Mr M King v Kennedy and Elliott Partnership LLP and Others: 6000566/2026
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 6000566/2026
Between
Mr M KingClaimantKennedy and Elliott Partnership LLP and OthersRespondent
Before
Employment Judge WrightMr B Williams - counsel for respondentDate 22 January 2026
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s application for interim relief failed and was dismissed. Approved by
REASONS
[1]The claimant requested written reasons under Rule 60(3).[2]This was the claimant’s application for interim relief. Such applications are dealt with urgently. The interim relief application was made and accepted on the 6 January 2026. It has to be made within seven days of the date of dismissal. The respondent agreed the date of dismissal was the 30 December 2025. Notice of this hearing was given on the 13 January 2026. Although not a requirement for an application for interim relief, the claimant engaged in Acas early conciliation for all three respondents on the 6 January 2026.[3]The respondents were also informed in a letter of the 13 January 2026 that it was not required to respond to the application for interim relief. At this stage of the claim, there is no response from the respondents.[4]Th claimant was employed as a Support Worker between 20 October 2025 until his dismissal on the 30 December 2025. He brings claims of unfair dismissal (he does not have qualifying service for a claim of unfair dismissal under s.94 Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), for unlawful discrimination Case Number: 6000566 / 2026 based upon the protected characteristic of sex and for ‘a whistleblowing claim including dismissal and any other unfair treatment after whistleblowing’. In essence, he contends after making eight protected disclosures he was subjected to 22 detriments, including his dismissal.[5]The claimant had provided a 33-page skeleton argument. The respondents’ 12-page skeleton argument was only sent shortly before the hearing commenced. Mr Law was offered an adjournment to review that skeleton, however he said he did not need to do so.[6]The only documents considered were the claimant’s 26-page particulars of claim and the two skeleton arguments.[7]Both parties’ submissions on the law were similar. In any event, the law on interim relief is long-established and settled. The substance is: Interim relief The Tribunal has the power to grant interim relief under s.129 ERA 1996 where, after hearing the application ‘it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find – (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in (i) section…103A’. Guidance on this provision (and the corresponding provisions relating to trade union activities) was provided by the EAT in London City Airport v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610: Whether the application for interim relief is made under the 1992 Act or the 1996 Act, the test to be applied by the Tribunal is the same in both cases. That is to say, that the Tribunal must be satisfied that “it is likely that on determining the complaint” the Tribunal will find that the reason or the principal reason for dismissal is that which the employee has asserted. It is not sufficient that the employee is able to establish that “it is likely” they were otherwise unfairly dismissed, i.e. for other reasons. They must be able to show that it is likely that it will be found that they have been dismissed for the sole or the principal reason of their trade union activities. (para.9) As long ago as the decision of this Employment Appeal Tribunal in Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068 it was held that the appropriate test is higher than simply establishing that the balance is somewhat more in favour of the employee's prospect of success. It must, on the authority of Taplin, be established that the employee can demonstrate a pretty good chance of success. (para.10) The EAT in Al Qasimi v Robinson (UKEAT/0283/17) emphasised that the test of likelihood is ‘a relatively high bar for a claimant’ (paras.9-10). In Wollenberg v Global Gaming Ventures (Leeds) Ltd (UKEAT/0053/18) a differently constituted EAT observed: The question is whether the claim under section 103A is likely to succeed. This does not simply mean more likely than not. It connotes Case Number: 6000566 / 2026 a significantly higher degree of likelihood. The Tribunal should ask itself whether the Applicant has established that he has a pretty good chance of succeeding in the final application to the Tribunal. (para.25) The Claimant is therefore only entitled to interim relief if they can persuade the Tribunal that they have significantly better than even chance of succeeding with all of the ingredients necessary to win a claim under s.103A ERA.[8]To summarise the various authorities, the burden is on the claimant. The Tribunal’s task at this hearing is necessarily a cursory exercise. No oral evidence will be heard in accordance with Rule 94. The Tribunal is conducting an expeditious summary assessment doing the best it can with untested evidence.[9]Interim relief is not something which should be granted lightly.[10]In light of those comments, the claimant has to establish that his case has a significantly high degree of likelihood of succeeding, rather than a mere possibility. At a final hearing, the claimant only has to prove his case on the balance of probabilities or establish 51% prospect of succeeding. This application involves a much higher degree of likelihood of success.[11]The claimant has to establish for the purposes of the test that: he made one or more qualifying disclosures and that the reason for his dismissal (if more than one the principal reason) was that he had made a protected qualifying disclosure.[12]The claimant’s eight pleaded protected disclosures do not upon a cursory assessment (the Tribunal’s role in this hearing) appear to fall within the test which Mr Law sets out at paragraph 13 of his skeleton argument. For each pleaded disclosure, there is something missing, whether that be a minimum factual content (Mr Law’s skeleton argument paragraph 15 relying upon Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] EQCA Civ 1436) or what the legal obligation under the heading of health and safety (s.43B(1)(d) ERA) the respondents have breached.[13]The pleaded disclosures require further information to be provided. They need to be such that the Tribunal considering them can see from the pleading, that every aspect of the legal test contained in s.43B ERA has been addressed.[14]Mr Law contends that all the pleaded disclosures can be aggregated (paragraph 21 quoting Norbrook Laboratories (GB) Ltd v Shaw [2014] ICR 546). The legal position he sets out is correct. Based upon the pleading however, it is not possible to say whether the disclosures made can or will cumulatively amount to a protected disclosure. Some may ultimately be found to be protected disclosures per s.43A ERA or the statements made may be aggregated to be found to amount to a protected disclosure. It is simply not possible to say at this stage that such a finding is likely. Case Number: 6000566 / 2026[15]Similarly, there is no clear link between any pleaded disclosure and the dismissal. There is a link as far as timing goes, that however needs to be explored in evidence. It does not automatically mean that if a claimant made a protected disclosure and they were dismissed shortly after doing so, that the causal link is there. It may well be that it is, but it cannot be said so, with a high degree of likelihood.[16]The Tribunal cannot say, at this stage that the prospects of any of these issues is likely to succeed, rather than a mere possibility. In short, the claimant would need to provide further details of the disclosures he relies upon, before any consideration at all could be given to whether his claim is likely to succeed. His claim although lengthy, is insufficiently pleaded to form the basis of an interim relief application, even if the claimant is subsequently found to have made a qualifying protected disclosure.[17]It should be made clear that the Tribunal is not making findings of fact on these issues. This is an assessment or overview at an early stage in the proceedings where the Tribunal does not even have the benefit of the respondent’s response to the allegations which are the subject of the interim relief application. What has been conducted is a summary assessment based upon a limited amount of time and limited documents. Full disclosure has not taken place.[18]Following this summary assessment, which has a higher burden of proof, it does not necessarily follow that the claimant will be unsuccessful when relevant evidence will be produced, heard and tested at a final hearing. The process at the final hearing is the opposite of this expeditious summary assessment. Approved by: