Mr A R Ramani and Mr G Talbert v Addison Lee Ltd: 3307721/2024 and 3300105/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3307721/2024, 3300105/2025
Between
(1) Mr A R Ramani (2) Mr G TalbertClaimantAddison Lee Ltd RECORD OF A PRELIMINARY HEARINGRespondent
Before
Employment Judge TynanThe First Claimant represented himself and the Second for claimantMr A Webster (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 2 December 2025
JUDGMENT
The First Claimant’s claim that he was victimised by the Respondent when, in April 2020, he alleges that he was required to work at least one night shift every weekend (paragraph 2.2.1 of the List of Issues in respect of his claim) is struck out pursuant to Rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 on the grounds that it has no reasonable prospect of success.
REASONS
[1]On 2 May 2025 the Respondent applied to strike out the First Claimant’s claim on the grounds that it has no reasonable prospect of success and because it is not being actively pursued. The Respondent made further written submissions on the application on 16 June 2025. At a hearing on 3 October 2025, Employment Judge Gordon Walker gave the Respondent permission to update its application. An updated application was filed on 6 November 2025 (pages 251 to 264 of today’s hearing bundle). 1 of 5[2]The strike out application, which now extends to the Second Claimant’s claim (the two claims having been consolidated), is pursued solely on the grounds that the claims have no reasonable prospect of success.[3]Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunals Procedure Rules 2024 provides: “(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds – (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success…”[4]The power to strike out should only be exercised in rare circumstances (Tayside Public Transport Company Limited (t/a Travel Dundee) v Reilly [2012] IRLR 755; cases should not, as a general principle, be struck out where the central facts are in dispute (Tayside and North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Ezsias [2007] EWCA Civ 330); and, as a general principle, discrimination cases should not be struck out except in very clear circumstances (Anyanwu v South Banks Student Union [2001] UK HL14).[5]In Anyanwu Lord Steyn said: “From my part such vagaries in discrimination jurisprudence underline the importance of not striking out such claims as an abuse of the process except in the most obvious and plainest cases. Discrimination cases are generally fact sensitive, and their proper determination is always vital to our pluralistic society. In this field perhaps more than any other the bias and favour of a claim being examined on the merits or demerits with its particular effects is a matter of high public interest.”[6]In a similar vein, Lord Hope said: “I would have been reluctant to strike out these claims on the view that discrimination issues of the kind which have been raised in this case should as a general rule be decided only after hearing the evidence. The questions of Law that have to be determined are often highly fact sensitive. The risk of injustice is minimised if the answers to these questions are deferred until all the facts are out. The Tribunal can then base its decision on its findings of fact rather than on assumptions as to what the Claimant may be able to establish if given an opportunity to lead evidence.”[7]Ahir v British Airways Plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1392, is a case in which the Court of Appeal upheld an Employment Tribunal’s decision to strike out claims of less favourable treatment as a fixed term employee. At paragraph 16 of the Judgment in Ahir, Underhill LJ noted that the hurdle of a strike out is higher than the hurdle for the making of a deposit order, which depends on the claim having little reasonable prospect of success as opposed to no reasonable prospect of 2 of 5 success; though as the Respondent notes in its updated application, Underhill LJ went on to identify at least one situation where strike out might be permissible. I refer in this regard to paragraph 24 of his judgment: “As I already said, in a case of this kind, where there is on the face of it a straightforward and well documented innocent explanation for what occurred, a case cannot be allowed to proceed on the basis of a mere assertion that that explanation is not the true explanation without the claimant being able to advance some basis, even if not yet provable, for that being so. The employment judge cannot be criticised for deciding the application to strike out on the basis of the actual case being advanced.'' Analysis[8]In my judgement, the First Claimant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that he was subjected to detriment in April 2020, as he alleges, because he did a protected act. He claims that he was required by the Respondent to work at least one night shift every weekend. However, in the words of Underhill LJ in Ahir, this is a case where there is on the face of it a straightforward and well documented innocent explanation for what occurred in April 2020, and accordingly that I should not allow the complaint to proceed on the basis of the Claimant’s mere assertion that it was instead an act of victimisation. The innocent explanation is supplied by the First Claimant himself, namely in an email he sent to Daniel Beeby of the Respondent some two and a half years later, on 20 November 2022, in which he asked to revert to his previous working pattern (pages 249 and 250 of today’s hearing bundle). In his email, the First Claimant described the circumstances in which changes had been made to his established shift pattern, namely as a result of a need to cover for a third colleague who had been furloughed as a result of the Coronavirus pandemic. When he apprised Mr Beeby of the relevant background, the First Claimant effectively described the arrangements in 2020 as consensual, specifically that they had been put forward by himself and the Second Claimant. He did not say or even suggest or infer that they had been forced upon himself or the Second Claimant, let alone that they were in response to any protected act of his or theirs. It is a detailed email that makes no mention of any pay issues, that the First Claimant had supported the Second Claimant in an equal pay grievance or that the Respondent had reacted to this. Instead, the tone was friendly and indicated no concerns as to the circumstances in which the arrangement had come to be in place, rather a desire to revert to his previous working pattern for health and family reasons.[9]In my judgement, it is proportionate to strike out the complaint. It is not in the interests of justice to allocate tribunal hearing time or to put the Respondent to the time and expense of defending a claim that in my judgement is bound to fail.[10]I decline to strike out the remainder of the Claimants’ claims. Whilst I recognise that if there is no reasonable prospect of the First Claimant establishing that the revised shift pattern implemented in April 2020 was in response to any protected act of his in 2018, it might be argued that it is equally unlikely that any alleged delay in 2022 and 2023 in addressing his request to revert to his previous shift pattern was materially influenced by it. However, unlike the position in 2020, 3 of 5 there is not a similarly straightforward and well documented innocent explanation available to me, such that I can confidently conclude that the Claimant has no realistic chance of establishing that it was linked to his claimed protected act.[11]As regards the Claimants’ equal pay complaints, the Respondent concedes in the case of the First Claimant that he was doing like work to Ann Fairclough and that she was paid more than he was in 2023 and 2024. In the case of the Second Claimant, it concedes that he was doing like work to Anna Fairclough and Georgina Smith, and that they were paid more than he was in 2024 and that Ms Fairclough was also paid more than he was in 2022 and 2023. Its position as regards the Second Claimant’s third named comparator, Isabelle Wright is unclear. The Respondent seeks to rely upon the fact that other women who did like work to the Claimants and their named equal pay comparators were paid less than they were (paragraph 24 of the updated strike out application). The Respondent complains that the Claimants are ‘cherry-picking’. However, this overlooks that the Claimants are entitled to select their comparators for equal pay purposes. In Reading Borough Council v James and ors 2018 ICR 1839, EAT, the Appeal Tribunal confirmed that a chosen comparator need not be representative. The female claimants in that case sought to compare their pay with that of a male highways operative. The EAT observed that the fact other men were performing that role at a lower rate of pay could not undermine the claimants’ chosen comparison. They were not required to select a comparator who was representative of a particular group of workers, and it was not open to the employer to contend for a ‘more appropriate’ comparator.[12]The Respondent has not advanced any further explanation for the apparent pay disparities within the group, for example that they are based on individual performance or appraisal ratings, are intended to aid recruitment or retention, reflect shift premiums or recognise preserved rights under the TUPE Regulations. As long ago as 26 March 2025, Employment Judge Laidler gave the Respondent permission to serve Amended Grounds of Resistance, amongst other things so that it would have the opportunity to articulate any material factor defence. It has elected not to do so, leaving me unable to come to an informed view as to the Claimants’ or indeed the Respondent’s prospects. Approved by: