Section 128 begins: (1) An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in [a number of statutory sections] … may apply for interim relief.”[8]It is necessary therefore to focus on the statutory sections in question. There are six of them in total but they include the three relevant ones for our purposes, section 100 and section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and paragraph 161(2) of Sch A1 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. (Paragraph 161 specifies the type of trade union activity that may amount to an automatically unfair dismissal.)[9]The statutory language in each case is effectively identical. Section 103A starts: (1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded … as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure. 2 of 5[10]Section 100 is the same except that the reason (in italics) involves a lengthier list of health and safety activities or concerns.[11]Section 152 of the 1992 Act also lists in a similar way, the trade union activity in question.[12]However, there are separate provisions dealing with redundancy situations. In the 1996 Act this is at section 105, in the 1992 Act it is at section 153. They are to the same effect, so I will consider the first of them, section 105. It begins in familiar fashion: (1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded … as unfairly dismissed if (a) the reason (or if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee was redundant, (b) it is shown that the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more other employees in the same undertaking who held positions similar to that held by the employee and who have not been dismissed by the employer, and (c) it is shown that any of the subsections 2A to 7N applies.[13]Those subsections from 2A to 7N then deal with other types of automatically unfair dismissal, situations that would ordinarily fall under their own section of the Act.[14]Subsection (3) applies where the reason for dismissal is that set out in section 100, i.e. health and safety cases.[15]Subsection (6A) applies where the reason for dismissal is as set out in section 103A, i.e. making a protected disclosure.[16]So, section 105(1) involves these three elements:(a) dismissal on grounds of redundancy;(b) some of those in similar roles not being dismissed; and(c) that the reason for the selection for redundancy is (for example) that the employee has made a protected disclosure. If all those points are shown, it is a dismissal under section 105 rather than (in a whistleblowing case) section 103A.[17]It must follow that where a dismissal falls under this section there is no right to apply for interim relief. Section 105 is not one of the six statutory types of automatically unfair dismissal identified in section 128, which provides the basis for these applications.[18]The same is true under the 1992 Act. As already mentioned, a distinction is drawn between a “general” dismissal on grounds of trade union activities under section 152 and a selection for redundancy on those grounds at section 153. 3 of 5[19]The rationale for that distinction is unclear but may perhaps lie in the extra difficulty of examining the reasons for a dismissal in such a redundancy context, and the resulting difficulty in assessing whether interim relief is appropriate. Interim relief is a summary remedy for clear cut cases.[20]However, it is important to check that all of the elements of section 105 apply here. The first is that the reason for the dismissal was redundancy. There is some tension between that requirement and the third requirement, that the principal reason was (in a whistleblowing case) that the employee had made a protected disclosure. It might be argued that if someone was selected for redundancy because of their whistleblowing, or health and safety or trade union activities, then the reason for their dismissal was not in fact redundancy at all. However, that view would nullify the whole provision. In my view is has to be understood in the sense that there has to be a genuine redundancy situation, and someone is included or caught up in that redundancy exercise because of such activities. There is a further requirement – (b) – that others were not dismissed. The effect of that requirement is that where, for example, the whole workplace or department closes and everyone in a similar type of role is made redundant, there is no scope for arguing that section 105 applies at all – a clean sweep situation of that sort would not involve a selection for redundancy on prohibited grounds.[21]I was referred to one case on this section generally, from the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland: McConnell and Larmour v Bombardier Aerospace – Short Bros Plc (No. 2) [2009] IRLR 201. That concerned a much larger redundancy exercise where over 300 people were made redundant. The court in that case placed weight on the fact that there was (by agreement) “a genuine redundancy situation.” That reflects the wording in subsection (1)(b) that there have to be “circumstances constituting the redundancy” which apply to a group.[22]The Court confirmed that section 105 made separate provision for claims of automatically unfair dismissal where a person was selected for redundancy for a prohibited reason and that in such a case an application for interim relief was not permitted.[23]Mr Jones has argued cogently that his dismissal was unfair because his role was mischaracterised as part of the exercise and he was put into a pool of one. However, his selection was clearly part of a much wider exercise. Its scope was explained in the witness statement of Ms Singh. She explains there that a business case was prepared in July 2025 following a drop in student numbers and that it was anticipated that 104 members of staff would be affected with a proposed reduction of 82.6 full-time equivalent roles. Consultation was held with the relevant trade unions and in the end, the outcome was not nearly so severe. 4 of 5 17 people were made redundant and 13 were successfully redeployed. Mr Jones’s own claim confirms the fact that it was a broad exercise.[24]I had regard to the business case which appears in the respondent’s bundle, at page 367. It clearly applied across various areas of the University including UCAIC, where Mr Jones worked, and where about half the staff were to be made redundant; also the Business School, the School of Fashion and Textiles, Technical Services and Link Tutors.[25]So, accepting for the moment that Mr Jones was put in a pool of one, that was still part of a wider departmental exercise, and in turn part of a university wide exercise. It also follows, taking a broader view, that others in a similar role were not made redundant, so this was not a “clean sweep” type of case.[26]On the material I have therefore, it seems clear that this was(a) a genuine redundancy situation,(b) not a “clean sweep” type of case, and(c) that if Mr Jones was dismissed on prohibited grounds it must ultimately come within section 105 – or, in the case of his trade union activities, under section 153 of the 1992 Act.[27]Accordingly, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear a claim for interim relief and it is refused.