Mr K Nwabueze v Simons Rodkin Solicitors LLP and Others: 3307551/2023 and 3301414/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3307551/2023, 3301414/2024

Between

Mr K NwabuezeClaimant

Simons Rodkin Solicitors LLP and OthersRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Hyams

Members

Ms C Baggs

Mr R Jewell

In person for claimant

Date 11 February 2026

REASONS

The claims made by the claimant, the procedural history up to the start of the hearing before us on 3 November 2025, and the approach which we have taken in this case

Introduction

[1]There were five preliminary hearings in regard to these joined cases before the liability hearing which started on Monday 3 November 2025. There were before us during that liability hearing three substantive bundles. The first contained the pleadings and tribunal orders. The second bundle contained the parties’ disclosed documents and consisted of 1550 pages including its index. The third bundle contained copies of inter-party correspondence, but we were not referred to the pages of that bundle during the liability hearing, so we make no further reference to it in these reasons. The respondents’ main witness statements were in a fourth bundle. We do not refer below to the pages of the witness statement bundle, instead referring simply to the paragraph numbers of each witness statement. In what follows, we refer to the first substantive bundle as B1, and to the pages of it as B1/1 onwards and we refer to the pages of the second bundle (to which we refer below as B2) in an equivalent way. The first preliminary hearing

[2]The first preliminary hearing occurred on 20 November 2023. That preliminary hearing concerned the first of the two claims made by the claimant (which were made against only the first and fourth respondents as stated above) and was conducted by Employment Judge (“EJ”) Carney. The record of that hearing was at B1/83-88. In paragraph 4 of that record, on pages B1/83-85, it was recorded that the claimant had made an application for anonymity and that EJ Carney had refused it for the reasons stated in that paragraph. We saw that in paragraph 4.4 on page B1/84, this was said. “The claimant failed to explain how an anonymity order was necessary in the interests of justice or to protect his convention rights. The abuse he alleged was made by people unconnected to the respondent or to the claimant’s Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 3 current claims. The alleged abuse predates these claims and the events they are based on. Many of the abuse allegations are several years old. The claimant has not explained why his name appearing in connection with these proceedings might lead to an escalation in the alleged abuse. Or why it might make it easier for his abusers to target him (they already know his online identity and he has already seen them in the vicinity of his home). Any published judgment would not include the claimant’s address. The only time his address might come into the public domain is if there are any observers at any public hearing (such as the liability hearing) who would be able to view the tribunal bundle of documents. If there are, the claimant can make an application at the time that any bundle shown to the observers has his address redacted. Nothing the claimant has said has outweighed the principle of open justice or the convention right to freedom of expression.”

[3]EJ Carney ordered the claimant to provide the further information stated in paragraph 7 on B1/85-86. The second preliminary hearing

[4]There was a second preliminary hearing on 22 February 2024, and that was conducted by EJ A Green. That hearing also concerned the first of the two claims made by the claimant. The hearing resulted in a listing of the hearing of the claims of the claimant on 3-7 November 2025 in person at Watford Employment Tribunal. The record of the hearing was at B1/89-104. The claimant had made a claim of indirect discrimination because of race, and that claim was dismissed on its withdrawal, in the judgment at B1/105. Case management orders were made, to be complied with during 2024. The third preliminary hearing

[5]There was then a third preliminary hearing on 16 September 2024. It was conducted by EJ Young, and her record of the hearing was at pages B1/106-113. That hearing was arranged because the claimant had filed the second of his two claims, as he had by then been dismissed by the first respondent (which is a limited liability partnership within the meaning of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000). The second claim was made against the same two respondents as the first claim, with the second and third respondents recorded above added. In paragraph 28 of her record of the hearing, at B1/110, EJ Young said this. “Ms Johns of counsel attended on behalf of all the Respondents in both claims. Mr Simon Aaron also attended however he had his camera off. I asked Mr Aaron to turn on his camera so that I could see that he was in a private environment. However, as soon was the hearing started the Claimant indicated that he could neither see us nor hear us and left the hearing. Mr Aaron was unable to put on his camera initially. Both Mr Aaron and the Claimant rejoined the hearing after 5 minutes. The Claimant indicated that he was now joining by his mobile phone as his laptop connection would not allow him to connect so that he could hear and see both me and Ms Johns. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 4 However, throughout the hearing on approximately 5-6 occasions the Claimant’s call would drop off and the Claimant could not hear whoever was speaking at the hearing and would have to log out and back in again. The Claimant also struggled to hear what the Employment Tribunal was telling him on multiple occasions due to the bad connection. As a result, I listed the further case management preliminary hearing in person only as it was not feasible to have a hearing with the Claimant’s connection as spotty as it was.” The fourth preliminary hearing

[6]That led to the fourth preliminary hearing, which took place on 25 March 2025 and was conducted by Regional Employment Judge (“REJ”) Foxwell. The record of that hearing was at B1/114-129. In paragraphs 1-3 on pages B1/118-119, REJ Foxwell said this. “1. This is the fourth case management hearing that has taken place in this case. It had been allocated 3 hours hearing time, but in the event took 4 hours 40 minutes. The result, however, is a comprehensive list of issues which is intended to be final. The clarification provided by the parties today has been combined with the list of issues prepared by Judge Green following the hearing on 22 February 2024. 2. Because of the time it took to work through all of the claims made in respect of the claimant’s four causes of action (disability discrimination, whistleblowing, victimisation and race discrimination) and because the parties will need an opportunity to consider what evidence they require to pursue or meet them, I decided that a further case management hearing was necessary simply to review the time estimate for final hearing (and to add days if necessary) and to remake the orders for the preparation of a bundle and the exchange of witness statements. 3. Mr Magier [who appeared in that hearing as counsel for the respondents, as he did in the hearing before us] mentioned that the respondents have an outstanding application to strike out the claims on grounds of the claimant’s alleged conduct and that it might be necessary for the question of disability to be resolved as a preliminary issue as well if it is not agreed. I expressed some doubt about whether it was proportionate to list separate public preliminary hearings for these but these are things that can also be considered on the next occasion.”

[7]The issues were stated at B1/120-129. Possibly unusually, we do not set out those issues verbatim here. That is because7.1 the list was very detailed,

7.2 it was predicated on the factual assertions of the claimant, Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 5

7.3 there was a significant amount of repetition in the list;

7.4 we have referred back to and determined all of the numbered issues on the list in our conclusions stated below, and

7.5 for the reasons stated below, we rejected many of the claimant’s factual assertions.

Introduction

[8]We have therefore in what follows first stated our findings of fact, then stated our understanding of the applicable law, and finally applied what we understood to be the applicable law to our findings of fact. We do, however, here record what the claimant’s legal claims were, albeit in less detail than was stated in the list of issues at pages B1/120-129, namely:8.1 that the claimant had been treated detrimentally within the meaning of section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) (not, we noted, section 48 of that Act, as stated in paragraph 3 of the list of issues at B1/121-122) for making one or protected disclosures within the meaning of section 43B of that Act. The three claimed protected disclosures were stated in paragraph 2.1.1 of the list of issues on page B1/121, but by the end of Mr Magier’s cross-examination of the claimant, we understood that the claimant accepted (in our view correctly) that the middle one of those three was not in fact a protected disclosure. The two claimed public interest disclosures were

(1) something which was said in a discussion with Mr Aaron of 25 August 2022, and

(2) something which the claimant said to Mr Aaron on 19 December 2022;

8.2 in relation to the same claimed protected disclosures, that the claimant had been dismissed unfairly within the meaning of section 103A of the ERA 1996, i.e. on the basis that the reason, or principal reason, for his dismissal was that he had made one or more protected disclosures within the meaning of section 43B of that Act;

8.3 that there had been a failure to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of the ERA 1996, for the claimant’s claimed disability of dyslexia;

8.4 that the claimant had been discriminated against directly because of race, contrary to sections 13 and 39 of the EqA 2010, or alternatively harassed within the meaning of section 26(1) and (4) of that Act, contrary to section 40 of that Act, in the 21 sets of claimed circumstances listed in paragraph 8.1 on pages B1/124-125;

8.5 that the claimant had been victimised within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010 because of the making by him of one or more of the claimed protected acts set out in paragraph

9.1 on page B1/126 (the most controversial of which was in paragraph 9.1.1, which was that the claimant Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 6 had ‘lodged a verbal complaint on 25 January 2023 to Michael Abraham stating that the claimant had reported that the second respondent [sic: it must have been meant to be a reference to Mr Nash, who was by the time of the writing of that list the fourth respondent; while we have not corrected references to the second respondent in the same way below, we have treated allegations in the list of issues relating to the second respondent as allegations relating to Mr Nash] had made about certain individuals involved in the music matter being part of a “white boys club”‘), the claimed detrimental acts (of which there were 18) being set out in paragraph

9.2 on pages B1/127-128; and

8.6 that there had when the proceedings began been a breach of the first respondent’s duty to give the claimant a written statement of employment particulars, or a change to such particulars, thereby attracting an award under section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 (“EA 2002”) in the event of the success of any of the claimant’s other claims.

[9]We found it helpful to identify the specific things done or omitted to be done which it is the claimant’s case were (for one or more legal reasons) unlawful and then to state what they were in simple chronological order, stating in relation to each of them what the claimant claimed was unlawful about them. Taking them in turn, they were as follows.9.1 On 25 August 2022, the claimant was suspended “from working on ... music matters” (that was our interpretation of the claimed detrimental act of “Suspension in or around 25 August 2022. The claimant was removed from working on the music matters.”). This was the subject of issues

3.1.1 and 8.1.2, so it was claimed that this was

(1) detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 47B of the ERA 1996,

(2) direct discrimination because of race, and/or

(3) harassment within the meaning of section 26 of the EqA 2010, the protected characteristic for that purpose being race. All of the issues stated in paragraph 3.1 of the list of issues at B1/122 were claims of such detrimental treatment and all of the issues stated in paragraph 8.1 on B1/124-125 were claims of such direct discrimination and/or harassment.

9.2 On the same day, Mr Nash said “I do not appreciate anyone running to teacher” and “he now knows that I (not you) can offer him a solution. Which, in time, will require negotiating and therefore, will generate further income for the practice, and therefore more money”. That was issue 8.1.1.

9.3 On 31 October 2022, the “claimant received written communication indicating that collaboration with the second respondent would cease.” That was issues

3.1.2 and 8.1.3.

9.4 On 23 or 25 January 2023, the claimant was “excluded from a meeting with Warner Music Chappell”. That was issues

3.1.3 and 8.1.5. We read that as a reference to a meeting with “Warner Chappell Music”, and in reality it was a reference to a telephone call with Mr Ed Condon of Warner Chappell Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 7 Music. (We saw no justification for the redaction of the names of clients of the first respondent.)

9.5 On 23 January 2023, ‘during a conversation with the second respondent [i.e. Mr Nash], the second respondent referred to the first respondent as a “white boys club”.’ That was issue 8.1.4.

9.6 On 25 January 2023, “the second respondent [i.e. Mr Nash] excluded the claimant from a meeting with a client”. That was issues

3.1.4 (which we concluded referred to 23 January 2023 mistakenly; the date in question was, we thought, 25 January 2023) and 8.1.6.

9.7 On 25 January 2023, Mr Abraham sent “a critical email to the claimant denying the claimant career development opportunities”. That was issues 3.1.5, 8.1.7 and 9.2.1, so in addition to being a claim of detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 47B of the ERA 1996 and/or direct discrimination because of race and/or harassment within the meaning of section 26 of the EqA 2010, the protected characteristic for that purpose being race, it was claimed that the conduct was victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of that Act: the claimed acts of such victimisation were all stated in paragraph 9.2 of the list of issues.

9.8 “Simon Cooper blaming the claimant for work mistakes when he had checked and approved the claimant’s work (setting the claimant up to fail)”. That was issues 8.1.8 and 9.2.2.

9.9 “Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron not supporting the claimant, developing his skills, or giving him positive feedback.” That was issues 8.1.9 and 9.2.3.

9.10 “The respondents failing to take immediate action on the claimant’s complaint about the monkey picture and caption.” That was issues 8.1.10 and 9.2.4.

9.11 “Mr Abraham applying a different and more onerous appraisal process to the claimant. The claimant relies on Priya Varsani as an actual comparator.” That was issues 8.1.11 and 9.2.5.

9.12 “Not permitting the claimant to sign his appraisal outcome. The claimant relies on Priya Varsani as an actual comparator.” That was issues 8.1.12 and 9.2.6.

9.13 “Not offering the claimant any hours after 3 August 2023.” That was issues 8.1.13 and 9.2.7.

9.14 “Terminating the claimant’s contract on 31 August 2023.” That was issues 8.1.14 and 9.2.8. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 8

9.15 “Not allowing the claimant to appeal against the decision to terminate his employment.” That was issues 8.1.15 and 9.2.9.

9.16 “On 7 December 2023 adding the question whether the claimant’s complaints had been made in good faith to issues to be considered as part of the claimant’s grievance.” That was issues 8.1.16 and 9.2.10.

9.17 “Refusing to tell the claimant who had alleged that he had not acted in good faith.” That was issue 9.2.11.

9.18 “Not upholding the claimant’s grievance.” That was issues 8.1.18 and 9.2.12.

9.19 “Making a finding that the claimant had not acted in good faith.” That was issues 8.1.19 and 9.2.13.

9.20 “Kevin Harris failing to address the claimant’s complaints.” That was issues 8.1.20 and 9.2.14.

9.21 “Kevin Harris (said to be of Black Caribbean heritage) not letting the claimant, who is of Black African heritage, explain why the monkey picture and caption was offensive to him and minimising his experience.” That was issue 8.1.21.

9.22 ‘Kevin Harris asserting that the claimant had raised dyslexia as a “distraction” and/or a “tactic”.’ That was issue 9.2.15.

9.23 “Refusing to provide the claimant with a copy of the video of his appraisal.” That was issue 9.2.16.

9.24 “Making disclosure of the appraisal video contingent upon the claimant disclosing his recordings of grievance meetings.” That was issue 9.2.17.

9.25 “Informing the claimant that the appraisal video recordings would not be released to him because he would use these to advance his claims.” That was issue 9.2.18.

9.26 ‘On or about 18 January 2024 Simon Cooper sending the claimant an article regarding the Duke & Duchess of Sussex’s complaints related to race entitled “History won’t be kind to Prince Harry”.’ That was issue 8.1.17. The year was plainly wrong. It was in fact 2023. The email and the article were at B2/122-126.

[10]Returning to the sequence of events preceding the liability hearing which we conducted, we saw that on 11 June 2025, the respondents made an application for(1) the strike-out of the claimant’s claims because of his conduct of the proceedings,

(2) a deposit order, and

(3) specific disclosure. That application was at B1/130-141. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 9 The fifth preliminary hearing

[11]There was then a further preliminary hearing, which was conducted by EJ Cowen. That hearing started on 22 August 2025 but was adjourned because of a lack of time on that day to complete it, and it was completed on 6 October 2025. As we record in paragraph 4 above, orders were made for compliance in 2024 in relation to the first of the two joined cases. Given that the second case was brought because of the claimant’s dismissal, one might have thought that there would be a need only to add documentary and oral evidence about the events relating to the claimant’s dismissal. However, that appears not to have occurred. Only on 6 October 2025 were case management orders made for the final preparation for the trial of the claims, listed to start on 3 November 2025. Those case management orders were recorded in a document which EJ Cowen approved on 6 October 2025 and which was sent to the parties on the next day, 7 October 2025. That document was at B1/159-163. The orders necessarily involved a very tight timetable in order to enable the hearing to start on 3 November 2025. The last date for compliance with the orders made was 30 October 2025, and that was for the sending of witness statements to the other side.

[12]EJ Cowen dismissed the respondents’ application for the striking out of any part of the claimant’s claims, but she did make a deposit order in relation to the following claims (as recorded in the document at B1/164-167):12.1 the claim that the claimant was dismissed within the meaning of section 103A of the ERA 1996 for making a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of that Act;

12.2 the claim that there had been a failure to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of the EqA 2010; and

12.3 the claim that there was at the time of the commencement of these proceedings a breach of the first respondent’s duty to give the claimant a written statement of employment particulars or a change to such particulars. What happened at the start of and during the hearing before us

[13]Mr Nash (the fourth respondent) was at the start of the hearing before us on 3 November 2025 not well enough to make a witness statement or to attend to give evidence, whether in person or via CVP. We were informed via a supplemental witness statement of Mr Aaron, the second respondent (i.e. the second respondent by the time the hearing before us began), of the extent of Mr Nash’s ill-health. Mr Aaron said in paragraph 2 of that statement that the respondents had made an urgent application on 24 October 2025 for the postponement of the hearing “due to the sudden deterioration in the health of Mr. David Nash and his inability to attend the hearing and/or give evidence”. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 10

[14]Because the claimant was not given by the respondents a witness statement made by Mr Nash, the claimant had not, he told us on 3 November 2025, given the respondents his witness statement.

[15]The respondents had given the claimant four of their witness statements on Friday 31 October 2025 and the final ones, the main two (those of Mr Abraham, the third respondent, and Mr Aaron), at the start of Monday 3 November 2025, but without giving the claimant the passwords for any of those statements. In effect, the respondents had therefore not given the claimant their witness statements yet.

[16]The claimant said that he had not given the respondents his witness statement because he was expecting further disclosure from the respondents. As EJ Hyams pointed out on 3 November 2025, that was not a good reason for not sending the claimant’s witness statement.

[17]The claimant complained also that he had not been provided with a hard copy of the hearing bundles. However, there had been an order for the provision of the bundles in digital as well as hard copy form, and there was no complaint that the claimant had not been provided with a digital copy.

[18]Mr Magier pressed the application for a postponement of the hearing because of the inability of Mr Nash to give evidence, but on the basis that if the application were unsuccessful then the respondents sought the the striking out of the claims as the claimant had not provided a witness statement and had not complied (fully, at least) with the requirement to disclose documents.

[19]The claimant said in response that his witness statement was ready to be sent to the respondents. EJ Hyams asked the claimant how long was his witness statement. The claimant said that it was 20 pages long. However, he said that his witness statement could not then and there be sent to the respondents because it was not in his (the claimant’s) possession. The claimant had a laptop computer with him, and EJ Hyams said that he presumed that the witness statement was ready to send, possibly even in the outbox of his email software, but the claimant said that the witness statement was not on his computer at that time. Rather, he said, it was only on a portable hard drive which he had left at home. When EJ Hyams asked by when the claimant could send his witness statement to the respondents, the claimant said that he could get home in about half an hour and would then be able to email it immediately. EJ Hyams said that it should then be emailed also to his (EJ Hyams’) judicial email address, as the tribunal would of course need to read it also, and if it were emailed directly to EJ Hyams then there would be no more delay than was necessary in it being received by the members of the tribunal.

[20]After much discussion with both the claimant and Mr Magier, EJ Hyams proposed that the tribunal would hear all of the oral evidence that the parties could currently give and(1) if there was nothing in the facts as found by us on the basis of that evidence and the documents before us from which we could draw the inference that the claimant was treated less favourably by Mr Nash because of race, or that Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 11 the claimant was treated detrimentally by Mr Nash because the claimant had made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996 or done a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010, or that any conduct of Mr Nash was related to race within the meaning of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010, and

(2) we concluded that the reason why the claimant was treated by Mr Nash as he was in fact (as found by us) treated was in all respects some reason other than race or that the claimant had made a protected disclosure of either sort, and there was no conduct which was related to race within the meaning of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010, then the claim in regard to the actions of Mr Nash would fail. If, however, there was evidence that transferred the burden of proof under section 136 of the EqA 2010, then the tribunal and the parties could consider further what to do about Mr Nash’s current inability to attend.

[21]After a 20-minute break, from 11:21 to 11:41, both the claimant and Mr Magier (having taken instructions) agreed to that proposal. EJ Hyams then discussed with them the time required to prepare the cross-examinations, given that neither party (treating the respondents as a single party for this purpose) had yet seen the other’s witness statements, and EJ Hyams proposed that the claimant had Wednesday afternoon for that purpose if he had not had sufficient time to prepare to cross-examine the respondents’ witnesses by then.

[22]We then adjourned the hearing. The time was about 12 noon, and we adjourned the hearing to 10.00am on the next day, 4 November 2025, on the basis that Mr Magier was confident that he would be able to start to cross-examine the claimant at that time if he received the claimant’s witness statement as soon as possible during the afternoon of 3 November.

[23]We were not inconvenienced by the likely delay in the sending of the claimant’s witness statements, as we had those of the respondents to read, and there were many documents in the bundle to which those witness statements referred and which were plainly relevant. However, during the course of the afternoon we became increasingly puzzled by the failure by the claimant to send his witness statement to EJ Hyams.

