Mr P Baker v Mr N Morgan and others: 3324269/2019
JUDGMENT
The Tribunal Orders the Respondents to pay the Claimant’s costs of the Remedy Hearing on 29 June 2022, to include the Claimant’s costs incurred in preparing for the hearing, such costs to be summarily assessed if they cannot be agreed.REASONS
[1]Having cautioned the parties that there may be some short delay in providing a decision on the Claimant’s costs application, in the absence of any hearings on 30 June 2022, I have been able to determine the application whilst the issues are still fresh in my mind.[2]By a Reserved Judgment dated 22 October 2020, sent to the parties and entered into the Register on 28 October 2020 (the “Liability Judgment”), the Claimant’s various complaints were upheld as against Mr Morgan, the Fourth Respondent to these proceedings. Mr Morgan was Ordered to pay to the Claimant sums which I calculate total £13,374.50 in respect of certain of his complaints, with the issue of remedy in respect of unfair dismissal to be determined at a further Remedy Hearing. In the event, and as I shall return to, that Hearing was also to consider the Claimant’s application for costs, as well as potential reconsideration of the Liability Judgment as regards the claim for holiday pay. In the event, it was not in fact necessary in the interests of justice for the Liability Judgment to be reconsidered, it being common ground that Judge Kurrein’s award to the Claimant in respect of holiday pay had been correctly calculated by him and, accordingly, that it should not be increased. The further potential for Employment Judge Kurrein to recuse himself from the Remedy Hearing fell away as the matter had instead come before me in Judge Kurrein’s absence on sabbatical. I addressed the Respondents’ concerns about this when giving reasons as to why I decided not to recuse myself from hearing this matter.[3]The Claimant’s unchallenged evidence before me was that the sums awarded to him in the Liability Judgment have not been paid. The Respondents submitted Notice of Appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 1 December 2020. Their Grounds of Appeal were considered by The Honourable Mr Justice Cavanagh, who Ordered on 22 March 2021 that the Appeal was totally without merit. I was told by Mr Varnam that the Respondents’ further application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal has since been refused. In light of those decisions it is unclear on what basis the sums awarded have not now been paid by Mr Morgan.[4]In his Written Reasons for his Order, Cavanagh J noted that most of the Grounds of Appeal were given over to trenchant criticism of the Employment Tribunal systems and of bias on the part of Employment Judge Kurrein, who the Appellants described as a “bigoted, twisted, contradictory parasite”. He was also described by the Appellants as “prejudiced and corrupt”. In similar vein, Mr Morgan claimed that I was biased, had projected an intense personal dislike of him and, whilst he said he did not have evidence that I was corrupt, that I was part of a corrupt system. He asserted that I had effectively engineered a situation in which I could then make criticisms of him. Throughout the Hearing on 29 June 2022, Mr Morgan reiterated the Respondents’ various criticisms of the Employment Tribunal system and of Employment Judge Kurrein, notwithstanding Cavanagh J’s observation that “there is not a shred of support for these allegations” and that no evidence had been put forward to sustain them. Cavanagh J observed that the Appellants had lost all objectivity and that allegations had been made that had no possible basis in reality. His observations equally apply to Mr Morgan’s comments to me about the system and Employment Judge Kurrein.[5]I do not set out in further detail here why I declined to recuse myself from the proceedings. I gave detailed oral reasons for my decision on 29 June 2022; the parties may request Written Reasons should they require them. Likewise, they are entitled to request Written Reasons for my Judgment on Remedy.[6]The Claimant’s costs application was emailed to the Tribunal at 11.44am on 3 February 2022. He contends that the threshold test has been met under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 76(1) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, namely by reference to which the Tribunal should consider whether to award costs against the Respondents. Mr Morgan claimed that he was unaware of any costs application until receipt, on or around 27 June 2022, of the Bundle for use at today’s hearing. I do not accept that. The parties have been on notice since 7 February 2022 (pages 41 and 42 of the Hearing Bundle) that the Hearing on 29 June 2022 (originally listed on 8 April 2022) would be to consider, amongst other things, the issue of costs and this was further confirmed in the Tribunal’s letter to the parties dated 31 March 2022. In any event, Mr Morgan and Ms Abbott of the First Respondent were copied into the costs application at the email addresses they have used for correspondence in the course of these proceedings. There is no suggestion that other correspondence to or from those email addresses has not been received. I find that Mr Morgan and Ms Abbott received the costs application when it was submitted on 3 February 2022 and, accordingly, that they have been on notice of it since that date, and aware since 7 February 2022 that it would be considered at the same time as the Tribunal determined remedy for unfair dismissal. The Respondents have had every reasonable opportunity to prepare themselves on the issue and, had they wished to do so, to make written submissions in response to those submitted on behalf of the Claimant. In any event, Mr Morgan was able to make submissions on the issue at the Hearing, albeit, as I shall return to, he failed to make the best use of that opportunity, using the hearing instead as a platform to make unfounded allegations against Mr Varnam and his instructing solicitor.[7]I can understand why the Claimant in particular may have preferred that the costs application was heard by Employment Judge Kurrein, given his previous involvement and potentially greater knowledge of the history of the proceedings. On the other hand, his Judgment and Reasons stand as a detailed and final record in the matter, the Respondents having been unsuccessful in their efforts to appeal his decision. Having carefully read the Liability Judgment, I cannot identify a proper basis to conclude that the responses had no reasonable prospect of success (Rule 76(1)(b)). That is the same threshold test for striking out claims and responses under Rule 37, a power that is used sparingly and only in the clearest cases, where either the facts are not in dispute (or are capable of summary determination) or the claim(s) or response(s) are legally misconceived. This was not such a case. At the heart of the dispute was the Claimant’s status as a groundworker at the Respondents’ sites. On advice, the Respondents asserted that the Claimant was self-employed. Such disputes regarding a Claimant’s status are the bread and butter of the Tribunals, particularly in the ‘Trades’. Although Employment Judge Kurrein determined that the Claimant had been employed by Mr Morgan, he did not state in his Judgment that the Respondents’ positions were misconceived or hopeless. On the contrary, the Judgment sets out the parties’ respective evidence and arguments before concluding at paragraph 112.11 of the Judgment that the Claimant had established, “on the balance of probabilities”, that he was an employee. I consider it essentially besides the point that Employment Judge Kurrein questioned the Respondents’ credibility and integrity. In making findings and arriving at a Judgment, Tribunals routinely reach conclusions as to a party’s credibility, even if they perhaps less commonly express a view as to their integrity. I do not agree with Mr Varnam that it may be inferred from the fact that the Respondents lacked integrity (or indeed, credibility) or otherwise from the Judgment that they were pursuing, and knew that they were pursuing, a hopeless response or otherwise acting vexatiously. As I shall come to, Employment Judge Kurrein was highly critical of the Respondents’ conduct (or, more specifically, Mr Morgan’s conduct of the proceedings on their behalf). If he had considered their responses to be without merit and vexatious, he might have said so explicitly rather than simply conclude that the Claimant had established his status as an employee on the balance of probabilities.[8]I am, however, satisfied that the Respondents (or, more specifically, Mr Morgan) acted abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings (Rule 76(1)(a)). I have referred already to Cavanagh J’s stinging criticisms of the Respondents/Appellants. I refer to paragraphs 22 to 41 of the Liability Judgment, in which Employment Judge Kurrein made what can only reasonably be described as trenchant criticisms of Mr Morgan’s conduct. He agreed with Mr Varnam’s submission that throughout the bulk of his evidence Mr Morgan had been truculent, confrontational, rude and evasive. He stated at paragraph 37 of the Liability Judgment that Mr Morgan was being “disruptive”, this being one of the stated thresholds in Rule 76(1)(a). That finding alone would be sufficient to require me to consider whether to make an award of costs.[9]I lost count on 29 June 2022 of the number of times I had to remind Mr Morgan that I would not go behind, nor allow him to go behind, the findings and conclusions in the Liability Judgment or the decisions of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and Court of Appeal. It was to no avail; Mr Morgan remained determined to criticise findings and decisions that he still does not agree with, including my decision on 29 June 2022 to proceed. In spite of his previous allegations “having no possible basis in reality” he continued to make them before me and to then complain that I was unfairly seeking to prevent him from pursuing lines of questioning and submissions that were a collateral attack on the findings and decisions in question, all the time asserting that this was not what he was seeking to do. His conduct during the Hearing on 29 June 2022 was often challenging. It is regrettable, not least because he is evidently capable of making relevant points when he turns his mind to it. I am particularly critical of his scurrilous attacks upon Mr Varnam and his instructing solicitor, Mr Hyland. Notwithstanding I have concluded that the threshold under Rule 76(1)(b) has not been met, the Claimant quite reasonably pursued an application for costs against the Respondents; his legal representatives, in turn, acted entirely professionally in terms of how they pursued that application on his behalf. Indeed, they are to be commended for showing great restraint in the face of Mr Morgan’s abusive provocations. Amongst other things, Mr Morgan asserts that they have manufactured a “tissue of lies … with Mr Baker as their patsy” and that they have manipulated the legal system and the truth. Those assertions have no basis in the real world. They are the expression of what Employment Judge Kurrein rightly described as Mr Morgan’s fixed and cycnical view of this litigation. He has not only abused his rights as a party to this litigation but he has also abused the privilege afforded to parties to engage in confidential settlement discussions by seeking to use the cloak of a “without prejudice” communication with the Claimant on 27 June 2022 (which, tellingly, was sent to the Claimant directly rather than communicated through his solicitors) to threaten the Claimant and heap yet further personal abuse upon his legal advisers; Mr Morgan did not dispute that he referred to Mr Hyland in that correspondence as a “parasitic shit”, amongst other things. All that Mr Morgan’s abusive comments and assertions have served to achieve is to further undermine his credibility and integrity.[10]The Respondent’s misconduct was not restricted to Mr Morgan’s conduct on 21 August 2020 and before me. I find that the Respondents effectively sought to ambush the August 2020 Hearing by serving their witness statements on the Claimant at 7.30pm the evening before the start of the Hearing. It is irrelevant in my Judgment that the Respondents had lost the benefit of legal expenses cover prior to the Hearing; even if they unexpectedly found themselves unrepresented prior to the Hearing that does not excuse their failure to serve witness statements that had evidently been finalised some weeks or even months prior to the Hearing.[11]It does not automatically follow that because a Respondent has behaved abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably that the Tribunal should make a Costs Order. The Tribunal retains a discretion in the matter and in the exercise of that discretion should have regard to the nature, gravity and effect of the conduct, though on the latter issue it is not necessary for the Tribunal to determine whether or not there was a precise causal link between the conduct in question and the specific costs being claimed. However, as I observed during the Hearing, a Costs Order is not intended to be punitive.[12]In this case, the Respondents’ conduct, through Mr Morgan, was serious and deliberate. It had its origins in Mr Morgan’s “fixed and cynical” views which lacked any possible basis in reality and, I find, was partly with a view to securing the Respondent’s desired outcome, namely a postponement of the August 2020 Hearing. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondents’ conduct resulted in Employment Judge Kurrein being unable to give Judgment on liability on 21 August 2020 and thereafter deal with remedy in relation to unfair dismissal. In my judgement, but for the Respondents’ conduct the Claimant’s remedy for unfair dismissal was eminently capable of being dealt with in under an hour and accordingly should have been capable of being determined immediately following Judgment on liability. The issues on remedy were limited. The fact that it took me until approximately 3pm on 29 June 2022 to give Judgment on remedy is a reflection of Mr Morgan’s ongoing disruptive conduct at the Hearing. I find that the Hearing before me would have been avoided altogether had the Respondents not acted abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably both prior to but particularly during the Hearing in August 2020. Legal costs have been incurred unnecessarily as a result. In the exercise of my discretion I shall make a Costs Order against the Respondents in respect of the Claimant’s costs both of the Hearing on 29 June 2022 and in preparing for that Hearing. However, before finally determining the amount of those costs I shall afford the parties a further opportunity to make written submissions as to the amount of the costs, having regard to the revised Schedule of Costs that I have directed the Claimant to file and serve by 7 July 2022. Without limiting anything the parties may wish to say on the subject, I would wish to understand why the preparations for the Remedy Hearing are said to have given rise to 16.3 hours of correspondence. If the Respondents wish to make any representations as to their ability to pay costs, they will need to set out their financial circumstances, which in the case of Mr Morgan should include a detailed statement of his assets, liabilities, income and outgoings. The Respondents should bear in mind that the Tribunal will not go behind the finding at paragraph 11 of the Liability Judgment. I shall Order that the parties have 21 days in which to make any further written submissions.[1]The Tribunal made a Costs Judgment on 2 July 2022 following a hearing on 29 June 2022. The Costs Judgment was sent to the parties on 19 July 2022. Mr Morgan submitted an application for reconsideration of that Judgment on 21 July 2022. His application was signed in his capacity as a Director of the First Respondent. I have treated it as an application on behalf of all four Respondents.[2]I invited the parties’ representations as to whether the application necessitated a hearing. The Claimant has expressed the view that this would give rise to unnecessary time and cost. The Respondents have not expressed any views on the matter, though have submitted additional detailed comments in response to the Claimant’s written submissions on the application. I am satisfied that the interests of justice do not require that there is a hearing to determine the application and that I can deal with the matter fairly and justly on the strength of the parties’ written submissions.[3]Rule 70 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 empowers the Tribunal, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, to reconsider any Judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. Rule 71 requires that any application for reconsideration must be presented in writing within 14 days of the date on which the written record, or other written communication, of the original decision is sent to the parties, or within 14 days of the date that the written reasons are sent (if later). The Respondents’ application is plainly in time[4]The starting point clearly has to be the decision the Tribunal reached after the hearing on 29 June 2022. I have re-read it. I consider that I set out in detail the reasons for the Costs Judgment. Should these matters be examined on appeal, it would be for the Higher Tribunal to say whether those reasons and my decision can stand. The Respondents assert that my findings “are totally false”, “provably false” and that the Judgment “must be changed to fit with the truth”. Any suggestion that my findings were perverse or that I erred in Law is generally a matter for appeal. Bias[5]The leading case on the test for bias is the House of Lords judgment in Porter v Magill 2002 2 AC 357, HL. The Respondents state that my findings are “deliberately contrived … created to meet a purpose. It is lately madeup lies”. They have not sought to substantiate those assertions, which I treat as an assertion of bias. At the hearing on 29 June 2022 I declined to recuse myself from the proceedings; in so doing, I noted that Mr Morgan had asserted that I was biased and had effectively engineered a situation in which I could then make criticisms of him. Again, those assertions were essentially unsubstantiated. The Respondents evidently disagree with my findings and decision in relation to costs, but have not set out in any meaningful way why the Tribunal may have been biased against them. As I observed on 29 June 2022, it seems to me that Mr Morgan has a deeply entrenched belief that the Employment Tribunal system, including its Judges, are biased against employers and that, rather than an objective assessment, is informing his views.[6]Impartiality requires not only that the Tribunal is independent and free from actual bias but that it must also be free from apparent bias. In that regard, the Tribunal must consider whether the circumstances would lead a fairminded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased. An informed hypothetical observer is someone in possession of the relevant facts and circumstances. I cannot discern from Mr Morgan’s written submissions or otherwise identify any facts or matters from which a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased in arriving at its findings and conclusions. Reconsideration[7]In Outasight VB Ltd. v Brown UK EAT/0253/14, the Employment Appeal Tribunal considered the Tribunals’ powers under Rule 70 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. At paragraphs 27 – 38 of her Judgment Her Honour Judge Eady QC, as she then was, set out the legal principles which govern reconsideration applications, and observed, “The interests of justice have thus long allowed for broad discretion, albeit one that must be exercised judicially, which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation.”[8]In Outasight, the Employment Appeal Tribunal was referred to the EAT’s Judgment in Redding v EMI Leisure Ltd. EAT/262/81 in which the EAT had observed: “…When you boil down what is said on [the Claimant’s] behalf, it really comes to this: that she did not do herself justice at the hearing so justice requires that there should be a second hearing so that she may. Now, “justice” means justice to both parties. It is not said, and, as we see, cannot be said that any conduct of the case by the employers here caused [the Claimant] not to do herself justice. It was, we are afraid, her own experience in the situation…”[9]The Respondents do not say in their application for reconsideration that they feel they did not do themselves justice on 29 June 2022, but if it is the case then it is not for want of being afforded a reasonable opportunity to state their position. As I noted at paragraph 6 of the Costs Judgment, they were on notice of the costs application from 7 February 2022 and accordingly had ample time to prepare for the 29 June 2022 hearing, including time to take legal advice or to research the issues for themselves if they did not wish to, or could not afford to, avail themselves of legal advice. As I noted at paragraph 6 of the Costs Judgment, Mr Morgan failed to make best use of the opportunities afforded by the hearing, using it instead as a platform to make unfounded allegations against Mr Varnam and his instructing solicitor. If, on reflection, Mr Morgan feels that he did not do the Respondents’ case justice on 29 June 2022, he only has himself to blame in the matter. As I further observed at paragraph 9 of the Costs Judgment, Mr Morgan is evidently capable of making relevant points when he turns his mind to it. His reconsideration application reinforces the point: on the one hand, he makes certain points that he might have made, but failed to make, on 29 June 2022; on the other hand, he cannot resist directing further abusive comments at Mr Varnam and Mr Hyland, accusing them of “absolute lies and more total bollocks”.[10]The Respondents’ interests are not the only consideration here. Justice has to be done to both parties and there are broader policy considerations including the need for finality in litigation. Litigation has to be kept within sensible bounds. The Respondents were afforded a reasonable opportunity to make representations in response to the Claimant’s application for costs and it is not necessary in the interests of justice that they should have a ‘second bite at the cherry’.[11]Even if I had been minded to reconsider the Costs Judgment, I would not have been persuaded to vary or revoke it. In the Costs Judgment I identified that the Tribunal retains a discretion in relation to costs even where a party has behaved abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably. A costs order does not automatically follow. I am satisfied that I correctly directed myself, and indeed I reminded the parties during the hearing, that I should have regard to the nature, gravity and effect of any relevant conduct, and that it is not necessary for the Tribunal to determine a precise causal link between the conduct in question and the costs being claimed. It is within the Tribunal’s discretion to order a party to pay another party’s costs even where these have not directly resulted from the conduct in question. In this case, the relevant egregious conduct was not limited to Mr Morgan’s conduct at Tribunal in August 2020, but extended to the Respondents’ conduct prior to the Final Hearing and in connection with the Remedy Hearing. I am satisfied that the Costs Judgment represents a fair and proportionate sanction in respect of the Respondent’s abusive, disruptive and unreasonable conduct which I found did give rise to avoidable costs.[12]In all the circumstances the application for reconsideration is refused. REMEDY JUDGMENT The Tribunal makes the following award of compensation to the Claimant: A basic award of £2,362.50; and[2]A compensatory award of £2,692.65. The total award of compensation is £5,055.15 and is in addition to the sums awarded by the Tribunal in its Judgement dated 22 October 2020, sent to the parties on 28 October 2020. COSTS JUDGMENT The Tribunal Orders the Respondents to pay the Claimant’s costs of the Remedy Hearing on 29 June 2022, including his costs incurred in preparing for the hearing, assessed in the sum of £6,240.[1]At the hearing on 29 June 2022, I made a Costs Order, those costs to be assessed if they could not be agreed. I allowed the parties a further 21 days from 19 July 2022 (the date on which the Costs Judgment was sent to them) in which to make any further written submissions in the matter. The Claimant’s written submissions were received on 9 August 2022. Having applied for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Costs Judgement on 21 July 2022, the Respondents subsequently requested on 9 August 2022 that the period of 21 days to provide written submissions should be suspended. Their request was not granted, but I allowed them a further 21 days in which to provide submissions. No submissions have been received from them, their only comments being in their 21 July 2022 reconsideration application before they had sight of the Claimant’s submissions as to the amounts being claimed and the justification for these.[2]The Respondents have copied the Tribunal into an email to the Claimant’s solicitors dated 16 December 2022 in which they continue to make allegations of professional misconduct against them, as well as adverse comments about the Employment Tribunals. However, the email is silent on the question of costs.[3]The Claimant’s costs are to be assessed on the standard basis. Rule 78(1)(b) of the Tribunals Rules of Procedure states that Employment Judges should apply the principles in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“CPR”) when undertaking detailed assessments of costs. Whilst the Order I made was for a summary assessment, nevertheless I have found it helpful in this matter to have regard to the CPR and to the 2021 Edition of the Guide to the Summary Assessment of Costs which is available to Judges, Parties and Practitioners in the Civil Courts.[4]Rules 44.3(1) and (2) of the CPR provide that where the court assesses the amount of costs on the standard basis it will not allow costs which have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount and will only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue. Costs which are disproportionate in amount may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily incurred. The court will resolve in favour of the paying party any doubt which it may have as to whether the costs were reasonably incurred or were reasonable and proportionate in amount.[5]The Guide states that costs will be proportionate if they bear a reasonable relationship to(a) the sums in issue in the proceedings(b) the value of any non-monetary relief in issue in the proceedings(c) the complexity of the litigation(d) any additional work generated by the conduct of the paying party(e) any wider factors involved in the proceedings, such as reputation or public importance and(f) any additional work undertaken or expense incurred due to the vulnerability of a party or any witness.[6]Rule 44.4(3) sets out the factors to be taken into account in deciding the amount of costs. Those factors include: the conduct of the parties, including conduct before as well as during the proceedings; the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order to try to resolve the dispute; the value involved in the proceedings; the importance of the matter to the parties; the complexity of the proceedings; the skill and specialised knowledge of the lawyers; the place where the work was done; and the receiving party’s last approved or agreed budget (this is not relevant in Employment Tribunals).[7]In my Reasons for the Costs Judgement I identified the conduct of the Respondents that led to the Costs Order being made. I described their conduct, through Mr Morgan, as serious and deliberate. I have not been told what, if any, efforts have been made to settle the dispute, though noted in my Reasons that the Respondents had sought to use the cloak of privilege to threaten the Claimant and abuse his legal advisors. Their conduct in that regard and the fact the Tribunal’s Judgement dated 21 August 2020 remained unpaid when the matter came before me on 29 June 2022, together with the general tenor of the Respondents’ correspondence indicates to me that they have a settled intention to avoid discharging their liabilities to the Claimant. The matter is clearly important to the Claimant, since it concerns the recovery of long outstanding wages and holiday pay in connection with work performed by him, together with compensation to reflect financial losses he has suffered as a result of the First Respondent’s unfair treatment of him. Whilst I accept that the Claimant has inevitably had to rely upon his legal advisors more than might otherwise have been the case had the Respondents not conducted the proceedings as they have, I cannot identify that the issues are especially difficult or unusual such as to warrant a higher hourly charge rate; in any event, I agree with Mr Varnam’s submission that £150 per hour for a Grade C fee earner is, if anything, low.[8]As regards the claimed solicitors’ costs:a. The Claimant’s statement for the Remedy Hearing comprises of seven short numbered paragraphs extending to little more than a single page of evidence in total. I shall allow 2 hours rather than 2.5 hours claimed for preparing the statement.b. I consider 0.8 hours for preparing a revised schedule of loss to be reasonable and proportionate.c. The Remedy Bundle comprised of 40 pages of documents. Whist I accept that the documents available for the August 2020 Hearing would need to have been updated and a revised Index produced, I consider it unreasonable to expect the Respondent to pay 4.1 hours of time spent on the matter. Instead, I shall allow 2.5 hours.d. The costs schedule relates to the Claimant’s entire costs rather than the costs that the Respondents were Ordered to pay. I shall allow 0.7 hours.e. No longer pursued by the Claimant.f. I take on board what Mr Varnam says about the period of time that the work covers and the Respondents’ conduct, both of which are entirely valid points. As he acknowledges elsewhere in his submissions, the hearings in June 2021 and February 2022 were postponed as a result of judicial decisions rather than because of the Respondents’ unreasonable conduct. They should not bear the costs of correspondence that may have resulted from those decisions. I consider that a reasonable and proportionate amount of time to allow is 12 hours. I therefore allow a total of 18 hours. That equates to £2,700 plus VAT using the charge rate of £150 plus VAT per hour.[9]I am satisfied that Mr Varnam’s brief fee of £2,500 plus VAT (which covered both his preparation for the Remedy Hearing, nearly two years on from the Hearing at which liability was established, and his attendance at the hearing itself) was reasonable and proportionate to the issues to be determined at the Hearing, including factoring in the additional work generated by the Respondents’ conduct and the importance of the matter to the Claimant given the Respondent’s ongoing attacks upon his and his advisors’ honesty and integrity. In my judgement it is reasonable and proportionate for the Respondents to meet those costs in full.[10]The total sum that I shall therefore Order the Respondents to pay in respect of the Claimant’s costs of and associated with the Remedy Hearing is £5,200 plus VAT.