Employment Judge L WisemanMr D Hay (instructed by Solicitor) for claimantMr K Gibson (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 20 June 2022
JUDGMENT
The tribunal decided the preliminary issues should be reserved to be determined at a final hearing after having had the opportunity to hear evidence.
REASONS
[1]The claimants presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal on the 25 October 2019. The claim was brought in terms of section 145A and 145B Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (inducements relating to trade union membership or activities).[2]A case management preliminary hearing took place on the 25 January 2022 at which the respondent’s representative invited the tribunal to arrange a preliminary hearing to determine two preliminary points:(i) whether the letter of the 31 May 2019 was “an offer” in terms of section 145A and 145B TULRCA and(ii) whether an associated employer may be the claimants’ employer for the purposes of those sections.[3]The hearing today was a preliminary hearing to determine the two preliminary issues. The representatives at today’s hearing agreed the hearing was akin to an application for strike out by the respondent, and that if I found there was no reasonable prospect of the claimants succeeding in showing the letter of the 31 May 2019 was an offer and/or that an associated employer could be the employer for the purposes of sections 145A and 145B TULRCA, then that would be the end of the claim. However, if I did not find for the respondent, then the claim would proceed to a final hearing where these two preliminary matters would be determined.[4]The parties had produced an Agreed Statement of Facts. I heard submissions from both representatives and I was referred to case authorities and a small file of productions. The respondent’s representative objected to the production of documents C2, C3 and C5. Mr Hay explained C5 (Acas agreement) had been produced for the sake of completeness, because there was a reference to it in the ballot paper (page 21). Further, the documents at C2 and C3 (contracts of employment) were produced because they were relevant to the causal connection between the contracts and the inducement offered. Mr Gibson accepted the explanation given by Mr Hay, and confirmed he had no difficulty with the documents being accepted under reservation. Agreed statement of facts(i) As at 31 May 2019 the Claimants were employed by the Respondent, Glasgow Airport Limited, which is a Scottish private limited company (with registered number SCO96624), with its registered office at St Andrews Drive, Glasgow Airport, Paisley, PA3 2SW.(ii) AGS Airports Ltd (“AGS”) is a UK private limited company (with registered number 09201991) owning 100% of the shares in a holding company, Airport Holdings NDH 1 Limited, which holds 100% of the shares in the Respondent. AGS has its registered office at 1 Park Row, Leeds, LS1 5AB.(iii) The Claimants transferred to the employment of the Respondent in around 2014 as a result of TUPE.(iv) As at 31 May 2019 the Claimants were members of Unite the union (“Unite”).(v) On around 14 January 2019, AGS began to consult with affected employees on the closure of its group defined pension scheme (the “Scheme”). In that consultation AGS consulted with representatives of the Claimants from Unite, amongst others.(vi) The consultation concluded without there being agreement from Unite on behalf of the Claimants as to the closure of the Scheme or as to the terms on which it might be closed.(vii) AGS decided to close the Scheme to new accruals with effect from 30 June 2019.(viii) The letter of 31 May 2019 with the form enclosed produced at pages 42 to 44 (the “Letter”) was issued to all Claimants by AGS following conclusion of the pension consultation.(ix) Mr Roger Hunt was employed by AGS as Chief HR and Development Director at 31 May 2019.(x) The Claimants allege that the Letter contains an offer which is the subject of this preliminary hearing. The respondent denies that this is capable of being an offer.(xi) Every year, the Respondent holds annual pay talks, and Unite is one of the unions involved in these pay talks.(xii) Beginning in around January 2019 there were pay talks between the Respondent and employees of the Respondent. Those pay talks included talks between the Respondent and representatives from Unite.(xiii) Notice of industrial action was served by Unite, and industrial action was undertaken by Unite (consisting of work stoppages), following a ballot referencing the 2019 pay talks and the proposed closure of the Defined Benefit Pension Scheme on 21, 24, 26 and 28 June 2019.(xiv) AGS deployed contingency arrangements to maintain service during these stoppages.(xv) The Scheme closed for future accrual on 30 June 2019. (xvi) Payment of the lump sum described in the Letter was made to all affected employees. Payment of the lump sum was made to those employees who did not return the form attached to the Letter. (xvii) Unite’s members voted to accept the 2019 pay offer on 9 July 2019. Respondent’s submissions[5]Mr Gibson referred to the statutory provisions at sections 145A and 145B of TULRCA and confirmed the issues for the tribunal to determine were(i) does the letter of the 31 May 2019 (respondent’s document 6) amount to an offer and(ii) can an associated employer (AGS Airports Ltd) be an employer for the purposes of these sections.[6]Mr Gibson clarified that AGS Airports Ltd held 100% of the shares in Airport Holdings NDH 1 Ltd, which in turn held 100% of the shares in the respondent. AGS consulted with employee representatives and representatives of Unite regarding a proposal to close the pension scheme to future accruals. The consultation concluded without agreement. AGS decided to close the scheme in any event. The letter of the 31 May 2019 was sent. The pension scheme closed on the 30 June 2019, and the lump sum was paid to all affected employees.[7]The respondent engaged in pay negotiations with representatives, including those from Unite. Industrial action was taken and AGS employed its contingency arrangements. Members of Unite ultimately accepted the pay offer.[8]Mr Gibson submitted the letter dated 31 May 2019 was not an offer, or, in the alternative, it was not an offer sufficient to engage the section. Further, it had not come from the claimants’ employer. Accordingly, the claims should be dismissed.[9]Mr Gibson referred to sections 145A and 145B of TULRCA and section 297 TULRCA (regarding the meaning of the term associated employer). He also referred to the IDS Handbook Volume 10 at paragraph 2.8.[10]In the case Scottish Borders Housing Association Ltd v Caldwell UKEATS/0001/21 the EAT decided a letter seeking to change terms and conditions of employment, was not an offer for the purposes of section 145A and 145B TULRCA. Mr Gibson submitted these cases were synonymous with the Scottish Borders Housing Association case because ever if the letter sought to change contractual rights, it was an anticipatory breach of contract and not an offer.[11]Mr Gibson noted sections 145A and 145B had come into being after the Wilson case where the European Court of Human Rights decided the UK had failed to protect Article 11 rights in circumstances where a financial incentive to move away from collective bargaining was made. In the Wilson case the employer had withheld pay increases from employees unless they gave up collective bargaining.[12]In the case of Kostal UK Ltd v Dunkley 2022 ICR 434 the employer had been in negotiations with the trade union and when those negotiations failed, the respondent put the offer directly to the employees. The Supreme Court gave guidance that the purpose of section 145B should be considered, which was to ensure UK law reflected Article 11. Mr Gibson directed the tribunal to paragraphs 29 – 30 of the Judgment.[13]Mr Gibson submitted the letter of the 31 May was not an offer, it was simply informing employees of the decision to terminate the scheme and enrol in another scheme. The lump sum was not an offer. Mr Gibson invited the tribunal to have regard to the Scottish Law Commission at paragraph 3.5 where guidance was provided regarding the issue of what is an offer.[14]Mr Gibson referred to the letter of the 31 May and to the four boxes in the middle of the letter, where the last box provided “should notice of industrial action be served, and the company is required to deploy its contingency arrangements, we would need to reconsider whether or not to make payment of this lump sum to employees at the airports affected.” Mr Gibson submitted this was not a criterion on which payment depended: it was simply information regarding how future events may affect payment of the lump sum.[15]On page 44 of the respondent’s productions a copy of the form accompanying the letter was produced. Mr Gibson submitted everyone entitled to receive the lump sum was paid it regardless of whether they completed the form. The form did not make the letter an offer. There was no reference to any agreement not to participate in industrial action.[16]Mr Gibson noted there had been industrial action and use of contingency arrangements, but the lump sum had still been paid.[17]Mr Gibson submitted the letter had not been sent from the employees’ employer. The letter makes reference to “the Company” and this was a reference to AGS. The letter was signed on behalf of AGS. Mr Gibson acknowledged Glasgow Airport was listed on the top of the letter, but this was a reference to participating employers, and part of the branding. The letter told employees of AGS’ decision.[18]Mr Gibson acknowledged AGS may be an associated employer, but submitted this was not good enough, and there was no reference to associated employers in the relevant statutory provisions. Mr Gibson submitted that had Parliament intended the provisions to apply to associated employers, they would have said so.[19]Mr Gibson invited the tribunal to dismiss the claims because the letter was not an offer, and even if it was, it had not come from the employer. If however the tribunal was not with him, he submitted either or both issues should be reserved for determination at a final hearing. Further, even if the tribunal decided the letter was capable of being an offer, it still left open the question of whether it was an offer in terms of section 145A and 145B. Claimants’ submissions[20]Mr Hay invited the tribunal to refuse the respondent’s application to dismiss the claims. He submitted the application was akin to a strike out application on prospects of success because (the respondent argued) the letter was not an offer and had not come from the employees’ employer. Mr Hay submitted these issues could not be determined in favour of the employer based on submissions. Mr Hay supported the respondent’s esto position that both issues should be reserved to a final hearing.[21]Mr Hay referred to the Scottish Borders Housing Association case and submitted it was not of assistance in this case because the tribunal must decide whether there was an offer. The case referred to did not take the tribunal further in understanding what an offer is. Mr Hay referred to McBryde on Contract which emphasised what can constitute an offer. In the Scottish Borders Housing Association case the EAT defined anticipatory breach but did not define “an offer”. There was no analysis of what an offer is, and the hearing was, in any event, fact specific.[22]Mr Hay confirmed he had no issue with paragraph 3.5 of the Scottish Law Commission paper, but he referred the tribunal to the footnote where the learned writers on contract recognised there was no rigid interpretation of what should, or should not, be a contract. In McBryde, there was emphasis on the concept of offer being a broad one.[23]Mr Hay referred to the Kostal case and submitted it did not take matters further, other than to say a broad approach was required.[24]Mr Hay next dealt with what the claimants could offer to prove and whether there was a reasonable prospect of them doing so. In terms of the section 145A claim, two matters were out for consultation as at January 2019:(i) the potential closure of the defined benefits pension scheme and(ii) annual pay talks. The talks included representatives of Unite. Unite balloted members regarding industrial action, and on the ballot paper (claimant’s bundle page 20 and 21) there was reference to annual pay and the proposal to close the defined benefits scheme. The ACAS agreement was produced at pages 18/19 and the agreement deals with pay and pension.[25]The ballot supported industrial action and two notices were served by Unite for industrial action on four dates in June.[26]The claimants offer to prove the content of the 31 May letter and the content of the boxes within that letter were an offer. With regards to that letter it was said:• there was reference to a one off lump sum payment being made to individuals;• it was paid in accordance with the criteria below;• the 4th box contained the criteria and emphasised them by putting them in italics. The claimants’ case was that a clear interpretation was that payment of the lump sum to individuals may well be affected by service of notice of industrial action and the Company being required to deploy its contingency arrangements (in effect, giving notice of industrial action and going through with it). Mr Hay acknowledged it did not explicitly say that if you go through with industrial action you will not be paid, but it may well affect whether payment was made or not. Mr Hay submitted this chimed with paragraph 11.28 of the IDS Handbook, where there was reference to threats instead of sweeteners. It was arguable that a negative offer was made, which was capable of acceptance or rejection measured against certain events undertaken by the claimants and the trade union.• Service of notice of industrial action and participation are clear examples of taking part in the activities of a trade union, and which are referenced in section 145A.• Mr Hay acknowledged the respondent stated everyone was paid the lump sum anyway, even though industrial action took place. Mr Hay submitted that drawing on Kostal the issue was the very real possibility of the payment being withheld, and that issue could not be determined today.[27]Mr Hay submitted the claimants had a readily arguable case that required to be heard in full.[28]The section 145B claim concerned the second offer contained within the same letter. The claimants offered to prove the effect of payment was to agree to defined benefit payments no longer being determined by collective bargaining. There was a dispute regarding whether a lump sum had been offered during consultation with Unite (prior to the letter being issued) and that what went out in the letter was different and of a higher amount.[29]There were 94 claimants, but only two contracts had been produced (claimants’ productions documents 3 and 11). Pension was not always treated as contractual remuneration but the contracts produced did mention pension and the scheme was named differently. The ballot paper referred to the defined benefits pension scheme being one of the matters in the trade dispute. Mr Hay submitted it was not possible, without evidence, to know whether the consultation undertaken in 2019 regarding the pension scheme was, or was not, collective bargaining. Evidence at a final hearing would provide details of the consultation and prior/subsequent events. There was also the issue of whether the BAA scheme resembled the AGS scheme, and what happened to it.[30]Mr Hay accepted the section 145A claims were on stronger ground than the section 145B claims, but submitted it could not be said at this stage that the section 145B claim had no reasonable prospect of success.[31]Mr Hay, with regard to the issue of “employer”, referred to it being an agreed fact that Mr Hunt was employed by AGS. Also, AGS was a parent company controlling the respondent through a holding company. It was submitted those facts alone were not sufficient to demonstrate that the offers in the letter were not being communicated by or on behalf of the respondent.[32]The letter (of the 31 May) did not require a construction that it only came from AGS. The branding on the letter referenced the respondent. Also, we did not know the extent to which the group structure operated, or the extent to which resources were shared, and these questions could have a bearing on the matter.[33]Mr Hay concluded by submitting the tribunal did not have enough information before it to allow it to determine the issue, and there was a need to hear all the facts at a final hearing. Mr Hay invited the tribunal to refuse the respondent’s application and to reserve determination of both issues to a final hearing. Discussion and Decision[34]I firstly had regard to the terms of section 145A and 145B of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act (TULRCA). Section 145A is entitled Inducements relating to union membership or activities and provides that “a worker has the right not to have an offer made to him by his employer for the sole or main purpose of inducing the worker… not to take part, at an appropriate time, in the activities of an independent trade union.”.[35]Section 145B is entitled Inducements relating to collective bargaining and provides “a worker who is a member of an independent trade union which is recognised, or seeking to be recognised, by his employer has the right not to have an offer made to him by his employer if(a) acceptance of the offer, together with other workers’ acceptance of offers which the employer also makes to them, would have the prohibited result and(b) the employer’s sole or main purpose in making the offers is to achieve that result. The prohibited result is that the workers’ terms and conditions of employment, or any of those terms will not (or will no longer) be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on behalf of the union.”[36]I next had regard to the claim brought by the claimants (document R2), who are all members of Unite trade union, which is recognised by the respondent for collective bargaining purposes at Glasgow Airport Ltd. I also had regard to the Response (document R3) and the Agreed Statement of Facts (as set out above). Was the letter of the 31 May 2019 “an offer”[37]The first issue to determine is whether there is any reasonable prospect of the claimants showing the letter of the 31 May 2019 was “an offer” in terms of sections 145A and 145B TULRCA. Mr Gibson’s principal position was that the letter of the 31 May was not an offer, but simply a letter informing employees of the decision to terminate the defined benefits scheme with enrolment in another scheme.[38]The letter of the 31 May was in the following terms: “AGS Defined Benefit (DB) Scheme: Outcome of Consultation The purpose of this letter is to advise you that the Company has considered all feedback received both from individual members and through the collective consultation process and has reached a decision on its proposal in relation to the DB scheme. AGS Airports Ltd (AGS) (and all the participating employers within the DB scheme) has therefore decided to close the DB scheme to the accrual of future benefits from 30 June 2019 and to enrol all active DB members in the AGS Defined Contribution (DC) scheme from 1 July 2019 at a contribution level specified by you. This means you will stop accruing a pension in the DB scheme from that date. Your DB pension will be worked out using your Pensionable Service and Final Pensionable Pay on that date. This pension is preserved in the DB scheme (and will always be subject to the rules of that scheme). This is called a deferred pension and will receive increases in line with the Rules of the Scheme and legal requirements between 1 July 2019 and your retirement. The Company will pay you a one-off lump sum in July payroll in accordance with the criteria below:• A lump sum payment of 30% of Base + Shift Pay (as at 31/12/18 with a minimum of £7000;• Your lump sum will be ££££• You must be an active member of the DB scheme on 30 June 2019 and not attained 36 years’ pensionable service of normal retirement age by that date to be eligible and• Should notice of industrial action be served and the Company is required to deploy its contingency arrangements, we would need to reconsider whether or not to make payment of this lump sum to employees at the airports affected…”[39]Mr Gibson referred to the Scottish Law Commission Review of Contract Law Discussion Paper on Formation of Contract, where it was stated that “… an offer is defined as a proposal from one party which is sufficiently definite in its terms to form a contract and also manifests an intention to be legally binding on the offeror should it be accepted by the party to whom it is addressed”. The Paper noted neither Gloag on Contract nor McBryde on Contract actually defined an offer.[40]Mr Hay referred to McBryde, the Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd Edition) at Chapter 6 and submitted the emphasis is on the concept of an offer being a broad one.[41]Mr Gibson submitted the information regarding payment of a lump sum was not an offer, and the reference to industrial action was not a criterion on which payment depended. It was merely information regarding the way in which future events may affect payment of the lump sum: payment was not contingent on not taking action. Everyone entitled to be paid the lump sum was paid it. There was industrial action and there was use of the contingency arrangements but the lump sum was still paid.[42]I, having considered the terms of the letter of the 31 May, could not accept Mr Gibson’s submission that the reference to industrial action was not a criterion on which payment depended. The letter stated clearly that the Company would pay a one-off lump sum in accordance with (the tribunal’s emphasis) the criteria below. The criteria included the fact that should notice of industrial action be served and the Company was required to deploy its contingency arrangements, consideration would need to be given to whether or not to make payment of the lump sum to employees at the airports affected.[43]I acknowledged it did not say payment would not be made, but it did say, very clearly, that it could affect whether payment was made. I considered this to be a warning, a marker, a threat that if industrial action was taken and contingency arrangements had to be deployed, then payment of the lump sum could be placed at risk.[44]I acknowledged Mr Gibson’s submission that in fact payment of the lump sum was made to all those entitled to receive it, including to those who took industrial action and required the Company to deploy its contingency arrangements. I considered it would be a matter of evidence for a future hearing why this position was adopted in circumstances where the Company had made clear that it would “need to reconsider whether or not to make payment of this lump sum to employees at the airports affected.”[45]I concluded there was, on a plain reading of the letter, an arguable case that the letter was an offer to pay a lump sum in accordance with the criteria set out, and it was for employees to decide whether to accept or reject that offer based on those conditions.[46]I also considered there was a need for evidence to be heard to inform the tribunal about the collective consultation undertaken, the parties to that consultation and prior/subsequent events.[47]I next considered the authorities to which I was referred. In the Scottish Borders Housing Association Ltd case (above) the EAT held that a letter intimating an intention to impose new terms and conditions should not be treated as an offer for the purposes of section 145C TULRCA.[48]Mr Gibson submitted these cases were analogous to the Scottish Borders case and the 31 May letter sought to change a contractual right and was an anticipatory breach of contract. I could not accept that submission because whilst the cases were similar insofar as collective consultation regarding changes had not been successful and ultimately a letter informing employees that changes were going to be made was issued, they differed in one material respect. The letter of the 31 May contained a statement saying the Company would pay a one-off lump sum in accordance with criteria as set out above.[49]I was also referred to the Kostal case. I accepted the case provided some useful guidance, but agreed with both representatives that this case did not take matters any further.[50]I decided, having had regard to the above points, to refuse the respondent’s application to (effectively) strike out the claims because the letter of the 31 May 2019 was not an offer in terms of sections 145A and 145B TULRCA. I considered there was an arguable case and that the issue should proceed to be determined at a final hearing. Can an associated employer be the claimants’ employer for the purposes of sections 145A and 145B TULRCA[51]I firstly had regard to the fact that in sections 145A and 145B TULRCA, there is reference to “by his employer”. The claimants are all employed by the respondent, Glasgow Airport Ltd.[52]I next had regard to section 297 TULRCA which provides that any two employers shall be treated as associated if(a) one is a company of which the other (directly or indirectly) has control, or(b) both are companies of which a third person (directly or indirectly) has control, and “associated employer” shall be construed accordingly.[53]AGS Airports Ltd (AGS) is a private limited company which owns 100% of the shares in a holding company, Airport Holdings NDH1 Ltd, which holds 100% of the shares in the respondent.[54]Mr Gibson’s submission was that the letter of the 31 May 2019 was sent by AGS to inform employees of the decision of AGS regarding the pension scheme. The letter was not from the “employer”. Furthermore, if Parliament had intended the provisions of section 145A and 145B TULRCA to apply to associated employers, it should have said so.[55]I was not satisfied the matter was quite as straightforward, and I say that principally because I considered a tribunal would require to hear evidence prior to making a decision regarding this issue. There was, for example(i) no information regarding the operation of the group structure;(ii) there was no information regarding the pension scheme or the deduction of contributions;(iii) there was a lack of clarity regarding those involved in the consultation exercise;(iv) the ballot paper (claimants’ documents page 20) referred to a trade dispute with Glasgow Airport Ltd, and in the summary of the matters in issue in the trade dispute referred to the 2019 pay dispute and the defined benefit pension scheme where “the employer” was proposing to close the scheme and(v) the letter of the 31 May 2019 was signed by Mr Roger Hunt, Chief HR and Development Director of AGS, but the letter carried the branding for AGS, Aberdeen International Airport; Glasgow Airport and Southampton International Airport. I considered evidence would be required regarding whether the letter was sent for or on behalf of the respondent.[56]I concluded it would be necessary for a tribunal to hear evidence prior to making a decision regarding this issue. I decided, therefore, to refuse the respondent’s position and to order the cases proceed to a final hearing. Employment Judge: Lucy Wiseman Date of Judgment: 20 June 2022 Multiple Schedule Multiple: 9208 - Glasgow Airport Limited Case Number Case Name 4111921/2019 Mr Jonathan Alexander -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111922/2019 Mr Scott Andrews -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111923/2019 Mr Stuart Armour -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111924/2019 Mr Steven Beith -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111925/2019 Mr Raymond Bell -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111926/2019 Mr James Black -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111927/2019 Miss Shenaz Boyce -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111928/2019 Mrs Margaret Brodie -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111929/2019 Mrs Ashley Campbell -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111930/2019 Mr Barry Campbell -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111931/2019 Mr Colin Campbell -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111932/2019 Mr Peter Candlish -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111933/2019 Mr David James Clark -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111934/2019 Mr Alan Thomas Colsh -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111935/2019 Mr Douglas Scott John Crawford -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111936/2019 Mr Keith Laird Douglas -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111937/2019 Mr Robert Downs -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111938/2019 Mr Murray David Ewing -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111939/2019 Mr David Craig Findlater -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111940/2019 Mr Kevin Fraser -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111941/2019 Mr Derek Alexander Fyvie -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111942/2019 Mrs Anne-Marie Gallacher -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111943/2019 Mr Alfred Gibb -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111944/2019 Mrs Lorraine Gordon -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111945/2019 Mr Ian Gracey -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111946/2019 Miss Nadine-Anne Harkness -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111947/2019 Mr Gordon John Harrison -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111948/2019 Mr Christopher Harron -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111949/2019 Mr Michael Harvey -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111950/2019 Mr David Henderson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111951/2019 Miss Angela Hogg -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111952/2019 Mr John Irvine -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111953/2019 Miss Margaret Johnstone -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111954/2019 Mrs Elaine Kelly -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111955/2019 Mr Paul Kelly -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111956/2019 Mr Craig Kidd -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111957/2019 Mr Gareth Kilpatrick -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111958/2019 Mr Benito Charles Lindsay -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111959/2019 Mr Brian Craig MacDonald -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111960/2019 Mrs Karen MacDonald -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111961/2019 Mr Robert MacKinnon -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111962/2019 Mr Gary James Malcolm -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111963/2019 Mr Kenneth Adam McCance -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111964/2019 Mrs Catherine Elizabeth McCrorie -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111965/2019 Mr Mark Jones McCrorie -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111966/2019 Mr Alexander Matthew McDonald -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111967/2019 Mr David McDowall -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111968/2019 Mr Kevin McDermott -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111969/2019 Mr Marc McGeough -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111970/2019 Mrs Naomi McKay -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111971/2019 Mr Tom Black McKerrel -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111972/2019 Miss Allison McLaren -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111973/2019 Mr Alan McNeil -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111974/2019 Mr Jamie Douglas McNicol -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111975/2019 Mrs Amanda Meikle -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111976/2019 Mr Douglas Muirhead -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111977/2019 Mr James Mulligan -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111978/2019 Mr Jason James Nicol -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111979/2019 Mrs Claire Ann O'Donnell -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111980/2019 Mr Mark O'Hara -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111981/2019 Mrs Agnes Ouhsaine -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111982/2019 Mr Steven Phillip Pegram -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111983/2019 Mr Mark Pettigrew -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111984/2019 Mrs Lynn Ann Queen -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111985/2019 Mr Scott Robertson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111986/2019 Miss Yvonne Rutherford -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111987/2019 Mr Michael James Shields -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111988/2019 Mr William Sime -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111989/2019 Mr David Simpson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111990/2019 Mr John Alexander Smith -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111991/2019 Mrs Lorraine Steel -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111992/2019 Mr Scott Steel -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111993/2019 Mr Robert Alan Stevenson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111994/2019 Miss Lynsey Sutherland -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111995/2019 Ms Catriona Anne Tainsh -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111996/2019 Ms Irene Thompson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111997/2019 Mr David Vennard -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111998/2019 Mr Cameron Watson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4111999/2019 Mr Mark Wheeler -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112000/2019 Mrs Alison Wilson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112001/2019 Mr Graham William Wood -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112002/2019 Mr Laurie Wylie -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112003/2019 Mr Gordon Baynes -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112004/2019 Miss Linda Margaret Cochrane -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112005/2019 Mr Brian Glover Fleming -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112006/2019 Ms Fiona Helen Grant -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112007/2019 Miss Avril Henderson -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112008/2019 Mrs Rhona Marie Kelly -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112009/2019 Mr Christopher Jack Marr -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112010/2019 Ms Linda Ann McGroggan -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112011/2019 Ms Ailsa Reid -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112012/2019 Mr Gordon Roy -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112013/2019 Ms Jill Stewart -v- Glasgow Airport Limited 4112014/2019 Mrs Lesley Scott -v- Glasgow Airport Limited