[24]In fact, the claimant sent his witness statement to EJ Hyams and Mr Magier only at 8.00am on the next day, 4 November 2025. He did so with this text (and this text only) in the email enclosing the statement: “Please see witness statement, Claimant experienced significant technical and formatting issues.”

[25]We resumed the hearing at 10.09am on Tuesday 4 November 2025. Through EJ Hyams, we asked the claimant why he had not sent his witness statement before 8.00am on that day. His explanation (as noted by EJ Hyams but with the notes tidied up for present purposes) was as follows.25.1 When he got home he found that there was a “huge leak”; his “sitting room” had “a lot of water coming through” from the third floor. He said more about Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 12 the background to that leak, saying that it had started on the previous Saturday, i.e. Saturday 1 November 2025.

25.2 He then had “technical issues” with which he had to deal.

25.3 He could show us that his witness statement had in fact been “prepared for a while”.

25.4 He could show us “a text message and confirmation that the house was experiencing the ceiling of [his] front room having water coming through it from two neighbours”. That water had led to a need to switch off the electricity and that had prevented the claimant from using his broadband internet service.

25.5 There were some issues in relation to his witness statement as he had just received the hard copy of the bundle, and part of having dyslexia is that having the bundle only on a computer makes it difficult to read the bundle.

25.6 He had to send his witness statement with erroneous cross-references to the bundle even though he had delayed in sending it to 8.00am on that day.

25.7 However, he now said, although a huge amount of his witness statement had been completed the day before, not all of it had been.

[26]As EJ Hyams pointed out to the claimant when the claimant mentioned the fourth of those factors, even if the power was switched off at his flat, the claimant could have used his mobile telephone (assuming that it had enough battery power left) as a route to the internet and sent his witness statement via the 4g or 5g mobile network.

[27]The witness statement was in fact 25 pages long. It was dated 3 November 2025. Its text ended towards the bottom of the final page, and it was in relatively small font with quite close spacing between the lines, and no blank lines between the paragraphs.

[28]Mr Jewell then asked the claimant: “Yesterday when the judge asked you why you did not have your witness statement in your outbox you said that it was not there but it was ready to be sent; are you now saying you only had it nearly ready to send?” The claimant’s answer to that question was this. “I was finalising the draft. The original one if I had sent it would not have represented what the final document was. I can show you that the original document was done quite a while ago; and the technical issue I had was with the numbering.”

[29]EJ Hyams’ notes continued that the claimant had said: “and recent finalisation which occurred after a point.” However, it was not clear what the claimant had said there, and EJ Hyams’ notes might have been incorrect or incomplete. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 13

[30]Mr Jewell then asked whether the claimant had started to read the respondents’ witness statements, and Mr Magier said that the passwords to them had been sent to the claimant at 8.41am that day. Mr Jewell then asked why the claimant had not sent the witness statement in its incomplete form the day before and updated it as far as possible overnight by reference to the bundle documents. The claimant then said that he was a single parent and had to juggle picking up his child and looking after her with doing the work.

[31]Mr Magier then made a number of points about the inconsistencies in the claimant’s position and the way in which the claimant could and should have proceeded. For example, Mr Magier said that the claimant had said that his witness statement was on a hard drive and ready to send yesterday, so there must have been a lot of water coming through the ceiling to prevent the claimant from sending it off as suggested by EJ Hyams using the 4g or 5g network and with the caveat that some bundle page references would need to be amended.

[32]Mr Magier also said that the respondents’ solicitors had sent emails to the tribunal at 3.19pm and 5.40pm on the day before, 3 November, copying them to the tribunal, asking the claimant where his witness statement was and why it had not been sent so far. Mr Magier said that the claimant had not responded to either of those emails.

[33]In addition, Mr Magier said that no pictures had been provided of the claimed water coming through the ceiling at the claimant’s flat, and that no good explanation had been given by the claimant for failing to send the witness statement as soon as he had got home, or at least very soon afterwards. He also said that while water coming through a ceiling was not easy to predict, childcare issues were. He also pointed out that the claimant had said nothing about any claimed technical issues having prevented the sending of the statement.

[34]EJ Hyams then asked the claimant what he meant by referring to “technical issues”. The claimant’s response was that he had “had issues with the password” to the hard drive. EJ Hyams then asked the claimant how he resolved those issues, and the claimant said that he was “trying to remember [the password]” and that he was “just entering different passwords that [he] was remembering.” EJ Hyams then pointed out that it is essential to have a record of the passwords required for numerous digital purposes, and the claimant said that he “[had] a problem with [his] laptop”, and that he “maybe need[ed] to be a bit more efficient” in relation to passwords.

[35]The claimant then, after some questions by Mr Jewell, said that he “[took] it on board that [he] should have a note pad” on which he recorded his passwords, if he did not have (as suggested by EJ Hyams) some encrypted software on which he stored all of his passwords. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 14

[36]EJ Hyams then asked the claimant about the technical issues other than in regard to formatting. The claimant’s response was to that the formatting “was about disjointed paragraphs.” He continued: “I was under a lot of stress yesterday; and I think it exacerbated how I was able to function [i.e. he was referring to his claimed difficulties in regard to functioning] on a day to day basis with my dyslexia. I had to go through all the numbering again. Also there were errors in my paragraphs which meant that I had to go through each paragraph and go through each bundle; and this was while I was attending to my child and all the things I needed to do.”

[37]EJ Hyams then asked Mr Magier how much time he would need to prepare his cross-examination of the claimant, and Mr Magier said that he would need only about two hours to do that. EJ Hyams then pointed out the relevance of the judgment of Leggatt J (as he then was) in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd

[2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm)

where, at paragraphs 15-22, Leggatt J pointed out the importance of contemporaneous documentary evidence and the extent to which cross-examination can (and cannot) assist a trial court or tribunal. EJ Hyams pointed out too that there is no point asking a witness to accept what a document says unless the accuracy or provenance of the document is disputed. EJ Hyams pointed out that cross-examination is required in relation only to evidence which is disputed and which is material, and that here most of the events were documented extensively: that is to say, some of the events were recorded in contemporaneous documents, and others took place through written communications, where there was no oral exchange such as in a telephone conversation or in a meeting in person. As EJ Hyams pointed out, while some latitude is required where a party is seeking in cross-examination to undermine the credibility of the witness, it is only where the parties disagree about what happened on a particular occasion that cross-examination is required on a particular factual issue, and even then only where the witness is likely to be able to give relevant evidence in relation to the factual issue.

[38]Mr Magier then asked for the claimant to be required to provide a photograph of the water coming through the ceiling. Mr Jewell then asked the claimant about the leak and the claimant said that water “was going through the electrical wires and an electrician did come over the weekend; [I was] told not to turn on the lights until matters had resolved”. At 11:16 and 11:19 the claimant sent us photographs: one of a ceiling with a line of droplets, the ceiling being that of the claimant’s living room, he said, and one of a coffee table with some water on it and a bucket next to it.

[39]Mr Magier then said that there was no expert evidence before the tribunal to support the claimant’s claim that he was disabled by reason of dyslexia. The claimant then said that his current employer (the Crown Prosecution Service) had made adjustments after he had said that he had dyslexia. He referred us to page B2/1002. That was page 3 of a “Workplace Needs Assessment Report” dated 25 Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 15 March 2024, and, as EJ Hyams pointed out, the report was plainly based only on the claimant’s “information”, as recorded on B2/1000, which was the first page of the report. The claimant then referred us to B2/44. That was a handwritten note of Mr Aaron stating the “Objectives/Targets/Tasks for next 12 months” as at 24, 26 and 31 July 2023, which (contrary to the claimant’s submission set out in paragraph 133 below) in itself proved nothing about the claimant’s claim that he was dyslexic.

[40]It was by then 11.30am on 4 November 2025. At that point we adjourned the hearing until 2pm to allow us and Mr Magier to read and absorb the claimant’s witness statement. The parties came into the hearing room at 2.07pm. EJ Hyams said that he could see no expert evidence that the claimant had dyslexia. The claimant had said this in paragraph 3 of his witness statement about his dyslexia: “I also believe that I was discriminated against on the grounds of Disability. This is because I have Dyslexia, which was diagnosed in 2002 when I was at University. Dyslexia disability impact statement is on page 996, WPNA is on page 1000, and referral to occupational health is on page 1018.”

[41]The latter page (B2/1018) was a repeat of page B2/223. That was a “fit note” provided by the claimant’s GP in which all that was said that could conceivably be relevant was this: “I would suggest OH input”. No indication of what that input might be was given, but the fit note was dated 15 March 2023 and recorded that the claimant was advised by the GP that because of the “following conditions” of “Stress - work related” and “Recent faint on 1st march and attendance at A+E”, he “may be fit for work taking account of the following advice”, which was this: “I would suggest OH input Mr Nwabueze feels he can continue with is work from his home environment”.

[42]EJ Hyams said that dyslexia is not diagnosed (or at least not as far as he was aware it is not diagnosed) by a medical doctor, but by an educational psychologist, and certainly not by an occupational health practitioner of any sort. Mr Magier then said that since there was no evidence of dyslexia, the claim of a failure to make a reasonable adjustment for it had no reasonable prospect of success. We then said that we would nevertheless not strike out that claim, and the claimant’s cross-examination then started.

[43]The claimant’s cross-examination continued until 16:34, and the hearing was adjourned to 10.00am on the next day, 5 November 2025. At the start of the next day, EJ Hyams asked the claimant about aspects of the sequence of events in January 2023, including whether he recalled a discussion with Mr Abraham on 17 January 2023. The claimant initially said that he could not recall one, despite being referred to B2/139 and B2/58-63, but then he said that he had a recollection of a discussion with Mr Abraham on that day (17 January 2023). Mr Magier then resumed his cross-examination. It ended after 16:30, but Mr Magier was then satisfied that he had asked all of the questions which he needed to ask the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 16 claimant in cross-examination. We then, at about 16:44, discussed the intended order of the witnesses on the next day, and Mr Magier said that Mr Aaron would be the respondents’ first witness.

[44]Four minutes later, so at 16:48, the claimant said that he had received a WhatsApp message from the nursery which his daughter (who, he said, was one year old) attended, saying that his daughter had a temperature of 38.3 degrees Centigrade and that she could not attend the nursery for the next 48 hours. The claimant said that he could not arrange for his daughter to be looked after at home instead. That was, he said, because the nanny whose services he used was not a full-time nanny but cared also for other children. He was adamant that there was no one else, including the child’s mother, who could look after his daughter during the next two days. Reluctantly, we had to accept that the hearing would have to be adjourned. We, however, concluded that we would spend the next day continuing to read the documentary evidence and the witness statements of the respondents.

[45]We then discussed resuming the hearing and concluded that we would need a further five days: the first four for hearing the respondents’ oral evidence and then submissions, and then deliberating, and the final, fifth day, for an oral judgment to be given and, if the claim succeeded to any extent, to determine remedy.

[46]We then on the next day (6 November 2025) realised that the next available opportunity for us to be able to resume the hearing was on 15-18 December 2025, after which there would be a delay of some months. We therefore concluded that we should offer the parties those days with us reserving our judgment.

[47]At 11:42 on that day, 6 November 2025, Mr Magier sent an email in which, among other things, he said this. “[T]he Tribunal may find it helpful, when deciding on the next steps in this case, to know that the Respondents have the intention of making a submission of no case to answer and calling further evidence if all or part of that submission fails. The Respondents are content with relying on written submissions only for this purpose so that the matter can be considered sooner than the next available hearing date. Alternatively, a one-day hearing, even if via CVP, could be listed. A submission of no case to answer is a similar course of action to what was already envisaged, whereby the Tribunal was going to consider whether the Claimant made out a prima facie case. The Respondents’ position is that considering a submission of no case to answer furthers the overriding objective: some or all of the Claimant’s claims may be dismissed which in turn may remove the need for a further five-day hearing. “

[48]We replied via EJ Hyams at 12:41 on that day, referring to paragraphs PI[635]- 635.01] of Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, and saying this: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 17 “In the light of that passage, we have concluded that it would be inconsistent with the interests of justice to spend time in considering whether to accept a submission of no case to answer. We have considered carefully how many days will be required for the resumption of the hearing. We are of the firm view that 5 days will be required if an oral judgment is to be given, and that we should be able to give our oral reasons on the morning of the fifth day. However, our only dates of availability for quite some time are 15-18 December 2025, and if we were to relist the case to resume in that week then the decision would have to be reserved. Otherwise the hearing would probably have to be resumed in March 2026. We would make a decision at this point to reserve our decision only if(1) the parties agreed to that, or, in the absence of such agreement,

(2) one or both parties said that they would want our reasons in writing. Please respond on this issue by 2.30pm.”

[49]Both parties were content with the proposal to resume the hearing on 15 December 2025 and continue it to 18 December 2025, after which we would issue a reserved judgment. In the claimant’s email in which he indicated that, he said this at the end: “Finally I have also tried calling around to book a dyslexia diagnosis appointment, if I succeed to book an appointment would that assist the Tribunal? This booking would have no bearing on when to resume the trial but on final consideration relating to my disability.”

[50]EJ Hyams responded to that email of the claimant’s email at 14:03, in the following terms. “It is not for me to advise a party, but a diagnosis now of dyslexia could not be relevant to your claim, as far as I can see, bearing in mind All Answers Ltd v W

[2021] EWCA Civ 606

[2021] IRLR 612

. Are you saying in your email to which I now respond that you are content for the hearing to resume for four days on 15 December 2025? I should say that there would be a reserved judgment after that hearing only if we concluded that your claim (that is to say, all of your claims) did not succeed on the evidence before us, with, as a result, no need to consider whether to seek to enable Mr Nash to attend the hearing. If we concluded that(1) your case did not fail in its entirety on the evidence before us, and

(2) it was necessary to see whether Mr Nash could attend, then we would record that in a case management summary, probably giving Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 18 fairly full reasons for that decision, which could be incorporated as far as necessary in our final reasons (which at that point might still be given orally, i.e. at a further hearing, assuming that we resumed the hearing in person).”

[51]On Thursday 11 December 2025, the claimant sent an email to EJ Hyams in which he made two applications. One was a renewed application for an anonymity order. The other was for “an expert witness which can help facilitate the relevant adjustment during the above hearing”. The following passage from the email gives a flavour of the latter application. “Why Courts Should Order an Expert Witness for Dyslexia Without Prior Medical Evidence: The absence of pre-existing medical evidence does not automatically preclude a Tribunal from ordering an expert report. The rationale for ordering such a report in such circumstances can be understood through the following legal principles and considerations: Establishing the Existence and Nature of the Disability: Evidential Burden: While the burden of proof generally lies with the claimant to establish a disability, the Tribunal’s role is to ensure a fair process for determining the facts. If a claimant alleges dyslexia as the basis for their discrimination claim, and there is no existing diagnosis or documentation due to passage of time in this case, the Tribunal must still determine whether the legal definition of disability is met. Necessity for Objective Assessment: A formal assessment by a qualified occupational psychologist or specialist dyslexia assessor can provide the objective evidence required to establish whether the claimant’s condition meets the criteria for a disability under the Equality Act 2010. This can include assessing cognitive functioning, identifying specific learning difficulties, and evaluating their impact on day-to-day activities. Without such an assessment, the Tribunal might be left to rely on Claimaint’s assertions.”

[52]On 15 December 2025, when we resumed the hearing (which was at 10.25am because the claimant arrived late, having, he said, been stuck in traffic), we were informed that Mr Nash had recovered from some very serious health problems and was now able and willing to give evidence. He had finalised a witness statement the day before, Sunday 14 December 2025. It was not before us, and it had not yet been sent to the claimant. It was in fact sent to us at 12.07pm on that day, 15 December 2025, and we understood that the claimant was sent it at about the same time.

[53]Before that occurred, EJ Hyams asked the claimant about the two applications which he had made on 11 December 2025, namely for an anonymity order and for the tribunal to procure an expert report to say whether or not the claimant had dyslexia. After much discussion about the applicable law relating to the possibility Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 19 or otherwise of making an anonymity order, during the course of which EJ Hyams referred to and read out parts of the judgments of Simler J when she was the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”), in British Broadcasting Corporation v Roden,

UKEAT/385/14

[2015] ICR 985

and Fallows v News Group Newspapers Ltd,

UKEAT/75/16

[2016] ICR 801

, and during the course of which Mr Magier pointed out that the claimant had already applied for and been refused an anonymity order in these proceedings, it became clear that the claimant was relying only on the new fact that his daughter’s identity might be revealed. As EJ Hyams pointed out, it was totally uncontroversial to simply anonymise the name of a minor in proceedings such as these, and that there was here no question of the claimant’s daughter’s name being stated in any judgment or other document in the public domain, or of it being necessary to anonymise the claimant in order to protect his daughter’s interests. Given that factor, EJ Hyams asked whether the claimant was pressing the application for anonymity, and the claimant said that he was not.

[54]EJ Hyams then turned to the question of expert evidence and said that he had never heard of, or come across a situation in which, a court or tribunal had arranged, or had considered seriously whether to arrange, the procuring of expert evidence except where an intermediary was required. There was here no question of a need for an intermediary.

[55]EJ Hyams then commented that while dyslexia is (or at least it was his experience in his former practice as a barrister in, and judicial experience in the First-tier Tribunal of, the law of special educational needs) a neurological condition, so that if it is diagnosed late in the life of a person, it is likely to have been present throughout that person’s life, expert evidence now about the claimant’s dyslexia could not be relevant. That was in part because the diagnosis of dyslexia leads to a diagnosis also of the things that can be done to assist the person in question, which are likely to vary from person to person because the effects of what we call dyslexia vary. It was also because the absence of a diagnosis of dyslexia and of the kinds of thing that could be done to counteract it during the period of the claimant’s employment was a critical factor here, bearing in mind paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 to the EqA 2010. In any event, EJ Hyams could see no legal basis for the tribunal procuring an expert report from an educational psychologist in relation to the claimant, not least because the claimant had not so far been diagnosed as being dyslexic, so that there was no evidential basis other than the claimant’s statement of his difficulties in reading and writing. In fact, the diagnosis of dyslexia was not required for the tribunal to conclude that the claimant had an impairment in the form of a difficulty in writing clearly and without grammatical and spelling errors here, given that one of the major reasons why (it was the respondents’ case: this is of course returned to below) the claimant had been dismissed was his inability to do the work which he was given in a timely manner and without multiple grammatical and spelling errors. Further, the work was said by the respondents to have been in some respects or at least on some occasions lacking in coherence. In a job where clarity of written communications was required and it was necessary for those communications to be prepared with a reasonable degree of speed, it was difficult to see what reasonable adjustments might be Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 20 recommended (i.e. irrespective of the cause of the errors in the written communications in question) which could alleviate to any significant extent those problematic outcomes as far as the work of the employee in question was concerned.

[56]Mr Magier responded to the claimant’s application for the tribunal to procure the obtaining of expert evidence to show whether or not the claimant was dyslexic by pointing out that(1) the claimant had on several occasions in the orders made in the preliminary hearings to which we refer in paragraphs 1-11 above been ordered to provide all of his evidence in support of his claim to have been suffering from a disability within the meaning of section 6 of and Schedule 1 to the EqA 2010, and

(2) the claimant had not provided any expert evidence to support the proposition that he was suffering from dyslexia.

[57]After a break, EJ Hyams said to the claimant that his application in relation to expert evidence could at best be regarded as an application for an adjournment for him to procure such evidence. The claimant said that he was never aware that he could procure such evidence himself. EJ Hyams said that the claimant had never needed permission to seek expert evidence: only permission to rely on such expert evidence as he had obtained. The claimant then said that it had never been “expressed to [him] or explicitly stated that one could do that.” He said that he understood that it was open to him only to put existing documentary evidence before the tribunal.

[58]The claimant then said that he had in fact contacted some educational psychology bodies but thought that he needed permission from us to obtain a report from one of them now. As EJ Hyams pointed out, that was not said in the application dated 11 December 2025. It was by then 12:20pm, and we agreed to start hearing oral evidence from Mr Abraham and to consider over lunchtime whether to grant the claimant’s application. We also agreed that Mr Nash’s evidence would be interposed at 10.00am on the next day, 16 December 2025, if the crossexamination of Mr Abraham had not finished by the end of the hearing day of 15 December 2025. We agreed that Mr Nash could give his evidence via CVP.

[59]The oral evidence of Mr Abraham started at 12.24pm. We adjourned for lunch at just after 1pm. We resumed the hearing at 2pm. The claimant then clarified that his application was for an adjournment so that he could seek expert evidence from a psychologist in relation to his reading and writing, or alternatively for a postponement of the determination of the claim of a failure to make reasonable adjustments within the meaning of section 20(3) of the EqA 2010 until he had had a chance to obtain such evidence.

[60]We rejected that application for the following reasons.60.1 The burden of proving that the claimant was dyslexic fell on him, and him alone. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 21

60.2 He had been ordered by orders 12 and 13 of EJ Young on 16 September 2024 (at B1/107-108) to put before the respondents by 8 November 2024 any evidence on which he relied to show that he was dyslexic and its impact on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.

60.3 Even if he now obtained an expert report, it could not assist his claim in any material way given the combined effects of All Answers Ltd v W

[2021] EWCA Civ 606

[2021] IRLR 612

and paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 to the EqA 2010.

60.4 Any difficulty that the claimant had in reading a document when crossexamining (which was all that was left as far as the oral evidence was concerned, the claimant having by then given oral evidence himself) could be alleviated by the content of the document being read out by someone else, or the claimant simply being given more time to read it than would be required by a person who did not have dyslexia.

60.5 Dyslexia did not, as far as we were aware, affect a person’s ability to understand what was being said, or to speak clearly and coherently.

60.6 In all of the circumstances, it was not in the interests of justice to adjourn the hearing for the purpose sought.

[61]At 14:17 on 15 December 2025, the cross-examination of Mr Abraham resumed. We had a 15-minute break during that afternoon, and the cross-examination continued until 17:06.

[62]The claimant arrived slightly late on the next day, 16 December 2025. At first he said that he wanted more time to prepare the cross-examination of Mr Nash. When EJ Hyams asked why that was necessary, the claimant said that it was because he wanted to put lots of documents in the bundle to Mr Nash. EJ Hyams said that that was highly unlikely to be necessary for the reasons which he, EJ Hyams, had already given on several occasions (including as recorded in paragraph 37 above). The claimant then said that he was feeling dizzy and sick and that he wanted an adjournment.

[63]Mr Magier said then that the respondents had foreseen that possibility and had decided that if the claimant sought an adjournment because of illness then the respondents would be submitting that the hearing should continue in the claimant’s absence, pursuant to rule 47 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

[64]EJ Hyams pointed out to the claimant(1) that he might well be feeling dizzy and sick because of the stress of the hearing, and

(2) that all hearings are stressful for litigants. EJ Hyams said that it is often said by medical and psychological experts that it is in the best interests of a litigant who is finding the litigation stressful to get the litigation concluded, and that here the claimant was likely to find that it was in his best interests to plough on. EJ Hyams suggested that the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 22 claimant had a break for an hour, to have a walk in the fresh air and a cup of coffee, for example. The claimant could then see whether he was fit to continue

the hearing.

[65]At 10:35am, we adjourned the hearing for that purpose. At 11:25am, our clerk came into the hearing room, where we were discussing the situation between ourselves, and said that the claimant had said to him (our clerk) that he (the claimant) had said that he had been advised to go to the local accident and emergency department, and was asking for our response. We said that that sounded like an application for an adjournment, and that we would like to hear from the claimant in person in that regard. Our clerk then said that the claimant had sent an email to EJ Hyams at 11:00. We then saw that the claimant had sent an email to EJ Hyams at that time in the following terms (only): “I have been advised to attend Watford emergency hospital with a reference number within 1hour.”

[66]The parties shortly after that came back into the hearing room. After a short discussion, during which(1) EJ Hyams said that the tribunal had to ask the parties for their representations on the way forward and asked the claimant in effect whether he was sufficiently well to participate for that purpose, and

(2) the claimant said in effect that he was able to participate for that purpose, we decided that we had no alternative to adjourning the hearing until the next day and we (through EJ Hyams) said that. However, EJ Hyams also said that we would adjourn the hearing to the next day (17 December 2025) on the expectation that we would resume the hearing without the claimant present if he did not attend, doing so under rule 47. EJ Hyams said that we had not made a decision in that regard, and that the only decision which we had made was to adjourn the hearing to 10.00am on the following day, 17 December 2025. We concluded (and EJ Hyams informed the parties accordingly) that we would then see what was the position and if the claimant was not present, or was present (and we said that he was welcome to participate via CVP rather than in person if that would help him) but saying that he was not well enough to participate in the hearing, then we would hear from the parties on how to proceed. We would expect to hear from Mr Nash as the first witness to give evidence in the event that we continued with the hearing of evidence from the respondents.

[67]We had by then seen that there was evidence before us of the claimant on several occasions when he was employed by the first respondent becoming (or saying that he had become) too unwell to stay at work in circumstances which, we concluded, he found challenging or in which did not want to continue to participate. During the course of the rest of that day, 16 December 2025, we followed through the sequence of events in that regard, and found three situations in which the claimant had said or shown by his conduct (or symptoms) that he was too unwell to continue to be at work, or participate in a meeting. The first was when, on 25 January 2023, the claimant refused to stay at work to be present at the intended review of his performance to be carried out by Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron. That Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 23 was evidenced by the email from the claimant dated 27 January 2023 at SB2/139, which started with this paragraph: “As you know I was not feeling well on Wednesday [25 January 2023] following the ongoing treatment that I had received from David. As a result, I could only work less than half a day. I will address this in a separate email.”

[68]In addition, in the email of 7 February 2023 at page B2/159, the claimant wrote that he had “[gone] home early due to distress” on 25 January 2023.

[69]The second occasion when the claimant said that he was too unwell to continue with something at work was on 27 February 2023, as shown by the emails at SB2/201-204. The claimant was due to have his first appraisal meeting in the evening of that day and at the bottom of page B2/204, he wrote this to Mr Aaron: “All of this caused me significant distress in which I asked Aryeh, Michael and you if I can go home early as I am not feeling well due to how I am being treated. Aryeh was ok about it, I asked Michael he said it’s ok. I asked you if it’s ok, you stated it’s not ok, none of this is ok. Aryeh intervened agreeing that I can go home. I felt dismissed, humiliated and degraded by how you treated me yesterday.”

[70]When Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham sought to hold the claimant’s appraisal meeting on 1 March 2023, the claimant again became unwell. That was evidenced in the documents most clearly at B2/214 and B2/219.

[71]At 9.44am on the next day, 17 December 2025, the claimant sent an email with the following text to EJ Hyams (the textual errors being in the original; all quotations above and below are verbatim, unless we have made a correction in which case that correction is shown by the use of square brackets): “Dear Judge; I have been vomiting last night and is still currently dizzy and unwell. I was seen by the Doctors at Watford Hosptial yesterday, whom advised that I should rest until the symptoms subsdue. My GP is due to call me before lunch-time for further assessment and support. Please can I use a CVP link to seek a trial adjournment? my deepest apologies.”

[72]We resumed the hearing at 10.00am. Mr Nash was present via CVP, as was the claimant. Mr Magier and one of the respondents’ witnesses (Mr Simon Cooper) were present in person.

[73]EJ Hyams then asked the claimant whether his application for an adjournment was stated sufficiently in his email. The claimant then said that he was receiving Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 24 a telephone call from his doctor and said that his doctor was asking him (the claimant) to go and see him (his doctor).

[74]Mr Magier then submitted that the law on the situation was helpfully summarised in Hall v Transport for London

[2024] EAT 26

[2024] ICR 788

, and he pointed us towards what was said in paragraph 31 of the judgment in that case. Mr Magier then went through the procedural history of this case, and said that on a number of occasions the claimant had been the cause of an adjournment. Mr Magier then pointed out that Mr Nash was now able to give evidence, having experienced (as stated in his witness statement) organ failure, a heart arrest, and a stroke as well as numerous illnesses. Mr Nash had a right to have the case against him as a named respondent heard within a reasonable time-frame. There would be prejudice to all of the respondents if the hearing were again adjourned. In addition, Mr Magier said, from a public policy perspective this case needed to end at some point and other cases were not being heard as this case kept being adjourned.

[75]EJ Hyams then asked the claimant about the email whose text we have set out in paragraph 65 above, not least because we did not think that the claimant would have been given advice of the sort that he said in that email he had been given in the 25 minutes after we had adjourned the hearing the day before, i.e. on 16 December 2025. The claimant then sent us and Mr Magier by email a photographed copy of a mobile telephone message with a website address consisting of a link to some “NHS 111 Care Advice” text which he had received the day before (i.e. on 16 December 2025) at 10:55. We clicked on that link and printed what was on the resulting web page to pdf. The web page had no reference number in or on it and the text on it was headed “NHS 111 Consultation Advice”, below which there were the words “This advice is provided in relation to your recent consultation only. Please do not share or use this advice in relation to any other matter.” The advice was as follows. “Advice Item 1. Unless advised not to take, paracetamol or ibuprofen can be used to relieve pain or fever. Follow the instructions in the pack. If in doubt ask a pharmacist. 2. Sit upright. 3. Use prescribed inhalers, nebulisers or oxygen according to the instructions. 4. If there are any new symptoms, or if the condition gets worse, changes or you have any other concerns, call us back. 5. Remember to take a list of any current medications if you go to the out of hours surgery.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 25

[76]When EJ Hyams pointed out that there was no reference number in the document, the claimant said: “ I apologise; it was a typo.”

[77]There was also nothing about being advised to attend hospital within the hour.

[78]Mr Magier asked whether the claimant had been given a discharge summary after attending at Watford General Hospital, and the claimant sent us and Mr Magier two documents which had (it was clear) been generated during the previous day after the claimant had attended that hospital. We do not need to go into the detail of the contents of those documents. It is sufficient to say that Mr Magier in our view correctly submitted that none of the documents showed that the claimant had had any specific condition or illness diagnosed to have caused his symptoms (or claimed symptoms) of the day before.

[79]After some discussion with Mr Magier and the claimant we decided that we would use the rest of the hearing days left, i.e. the rest of that day, 17 December, and the whole of the next day, 18 December, to conclude the oral evidence, and that we would invite submissions to be given in writing after that. EJ Hyams said that the claimant might wish simply to watch, in which case we would ask such questions of the witnesses as we saw fit, and would test their evidence as much as we could, consistently with our duty of impartiality, or the claimant could ask questions as well. If he did, then he could take as long as he liked with each witness but the cross-examinations would end at the end of the next day, so that if the claimant had not used his time well then we would treat the evidence which was not the subject of cross-examination as unchallenged.

[80]The claimant’s response was to say this: “On the basis that I have no choice then I will do it.” He asked whether he could record the hearing given his current illness. After some debate, we, through EJ Hyams, said that the claimant could record the hearing. The claimant then said that his mobile telephone was not permitting him to make a recording. In order to ensure that there was no further impediment to the hearing resuming, EJ Hyams said that he would use his mobile telephone to record the hearing and give the parties access to the recording of the hearing.

[81]It was 12:07pm. At 12:10 we started to hear evidence from Mr Nash. EJ Hyams sought to identify questions which he could ask, but said that they were all in reality ones to be asked in cross-examination, by the claimant. The claimant then said that he would cross-examine Mr Nash. The cross-examination continued until 12:50, when Mr Nash needed a break. We then adjourned for lunch and resumed the hearing an hour later.

[82]The cross-examination of Mr Nash continued until 15:28. We then heard oral evidence from Mr Kevin Harris via CVP on behalf of the respondents. The claimant cross-examined Mr Harris until 16:28 at which point we, through EJ Hyams, stopped the cross-examination as the claimant was engaging in argument with the witness and was asking questions which he had previously asked of that witness. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 26

[83]We then heard oral evidence from Mr Cooper, now present via CVP instead of in person. He was cross-examined until 17:02, at which point the claimant had repeated a question and had accepted that he had no more questions to ask of Mr Cooper.

[84]We adjourned the hearing to the following day, to resume at 10.00am, again in part in person and in part via CVP. Mr Abraham was slightly delayed in arriving in person on the next day, 18 December 2025, so EJ Hyams discussed with Mr Magier and the claimant (who also arrived a little late, but was present via CVP shortly after 10.00am) the relevance of the evidence of Ms Varsani (whose witness statement was very short).

[85]Mr Abraham then resumed giving evidence at 10:18. He first made an impassioned and emotional plea for us to revoke the permission given to the claimant the day before to record the hearing. What he said suggested that he, Mr Abraham, felt somewhat persecuted by the claimant’s actions and claims, and that he rather doubted the claimant’s good faith. Mr Abraham said that he feared the claimant releasing the recording in one way or another and it getting onto the internet in some way.

[86]On realising that the claimant was now exhibiting no signs of illness whatsoever, we concluded that we would revoke the permission which we had given to the claimant to record the hearing, on the basis that he was now well enough to make a note as the hearing proceeded. Although any cross-examiner usually has a hard time making a note as well as cross-examining, there was in our view no justification for treating the claimant any differently from any other cross-examiner at that point.

[87]The claimant then cross-examined Mr Abraham until 13:17. The claimant sought the disclosure of a short exchange of emails relating to an occasion when, he said, Mr Abraham had asked the claimant to attend a hearing at the High Court in an insolvency case with his (the claimant’s) wig and gown despite the fact that the claimant was not a registered barrister. Mr Abraham’s distrust of the claimant had led him to decline to disclose the emails up to that point. There was no claim of detrimental treatment by the claimant made in these proceedings in relation to that event in the High Court, and it was not referred to in the list of issues. Nor was it referred to in the claimant’s witness statement. EJ Hyams suggested that it was likely to help Mr Abraham’s defence as well as that of the other respondents if the emails were disclosed.

[88]We adjourned for lunch and resumed the hearing at 14:19. Mr Magier submitted that we should not order the disclosure of the emails but said that if the tribunal was unwilling to refuse the application for the documents’ disclosure then the respondents would disclose the emails to get the matter over and done with to prevent what he called the claimant’s ambush leading to any negative inference being drawn. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 27

[89]EJ Hyams pointed out to the claimant that the emails were clearly relevant only to credibility and the claimant said that they were “relevant to how [he] was treated as a whole”. In the circumstances, we concluded that we should end the crossexaminations at 4.25pm and at that point allow the claimant to press his application for the disclosure of the emails.

[90]Mr Aaron was then called to give evidence at 14:25. His cross-examination was ended by us at 16:30. We could have ended it sooner in order to permit the respondents to adduce evidence from Ms Varsani and Mr Kaye before 16:25 but we decided to permit as much cross-examination of Mr Aaron as possible and, as with the previous day, to sit later than normal in order to allow for the crossexamination of all of the respondents’ witnesses before we adjourned the hearing. The claimant then submitted that the emails about him going to the insolvency court to appear with his wig and gown on should be disclosed by the respondents. EJ Hyams then asked Mr Magier why the respondents did not just disclose them so that the claimant could not complain that he was denied sight of them. Mr Magier said that the respondents would disclose them but only if the respondents were able to cross-examine the claimant on the emails. The claimant then agreed to that on the basis that he was willing to forego the right to cross-examine the remaining witnesses, who were Ms Varsani and Mr Kaye. The emails were then disclosed by the respondents via Mr Magier, and copied to us (via EJ Hyams’ email address). EJ Hyams then pointed out that by agreeing not to cross-examine Ms Varsani and Mr Kaye, the claimant was to be treated as having accepted the truth of their witness statements. The claimant then protested that he had had no idea that that was the effect of agreeing not to cross-examine them. In order to ensure that the case was dealt with as fairly as possible, and to avoid any further adjournment, we agreed to permit the claimant to cross-examine those witnesses after all, and to do so next. We also agreed with the parties that they should give their submissions in writing to the other party and the tribunal by 4pm on 16 January 2026, and that they should send to the other party and the tribunal any submissions in reply by 4pm on 30 January 2026.

[91]Ms Varsani then gave evidence from 16:47 until 16:56, at which point Mr Kaye was called to give evidence. He did so until about 17:10, after which EJ Hyams said that he was not keen to hear more evidence from the claimant since the claimant had given no positive evidence about what we will call the wig and gown incident. Mr Magier then pointed out that the claimant had given no evidence on that incident at all. The claimant then said that he was a litigant in person and wanted fairness on the matter, saying too that it was “quite complex”. EJ Hyams pointed out that it was the respondents who had wanted to cross-examine the claimant. EJ Hyams also said, having read the emails, that what was said in the emails was apparently completely consistent with Mr Abraham’s oral evidence about the circumstances to which they related. Mr Magier then said that the respondents did not need to cross-examine the claimant on the emails, and we gave directions for the exchange of written submissions and said that in part because the listing staff were by now probably no longer in the office, if the claim succeeded then EJ Hyams would conduct a short telephone hearing to arrange a remedy day. Mr Magier said that the respondents would be seeking an order for Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 28 the payment by the claimant of costs, no matter what the outcome of the liability hearing, and EJ Hyams said that the respondents could then make such application(s) as they saw fit once the liability judgment had been promulgated. The hearing ended at 17:16. What happened after the liability hearing had ended

[92]On the following day, 19 December 2025, the claimant sent EJ Hyams an email with the following text in it. “Dear Judge, I wish to draw your attention to the points below. 1) You kindly agreed to send me the recording of the hearing that you recorded on my behalf. Following my I’ll-health, I found it deeply concerning that the respondent counsel stated they had anticipated this, which suggests they conducted the hearing in an ambush manner to create a perceived pressure and stress to subsequently make me ill. The impact of the racial words used by David Nash and everything that occured by David Nash against me and subsequently re-living the situation again when I was confronted with David Nash at court was very triggering to my health and I did not realise how ill I would get. Once I rested after the the hearing is somewhat subdue. 2) I would like to seek permission to renew my application for anonymity on the grounds that the impact this could have to me if my disability is known to the public.”

[93]On Monday 22 December 2025, EJ Hyams responded in the following terms. ‘Good Morning, Mr Nwabueze(1) The recordings are too large to send to you by email, but in any event I have decided that the only thing which I should do is to send you the transcriptions of them which I have procured by using a free internet transcription facility. Plainly, the result is not completely reliable, but it is helpful to have been able to make use of the facility. I emphasise that the course of action which I took last week in recording the hearing on the basis that I would make the recording available was exceptional, and that I have since then reflected and realised that no party would normally be given access to a recording itself unless it was ordered by the Employment Appeal Tribunal to be made available. As a result, I have concluded that all that I should do is give you a transcription as procured by me using free software, which is what I now do. I enclose two copies, one in pdf and one in Word, of each of the three recordings which I made. I did not start the second one until after the hearing had resumed after a short break. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 29

(2) As for your request to renew your application for an anonymity order, I fail to see how that application could succeed. That is because (1) your “disability” is not stated in your email copied below; (2) if you mean in that regard what you have described as dyslexia, that condition has not so far been diagnosed by a suitably qualified expert (and may never be so diagnosed); and

(3) the circumstances have not changed since Monday of last week, when, as I understood the situation, you did not press the application because it was (on the basis of the case law which I discussed with you, including British Broadcasting Corporation v Roden,

UKEAT/385/14

[2015] ICR 985

and Fallows v News Group Newspapers Ltd,

UKEAT/75/16

[2016] ICR 801

) capable of being applicable only to the identity of your child, and as I said then, that identity would not be revealed by us.’

[94]The claimant then did in fact renew his application for an anonymity order. He did so in an email sent at 16:29 on Monday 5 January 2026. EJ Hyams dismissed that renewed application for reasons set out in a separate document which he approved on 7 January 2026 and which was sent to the parties on the same day. In that document, EJ Hyams informed the parties that we, the tribunal, had agreed to meet in private and deliberate on 5 and 6 February 2026. At 15:32 on 9 January 2026, the claimant renewed his application for anonymity, contending that there was a material change of circumstances which justified the renewed application. Also on 9 January 2026, the respondents sent to the claimant and us their written closing submissions. On 12 January 2026 the claimant sought a significant extension of time for sending his written closing submissions. On that day, EJ Hyams extended time for all parties to send their closing submissions to 4pm on 23 January 2026, but retained the final date of 30 January 2026 for sending written submissions of any sort. That was not least because we had arranged to meet in private and deliberate on 5 and 6 February 2026. On 14 January 2026, EJ Hyams’ decision to dismiss the claimant’s renewed application for anonymity was communicated to the parties. The claimant then, on 16 January 2026, made a further application for anonymity and asked for “access to the full transcript of the the trial as an adjustment to aid me within these proceedings”. On that day, 16 January 2026, EJ Hyams sent his responses to those applications (which was to reject them) to the tribunal staff for sending to the parties, but they were not so sent before, on 23 January 2026, the claimant made a further application for anonymity and for a further extension of time for sending his written closing submissions.

