Miss S Mohammed v Discover the World Ltd: 6000768/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 6000768/2025

Between

Miss S MohammedClaimant

Discover the World LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Macey

In person for claimant

Mr Feeny (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 24 October 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]By consent the respondent’s name is amended to Discover the World Limited.

[2]The claimant’s complaints of automatic unfair dismissal by reason of making a protected disclosure and suffering a detriment on the grounds of making a protected disclosure are dismissed on withdrawal by the claimant.

[3]The claimant has less than 2 years’ continuous service with the respondent at the date of her dismissal and, pursuant to Section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 the Employment Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear a claim of unfair dismissal as presented.

[4]The claimant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that it was not reasonably practicable to present her complaints for breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages within the applicable time limit. The complaints of breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages are therefore struck out under Employment Tribunal Rule 38(1)(a).

[5]The application to strike out the complaints of discrimination is refused. The Tribunal will decide at the final hearing whether or not the complaints of discrimination were presented within the applicable time limit.

REASONS

[1]The purpose of the preliminary hearing in public was to decide the respondent’s strikeout application based upon the claimant not presenting her complaints to the Tribunal within the applicable time limits.

PROCEDURE

[2]There was a preliminary hearing bundle prepared by the respondent of 50 pages. The claimant also provided two pdf documents to the Tribunal and the respondent in advance of the hearing (though unfortunately the Tribunal did not have sight of these until the day of the hearing). One was titled “Fire and Medical” (27 pages) and the other was titled “More Medical” (7 pages). The claimant also provided a written witness statement and gave sworn evidence to the Tribunal. The respondent also prepared a skeleton argument and the respondent and the claimant made oral submissions/ representations to the Tribunal.

FACTS

[3]The claimant commenced employment with the respondent as a data entry administrator on 9 August 2022. The claimant’s employment terminated on 5 July 2024.

[4]The claimant commenced ACAS early conciliation on 2 October 2024 and ACAS early conciliation ended on 13 November 2024.

[5]The claimant presented complaints of unfair dismissal, discrimination relying on the protected characteristics of age, race, sex and disability, breach of contract for failure to pay notice pay and unauthorised deductions from wages for failure to pay accrued holiday pay on termination on 8 January 2025.

[6]On 22 October 2023 the claimant lost her accommodation due to a house fire. The claimant became homeless at that point and is still currently homeless. She has been sofa surfing since that date alternating between two different addresses.

[7]Prior to 22 October 2023 the claimant had been suffering from anxiety and depression. The claimant also had been struggling with severe menopause symptoms, including brain fog, insomnia, vasomotor symptoms, hair loss, and poor memory and concentration prior to 22 October 2023 and these were ongoing throughout her employment and prior to presenting her complaint to the Tribunal.

[8]Following the fire on 22 October 2023 the claimant was also diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Also, as of 14 November 2023 the claimant was experiencing severe depression and severe anxiety.

[9]The claimant also has an underactive thyroid for which she takes medication.

[10]The claimant commenced cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) on 5 April 2025 with NHS Talking Therapies. The claimant received a further letter from NHS Talking Therapies on 1 May 2024 signposting her to self-help materials for PTSD and confirming that a review would be offered to the claimant in two months’ time.

[11]The claimant continued working for the respondent after the fire. The claimant did take two sick days out of the country in May 2024 followed by a period of annual leave where she took a holiday abroad.

[12]On the claimant’s return from annual leave, she was involved in many consultation meetings with the respondent in respect of a proposed redundancy. The claimant was continuing to work between the consultation meetings.

[13]The last consultation meeting was on 1 July 2024 in which the claimant was informed that her employment would terminate on 5 July 2024. The claimant was paid in lieu of notice (though there is disagreement between the parties about whether it was for the correct period).

[14]The claimant raised a grievance and appealed the decision to terminate her employment. The claimant did not attend the appeal hearing. The claimant did not engage with the grievance process or attend a grievance hearing.

[15]Between 8 August 2024 and 1 October 2024, the claimant was corresponding with both her Member of Parliament (“MP”) and Southwark Borough Council about her ongoing homelessness.

[16]The claimant was receiving assistance from ACAS in the months leading up to commencing ACAS Early Conciliation on 2 October 2024. The claimant was also in contact with ACAS during the Early Conciliation period.

