Mr D Lee v Ford Retail Ltd T/a TrustFord: 6001387/2026

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6001387/2026, 6043741/2025
Mr D LeeClaimantFord Retail Limited t/a TrustFord FULL WRITTEN REASONS 1. I explained my summary reasons for rejecting the claimant’s application for interim relief under s128 and s129 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 at the hearing on 11 March 2026. The judgment relating to the claimant’s application was sent to the parties on 12 March 2026. The claimant emailed the Tribunal on 13 March 2026 and requested written reasons. I decided that it would be appropriate to provide full written reasons given the limited nature of the decision made in an interim relief application in accordance with Rule 60(4E) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. 2. The claimant has another existing Tribunal claim (case reference 6043741/2025) which he presented to the Tribunal on 27 November 2025 containing disability discrimination complaints. 3. The task for the Tribunal on an interim relief hearing is to make a broad assessment on the material available to try to get an understanding of the evidence and to make a prediction of what is likely to happen at the eventual substantive hearing of these claims. In doing so, I am not making findings of fact relating to this claim. I mustRespondent
Date 26 March 2026
[1]I explained my summary reasons for rejecting the claimant’s application for interim relief under s128 and s129 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 at the hearing on 11 March 2026. The judgment relating to the claimant’s application was sent to the parties on 12 March 2026. The claimant emailed the Tribunal on 13 March 2026 and requested written reasons. I decided that it would be appropriate to provide full written reasons given the limited nature of the decision made in an interim relief application in accordance with Rule 60(4E) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.[2]The claimant has another existing Tribunal claim (case reference 6043741/2025) which he presented to the Tribunal on 27 November 2025 containing disability discrimination complaints.[3]The task for the Tribunal on an interim relief hearing is to make a broad assessment on the material available to try to get an understanding of the evidence and to make a prediction of what is likely to happen at the eventual substantive hearing of these claims. In doing so, I am not making findings of fact relating to this claim. I must consider the documentary evidence that was made available to me during this hearing, together with the parties’ submissions.[4]I also note that Rule 95 of the Employment Tribunal Rules makes it clear that the Tribunal shall not hear any oral evidence during an interim relief hearing unless it directs otherwise.[5]The parties provided a considerable volume of documents to the Tribunal for my consideration (over 120 pages from the claimant and over 330 pages from the respondent). The respondent also provided a skeleton argument. I did not read every page of the documents sent to the Tribunal – it would simply have been impossible to do so, given that the time estimate for this hearing was three hours. Case Number: 6001387/2026 2[6]Both parties made oral submissions during the hearing today. The key legal points that I considered included:6.1 the well-known authority of Taplin v C Shipham Ltd [1978] IRLR 450, which requires the Tribunal to consider whether it is ‘likely’ that the claimant will establish that she was dismissed because of a protected disclosure;6.2 ‘Likely’ has been interpreted to mean that the claimant has “a pretty good chance” of establishing that she was dismissed for that reason (see for example: Ministry of Justice v Safraz UK EAT/0578/10, London City Airport Ltd v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610). I note that the EAT in Sarfraz held that: “’Likely’ does not mean simply ‘more likely than not’ – that is at least 51% - but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood”.6.3 Sarfraz also confirms that the test must apply to all elements of the claim.6.4 the EAT’s decision in Dr C Hancock v Mr M Ter-Berg and NHS England Midlands and East (UKEAT/0138/19/BA) which concluded that the ‘likely to succeed’ test for interim relief applies to all elements of a claim that the claimant has to prove, not just to the reason for dismissal. Mr Justice Choudhary held at paragraph 38 that: "The Tribunal will clearly need to consider the likely outcome of the eventual determination of the complaint. The provision [for interim relief does not preclude a] Tribunal from having regard to the merits of other elements of the claim aside from the reason for dismissal. Indeed, if it were not to have regard to such matters at the interim relief stage, then it would not be considering the likely outcome on determination of the complaint (but only part of it)...a full determination of employee status would require disclosure, witness statements and a substantive hearing at which witnesses would be questioned and cross-examined. To convene such a hearing, even on an expedited basis, would lead to substantial delays in the hearing of an interim relief application. Indeed, the intended interim nature of that hearing would be substantially undermined, particularly if the preliminary issue is itself the subject of any subsequent appeal."[7]On the basis of the evidence presented to me during the hearing, I concluded that the claimant did not meet the test required to grant his application for interim relief. The key reasons for my decision are set out below. Is it likely that the claimant make a protected disclosure or protected disclosures to the respondent under s43B ERA? Is it likely that the C had reasonable belief that: a) Any qualifying disclosures made fell within categories set out in s43(B)(1); and b) Such disclosures were made in the public interest? Case Number: 6001387/2026 3[8]The claimant disclosed information in a report dated 16 December 2025 and followed up with this on 19 December 2025to Ford UK via its EthicsPoint procedure. This information was also provided to the respondent on 20 December 2025. On a broad brush assessment, I concluded that the claimant had disclosed information that he reasonably believed (at least in relation to the report submitted on 16 December 2025) showed that there had been a breach of a legal obligation.[9]However, I concluded that the claimant did not reasonably believe that such disclosure was in the public interest. This is because the claimant referred to concerns that he had raised regarding the handling of his personal health conditions in the workplace. He did not raise concerns regarding the respondent’s handling of the health conditions of its wider workforce. For example, the claimant did not make any specific allegations of disability discrimination by the respondent against other employees.[10]I therefore concluded that the claimant had not made a protected disclosure to the respondent. If so is it likely that the reason or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal was such protected disclosure or protected disclosures under s103A ERA?[11]Even if the claimant had made a protected disclosure or disclosures, I could not conclude that it was likely or that there was a ‘pretty good chance’ that the claimant would succeed in persuading the Tribunal that he was dismissed for making such disclosure or disclosures. This is because:11.1 on the claimant’s own case, the respondent had decided to ‘get rid’ of the claimant before the meeting on 8 December 2026 where the respondent attempted to hold a protected conversation and make a settlement proposal to the claimant. The claimant described this meeting as a ‘de facto dismissal’ in his claim form;11.2 this meeting took place over a week before the claimant states that he made his first protected disclosure on 16 December 2026.[12]I rejected the claimant’s application for interim relief for the reasons set out above. Approved by: Employment Judge Deeley 26 March 2026 Case Number: 6001387/2026 4 Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 52) and any full written reasons for the judgments are published online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant and respondent.