Mrs M Boyle v Royal Mutual Insurance Society Ltd: 4100710/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (SCOTLAND)

Case No 4100710/2025, 8000498/2026

Venue Edinburgh

Hearing 8 April 2026

Between

Mrs M BoyleClaimant

Royal Mutual Insurance Society LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge M A Macleod

Mr M Briggs (instructed by Advocate) for respondent

Date 14 May 2026

JUDGMENT

The Judgment of the Employment Tribunal is that the claimant’s application to amend her claim dated 16 January 2026 is refused; and that these proceedings should not be combined with the claimant’s claim under case no: 8000498/2026.

REASONS

[1]The claimant presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal on 16 April 2025, in which she complained that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of sex by the respondent.

[2]A Preliminary Hearing was listed to take place on 8 April 2026 in order to determine whether the claimant’s application to amend her claim dated 8 December 2025 should be granted. The respondent opposed the application.

[3]The claimant appeared on her own behalf at the Hearing, and Mr Briggs, advocate, appeared for the respondent.

[4]It was agreed that there was no requirement for the claimant to give evidence at this Hearing, but that the issue would be determined according to the submissions of parties alone.

[5]A Joint Bundle of Documents was presented by the parties, to which reference was made during the course of the Hearing. The Application to Amend

[6]On 8 December 2025, the claimant submitted an email to the Tribunal (213) in which she made an application to amend her claim.

[7]This is not the first application to amend made by the claimant. An earlier Preliminary Hearing took place on 14 October 2025 before Employment Judge Maclean. In the Note following that Hearing (75ff), the Employment Judge granted the claimant’s application dated 22 September 2025 to amend her claim to the extent set out in the Order at the start of that Note.

[8]That application concerned the claimant’s wish to add claims of disability discrimination to her complaints.

[9]On 11 November 2025, the respondent submitted amended grounds of resistance, including a document showing the changes made, an updated table of complaints with responses and a List of Issues (83ff). The List of Issues, in draft (132ff), was an attempt by the respondent to clarify and confirm the claims made. the claimant responded with her own draft List of Issues (145ff).

[10]Following further correspondence, and the postponement of an earlier Hearing, the claimant submitted her application to amend (213). She stated that the amendments related to:a. Discrimination arising from disability (section 15, Equality Act 2010 (EqA));

b. Failure to make reasonable adjustments (section 20/21, EqA);

c. Direct sex discrimination (section 13, EqA);

d. Victimisation (section 27, EqA);

e. Procedural unfairness in the application of performance processes;

f. Failure to conduct grievance processes fairly.

[11]She said that the claims arose from a number of evens, including the Off Track decision issued on 18 September 2025, the refusal of reasonable adjustments and Occupational Health (OH) referral, inconsistent treatment of claimant in comparison with a male colleague with outstanding OKRs, the introduction of a Get Back on Track plan only after she raised a grievance, the grievance outcome of 7 December 2025 and “continuing detriments since that date”.

[12]Following the respondent’s objections to the application on 9 December 2025 (215), the claimant submitted further explanations of her application, and set out the terms of her proposed amendment in response to the Tribunal’s Order (221) to do so, on 16 January 2026. The respondent submitted further objections thereto.

[13]The claimant set out therein the points she wished to add to her claim. The Respondent’s Opposition

[14]The respondent’s opposition to the application to amend is primarily set out in their email of 16 January 2026 (225). This was expanded upon by Mr Briggs before me. Essentially their position was that amendment contained either claims which had already been pled, claims which were insufficiently particularised or incapable of founding a claim. Submissions

[15]The claimant spoke in support of her application. She said that on 8 December, the day after she received the grievance outcome, she did not feel that it had been fairly processed, as she had not seen any of the evidence presented by the respondent.

[16]She considered this to be part of a continuing, and escalating, course of conduct by the respondent, which has had a financial impact on her entitlement to a bonus. She explained that “OKR” means objectives and key results.

[17]The claimant said that she understood that she had raised a claim and had asked to amend it on two occasions, but that she continued to be treated badly. She advised that she did not “know the law and all that sort of stuff”.

[18]She pointed out that the reason for the delays in the proceedings have not been within her control, as she required to seek a postponement of a Hearing in November due to the death of 2 close family members and her son being in hospital.

[19]She said that new facts were being pled, and that if new detrimental occurrences were taking place, she had to do something about that.

[20]The claimant confirmed that the document at 222ff is the amendment which she was seeking to add to her claim.

[21]For the respondent, Mr Briggs made a short submission in opposition to the amendment application.

[22]A number of Preliminary Hearings have already taken place in this case, and there is a pattern emerging whereby the claimant seeks to add detail to existing parts of her claim or update with facts subsequent to the claim being lodged.

[23]In the November Preliminary Hearing, the respondent did not object strongly to the claimant’s application to amend, on the basis that it was understood that that would be the end of the new claims. Any new claims could then form the basis of a different claim. The respondent is concerned that it will be impossible to move these proceedings to a final Hearing if the claimant continually seeks to refine the existing pleadings.

[24]Mr Briggs confirmed that it is his understanding that a new claim has been lodged by the claimant to the Tribunal.

[25]He reiterated the points made in the respondent’s opposition to the application to amend already submitted.

[26]He confirmed that the respondent did not take issue with the delay of the November Hearing, nor sought to make any comment or criticism of matters in the claimant’s private life.

[27]In response, the claimant confirmed that her new claim is registered under case no: 8000498/2026. Discussion and Decision

[28]In addressing any application to amend, the Tribunal is required to consider a number of factors, usually drawn from the well-known case of Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore

1996 ICR 836

. At p.843, Mummery J, as he then was, said: “(4) Whenever the discretion to grant an amendment is invoked, the tribunal should take into account all the circumstances and should balance the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. (5) What are the relevant circumstances? It is impossible and undesirable to attempt to list them exhaustively, but the following are certainly relevant.(a) The nature of the amendment. Applications to amend are of many different kinds, ranging, on the one hand, from the correction of clerical and typing errors, the addition of factual details to existing allegations and the addition or substitution of other labels for facts already pleaded to, on the other hand, the making of entirely new factual allegations which change the basis of the existing claim. The tribunal have to decide whether the amendment sought is one of the minor matters or is a substantial alteration pleading a new cause of action.

(b) The applicability of time limits. If a new complaint or cause of action is proposed to be added by way of amendment, it is essential for the tribunal to consider whether that complaint is out of time and, if so, whether the time limit should be extended under the applicable statutory provisions, e.g. in the case of unfair dismissal, section 67 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.

(c) The timing and manner of the application. An application should not be refused solely because there has been a delay in making it. There are no time limits laid down in the Regulations of 1993 for the making of amendments. The amendments may be made at any time – before, at, even after the hearing of the case. Delay in making the application is, however, a discretionary factor. It is relevant to consider why the application was not made earlier and why it is now being made: for example, the discovery of new facts or new information appearing from documents disclosed on discovery. Whenever taking any factors into account, the paramount considerations are the relative injustice and hardship involved in refusing or granting an amendment. Questions of delay, as a result of adjournments, and additional costs, particularly if they are unlikely to be recovered by the successful party, are relevant in reaching a decision”.

[29]As it appears to me, the primary reason for the respondent’s opposition to this application is that there requires to be certainty in the proceedings, and that the claimant has had the opportunity to amend her claim on at least one occasion before. Their secondary position is that the terms of the application to amend includes material already pled, and a lack of clarity about what the new claims might be.

[30]The claimant, perhaps understandably, feels that her relationship with the respondent is ongoing, which means that potentially unlawful acts continue to be committed against her.

[31]The nature of the application is relatively significant, in that it does seek to introduce new facts not previously pled, and adds to an already voluminous claim in which a considerable amount of effort has been carried out to try to define its scope and precise detail.

[32]As I understand it, the respondent does not argue that the new allegations are time-barred. Time limits therefore do not bear upon the argument.

[33]The timing and manner of the application is, again, of relevance, in that there have been considerable efforts made to define the claim and its scope, and to disrupt the settled set of claims and responses in the case is undesirable.

[34]Finally, I must weigh up the potential prejudice suffered by the respective parties in the event that the application were granted, or refused.

[35]It is my conclusion that this application should not be granted, for the following reasons:a. The claimant has had a number of opportunities to amend her claim previously;

b. The respondent, and the Tribunal, have required to consider at great length what claims are now being made, and a considerable effort has been put in by the respondent in particular to ensure that there is clarity for all concerned in the list of claims to be determined by the Tribunal;

c. While the claimant is an unrepresented and unqualified party litigant, the Tribunal requires to consider the interests of justice as they affect both parties, and to require the claimant to comply with the overriding objective of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024;

d. The claimant appears to suggest that she has no option but to continue to raise new claims as they arise, in these proceedings, but this is simply not correct. She has already raised separate proceedings, against the same respondent, and therefore if she wishes to raise new claims, it would be appropriate to do so in those proceedings, rather than detaining the Tribunal further in this case;

e. The application to amend does cover ground already covered by the claims submitted, but also suffers from a lack of specification and detail. These matters can be addressed, but it is my judgment that the proceedings in this case must now be prepared for final Hearing, and that to allow the claimant to amend her claim again would not be consistent with the overriding objective, in that it would introduce further delay to the proceedings and would be disproportionate to the issue to be determined in this case.

[36]Accordingly, it is my judgment that the claimant’s application to amend her claim should be refused, for these reasons. It is imperative that this case should now be listed for a final Hearing without further delay. The case is extremely complex as it stands, and any further amendment would, in my view, create disruption and confusion for both parties. There must be finality in litigation, and where the claimant has not made any commitment to stop making applications to amend her claim, the Tribunal must, in my view, step in and prevent any further additions to the claims made so that a Hearing may be convened and the dispute properly and fully addressed.

[37]It is also my judgment, and direction, that these proceedings should not be combined with the claimant’s other claim against the same respondent (8000498/2026), simply on the basis that it would be likely to cause significant and unnecessary delay in this case.