Employment Judge TaftMr Giani (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 1 December 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaint of unfair dismissal is well-founded. The Claimant was unfairly dismissed.[2]The complaint of breach of contract is well-founded. The Claimant was wrongfully dismissed without notice in breach of contract.[3]The complaint in respect of holiday pay is not well-founded.[4]When the proceedings were begun, the Respondent was in breach of its duty to provide the Claimant with a written statement of employment particulars.
REASONS
Conclusions
[1]This is a claim for unfair dismissal, wrongful dismissal and unpaid accrued holiday pay arising out of the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the Respondent.[2]There was initially a dispute as to whether employment began in June or September 2021, with unusually the Claimant suggesting that employment began later. During the hearing, the Claimant conceded that employment began in June.[3]The Claimant says he was dismissed without notice and without fair reason on 16 August 2024. The Respondent says he resigned without notice. The Claimant says that the Respondent did not pay him in respect of accrued but untaken holiday at the date of termination. The Respondent says that there was no accrued but untaken holiday at the date of termination. The parties agree that the Respondent did not provide the Claimant with a written statement of employment particulars.[4]The Respondent had attempted to bring a contract claim but all matters said to be a breach of contract on the part of the Claimant fall within Article 5 of the Extension of Jurisdiction Order 1994. The Employment Tribunal does not therefore have jurisdiction to consider that claim. Issues[5]The key issue in this case is whether or not the Claimant was dismissed. At the conclusion of submissions, the Claimant’s representative began to talk about constructive dismissal. I stopped him because he had not identified constructive dismissal as an issue when we discussed them at the start of the hearing. We had heard no evidence on constructive dismissal, and the Respondent had by then already concluded submissions. It was simply far too late to be introducing this as an issue. The Claimant then conceded that his claim was one of express dismissal alone.[6]If the Claimant was dismissed, the Respondent did not plead a reason for dismissal. Whilst the Respondent’s Counsel sought to suggest that the matters pleaded in the section of the ET3 referring to its attempted contract claim were a pleaded reason for dismissal, they were not: they refer to matters occurring after dismissal. The Respondent did not apply to amend its response to assert a reason for dismissal. It was agreed therefore that if I were to find that the Claimant was dismissed, he was unfairly dismissed.[7]Further, given that the Respondent did not suggest that the Claimant had committed gross misconduct, it was further agreed that if the Claimant were dismissed, he was wrongfully dismissed without notice.[8]Both parties agreed that the Claimant was entitled to statutory holidays of 5.6 weeks under the Working Time Regulations 1998. The issues before me were how much holiday the Claimant had accrued in the holiday year ending with the termination of his employment, and how much holiday he had taken in that holiday year. Law
The law
[9]Section 86 Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that where an employee has been employed for between two and twelve years, his employer is required to give him one week’s notice per complete year of continuous employment.[10]Section 95 defines dismissal. As one might expect, an employee is dismissed if his contract is terminated by the employer, with or without notice. If express words such as “you are dismissed” or “I have resigned” are not used, I must look to the words that are used, and the surrounding circumstances, to ask myself whether a reasonable employer or employee would have understood the words and actions to amount to a dismissal or resignation.[11]Section 98 provides that it is for an employer to show the reason for a dismissal and that it falls within one of the potentially fair reasons within S98(2) or is some other substantial reason of a kind to justify dismissal. I need not go on to discuss s98(4) because the Respondent does not adduce a fair reason for dismissal.[12]Regulations 13 and 13A Working Time Regulations 1998 together provide the right to 5.6 weeks holiday per year, or 28 days for an employee who, like the Claimant, works 5 days per week. Regulation 13(3) provides that the worker’s leave year begins either on such date as is provided in a relevant agreement or on the date employment began and each subsequent anniversary.[13]Regulation 2(1) defines a relevant agreement as “a workforce agreement which applies to [the worker], any provision of a collective agreement which forms part of a contract between [the worker] and his employer or any other agreement in writing which is legally enforceable as between the worker and his employer.”[14]Regulation 14 provides that an employee is entitled to compensation for any leave he has not taken in the leave year in which his employment ends. Reg 14(3) provides a formula to calculate that entitlement so that he is entitled to the proportion of the annual entitlement that has accrued less any days taken.[15]It is trite law that credibility of a witness is assessed by examining what they say about the matter in issue and assessing that against contemporaneous documents where they exist. Judges are not assisted by hearing evidence about other matters – for even if a witness may lie about one matter, it does not necessarily mean that they are lying about everything. Evidence[16]I heard evidence from the Claimant and from Eduards Livmanis, Alggirdas Zavackas, Karolina Kutkaite, Emilija Livmane, Dali Kurtanidze and Artis Seikstuls for the Respondent, who were among twelve witnesses who had provided statements. Because there was confusion over which witnesses Respondent was calling, I reviewed some statements for witnesses who were not called. I gave very little weight to those statements from witnesses who were not called.
Findings of Fact
[17]There was a bundle from the Respondent of 364 pages, including the statements. I reviewed those documents to which I was referred. The Claimant had also submitted a bundle but the only document I considered from that bundle was the Claimant’s supplemental statement. The Respondent had also submitted pay documents and a holiday schedule. I reviewed a payslip from 5 July 2021 and the holiday schedule, after that was said to be agreed by the Claimant.[18]I restricted both advocates’ cross examination to the issues in question: whether or not the Claimant resigned or was dismissed, what holiday he had accrued and what holiday he had taken in the holiday year. I had to remind both on more than one occasion that their cross examination should be so restricted in order that we were able to conclude evidence in time for me to give judgment during the two-day hearing.[19]Evidence from the Respondent’s witnesses was problematic in that much of what was said in oral evidence about the key issue of whether the Claimant was dismissed or resigned was not contained in their written statements. All the statements contain a paragraph confirming that the Respondent’s representative prepared them based on information provided by the witnesses. But all the witnesses giving evidence claimed to have written the statements themselves. The fact that a matter confirmed in oral evidence is not contained in a witness statement does not necessarily affect credibility: what affects credibility is where evidence is inconsistent with a statement or documents or where evidence given by two witnesses about the same matter is inconsistent.
Findings of Fact
[20]The Respondent is owned and run primarily by Eduards Livmanis. He has family members working in the business – his sister and wife assist with administrative matters.[21]The Claimant commenced employment with the Respondent on 25 June 2021. We see that from the joining statement and from the payslip dated 5 July 2021 that shows he had by then earned £2000. The Claimant was not given a statement of particulars either then or at any time throughout his employment.[22]Emilija Livmanis says that there was a holiday policy in a staff handbook. She said that this indicated that the Respondent’s holiday year followed a calendar year. That document was not adduced in evidence.[23]By July 2024, the Claimant’s role was that of sales manager, running a team of sales agents. He had set up a WhatsApp group to communicate with those sales agents. The Claimant had the use of a company car, which he needed for business travel. I make no further findings on what happened during the Claimant’s employment because that is not needed to determine the question of whether Claimant was dismissed.[24]The Respondent’s holiday records show that the Claimant was on holiday for two days in January 2024, eight days in April, seven days in May and five days in July.
Conclusions
[25]In July 2024, Claimant went on holiday for a week. During that holiday he injured his ankle. He contacted Mr Livmanis to inform him that he could not drive, though he offered to work from home. Mr Livmanis indicated that the Claimant should take sick leave.[26]Mr Livmanis was not happy with the Claimant’s performance. In oral evidence, Mr Livmanis said that whilst he had performance concerns, the Claimant would have been given opportunity to improve and that he envisaged giving the Claimant a year to demonstrate improvement.[27]The Claimant returned to work in mid-August. Mr Livmanis asked him to come in on Friday 16 August to train up a new sales agent. This was not the Claimant’s usual working day because he worked Sunday to Thursday.[28]The Claimant had not been at work long before Mr Livmanis asked to speak to him. He asked the Claimant to return his car keys. The conversation became heated.[29]The Claimant says that Mr Livmanis asked for his keys and asked him to write a resignation letter and that he refused. The Claimant says that Mr Livmanis then told him he was dismissed and asked him to return the rest of his company property – a laptop, tablet and scanner.[30]Mr Livmanis agrees that he asked to speak to the Claimant and asked him to give back his company car keys. He said in oral evidence that he asked for the car keys to push the Claimant to improve his performance.[31]In his witness statement, Mr Livmanis says that the Claimant stormed out and left the premises for thirty minutes before returning, handing him the keys and told him he was not working for the Respondent any more. He said that Claimant told him to “fxxx off”. The statement goes on to say that Mr Livmanis followed the Claimant to ask him to stay and hand over his work and that the Claimant repeatedly told him to “fxxx off”.[32]In oral evidence, Mr Livmanis said that when the Claimant returned after thirty minutes, he went into the office and dropped the keys and said he was leaving. He didn’t mention the foul language detailed in the statement. He admitted that he asked the Claimant to write a resignation letter but said that this was because the Claimant had resigned. He said that his wife Inna and sister Emilija witnessed the conversation.[33]Inna Livmane did not give oral evidence but did provide a statement. That statement does not indicate that she witnessed the conversation on 16 August.[34]Emilija Livmanis did give oral evidence about 16 August, though again her statement does not cover the conversation. Her statement says that “it came as a surprise to learn that the Claimant had resigned”. This is odd wording if she indeed witnessed the conversation in which he resigned, even accounting for the fact it is a statement not in her first language.[35]In oral evidence Emilija Livmanis said that she overheard the conversation due to the open door between her office and the office in which Claimant and Mr Livmanis were speaking. She said that the Claimant threw the keys on the table and said he was leaving. She didn’t mention the foul language described in Mr Livmanis’ statement. She then said that the Claimant didn’t resign by her understanding of what that meant – which would be to write a formal letter - but he walked out. When I asked her what he said exactly and in which language, she said that they spoke in Russian and that he said he was leaving before correcting herself to say resigning was a better translation.[36]The Claimant points out that he couldn’t have used own car for work because he didn’t have insurance for business purposes. This was part of the reason he understood that Mr Livmanis was dismissing him when he asked for the company car keys. The Claimant says that he could not afford to resign because he had financial commitments including his mortgage and a property purchase.[37]I prefer the evidence of the Claimant as to what happened on 16 August because Eduards and Emilija Livmanis are inconsistent - they were inconsistent between their statements and oral evidence, in some cases inconsistent within what they said in oral evidence and in some cases inconsistent with each other.[38]On 16 August, the Claimant sent a WhatsApp message to the sales agent group “Thanks to everyone for nice working time spent together, but unfortunately my and Adugs way split today. Hope I haven’t done anything bad to anyone and thank you for your support”[39]That does not assist us because it does not say whether the Claimant was dismissed or resigned.[40]Karolina Kutkaite gave evidence about a conversation she had with the Claimant on 18 August. Her witness statement prepared in English says that the Claimant told her he had resigned, that Mr Livmanis was dissatisfied with his performance and that he no longer wanted to work with the Respondent. She said that the Claimant regularly contacted her by phone after that and that he was satisfied with his decision to leave.[41]In oral evidence with the assistance of a Lithuanian interpreter, she said that the Claimant told her he had left because he had had enough. On further questioning, she said that he said he was leaving and didn’t want to continue working for the Respondent. When pressed that this was not the same, she said that the reason for the difference may be due to language.[42]I do not accept Ms Kutkaite’s evidence because of her inconsistencies. I am not satisfied that the Claimant told her that he left because he had had enough or that he decided to leave.[43]Artis Seikstuls gave evidence about the Claimant attending to collect his belongings on 18 August, when he spoke to staff in the cold room. He was clear that the Claimant did not give his reason for leaving, i.e. whether he resigned or was dismissed.[44]Dali Kurtanidze gave evidence about a phone call on 18 August in which she said the Claimant told her that he resigned. She did not say this in her witness statement. She didn’t say it until the very end of her evidence when I asked her exactly what he had said. Before that, she had talked about her impression from what the Claimant had said about being happy to move on. I do not accept her evidence on this point - I do not accept that the Claimant told her that he had resigned.[45]Algirdas Zavackas gave evidence with the assistance of a Lithuanian interpreter that, a few days after 16 August, the Claimant told him he had left – that he hadn’t said that he resigned but that he had left the job.
Conclusions
[46]I find that Claimant was dismissed. He did not resign. Mr Livmanis might not have used the word dismissed or its Russian equivalent, but he asked the Claimant to write a resignation letter. When he refused, he told him to return company property – not just the car keys but all company property. In circumstances where the Claimant had not resigned, a reasonable employee would have understood that meant he was dismissed.[47]I find that all of the Claimant’s messages and conversations as described in my findings of fact above are consistent with a dismissal. It is not surprising that a senior employee does not want to tell his subordinates that he was dismissed. He used neutral language in the 16 August message and did not give a reason for leaving in the 18 August meeting. That is consistent with professionalism, as Mr Sadygov put it. It does not indicate one way or another whether or not he was dismissed or resigned.[48]The witnesses who gave evidence about later phone calls to a large extent focused on the fact that Claimant did not want to return to the Respondent. That again is consistent with a dismissal: it is not surprising that an employee who had been dismissed in the circumstances the Claimant described would not want to return, and that he might put a positive spin on that when speaking with ex colleagues, particularly those who were subordinate to him.[49]I have found that the Claimant was dismissed without notice, i.e. wrongfully dismissed. He had three complete years’ service – from June 2021 to August 2024. He was entitled to a week’s notice for each complete year, i.e. three weeks.[50]The Claimant was unfairly dismissed because the Respondent has neither pleaded a fair reason for dismissal nor adduced any evidence of a fair reason for dismissal. Mr Livmanis expressly stated that he did not intend to dismiss the Claimant for reason of capability.[51]No “relevant agreement” set out the holiday year. It may have been the practice of Respondent to work in calendar years, but Regulation 2(1) defines a relevant agreement as a written agreement. No such agreement was adduced in evidence. I therefore find that the holiday year commenced on the anniversary of the Claimant’s employment. The final holiday year commenced on 25 June 2024 and lasted until 16 August 2024 – 52 days.[52]That is 14.25% of the holiday year – 52 of 365 days. 14.25% of 28 days is 3.99 days, which should be rounded up to 4. The Claimant had taken 5 days in July 2024 so there was no untaken holiday accrued at termination.[53]Were I wrong about the holiday year, 1 January 2024 to 16 August 2024 is 228 days. That is 62.47% of the holiday year. 62.47% of 28 days is 17.5 days. The Claimant had taken 22 days in 2024 so there was no untaken holiday accrued at termination.[54]The parties agreed there was a failure to provide written particulars. Approved by: REMEDY JUDGMENT[1]The respondent shall pay the claimant £2,100.00 as damages for breach of contract. This figure has been calculated using gross pay to reflect the likelihood that the claimant will have to pay tax on it as Post Employment Notice Pay.[2]The respondent shall pay the claimant the following sums as damages for unfair dismissal:(a) A basic award of £2,100.00.(b) A compensatory award of £9,409.82. Note that these are actual the sums payable to the claimant after any deductions or uplifts have been applied.[3]The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Benefits) Regulations 1996 apply:(a) The total monetary award (i.e. the compensatory award plus basic award) payable to the claimant for unfair dismissal is £11,509.82(b) The prescribed element is £9,009.82.(c) The period of the prescribed element is from 16 August 2024 to 6 January 2026.(d) The difference between (a) and (b) is £2,500.00.[4]When the proceedings were begun the respondent was in breach of its duty to provide the claimant with a written statement of employment particulars. It is just and equitable to make an award of an amount equal to four weeks’ gross pay. In accordance with section 38 Employment Act 2002 the respondent shall therefore pay the claimant £2800.00.[1]In a liability judgment on 7 November 2025, the Tribunal found that the Claimant was unfairly dismissed and wrongfully dismissed in breach of contract. The Tribunal further found that the Respondent was in breach of its duty to provide the Claimant with a written statement of employment particulars.[2]The remedy hearing was heard on 6 January 2026. Oral judgment and reasons were given at that hearing. Before the written judgment was promulgated, the Respondent requested written reasons, which are now provided.[3]Remedy for the breach of contract claim was agreed by the parties at £2,100.00.[4]As far as the unfair dismissal claim is concerned, the Claimant was not seeking re-instatement or re-engagement. The basic award was agreed by the parties at £2,100.00.[5]As for the compensatory award, the Claimant claimed loss of statutory rights and loss of earnings for the period from his dismissal until 6 January 2025. The Respondent disputed entitlement to loss of statutory rights on its Counter Schedule of Loss. The Claimant further claimed injury to feelings, though abandoned the claim to an uplift for breach of the ACAS Code during the hearing.[6]The amount of net pay claimed was in dispute because the Claimant suggested an average of the 3 months ending with the dismissal should be the method of calculation, whereas the Respondent suggested that it should be an average of pay in 2024. There was a further dispute over whether the Claimant had adequately mitigated his loss. The Claimant confirmed that he had received qualifying benefits during his period of loss.[7]The Claimant also claims compensation under Section 38 Employment Act 2002 for the Respondent’s failure to provide a written statement of particulars. The Claimant suggested that this should be compensated by 4 weeks’ pay whereas the Respondent suggested that there should be no award, or in the alternative it should be 2 weeks’ pay.[8]The Tribunal heard evidence from the Claimant. An 11-page bundle containing the Schedule of Loss and Counter Schedule of Loss was provided alongside a further bundle of 55 pages. Both parties made submissions. The law[9]Section 123 Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and sections 124, 124A and 126, the amount of the compensatory award shall be such amount as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal in so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by the employer.(2) The loss referred to in subsection (1) shall be taken to include— (a) any expenses reasonably incurred by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal, and (b) subject to subsection (3), loss of any benefit which he might reasonably be expected to have had but for the dismissal.(3) …(4) In ascertaining the loss referred to in subsection (1) the tribunal shall apply the same rule concerning the duty of a person to mitigate his loss as applies to damages recoverable under the common law of England and Wales or (as the case may be) Scotland.[10]In Dunnachie v Kingston upon Hull City Council [2004] ICR 1052, the House of Lords confirmed that the phrase “just and equitable” in Section 123(1) did not give the Tribunal freedom to make an award for non-economic loss so a Claimant could not recover compensation for injury to feelings.[11]It follows that employees who are unfairly dismissed are compensated for actual financial loss they have suffered by no longer being paid by their employer, subject to mitigation. The onus is on the employer to show a failure of mitigation - Fyfe v Scientific Furnishings Ltd [1989] ICR 648. It is for an employer to prove that a Claimant has acted unreasonably; what is reasonable or unreasonable is a matter of fact - Cooper Contracting Ltd v Lindsey [2016] ICR D3.[12]The Recoupment Regulations provide that where a Claimant has claimed qualifying benefits during the period from dismissal to the date remedy is decided, the judgment must set out the prescribed element (that is the compensation for loss of earnings) and the prescribed period (that is the period from dismissal to the date of the hearing at which remedy is decided).[13]Awards for loss of statutory rights date back to the National Industrial Relations Court’s decision in Norton Tool v Tewson [1973] 1 WLR 45. They compensate a Claimant for the loss of those rights they enjoyed by reason of their length of service with the Respondent, rights that they will take time to build up with a new employer. The amount of such an award is not an exact science.[14]Section 1 Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that where a worker begins employment with an employer, the employer shall give to the worker a written statement of particulars of employment.[15]Section 38 Employment Act 2002 provides that(1) This section applies to proceedings before an employment tribunal relating to a claim by a worker under any of the jurisdictions listed in Schedule 5.(2) …(3) If in the case of proceedings to which this section applies— (a) the employment tribunal makes an award to the worker in respect of the claim to which the proceedings relate, and (b) when the proceedings were begun the employer was in breach of his duty to the worker under section 1(1) or 4(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or (in the case of a claim by a worker) under section 41B or 41C of that Act, the tribunal must, subject to subsection (5), increase the award by the minimum amount and may, if it considers it just and equitable in all the circumstances, increase the award by the higher amount instead.(4) In subsections (2) and (3)— (a) references to the minimum amount are to an amount equal to two weeks’ pay, and (b) references to the higher amount are to an amount equal to four weeks’ pay.(5) The duty under subsection (2) or (3) does not apply if there are exceptional circumstances which would make an award or increase under that subsection unjust or inequitable.[16]Schedule 5 includes a claim for unfair dismissal. Findings of Fact[17]The Claimant was dismissed on 16 August 2024. He had been in his role as Sales Manager since January 2024. His pay fluctuated.[18]Shortly after his dismissal, he sought work with UAB Virauda, a company working in the same field as the Respondent. He met with representatives of Virauda on 28 August 2024. A template Referral Agreement was sent to him on 5 September 2024. The agreement confirms that the “Referrer” (which would be the Claimant) is an independent contractor, not an employee. It provides for 3% commission and fuel costs.[19]The Claimant told the Tribunal that he did some data analysis before deciding whether to take up the offer because he wanted to be satisfied about whether Virauda were delivering on time and how they work with shops. He said that he wanted to be satisfied because of his previous experience with the Respondent. He said that he did not sell anything for Virauda and was not paid by them.[20]The Respondent cross-examined the Claimant on payments out of his bank statements to a savings account, pointing out that statements for those accounts were not disclosed. I take judicial notice of the fact it is unlikely that payments for work done from Virauda or indeed an employer would be made to a savings account. I therefore find that if the Claimant did receive payment for any work done after his dismissal, it would likely have been paid into one of the two current accounts for which statements were contained in the bundle.[21]I therefore accept the Claimant’s evidence on this point. There is no provision in the template agreement for payment for data analysis and no evidence presented either that the Claimant made any sales for Virauda or that Virauda made him any payments. Notably, there were no payments made into either bank account for which statements were in the bundle.[22]Those statements show that the Claimant received payments from various individuals over the period for which he claims losses. He said they were for repayment of loans made to close family and friends. He said that he asked for repayments due to being out of work without an income. He claimed that repayments were also made whilst he was still employed by the Respondent. Whilst the statements contained within the bundle largely relate to the period after his dismissal, there are some payments from some of the individuals into his Nationwide account in July. I therefore accept the Claimant’s evidence about this and find that none of these payments were for work done.[23]The Claimant said that he did not pursue the opportunity with Virauda because the Respondent’s owner/director Eduards Livmanis began speaking to suppliers and customers in the industry about him. He said that Mr Livmanis threatened both him and Virauda with legal proceedings for breach of a restraint of trade. I accept the Claimant’s evidence about that because it is consistent with the Respondent’s attempt to bring a contract claim on its ET3.[24]The Claimant then did a day’s training with Amazon, for which he received £54.50. Before he could pursue that, he accepted self-employment with Hercules. He is paid under the CIS scheme for that. Statements are contained within the bundle. Until 6 January 2025, he was receiving less than he had been paid by the Respondent. He was paid a total of £3,841.50 up to that date.
Conclusions
[25]I have found as a fact that the only payments the Claimant received for work done during the period of loss were the £54.50 for Amazon training and £3,841.50 from Hercules.[26]It is for the Respondent to prove a failure to mitigate loss. I do not accept that the Claimant not pursuing the opportunity with Virauda was a failure to mitigate: there was a good reason because the Respondent threatened action for breach of restraint of trade. It was therefore reasonable not to pursue an opportunity that could lead to expensive and risky High Court proceedings.[27]I find that the Claimant did take reasonable steps to mitigate his loss – initially pursuing self-employment within the same industry and then employment in different industries after the Respondent threatened proceedings for restraint of trade.[28]Taking all that into account, I find the Claimant’s efforts to mitigate his loss were reasonable but even if they were not, the Respondent has not discharged its burden to show that he would have found alternative work before he did. His losses flow from the dismissal.[29]For a compensatory award, the Tribunal does not look to the calculation of week’s pay in the Employment Rights Act, but what the Claimant would likely have been paid by the Respondent in the period of loss. I agree that the appropriate way to calculate that is to look at what he was paid in the sales manager role from January 2024. However, it is not appropriate to consider his August payslip because he was only employed for part of that month.[30]The Claimant’s total net pay contained on his payslips covering the period January 2024 – July 2024 is £18,886.57. That is a period of 30 weeks. His net weekly pay was therefore £629.55. The period of loss claimed is 16 August 2024 to 6 January 2025 - 20.5 weeks. £629.55 x 20.5 = £12,905.82. Credit must be given for the earnings since the dismissal. The Claimant earned £3,896.00 during that period (£54.50 + £3,841.50). His total loss of earnings was therefore £9,009.82.[31]That sum represents the prescribed element for recoupment purposes. The prescribed period is set by the Recoupment Regulations as the date of dismissal (16 August 2024) to the date of hearing (6 January 2026).[32]It is now trite law that it is appropriate to award a Claimant compensation for loss of statutory rights. The Claimant claims £400.00. I agree that is an appropriate amount. Calculation of the award is not an exact science.[33]The Claimant sought to distinguish Dunnachie on the basis that in that case the Claimant sought compensation for the manner of his dismissal but here the Claimant seeks compensation for the fact he is not able to continue in his prior field, i.e. matters occurring after his employment ended. But Dunnachie is clear that Section 123(1) doesn’t allow any non-economic loss. It matters not that the Claimant is seeking non-economic loss for a different reason than that in Dunnachie: the principle is the same. In any event, the Claimant did not adduce any evidence in respect of hurt feelings.[34]To award no compensation for a breach of the duty to provide written particulars, there would need to be exceptional circumstances which would make an award unjust or inequitable. I do not consider that there are such exceptional circumstances. The minimum amount is 2 weeks. If it is just and equitable, I may award 4 weeks. I take into account a total failure here: a period of 3 years in which no written particulars were provided whatsoever. I therefore consider it just and equitable to award 4 weeks. 4 x £700.00 = £2,800.00.[35]Total compensation is therefore £2,100.00 (agreed) for breach of contract; £2,100.00 is agreed for the basic award; £9,409.82 is awarded for the compensatory award, of which the prescribed element is £9,009.82; and £2,800.00 is awarded for breach of the duty to provide written particulars. Approved by: