Mr P Knowles v London North Eastern Railway Ltd: 6001613/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6001613/2025

Between

Mr P KnowlesClaimant

London North Eastern Railway LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Jaleel

In person for claimant

Ms V Kendrew for respondent

Date 15 April 2026

REASONS

[1]These reasons are produced at the claimant’s request having delivered oral judgment at the Preliminary Hearing.

Background

[2]By way of the claim form presented to the Tribunal on 16 January 2025 and those matters heard at the preliminary hearing on 15 May 2025 the claimant sought to advance complaints of discrimination namely discrimination arising from disability as well as a claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments.

[3]This claim has previously been case managed during a Preliminary Hearing on 15 May 2025 by Employment Judge Morgan, who summarised the background to this claim and set out the purpose of today’s hearing in his case management summary.

[4]The claimant was employed by the respondent, a train operating company, as a Product Manager, from 18 September 2023 until 29 March 2024. He was dismissed with one month’s notice on 28 February 2024.

[5]Early conciliation started on 21 April 2024 and ended on 22 May 2024. The claim form was presented on 16 January 2025.

[6]The claim is about disability discrimination. The claimant states that he had fibromyalgia and as a result he gets fatigue and confused. The claimant also states that he has ADHD, and/or depression. However, the claimant does not rely on ADHD and/or depression in his discrimination claims against the respondent. The claimant only seeks to rely on these additional disabilities for purposes of seeking the just and equitable extension to the limitation period.

[7]Employment Judge Morgan noted that the claimant did not submit his complaints within the primary time limit under s123 of the Equality Act 2010. He stated that the purpose of the hearing was to consider whether the claimant’s claim was presented within a further period that the Tribunal considers just and equitable.

[8]The issues for this hearing were to consider whether the claimant has no reasonable prospects of success in establishing that it would be just and equitable to extend the period to 16 January 2025 (the date of submission of the claim). In the alternative the Tribunal will consider whether to make a deposit order on the grounds of limitation.

[9]For the purposes of time limits:1.1 The claimant was dismissed on 28 February 2024 (with his last working day being 29 March 2024)

1.2 The claimant contacted ACAS for early claim conciliation on 21 April 2024 and received his certificate on 22 May 2024;

1.3 The claimant issued his claim on 16 January 2025 and therefore any complaint that took place before 16 October 2024 are outside of the statutory time limits. The latest act of discrimination as identified by Employment Judge Morgan was the claimant’s dismissal on 28 February 2024; and

1.4 The claimant should therefore have lodged his claim by 27 June 2024.

[10]I had before me a bundle of documents which was lodged on behalf of the parties and the claimant also submitted a witness statement dated 28 August 2025. The Tribunal then heard evidence from the claimant only. Parties were also afforded the opportunity to make submissions; Ms Kendrew elected to supplement with written submissions and the claimant was afforded the opportunity to respond to the aforementioned. Key legal principles

[11]The claimant has brought complaints of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. The time limits provisions of the Equality Act 2010 are set out at s123, which states: “1) Proceedings…..may not be brought after the end of –(a) The period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b) Such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.”

[12]I considered the legal principles set out below, in addition to those set out in both representatives’ helpful submissions. I have not reproduced the contents of the arguments and submissions in this Judgment in the interests of brevity.

[13]Conduct complained of which extends over a period of time is treated as being done at the end of the period (s123(3)(a) Equality Act 2010). In this way, where conduct is a continuous course, it does not matter if something complained of more than 3 months previously, so long as the last conduct within that chain is done within the 3 months prior to the bringing of the claim.

[14]The Court of Appeal in Robertson v Bexley Community Centre

[2003] IRLR 434

stated that it is for the claimant seeking an extension of time to persuade the Tribunal that this should be granted.