[95]On 23 January 2026, at 13:55, the respondents provided some “further written submissions”. At 15:57, the claimant made an “application for an anonymity order on the grounds of significant and demonstrable mental health detriment arising from the respondent’s actions” and “an extension of time also to accomdate any resolution to my anonymity application”. He also said: “During the hearing the Tribunal indicated that one solution is to give me their notes specific to the trial can this be granted as a reasonable adjustment?” At 18:30, EJ Hyams sent to the tribunal staff for onward transmission his decision to reject the first two of those applications and the reasons for that decision. In order to ensure that the claimant Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 30 knew the position as soon as possible, five minutes later, so at 18:35, EJ Hyams sent a separate email to the parties, in the following terms. “I have determined the claimant’s applications stated below for a further extension of time for sending written closing submissions and for anonymity. I have done so for reasons which I have asked be sent to the parties as soon as possible next week, along with my reasons, which I sent to the tribunal staff a week ago, for dismissing the claimant’s applications of 16 January 2026 (which it appears have not yet been sent to the parties). Principally in order to enable the claimant to know what is the position as soon as possible, I now inform the parties that the final paragraph of my reasons for my decisions on the claimant’s applications of today for an extension of time and anonymity is in the following terms. Having considered the matter carefully, including by an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed, I have concluded that there is no good justification for the making of an anonymity order. I have also decided that the claimant should have no further extension of time for putting his final submissions before the tribunal. I stress, however, that the claimant is not precluded from putting his final submissions before the respondents and the tribunal as the submissions stand now, or as they stand at the start of next week, as I have informed the parties in a short email sent by me rather late today (23 January 2026). I add that the tribunal cannot be confident that the claimant will not continue his pattern of repeated applications for an extension of time and that in my judgment the interests of justice require that the claims are now determined without any further delay. As for the claimant’s application for what he calls a reasonable adjustment in the form of me sending the claimant my notes of the hearing, that is not something which I have ever done before, and in my view it is not appropriate here. The claimant knows his case and he must state it now as best he can. In any event, the claimant has not put before the tribunal any evidence of a disability which requires the making of an adjustment of the sort which he now seeks.”

[96]On Monday 26 January 2026, EJ Hyams’ full response to the claimant’s first two applications of 23 January 2026 was sent to the parties. On 28 January 2026, the claimant made an application for “an interim anonymity”, and “a 2weeks extension for my submission as a reasonable adjustment”. EJ Hyams rejected those further applications for reasons which he sent to the tribunal staff on 28 January 2026 for sending on to the parties. In those reasons, EJ Hyams pointed out that the claimant was not seeking to make oral submissions and offered, subject to the availability of the respondents and to what the respondents might say in response to the offer, to permit the claimant to make at the start of the hearing day on 5 February 2026 oral submissions instead of, or as well as, written submissions. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 31

[97]In that regard, in the text sent by email on 28 January 2026 to the tribunal’s staff for sending on, EJ Hyams wrote this. ‘I reject also the claimant’s renewed application for any further order to be made in regard to the making of written submissions. I add that I do not accept the claimant’s implied assertion that a diagnosis of disability would justify the grant to him of anything more than the tribunal has already granted by way of what I will call “adjustments” in regard to the making of written submissions. I should say that the claimant is not, as I understand it, seeking an opportunity to make oral submissions, but that if he were seeking to do so, then it might be possible to make oral submissions via CVP at the start of 5 February 2026, subject of course to the availability of the respondents. I would expect to hear submissions from the parties (principally the claimant) for no more than the morning of that day. That would not preclude the claimant from putting before the respondents and the tribunal written submissions, which would then simply be in addition to the oral submissions. As for the claimant’s claim of illness having made it difficult for him to complete his written submissions, that is not supported by medical evidence but in any event, the claimant is plainly able to communicate at some length in writing, as is shown by his repeated applications to this tribunal. In addition, and finally, I stress that the claimant can at any time up to the close of business on 4 February 2026 put before the respondents and the tribunal his closing written submissions. If the respondents needed time to respond to such submissions, then of course they could have it; they would in fact have it if the tribunal heard oral submissions in the morning of 5 February 2026. In any event, it is incumbent on the claimant to work on and finish his written closing submissions without delay.’

[98]That text was not sent to the parties on that day or before 11:17 on the next day, 29 January 2026, so EJ Hyams at that time, 11:17, sent an email to the parties in which that text was set out, below the following passage. “I write now (directly and not through the tribunal staff, but on the basis that this email will be placed in the tribunal’s files for the above cases) in order to ascertain as soon as possible the parties’ position in regard to the possibility, which I have raised in my response to the claimant’s email of yesterday, of the claimant being given an opportunity to make oral submissions in the morning of 5 February 2026, when the tribunal is currently intending to meet in private only. If the claimant wishes to take up that opportunity and the respondents are content with that and wish to be present and/or represented and can be so present or represented, then the parties should say so by 9.30am tomorrow morning, 30 January 2026. If, however, the claimant wants to make oral submissions and the respondents are not able to be so present or represented and want to be so present or represented, then it will be necessary to consider whether to arrange a further in-person hearing, at which the claimant can make oral submissions Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 32 and the respondents can respond. If that occurred, then, I am thinking, it would make sense for the hearing to take place over 3 days, via CVP, with at most the morning of the first day set aside for oral submissions and the afternoon of the final day being intended to be used for the giving of an oral judgment. So, I now ask that the parties respond by 9.30am tomorrow morning to what I say above. I will then consider what should occur next: I am thinking of holding a short telephone hearing to arrange for the hearing to resume in person for 3 days at the earliest opportunity. If the hearing of next week is not to take place, then the interests of justice require that the tribunal staff know that by tomorrow morning so that the hearing days of 5 and 6 February 2026 can be reallocated. In the rest of this email, I first set out my response to the claimant’s email of yesterday which, yesterday, I asked the tribunal staff to send to the parties but which has not yet been sent. I then set out also the text which I asked, in two emails of 16 January 2026, be sent to the parties but which has not so far been sent.”

[99]In his email of 28 January 2026 which was copied below that passage, EJ Hyams responded to the claimant’s renewed application for an interim order in regard to anonymity by, among other things,(1) stating that he saw the claimant’s repeated applications for an anonymity order as being “completely unjustified”, and

(2) referring to what Bean LJ said in his judgment in Nwabueze v University of Law Ltd and others

[2020] EWCA Civ 1526

[2021] IRLR 149

about the claimant’s application to that court for anonymity, which was made on substantially the same basis as the bases for the various applications made to this tribunal for anonymity, albeit that there had been some additional grounds on occasion. EJ Hyams noted that Bean LJ had said in that case: “I do not consider that there are any clear or cogent grounds for granting anonymity in this appeal.”

[100]At 15:49 on that day, Mr Magier responded on behalf of the respondents by email: “The Respondents are available and would like to be represented at the hearing on 5 February 2026, should the Claimant choose to give oral submissions. The Respondents are content for the hearing to be in person, subject to any other view from the Tribunal. I am asked to emphasise that the Respondents’ primary priority is finality. The Claimant has now had the bulk of the Respondents’ submissions since 9 January 2026. The Claimant could have used that time proactively to work on his written submissions. The Claimant could have even responded to the Respondents’ submissions on a point-by-point basis. That is a very serious advantage. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 33 I am further asked to emphasise the Respondents’ respectful position is that this case should be adjourned no further. Some four-and-a-half days of what was initially listed as a five-day hearing were wasted by the Claimant’s behaviour. The Respondents maintain that the Claimant’s evidence for justifying those previous adjournments is either lacking or defective. There is a real concern that the Claimant’s intention is to never let this case come to a conclusion.”

[101]At 09:28 on 30 January 2026, the claimant responded by email. The first part of the email was short, and responded in regard to the invitation to attend to make oral submissions simply in the following manner. “Oral submission In regards to the hearing next week, if the Judge can provide further dates as it would be difficult for me to attend next week as I am not available then.”

[102]In the rest of the email, the claimant made further relatively lengthy submissions by way of a further application for anonymity but which was made on essentially the same basis as those which had been made previously.

[103]The respondents responded (via Ms Millington, the solicitor who had conduct of the case on behalf of the solicitors instructed by the respondents who had instructed Mr Magier) to the claimant’s email sent at 09:28 on Friday 30 January 2026, in the following terms. “Further to the Claimant’s below response, the Respondent vehemently objects to any postponement of the hearing. The Tribunal has afforded the Claimant every opportunity to provide submissions. He has failed to provide written submissions and now seeks to delay proceedings further by refusing the Tribunal’s offer to allow him to make submissions in person or via CVP. The Claimant has failed to provide any reason why he cannot participate next week and it appears the Claimant is simply seeking to draw out the proceedings further. The Respondent respectfully asserts that if the Claimant if not prepared to provide submissions on or by Thursday, the Tribunal must continue with the listed deliberations and providing judgment in their absence.”

[104]EJ Hyams then, at 11:38 on the same day, 30 January 2026, wrote to the parties by email in the following terms. ‘The claimant has not said that he cannot attend, even via CVP, a hearing next Thursday morning and make submissions orally. He has merely said that “it would be difficult for me to attend next week as I am not available then”. In the circumstances, I regard that as a statement that the claimant Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 34 does not, at least currently, want to make oral submissions next Thursday morning. I accept the thrust of the respondents’ submissions in their response in their email below to the above-quoted words. In some hearings in person, parties ask me what are submissions. I then say that submissions are that party’s opportunity to say why their case should win. Submissions are of course more than that, but they are as far as the tribunal is concerned often the least important part of a party’s participation in a case. Submissions can help a tribunal to arrive at a reliable, or apt, determination, but submissions are not necessary for that to occur. It is the job of a tribunal which has heard evidence to determine what the issues are at the end of that evidence, and then to decide what are the relevant facts and how the relevant law applies to those facts. The key factor where submissions are concerned is that the parties have a sufficient, and fair, opportunity to make them. The claimant has now had 6 weeks within which to put together his closing submissions. The respondent[s are] not objecting to the claimant putting his submissions before the tribunal even as late as the morning of the day when the tribunal starts to deliberate. In all of the above circumstances, I have concluded that next week’s hearing should not be postponed. If the claimant, in the light of that determination, decides that he does after all wish to be present at the hearing during the morning of Thursday 5 February 2026 in order to make submissions, then he must let the respondents and me know that by 4pm on Monday 2 February 2026. If he does not by then say that he wishes to be present to make oral submissions, then the hearing will take place as a deliberation hearing in private only. If the claimant does not put any written submissions before the respondents and the tribunal by 10am on Thursday 5 February 2026, then the tribunal will determine his claims without written submissions from him.’

[105]The claimant then responded in an email sent at 13:35 on the same day, 30 January 2026. We set out the whole of the text of the email in order to show the extent to which the claimant was capable of putting together a written response at some speed. With the email the claimant enclosed a report by Ms Julianna Krol, who was shown to have become an “Associate Member of the British Dyslexia Association (AMBDA), [on] 17th April 2025”. The report was dated 22 January 2026, and it showed that the author had assessed the claimant on 20 January 2026. “Dear Judge, 1. Can a hearing be set within the next few weeks for oral submission as I have a medical meeting on 5 Feb and would have issues with child care. I Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 35 am also trying to recover for the effects of my anxiety and the reasonable adjustment by granting an order will be able to resolve my anxiety impacting my dyslexia and allowing me to fully participate. 2. I have attached a document confirming my full diagnosis of dyskexia and asking for the courts to admit this as new eveidence and allow time for entire submissions to be tailored around the attached report: 3. In addition to such new evidence I am seeking that the courts order the Respondent to disclose the belive distribution contract as its form part of my claim regarding ethical concerns I.e conflict of interest etc. This new issue arose following what appears to be Mr Nash saying something that appears to contradict him under oath as per his own companies website. 4. Can the Jduge provide me with the adjustment by allowing me to use the Tribunal notes. During the Trial this was offered by the Judge, however based on my diagnosis can this still be provided as an adjustment if the Tribunal are unable to provide me with the transcripts? 5. Furthermore, I respectfully apply to the Judge for an order granting anonymity in these proceedings I have been formally diagnosed with dyslexia, a condition that, as defined under the Equality Act 2010, constitutes a disability due to its substantial and long-term adverse effect on my ability to perform normal day-to-day activities. Grounds for Application I seek anonymity on the following grounds:a. Substantial Adverse Effect of Dyslexia: My dyslexia significantly impairs my ability to perform tasks such as reading, writing, and processing information, which are essential in the context of these proceedings.

b. Potential Harm from Disclosure: Public disclosure of the Claimant’s identity, coupled with the disclosure of their disability, may lead to: i. Stigma and Discrimination: I have reasonabl believes that revealing their dyslexia could result in further discrimination or prejudice, both within the workplace and in future employment opportunities. This belief is supported by F v J

[2025] EAT 34

, where the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that a claimant who reasonably believed disclosing their disability would harm future career prospects was entitled to an anonymity order. ii. Emotional Distress: I have experienced heightened anxiety and distress due to the potential public disclosure of my disability any maters surronding it, which may exacerbate existing health conditions. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 36

c. Inability to Participate Effectively: My dyslexia, combined with the stress associated with public disclosure, is impeding my ability to effectively participate in these proceedings, thereby affecting the fairness of the hearing. Legal Framework The Tribunal has the discretion to grant anonymity orders to protect the welfare of parties involved in proceedings. The Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure provide for such orders where necessary to ensure a fair hearing and to protect the interests of vulnerable parties. In F v J

[2025] EAT 34

, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that a claimant who reasonably believed disclosing their disability would harm future career prospects was entitled to an anonymity order. This case underscores the importance of considering the potential harm to a claimant when deciding on anonymity applications. Conclusion 8. In light of the above, I respectfully submits that granting an anonymity order is necessary to protect my rights under the Equality Act 2010 and to ensure a fair and just hearing. 9. I requests that the Tribunal: a. Grant an order prohibiting the publication of any material identifying the Claimant and my disability. b. Ensure that all proceedings, including judgments and orders, refer to me by a pseudonym or initials. 10. I have provided evidence of my dyslexia diagnosis as attached.”

[106]EJ Hyams responded at 16:59 on that day, 30 January 2026, as follows. “The claimant’s email below in effect repeats applications which have already been dealt with by me. He therefore implicitly seeks the variation or revocation of my previous procedural decisions. There is nothing in those repeated applications which would in my judgment justify revoking or varying the previous procedural decisions to which they relate. It is possible that the claimant does not realise that he is in fact simply seeking to raise issues which have already been decided and in relation to which there is no material change of circumstances. Indeed, I am finding it hard to see why the claimant is seeking to persuade me to change my Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 37 preceding procedural decisions unless he does not understand the impact of Serco Ltd v Wells

UKEAT/0330/15

[2016] ICR 768

. For the avoidance of doubt, and taking them in turn, my response[s] to the claimant’s new repeated applications are as follows. 1. The hearing of 5-6 February 2026 The claimant now says that he has “a medical meeting on 5 Feb and would have issues with child care”. I note that the claimant has previously obtained an adjournment on the basis that his child could not be in the nursery which she would otherwise have been in during the day because of illness. In any event, it is the claimant’s case, and the interests of justice require that the hearing of 5-6 February 2026 is not adjourned unless there is a very strong reason for doing so. Here, in my judgment there is no such reason. That is for the following reasons. A “medical meeting” must be capable of being rearranged, and the claimant has enough notice now to arrange child care if it is not already in place for the morning of 5 February 2026. My previouslystated decision on this issue, communicated this morning, stands. 2. The claimant’s new evidence relating to his dyslexia This is new evidence, the relevance of which can be the subject of submissions. It is not a justification for altering any of my previous procedural decisions. 3. Application for an order for disclosure of “the belive distribution contract” I dealt with this morning’s version of this application this morning and dismissed it. If and to the extent that the application is better framed than it was this morning, it raises nothing new. For the avoidance of doubt, I say now that I cannot see any justification for the making of an order for disclosure of the sort now sought. That is because(1) the evidence in the case is closed, and in any event

(2) the document in question would in my view be at best of only peripheral relevance. 4. The application for my notes This is a simple repetition of an application which I have already (in my email sent at 18:35 on Friday 23 January 2026) dismissed. 5. Anonymity This further repetition of the claimant’s application for anonymity raises nothing new. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 38 Some general comments and a statement of what will now be happening I gave the parties my judicial email address to be used for the purposes of the hearing, and on the basis that if it were used inappropriately, then I would ignore what was sent. I have so far dealt with applications which the claimant has made by sending them to me as well as the tribunal and the respondents with as much speed as possible and without troubling the respondents on them unless I saw a need to do so. I have, however, on occasion not dealt explicitly with one or two aspects of the claimant’s emails. That is because they were in my view inappropriately raised. In any event, the claimant needs to bear in mind the need to comply with rule 3(4) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, which is in these terms. “The parties and their representatives must- (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.” If from now on I see the claimant as making in substance no more than a repeat application, then I shall not respond to it. If the claimant does make any repeat application, then he must state in what way he contends that there is a material change in circumstances within the meaning of Serco v Wells. The respondents need not trouble themselves in relation to the application unless I ask them for a response to it. If I am of the view that the claimant asserts nothing which could be a material change of circumstances within the meaning of Serco v Wells, then I will not respond to the repeated application. In conclusion The position is unchanged from that which I stated in my email of this morning, which I sent at 11:37, which is copied below in this chain.’

[107]At 09:32 on the next working day, Monday 2 February 2026, the claimant wrote to EJ Hyams by email: “Dear Judge Hyams, I wish to make an oral submission, I am currently unwell due to my acute anxiety reported by the Dr, I constantly feel like vomiting and having dizzy spellls. If the Judge can provide me with a 2weeks recovery period. I will respond today to the anonymity application”.

[108]At 10:29 on that day, EJ Hyams responded: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 39 “The claimant has asked in his email below, again, for a postponement of this Thursday’s hearing on the basis that he does in fact want to make oral submissions, but not on Thursday of this week. I see that as a repeated application. In any event, I am not at all confident that if the hearing were postponed for a period of, say, 2 weeks (and that could occur only if the parties and the tribunal could attend a hearing so soon after this week), the claimant would not make a further application for a postponement. In any event, it is in my judgment in the interests of justice that the hearing of this Thursday and Friday is not postponed and that the claimant knows that this is his one and only chance to make oral submissions. I therefore now reiterate the position as stated in my email of Friday of last week: the claimant must by 4pm today say whether or not he will be attending the hearing in the morning of Thursday of this week. If he does not do so, or if he says that he will not attend that hearing to make oral submissions, then that hearing will go ahead in private.”

[109]At 11:45 on the same day, the claimant responded at length. With apologies to the reader for doing so, but in order to help make it clear why we came to the conclusion that we should determine the claimant’s claims without receiving written submissions from him (for that is what occurred, as can be seen from what we say below), we set out below the entirety of that email also. We observe, however, that the email appeared to have been drafted with the “assistance” of AI, or Artificial Intelligence, since(1) Serco v Wells did not go to the Court of Appeal,

(2) there does not appear to be a case with the neutral citation of

[2023] EWCA Civ 200

, and

(3) Serco v Wells was not about an anonymity order or the effect of a settlement agreement on an application for an anonymity order. In any event, the email was as follows. “Please I and dealing with my situation, whilst I am being notified from my child nursery that she is still not fully well as her temperature is going up following a suspected viral infections. If my child returns home from nursery early today which I suspect is highly likely whist she is unwell it will be very hard for someone else other than me to look after her as she would seek my comfort for her recovery. If she is unable to go to nursery tomorrow if her condition does not improve it will impact my ability to give full and complete oral submission this week. Sadly this has all arisen also during winter period in which all would be aware of how much our children are prone to infections. I am asking the Judge for sympathy and understanding to my position as a single parent with my own disabilities and given time for my child to fully recover. Based on what was reported by her nursery to me today at 10:31 hey symptoms are increasing. At 11:40 her nursery has indicated she is very quiet and are keeping me updated. Anonymity Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 40 To the Tribunal, Application for an Anonymity Order pursuant to Rule 37 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 and the principles articulated in Serco Ltd v Wells

[2023] EWCA Civ 200

. Introduction This application is filed in consideration of the principles laid down in Serco Ltd v Wellls, recognising the heightened threshold for such orders postsettlement, but asserting that the present circumstances constitute exceptional circumstances justifying anonymity and or material change in the circumstances of this case. Background I have brought a claim that include whistleblowing. This case is not a postsettlement scenario where my identity is being retrospectively anonymised. Here, I am a witness and party whose imminent disclosure poses a substantial and ongoing risk. I initiated proceedings against the Respondent, alleging discrimination, whistleblowing, breach of contract. I am the former employee of the Respondent, I was a direct witness and victim in the events giving rise to these allegations. My evidence and submission is considered crucial and central to the fair determination of this claim, providing direct insight into the entirety of the claims. Legal Basis for Anonymity Rule 37 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 provides that a Tribunal may make an order to prevent the disclosure of information if it is necessary to protect the interests of any child or vulnerable party, or to protect any person’s privacy. The Serco Ltd v Wells case clarifies that while the primary focus of anonymity orders is often on active parties during live proceedings, the need to protect individual privacy and prevent undue hardship can, in exceptional circumstances, justify such orders even for witnesses. The case highlights that the burden rests heavily upon the applicant to demonstrate necessity and that mere speculative concerns are insufficient. Exceptional Circumstances Warranting Anonymity My circumstances fall outside the general presumption favouring open justice, establishing exceptional grounds for anonymity. These grounds are not based on speculative future harm, but on a demonstrable and immediate risk of significant and severe undue hardship that would prejudice my Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 41 personal safety and professional standing, and consequentially impact the integrity of the proceedings. (a) Imminent and Credible Threat to Personal Safety: The Judge has seen the Victim Support Officer of ongoing issues relating to current threat that can also target my child which without this anonymity as a parent and a person can subject both my child and I to ongoing threat and increase danger: the respondent is approaching people are making references to my work at CPS an anonymity will protect me and prevent them from going further with these conduct as it can place me in danger if the general public are aware that I work in the CPS. Severe Reputational and Professional Ruin with Direct Impact on Future Livelihood Beyond physical safety, the disclosure of my identity would irrevocably damage my professional reputation and ability to secure future employment, leading to extreme undue hardship. This is not a situation where a former employee is seeking to avoid disclosure of a past settlement as in Serco v Wells. Here, I am a former employee whose disclosure has direct and immediate consequences on their ongoing or imminent professional life. Examples illustrating this severe and immediate impact include: Whistleblower Retaliation in a High-Profile Industry, If my allegations concern conflict of interest, misconduct within a specialised and potentially insular industry, my submission risks being blacklisted and ostracised. Employers within that sector might refuse to hire anyone identified as a whistleblower, regardless of the merits of their testimony. This would lead to a complete inability to earn a living especially as a single parent and impact my wellbeing. Disclosure in a Interconnected Community:In certain professions or geographic locations where communities like in the legal profession and music profession are small and closely knit, the identity of me could become widely known, leading to social and professional isolation. For instance, the respondent has approached the BSB making complaints against me regarding my whistleblowing claim, targeted my child and my disability, the respondent has appraoched a former Clerk James Park from Chamber sharing information about my currrent work with the CPS meanwhile they have shared with him how they have defeated me, discredited me etc, the Respondent has approached my former boss and told them about my work situation with them and my legal action I took against the Respondent. The Respondent friend have messaged me telling me how jealous they used to be of me and other tactically asking questions about my child. The Respondent has stated during cross examination that they can speak to anyone they want about my work situation because I took them to court. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 42 These are just a few instances of ongoing harrasment that both my child and I are receiving from the Respondent. These are not speculative but actual facts Vulnerability in the Context of Protected Characteristics: Where my submission relates to sensitive personal matters involving protected characteristics like disability and race, my identity being disclosed might lead to targeted harassment or ostracisation by groups with extreme views, making it impossible for me to maintain a professional presence or personal safety in my current environment. The severity of this potential reputational and professional damage goes beyond inconvenience; it constitutes a realistic threat of livelihood destruction. This is not seeking to shield myself from the natural consequences of such actions, but rather to mitigate a disproportionate and undue hardship directly stemming from such compelled participation in these proceedings. Impact on the Integrity of the Proceedings: Crucially, the inability of me to make submission freely and without fear would fundamentally compromise the integrity of these proceedings. If I am too afraid for my safety to give oral evidence and submission, or is professionally ruined to the extent that I cannot practically continue my career, the Tribunal will be deprived of vital, unvarnished submission as the Tribunal witness during the hearing of my unwellness. This would prevent a fair and just determination of my case, undermining the very purpose of the employment tribunal system. The my willingness to provide aubmisikn is contingent on my anonymity protection. Distinguishing from Serco v Wells This application is fundamentally distinct from Serco v Wells in that: I am a current and essential party in active proceedings, not a former party seeking to anonymise a concluded claim. I seek to prevent future, imminent undue hardship and danger, not to retrospectively hide a past settlement. The grounds are based on concrete threats to personal safety and demonstrably severe professional ruin, not speculative concerns about future employment prospects after a settlement. I continued ability and willingness to provide crucial submission is directly dependent on receiving anonymity. Conclusion In light of the imminence of threats to personal safety and the demonstrable risk of severe and irreparable reputational and professional ruin, I Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 43 respectfully submits that exceptional circumstances exist to justify an order for anonymity. The protection of my identity is necessary to ensure my personal safety, prevent undue hardship that would cripple my livelihood, and critically, to secure their participation as a party, thereby upholding the integrity and fairness of these proceedings. I am willing to engage further with the Tribunal and the parties, under strict confidentiality protocols, to address any concerns and refine the scope of the anonymity order as necessary. I therefore requests that an order be made: 1. That the name, address, and any other identifying details of me be withheld from public disclosure. 2. That any documents filed in these proceedings refer to me by a pseudonym or anonymity such as “RS” or similar designation. 3. That reporting of any apsect referencing a child by the media or any other third party be restricted from identifying me.”

[110]At 12:57, EJ Hyams replied: “I do not regard the situation to which the claimant refers below as raising anything new, in that he has already referred to difficulties with child care as a justification for not attending to make submissions orally on Thursday of this week, and I have already concluded that that is not a sufficient justification in the circumstances for postponing the hearing of Thursday and Friday of this week, which was originally going to be in private. I reiterate that the claimant can still make submissions in writing, and he has now had over 6 weeks within which to prepare them.”

[111]Then, at 13:55 on the same day, 2 February 2026, the claimant sent the following text in a further email: “Dear Judge, My child is unable to attend nursery in the coming days. I asking for extra time to attend to my child who is currently unwell and unable to attend nursery the coming days. I will not have enough time to deal with preparing my submission which relates to new evdience regarding dyslexia. If the matters is rejected can the Judge stay the hearing pending an appeal with the EAT regarding these adjustment? Kind regards”

[112]At 14:20, EJ Hyams responded: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 44 “The claimant is now asking for a stay because he needs more time to prepare his submissions about the impact of the new evidence about his claimed disability of dyslexia. I have already referred to the difficulty of the tribunal taking into account evidence from an expert procured after the end of the employment to which a claim relates. That is primarily (but not only ) because of the case of All Answers Ltd v W

[2021] EWCA Civ 606

[2021] IRLR 612

. In addition, the time for adducing evidence has ended here: the evidence in this case is closed, subject to the possibility of the tribunal agreeing to resume the hearing. Such a resumption would be exceptional and would have to be to hear relevant evidence. If the new report about the claimant’s reading and writing difficulties cannot be relevant, then it cannot justify a resumption of the hearing of evidence. It is the above things about which I expect the tribunal to receive submissions. Those things have been well-ventilated by me for some months now. It is in my judgment not in the interests of justice for a stay now to be granted for the purpose sought by the claimant.”

[113]At 07:34 on the next day, Tuesday 3 February 2026, the claimant wrote in a further email: ‘Dear Judge, The below address anonymity application, new evidence and if not granted to allow a stay of the hearing pending the outcome of the higher court. Your rejection of my application was based on a case of Serco that did not apply in my circumstance. The stay in the proceeding is to appeal the 1. anonymity order as the case cited does not apply to my case and as such you ered in your judgement, 2. allow extra time for my baby to recover fully as it would enable me to participate fully and 3. to address new evidence if the judge does not accept my application to include dyslexia report by a educational psychologist as relevant new eveidence. In the case of All Answers Ltd v W

[2021] EWCA Civ 606

, the Court of Appeal granted an anonymisation order to the respondents, Mr. W and Ms. R, to protect their identities during the proceedings. The court’s order, dated 12 February 2021, specified that the respondents (Claimaint) would be known as Mr. W and Ms. R, thereby anonymising their identities. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 45 The anonymisation order was made to safeguard the privacy of the respondents (Claimaint), particularly given the sensitive nature of the allegations involving disability discrimination. Such orders are typically granted to prevent the disclosure of personal information that could lead to undue distress or harm to the individuals involved. The court considered the balance between the principle of open justice and the need to protect the respondents’ (Claimaints) personal information, ultimately determining that anonymisation was necessary in this case. The order was made pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction and relevant legal provisions, including section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) rule 39.2(4).”

[114]The claimant then set out again the whole of the text from the heading “Anonymity” onwards which we have set out in paragraph 109 above, and then continued: “Submission in Response to the Threshold for Reopening the Case in All Answers Ltd v W [g2021] EWCA Civ 606 APPLICATION TO RE-OPEN THE HEARING AND ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE I, respectfully submit this application to re-open the hearing of my case based on compelling new evidence from a recent diagnostic assessment report regarding my dyslexia. This submission demonstrates how the report meets the thresholds for reopening the closed case, as established in ALL Answers Ltd v W

[2021] EWCA Civ 606

. Despite the Respondent signing statement of all disclosures being submitted they submitted an evdience after I had signed my witness statement and which shows confirmation of Priya making racial references in which it was brought to light in the last hour of her making racial references to let’s monkey around with a human like figure of a monkey/human. This shows the nature as to how disadvantage I have been within these proceedings. Let’s monkey comment. I was deprived from cross examining Simon and Michael regaridng this email. This is deeply unfair. Furthermore more in regard to the report The diagnostic assessment report provides critical insights into significant challenges I face related to dyslexia that could affect the tribunal’s fairness and outcome. The Educational Psychologist states that I “sought a specialist assessment due to ongoing difficulties experienced in the workplace in relation to reading, writing, and information processing demands.” Despite my strong academic and professional achievements within the legal sector, I require substantial effort and additional processing time for literacy-based tasks, especially under time pressure. This assessment aims to clarify my cognitive profile and support access to appropriate strategies and Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 46 reasonable adjustments necessary for my efficiency and confidence in a professional setting. 2. New Evidence The report details my persistent phonologically based difficulties, which significantly impact my reading, writing, and information processing abilities. Notably, the Respondent has portrayed my disability as a tactic to and deflection, these are desparagjng comments to someone with dyslexia challenges. The report counters these derogatory claims by confirming the genuine nature of my struggles. Specifically, the report states that tasks requiring rapid naming of familiar symbols were particularly effortful, as I “required a significant amount of time to complete them,” with reduced accuracy as the demands increased. My reading efficiency was notably reduced when managing complex documents. 3. Substantial Merit Evidence of Dyslexia. The assessment confirms a profile consistent with dyslexia, marked by difficulties in phonological awareness and processing speed, aligning with the definition outlined in the Rose Report (2009). This substantial evidence underscores my claim of discrimination under employment law. Impact on Work Capability: The report indicates that my tasks in reading and writing are effortful and time-consuming, particularly during evaluations conducted by Simon Rodkin. This challenges previous tribunal assessments that did not account for the extensive cognitive load I experienced. 4. Legal Precedents and Procedural Fairness - The report articulates how my specific learning difficulties necessitate reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act, justifying the need for improvements in workplace functionality and fairness in evaluations. The All Answers case supports this necessity, reinforcing that employers must actively respond to the needs of employees with disabilities. Please note under oath Simon Aaron confirmed his agreement to reasonable adjustment for my dyslexia contrary to his false pleadings. The report is relavant to the signed agreement by Simon to provide me with reasonable adjustment specially for my dyslexia. It also illustrates my longstanding history of dyslexia throughout my employment history and education. - Reopening the case is essential for assessing how these unmet needs could influence the tribunal’s findings and contributes to the integrity of the tribunal process by ensuring all evidence is considered, rather than ignoring significant factors that could lead to an unjust outcome. 5. Recommendations and Support Strategies Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 47 The assessment provides practical recommendations, such as allowing additional time for tasks involving significant reading and writing, alongside structured formats for written materials. These adjustments are vital for my ability to perform effectively, emphasising the need for the tribunal to acknowledge such supports to arrive at a fair resolution. 6. Conclusion In light of the compelling new evidence presented in the report, which articulates my documented difficulties and their implications for my previous employment, it is essential for the tribunal to reassess the case. Ignoring these factors may lead to an unjust outcome, undermining principles of fairness and equality in employment law. This report not only meets but reinforces the threshold for reopening the case, underscoring the need for a thorough evaluation reflective of my true capabilities and challenges in the workplace.”

EVIDENCE

[115]Shortly afterwards, at 08:15 on that day, Tuesday 3 February 2026, EJ Hyams responded by email: “The claimant’s email below raises the fact that I did not deal yesterday with the claimant’s further renewal of his application for an anonymity order, and he presses that further application. I did not deal with that application expressly because in my view it was a repeated application and there was no material change of circumstances. The claimant then and now, today, is merely advancing his arguments in a different way. He has not understood, it appears, that the principle in Serco v Wells is as I described it in paragraph 9 of my reasons which were sent to the parties on 7 January 2026 for dismissing the claimant’s application for anonymity as it then stood. The claimant is showing by his repeated pressing of his application for anonymity that he is currently able to write at length. I record here that the claimant having not stated by 4pm yesterday that he wanted to attend the hearing on Thursday of this week in order to make oral submissions, that hearing will, as originally planned, be in private and will be for the purpose of deliberation only. The claimant continues to be free, if he wishes to ensure that the tribunal has his submissions before it, to complete and send to the respondents and the tribunal his written closing submissions by at the very latest 10am on Thursday morning.”

[116]At 08:40 on the same day, the claimant sent an email repeating the text which we have set out in paragraph 114 above and saying, above that text: “Dear Judge, My email included an application to admit new evidence below.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 48

[117]EJ Hyams responded four minutes later: “I understand the claimant’s email below to be his submissions in relation to his new evidence. They will be considered by the tribunal on Thursday and Friday of this week. The respondents may wish to respond to them.”

[118]Five minutes later, so at 08:49, the claimant responded: “The submission is in relation to my application to re-open the hearing. If it is not admitted as new evidence I ask the court to stay the proceedings or allow me to seek a stay from the higher court to address this point. This is in line with the conventional rights for having a fair hearing.”

[119]At 09:53, the claimant wrote in a further email: “Dear Judge, I belive that if I am being misunderstood or I am not understanding the Judges direction, my application is to re-open the hearing to admit evidence that supports my entire disability claims. Has the Judge agreed to admitting this as new evidence relavant to my disability claim? Can this point be made clear? As stated I wish to make an oral submission but I have a child in my care 24/7 that is recovering from a virus and with significant rashes all over her face. I can’t complete submission using all the documents and evdience whist caring for my child. I am also in huge amount of distress due to the anonymity applications which is impacting my ability to complete the submission and make oral submission impacting again my conventional rights. I am seeking a stay in the proceeding to address fully the admission of new eveidence, and my anonymity. Can I seek permission from the EAT to address these two points.”

[120]At 11:17, EJ Hyams responded: ‘The claimant is not being misunderstood. He is misunderstanding how tribunal proceedings are conducted. I have not decided anything about the claimant’s new evidence. Whether it should be admitted, what weight it should be afforded if it is admitted, and whether or not it would be necessary to give the parties an opportunity to attend a resumption of the hearing to deal with it, are all matters for determination by the tribunal on Thursday and Friday of this week. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 49 In the meantime, the claimant is free to make any and all submissions which he wishes to make in support of the proposition that his new evidence should be admitted and what its effect, if admitted, would be. The respondents can if they wish make further submissions on the matters to which I refer in the preceding paragraph above. The claimant’s repeated application for a stay is refused. I cannot see any justification for a stay on the basis proposed by the claimant, which is that he wishes to “seek permission from the EAT to address [the] two points” of “the admission of new [evidence] and [the claimant’s] anonymity”.’

[121]At 11:59, the claimant wrote: “Dear Judge, I am slightly confused by the direction. I understand now that the evidence concerning my disability and its admissibility will be dealt with on the 5 and 6. However what I do not understand given the directions below is has the Judge agreed to postpone full submissions regarding matters for the full deliberation of the case subject to the below new directions? If so when would the Judge set a new date for full oral/written submissions pending the outcome of the below directions whilst having in mind that I am currently caring for a under 2years old that is not well and is not subject to child care?”

[122]At 12:59, EJ Hyams responded (the emphasis by bold and underlining being in the original text): ‘I do not believe that what I have said so far is unclear. The tribunal may at the end of this week have concluded that the new evidence should not be admitted on the basis that it is irrelevant. If it is not admitted then there will be no need to resume the hearing, and the tribunal will issue its judgment on the claims and the reasons for that judgment. No new date has been set “for full oral/written submissions pending the outcome of the below directions whilst having in mind that I am currently caring for a under 2years old that is not well and is not subject to child care”, or for any other reason. Now is the time for submissions, and this is the last time that submissions can be made unless the tribunal at the end of this week decides that it should hear more submissions. However, tribunals do not normally decide to invite further submissions when they are in the course of deliberating and the parties have had a full opportunity to make submissions (whether orally or in writing, or both). Indeed, it is exceptional do so. I cannot at least currently see a need to do so here. The hearing would resume in person only if the tribunal concluded that the new evidence should be admitted and Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 50 that the parties should be given an opportunity to make submissions on it. So, the tribunal might decide that the evidence should be admitted but that it was of no weight so that it did not add anything material to the claimant’s case. In summary, the parties must work on the assumption that no further opportunity to make submissions will be afforded to them. Employment Judge Hyams’

[123]At 14:39, so 1 hour 40 minutes later, the claimant wrote again by email: “Dear Judge, Writing an application without reading other documents is different to writing a submission whilst cross reference and fully refering to complex and large amounts of documents. The dyslexia report is also relevant to the Employment Tribunal providing me with relavnt extra time . The Tribunal has not asked me how much time do I need as an adjustment. The time table was set without my needs being fully considered. I am unable to make oral and written submissions due to my child being unwell and the significant distress that I face , the intimidation that I face by the Respondent that has currently been left unresolved by the Tribunal. Whilst the anonymity would have help resolve part of this issue it has not been granted. It is a fundamental principle of the Employment Tribunal system that it has a duty to ensure that proceedings are conducted fairly and justly for all parties not just for the Respondent. This includes actively protecting claimants from any form of intimidation or harassment by respondents. The tribunal is equipped with a range of powers to manage and prevent such conduct: Case Management Orders:The tribunal has broad case management powers. If intimidation is brought to its attention, it can issue specific orders to prohibit certain conduct. This could include direct orders against the respondent to cease making enquiries about the claimant, to stop contacting third parties about the claimant, or to desist from any actions that could be construed as spying or harassment. I am also seeking an order prohibiting the respondent and their representatives from making any further enquiries about my child or their activities. An order prohibiting the respondent from contacting or making disparaging remarks about me to any third parties. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 51 An order requiring the respondent to cease any perceived “spying” activities. Whilst I am experiencing significant distress, the tribunal retains its powers to protect me. The refusal of anonymity was a decision made based on specific legal criteria. However, it does not grant the respondent carte blanche to intimidate me. I have actively engaged with the tribunal by providing clear evidence of the ongoing intimidation and requesting specific protective orders and sanctions. My well-being and ability to present my case fairly paramount considerations for the tribunal. I am writing to for you to re-review my request anonymity in my case primarily due to the significant challenges and distress I am facing impacting the above hearing and my case. The granting of this is in line with the equality act 2010 and the challenges I face as a result of my dyslexia which is new evidence and covered under the equality act as a duty for the Tribunal to provide me with responsible adjustment.. This request is made in light of my ongoing struggles and the potential impact that an open court identity could have on my psychological well-being and ability to engage with the legal process effectively. 1.Diagnostic Confirmation I have been diagnosed with dyslexia, which significantly affects my ability to read, process, and produce written information. This was confirmed in a diagnostic assessment conducted by a certified specialist, indicating persistent phonological awareness difficulties and slow processing speeds, common symptoms experienced by individuals with dyslexia. 2. Impact on Functioning. My dyslexia manifests in considerable challenges while managing complex information, leading to frustration and cognitive overload, especially in high-stakes environments such as court proceedings. I often require extra time to process written materials, and concentration is particularly challenging under pressure. Justification for Anonymity: 1. Psychological Safety: Public exposure could exacerbate my anxiety and hinder my ability to communicate effectively during proceedings as it is clearly having an adverse impact. Anonymity would allow me to participate fully without the added stress of potential stigma, thereby improving my capacity to engage with the judicial process. 2. Fair Access to Justice. The right to a fair trial includes being able to participate without discrimination based on disabilities. Anonymity would ensure equal treatment in the judicial process and accommodate my needs stemming from dyslexia. In light of the above, I respectfully request that the court considers granting me anonymity throughout these proceedings. I believe this adjustment Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 52 would facilitate my full participation while alleviating the additional burdens dyslexia imposes on me in such a challenging context.”

[124]At 14:53, EJ Hyams responded: “The claimant makes a repeat application (or, it may be said, two repeated applications) below: for a postponement of the deliberation hearing of Thursday and Friday of this week and for an anonymity order. As for the first of those applications, the claimant has already had more than 6 weeks to write his closing submissions. The putting before the tribunal now of a report to the effect that he has dyslexia does not affect that. The claimant is now putting differently-worded and long submissions in support of his repeated applications. The claimant plainly can write, or procure the writing of, what he wants to say to the tribunal. The position is unchanged. For the avoidance of doubt, I dismiss the repeated applications for an anonymity order and a postponement of the deliberation hearing of Thursday and Friday of this week. I see that the application is making the following applications in bold font. ‘I am also seeking an order prohibiting the respondent and their representatives from making any further enquiries about my child or their activities. An order prohibiting the respondent from contacting or making disparaging remarks about me to any third parties. An order requiring the respondent to cease any perceived “spying” activities.’ I do not see any power in the employment tribunal to make any of those orders, and in any event even if there were such a power, I see no justification for making such orders.”