[17]The claimant had a hysteroscopy and biopsy on 21 November 2024. The letter confirming the date of the pre-admissions appointment (14 November 2024) for this procedure was provided by the claimant. The claimant was in hospital for one day for the procedure. The reason for the biopsy was to ensure the claimant did not have cancer. The hysteroscopy was necessary due to the ongoing menopause symptoms the claimant was experiencing. The claimant then recovered at home. For two weeks (up to approximately 5 December 2024) following this procedure the claimant did not do practically anything other than resting.

[18]The claimant says that she did not realise that she only had a month to present her claim to the Employment Tribunal following ACAS issuing the ACAS Early Conciliation Certificate on 13 November 2025. She first stated this fact during cross-examination.

[19]The claimant’s understanding was that the month deadline started from when the respondent provided information to ACAS about whether it would be willing to settle out of court. The claimant in cross-examination was unable to state from what date she thought the one-month time limit had commenced or what date she thought she needed to present her claim. The claimant simply believed that she had presented her claim to the Employment Tribunal early not late.

[20]The claimant had not been given this misinformation by ACAS or anyone else.

[21]On 8 April 2025 the respondent wrote to the Tribunal making an application to strike out the claim on the basis that it had been presented out of time and therefore the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to hear it.

[22]On 10 May 2025 the Tribunal ordered the claimant by 7 June 2025 to write to the respondent and the Tribunal to explain why her claim had been brought out of time, and why it might be just and equitable for the Tribunal to consider the claim in any event. Also, that the statement should be signed by a statement of truth.

[23]The claimant did not comply with this order.

[24]On 24 June 2025 the respondent wrote to the Tribunal requesting an order that unless the claimant provides her statement explaining why the claim had been presented out of time and supporting reasons by 22 July 2025, then the claim will be dismissed.

[25]On 30 August 2025 the Tribunal sent a letter to the claimant informing her that it was considering striking out the claim because it had not been actively pursued. The claimant was given a deadline of 8 September 2025 to respond.

[26]The claimant sent an unsigned witness statement to the Tribunal and the respondent on 21 October 2025. The claimant also sent two pdf documents containing information about the fire on 22 October 2023, correspondence regarding her homelessness and medical information on 21 October 2025. The correspondence to the Tribunal did not include the case number for this matter. This meant that I did not have sight of the witness statement and the claimant’s documents until 11 am on the morning of the hearing. LAW Strike-out under Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024

LAW

[27]Rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 states: “The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on application of a party strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds: (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success.”

[28]The Tribunal must have regard to the overriding objective when considering whether to strike-out the claim.

[29]Strike-out is a draconian step that should be taken only in exceptional cases. Such an exceptional case might arise where it is instantly demonstrable that the central facts in the claim are untrue or there is no real substance in the factual assertions being made.

[30]The Tribunal should take the claimant’s case at its highest, unless contradicted by plainly inconsistent documents.

[31]The obligation to take the claimant’s case at its highest for the purposes of a strike-out application, particularly where a litigant in person is involved, requires the Tribunal to do more than simply ask the claimant to be taken to the relevant material. The Tribunal should carefully consider the claim as pleaded and as set out in relevant supporting documentation before concluding that there is nothing of substance behind it. Time limits Time limits for breach of contract claims and unauthorised deductions from wages claims

[32]The statutory test for time limits in respect of a breach of contract claim is set out in Article 7 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 (“the Order”), namely: “Subject to Article 8B an employment tribunal shall not entertain a complaint in respect of an employee’s contract claim unless it is presented:(a) Within the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination of the contract giving rise to the claim, or

(b) Where there is no effective date of termination, within the period of three months beginning the last day upon which the employee worked in the employment which has been terminated… (ba)…

(c) When the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within whichever of those periods is applicable, within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

[33]Article 8B of the Order states:(1) This article applies where this Order provides for it to apply for the purposes of a provision of this Order (“a relevant provision”).

(2) In this article – (a) Day A is the day on which the worker concerned complies with the requirement in subsection (1) of section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (requirement to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings) in relation to the matter in respect of which proceedings are brought, and (b) Day B is the day on which the worker concerned receives or, if earlier is treated as receiving (by virtue of regulations made under subsection (11) of this section) the certificate issued under subsection (4) of that section.

(3) In working out when the time limit set by a relevant provision expires the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted.

(4) If the time limit set by a relevant provision would (if not extended by this section) expire during the period beginning with Day A and ending one month after Day B, the time limit expires instead at the end of that period.

(5) Where an employment tribunal has power under this Order to extend the time limit set by a relevant provision, the power is exercisable in relation to that time limit as extended by this regulation.

[34]The statutory test for a complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages (for the failure to pay accrued but untaken holiday pay on termination) is set out in section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”), namely: “(1) A worker may present a complaint to an [employment tribunal] —(a) that his employer has made a deduction from his wages in contravention of section 13 (including a deduction made in contravention of that section as it applies by virtue of section 18(2)),

(b) …

(d) … (2) Subject to subsection (4), an [employment tribunal] shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with— (a) in the case of a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, or (b) in the case of a complaint relating to a payment received by the employer, the date when the payment was received. (3) … (3A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (2). ] (4) Where the [employment tribunal] is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this section to be presented before the end of the relevant period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.”

[35]Section 207B of the ERA is the same as Article 8B of the Order set out above.

[36]I referred myself to the guidance in the cases of Wall’s Meat Co Ltd v Khan

[1979] ICR 52

, EWCA, as to the Tribunal’s discretion in such matters and also that as stated in Porter v Bandridge Ltd

[1978] ICR 943

, EWCA, the burden of proof is upon the claimant and that in respect of ignorance of rights, the correct test is not whether the claimant knew of his or her rights but whether he or she ought to have known of them.

[37]The Court of Appeal in Lowri Beck Services Ltd v Brophy

[2019] EWCA Civ 2490

summarised the principles that apply to the reasonably practicable test: “There has been a good deal of case law about the correct approach to the test of reasonable practicability. The essential points for our purposes can be summarised as follows:(1) The test should be given "a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee (Marks and Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan

[2005] EWCA Civ 470

[2005] ICR 1293

, which reaffirms the older case law going back to Dedman v British Building & Engineering Appliances Ltd

[1974] ICR 53

(2) The statutory language is not to be taken as referring only to physical impracticability and for that reason might be paraphrased as whether it was "reasonably feasible" for the claimant to present his or her claim in time: see Palmer and Saunders v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

[1984] IRLR 119

. […]

(3) If an employee misses the time limit because he or she is ignorant about the existence of a time limit, or mistaken about when it expires in their case, the question is whether that ignorance or mistake is reasonable. If it is, then it will have been reasonably practicable for them to bring the claim in time (see Wall's Meat Co Ltd v Khan

[1979] ICR 52

); but it is important to note that in assessing whether ignorance or mistake are reasonable it is necessary to take into account any enquiries which the claimant or their adviser should have made.

(4) If the employee retains a skilled adviser, any unreasonable ignorance or mistake on the part of the adviser is attributed to the employee (Dedman). […]

(5) The test of reasonable practicability is one of fact and not of law (Palmer).”

[38]Where the claimant relies upon their ill health and other matters as to reasons why they were not able to present the claim in time, the Tribunal should consider what else they were able to do over that period to assess the practicability of presenting a claim: Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd v Britton

[2022] IRLR 906

. Time limits for discrimination complaints

[39]The statutory test in respect of discrimination complaints is set out in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010, namely: “Subject to section 40B, proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of – the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.”

[40]Section 40(B) of the Equality Act 2010 is the same as Article 8B of the Order set out above.

[41]The discretion to hear out-of-time claims within whatever period the Tribunal considers to be ‘just and equitable’ is clearly broader than the discretion to allow late claims to proceed where it was not ‘reasonably practicable’ to present the claim in time (and then only if the claim was presented within a reasonable time thereafter).

[42]I had regard to Bexley Community Centre (t/a Leisure Link) -v- Robertson

[2003] EWCA Civ 576

that the time limit should not be extended unless the claimant convinces the Tribunal that is it is just and equitable to do so and the exercise of the discretion should be the exception, not the rule.

[43]I also had regard to O’Neill -v- Jaegar Retail Ltd

UKEAT/0026/19

that the Tribunal should not adopt an unduly restrictive view of the relevant evidence.

[44]Section 123 of the Equality Act 2010 does not specify any list of factors to which a Tribunal should have regard in deciding whether to extend time for ‘just and equitable’ reasons.

[45]The Court of Appeal in Southwark London Borough Council v Afolabi

2003 ICR 800

, CA suggested that there are two factors which are almost always relevant when considering the exercise of any discretion whether to extend time: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; and whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent.

[46]DPP -v- Marshall

[1998] IRLR 494

held that the Tribunal’s discretion is as wide as the civil courts under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. This requires civil courts to consider factors relevant to the prejudice that each party would suffer if an extension was refused.

[47]Section 33(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 requires the court or tribunal to consider the prejudice that each party would suffer if the extension of time were granted. The Court of Appeal in Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Carroll

2017 EWCA Civ 1992

, CA, summarised the test thus: “The essence of the proper exercise of the judicial discretion under S.33 is that the test is a balance of prejudice and the burden is on the claimant to show that his or her prejudice would outweigh that to the defendant.”

[48]Although section 33 does not apply to employment tribunals when deciding whether to extend time under the Equality Act 2010, a consistent line of EAT authority beginning with British Coal Corporation v Keeble and ors

1997 IRLR 336

, EAT, shows that they are generally expected to apply an equivalent test.

[49]Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 states: (3) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to –(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the Claimant;

(b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the Claimant or the Defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed…;

(c) the conduct of the Defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent (if any) to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the Claimant for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the Claimant’s cause of action against the Defendant;

(d) the duration of any disability of the Claimant arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action;

(e) the extent to which the Claimant acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the Defendant … might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages;

(f) the steps, if any, taken by the Claimant to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received.

[50]Although section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 is a useful checklist there is no legal obligation on the Tribunal to go through the list provided no significant factor is left out. The emphasis should be on whether the delay has affected the ability of the Tribunal to conduct a fair hearing (Marshall).

[51]Adedeji -v- University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust

[2021] EWCA Civ 23

cautioned against Tribunals rigidly adhering to the checklist of potentially relevant factors in section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. Tribunals should assess all the relevant factors in a case, including “the length of and the reasons for the delay.” SUBMISSIONS

[52]In respect of all the complaints (regardless of which test was applicable) Mr Feeny submitted that the reasons for the delay provided in the claimant’s witness statement (being her homelessness, her mental health and her medical symptoms) were not the true reasons. Mr Feeny submitted that it was clear from the evidence that the real reason for the delay in the presentation of the claim was the claimant’s misunderstanding about the start date of the one-month time limit following the issuing of the ACAS Early Conciliation Certificate.

[53]Mr Feeny submitted that the other reasons were not causative because the claimant took annual leave abroad in May 2024, she continued to work in the weeks up to July 2024, between August 2024 and October 2024 she corresponded with her MP and Southwark Borough Council and that she liaised with ACAS before commencing Early Conciliation and during the Early Conciliation period.

[54]Mr Feeny further submitted that the claimant’s evidence had not indicated that she had been provided with this wrong information but that she had simply misunderstood the correct legal position. Mr Feeny also highlighted that during the claimant’s evidence she had not been able to clarify what she thought had been the trigger point for the one-month time limit or the date she thought the one-month time limit had started. That even if there was later correspondence the fact was that the claimant got the law wrong, she had not been misled by anyone else and she had been in regular contact with ACAS.

[55]In respect of the claimant’s one day operation on 21 November 2024 and the two weeks’ rest period afterwards Mr Feeny submitted that this rest period was not a reason why the claimant could not have presented the claim and that in any event the two weeks ended approximately a week prior to the deadline for presenting the claim.

[56]In respect of the test of reasonably practicability for the breach of contract complaint and the unauthorised deductions from wages complaint Mr Feeny submitted that it clearly had been reasonably practicable for the claimant to bring her claim on time and that the claimant should have asked ACAS.

[57]In respect of the just and equitable extension test for the discrimination complaints Mr Feeny submitted that the length of time was not insignificant being nearly a month. That there was an item of forensic prejudice to the respondent because one potential witness (Mr Pereira) had left the respondent in May 2025 and had moved away.

[58]Mr Feeny submitted that on the merits the claimant would have an uphill battle with her discrimination complaint concerning the dismissal because the reason the respondent has asserted for the redundancy in its response form was due to the outsourcing of the claimant’s department to India. That both the claimant and her colleague were made redundant.

[59]Mr Feeny also submitted that the respondent would suffer general prejudice from the late bringing of the claim, including: 59.1. That the resolution of the claim has already been delayed by the need to deal with jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. That once the burden is on the claimant to persuade a Tribunal to accept her claim out of time, the Tribunal is entitled to take into account general prejudice resulting from delays in the Tribunal system. The effect of delay on witnesses’ recollections, particularly in circumstances where it is not clear what the claim is about, would likely prejudice the respondent’s ability to present its defence at the final merits hearing (whenever that may be listed); 59.2. The claims have not been particularised, though it is accepted that the claimant refers to her health issues in the claim form. That it may be that, following particularisation of the claims, they are considered to have little or no real prospect of success. Time and effort will have to be spent particularising the claims, should time be extended. This will put the respondent to additional cost and will further delay resolution of the claim. 59.3. The claimant has already shown an inability to comply with directions. The Tribunal can have no faith that, should the claim be allowed to proceed, the claimant will comply with future directions.

[60]The claimant submitted that the reason she misunderstood the start point of the additional one-month time limit for presenting her claim was due to all the mental health issues that she was still going through at the time. That these had not been resolved and that her anxiety and menopause symptoms were still ongoing. Further that her homelessness was still ongoing. That her PTSD and other mental health symptoms were still being triggered and she was still being triggered as at the date of the hearing (which unfortunately coincided with the two-year anniversary of the fire). The claimant also highlighted that the work situation (i.e. being dismissed) had escalated her mental health problems.

[61]In respect of her corresponding with her MP and Southwark Borough Council between 8 August 2024 and 1 October 2024 the claimant submitted that she had to concentrate on her housing at that time because she was about to lose her current living situation (she was “going to be put out”) and she had no-one to assist her with these issues, she had no choice.

[62]In respect of not including her misunderstanding of when the one-month time limit started in her written witness statement the claimant submitted that she was not sure what information to include and she did not know how much to write.

[63]On the merits the claimant submitted that she had enquired about another position at the respondent but it had then disappeared and that she had been denied that alternative position without any reason. Further that she had been told that it was the claimant’s responsibility to try and retain her job and that it was not the respondent’s responsibility. The claimant also informed me at the start of her submissions that she had not appreciated that there would be a discussion about the merits of her claims in this hearing and that she thought the focus would just be on the time limit point.

[64]The claimant submitted that she was in contact with ACAS in the months leading up to the Early Conciliation period because she was using them as a sounding board and to she needed to get advice.

[65]The claimant submitted that her medical issues had also coincided with her ongoing mental health problems, her menopause symptoms and her homelessness. That her pre-admissions appointment and operation were on back-to-back dates in November 2024 (14 November 2024 and 21 November 2024). All these issues compounded together and the claimant submitted that she did not know how anyone else would not be confused when facing all these issues together at the same time.

[66]The claimant submitted that although one of the respondent’s witnesses had left the organisation (and moved away) there were still a number of individuals who could provide witness evidence on behalf of the respondent. CONCLUSIONS Breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages

CONCLUSIONS

[67]In respect of the claim of breach of contract (for failure to pay the correct notice pay) the parties agree that the claimant’s last day at the respondent was 5 July 2024 and that the claimant received payment in lieu of notice (though they disagree about the period of time paid for in the payment in lieu of notice). I conclude that the claimant’s effective date of termination was 5 July 2024.

[68]I conclude that the primary time limit for the breach of contract claim was, therefore, 4 October 2024. As the claimant contacted ACAS to commence Early Conciliation on 2 October 2024, and Early Conciliation ended on 13 November 2024 the claimant’s limitation period to issue her breach of contract claim, accounting for the time spent in ACAS Early Conciliation, ended on 13 December 2024. Length of the delay

[69]The claimant did not present her claim to the Tribunal until 8 January 2025. I conclude that she presented her complaint for breach of contract 26 days late. This was not a very short delay but nor was it unduly long, being just under a month.

[70]In respect of the unauthorised deductions from wages complaint (for failure to pay accrued holiday on termination) neither the claim form nor the response indicate when the claimant was in fact paid her last payment by the respondent. On the balance of probabilities, as she was paid a figure including payment in lieu of notice, I conclude that this payment occurred on her effective date of termination on 5 July 2024.

[71]I conclude that the claimant also presented her unauthorised deductions from wages complaint 26 days late. Reasons for the delay

[72]The relevant time period to focus upon is 13 November 2024 to 8 January 2025 inclusive.

[73]In her witness statement the claimant relied on her mental health, medical reasons, menopause symptoms and her homelessness.

[74]Given the claimant’s evidence and her submissions, I do conclude that she was still experiencing mental health difficulties of anxiety and PTSD prior to 13 November 2024 and between 13 November 2024 and 8 January 2025. Although she was initially diagnosed with PTSD in November 2023 after the house fire (22 October 2023) the letter confirming her CBT in April 2024 and the letter dated 1 May 2024 talking therapies both demonstrate that her mental health difficulties were ongoing (requiring future reviews) and had not been resolved. Indeed, I observed firsthand that she was still being triggered in the hearing itself (which coincidentally was the two-year anniversary of the house fire).

[75]I also conclude that the claimant’s menopause symptoms were still ongoing prior to 13 November 2024 and between 13 November 2024 to 8 January 2025. The hysteroscopy which took place on 21 November 2024 was to investigate ongoing menopause symptoms and it is highly unlikely that an immediate resolution of the symptoms occurred at that point given the procedure was investigatory.

[76]I conclude that the claimant was still homeless prior to 13 November 2024 and between 13 November 2024 and 8 January 2025. This is clear from her ongoing communications with her MP and Southwark Borough Council and from the claimant’s oral evidence.

[77]Finally, I conclude that the medical reason put forward by the claimant (the hysteroscopy and biopsy) procedure that took place on 21 November 2024 only in fact impacted the claimant for two weeks following that procedure. I conclude that between 5 December 2024 and 13 December 2024 this medical procedure on its own did not prevent the claimant from issuing her claim in time.

[78]Following Cygnet as the claimant is relying on her mental health, menopause symptoms and homelessness I do need to consider what else she was able to do over that period to assess the practicability of presenting a claim. All these issues had been ongoing for some time, the homelessness since 22 October 2023 and the mental health and menopause symptoms had started prior to October 2023 but her mental health had worsened after 22 October 2023. The claimant had still been attending work until her employment terminated on 5 July 2024, she went abroad in May 2024, she was corresponding with her MP and Southward Borough Council between August 2024 and October 2024 and she had been in contact with ACAS in the months leading up to Early Conciliation and during the Early Conciliation period.

[79]I conclude, therefore, that these reasons per se did not prevent the claimant from presenting her claim in time.

[80]The claimant did not present her claim in time because she misunderstood how to calculate the time limit. The claimant did not appreciate or understand the impact of Article 8B (4) of the Order (and the equivalent provisions for the other complaints), that when the primary time limit expires after the start of Early Conciliation (but before one month after the end of Early Conciliation) the claim must be presented no later than one month after the end of Early Conciliation. The claimant did not realise that she only had a month after the end of Early Conciliation, she believed that the start of the one month was a different trigger point.

[81]I do conclude that everything the claimant was experiencing at the time of the Early Conciliation Period and between 13 November 2024 and 8 January 2024 did have an adverse effect on her mental acuity and that she was genuinely confused during this time period.

[82]In respect of the reasonable practicability test it is not enough to rely on ignorance or misunderstanding. In assessing whether ignorance or mistake are reasonable it is necessary to take into account any enquiries which the claimant or their adviser should have made.

[83]I conclude that as the claimant had been in contact with ACAS for the months leading up to Early Conciliation and during the Early Conciliation period she should have asked ACAS for clear guidance on the deadline for issuing her claim following the end of the ACAS Early Conciliation period.

[84]I, therefore, conclude that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to present her complaints of breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages by 13 December 2024.