[15]The Court of Appeal in Adedeji v University College Hospital Birmingham NHS Trust [2021] EWCA Civ23 has set out the approach that the Employment Tribunal should take in relation to the just and equitable test. The Court of Appeal emphasised that there is no need to go through every factor set out in the s33 Limitation Act 1980 ‘checklist’ recommended in British Coal Corporation v Keeble

[1997] IRLR 336

. Underhill LJ stated at paragraph 38 of his judgment: “The best approach for a Tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion under section 123(1)(b) is to assess all the factors in the particular case which it considers relevant to whether it is just and equitable to extend time including……the length of, and the reasons for, the delay.”

[16]It is for the claimant to persuade me to exercise my discretion to extend time (Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston

[2009] EWCA Civ 1298

). That discretion is wide, and is to be exercised in response to the particular facts or circumstances of the case in question (Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

[2018] ICR 1194

CA; University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation

[2021] EWCA Civ 23

[17]In addition, the Tribunal must consider the potential prejudice to the parties of any decision on time limits, including the merits of the claim (Donald v AVC Media Enterprises Ltd EAT/00016/14). I also note that in the recent case of Secretary of State for Justice v Johnson [2022] EAT1, the EAT applied Adedeji and noted that the Employment Tribunal should consider the effect that extending the time limit would have on the respondent’s ability to defend the claim where events took place some time ago. Claimant’s evidence regarding delay

[18]The claimant’s delay in presenting his claim was considerable and in his own evidence the claimant accepts this ‘I do not suggest that the delay is trivial’. As set out above the last potential act identified by Employment Judge Morgan at the preliminary hearing was the termination of employment on 28 February 2024. The primary time limit for presenting a claim expired on 27 June 2024.

[19]The claimant’s evidence was that the delay in presenting his claim is related largely to two factors(1) his mental and physical health and

(2) the ignorance/misunderstanding of the time limits applicable to discrimination claims.

[20]In respect of his medical conditions the claimant highlighted that he was impacted by ‘fibro fog’ which caused him confusion and not being able to concentrate, slowing processing and causing memory lapses. He also referred to his ADHD and depressive symptoms as contributing to the delay in submitting the claim. The side effects of his medication pregabalin and duloxetine are also said to cause him daytime drowsiness. In his witness statement the claimant stated “…These conditions are long-term and have a substantial adverse effect on my day-to-day activities including reading, concentrating, organising paperwork, sleeping and travelling..”

[21]The claimant states that he was impacted by symptoms from May to December 2024 which included daily fatigue, cognitive impairment, low mood anxiety and side effects of medication. He also states that the grievance/appeal process exacerbated his symptoms.

[22]The claimant also provided a letter from Psychiatry UK dated 18 May 2024 which confirmed a diagnosis of Adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Fibromyalgia, Depressive disorder and Hiatus Hernia/GORD. It also confirmed that he was taking medication and that he would benefit from Primary Care CBT therapy. However, the letter also stated: “..His proactive approach to seeking help and engaging with healthcare professionals suggests a good capacity for making informed decisions about his care…” “..Paul does not appear to pose a significant risk to himself or others. He has not expressed any suicidal ideation or violent tendencies. While he does experience periods of low mood associated with his depression, Paul has a supportive family structure and is taking steps to manage his mental health proactively….His engagement with healthcare services and openness to treatment suggest that he is in a relatively stable position regarding safeguarding concerns…”

[23]During cross-examination it was put to the claimant that the medical evidence suggested he had clear mental capacity at the time, but he was adamant that it related to his treatment and conditions only rather than his wider capability.

[24]It was the claimant’s evidence that the combination of conditions impacted on his ability to function as a whole. However, he accepted that there was no medical evidence in the bundle of documents which supported the view that he was unable to submit a Tribunal claim during the requisite time period.

[25]The claimant also received advice from his trade union and ACAS:a. the claimant was in receipt of trade union advice from March 2024 and was instructed to follow ACAS advice. In his oral evidence the claimant stated that he has been back in touch with his trade union advisor who accepted “that he had failed me a little bit”.

b. The grievance meeting documents suggest that the claimant also had access to a solicitor at that time. The claimant stated that his focus was on trying to resolve matters without escalation and he did not approach his solicitor despite telling his employer he would.

c. The claimant accepted that he discussed matters with ACAS and stated that he was advised that he one year to submit is claim. In his evidence he accepted that he probably misunderstood the advice that was provided but stated that this was compounded by fibro-fog and low mood.

[26]The claimant also added that he had ongoing family responsibilities as a parent of 3 children and whilst unwell, left him with very limited capacity for complex administrative tasks.

[27]The claimant was keen to emphasise that the primary reason as to why he did not submit his claim on time related to his health conditions and on his symptoms stabilising in January 2025, he promptly lodged this on 16 January 2025.

[28]The claimant is of the view that any prejudice to the respondent is limited as key issues turn on contemporaneous documents. In contrast he contends that prejudice to himself is significant as he would lose the opportunity to proceed with his claims.

[29]My findings on these points are as follows:a. the claimant did not provide any objective evidence as to why his health prevented him from issuing a claim; the claimant’s medical evidence does not refer to any significant difficulties caused by his health at the requisite time and I do not accept the claimant’s explanation that the correspondence from Psychiatry UK was limited in its scope. If there were any specific concerns with regards to his ability for example concentrating, cognitive function, fatigue, pain etc that would be highlighted as part of the consultation. In fact, the correspondence supported that his mental health was stable. Even if I am incorrect about my assertion with regards to the same, there is no further medical evidence or GP notes or other medical professionals that evidence that the claimant had significant difficulties in functioning on a daily basis as claimed due to his health. In fact, up to May 2024 the claimant commenced a new job role, was able to discuss matters with his union representative, acas conciliator and engaged in a grievance/appeal procedure. This is inconsistent with the level of restriction claimed due to ill health (physical and cognitive), care responsibilities and side effects of medication.

b. Further, there is a complete lack of supporting medical evidence postdating May 2024 – December 2024 to corroborate the claimant’s evidence. It is reasonable to expect anyone with exacerbated physical and mental health symptoms to have discussed ongoing issues and treatment options with relevant medical professionals. There is simply no evidence submitted in support of this.

c. The grievance/appeal process concluded by the end of May 2024. There is no objective evidence to indicate that the process had exacerbated the claimant’s condition as claimed (referred to above). In fact, the medical evidence dated 18 May 2024 which is in close proximity stated that he had a proactive approach to seek help and engage with healthcare professionals which suggested a good capacity for making informed decisions.

d. The claimant discussed matters with his trade union representative (who assisted him during the internal process) and he also contacted ACAS on or around 21 April 2024. His employment had been terminated, and he would have been aware that he could bring a claim in the Employment Tribunal in respect of the manner in which he alleges he had been treated by the respondent. I found it implausible that both ACAS and a trade union representative would fail to and/or negligently advise the claimant about strict time limits that apply to the submission of his claim(s) in the Employment Tribunal. Further, there is a lack of evidence to corroborate the claimant’s evidence such as for example emails to ACAS or the trade union which would shed light on their shortcomings. The claimant stated that he did not wish to rely upon negligent advice being provided by ACAS or the trade union representative. The claimant also confirmed that he had not raised any complaints with regards to the advice he had received.

e. Even if there were a genuine misunderstanding and the claimant remained ignorant of time limits, I concluded that ignorance was not reasonable in those circumstances. The claimant had access to the ACAS website and other literature from the time of his dismissal onwards. It was not reasonable for the claimant to fail to make any enquiries or conduct any research on his own in relation to time limits. A simple Google search relating to discrimination claims in the Tribunal would have highlighted time limits for bringing a claim. If he was in any doubt and he felt that he wasn’t able to concentrate when advice was forthcoming, there was no doubt he could have made a simple secondary check to ensure the information was accurate.

f. I also take into account that the claimant was able to find employment by mid-April 2024. The claimant stated that he was working in excess of his contractual 40 hours a week and felt he was doing a good job. He left his role due to redundancy in October 2024 and was able to make in excess of 300 job applications. There is no evidence of seeking time off due to his health and he was fact he was regularly working over 40 hours a week. His ability to make in excess of 300 job applications at the time is also inconsistent with his claim that he had limited capacity to undertake administrative tasks due to ill health, managing care responsibilities and side effects of medication.

g. The claim was submitted in January 2025, a delay of over 6 months, which is considerable.

[30]I must also weigh up the balance of prejudice caused to both parties. If I do not extend the time limits, the claimant will not be able to proceed with his discrimination complaints. There is also prejudice to the respondent in looking back at matters between September 2023 to February 2024; memories fade and there is a real risk that key documents relating to issues at hand are no longer available due to the considerable passage of time.

[31]I must also weigh up the merits of the claimant’s claims. I note that the claims as clarified at the previous case management hearing by Judge Morgan include:31.1 the claimant started working for the respondent on 18 September 2023

31.2 The claimant had a 12-month contact with the respondent. He was dismissed 6 months into the contract through the probation review procedure on the grounds of poor performance

31.3 the claimant states that the respondent had a practice of working from its office, site or location which was changed in December 2023 and as a result of his inability to adapt to change he suffered from a flare up of his condition.

31.4 the claimant states that he was forced to work additional hours and the decline in his health led to a deterioration of his performance at work causing him to be dismissed.

31.5 the claimant also complains that the respondent’s policy of failure to pay occupational sick pay in the first year of employment was discriminatory.

31.6 the acts of discrimination arising from disability the claimant relies upon as set out in the case management summary document took place from December 2023 to 28 February 2024

31.7 the failure to make reasonable adjustments relied upon by the claimant as set out in the case management document took place from 18 September 2023 to 28 February 2024

[32]I note that the claimant would be required to provide sufficient evidence to the Tribunal to show a prima facie claim for discrimination and/or failure to make reasonable adjustments. I am not making findings of fact on these matters. For the purposes of a claim under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, it is not sufficient for the claimant simply to assert poor performance alongside the existence of a disability. He must establish, on the evidence, that the alleged unfavourable treatment (including dismissal) was because of something arising in consequence of his disability. In circumstances where the Respondent contends that no such causal link was identified or communicated at the time and that the claimant did not attribute his performance difficulties to any medical condition during employment this presents a clear evidential hurdle. Further, even if such a link were established, the respondent retains the statutory defence of objective justification, namely that the treatment such as performance management and working arrangements was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, such as maintaining performance standards and were objectively justified.

[33]In relation to then reasonable adjustments claim similar challenges apply. It is argued that any requests for adjustments arose post dismissal only, which if established would materially undermine the claimant’s complaint and is far from straightforward. The fact that a change in working practices took place, again does not qualify the complaint as being well made out. The claimant will be required to show that those requirements were the relevant PCPs, that they caused a substantial disadvantage linked to disability, and that the respondent knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, both of the disability and of that disadvantage at the time when any adjustment should have been made. Similarly, the complaint relating to the application of sick pay is fact sensitive.

[34]In both instances the burden of proof does not shift automatically.

Conclusion

[36]I have concluded that it would not be just and equitable to extend the time limit for bringing the claimant’s claim, such that the presentation of his claim on 16 January 2025 would have been in time. The key reasons for my conclusion are:a. the claimant has failed to provide an adequate explanation of why he was unable to present his claim between 28 February 2024 and 27 June 2024;

b. the claimant referred to ill health but did not provide any objective medical evidence as to why this prevented him from presenting his claim by 27 June 2024. Further, the level of activity the claimant was engaged in was inconsistent with the level of restriction he claimed in respect of his ability to function, physically and cognitively between February 2024 – December 2024;

c. the claimant referred to misunderstanding/ignorance of time limits, but I found this was not reasonable in the circumstances; and

d. the respondent will be prejudiced if the Tribunal extends the time limits such that the claimant is able to pursue his complaints, which already date back over two years as at the date of this Judgment.

[37]For those reasons I concluded that the claim was not brought within the relevant time limit or other such period as was just and equitable. I therefore struck out the claimant’s claims of discrimination arising from disability and failure to make reasonable adjustments. Approved by