Employment Judge A KempMs C Allison for claimantService Director for claimantMs A Stobart (instructed by Advocate) for respondentMr B Morley (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 7 May 2025
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is outwith the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal under section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and is dismissed. E.T. Z4 (WR)
REASONS
[1]This was a Preliminary Hearing held into issues of jurisdiction on the basis of timebar. The claimant was represented by Ms Allison, a Service Director of a charity referred to below, who is not legally qualified or experienced, and the respondent by Ms Stobart, Advocate. I am grateful to them both for the helpful way in which they conducted the hearing.
The claim
[2]Ms Allison confirmed that the claimant made only a claim of unfair dismissal under section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the Act”), having earlier withdrawn a claim of automatic unfair dismissal in relation to a public interest disclosure, or whistleblowing as it is often called.[3]The parties had disagreed on the date of dismissal in their pleaded cases, with the claimant alleging that it was on 24 March 2024 and the respondent on 8 February 2024. Ms Allison explained that she was not clear on the law applying to that matter, and it was agreed that the date of termination would be an issue for evidence.[4]Early Conciliation had commenced on 20 June 2024, with the Certificate issued on 24 June 2024 and the Claim Form presented on 24 July 2024. If the earlier date was the applicable one, the claim was out of time subject to issues as to reasonable practicability as discussed below. If it was the later date it was in time.[5]A Preliminary Hearing had been held on 10 February 2025 before EJ Doherty at which the present hearing was fixed, and arrangements for it were made by orders. A Notice of the present hearing was sent with the Note of that Preliminary Hearing on 18 February 2025.
The issues
[6]I explained that I had identified the following issues:(i) What was the effective date of termination?(ii) Was the claim within the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal and in that regard if presented late (a) was it not reasonably practicable to have presented the Claim Form timeously and (b) if so was the Claim presented within a reasonable period of time thereafter?[7]The parties confirmed that they were content with those issues.
The evidence
[8]The claimant gave evidence, and spoke to most but not all of the documents that had been produced in a Bundle. Whilst that Bundle was not finalised until late on 25 April 2025 and had not been seen by Ms Allison until the morning of the hearing she confirmed that she was prepared to proceed, and that it contained all the evidence she wished to found on.[9]Before the hearing commenced I explained how it would be conducted, about the asking of questions and referring to documents within the Bundle which failing I would not read them, and about re-examination. I explained about submissions, and that I could give a measure of assistance under the overriding objective but not so as to act as if the claimant’s solicitor.[10]During the claimant’s evidence Ms Allison had been explaining some of the documents, which I indicated was not appropriate when she was questioning the witness, and I raised with her after the claimant had completed his evidence whether she wished to do so herself. She did, and Ms Stobart helpfully did not have any objection. Ms Allison then gave brief evidence.
The facts
[11]I found the following facts, material to the issues before me, to have been established: Parties[12]The claimant is Mr James Brown.[13]The respondent is Northlink Ferries Serco Ferries (Guernsey) Limited.[14]The claimant was employed by the respondent in a security role on vessels from on or around 1 August 2017 [the claimant in his Claim Form had suggested that it was slightly earlier but that difference is not material for present purposes].[15]The claimant had a tour of duty of two weeks. He joined the vessel at Aberdeen, the vessel being a ferry which then sailed to Orkney and Shetland before returning to Aberdeen. The claimant spent the two weeks of the duty on the vessel, followed by two weeks on leave.[16]The claimant had not had periods of illness in 2023 save for two days from some form of infection or “bug”.[17]The claimant had prior to working with the respondent been the skipper of a vessel, and held other posts. He was born in 1970. Disciplinary process[18]The claimant was suspended on full pay in December 2023 in relation to a number of allegations made against him. The claimant had access to the internet and was able to send and receive emails. He had however some difficulties in accessing emails from time to time, and asked the respondent to send him hard copies of communications, on a date not given in evidence.[19]A disciplinary hearing in relation to the allegations was held on 8 January 2024, which was not completed and reconvened on 25 January 2024. The claimant attended both the disciplinary hearings with a colleague accompanying him. On 23 January 2024 the claimant also provided the respondent with a written witness statement setting out his position in relation to the allegations. In that he referred to struggling with his mental health. Termination of employment[20]On 8 February 2024 the respondent wrote a letter to the claimant informing him that he was dismissed with immediate effect. The letter stated “In light of the above findings, because I have decided that all of the allegations are proven, and in light of the seriousness of your misconduct, I have decided to terminate your employment, effective immediately, on the grounds of gross misconduct. Your last day of service with the Company is the date of this letter.” It referred to a right of appeal, and that that was required within five days of receipt of the letter.[21]The letter was sent on headed paper of Serco Ferries (Guernsey) Crewing Limited, and was signed by Andrew Senneck, Crewing Manager. It had a logo for Northlink Ferries, being the trading name of the ferry on which the claimant had sailed.[22]The claimant did not see that letter until a hard copy was sent to him by post by the respondent. On 15 February 2024 the claimant emailed Paul Gellatly, the HR officer of the respondent stating “I received the hard copy. Thank you.” In doing so he referred to the letter dated 8 February 2024. Appeal[23]The claimant appealed the decision to dismiss him doing so by an appeal document prepared with the assistance of a friend. It was undated, but was sent by the claimant by email to Mr Gellatly in or around mid-February[24]An appeal hearing was arranged, which the claimant was not able to attend through illness, and an alternative date was arranged, which he did not attend as he had not received the intimation of its date until the day of the appeal itself. On that day, being 1 March 2024, Serco Ferries (Guernsey) Crewing Ltd wrote to the claimant to state that the appeal had been heard in his absence and had been refused and that the decision to terminate his employment on the grounds of gross misconduct was upheld. The claimant received that letter shortly thereafter. Events after termination[25]Following the termination of his employment the respondent ceased its payments to him.[26]The claimant was very upset by that termination. He disputed the reasons for it. His mental health worsened and he suffered from high levels of anxiety. He did not eat properly, or sleep well, and he avoided much social contact with others. He went walking at night so as to avoid meeting people.[27]Around the end of March 2024 the claimant attended the office of the Department of Work and Pensions on Orkney to make an application for benefits, which was successful.[28]In April 2024 the claimant attended at Aberdeen Royal Infirmary and was assessed by Dr Fiona Summers, Consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist. Dr Summers conducted a follow up appointment with him by telephone in May 2024.[29]On or around 22 May 2024 a friend of the claimant was concerned at his mental health, in particular that he had not been eating or sleeping well, and suggested that he seek assistance from the Blide Trust. That is an organisation in Orkney, where the claimant resides, that provides support and assistance to those with mental health issues. Ms Clare Allision is its Service Director. She has a degree and a PhD, but is not legally qualified or experienced. Emails were exchanged and a meeting arranged.[30]The claimant also sought assistance from Citizens Advice on a date not given in evidence, but was after he had first contacted the Blide Trust.[31]The Blide Trust contacted Grampian Community Law Centre for advice on or around 7 June 2024, and a discussion with them was held on 20 June 2024. The Centre is a Law Clinic operated by Robert Gordon University. Emails were exchanged with Ms Rachel O’Neill, Lecturer. At that discussion the claimant was advised as to time-limits for a claim of unfair dismissal, and the need to commence Early Conciliation first. On 20 June 2024 Ms Rebecca Cox, the Law Centre Manager and a solicitor, emailed Ms Allison referring to the discussion that had taken place on Teams, which she had participated in, and provided a link to commence early conciliation with ACAS.[32]The claimant contacted ACAS that same day using that link, and so commenced Early Conciliation in respect of the respondent on 20 June[33]A Certificate as to that Early Conciliation was issued on 24 June 2024.[34]On 3 July 2024 Dr Summers sent a report to the claimant’s GP, which recommended psychological therapy to address his high levels of anxiety.[35]A Claim Form for the present claim was presented by the claimant on 24 July 2024. It stated as the date for termination of employment 24 March Submissions[36]Ms Allison in brief summary argued that it was reasonable that the claim was presented when it was as the claimant was so unwell. He was not aware of the details or time elapsing, and had help from a friend, but had not been able to access help until 22 May 2024, then sought advice from the Law Clinic, and acted the same day applying for an ACAS certificate. The claim was made as rapidly as it could have been. There was a reasonable reason for the delay. The claimant sought closure.[37]Ms Stobart in brief summary argued that the effective date of termination was 8 February 2024. On the face of it the claim was late as early conciliation was not commenced until 20 June 2024. It was not reasonable to rely on ignorance, and the evidence of illness was not sufficient. Reference was made to Inchcape Retail Ltd v Shelton EAT1042/19, Chourafi v London United Busways Ltd 2006 EWCA Civ 689 and Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd v Britton [2022] IRLR 906. The submission as to closure was not a relevant consideration for the issues before the Tribunal.
The law
[38]Section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that the Tribunal shall not consider a complaint of unfair dismissal unless it is presented to the tribunal(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.[39]The presentation of a claim is subject to early conciliation under section 207B of the Act, as provided by section 111(2A). Where early conciliation is commenced timeously it has the effect of delaying the date by which the claim must be presented, but if it is not commenced timeously it has no effect on the date by which the claim must be presented. The terms of section 111 contain other provisions not relevant for the purposes of this case.[40]The effective date of termination is addressed at section 97 of the Act. Where there is a dismissal without notice, it is the date on which the termination takes effect. Termination was addressed by the Supreme Court in Gisda CYF v Barratt [2010] IRLR 1073, and in very brief summary a notice of termination given by the employer is effective in law when the employee reads it or has a reasonable opportunity to do so.[41]The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove that it was not reasonably practicable to present the complaint in time: Porter v Bandridge Ltd [1978] IRLR 271.[42]The question of what is reasonably practicable is explained in a number of authorities. In Palmer and Saunders v Southend on Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119, a decision of the Court of Appeal, the court suggested that it is appropriate: “to ask colloquially and untrammelled by too much legal logic, ‘Was it reasonably feasible to present the complaint to the Industrial Tribunal within the relevant three months’?” That, it explained, is a question of fact for the Tribunal taking account of all the circumstances. It gave the following guidance: “Dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case, an Industrial Tribunal may wish to consider the manner in which and reason for which the employee was dismissed, including the extent to which, if at all, the employer's conciliatory appeals machinery has been used. It will no doubt investigate what was the substantial cause of the employee's failure to comply with the statutory time limit; whether he had been physically prevented from complying with the limitation period, for instance by illness or a postal strike, or something similar. It may be relevant for the Industrial Tribunal to investigate whether at the time when he was dismissed, and if not then when thereafter, he knew that he had the right to complain that he had been unfairly dismissed; in some cases the Tribunal may have to consider whether there has been any misrepresentation about any relevant matter by the employer to the employee. It will frequently be necessary for it to know whether the employee was being advised at any material time and, if so, by whom; of the extent of the advisors' knowledge of the facts of the employee's case; and of the nature of any advice which they may have given to him. In any event it will probably be relevant in most cases for the Industrial Tribunal to ask itself whether there has been any substantial fault on the part of the employee or his advisor which has led to the failure to comply with the statutory time limit. Any list of possible relevant considerations, however, cannot be exhaustive and, as we have stressed, at the end of the day the matter is one of fact for the Industrial Tribunal taking all the circumstances of the given case into account.”[43]In Asda Stores Ltd v Kauser UKEAT/0165/07, a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Lady Smith at paragraph 17 commented that it was perhaps difficult to discern how: “‘reasonably feasible’ adds anything to ‘reasonably practicable’, since the word ‘practicable’ means possible and possible is a synonym for feasible. The short point seems to be that the court has been astute to underline the need to be aware that the relevant test is not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but asking whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done.”[44]Ignorance, usually of the fact of a time limit but also of the right to make a claim, has been an issue addressed in a number of cases. In Wall's Meat Co Ltd v Khan [1979] ICR 52, the test which Lord Denning had earlier put forward in another case, Dedman, was re-iterated as - “It is simply to ask this question: Had the man just cause or excuse for not presenting his complaint within the prescribed time? Ignorance of his rights—or ignorance of the time limit—is not just cause or excuse unless it appears that he or his advisers could not reasonably be expected to have been aware of them. If he or his advisers could reasonably have been so expected, it was his or their fault, and he must take the consequences.”[45]In Marks and Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan [2005] IRLR 562 the Court of Appeal stated that “The first principle is that section 111(2) should be given a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee.” It set out the issues to consider when deciding the test of reasonable practicability, which included(i) what the claimant knew with regard to the time-limit(ii) what knowledge the claimant should reasonably have had and(iii) whether he was legally represented.[46]In Lowri Beck Services Ltd v Brophy [2019] EWCA Civ 2490, the Court of Appeal re-stated that the test of reasonable practicability should be given a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee. The claimant in that case did not have professional advice, which was held to be a factor in his favour.[47]The nature of the test was considered in Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd v Britton [2022] EAT 18, in which it was stated that “the employment judge directed himself that section 111(2) should be given a liberal construction in favour of the employee, citing Dedman v. British Building & Engineering Appliances Ltd [1974] ICR 53, CA. In my judgment, I note that this is not reflective of the way that section 111(2) has been interpreted and applied by the Court of Appeal in more recent cases. The test is a strict one and, perhaps in contrast to the ‘just and equitable’ extension in other statutory contexts, there is no valid basis for approaching the case on the basis that the ET should attempt to give the ‘not reasonably practicable’ test a liberal construction in favour of the claimant.”[48]It is, with great respect to the EAT, difficult to understand that last sentence except in the context of a distinction with the test in discrimination law. The reference to a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee had itself been made in Williams-Ryan, which the EAT in Britton cited, and although Brophy was not mentioned it had re-stated that principle. Williams-Ryan and Brophy are both Court of Appeal authority. Each is not binding on a Tribunal in Scotland but is worthy of considerable respect, particularly in relation to a UK-wide statutory provision. I consider that they should be preferred to Britton, and followed, in this respect.[49]The Tribunal conducts its own assessment of the issue of reasonable practicability, and whilst it may take account of medical evidence it is not bound to accept it, particularly if there is other evidence that is not consistent with it - Chourafi v London United Busways Ltd 2006 EWCA Civ 689. That was a case where the claimant had not attended the Preliminary Hearing to give evidence, however.[50]The issue of a medical condition was addressed in Kauser, in which the following was said about the Tribunal’s judgment: “There is no finding of illness or incapacity. The circumstances are not comparable, for instance, to those of the Claimant who fell ill seven weeks into the three month period, in the case of Schulz v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1999] ICR 1202. It cannot be sufficient for a Claimant to elide the statutory time limit that he or she points to having been ‘stressed’ or even ‘very stressed’. There would need to be more.”[51]Where a claimant was under a mistake as to the detail of the time limit, guidance on the issues that arise was given in Dedman as follows: “What were his opportunities for finding out that he had rights? Did he take them? If not, why not? Was he misled or deceived? Should there prove to be an acceptable explanation of his continuing ignorance of the existence of his rights, it would be inappropriate to disregard it, relying on the maxim ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’. The word ‘practicable’ is there to moderate the severity of the maxim and to require an examination of the circumstances of his ignorance”.[52]It appears to me firstly that the statutory words must be applied, and secondly that in doing so whilst a liberal interpretation of those words in favour of the employee is permissible, that is against the test of reasonable practicability, and not whether what the claimant did was reasonable. All of the circumstances are considered when making that assessment.[53]The issue of whether ignorance of a claim or time limit was reasonable was also addressed in Inchcape, to which the respondent referred in submission. In that case the EAT stressed that the matter was case specific: “Claimants in ETs vary enormously. On the one hand there are claimants with a good education and command of English and ready access to the Internet and sources of advice. It will generally be reasonably practicable for them to find out about the enforcement of their rights, not least by using the Internet. It is not difficult for an educated person to find out from official websites that there is a strict time limit for bringing a complaint of unfair dismissal. On the other hand, there are many claimants with very limited education and English, health difficulties and disabilities, and virtually no access to the Internet and sources of advice. It may be much more difficult for them to obtain advice.”[54]If the claimant is successful in arguing that it was not reasonably practicable to have presented the claim in time, it is then necessary to consider whether the claim was presented within a reasonable period of time thereafter. In Cullinane v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Ltd UKEAT/0537/10 it was stated that the question whether a further period is reasonable is not the same as asking whether the claimant acted reasonably, but requires “an objective consideration of the factors causing the delay and what period should reasonably be allowed in those circumstances for proceedings to be instituted”, having regard to the 'strong public interest' in claims being brought promptly, and against a background where the primary time limit is three months.[55]In Howlett Marine Services Ltd v Bowlam [2001] IRLR 201 it was confirmed that the issue of reasonableness was assessed having regard to all the circumstances. That case concerned a different claim to unfair dismissal but the provision in question in that case was in essence the same as the issue of reasonableness in section 111.
Discussion
[56]I require to assess the evidence led before me and make findings in fact on the basis of that. I must then apply the law to those factual findings.[57]The claimant gave evidence that I am sure he genuinely believed to be true. I appreciate that he suffers from mental health issues, and in particular from anxiety. He did however have a tendency to make rather wide generalisations about his mental health, in my view, when giving evidence and much of his evidence was not consistent with the terms of the report from Dr Summers on which he also founded, as addressed in more detail below. There were some other inconsistencies as also noted below. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that his evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be accepted on some of the key matters.[58]I was satisfied that Ms Allison was a credible witness, but where she made comments on medical matters including by reference to an email she wrote I had concerns as to her qualifications for doing so. Such evidence is not inadmissible (as addressed in Rule 41) but in all the circumstances I gave it little weight as addressed below. Effective date of termination[59]The first issue is that of the effective date of termination. There was in my view no basis in the evidence for the claimant’s argument that it was 24 March 2024 and that date appears to have been chosen essentially as a vehicle to argue that the claim was submitted in time. No other explanation for that date was proffered in evidence, and it was not consistent with any document, the appeal having been refused on 1 March 2024 and the letter having been received shortly afterwards on a date not given in evidence, but likely to have been about three weeks before 24 March 2024. That the claimant sought to rely on that date on what was I consider an artificial argument is one factor to consider in assessing the reliability of his evidence, in my view.[60]The claimant was sent a letter detailing his summary dismissal, dated 8 February 2024, and that was the date the respondent argued for, but his evidence, which I accepted on this point as there was no cross examination, was that he had not received the email, and had had difficulties in receiving earlier emails such that he had at some point, not given in evidence as to a date, asked for hard copy documents to be sent. The respondent did send a hard copy, and he acknowledged receipt of what he confirmed in evidence was the letter of 8 February 2024 by his email sent on 15 February 2024. It was accepted by him that he had received the letter at the latest by that date, and was aware of its terms which were clear that the termination was with effect from the date of the letter. Whist the legal analysis may be different given the case of Gisda, as I shall shortly come to, the letter clearly sought to effect a summary termination of employment on that date.[61]For completeness I should add that the letter of 8 February 2024 was not from the respondent, but another company. The relationship between the two companies was not addressed in evidence, and I did not notice the point until considering the decision, but I infer from the evidence and the lack of any challenge that the two companies are related and that the entity sending the letter did so with the authority of the respondent such as to be its agent in law. That matter in my view does not therefore affect either the effective date of termination or the issues of reasonable practicability or reasonable time.[62]It appeared to me that as a matter of law the termination can only have been effective from when the claimant knew of it, or had a reasonable opportunity to do so, given the authority of Gisda. In my view the evidence before me indicated that the claimant did not read, or have a reasonable opportunity to read, the letter until on or around 15 February 2024. That is the date I consider is the effective date of termination for statutory purposes, such that the answer to the first issue is 15 February 2024. That is, on the face of it, outwith the primary period under the section. Reasonably practicable[63]The second issue is whether the claimant has proved, on the balance of probabilities, that it was not reasonably practicable for him to have presented the claim form timeously. In this context timeous presentation meant starting Early Conciliation on or before 14 May 2024, followed by a timeous presentation of the claim after the certificate is issued. He did not do so, having commenced conciliation on 20 June 2024. The claim was not presented until 24 July 2024, and is therefore over two months late, in the context of a period of three months. As early conciliation was not commenced timeously the period of it does not affect the date by which the claim must be presented.[64]I consider that the claimant has not discharged the onus that is on him in this regard. Whilst I accept that he was adversely affected by the dismissal, which dismissal he regarded as unfair, and that he did have a mental health reaction to it which included him not eating or sleeping properly, there is other evidence that does not support his own evidence on the extent to which his mental health was affected. His evidence was, in broad summary, that he was not thinking properly, his brain was as he put it not working, he had no sense of time, and could not address making a claim in those circumstances. I have come to the conclusion that that is not reliable as a description of his cognitive abilities at the time.[65]The evidence that is not consistent with that is from a number of sources. Firstly by way of chronology after the letter of termination the claimant sent an email to acknowledge receipt of the letter of dismissal, which he did on 15 February 2024, and secondly, and more significantly, he also around that time (the exact date was not given in evidence) set out an appeal document with a more than insignificant level of detail as to the arguments he wished to make. Whilst that was with the assistance of a friend, it was sent from his email account and in his name. His friend assisted rather than did all the work for it was what I took from his evidence. I infer from his evidence that a material part of it is his own work.[66]Thirdly he attended at the DWP personally to apply for benefits in around late March 2024, and that application succeeded. I had asked him about that, as it had been partly referred to in evidence and given what he had said about his mental health I had rather assumed that he would say either that someone else attended for him, or that he had attended with a friend. That is not what his evidence was however. He did so himself. Applying for benefits is of course something to be expected when employment terminates, and given the circumstances, but both the fact that he had done so himself and that it was successful indicate a reasonable ability to conduct his own affairs. That, and the terms of the email appeal, are I consider issues that contradict his own evidence of his not being able to think in any meaningful way at that time.[67]Fourthly he also claims to have lost track of time, and to have “lost” about five months over the year 2024, but that evidence, and his evidence on his cognitive abilities more generally, is not I consider consistent with the report of Dr Summers. For reasons I explain further below it did not support the claimant’s argument on reasonable practicability, in my view, and it is therefore a different set of circumstances to those applicable in Chourafi. As that case made clear the decision is one for the Tribunal, and a medical report is only one aspect of the evidence that may be relevant. What I considered was significant was the inconsistency between the claimant’s oral evidence and the terms of the report.[68]That report was by letter dated 3 July 2024, not obviously prepared for the purposes of the present claim but presumably after a reference from the GP to whom it was addressed. In the report she describes her assessment of his level of cognitive functioning, to summarise it, and there is very limited evidence from that report of limitations to it. Her report in this important regard very largely contradicts the claimant’s evidence on that matter. The first aspect in this regard is that she states he attended the clinic in April and had a follow up telephone appointment in May (although not stated specifically it is inferred that they were in 2024, and therefore during the material period for present purposes). The second aspect is that his comments to her, as she reported them, included that he suffered from memory loss. He described his cognition as “variable”. That again is not consistent with his oral evidence.[69]The third aspect is that the assessment she provided to his GP was that he demonstrated no significant impairments in focussed and divided attention nor in processing speed, working memory or language. He had she stated superior visuospatial and constructional skills. His semantic memory was in the average range, and his planning and organising was above average. The only area where he demonstrated a moderate impairment was in distractibility. Given that written evidence from a consultant there is in my view no evidence supporting the argument that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to have commenced the claim timeously, and on the contrary it contradicts such an argument.[70]The fourth aspect is that the report referred to what the claimant had told her in late May 2024, when he said that he was applying for employment. He denied saying that in his evidence, but she was not called as a witness. I am therefore left with her written evidence, on which the claimant sought to rely, which contradicts his own that he was not applying for employment.[71]The report is not entirely contrary to the claimant’s position. It also stated, in addition to the point on distractibility, that the claimant suffered from high levels of anxiety, which was related to background trauma. Her advice (being given to the claimant’s GP) was that he would benefit from psychological therapy to address his anxiety, and he was recommended for a Scotland-wide free bus travel pass for which he would meet the criteria. The claim is not one of disability discrimination and there has been no suggestion that the claimant is a disabled person under the Equality Act 2010.[72]There is therefore evidence of distractibility and of high levels of anxiety, but of themselves in my view they are not sufficient to establish the issue of reasonable practicability as the claimant sought to do. That evidence is I consider similar to the evidence assessed as insufficient in Kauser. The circumstances of the two cases are different, but the conclusion of that case in my view supports the conclusion that the claimant has not discharged the onus on him in this regard.[73]Taking the report of Dr Summers as a whole, in my view it contradicts the claimant’s evidence not functioning cognitively to a significant extent at the time of dismissal or after it in the period to July 2024.[74]That is not however the only evidence relevant in this context. There are further matters that I considered relevant from the evidence I heard, each of which does not support the reliability of the claimant’s evidence. The fifth of these factors is that in the email of appeal the claimant referred to mental health breakdown in 2023, but he accepted in cross examination that he had not had any period of absence from work because of that. He stated that there was a difference between work matters, where he was able to function, and private ones where he was not, but that is not an easy distinction to understand and it is not supported in the report from Dr Summers. His written suggestion of a mental breakdown is I consider contradicted by the evidence more broadly, and indicates a tendency to exaggerate on his part.[75]There is sixthly a report from Dr Sheehan one of the GPs at his practice who he said knows him well, but there was nothing from that report on the detail of how he was functioning in the period February to July 2024 which is the period of time I am concerned with. That is at the least surprising if the claimant was functioning as badly as he had claimed, and that in the context of what appears to have been a referral to Dr Summers by the same GP practice, albeit a partner of Dr Sheehan. No GP notes or such other evidence was before me.[76]Seventhly the claimant in his Claim Form averred that the investigation was carried out while he was having a mental breakdown. He was however able to attend two disciplinary meetings, and prepared a document setting out his position on the allegations, both of which actions are not in my view consistent with a mental breakdown (nor is that mentioned by Dr Summers in her report). In my view this is a further example of exaggeration by the claimant.[77]In my view these last three matters are also not consistent with the claimant having such a limited if any level of cognitive functioning as he set out in his evidence, and tend to support the conclusion reached from the earlier matters. In my view the evidence overall does not support his oral evidence that he did not know of the right to claim unfair dismissal or the time limits to do so. I have concluded that that evidence is not reliable. I consider that he could reasonably be expected to know of those matters or to make researches or enquiries about them, including by doing so online, and his mental health issues did not mean that it was not reasonably practicable for him to have done so.[78]The claimant is a mature person, whose experience included as the skipper of a vessel. He had access to the internet, and although he had some difficulties in sending and receiving emails such that he asked the respondent to send correspondence by hard copy I did not consider that those matters materially affected his ability to conduct research online or seek assistance from others. He did have such assistance for example in relation to his appeal document.[79]He was in my view the kind of claimant who fell more into the former category of those referred to in Inchcape than the latter. That is at best a form of guide, but so far as it was relevant it did not support the claimant’s argument as to reasonable practicability including that he did not know of the right to claim unfair dismissal or of time-limits. As Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law puts it: “There is a distinction in mistake or ignorance cases between a case in which the litigant knew of the existence of the employment right in question but was ignorant of the time limit and a case in which the litigant was ignorant to the more fundamental matter of the very existence of the right. As to the latter, the courts have pointed out that with the widespread public knowledge of unfair dismissal rights, it is all the time becoming more difficult for an employee to successfully plead ignorance: see, for example, Riley v Tesco Stores Ltd [1980] IRLR 103, [1980] ICR 323 at 328, 329, 335; Wall's Meat Co Ltd v Khan [1978] IRLR 499, [1979] ICR 52, CA. If this was the case in the 1980s, it applies with significantly more force now. With increasing discussion and coverage of employment rights and litigation in the media, and the ease of searching for information online, the cases of justifiable ignorance will be fewer and fewer. It is nonetheless possible to envisage examples of individuals, such as those who are illiterate or do not speak English, have a relevant disability or have been isolated from the usual sources of information listed above (for example, victims of human-trafficking), who, even now, may be reasonably ignorant of their rights.”[80]It is a question of fact, but in light of the matters identified above in relation to the reliability of the claimant’s evidence generally I have decided that I cannot accept his evidence that he was not aware of the right to claim unfair dismissal or in relation to time-limits. I have concluded that he was aware of the right to do so. His email of appeal indicates an intention to challenge the decision, and although it did not specifically refer to the unfairness of it, what was said is at the least consistent with such an argument. The claimant is someone with wide experience more generally.[81]I have taken into account that the claimant did not have legal advice until 20 June 2024, and that although he had advice before that from the Blide Trust and Citizens Advice that was not from those who were legally qualified. In my view however that aspect is not sufficient to displace the conclusion I reached that the claimant did have a sufficient level of cognitive functioning, as Dr Summers’ report indicated, that it was reasonably practicable for him to have conducted research into making a claim, including issues of time limits, and how to do so, then to have commenced the claim, within the primary limitation period being up to 14 May 2024 as to early conciliation and then presenting the Claim Form to the Tribunal as explained above.[82]In my view Ms Stobart was right to argue that the claimant wishing to have closure from the Claim is not a factor that is relevant to the consideration of the issue of reasonable practicability. I did not therefore take that aspect of the evidence or submission into account.[83]Ms Allison gave evidence which included referring to an email she had written to the respondent’s solicitor with her views of the position. She is someone with a degree and PhD but has no medical qualifications, and although that evidence is not inadmissible it was I consider of very little weight given the report that there was from Dr Summers. She is someone seeking to assist those such as the claimant with mental health difficulties, for which she is to be commended, but as a matter of evidence I did not consider that what she had written could supersede the written opinion of Dr Summers who as stated is a consultant.[84]I concluded in all the circumstances from the evidence before me that the claimant had not established that it was not reasonably practicable for him to have presented the claim by 14 May 2024, in the sense of commencing Early Conciliation by then, securing a certificate and then timeously presenting a Claim Form (which in simple terms generally means presenting it within a month of the date of the certificate). On that basis the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction under section 111 of the Act. Reasonableness[85]I then considered the remaining issue of reasonableness lest I was wrong on that matter. It was relevant that by 20 June 2024 at the latest the claimant had advice about the claim from someone whose email states that she is a solicitor, as well as advice from Ms Allison and Citizens Advice, and about time-limits specifically, as well as the need to start early conciliation. He did so that day using a link that the Law Centre had sent him. The certificate was issued on 24 June 2024, and he could not have commenced the claim before then as the certificate was required to do so.[86]What was in my view not explained however was why it took from around 24 June 2024 until 24 July 2024 to present the Claim Form. The Claim was out of time on 24 June 2024, and the Early Conciliation process, whilst required, did not extend time at all. In light of the discussion with a solicitor on 20 June 2024 I infer that the claimant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that as at 24 June 2024 when a claim could be presented it was out of time and required urgent action. In such a situation, in my view it was reasonable to expect that any claimant would have presented the claim within at the most a few days of 24 June 2024. The form that was presented was relatively short, and there was no suggestion that it required any particular time to complete.[87]There was no evidence of the detail of the legal advice given, and there was no document recording what it was. There was no suggestion that it was not adequate. I asked about that period of time between 24 June 2024 and 24 July 2024 but the claimant could not say why it took such a period. I did not therefore have evidence of there being any reason for that apparent and not inconsiderable delay.[88]In all the circumstances it appears to me that it was reasonable to present the Claim Form within a few days of 24 June 2024, and that doing so on 24 July 2024 was well beyond what was a reasonable period of time. That is because the primary time limit is reasonably short at three months, that had expired well over a month before 20 June when Early Conciliation commenced after advice given that day, and it was, or ought reasonably to have been apparent, that the Claim Form would be materially late even then. It appeared to me that it was or ought reasonably to have been apparent that there was an urgency over the timing of presenting the Claim. In short, there was an undue and unexplained further delay of over three weeks which I consider meant that the claim was not presented within a reasonable period of time. For that separate reason therefore the claim would be out of time even if it had not been reasonably practicable to have presented it timeously contrary to my finding on that issue.[89]In those circumstances I concluded that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the Claim under section 111 of the Act and I require to dismiss it accordingly.