Mrs S Mullen v The Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd and Quilter plc: 4100362/2026
REASONS
[1]The claimant was employed by the First Respondents as an Account Manager between the 15 November 2011 and the 18 November 2024. In these proceedings the claimant claims disability discrimination and detriment/dismissal due to exercising rights under the Public Interest Disclosure Act. The claims are resisted by both respondents.[2]The claimant has previously brought proceedings claiming disability discrimination, unfair dismissal and detriment/dismissal against the First Respondents. The claimant’s claims in that action were dismissed by EJ Macleod by judgment dated the 5 August 2025.[3]On 13 April 2026 a Notice of Hearing was sent to the parties which stated that on the 2 July 2026 there would be a Preliminary Hearing at which the Tribunal would determine whether the claim should be struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success and/or whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the claim on the basis that it has not been lodged within the relevant statutory period or is res judicata.[4]At the Preliminary hearing on the 2 July 2026 the claimant represented herself, the First Respondents were represented by Mr Briggs, Advocate and the Second Respondents were represented by Ms Ferber KC. Parties referred to a Joint Bundle of Documentation numbered 1-337.[5]The claimant intimated an amendment to her pleadings on the 10 April 2026. The amendment included new claims against the First Respondents of post termination victimisation and post termination harassment (152). The claimant’s amendment was opposed by letter from the First Respondents of the 10 April 2026 (158-159). As at the 2 July 2026 this amendment remained outstanding. Claims against the First Respondents[6]There was discussion around the claims the claimant brings against the First Respondents in these proceedings. After such discussion the claimant submitted that the totality of the claims brought by her against the First Respondents are contained in the Minute of Amendment and it was for this reason that the Minute of Amendment had been submitted by her.[7]In these circumstances all parties consented that the outstanding Minute of Amendment would also be discussed in the course of the PH on the 2 July 2026. It was agreed that were the Minute of Amendment not to be considered then it would be impossible to consider the outstanding issues of identified in the Notice of Hearing for these proceedings.[8]The Minute of Amendment contains claims of post employment victimisation and post employment harassment. S108 of the Equality Act 2010 provides a basis for bringing claims where relationships have ended. However, s108(7) of the Equality Act 2010 states: “conduct is not a contravention of this section in so far as it also amounts to victimisation of B by A.”[9]The terms of s108(7) of the Equality Act 2010 were read out to the claimant and explained to her. The claimant understood the meaning of s108(7) and in these circumstances withdrew her claim of post-employment victimisation leaving the sole claim in the Minute of Amendment (and the sole claim against the First Respondents) to be that of post employment harassment. The claim of post employment harassment relates to the content of an internal document of the respondents dated the 13 March 2025 which came to the attention of the claimant in late March/early April 2026 following a SARS request on her part.[10]The claimant’s amendment to include a claim of post employment harassment was considered after having regard to the well known principles in Selkent v Moore 1996 ICR 836 EAT. To this end the Tribunal noted that the claim is a new claim and is identified as such in the Minute of Amendment. The Tribunal noted that there is a cogent argument to extend time on a “just and equitable” basis under s123 of the Equality Act 2010 as the relevant information only came to light on the 27 March 2026 and the 9 April 2026. The Tribunal also noted that the application to amend was made at an early stage in proceedings and prior to this case being listed for a Hearing on the Merits.[11]However, in considering the important question of the balance of hardship and injustice the Tribunal considered the merits of the claimant’s application to amend. In doing so, the Tribunal considered the legal basis of the claimant’s claim of post termination harassment. The decision of Lady Haldane in the EAT in the case of Greasley-Adams v Royal Mail Group Ltd was brought to the attention of the Tribunal by Mr Briggs for the first respondents. In rejecting the proposition that there can be a breach of s26 where an individual is unaware of the harassment at the material time Lady Haldane cited the authority of Pemberton v Inwood (2018) ICR 291, CA where Underhill LJ (referring to his earlier decision of Dhaliwal) stated: “In order to decide whether any conduct falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a) (of s26 of the Equality Act 2010) has either of the proscribed effects under subparagraph (1)(b), a tribunal must consider both (by reason of subsection (4)(a)) whether the putative victim perceives themselves to have suffered the effect in question (the subjective question and (by reason of subsection (4)(c)) whether it was reasonable for the conduct to be regarded as having that effect (the objective question). It must also, of course, take into account all the other circumstances –subsection (4)(b). The relevance of the subjective question is that if the claimant does not perceive their dignity to have been violated, or an adverse environment created, then the conduct should not be found to have had that effect. The relevance of the objective question is that if it was not reasonable for the conduct to be regarded as violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for him or her, then it should not be found to have done so.”[12]Following the analysis in Greasley-Adams the Tribunal concluded that as the claimant only became aware of the alleged harassment over a year after the event, the claimant’s claim of post termination harassment would appear to have no reasonable prospects of success. In these circumstances the Tribunal concluded that the balance of hardship and injustice favours the respondents as if the amendment is allowed, the respondents would face the time and cost of defending such this claim.[13]In these circumstances the claimant’s Minute of Amendment is refused. As the claimant’s Minute of Amendment contains the totality of her claims against the First Respondents, her case against the First Respondents is dismissed under Rule 38 as having no reasonable prospects of success. Claims against the Second Respondents[14]Ms Ferber submitted that the Second Respondents were neither a past, present or putative employer of the claimant and nor did she ever have ‘worker’ status with them. To this end Ms Ferber referred to a document within the Bundle numbered 240-244 which identified the claimant’s then putative employer as a company called Henderson Stone & Co rather than the Second Respondents. In response, the claimant admitted with reference to this document that the Second Respondents are neither a past, present or putative employer and neither did she ever have ‘worker’ status with them.[15]In these circumstances, and after consideration of s39 and s41 of the Equality Act 2010, the Tribunal concluded that the claimant’s claims against the Second Respondents should be struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success under Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024.[16]In these circumstances it is the judgment of the Employment Tribunal to dismiss all the claimant’s claims against the First and Second Respondents in these proceedings. 8th April 2026