[85]For these reasons, therefore, the claimant’s complaints of breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages have no reasonable prospect of success. I, therefore, exercise the Tribunal’s discretion to strike-out the claimant’s complaints of breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages under rule 38(1)(a) for having no reasonable prospect of success. Discrimination complaints

[86]In exercising the broad discretion to hear out-of-time claims within whatever period the Tribunal considers to be ‘just and equitable’ I turn to considering the length of, and reasons for, the delay; and whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent. Length of delay

[87]The claimant’s discrimination complaints require an assessment of when the last potential act of discrimination took place. Considering both the claim form and the response I conclude that the last potential act of discrimination was the termination of the claimant’s employment which took effect on 5 July 2024.

[88]This means that the deadline for presenting the complaints of discrimination to the Tribunal is 13 January 2024 for the same reasons as explained in paragraph 68 above.

[89]The claimant did not present her claim to the Tribunal until 8 January 2025. I conclude that she presented her complaints of discrimination 26 days late. I conclude that this was not a very short delay but nor was it unduly long, being just under a month. Reasons for delay

[90]For the same reasons as set out above, I conclude that the claimant did not present her claim in time because she misunderstood how to calculate the time limit.

[91]For the same reasons as set out above, I also conclude that everything the claimant was experiencing at the time of the Early Conciliation Period and between 13 November 2024 and 8 January 2024 did have an adverse effect on her mental acuity and that she was genuinely confused during this time period. Although the claimant’s failure to seek clarification from ACAS was determinative in respect of the test of reasonable practicability the effect is not the same for the broad discretion provided by the test of just and equitable. The claimant was genuinely mistaken about the deadline and there were strong reasons why she was confused at the relevant time. Prejudice to the respondent

[92]In respect of the merits of the claimant’s discrimination complaints I conclude that I have not been presented with sufficient evidence to include an assessment of the merits when balancing the prejudice between the claimant and the respondent. The submissions by both parties indicate potential arguments on both sides and nothing has been presented to me that is incontrovertible evidence that the claimant would either succeed or fail in her complaints of discrimination.

[93]I conclude there is minor forensic prejudice to the respondent due to one of the witnesses (Mr Pereira) leaving its organisation and moving away. I do note, however, that the narrative attached to the claim form mentions Ms Hines and Ms Thorne in the context of the harassment complaints. The narrative attached to the claim form also mentions Mr Furlepa as being involved in the consultation meetings (leading up to her dismissal) with the claimant. I conclude that there are other individuals who can provide witness evidence on behalf of the respondent to defend the complaints of discrimination which means that this minor forensic prejudice is not determinative and simply needs to be added to the assessment of the balance of prejudice.

[94]There is also general prejudice to the respondent in respect of delay and the impact of that delay on its witnesses’ recollections. I conclude that this prejudice has been increased due to the lack of particularisation in the claim form as time will need to be spent particularising the claim either through provision of further information from the claimant or during another preliminary hearing.

[95]Mr Feeny also submitted that the Tribunal could have no faith that the claimant would comply with future directions of the Tribunal because of her failure to comply with the Tribunal’s order dated 7 June 2025. I do not agree that because a claimant has failed to comply with one order made by the Tribunal this therefore means the claimant will not comply with any future directions or orders made by the Tribunal. I would only reach that conclusion if there were a pattern of failing to comply with orders and directions. I, therefore, do not add this point into the general prejudice the respondent will experience if the time limit is extended. Balancing the prejudice between the claimant and the respondent

[96]The prejudice to the claimant if the time limit is not extended to 8 January 2025 is that she will not be able to pursue her complaints of discrimination against the respondent. As her complaints of breach of contract and unauthorised deductions from wages have already been struck out above the impact on the claimant if I do not extend the time limit will be great.

[97]The minor forensic prejudice and general prejudice the respondent will suffer if I do extend the time limit to 8 January 2025 is also very real and not insignificant.

[98]In weighing the balance between the claimant and the respondent I do, however, take into account that the delay in presenting the claim was not unduly long and that the claimant had strong reasons why she was genuinely confused between 13 November 2024 and 8 January 2024 and therefore mistaken as to the correct time limit for bringing her claim.

[99]I, therefore, conclude that the balance of prejudice lies in favour of the claimant and that it would be just and equitable to extend the time for presenting the complaints of discrimination to 8 January 2025.

[100]Given the above I conclude that it is not open to me to use my discretion to strikeout the complaints of discrimination on the grounds that they have no reasonable prospects of success. The respondent’s application to strike-out the claimant’s complaints of discrimination is refused. Approved by: