Mr A Lazenby v Halliburton Management Ltd: 4103769/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)
Case No 4103769/2025
Between
Mr Alexander LazenbyClaimantHalliburton Management LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge R McPhersonMr M Salt for claimantLay Representative for claimantMs C Law (instructed by Solicitor) for respondentDate 10 April 2026
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to the claimant’s claim of unlawful deduction of wages, and the claims are dismissed.
REASONS
[1]On 11 October 2025, the claimant’s ET1 was presented, asserting complaints of unlawful deduction of wages. The claimant argues that, between July 2024 and March 2025, he was deployed and worked as a Data Engineer but was paid at a lower rate for a Logging Geologist until the end of March 2025, which he argues amounts to an unlawful deduction of wages.[2]The respondent resists the claims, including setting out that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim for unpaid wages as the time limit had expired before the presentation of a claim and did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim for breach of contract, in that the claimant’s employment is ongoing, and further (at 3.3) that the respondent’s position is that they were not under legal obligation to pay claimant a higher rate for work performed prior to 1 April 2025, the respondent arguing that the higher rate entitlement arose from 1 April 2025 when the claimant was promoted to the position of Data Engineer.[3]At the outset of this hearing, Mr Martin Salt, who was the claimant’s uncle, explained that while he had a background in law several years previously, this was not in litigation or employment law. He was acting as a lay representative.[4]The claimant’s mother, Mrs Alison Lazenby, acted as a McKenzie friend, providing broad support for the claimant, rather than give evidence of matters within the claimant’s knowledge.[5]The claimant was the sole witness, and the Joint Bundle of Documents, which included a document created by the claimant, headed "Detailed Timeline of Key Events and Correspondence” covering the period 31 January 2022 to 3 September 2025, a second claimant document headed "Summary of Key Events” covering the period 31 January 2022 to 23 October 2025 and a series of emails between 29 January 2025 and 30 October 2025.[6]At the outset of this hearing, it was confirmed for the claimant that his claim was for unlawful deduction of wages and not for breach of contract. Findings in fact[7]These findings of fact are limited to the issues of the time bar arising from the unlawful deduction of wages claim.[8]On 31 January 2022, the claimant commenced employment with the respondent as a Logging Geologist.[9]On 17 July 2024, the claimant considers that he began acting up in the role of Data Engineer and considers that he was entitled to a higher rate, which was subsequently applied from 1 April 2025. No contemporaneous documentation was provided for the period July 2024 to 28 January 2025; however, the Tribunal concludes on the evidence before it that a payslip issued to the claimant towards the end of July 2024 would have demonstrated that no pay rise had been applied, and further that position was repeated each month thereafter up to 29 April 2025 as set out below.[10]The claimant works 3-week periods offshore, and during the period when he was offshore, he would have his mobile phone but not his laptop computer.[11]On 29 January 2025, the respondent sent the claimant an email containing information regarding the change of the payroll system implemented in February and March 2025, setting out that whilst salary would continue to be paid for each month at the end of the month, identified cut-off dates for applying for worked overtime, Offshore Day Rate (ODR) and on call.[12]On 31 March 2025, the March 25 payslip was issued to the claimant at the Logging Geologist rate, setting out the basic salary, additional holiday, Sperry ODR, lead bonus and pension.[13]On 1 April 2025, a respondent e-mail confirmed the claimant's promotion to the role of Data Engineering; no new contractual terms were issued.[14]On 29 April 2025, the final payslip was issued at the rate applicable to and equivalent to a Logging Geologist, setting out that it covered the pay period 1 April to 30 April 2025, setting out the basic salary, additional holiday, Sperry ODR, lead bonus, holiday and pension (the 29 April 2025 Payslip).[15]On 29 May 2025, the first payslip was issued at the higher rate, which the claimant considers applicable to a Data Engineer, setting out that it covered the pay period 1 May to 31 May 2025, setting out the basic salary shown as two payments, additional holiday, Sperry ODR, lead bonus and pension (the 29 May 2025 payslip).[16]The claimant’s Summary Timeline of Key Events sets out as “29” (that date being corrected in the hearing), “May 2025 First Payslip at Data Engineer rate (paid in arrears; no back -pay). This prompted Claimant to initiate a formal grievance process, in line with Halliburton’s stated procedure.”[17]On 4 June 2025: 1. The claimant issued a Written Grievance to the respondent (the 4 June 2025 Grievance). 2. The 4 June Grievance set out that it was raised as “a formal grievance in accordance with the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary Procedures. I have been unable to locate an official grievance procedure “The basis of my grievance is as follows Last year, I was verbally promoted from my role as Logging Engineer.” The 4 June 2025 Grievance did not set out that the claimant was unaware of the rate that the claimant argued should have been applied until after 29 April 2025. The claimant set out his Written Grievance and requested the respondent’s Grievance Procedure as it was not available in the Employee Handbook or on the respondent's Intranet. The claimant also requested an amended employment contract for the Data Engineer role, which clearly detailed his base rate, day rate, and any associated bonuses. The claimant was able to identify the ACAS Code at this time without reference to the respondent documentation. The claimant, directly or through a third party, would have been able to carry out relevant internet searches, whether on a phone or a laptop, including on time limits for Tribunal claims from the end of July 2024, when he received a payslip which did not include a pay rise which he considered should have been applied. 3. It was the claimant’s position, as set out in his detailed timeline of key events, that he received a reply from Ms Caitlin Dennis, HR Associate, saying she was moving jobs and she had sent the claimant's email to Maria Tcheukoua for further handling.
procedure
[18]On 9 June 2025, the respondent provided the claimant with a letter headed Amendment to Terms of Contract reflecting the role of Data Engineer, effective 1 April 2025 and set out the annual salary along with Job Duties, Qualification and Scope document.[19]On 10 June 2025, the respondent’s HR Associate, Ms Emily Clark, acknowledged receipt of the claimant’s 4 June 2025 Grievance and set out that she would review same, and she looked “forward to sharing the next steps in the process shortly” (that process being the respondent Grievance process).[20]On 17 June 2025: 1. At 8.28 am, the respondent HR Country Manager, Mr Tariq Salhah, thanked the claimant for his message, apologised for the delay and set out that the claimant's Grievance was “being treated as a priority, and HR are actively following up on your request.” 2. At 9.12 am, Ms Clark emailed the claimant with a letter proposing 20 June for the Grievance Meeting, together with a copy of the respondent's Grievance Policy. Ms Yuliya Poltavchenko, the respondent Sperry Manager, was copied in. 3. At 10.37 am, the claimant responded to Ms Clark, Ms Villalon, Mr Salhah and Ms Poltavchenko, advising “Unfortunately, I am offshore at present, on dayshift, and current operations require me to stay in the logging unit. Therefore, I will be unable to meet on Friday the 20th. Please could we reschedule to Tuesday 24th when I am back onshore?” The claimant acknowledged the grievance documentation provided, noting that the version attached and provided to the claimant “says to “Refer to the UK Grievance Procedure for comprehensive process instructions” if there is a fuller version could this also be provided.” While offshore on this date, the claimant was able to open and read email attachments via his smartphone. 4. At 10.39 am, the claimant emailed Mr Salah, copying Ms Villalon and Ms Clark, describing his disappointment with what he regarded as the “lack of timely follow-up. I would therefore like to reiterate the need for: A copy of the company’s grievance procedure A substantive update on the progress of my grievance, including how and when it will be addressed As per the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures, grievances should be handled promptly and fairly. Unfortunately, the delays to date are contrary to those principles and are causing me further concern. I respectively request a written response and confirmation of the next steps by no later than 19th June 2025. If I do not receive a response by that date. I will consider escalating the matter further” (emphasis added). While offshore on this date, the claimant again set out, in this email, reference to the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures. The respondent’s Grievance Policy and Procedure provided to the claimant by the respondent was silent on the claimant's relevant statutory rights; it did not set out any right to go to the Employment Tribunal or a time limit for doing so. The respondent's Grievance Policy and Procedure provided to the claimant did not identify the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures. 5. The claimant, directly or through a third party, would have been able to carry out relevant internet searches, including on time limits for Tribunal claims and certainly could have done so both prior to this period offshore and by 24 June when he confirmed he was onshore, against the background of his expressed dissatisfaction and his explicit statement on this date that he would consider “escalating the matter further”, if he did not get the response he sought by 19 June 2025. 6. At 11.29 am, Ms Clark provided the attached full Grievance Procedure and confirmed that she would “adjust the meeting shortly”, which she did, confirming it as 24 June 2025.[21]On 24 June 2025: 1. The stage 1 Grievance Meeting took place, led by the respondent’s Sperry OPS Manager, Ms Poltavchenko. The claimant provided a Statement which set out “Firstly, I would like to make it clear that I took this ‘official grievance route’ very reluctantly and only after repeated communications had been made, and I had exhausted all the informal options I could think of. I believe I have always been extremely patient and respectful”, describing his view that he had “only received payment as a Data Engineer from April 1, 2025. That’s a span of 8 trips and nearly 9 months.”, and set out, that he sought both “back pay between 17 July 2004 and 1 April 2025” and a “written contract and any associated bonus entitled. (Please know this part of my grievance has been largely resolved since I received an updated contract on July 7, 3 days after I sent my grievance letter.) The contract does not cover day rates or bonuses.” The claimant set out what he regarded as a “pattern of delayed responses and vague answers continuing”, that he “escalated” the issue in September 2024, copying in HR and that “none of these promises materialised. In fact I had to chase repeatedly…” and that he “continued to follow up and chase during January, February and March 2025…”, and proposed that he was aware of a “colleague and peer … promoted in June 2024 and paid accordingly from that point”. The claimant did not suggest that he had been unable to calculate the pay differential until he had received the contract. 2. At 2.44 pm, the claimant emailed his own meeting minutes to the meeting participants, which set out that when he was asked what figure of backpay /compensation he was seeking, he set out that figure “about £6,000”. The claimant’s Minutes notes did not suggest that the claimant had been unable to calculate payment, which he considered he had been underpaid and concluded with the claimant noting that he “would get a written response within 5 working days (longer if” the Manager “needed to interview someone on holiday”. The claimant further provided his written statement and his prepared Timeline Document to the meeting participants. 3. At 4.38 pm, Ms Clark emailed the claimant, “Thank you for your detailed notes”.[22]On 1 July 2025, the 5-day primary deadline for the Stage 1 decision passed.[23]On 2 July 2025 at 10.38 am, Ms Clark emailed to see that there were delays and investigations, describing that “We hope to complete the investigation this week. Apologies it's taking a bit longer than planned. We appreciate your patience. Please let me know if you have any questions in the meantime.” The end of that week (Friday) was 4 July 2025.[24]On 3 July 2025 at 8.39 am, the claimant emailed Ms Clark, “Thanks for the update”.[25]On 7 July 2025, the claimant emailed Ms Clark, copying his Manager and Ms Villalon, “Could you provide me with an update. I was hoping to have heard back from Yuliya by now. It will have been two weeks tomorrow since our stage 1 meeting”.[26]On 8 July 2025 at 7.58 am, the claimant emailed Ms Villalon and Ms Clark, copying in his manager, “Please can you provide me with an update of the investigation?”[27]On 11 July 2025 at 12.26 am, Ms Clark emailed the claimant, “I apologise for my delay. Yuliya is still in the process of investigating the grievance claim. I will be able to provide an updated decision later. I appreciate your patience.”[28]On 14 July 2025 at 8.44 am, the claimant emailed Ms Clark, copying in his Manager and Ms Villalon, setting out that “I'm very disappointed that Yuliya has not yet completed her investigation, having committed to do so within 5 days. It will be 3 weeks tomorrow since our meeting on June 24th. I provided all the information you required from me on the same day that we met, so I'm struggling to understand the ongoing delays. I would appreciate a response as quickly as possible In addition, I forwarded a copy of the notes I made during the meeting to everyone but have yet to receive a copy of the notes that you made. Please could you send them on to me?”[29]On 24 July 2025: 1. At 8.16 am, the claimant emailed Ms Clark, copying in his Manager and Ms Villalon, “I’m writing for the outcome of my stage 1 grievance meeting. It's been over a month now since we met, and I would really like to get this resolved and move on”. 2. At 12.26 am, Ms Clark responded to the claimant, “Yuliya has provided her feedback and findings from the investigations she carried out following the Grievance. We will be replying to you in writing no later than tomorrow.”[30]On 28 July 2025, the respondent ET3 calculated was the last date for presenting a claim under the primary 3-month time limit in terms of section 23(2) of ERA1996.[31]On 7 August 2025, at 9.49 am, the respondent provided a Stage 1 decision by e-mail to the claimant, in a letter dated 4th of August 2025 (the 7 August 2025 Outcome Notification), which set out that any appeal should be notified in writing within 5 days. The respondent also attached three documents: the Minutes from the Stage 1 Grievance Meeting, the respondent's UK Appeal Policy, and the Appeals Procedure for Stage 2. While the respondent's email of 7 August stated that a Compensation Summary was attached, it wasn't.[32]On 8 August 2025; 1. At 7.39 am, the claimant acknowledged the respondent's decision, noted the letter was dated 4 August and set out, “I will seek advice and let Emily know in writing if I wish to appeal by August 12”. The claimant asked for compensation summary referred to in the letter as “it was not attached as promised”. 2. At 10.36 am, Ms Villalon emailed the claimant with PDF document (copying in Ms Clark and the manager), “Please see attached copy of the compensation summary”. 3. At 4.06 pm, the claimant emailed Ms Villalon (copying in Ms Clark and the Manager), “Thanks for sending this over. Please could I get a copy of this in another format (excel sheet)? It's difficult to read as the tables are shifted due to being in PDF form.” The claimant did not suggest that he was unable to read and consider an Excel spreadsheet while offshore.[33]On 10 August 2025 at 8.22 am, the claimant sent Ms Villalon an email (copied to Ms Clark and the manager) “In addition to re-sending the Compensation Document in a readable format, could you please confirm whether the two appeal documents attached to the your recent email are the current and applicable version?” commenting that one appears to relate to disciplinary appeal and the second outlined a process different from that set out in the documents provided on 17 June and concluded “As this process is timebound” (emphasis added) “I would appreciate a prompt response, ideally by 4:00 pm on Monday, when I will be waking for my shift”. The claimant was able to open the attachments provided.[34]On 11 August 2025: 1. At 9.37 am, Ms Villalon emailed the claimant, copying in Ms Clark and the Manager, “Please see attached an Excel copy of the compensation document. Do you have a question regarding appealing? The paperwork that has been sent is correct; however, I will check on the discrepancy. If you would like to appeal, you should submit this to myself and Emily. As per the Grievance policy, you have the option to appeal a stage 1 Grievance decision.” 2. At 4.26 pm, the claimant responded to Ms Villalon, copying Ms Clark and the manager providing his appeal with email, “Thanks for sending the Excel file over. My specific query is whether or not I have to include 'ground' in my appeal notification to Emily. To be on the safe side, I have included “grounds”, but it was not very clear”, 3. The claimant's written appeal described “This decision was sent 6.5 weeks after the Stage 1 meeting on 24 June, despite this Company’s Stated timescale of five working days. Because of this delay, I am now offshore and working night shifts while handling this matter, with only my phone to access documentation. This significantly limits my ability to prepare a comprehensive response. Had the five-day turnaround time been met, I would have been onshore with access to my laptop and hard copies of the relevant Company Policies and Procedures, minutes, letters, and statements, enabling me to more easily review the information and properly prepare my response. I do not accept the findings of the Stage 1 outcome on the following grounds:” setting out 4 grounds, including: 1. Failure to properly compensate for higher- level duties performed. The decision letter acknowledges that I was working as a Data Engineer from July 2024 to April 2025, yet I was not fully compensated for performing at this level. 2. … … For the record, I attach my prior grievance statement, as well as my notes from the Stage 1 meeting, which were forwarded to all copied parties on 24 June. As mentioned above, because I am currently deployed offshore on nightshifts, I will be unable to participate in any Stage 2 hearing until my return onshore. I therefore request the Stage 2 meeting be scheduled during the first week of September to ensure my full participation.” The claimant was able to formulate and issue his detailed multi paragraph written appeal while offshore. 4. At 5.10 pm, Ms Villalon responded, copying in Ms Clark and the Manager, “No problem. We do require you to include the grounds for your appeal so I appreciate you adding that information to your appeal letter. One of my colleagues from the HR team will be in contact with you shortly” 5. The claimant commenced ACAS Early Conciliation while working offshore.[35]On 22 August 2025: 1. At 11.37 am, the claimant emailed Ms Villalon, copying Ms Clark, “I’m writing to check if a date has been set for a Stage 2 meeting- I haven’t heard yet regarding a date.” 2. At 12.15 pm, Ms Villalon emails the claimant (copying in Ms Clark and the manager), “One of my colleagues is reviewing your appeal and looking to arrange a meeting around your availability. They will reach out shortly with more details” 3. At 12.17 pm, Ms Devine, respondent HR contact, emailed the claimant, “Can you please advise the date that you will be back from offshore? Apologies, I thought I had replied on Monday but this is still sitting as a draft.” 4. At 12.27 pm, the claim responded to Ms Devine, “I’m currently scheduled to get home Tuesday night (August 26th). However, I need to factor in time for delays and scheduled appointments and prep time. Therefore, I would grateful if you could schedule the meeting for the week of September 1st (the earlier in that week the better for me). Please let me know who will be in the meeting from the Halliburton side and send me an agenda/format so I know what to expect and prepare.”[36]On 26 August 2025: 1. At 12.15 pm, Ms Devine notified the claimant by email that they proposed the Appeal Meeting to take place on 3 September 2025 with the Area Operations Manager, providing Teams meeting link. 2. At 12.35 pm, the claimant responded to Ms Devine “Thanks for letting me know. This date and time will work fine for me”[37]On 3 September 2025: 1. In the morning, the Stage 2 Grievance Appeal Meeting took place with the respondent, Area Operations Manager. Although the minutes of that meeting within the Joint Bundle were incorrectly labelled in the Index to the Joint Bundle as minutes of a disciplinary meeting, that was corrected in the hearing, and no issue arose from the labelling in the Index. The claimant, in his Opening (written) Statement at this meeting, set out his calculations and provided a table “to see compensation breakdown” and described that there was supporting case law which supported his position “Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41 – tribunals look at the reality of the working relationship, not uncommunicated or retrospective terms, especially where there is an imbalance of power” and “Miles v Wakefield MDC [1987] AC 539 – employee are entitled to proper pay for work actually done” and at the foot page 4 described that “I would like to inform the company that I have submitted this matter to ACAS for Early Conciliation and am currently awaiting the assignment of a conciliation. I took this step before the Stage 2 meeting in order to comply with the statutory time limits for a filing a claim. It is my genuine hope that we can reach a fair a satisfactory resolution without the need to escalate the matter to an Employment Tribunal.” 2. In the course of the Stage 2 Grievance Appeal Meeting, the claimant set out, “Between July 2024 and March 2025, I was deployed as and carried out the full responsibilities of a data engineer. Yet paid at logging geologist rate. I view this constitutes unpaid wages for work performed at a higher rate.” 3. At 11.45 am, following the meeting, the claimant provided Ms Devine and the Area Operations Manager, thanking them for taking the time to meet “I appreciate your attention to this matter, and I remain hopeful that we can reach a fair resolution. As you know, I have made every effort over the past nine months to resolve this informally, and I only pursued the formal route after those attempts were unsuccessful.” and attached 3 documents: the claimant’s written Open and Closing statement, 2 Evidence timeline summary and “Claim calculation - a breakdown of how I arrive at the back pay figure”[38]As set out in his Opening Written Statement for the Appeal Stage 2 meeting and prior to being assigned an ACAS conciliator, the claimant had carried out research on what he considered to be supporting case law and approached ACAS in order to comply with the claimant’s existing understanding of relevant process, including “the statutory time limits for filing a claim”.[39]In the course of the subsequent ACAS Early Conciliation, the claimant had spoken to ACAS, who had advised him that he had “one month to present a claim from the issue of the certificate”, this is a general statement of the stop the clock mechanism whereby when ACAS Early conciliation is commenced within the 3 month primary time limit, a claimant would have one month following the issue of the Certificate to present a claim. The claimant did not rely on that statement in his presentation of the ET1 on 11 October 2025, around 20 days after the issue of the ACAS EC certificate and not close to 1 month. No determination was made as to the level of detail of information ACAS were provided with by the claimant, who continued (and continues) in employment at the time, such as when the last deduction was made.[40]The claimant who referred to Autoclenz & Miles in his Opening Written Statement for the Appeal Stage had approached ACAS in order to comply with the claimant’s existing understanding of relevant process, including “the statutory time limits for filing a claim”, and was at all material times, including during the period when he considered he was being underpaid, able to carry out research on Employment Tribunal matters, that ability included the ability to identify ACAS Early Conciliation process and the primary 3 month time limit for presenting a claim to Tribunal.[41]On 22 September 2025, ACAS Early Conciliation certification was issued to the claimant, marking the conclusion of Early Conciliation. The ACAS certificate issued to the claimant set out “This certificate is to confirm that the prospective claimant has complied with the requirement under ETA 1996 s18 to contact Acas before instituting proceedings in the Employment Tribunal”. It did not describe the 3-month primary time limit, nor did it describe that any claim was in time.[42]On 7 October 2025, the claimant emailed Ms Devine, copying in the Area Manager, “Please could you give me an update regarding the stage 2 grievance meeting, as it’s been five weeks since the meeting.”[43]On 11 October 2025, the claimant presented his ET1. 1. The ET1 at 8.2 set out that the claimant's sole claim was unpaid wages, arguing that he was “not paid correctly for the work I performed from July 17th to March 31st 2025”. 2. The ET1 at 8.2 set out that it was his view that he was paid at “the lower Geologist rate. The company does not dispute that I performed” Data Engineer duties, describing the Grievance process and sets out “I appealed the Stage 1 decision and attended Stage 2 meeting on 3 September 2025: I was told a decision would follow within five days but I have not received.” I believe my claim is supported by Autoclenz v Belcher [2011] UK SC and Miles v Wakefield MDC [1987] AC 539. I seek back pay at the DE rate (base pay, day rate and bonuses) for July 20025 – March 2025…. I initiated ACAS Early conciliation within statutory time limits. I have acted in good faith throughout and sought to resolve this matter internally.” The ET1 did not propose that ACAS had identified that the claimant make a reference to either Autoclenz or Miles, nor did it propose that he had delayed presenting his claim during the period when he considered he was being underpaid, on the advice of ACAS. 3. The ET1 at 9.2, the claimant set out “I recorded the number of days to each offshore trip(hitch) undertaken between July 17th, 2024 and March 31, 2025. I used the variable day rate deficit (the difference between Logging Geologist and Data Engineer Day rates and bonuses- £39 until 17th, then £22 onwards). This deficit was multiplied by the days of each hitch, to get the amount owed per each hitch.” The claimant set out the total and described, “I added the base salary difference for the 9-month period,” and set out the total monetary claim sought. The claimant did not suggest in the ET1 that he had been unable to formulate the monies at any earlier period. 4. The ET1 at 11 identified his representative as his mother. At the time of presentation, the claimant was not receiving any advice from his uncle. 5. It was only after the Tribunal notified the parties that, reflective of the respondent ET3, a hearing time bar was appointed that the claimant was assisted by his uncle (his lay representative today). 4. The claimant further again references in the ET1 Autoclenz and Miles, reflecting research carried out by him prior to the 3 September 2025 Stage 2 Appeal Hearing.[44]Also on 11 October 2025 at 7.41 pm, the claimant emailed Ms Devine and the Area Operations Manager, “I’m writing to let you know that I’ve submitted my claim to an employment tribunal on the advice of the ACAS conciliator. I had to do this now in order to comply with the time limit. It is my understanding that I can withdraw the claim if we are able to settle beforehand. To that end, I hope I’ll be able to receive your decision on the stage 2 decision ASAP.”[45]On 12 October 2025, Ms Devine responded to the claimant, copying in the Area Manager, “We hope to have a decision to you shortly. As advised, some of this we have had to speak to have been out of office.”[46]On 23 October 2025: 1. At 12.38 pm, the claimant emailed the Area Manager, copying in Ms Devine, noting that it was over 7 weeks since the stage 2 meeting, describing that the prolonged delay was deeply disappointing. 2. At 4.45 pm, Ms Devine emailed the claimant with the Final grievance decision set out in an outcome letter, minutes of the appeal meeting, and a bonus spreadsheet. The letter set out the respondent's position on the sequence of events, including that after deployment in July 2024, the claimant was put forward for promotion on 1 October 2024, which subsequently took effect on 1 April 2025, from which point the claimant was paid at the higher rate.[47]On 30 October 2025, the claimant emailed the respondent's HR advising that he was disappointed by the respondent's decision and that he would be pursuing the claim through the Tribunal.[48]On ET3 was provided, which set out in the Response at 2.3, the “claim is for alleged unpaid wages in respect of the period between 17 July 2024 and 31 March 2025. The Clamant received the last payment for the Respondent for work that he had undertaken between those dates on 29 April 2025. That is the date of the last alleged deduction and the primary time limit … under section 23(2) of the ERA was therefore 28 July 2025” Conclusions on witness evidence[49]The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the claimant as broadly straightforward on matters of fact, subject to the qualification that to the extent that the claimant had a discussion with ACAS, it is unnecessary to conclude whether the claimant intimated to ACAS that the final deduction was in May or he was otherwise was silent, ACAS statement that there was (generally) a month period to present a claim from end of Early Conciliation, was not a statement the claimant relied upon. The claimant did not wait until close to the expiry of the 1-month period before presenting his claim. While the Tribunal concludes that, insofar as it is suggested for the claimant that he was relying upon ACAS guidance and advice, that is not correct, this simply reflects the passage of time and the complexity of matters before the Tribunal and should not be read as an indication that he was seeking to be unreliable. Submissions[50]Oral submissions were made for the claimant. In the interests of brevity, the Tribunal does not consider it necessary to set out the full terms of those submissions but refers to them below where relevant.[51]For the respondent, it was argued that there was no obligation on the respondent to give advice on statutory rights or process; the claimant was not ignorant of the right to bring a claim; the claimant acted too late; and that he operated on a mistaken belief is not sufficient. The claimant had failed to discharge the obligation to demonstrate that it was not reasonably practical to present his claim within 3 months or within such further reasonable time. ss13(3) and (4A) 1996 do not give any additional leeway; they do not create a continuing deduction. Employment Rights Act 1996[52]S13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) sets out 13. Right not to suffer unauthorised deductions.(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless— (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or (b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction.(2) In this section “relevant provision”, in relation to a worker’s contract, means a provision of the contract comprised— (a) in one or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question, or (b) in one or more terms of the contract (whether express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing) the existence and effect, or combined effect, of which in relation to the worker the employer has notified to the worker in writing on such an occasion.(3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions), the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion.(4) Subsection (3) does not apply in so far as the deficiency is attributable to an error of any description on the part of the employer affecting the computation by him of the gross amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion.(5) For the purposes of this section a relevant provision of a worker’s contract having effect by virtue of a variation of the contract does not operate to authorise the making of a deduction on account of any conduct of the worker, or any other event occurring, before the variation took effect.(6) For the purposes of this section an agreement or consent signified by a worker does not operate to authorise the making of a deduction on account of any conduct of the worker, or any other event occurring, before the agreement or consent was signified.(7) This section does not affect any other statutory provision by virtue of which a sum payable to a worker by his employer but not constituting “wages” within the meaning of this Part is not to be subject to a deduction at the instance of the employer.[53]Section 23 ERA 1996 sets out: 23. Complaints to employment tribunals.(1) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal — (a) that his employer has made a deduction from his wages in contravention of section 13 (including a deduction made in contravention of that section as it applies by virtue of section 18(2)), (b) that his employer has received from him a payment in contravention of section 15 (including a payment received in contravention of that section as it applies by virtue of section 20(1)), (c) that his employer has recovered from his wages by means of one or more deductions falling within section 18(1) an amount or aggregate amount exceeding the limit applying to the deduction or deductions under that provision, or (d) that his employer has received from him in pursuance of one or more demands for payment made (in accordance with section 20) on a particular pay day, a payment or payments of an amount or aggregate amount exceeding the limit applying to the demand or demands under section 21(1).(2) Subject to subsection (4), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with— (a) in the case of a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, or (b) in the case of a complaint relating to a payment received by the employer, the date when the payment was received.(3) Where a complaint is brought under this section in respect of— (a) a series of deductions or payments, or (b) a number of payments falling within subsection (1)(d) and made in pursuance of demands for payment subject to the same limit under section 21(1) but received by the employer on different dates, the references in subsection (2) to the deduction or payment are to the last deduction or payment in the series or to the last of the payments so received. (3A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (2).(4) Where the employment tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this section to be presented before the end of the relevant period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable. (4A) An employment tribunal is not (despite subsections (3) and (4)) to consider so much of a complaint brought under this section as relates to a deduction where the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made was before the period of two years ending with the date of presentation of the complaint. Relevant case law[54]Recent guidance on the question of time limits for protection of wages claims was provided by the EAT in Wharton v Sheehan Haulage and Plant Hire Ltd [2024] EAT 127 (Wharton), in which the EAT concluded that the Tribunal had erred in treating the 3 month time limit from running from the date of termination of Mr Wharton employment, in a claim for unlawful deduction of wages, in terms of section 23(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 the three month time limit runs from the date when the alleged deductions were made. In that case, although termination occurred on 9 September 2020, the deduction was not applied until later, on 18 September 2020. The EAT set out “24. Section 23(1) ERA 1996 states that a worker may present a complaint to an Employment Tribunal that, amongst other things: "his employer has made a deduction from his wages in contravention of section 13 ". Section 23(2) addresses the time limits for such a claim to be brought: “(2) Subject to sub-section (4), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with: a) in the case of a complaint relating to a deduction made by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made.”[55]In Taylorplan Services Ltd v Jackson and ors 1996 IRLR 184, EAT (Taylorplan), the EAT identified that the approach was for the Tribunal to ask itself the following questions:(1) Is this a complaint relating to one deduction or a series of deductions by the employer?(2) If a single deduction, what was the date of the payment of wages from which the deduction was made?(3) If a series of deductions, what was the date of the last deduction?(4) Was the relevant deduction under (2) or (3) above within the period of three months prior to the presentation of the complaint?(5) If the answer to question (4) is in the negative, was it reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within the relevant threemonth period?(6) If the answer to question (5) is in the negative, was the complaint nevertheless presented within a reasonable time?[56]In the Joint Bunde, three reported decisions were provided: Court of Appeal decision in Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd [1974] 1 AllER 520 (Dedman), Wall’s Meat Ltd v Khan [1979] ICR 52 (Khan) and Canada Life v Gray [2004] ICR 673 (Canada Life).[57]Although neither party made reference to Canada Life in oral submissions, for completeness, the Tribunal notes that it was concerned with the operation of the Working Time Regulations 1998 and the right to annual leave. It is not considered necessary to set out the subsequent judicial consideration of Canada Life.[58]In Dedman, when the time limit was 1 month, and many years before smart phones and laptops, in assessing whether ignorance of a right is reasonable, as Lord Scarman commented in Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd 1974 ICR 53 (Dedman), the Tribunal should ask further questions: “What were his opportunities for finding out that he had rights? Did he take them? If not, why not? Was he misled or deceived?’”[59]Subsequent to Dedman, the Court of Appeal in Porter v Bandridge Ltd 1978 ICR 943 (Porter), having referred to Lord Scarman’s comments in Dedman, ruled that the correct test is not whether the claimant knew of his or her rights (Mr Porter in that case only heard about Unfair Dismissal from someone else) but whether he ought to have known of them. The Court of Appeal upheld a Tribunal decision that a claimant who took 11 months to present an unfair dismissal claim ought to have known of their rights earlier, even if in fact they did not.[60]Further in Avon County Council v Haywood Hicks [1978] IRLR 118 (Avon), the EAT overruled a Tribunal which had allowed a claim out of time on the basis that the claimant was, in fact, unaware of the time limit and at para 6 commented that “this was a case where the employee out to have known of his right even if he did not actually do so.”[61]In Trevelyans (Birmingham) Ltd v Norton 1991 ICR 488 (Trevelyans), the EAT held that when a claimant knows of their right to complain (in that case of unfair dismissal), they are under an obligation to seek information and advice about how to enforce that right.[62]The Court of Appeal in Palmer & Saunders v Southend- on-Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119 (Palmer) set out that the existence of an internal appeal does not by itself render it not reasonably practicable to present a claim, within the relevant time limit.[63]In so far as, for the claimant, it is proposed that the respondent documentation in not setting out statutory time limits misled the claimant, and while no authority for the proposition was provided, the Tribunal has reminded itself that as set out in Crossley v Faithful and Gould Holdings [2004] ICR 1615 (Crossley), there are no implied terms in the contract that an employer ought to take reasonable care of an employee's economic well-being. For the claimant, no authority was referenced identifying any general duty upon employers to advise an employee of their potential or actual statutory rights against the employer.[64]In submission for the claimant, the Tribunal was referred to Khan. As background, in Khan, there was a fairly involved sequence of events. In August 1976, Mr Khan was sacked following a fight with a colleague, in which he argued he acted in self-defence; the colleague was not sacked, and Mr Khan was unsuccessful in appealing the decision. Some 9 days later, he was told at what would now be called a Jobcentre that he would not get unemployment pay for 6 weeks, but that non-eligibility would go to the (what was in effect a local) benefit tribunal; Mr Khan (wrongly) believed this referred to what were at the time Industrial Tribunals. Just before the 3 months were up, Mr Khan went (again) to what would now be called a Jobcentre and saw a notice telling him what to do if he was dismissed and advising of the 3-month time limit. Mr Khan was not, however, concerned as he believed his claim was already underway. Subsequently, at the benefit tribunal, Mr Khan was told he was eligible for unemployment benefit but that they could not deal with the Unfair Dismissal claim. Afterwards, he sought advice and ultimately found a solicitor who acted promptly in presenting a claim (which was out with the 3- month time limit). The (then Industrial) Tribunal accepted the claim based on the statutory “escape clause” which was expressed as “An industrial tribunal shall not consider a complaint … unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination or within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within the period of three months.” The EAT upheld that decision but invited the employers to appeal.[65]In Khan, at the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning set out, “The present case is not one where the man was ignorant of his rights or of the time limit. He was aware of them, but he thought quite naturally that his claim was already lodged and was being processed before the appropriate tribunal”.[66]Further in Khan, it was held that the Tribunal needed not only to find what the mistaken belief which led to the delay was, but also to go on to consider whether the belief was reasonable; Brandon LJ describes: “With regard to ignorance operating as a similar impediment, I should have thought that, if in any particular case an employee was reasonably ignorant of either(a) his right to make a complaint of unfair dismissal at all, or(b) how to make it, or(c) that it was necessary for him to make it within a period of three months from the date of dismissal, an industrial tribunal could and should be satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for his complaint to be presented within the period concerned. For this purpose I do not see any difference, provided always that the ignorance in each case is reasonable, between ignorance of (a) the existence of the right, or (b) the proper way to exercise it, or (c) the proper time within which to exercise the right, is concerned, I do not see how it can justly be said to be reasonably practicable for a person to comply with a time limit of which he is reasonably ignorant. While I do not, as I have said, see any difference in principle in the effect of reasonable ignorance as between the three cases to which I have referred, I do see a great deal of difference in practice in the ease or difficulty with which a finding that the relevant ignorance is reasonable may be made. Thus, where a person is reasonably ignorant of the existence of the right at all, he can hardly be found to have been acting unreasonably in not making inquiries as to how, and within what period, he should exercise it. By contrast, if he does know of the existence of the right, it may in many cases at least, though not necessarily all, be difficult for him to satisfy an industrial tribunal that he behaved reasonably in not making such inquiries.”[67]In addition, in support of the claimant, a number of further cases were referred to in oral submissions, which are listed in order of date for ease of reference; Reid v Camphill Engravers [1990] ICR 435 (Reid), United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar 1995 ICR 65 (UAE), Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore [1996] ICR 836 (Selkent), British Coal v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336 (British Coal), Stringer v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] ICR 932 (Stringer), and Muschett v HM Prison Service [2010] EWCA 25 (Muschett).[68]While for the respondent it was intimated that the cases referred to for the claimant were not relevant, to the extent they were referred to and while they predate Wharton, it is considered appropriate, in the circumstances, to provide some comment on the cases referred to for the claimant.[69]In Reid, the claimant, having become aware he was being paid less than the then statutory minimum wage, having made several requests for an increase, resigned in April 1984 and presented a claim for unfair dismissal and unauthorised deductions of wages. The Tribunal held that Mr Reid, by continuing to work when he knew he was underpaid, had affirmed his contract, rejected his unfair dismissal complaint, and concluded he could only be awarded for deductions made in the three months prior to the resignation.[70]In Reid, the EAT held that it had been inappropriate for the Tribunal to have concluded that Mr Reid had affirmed a contract where the employer was in breach of the statutory minimum wage at the time, and that the Tribunal ought to have held that Mr Reid was constructively dismissed and thus the dismissal was unfair. On the deduction of wages, the EAT held the predecessor to the current provision on deduction of wages should be construed as meaning that a complaint was to be presented within 3 months beginning with the date of the payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, and where there was a series of deductions, the 3-month period ran from the last deduction in the series.[71]In UAE, the issue of time limit was around the separate issue of time for an appeal against the Tribunal’s decision, where the original Tribunal had not given effect to the immunity conferred by the State Immunity Act 1978.[72]In Selkent, Mr Moore had been summarily dismissed and presented a claim that he had been unfairly dismissed but made no mention in the supporting facts of trade union membership, trade union activities, or that such membership or activities may have been a reason for his dismissal. He subsequently wrote requesting an amendment to the originating application to include a complaint that he had been automatically unfairly dismissed by reason of his trade union activities. His application to amend was considered without considering any representations from the former employer, Selkent Bus, who appealed on the basis that there had been a denial of natural justice, in essence that that they not been offered an opportunity to address the Tribunal on their view that the amendment raised new issues which were not pleaded in the originating application, and the three-month time limit had expired by the time of the application to amend. The EAT allowed the appeal and refused the application to amend, holding that although there was no express obligation in the then Tribunal Rules requiring a Tribunal to seek or consider representations from each side before deciding whether to grant or refuse an application to amend, that discretion must be exercised judicially, with the EAT noting “It is, however, common ground that the discretion to grant leave is a judicial discretion to be exercised in a judicial manner, i.e., in a manner which satisfies the requirements of relevance, reason, justice and fairness inherent in all judicial discretions”. The EAT, in refusing the application, commented that these were new allegations which were made late.[73]In British Coal, the issue was whether it was appropriate to extend the time for presentation of a claim of unlawful sex discrimination on the (different to the current case) grounds that it was just and equitable to do so under the predecessor to Section 123 of the Equality Act 2010, which broadly sets a primary time limit of 3 months, less one day, from the date of the complainedof act of discrimination, and which provides that time in such discrimination claims may be extended on the basis that it is just equitable to do so. In consideration on that different statutory formulation of whether it was just and equitable to extend time, factors which are almost always relevant to consider when exercising any discretion whether to extend time such as :(a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay and(b) whether the delay has prejudiced the respondents (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh) reference is made to Jones v Secretary of State for Health & Social Care [2024] EWCA Civ 1568 [Jones].[74]In Stringer, the Court of Justice was concerned with workers who were on long-term sick leave, holding that such a worker who was unable to take his paid annual leave was entitled to take it later, after the period of sick leave had ended. The then-applicable European Directive did not preclude national legislation or practices according to which a worker on sick leave was not entitled to take paid annual leave during that sick leave, provided that the worker in question actually had the opportunity to take that leave during another period.[75]In Muschett, is a Court of Appeal decision considering a decision of the EAT in which the claimant Mr Muskett was sent by an agency to work for an end user was not entitled to pursue a claim for race discrimination against the end user, as it could not be shown that he was contractually obliged to personally execute any work or labour for the end use.[76]For the respondent, in submissions reference was made to Cygnet Behavioural Health v Britton [2002] EAT 108 (Britton) in which the EAT overturned a Tribunal decision which had held that it had not been reasonably practicable for Mr Britton to present his claim within the primary time limit, and he had presented his claim within a reasonable period thereafter.[77]In Britton, the EAT set out at para. 18 “There are two standard time limits in statutory employment law. The present case is concerned with the question whether the claimant can show that it was not reasonably practicable to claim in time and that the claim was presented within a reasonable further period. The other type of time limit, of course, is the test which requires the ET to consider whether it would be just and equitable to allow the claim to succeed. This applies for example in discrimination cases. The "just and equitable" test is very much more generous towards the claimant than the "not reasonably practicable" test”[78]The EAT in Britton, from 33 set out:33. The claimant contacted the ACAS helpline some time between 6 and 11 November. He understood from that conversation that he had to complete the online referral to commence the early conciliation process which he did on 11 November 2019. About the same time, he spoke to an ACAS adviser, Steve Molloy who told him that once he had submitted the form and the early conciliation process had concluded, he would receive the Certificate and that the clock would then run for general limitation. The employment judge said that: “23 The claimant was aware in a general sense that there was a limitation period and that in order to comply with it he should act as soon as possible after he received the ACAS certificate. In his words he regarded the receipt of certificate as the "trigger" for his next steps.”34. The claimant did not, however, take any steps to identify what the applicable time limit was. He said that it was difficult for him to access information from a website or a library. He needed to speak to people or as a fallback to send or receive emails. There was evidence that the claimant sent lengthy and detailed emails, but the employment judge accepted his argument that this did not mean that he was fully able to read documents, as the two functions involved different cognitive processes, upon which his dyslexia has differing effects.[79]Further, at paragraph 53 of Britton, the EAT sets out that “A person is who is considering bringing a claim for unfair dismissal is expected to appraise themselves of the time limits that apply; it is their responsibility to do so.” Discussion and decision[80]While for the claimant it is argued the effect of s13 (4A) ERA 1996 is that time does not run until the date of issue of the first payslip which does not have a deduction, or otherwise one month after the date of last deduction, the Tribunal does not accept the wording within s13 ERA 1996 give raise to same. It is contrary to both Taylorplan and Wharton.[81]While it is argued for the claimant, that he had no reason to file a grievance before May 2025 (including because the promotion was not as the claimant would argue “formalised” until April 2025), on the facts the Tribunal concludes that the claimant was aware of there being no increase in pay by the end of July 2024. The claimant had raised issues around same and expressly refers in the 24 June 2025 Statement to what he had regarded as a pattern of delayed responses and vague answers and had “escalated” the issue in September 2025 and continued to follow up and chase during January, February and March 2025. One the facts in this case the Tribunal concludes that from around one month after the claimant considered he was appointed to the roll of Data Engineer, it was apparent that there was no commensurate pay rise, that is, by the time the payslip was issued to him. The claimant further indicates in his documentation to his employer that he understood a colleague was being paid at what the claimant considered to be the higher applicable rate. The claimant thus understood from around the end of July 2024 that no pay increase had been applied. He was on notice from that date onward. The Tribunal does not accept, on the facts, that that the claimant had no reason to file a grievance before May 2025.[82]The Tribunal does not accept that the claimant, on the facts, found it difficult to escalate the dispute and notes that on 7 August 2025 the claimant had expressly set out that he would “seek advice”, in the circumstances it had been open for the claimant to seek advice, including on relevant time limits before that date and certainly following July 2024 in response to there being no pay rise and what the claimant complained of as a pattern of delayed responses and vague answers.[83]The claimant works 3-week periods offshore. The Tribunal, however, notes that while offshore on 17 June 2025, the claimant was able to set out in an email, reference to the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures, which had not been identified by the respondent's documentation, which he had previously referred to in the 4 June 2025 Grievance and described that delays were contrary to the ACAS Code and were causing him “further concern” and that he would consider escalating the matter further.[84]For the claimant it was noted that the respondent did not make the claimant aware of the relevant time limits. While the respondent’s documentation is silent on the claimant’s rights and time limits, it was not misleading. There is, in any event, no relevant obligation on an employer to advise its employees on statutory rights or claims against itself, reference is made to Crossley. While the respondent documentation, the Employee Handbook, was silent on statutory time limits, that silence was not misleading; the claimant did not, for instance, await the outcome of the Appeal before considering that he was required to present his claim. In any event, the respondent was not under an obligation to advise the claimant of such statutory rights. Reference is made to Crossley. The claimant was not misled or deceived; see Dedman.[85]It is noted that the claimant had described on 17 June 2025 that he had considered escalating the matter further, 10 August 2025 described the process as timebound and in his statement for the 3 September 2025 appeal meeting described that he had submitted the matter to ACAS and had taken that step “before the Stage 2 meeting in order to comply with the statutory time limits for filing a claim”, and again set out on 11 October 2025 that he had submitted his claim to Employment Tribunal at that time “in order to comply with the time limit”.[86]Having regard to Dedman, Porter Avon and Trevelyan, it is not accepted that it was not incumbent on the claimant to identify that he had statutory rights and the relevant time limits. The claimant is a sophisticated individual who took the opportunity after what he regarded as a pattern of delayed responses and vague answers to identify the ACAS Code and that there were time limits for presenting a claim. The claimant did not delay in taking those opportunities due to any deception on the part of the respondent, while the respondent was silent on the claimant’s statutory rights to present a claim to Tribunal against itself, that silence was not misleading.[87]That the claimant pursued an internal appeal did not of itself make it not reasonably practicable for his claim to be presented within time (ref Palmer) on the facts, the claimant did not proceed on a mistaken belief that he was required to await the outcome of the respondent process before presenting his claim; he presented his claim on 11 October 2025, while the appeal outcome was not notified until 23 October 2025., nor did he delay until close to the 1 month period following the issue of ACAS certificate. The claimant did not rely upon the advice of ACAS in the presentation of the ET1.[88]The claimant's mistaken belief did not arise from an ACAS general comment that (when a claim is otherwise in time) a claimant would have 1 month from the end of ACAS Early Conciliation to present a claim. The claimant was advised that Early Conciliation had concluded on 22 September 2025 and presented the claim on 11 October, materially less than 1 month after the conclusion of Early Conciliation. The claimant ET1 explicitly set out that he (anticipated) “initiated ACAS Early Conciliation within statutory time limits.” The ACAS certificate and or its wording do not operate to extend time in this instance.[89]Had the relevant “start” date for calculating the time limit, including the ACAS Early Conciliation stop the clock, been 29 May 2025, that is, the date of issue of the May 2025 Payslip, the claim would have been in time- i.e. 3 months before the date of referral to ACAS on 11 August 2025.[90]The claimant proceeded on a mistaken belief that the relevant 3-month time limit did not commence until 29 May 2029, when there was no ongoing deduction. That is not correct.[91]The ET1 was presented on the claimant’s mistaken belief that the relevant 3- month time limit, allowing for ACAS extension, started on 29 May 2025. It did not; it started on 31 March 2025, when the claimant received the last payment in a series he disputed. Reference is made to Wharton.[92]The claim was not presented within a further reasonable period; reference is made to Norton.[93]The claimant understood his position on the alleged underpayment, which had been set out to the respondent in his 4 June 2025 written grievance and which arose from the issue of the payslip following 17 July 2024 (which is concluded to have been issued around 31 July 2024) and continued each month thereafter until the issue of the payslip on around 29 April 2025.[94]While the claimant points to delays in the respondent's process, the claimant did not wait for the outcome of his appeal; the claimant proceeded on a mistaken belief arising from a misapplication of the time limit rather than from ignorance of the same.[95]The claimant ought to have understood the applicable time limit, reference is made to Porter. The claimant is a sophisticated individual whose ET1 expressly set out the full citation for two decisions which he considered relevant, and that he believed that he had initiated ACAS early conciliation “within statutory time limits”.[96]While the claimant worked offshore at periods of around 6 weeks, this did not render it reasonably practical for the claimant to present his claim within the primary (and greater than 6-week) 3-month primary limitation period, including having regard to the claimant having had opportunity to finding out that he had rights to bring a claim from around when he received the first payslip which did not show a pay rise towards the end of July 2024.[97]While, for the claimant, reference is made to Selkent, it being understood that, in essence, it is argued that the application of the time limit would amount to a breach of natural justice in depriving the claimant of the opportunity to argue his case in full at a final hearing, the Tribunal does not agree. In Selkent, the issue of natural justice arose when a decision was reached without considering one party’s views. That is not the case here. Where, as in the present case, the claimant has misapplied the primary time limit despite having the opportunity to find out at a much earlier stage that he had rights and not having taken that opportunity, it does not amount to a breach of natural justice for the claim not to proceed.[98]The claimant has failed to discharge the obligation to demonstrate that it was not reasonably practical to present his claim within 3 months or within such further reasonable time.[99]The Tribunal is not satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to have been lodged within the time period required by s23 ERA 1996. As of 4 June 2025, the claimant was aware of the ACAS code, and by 17 June 2025, set out that he was considering escalating the matter further; those events followed what the claimant considered to be a pattern of delayed responses. The claimant had opportunities to learn about his statutory rights and the applicable time limit, including via his laptop and smartphone, from around the end of July 2024, when he received a payslip that did not include an increase, as he subsequently did. Further, the claim which was presented on 11 October was not, in any event, presented within such further period as was reasonable. The claim of unlawful deduction from wages was brought outwith the time period required by section 23 ERA 1996.[100]The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter, having regard to the time limitations provided in s23 ERA 1996, and the claims are therefore dismissed.