[125]At 15:13, the claimant wrote by email: “Dear Judge, The Claimaint is seeking an urgent stay for the EAT of the above hearing The issue I am facing is that I am under significant duress and I am pleading to the Tribunal to appreciate the distress this this is causing. The statement to no justification in making such order is terrifying as it implies that the Respondent can make enquires about my child without my Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 53 consent to intimidate me or for their own vexatious purposes. This is deeply distressing.”

[126]At 16:08, EJ Hyams responded to that email: “While, consistently with what I said in my email sent at 16:59 on Friday 30 January 2026, I could simply have ignored the email below, for the avoidance of doubt I have concluded that the claimant raises nothing new in the email to which I now respond.” At 16:47, the claimant wrote by email: “Dear Judge, Does the current anonymity of my child extend to the Respondent not being able to make direct reference to my child meaning making enquires as a result of information from the above case? Having understood fully now my dyslexia and having a support from an educational psychologist allows me to manage more my dyslexia. I have a meeting with the educational psychologist tomorrow for her to give me support and help in how to manage my dyslexia. .This is coming at a time I am currently disadvantage at the above hearing. If I can have the meeting with her Tomorow morning it would serve as a benefit and allow me to fairly and fully prepare my submission without being disadvantage and have it ready”.

[127]At 17:02, EJ Hyams responded to that email: “I do not understand the first paragraph of the email from the claimant below. If and to the extent that I can discern anything meaningful in the paragraph, it appears to be about something which is outside the employment tribunal’s jurisdiction. Nothing materially new is raised in the second paragraph of that email.”

[128]At 17:49 on the same day, 3 February 2026, the claimant wrote by email: “Dear Judge, What is new is that I did not have a current diagnosis and the diagnosis provide an insight into my dyslexia as such the educational pschologiest is helping me to understand how best I can read documents effectively and efficiently and providing me with further writing software to help sumerise documents and write documents using certain softwares. Without this support it is making my submission difficult and at a disadvantage. Whilst the anoyminity application is being appealed using the limitation of my current support it helps mitigate the distress I am under. If 2weeks can be given to me to adopt any strategies that the psychologist provides me, it allows also for my child to recover and be able to return to nursery and or Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 54 other child care. I would want to provided oral submission along with a written submission as within 2weeks I would be ready.”

[129]At 18:47, EJ Hyams responded: ‘The claimant’s repeated applications for a postponement have been advanced on many bases. The claimant appears to be spending the time that he could have been spending in writing submissions to supplement those which he has already made in his “witness statement” in pressing his numerous applications. The interests of justice include the need for finality and I reiterate that this tribunal cannot be confident that the claimant will not make repeated applications for postponements. What the claimant refers to as being “new” below is potentially relevant to his claims on which this tribunal will be deliberating on Thursday and Friday of this week. In any event, I invite the respondents to respond by 4pm tomorrow to what the claimant says in his email below, sent at 17:49 today.’

[130]At 19:17, EJ Hyams added: “I should say for the avoidance of doubt that the deliberation hearing of Thursday and Friday will take place in any event.”

[131]At 20:38, still on Tuesday 3 February 2026, the claimant wrote by email: “Dear Judge, I am a parent to a child that is currently not well, I do not have easy access to my hard copies files as part of my reasonable adjustment because I am soothing and comforting my child most of the day and night to help her recovery. If I bring the folder out to work on anything whilst soothing my child she tries to destroy the papers. I am currently experiencing a period where she needs me 24/7 during this period of her recovery. As such I am unable to concentrate on a submission that require a heighten level of concentration and focus due to my dyslexia. My daughter is due back in nursery on Monday and I will be having leave from work to be able to focus and concentrate. At the start of the hearing you stated along the lines that no-one sends their child to nursery at my child’s age and you questionedb me being a single dad to an under 2year old. Please give me this adjustment and understanding as a single parent to be there for my child whilst I also get support for my dyslexia. If I do not provide my final submission within 2weeks then I will accept a deliberation without my submissions. This is in favour to the Respodent and the interest of justice. The issue facing our babies is well known across many nurseries across the country and even throughout the US nurseries. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 55 Please give me this benefit of doubt and understand the hardship that I am facing in regaridng to my final submissions.”

[132]At 14:22 on Wednesday 4 February 2026, Mr Magier sent some further submissions on behalf of the respondents. Those submissions were to the effect that the report of the educational psychologist dated 22 January 2026 which the claimant had sent to the respondents and the tribunal at 13:35 on Friday 30 January 2026 (as can be seen from what we say in paragraph 105 above) was of no relevance and therefore was inadmissible.

[133]At 10:00 on 5 February 2026, we started our deliberations. At 11:14 on that day, the claimant sent a further email. It was as follows. “Dear Judge, Whilst I am currently limited pending the return of my child to nursery next. I am still in shock, distressed and alarmed by the email the Respondent withheld until the last hour of cross examination that shows offensive language and imagery of a human like ape and references to “let’s monkey around”. These combined with her knowledge of my complaint against David and subsequent email using similar imagery is racially offensive and I cannot belive that I was in such a work environment. Combined with the idea that David Nash does not seem to realise that white boy club and old boys club has the same meaning for black people in the UK. I briefly respond without access to making full references to hard copy, whilst using softwares to help with my writing. The emails that I have used softwares to assit me have no errors, the emails were I have not used software support have errors and are limited on reflection. The Educational psychologist is aware of the legal issues and is currently preparing the report to include what we had discussed regarding 2022/2023. The report limited full details to protect my privacy with other employees. To counter the Respondent’s legal submission, consider the following points: 1. Late Disclosure of Needs: the educational psychological report is created to support me in my work place and in my personal life. The report illustrate a history of struggles in which I can confirm in an update witness statement that I discussed my struggles with writing, reading, etc included 2022-2023. Respondent accepts that they had knowledge of my dyslexia the Report helps to show an insight into my struggles as to why I was dismissed as they clearly make references to my performance and my dyslexia in the Termination document they sent me, please note that most of the termination letter refers to my perfomance and my dyslexia in which this Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 56 reports will help me counter. I also asked them to referr me to occupational health to address my dyslexia they refused, instead they requested to speak to my Dr regarding Dyskexia as they treated as a medical condition. The report is created by a educational psychologist not a legal expert for a Tribunal there is nothing misleading but based on a report that illustrate my struggles. If the Respondent did not approach occupational health to assess these needs, they cannot claim to be unaware of necessary adjustments. My earlier mentions of dyslexia should have prompted the Respondent to engage occupational health proactively, rather than waiting until to the end of an appraisal to sign an agreement to reaomable adjustments for my dyslexia which is evidence of such knowledge of long lasting impairment impacting my work performance. Please note dishonesty was not the octcome of the appraisl henced the signed agreement on how to move forward. Despite the signs agreement and agreement to provide me with reasonable adjustment the Respondnet failed to implement anything instead used my zero hour contract to stop me from working and then they began creating false narratives of dishonesty and poor performance in which the report will help in final submission if granted help counter such false narratives. 2. Timing and Relevance of the Report: While the Respondent argues that the report from an occupational psychologist is irrelevant, it provides crucial insights into the my condition retrospectively. This could support the necessity for adjustments at the time of dismissal and confirms the same adjustment that Simon agreed upon. The Respondents should not disregard evidence that can substantiate the Claimant’s position regarding reasonable adjustments. As I stated just below I can assure the courts as an undertaking to the Tribunal if within 2weeks I do not provide submissions regarding all relavnt issues then I accept a deliberation without my final submission. This does not prejudice the respondent if they belive that they have a strong case.”

[134]We then read the report of Ms Krol with care and considered how we should proceed. We saw that in it, Ms Krol had written on page 7: “He has developed a range of compensatory strategies and uses assistive technology to support daily and professional functioning. This includes speech-to-text software, text-to-speech functions, dual computer screens, a standing desk, a specialized mouse, and noise-cancelling headphones. He reports that these aids help him focus and manage tasks, particularly in complex or high-volume work contexts. Kelechi demonstrates strengths in verbal reasoning, research and analytical tasks, and problemsolving. He also engages in creative activities, including music, which he approaches intuitively rather than through formal methods. These strengths have supported him both academically and professionally. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 57 Kelechi reports that supportive coping strategies and adjustments in the workplace help mitigate the impact of these difficulties on day-to-day functioning.”

[135]The whole of the report was relevant to our determination of what we should do at this point, but we noted the following futher parts of it in particular.135.1 “During secondary education, Kelechi received learning support in relation to difficulties with information processing, numerical accuracy and grammatical accuracy. He did not receive examination access arrangements at that stage. At university, support included access to a laptop, additional guidance regarding his learning needs, meetings with a psychologist, extra time in assessments and access to lecture notes. Formal learning support was later withdrawn, and Kelechi reports that at the time he did not fully anticipate the impact that his literacy difficulties would have on day-to-day functioning or within a professional work environment.” (Pages 4-5)

135.2 “Kelechi did not report any visual discomforts or disturbances. He has not expressed difficulties related to print clarity, visual distortion, or text movement. He reports that reading difficulties are related to processing and concentration demands rather than visual discomfort. No visual support is currently required.” (Page 12)

135.3 “He reported that tasks requiring prolonged concentration or the processing of large amounts of information are more effortful and that he benefits from additional time to process information fully.” (Page 12)

135.4 “Kelechi found reading extended passages of text highly demanding. Even passages with relatively straightforward language required considerable concentration to read and process. To support focus and reduce visual overload, a strategy was adopted whereby text was covered so that only one paragraph was visible at a time. This adjustment helped him concentrate on individual sections of the text.” (Page 13)

135.5 “Despite this support, the level of effort required to decode and process the text meant that Kelechi often needed to reread sections multiple times in order to understand and retain information. This increased cognitive effort and led to understandable frustration, as returning to the text repeatedly disrupted his overall understanding. The difficulty appeared to arise from the combined demand of decoding, maintaining attention and extracting meaning at the same time. At several points, Kelechi requested that the text be read aloud. When this support was provided, he was able to respond to some comprehension questions more effectively. While this could not be formally scored, it provides qualitative evidence that comprehension improves when the reading demand is reduced, suggesting that his Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 58 understanding of language is stronger than his ability to access meaning independently through text. Throughout this task, Kelechi remained engaged and motivated, despite the high level of effort required. Oral reading fluency tasks assess how easily and smoothly text can be read aloud, considering speed, accuracy and continuity. Fluent reading supports understanding by reducing the effort required to recognize individual words. Kelechi required extended time to read passages aloud and his reading was slow and effortful. Frequent pauses, omissions and rereading of words were observed, as he worked carefully to maintain accuracy. He often returned to previously read words, which disrupted the flow of reading and made it more difficult to maintain meaning across sentences. Kelechi benefitted from isolating sections of text to reduce visual distraction, even when passages were relatively short. Despite the challenges, he remained attentive and committed to the task, attempting to read as accurately as possible. These observations align with his report that large blocks of text, such as lengthy emails or written instructions, are particularly difficult to manage and that information is more accessible when broken down into smaller, clearly structured sections.” (Page 14)

135.6 “Kelechi reported that the majority of his written work is produced using speech-to-text software. In this case extended handwriting or unsupported written tasks would not provide an accurate reflection of his written skills, and writing difficulties were therefore explored through background information, spelling tasks and observed literacy demands.”

[136]In all of the above circumstances, and having considered with great care how to proceed, we concluded during the morning of 5 February 2026 that it was not in the interests of justice to adjourn our deliberations to a later date. We also concluded that the report of Ms Krol was relevant only in regard to what adjustments needed to be made in relation to the claimant’s participation in the proceedings before us. We did so for the following reasons.136.1 By the time that he was assessed by Ms Krol, on 20 January 2026, the claimant had already “developed a range of compensatory strategies and use[d] assistive technology to support daily and professional functioning” (see what we have set out in paragraph 134 above, all of which as relevant here).

136.2 By that time (see what we have set out in paragraph 135.6 above), “Kelechi reported that the majority of his written work [was] produced using speech-to-text software.”

136.3 The emails sent by the claimant to which we refer in paragraphs 94-133 above (and we have set out only parts of the text of those emails, despite setting out some of them at length) showed in our view that the claimant was well able to write at length and at speed about something when he wanted to do so. He was also plainly capable of arguing his points, and Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 59 therefore he could, if he had chosen to do so, have compiled some written closing submissions before 5 February 2026. The fact that some of the long emails whose text we have set out above made little sense and in some respects was markedly inaccurate (see what we say in paragraph 109 above) did not detract from the proposition that the claimant was well able to create textual documents, some at least of which plainly stated what he wanted to say, even if he had in many cases said the same thing before, in different language.

136.4 Even if he had not completed them, he could have sent us some partial submissions at the latest by 10.00am on 5 February 2026. He did send us some submissions at 11:14am on that day, and we have set them out in paragraph 133 above. We decided that we would take them into account in our deliberations, as well as the submissions made by the claimant in the emails to which we refer in paragraphs 114 and 119 above.

136.5 The claimant’s initial rejection of the invitation to make oral submissions was based on the proposition merely that “it would be difficult” for him to attend the hearing in the morning of 5 February 2026 as he was “not available then” (see paragraph 101 above).

136.6 When EJ Hyams responded on the same day (see paragraph 104 above) that he regarded that “as a statement that the claimant does not, at least currently, want to make oral submissions next Thursday morning”, the claimant wrote (see paragraph 105 above): “Can a hearing be set within the next few weeks for oral submission as I have a medical meeting on 5 Feb and would have issues with child care. I am also trying to recover for the effects of my anxiety and the reasonable adjustment by granting an order will be able to resolve my anxiety impacting my dyslexia and allowing me to fully participate.”

136.7 EJ Hyams responded (see paragraph 106 above) at 16:59 on the same day, 30 January 2026: ‘The claimant now says that he has “a medical meeting on 5 Feb and would have issues with child care”. I note that the claimant has previously obtained an adjournment on the basis that his child could not be in the nursery which she would otherwise have been in during the day because of illness. In any event, it is the claimant’s case, and the interests of justice require that the hearing of 5-6 February 2026 is not adjourned unless there is a very strong reason for doing so. Here, in my judgment there is no such reason. That is for the following reasons. A “medical meeting” must be capable of being re-arranged, and the claimant has enough notice now to arrange child care if it is not already in place for the morning of 5 February 2026.’ Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 60

136.8 On Monday 2 February 2026, the claimant responded (see paragraph 107 above): “I wish to make an oral submission, I am currently unwell due to my acute anxiety reported by the Dr, I constantly feel like vomiting and having dizzy spellls. If the Judge can provide me with a 2weeks recovery period.”

136.9 After EJ Hyams rejected that request in the terms set out in paragraph 108 above, the claimant said (see paragraph 109 above) this at 11:45 on the same day: “I am being notified from my child nursery that she is still not fully well as her temperature is going up following a suspected viral infections. If my child returns home from nursery early today which I suspect is highly likely whist she is unwell it will be very hard for someone else other than me to look after her as she would seek my comfort for her recovery. If she is unable to go to nursery tomorrow if her condition does not improve it will impact my ability to give full and complete oral submission this week.”

136.10 EJ Hyams having then said in the text of the email set out in paragraph 110 above that he did not see the claimant’s claimed childcare issue to justify postponing the hearing of 5-6 February 2026, the claimant (at 13:55 on 2 February 2026) sent the email the text of which is set out in paragraph 111 above, saying that he would “not have enough time to deal with preparing my submission which relates to new evdience regarding dyslexia”.

136.11 At 09:53 on the next day, 3 February 2026, the claimant wrote (see paragraph 119 above): “As stated I wish to make an oral submission but I have a child in my care 24/7 that is recovering from a virus and with significant rashes all over her face. I can’t complete submission using all the documents and evdience whist caring for my child.”

136.12 In the afternoon of that day, the claimant gave these as the reasons for seeking a postponement (see paragraph 123 above): “I am unable to make oral and written submissions due to my child being unwell and the significant distress that I face , the intimidation that I face by the Respondent that has currently been left unresolved by the Tribunal. Whilst the anonymity would have help resolve part of this issue it has not been granted.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 61

136.13 As we record in paragraph 125 above, the claimant wrote at 15:13 on 3 February 2026 that he was seeking a stay while he pressed an appeal to the EAT (against what, he did not say) and gave this as his reason for seeking a postponement: “The issue I am facing is that I am under significant duress and I am pleading to the Tribunal to appreciate the distress this this is causing.”

136.14 Later on that day (see paragraph 128 above), the claimant gave this as a reason for his application for a postponement: “If 2weeks can be given to me to adopt any strategies that the psychologist provides me, it allows also for my child to recover and be able to return to nursery and or other child care. I would want to provided oral submission along with a written submission as within 2weeks I would be ready.”

136.15 At 20:38 on the same day, Tuesday 3 February 2026, the claimant wrote this (see paragraph 131 above): “I am currently experiencing a period where she needs me 24/7 during this period of her recovery. As such I am unable to concentrate on a submission that require a heighten level of concentration and focus due to my dyslexia.”

136.16 The claimant did, however, nevertheless, at 11:14 on 5 February 2026, send a submission relating to

(1) one of the emails sent by Ms Varsani which he said that Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron should have done something about, and

(2) the report of Ms Krol: see paragraph 133 above.

136.17 We had before us no medical or independent evidence to support the claimant’s assertions of ill-health on the part of his child, but in any event that asserted ill-health was in the period shortly before the hearing of 5 February 2026, when the claimant knew on 18 December 2025 that he had to put before the tribunal his written closing submissions by 16 January 2026 and submissions in reply by 30 January 2026.

136.18 We had good reason to doubt the claimant’s veracity about his reasons for not being able to put together written submissions. That reason was the circumstances which we describe in paragraphs 65 and 75-77 above.

136.19 The claimant’s reference in the email whose text we have set out in paragraph 114 above to the “evdience after I had signed my witness statement and which shows confirmation of Priya making racial references in which it was brought to light in the last hour of her making racial references to let’s monkey around with a human like figure of a monkey/human” raised something which did not justify re-opening the evidence. That was because the claimant was not complaining about the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 62 acts of Ms Varsani. He was complaining about the fact that Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham had not taken Ms Varsani to task about the use of a monkey photograph, and the claimant had already cross-examined them on that question. We refer to that email in paragraph 255 below, which had to be read against what was said in paragraphs 248-254 below, and in our view the email to which we refer in paragraph 255 below did not require the reopening of the evidence.

136.20 In addition, Ms Krol’s report dated 22 January 2026 was irrelevant to the claims of the claimant. That was because of paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 to the EqA 2010, to which we refer in paragraph 283 below, and All Answers Ltd v W

[2021] EWCA Civ 606

[2021] IRLR 612

. We took that report into account in deciding whether we should give the claimant more time to put written submissions before us, but it did not require the resumption of the hearing with the parties present.

136.21 The only adjustment that we could see that we could give the claimant if one was required, was more time to put before us his written submissions. However, by 5 February 2026, the claimant had already had seven weeks within which to write and put before us his closing submissions.

136.22 Fairness requires only that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to make submissions to the tribunal: there is no obligation to ensure that a party makes submissions. A far greater opportunity had been given to the claimant to make submissions here than is normally given to a party (including a vulnerable party or one who has a learning difficulty) to a hearing before the tribunal.

136.23 In any event, it was the claimant’s case and he could reasonably have been expected to say even in summary form what it (i.e. his case) was without difficulty, even though he made many assertions of wrongdoing. In fact, he did do that in parts of his witness statement and in his emails to which we refer in paragraphs 114, 119 and 133 above.

136.24 The claimant had been able to add at least five pages to his witness statement (which was in relatively small font with quite close spacing between the lines, and no blank lines between the paragraphs) between the time when he got home on 3 November 2025 (having left the tribunal building soon after 12 noon) and 8am on 4 November 2025: see paragraphs 19-24 and 27 above. The claimant had also managed to do that despite his childcare commitments: see paragraphs 30 and 36 above.

136.25 Submissions are not the most important part of a hearing, although it is vital to give the parties an opportunity to make them. Good submissions help the tribunal, but bad ones distract the tribunal, and in any event the tribunal has the task of making findings of fact, deciding what law to apply to those findings of fact, and coming to conclusions, no matter what submissions are made to it. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 63

136.26 We were not at all confident that if we postponed our deliberations for, say two weeks, the claimant would put before us any written submissions at that time. That was because of all of the circumstances to which we have referred above in this paragraph. If the claimant would “accept a deliberation without [his] submissions” if he did not put any submissions before us within two weeks from 3 February 2026 (which is what he said in the email set out in paragraph 131 above), then that could be taken to suggest that all he wanted to achieve was delay.

136.27 In any event, in our judgment the interests of justice required us to determine the claims now, without further delay. We therefore did that.

[137]Having done that, we came to our above judgment, which was for the following

[138]We heard oral evidence (in the manner and on the days stated in paragraphs 13- 91 above) from the claimant on his own behalf and, on behalf of the respondents, from the following witnesses:138.1 Mr David Nash, the fourth respondent, who worked for the first respondent (whether on a self-employed basis or under a contract of employment was not made clear to us) as a “Music Industry Consultant”; as with all of the witnesses who were respondents, we refer to this witness in our reasons from paragraph 139 onwards below simply as “Mr Nash” (rather than as, in his case, “the fourth respondent”);

138.2 Mr Michael Abraham, the third respondent, who was at all material times one of the two partners of the first respondent (its sole salaried partner at all material times);

138.3 Mr Simon Aaron, the other such partner (as the sole equity partner) and the second respondent;

138.4 Mr Simon Cooper, a consultant solicitor who provided services to the first respondent on a contractual basis which was not stated to us;

138.5 Mr Kevin Harris, a barrister who was employed by the first respondent as a consultant on a contractual basis which was not stated to us;

138.6 Ms Priya Varsani, who was at all material times a trainee solicitor employed by the first respondent; and

138.7 Mr Aryeh Kaye, who was at all material times employed by the first respondent as its Office Manager. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 64

[139]In addition to the bundles of documents which were put before us at the start of the hearing as described in paragraph 1 above, a number of documents were disclosed by both parties and put before us during the course of the hearing, many of which were put in a supplementary bundle which was sent to the tribunal on 11 December 2025, to which we refer as the SB, and to its pages as for example SB/1. In addition, several video and audio recordings were put before us during the hearing. Having read the documents to which we were referred during the hearing and having seen and heard those recordings, we made the following findings of fact. Our findings of fact The manner in which the claimant came to be employed by the first respondent

findings of fact.

[140]The claimant and Mr Abraham knew each other socially long before the claimant came to be employed by the first respondent. The claimant was at that time and at the start of the claimant’s interactions with the first respondent known to Mr Abraham as Ian Nwabueze. That was clear from the text message of 18 January 2022 at B2/1528, which was sent on the day when the claimant was first interviewed by Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron formally on behalf of the first respondent. It was also clear from the WhatsApp message at B2/1453 (repeated at SB/67), which was sent on 28 January 2022.

[141]The claimant initially sought to be engaged formally by the first respondent as something other than a “Paralegal Assistant”. That was clear from, among other things (including the oral evidence of both Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron), the email of 2 February 2022 at B2/81 from Mr Abraham to the claimant, which was relevant also because in it Mr Abraham stated (in the final two paragraphs of the email) the basis on which the first respondent was willing to engage the claimant as far as the possibility of the claimant becoming a trainee solicitor was concerned. The claimant was, it was clear from the email, at that time seeking to be offered a pupillage, i.e. a position as a pupil barrister. It was our understanding that in order to become a practising barrister, it is necessary to have undergone, or to have obtained an exemption because of relevant previous experience from having to undergo, a successful pupillage. The pupillage is successful only if it is completed satisfactorily as far as the pupilmaster/mistress is concerned.

[142]We could see that the claimant was plainly looking at the alternative route to becoming a qualified lawyer, which was as a solicitor, for which a successfully completed formal traineeship of two years as a full-time trainee (or its part-time equivalent) is required, unless the person in question is exempted from the requirement because of relevant previous experience. The final two paragraphs of the email of 2 February 2022 from Mr Abraham to the claimant at B2/81 were as follows. “You have expressed interest in a training g contract [sic], in the event you are unable to secure a pupillage in September. We are very much interested in the possibility of creating a future training contract. It has always been our Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 65 policy to work alongside prospective trainees and build a relationship with them prior to offering a training contract. Therefore we would propose to adopt the same approach. Please be aware that we currently have two members of staff that are hoping to become Trainee Solicitor and in one case, this is likely to happen within the next month. You would appreciate that we would need to consider the position of existing members of staff in relation to this. If you would like to take matters further, can you please let us have your C.V [i.e. curriculum vitae] and two references preferably from places that you have been employed during the last 3 years.”

[143]It took a further 26 days for the claimant to send his CV: he sent it under cover of the email dated 28 February 2022 at B2/82. The email was signed by the claimant as “Kelechi (Ian)”. The CV (at B2/83-86) showed that the claimant (who was not named in the CV itself, we saw) was an undergraduate at the University of Greenwich from 1999-2003, studying for a BA Hons in Business and Administration, and that there was a gap in his CV for the following five years. In 2010 he was shown as having started studying for the Graduate Diploma in Law at the BPP Law School. That was stated to have taken him two years, so the course may have been undertaken part-time. There were significant gaps in the CV after then until 2016-2017, when the claimant was shown to have undertaken the “Legal Practice Course LLM Mode”. There was then another gap until the claimant was shown as having undertaken the BPP Law School Bar Professional Training Course between 2019 and 2021 so, again, over a period of two years. The CV stated that the claimant was called to the Bar in July 2021, and that from December 2021 to the date of the CV, he was “Assisting Head Barrister, London” at the “Chambers of Julian Hunt”. It was not said by the claimant whether he was doing that on a paid basis or a voluntary basis. We had not ourselves heard of a “head barrister” in a set of chambers, so we inferred that the chambers was that of a sole practitioner by the name of Julian Hunt. The claimant’s CV stated that the work which he did there was “Assisting Julian Hunt by conducting legal research, drafting legal proceeding [sic], taking conference client notes [sic]”.

[144]The CV showed (at B2/84) that the claimant was saying that he had spent some time in the United States of America at least watching, if not participating in, work related to music. That was clear from the following sequence at the top of B2/84: “2014 12months I observed Mr Kerry Gordy (son of Berry Gordy founder of Motown Records) conduct proceedings to terminate US Copyright. I developed an insight and understanding of US and International Copyright law. 2014 3months Mini Pupillage Shadowed CEO Attorney at Hartman and Co Manhattan Law firm. I observed the US court at work. I developed an insight into the US courts systems, US litigation and commercial disputes on multi-million-dollar contract matters. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 66 2013 3months Manhattan, New York, mentor Mr Lyor Cohen (Former CEO of Warner Music Worldwide, 300 Entertainment and currently Head of YouTube music), I observed the formation of an entertainment corporation. I had exposure to a variety of influential business leaders and Legal network (Senior Lawyers).”

[145]We saw that at B2/1454 there was an exchange of text messages between Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron of 31 March and 1 April 2022, in which Mr Aaron said to Mr Abraham on 31 March 2022: “Can you ask your mate to stop calling me. I can see another missed call from him. Either he wants to come or he doesn’t, there’s nothing to keep discussing and it’s wasting all our time. Anyone would think we’re ironing out the terms for the chief exec of British Airways!”

[146]Mr Abraham first responded: “I’ll tell him”; “He’s not my mate though”.

[147]Mr Abraham wrote to the claimant shortly afterwards, copying what he wrote to Mr Aaron (and the copied text was also on B2/1454): “Simon doesn’t want further discussions about the contract, he says either your [sic; i.e. you are] happy with it or not. it’s a decision for you really now as to whether you want to come work for us, it’s no commitment and nothing to lose If you want to give it a go”.

[148]On the next day, 1 April 2022, Mr Aaron wrote to Mr Abraham (at the bottom of B2/1454, where he wrote: “That’s what I told him”) that he had written this to the claimant: “Hello I gather that there is some complication with the bar council about the use of legal counsel. It might be possible to use a title of legal advisor but we’ll have to work with you a few weeks to assess your level first (because it’s a title that implies to clients that you are capable of advising independently, which at the moment we have no idea)”.

[149]By the time that the claimant came to be engaged formally by the respondent, he was using the first name of Kelechi. That was clear from the document that described itself as a “zero hours contract” which was dated by hand 14 April 2022, at B2/30-36, under which the claimant was described (at the top of B2/31) as a “Paralegal Assistant”, “responsible to Simon Aaron and Michael Abraham” and that he would be required to “undertake the following duties and responsibilities”, which started with “Assisting the fee earners and in particular Michael Abraham and Simon Aaron with Civil Litigation and Music Law (and you may be asked to Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 67 help in other areas)”. The normal hours of work for the claimant, when he did work under the contract, were (by reason of clause 6 of the contract, on B2/32) “10.00am to 6.00pm less one hour for lunch where you work a full day”.

[150]The claimant’s work for the first respondent (and therefore in practice Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham via the first respondent which, by virtue of section 1(2) of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, is a corporation) started off being done mainly in what the claimant called the first respondent’s “music department”, which, as far as we could see, consisted principally of the work done by Mr Nash. The precise way in which the claimant worked was not directly relevant, since he did not have the right to, and did not, claim that he was dismissed unfairly within the meaning of section 98 of the ERA 1996. However,(1) the claimant’s effectiveness as a paralegal and

(2) the way in which he worked or otherwise interacted with the second to fourth respondents and other people who worked for the first respondent, were relevant. That was because if he we found as a fact that the claimant’s work and work relationships were good, then that would be good evidence that the claimant might have been dismissed and otherwise treated detrimentally for a reason which contravened either section 47B of the ERA 1996 or the EqA 2010.

[151]In what follows, in part for the sake of clarity and in part because there was a claim against Mr Nash personally, we first state our main findings of fact about the manner in which the claimant worked and otherwise interacted with Mr Nash in the period up to Christmas 2022. After that, and in effect restarting our statement of the events chronologically, we state our additional findings of fact about what happened during the same period in regard to the claimant’s desire to become a qualified lawyer by becoming a fully qualified barrister. Those additional findings of fact concern in the main the manner in which the claimant performed or acted when assisting (principally) Mr Abraham. We then turn to, and state our findings of fact about, the events of 2023 up to the date when the claimant was informed by the first respondent that he was being dismissed, which was 31 August 2023. We then make findings of fact about relevant events which occurred after then. The claimant’s work in the music department of the first respondent during 2022 and other events relating to the claimant’s employment by the first respondent in 2022

[152]In paragraph 9 of his witness statement, the claimant said this: “I had been employed since approximately April 2022 in the capacity of a Paralegal. I worked within the music department, and my job role was to assist Partners in the firm on their matters.”

[153]Mr Nash was not consulted by anyone acting on behalf of the first respondent before the claimant was in effect allocated to work with Mr Nash by the first respondent. That was clear from the following passage of Mr Nash’s witness statement, all of which we accepted as being an accurate statement of Mr Nash’s experience of working with the claimant in the period up to Christmas 2022. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 68 “2. The Claimant was introduced to me on the day he started on 27th April 2022. I had never been introduced to him prior and was not told that I was going to be having a colleague working with me. I had not been notified that my working arrangement had been changed or that I would be working with anyone else. Prior to this I had mostly been working alone and did not need assistance with matters, other than conversations with Simon Aaron if and when it concerned contractual issues or other legal points. 3. During my first in-person conversation with the Claimant, without me having enquired about his experience, he informed me that he had recently returned from the USA, where he had been working with the legal team handling the accounts of the Motown group. Including their artist’s recording and publishing agreements, including licensing, sponsorships, and reversionary rights for Motown’s artists and songwritiers, etc. 4. I found this extremely exciting and interesting, as I have spent many years learning about the Gordy legacy and Motown’s impact on world music, not just America’s landscape. I asked questions regarding the catalogues of Smokey Robinson, The Corporation, Stevie Wonder and Marvin Gaye, amongst others, with the hope that he may share some of his knowledge and insight into the workings of these amazing artists and songwriters. 5. Marvin Gaye was of particular interest at that time, as the Robin Thicke/Pharrell/Gaye estate matter regarding the use of a Gaye recording/title was being disputed in the formers recording/title “Blurred Lines”, and was being contested in the US copyright courts. 6. When I started asking questions about specifics, such as Motown Records, or Jobete Publishing and its artists and songwriters, he seemed to back away very quickly from answering any questions. He did not acknowledge or comprehend the astonishing background(s) of Stevie Wonder, Smokey Robinson or Holland/Dozier/Holland, and their achievements as artists and as songwriters! I was surprised given that he had just boasted about his experience at Motown records. 7. My experience with the Claimant was that his knowledge seemed very limited and he was unwilling to engage unless he was very prepared, and at those times it seemed as if he was purely quoting from text. He would often back away from answering questions when I threw them out for discussion. 8. During these early months, I mentioned to Simon Aaron and other colleagues on a number of occasions at the time, that I didn’t believe Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 69 that he knew a great deal about the history of music, or today’s music scene, or how to “handle” the variety and diversity of our clients. 9. He struggled to deal with the simplest of tasks, like composing an email to our clients or the other party’s solicitors Warner Chappell’s legal representatives. On one attempt, we reached around eleven drafts (for a summary update) before we were actually able to send out a single email. Even then the final email contained basic spelling errors. There was one occasion where I was dictating the content of an email to the Claimant, which was to be sent to Simon Aaron. It took a further 7 hours for that email to actually make its way across the office to Simon, but only after I had prompted the Claimant again to send it. It’s not how I work, and everybody knows that. 10. The Claimant would not respect the fact that I had to take the lead on cases, and would take action on cases without my knowledge or involvement. He seemed to want to hold himself out as the lead fee earner on matters. I was alarmed by this as I did not consider him to have the knowledge or experience to do so, and this ultimately would not benefit the clients. Throughout this whole matter, I was working from home and this is why the firm may have not had a full understanding of what was happening, as he was taking these actions and keeping it to himself. 11. This is illustrated by his comment on page 141 [that was an email dated 27 January 2023, so it post-dates the period which we are describing in this section of our reasons] where he refers to having taken the enquiry and managing the matter with David assisting. This is entirely untrue as he knew nothing about the matter, the client or the issues. He might have taken the initial call but nothing further would have happened until it was put through to me. 12. Given all of these issues, I believed him to be incompetent, and I did not want to work with him any longer. I was happy with the original working relationship, whereby I would carry out work for myself and obtain Simon Aarons assistance where necessary. I had explained my reasons for not wanting to work with the Claimant on page 97-98. I emailed the office manager Aryeh Kaye on 30th September 2022, explaining that I did not want to work with the Claimant page 99. I believe that we resumed working together a short while after this from 12th September 2022. 13. In relation to the email of 31st October 2022 (page 104), I thought it had been agreed for this particular case that I was dealing with this matter directly together with Simon Aaron. I believe that the Claimant had emailed the lawyer on the other side directly, and so I clarified this with him. Aryeh emailed me the following day, asking that I do copy the Claimant into my emails for this case, page 105. I had made it clear Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 70 that I did not think that the Claimant was helping me, and I believe he was hindering my work. I admit that I did not copy him into all emails, as I did not see the need to. 14. On the limited number of cases and clients that we began to work on, I found the Claimant’s approach and technique to be slow and at times I found him patronising towards the clients. He struggled to understand the needs of our clients and therefore would come across as confused or less than adequately informed regarding the accompanying facts, that may have been relevant to our client. I found him patronising and aloof, and I felt that he made our potential clients feel ill at ease. 15. I had a cordial relationship with the Claimant despite the fact that I did not rate his ability. During the early stages, we had a healthy engagement regarding matters. As is my nature, I made light of situations and we would laugh together. I would never in my life believe that he was recording conversations and taking notes of my conduct. 16. I believed that we were moving forward. So much so, that during the Christmas Party in 2022, I offered the Claimant the opportunity to attend an event for London Fashion Week, which I was attending with a band/artist I was working with. The Claimant jumped at he opportunity, but this obviously didn’t happen because of the circumstances that followed.”

[154]The emails to which Mr Nash referred in that passage fully bore out what they were said to show (although the email at B2/99 was sent on 30 August 2022 and not 30 September 2022, as Mr Nash said in paragraph 12 of his witness statement). For example, the email at B2/97-98 from Mr Nash to Mr Aaron referred to the difficulties which Mr Nash had had with the claimant by the date of the email (26 August 2022) and ended for material purposes with this passage: ‘As Kelechi has made it abundantly clear to me he is resolute and that I am at fault, and in his own words “I am right”. There seems little else to do, but to consider moving forward alone, and do as we have done with matters of this nature in the past, and you & I work on the final draft(s). It’s a shame, but I don’t feel inclined to continue to share my knowledge and experience with an individual that has little if any faith in the ways I handle matters. Of course, you are the boss, and if you feel this matter is better managed by Kelechi, then I am more than willing to step away entirely.’

[155]The emails at B2/104-105 were the subject of two specific claims stated in the list of issues at B1/122 and B1/124 (in paragraphs 3.1.2 and 8.1.3 respectively). We record here that we regarded Mr Nash’s evidence about them, stated in paragraph 13 of his witness statement, to be an apt description of their effect, but of course Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 71 they spoke for themselves. We return to them in paragraph 311 below where we state our conclusions on the relevant factual assertions of the claimant. The first claimed public interest disclosure and its aftermath

[156]The first part of the email at B2/97-98 from Mr Nash to Mr Aaron (which was sent on 26 August 2022) related to the claimant’s claimed public interest disclosure stated in paragraph 2.1.1.1 on B1/121, which was this: “25 August 2022: Discussion with Simon Aaron, partner of the first respondent”.

[157]The email at B2/97-98 was therefore written the day after the claimed public interest disclosure of the claimant. It is convenient to set out the part which described the situation in which the claimant was claiming that he had made a public interest disclosure on 25 August 2022, which we now do. ‘Morning Simon. To clarify a matter that seems to have exploded into something, which it shouldn’t have. An extracted part of Kelechi’s attendance notes from Wednesday’s zoom call with the client. “[Name redacted] - Can you look over record company contract as I do want to jump ship, I want to get back into being independent. David Nash - Believe distribution,” Although, an accurate report would be to state that after [Name redacted]’s question, statement “I want to get back into being independent”, I asked Alex “Have you heard of Believe”? It was simple question, the beginning of an open-ended conversation and I mentioned a single company to demonstrate to our client that I knew of possible solutions to new matter he had brought to my attention during a ‘live’ conversation. It’s called thinking on my feet! I did not make any specific recommendations. Other than to state that I had had dealings with them, and I would happily, send him information on that particular company. It was not a closed conversation in which I was promoting one company over another. The conversation was left open, for further discussion. It was not a major part of the overall conversation. This entire situation has been blown out of all perspective!’

[158]In fact, the day before, 25 August 2022, Mr Aaron had sent the email at B2/95, to both the claimant and Mr Nash, copying it to Mr Kaye, in which Mr Aaron referred Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 72 to a conversation of the day before (24 August 2022) with the claimant. The email at B2/95 from Mr Aaron was therefore even more contemporaneous, and it was in our view the very best evidence of what was claimed by the claimant to have been a public interest disclosure. It bears repeating in full, which we now do. ‘I recall Kelechi asking me yesterday about whether we can recommend to clients the names of third party organisations/distributors. This seems to have led to some kind of tension between both of you, I am not sure why, but I will repeat what I said. There is a rule that we as solicitors need to tread carefully around, whereby we do not give specific financial advice to clients (we cannot unless we have special FCA permission). So in litigation matters for example, we might encourage a client to take out an insurance policy, and we can go as far as to suggest the names of a few insurance companies who we think might assist, but we should not specifically recommend one insurer over another, otherwise we are treading into the territory of giving discreet financial advice. In general terms, it is a good policy to follow for other reasons too e.g. if the insurer went belly-up, the client might grumble that we made the recommendation and we should cover the loss. So, we try to follow that rule in a wider context, but we don’t want to come across as overly difficult/unhelpful, so we try to strike a sensible balance. If a landlord client asked me do I know a good letting agent, I might mention a few I know, and I might say that someone has told me they particularly liked this particular agent. However I would add the caveat that for professional

[159]We pause to say that the reference there to the FCA was to the Financial Conduct Authority, which governs the giving of advice about financial products, so in our view the role of the FCA did not cover the giving of advice (if such it was that Mr Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 73 Nash did in the circumstances) about a third party organisation from whom a client might buy services such as marketing or distribution. In our understanding, the only relevant legal obligations which might be engaged where a solicitor (or a barrister) mentions a third party supplier of something other than financial services are159.1 the law of negligence and

159.2 the implied contractual duty to act in the best interests of the client, which could in our view add nothing to the obligation in the law of negligence unless the lawyer had a financial stake in the third party supplier. In the latter case, we concluded that all that would be required of the law of contract would be to inform the client of that financial stake.

[160]In paragraph 19 of his witness statement, Mr Nash said that he mentioned “Believe Distribution” as he had “recently dealt with them and was happy with them.” Mr Nash continued: “I should clarify that this is a multinational company. I have no shares in this company and would not have received any commission for any recommendation.” That evidence was not challenged by the claimant and in any event we accepted it.

[161]The situation was further evidenced by the exchange of emails at B2/96. Neither of the emails was shown by what was on that page completely: the email from the claimant at the bottom of the page was cut off and we could not see its end anywhere in the bundle. It was dated 24 August 2022, and we set it out in the following paragraph below. That email was sent to Mr Nash and was copied to Mr Aaron.The email on the rest of the page was from Mr Nash (that was clear from its end) to the claimant and was copied to Mr Aaron. The index to B2 said that that email was sent on 25 August 2022. That email of 25 August 2022 was one of the claimed acts of detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 47B of the ERA 1996, and it too bears being set out in full.

[162]The truncated email from the claimant at the bottom of B2/96 was in these terms. “Dear David, Please see the attendance note for your contribution. I will also await both documents to email our clients confirming his instructions and the draft response for Ed to commence negotiation. I spoke to simon about what we discussed and he agreed that we should make references to more than one company that our clients have been happy with but we are unable to make any recommendation because it is not within our scope.”

[163]Mr Nash’s reply was this. ‘Thanks. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 74 To be CRYSTAL CLEAR, Kelechi! I simply asked our client a question “Have you heard of Believe”? To which he responded “No, I have not”. I then told him that I would send him information on the company. Which I shall do. My goal with any client, is to demonstrate an extensive knowledge of the industry which we claim to know something about. Our client is looking to find alternative solutions to his distribution situation, moving forward. I offered a solution. It’s what I do! He now knows that I (not you) can offer him a solution. Which, in time, will require negotiating and therefore, will generate further income for the practice, and therefore MORE MONEY! I tried to explain to you prior to that zoom, that Alex would no longer feel comfortable working with [name redacted] in any capacity, but you have pushed the JV agenda, without considering the clients point of view, and yesterday’s conversation confirmed every single point I have raised since we became aware of the deception, on the part of [name redacted] I have no intention of altering the way I deal with clients, unless I feel that I have acted unethically, which I do not. For the record. I do not appreciate anyone “running to teacher”. If my conduct is now being questioned, then maybe it’s time to review the entire relationship? Let me know Simon, if that’s what you would like. Wishing all a wonderful Thursday morning.’

[164]The email at B2/99 from Mr Nash to Mr Kaye was (as we say in paragraph 154 above) sent on 30 August 2022. The email was in these terms (only): “Basically. I have no further wish to work with Kelechi, on this or any other matter, and I wanted to know what Simon’s thought are on the situation and how he would like to move forward.”

[165]Mr Nash did not refer in his witness statement to his email of 28 November 2022 at B2/109. Mr Aaron did: in paragraph 28 of his witness statement (i.e. his first witness statement; all references below to Mr Aaron’s witness statement are to that first statement) which we accepted, he said this: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 75 “Another issue which troubled me was that the chemistry between the Claimant and David did not seem to settle well. Not long after the episode concerning the recommendation of a distributor, David said that he would prefer not to work with the Claimant any longer (B2 page 99). Aryeh and I tried to encourage David to continue working with him (B2 page 103), particularly as one of the purposes of employing the Claimant was to help David. Things seemed to be better during September and October, but towards the end of October the relationship was showing signs of strain again, and on 28 November David sent me an email expressing his upset about the Claimant. (B2 page 109)”.

[166]The email at B2/109 contained this passage. ‘Regarding Kelechi, I have tried to be supportive and encouraging, but if there are “lies” now being circulated by him, then I cannot work with him any further. How can I, if I cannot trust him to report the facts to management accurately. Or if I have a colleague who believes that it is His actions, knowledge and expertise that is attracting clients and not mine and yours. That is not #teamwork and I cannot support someone who cannot work as part of a team, a family. Sorry to put things in such a blunt fashion, and I am in no way giving any kind of Ultimatum to you or Michael, but who knows what he is willing to say or do next or indeed what he has said or done already. He has already accused me of unprofessional conduct. Questioned my practices and actions. Attempted to tell me how to write an email to my own client, and today he contacted our clients Manager, when I was led to understand that I was to communicate with any parties, and therefore once again he has undermined my position, when he knew fully that I was dealing with all communications. I don’t believe you or Michael would accept those actions, and therefore I don’t believe I should or indeed, could.”

[167]The next paragraph of Mr Aaron’s witness statement (which we accepted) explained a part of Mr Nash’s evidence to which we have not yet referred, and which we set out in the next paragraph below. Paragraph 29 of Mr Aaron’s witness statement was as follows. “‘Though I cannot recall the exact date, I remember that one evening around this time, Aryeh and I had a meeting with the Claimant and David, where the Claimant was in the office and David joined by phone. We tried to help them Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 76 to work out their differences, but it was obvious that things were strained between them. One thing that particularly stayed in my mind about the conversation was when the Claimant accused David of “oppressing” him, as I found this to be quite strange terminology. I felt that it was a very loaded expression, which didn’t seem appropriate to the discussion, and I was not surprised when David said that he took offence to the accusation.’

[168]In paragraph 17 of his witness statement (which we accepted), Mr Nash said this: “I was shocked and devastated at the Claimants repeated use of the word oppressive to myself and the firm, to describe my actions. To me the word has nothing but extreme darkness and negativity attached to it, and there is no need to use that type of language. I did express this to Simon also within my email on page 142-143. The claimant can be seen continuing to describe me as oppressive on page 146, 149 and 151. I consider myself to be lighthearted in nature and I have never had anyone describe me in this manner in my 57 years. My goal has always been to bring a measure of fun and I want to question and share my knowledge, along with learning from others, and the Claimant was a part of that.”

[169]We set out the content of the email at pages B2/142-143 in paragraph 229 below. That email was sent by Mr Nash on 29 January 2023. Before returning to that email, we(1) refer to the second set of circumstances on which the claimant relied as showing that he had made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996, and then

(2) we go back in time chronologically and state our findings of fact on events which occurred in parallel to those relating to Mr Nash. The second claimed public interest disclosure

[170]In paragraph 31 of his witness statement (which we accepted), Mr Aaron said this: “Around mid-December 2022 the Claimant raised another issue with me concerning David, in which he alleged that David was behaving unethically. I looked into the matter, and in fact it was quite an interesting point to do with how far one can go in negotiations with suggestions that the client might be interested in developing a contractual relationship with the other side, if in fact that was not the client’s intention. It was a point on which I sent an email to David and the Claimant, giving them guidance and making suggestions (19 December 2022) (pages 115-117). It was actually a very interesting question from an academic perspective, on which there might well be a range of opinion, and I certainly did not take the view that David had intentionally engaged in unethical behaviour. It was simply an issue for guidance. David took the point on board, and responded “Thank you Simon, I do see your point and I agree”. I was not troubled any further by the matter, but in due course (after the Claimant realised that we had concerns about his performance) this would transpire to be another incident that the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 77 Claimant would repeatedly re-visit in his attempts to twist the episode into an alleged ‘whistleblowing’ incident.”

[171]The email of 19 December 2022 from Mr Aaron at B2/115 ended with the following paragraph. “It may be that [name redacted] has very little intention of going forward with [name redacted] but as long as he promises not to make a final decision until the discussion with [name redacted] has ended, then we are ok to keep going as you are below. Do you see the point? It is very subtle, but you need to do it for your own ethical protection.”

[172]In fact, the lay client was named via the attachment to the email at B2/117, and we could not see a legal justification for it being redacted in the context of a public hearing of these claims. In any event, the first email in the chain, to which Mr Aaron did not refer, was at B2/114, which was from the claimant to Mr Aaron (not copied to Mr Nash) in which the claimant wrote that he was “not privy to any conversation regarding the below strategy mentioned in David’s email below.” Mr Aaron then, in the email at B2/115, copied Mr Nash in when replying to the claimant. Mr Nash then, in the email at B2/116, which he copied to the claimant, merely said: “Thank you Simon, I do see your point and agree.” At B2/117, the claimant, after receiving the emails at B2/115 and B2/116, wrote this: “I strongly recommend that the email sent to our client by David is withdrawn urgently, as David confirmed in the email what the purpose of delaying terminating the verbal agreement is. This places our client in serious legal risk of legal acceptance of an agreement if [named blanked out] accepts such proposal despite it being our clients intention and or proposal.”

[173]What Mr Nash said in paragraph 21 of his witness statement was relevant here and was as follows. “In relation to the matter of the management agreement, I believe the Claimant had his wires crossed and wasn’t sure what was going on within the negotiations. When Simon emailed guidance (page 115), I understood what he was saying, but the Claimant didn’t seem to grasp the point and kept on bringing it up again. I don’t know how he could have thought that I had behaved improperly. The Claimant did after his termination raise the matter with the SRA and they decided not to investigate this issue, as they were satisfied that there was no deceptive or bad advice page 624.”

[174]The letter at B2/624 was headed “Investigation into Simons Rodkins Solicitors LLP and Mr Michael Abraham’s conduct”, was dated 2 April 2024, and was from Mr Martin Dean, an Investigation Officer at the Solicitors Regulation Authority, to Mr Aaron. In it, Mr Dean said this: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 78 “I note that the client was a musician who wanted to change management at a point where the agent’s contract, including royalties, was being renegotiated. The Firm advised the client to continue with these negotiations despite wanting to leave that agent. The proposed contract had details of future royalties if the contract was terminated. I do not believe this was deceptive or bad advice.” Texts of 1 August 2022 relating to the claimant’s attempts to arrange a pupillage for him involving the first respondent in some way

[175]It is convenient here to go back in time chronologically to 1 August 2022. On that day Mr Abraham sent the texts in the main part of B2/1455 to Mr Aaron. At 10:52, Mr Abraham wrote: “Kelechi just really irritated me, calling me to the meeting room whilst I’m busy, wanting to talk about potential barrister training, I told him not to bother me in a Monday morning with this stuff”.

[176]At 18:38, Mr Abraham wrote to Mr Aaron: “Kelechi just called me, essentially he seemed to be getting angry about the fact that we are not positive about doing the bar training I told him Zsofia is leaving and therefore potentially a full-time opportunity might be coming available, he said that if he is going to do full time then he would only do it as either a trainee solicitor or as a pupil barrister I told him that I would tell you that and he started to backtrack a bit”.

[177]Three minutes later, Mr Abraham added: “I think we need to either have a sit down with him or simply tell him where he stands”.

[178]Mr Aaron replied less than an hour later: “Yes I think Aryeh had much the same thought, so I’ll let both of you talk to him” “Aryeh wants to say he can start full time beginning September, with a potential view to training contract but only a solicitor training contract”. Emails of 4, 5 and 9 August 2022 about the possibility of the claimant being offered a training contract

[179]On 4 August 2022, Mr Kaye sent the email at B2/87 to the claimant. The whole of it was material. Its text was as follows. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 79 “Dear Kelechi, Further to your talks with Simon and Michael I just want to repeat their offer, on the basis that Zsofia leaves at the end of the month, after she has left we are able to increase your days on your current contract and pay from 2 to 5 days a week. You have told Simon and Michael you don’t want to increase your days, and I am just suggesting you think about it a few days and confirm by the end of next week (12th August) if that is still your position. Regarding a training contract we are willing to eventually consider you for that position but we are not willing to offer one immediately. I would also like to make it clear that no promise of a training contract commencing September was made to you at any time, we only indicated we would review the position. You will not lose out by working 5 days now as time worked now will be used to reduce the two years of your training contract whether at this firm or any other. Increasing your days to 5 is the next logical career step at the firm and brings you closer to a training contract offer. If you do not increase your days we will be looking to bring others in who may be a competitor for any training contract in the future.”

[180]The claimant replied later that day in the email at the top of B2/88, which was in these terms. “Whilst I would prefer for Zsophia to stay. Are you suggesting that she may not leave at the end of the month? Simon suggested after two months of working full time from September a training contract will be considered. Would that still be the position? How much will ones pay be increased by from September and during a training contract? Would my role be changed to a legal adviser on a full-time bases?”

[181]The following day (5 August 2022), Mr Kaye responded in the email at the bottom of B2/89, which was in these terms. “Dear Kelechi, Sorry I missed the call. Zsofia is expected to leave the end of August. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 80 You are on a flexible contract it allows for you to increase days, there is no intention to change any part of the contract such as title or pay. No one is giving a hard date for a training contract all that has been said is we are willing to consider one. Any discussion of pay would be following an offer not now but as you are aware this is not a city firm and pay is low, it is unlikely to be significantly different. The idea of being here from your perspective, is you presumably want to qualify as a solicitor. Have a nice weekend and see you Monday.”

[182]The claimant then, on the same day, at 19:25 sent the email at the top of B2/89, to Mr Kaye, Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron. It was in these terms. “Dear All, As the position appears to have changed from what I discussed on Wednesday with Simon; that after 2months of full time a review on a training contract will be considered. My concerns now is that the goal post will keep on shifting in addition to a real risk in whether anything will be offered. I will thus continue working two days a week. I hope my decision gives you time to find someone full time.”

[183]Nine minutes later, Mr Abraham responded (in the email at the bottom of B2/90): “Dear Kelechi, Nobody said training contract guaranteed after two months of full time. In the conversation that we had, I made clear that during the 2 months we would have a chance to see you in action properly and make a decision as to whether you are a good candidate to be our next trainee solicitor. At the moment we only see you in action for 2/5 of the working week. If we said that its guaranteed then it would make no sense for us to wait 2 months. I therefore can’t understand the comment about shifting goal posts and generally am sensing a misplaced frustration. Have a good weekend and shabbat shalom. Will see you on Monday.”

[184]Four days later, so on 9 August 2022, the claimant responded in the email at the top of B2/90, which was sent at 10:35 and was in these terms. “Dear Michael, I did not state that a training contract will be offered after 2months. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 81 I stated that in my conversation with Simon he had stated that after 2months of working full-time that it a training contract will be reviewed. Shifting goal post is basically not making it clear regarding what the process is. Furthermore Arye confirmed in an email that my position title will be reviewed in September. I will work 2days a week to be able to keep myself available for interviews and to work on my applications as it is quite clear that I am not valued.”

[185]While we refer below to the concerns which Mr Abraham had about the claimant’s work, we record here that that email of the claimant was sent technically on the same day that Mr Abraham sent the email at B2/91, which was sent to the claimant at 00:54 on 9 August 2022, and was in these terms. “Subject: RE: Urgent attention [name blanked out] Dear Kelechi, I didn’t ask you to email the figure for statutory interest. In future please do not send out sensitive emails without first checking with me. You must realise that we have a way of doing things and working to achieve results. I appreciate that you wish to help, but jumping the gun and sending out correspondence, without me having a chance to check it can have the opposite effect. You should have been especially conscious of this after our morning discussion, where I emphasised that we need to be particularly careful about how we word our correspondence with them, as you wanted to complain about Charlotte going on holiday without dealing with the matter. I note that you told us that you had a bit of a stern discussion with HMRC, asking them to waive statutory interest. I’m sorry to tell you that they somehow sent us a new proof of debt with £3,000 additional debt added on top.”

[186]The claimant responded in the email sent at 10:37 on 10 August 2022 at B2/92- 93, and Mr Abraham responded to that email in one sent at 11:05 on the same day, which was at the top of B2/92. We took the content of both of those emails into account fully in our deliberations. Emails of 9 and 12 August 2022 between the claimant and Mr Abraham about the claimant’s desire to qualify as a lawyer

[187]In the email in the bottom half of B2/94, which was sent at 23:02 on 9 August 2022 and responded to an email which we did not see in the documentary evidence before us but which it appeared clear had as its heading the subject “Re: Increasing your days”, Mr Abraham said this: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 82 “Dear Kelechi, The process is quite clear and has been explained, but I will set it out again. We are offering for you to work 5 days a week rather than 2 from when Zsofia leaves, (provided she does actually leave). This would be on the same contractual basis that you are now. After two months we can review the position in relation to offering you a training contract. There is nothing unclear or complicated about that process. Obviously you are welcome to carry on as you currently are. I know you are extremely keen to qualify as a barrister, more so than you would wish to become a solicitor and we would wish to support you so far as reasonably possible, in achieving your desired qualification. If remaining on a 2 day basis assists you with regard to applying/interviewing for barrister roles, that is understood. Obviously, it means that someone else that wants full time work might fill Zsofia’s role and/or any future solicitor training contract position.”

[188]The claimant responded three days later, on 12 August 2022, at 16:34, in the email at the top of B2/94, whose text was this: “Hope you are well! What are your thoughts regarding registering as a pupillage provider for 1year?”

[189]We observe that the emails of 26 and 30 August 2022 to which we refer in paragraph 154 above were sent after that email was sent and before Mr Abraham sent the text message to which we now refer. Text of 2 September 2022 from Mr Abraham to Mr Aaron

[190]Three days after Mr Nash sent the email at B2/99 which we have set out in paragraph 164 above, Mr Abraham sent the text message at B2/1456 dated 2 September 2022 to Mr Aaron, namely: “Kelechi is playing games with me, and I literally don’t want him here anymore”. Texts between Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham of 6 September 2022

[191]Mr Aaron’s next message on that page, so what appeared to be the first texted reply to the one which we have just set out, was sent four days later, on 6 September 2022, and was in these terms: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 83 “I spoke to David and he agrees with last nights discussion, and would be willing to give things another try following us speaking to kelechi (assuming kelechi accepts what we say and doesn’t have delusions of grandeur) So we need to chat with him tomorrow”.

[192]Mr Abraham responded on the same day, in the text in the bottom half of B2/1456, which was this: “We cant change his behaviour or ego, the bottom line is I can’t see myself working with him on a day to day basis the way I do with the others, not because he’s a bad person or stupid, he will just do my head in and interrupt my thought process, that’s not good for me, if you think he could work with others such as DN, SC or KH, or indeed yourself, then that’s fine, my feeling is that he cant be moulded or made to act as an extension of someone else, which is essentially what we expect from trainees/paralegals”. Aspects of the work done by the claimant for Mr Abraham in 2022

[193]Mr Abraham gave extensive evidence about his experience of the work done by the claimant. As we say in paragraph 150 above, it was necessary to decide whether there was any evidence to support the proposition that Mr Abraham’s view of the claimant’s work was affected negatively by the claimant’s race, in other words whether his view of the claimant’s performance was less positive than it would have been if the claimant had been, say, white and British. Mr Abraham’s evidence about the claimant’s work overlapped with that of Mr Nash, so we do not here set out what Mr Abraham said in his witness statement about the things to which we refer above. We do, however, record here that we accepted what Mr Abraham said in paragraphs 14-17 and 20-28 of his witness statement in its entirety, in other words we accepted as facts the events and concerns which Mr Abraham described in those paragraphs. We did so having heard and seen the claimant, Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron (who described, in paragraph 27 of his witness statement, his own experience of the claimant’s work in October and November 2022) give evidence, and having taken into account the contemporaneous documents to which Mr Abraham referred in those paragraphs (to one of which we return in the next paragraph below). We have already referred, in paragraphs 185 and 186 above, to some of those contemporaneous documents. For the avoidance of doubt, we found(1) what Mr Abraham said to us and in those contemporaneous documents about what the claimant did and did not do in the events to which that evidence related, to be objectively wellfounded and

(2) that Mr Abraham’s concerns about the claimant’s conduct as described in those documents and that oral evidence were genuine. Text messages between Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron of November 2022

[194]On 5 November 2022, at 22:10, Mr Aaron texted Mr Abraham (the text was at the top of B2/1457): Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 84 “An interesting call from kelechi yesterday 5 minutes before Shabbat, he was in quite a panic about the job, said he’d spoken to you yesterday”.

[195]Mr Abraham responded at 07:41 on the next day, 6 November 2022, in the text in the main part of B2/1457, which was in these terms. “So in a nutshell, he was sending me messages on whatsapp about politics and we were having a little discussion, then I asked him what days he was coming in next week, and also why he is entering no time on insight, he immediately called me and sounded quite distraught, he was telling me that he stopped entering time since the David Nash debacle because his confidence had been so badly dented by it, he said that prior to that whole issue, he was entering time properly on insight and was criticised for being professional, he was going on about what happened there and how upset he was by that episode, and that David Nash was a liar. I said that whilst I don’t understand exactly what went on there with David Nash, we can’t force him to work with you on the matter, since DN is the more senior fee earner and he (kelechi) is very junior at the firm. I said that this wasn’t really a good excuse for not having entered any time over 2 months, that despite being disappointed about that, he should have got his head down to the work. I told him that he should now be entering time on matters where he does work. He sounded concerned about his job so I reassured him not to worry but to pick it up going forward. He then started going on about you speaking to him on Monday, I said that you were under pressure and unlikely to have time for it over the next couple of weeks. He was adamant that you agreed to sit with him on Monday, so I said that me and Aryeh would sit down with him to look at the policies this week if he wanted. He sounded very annoyed about that and said that he would only agree to that if I had authority to agree to it (i.e us agreeing to become a barrister training provider). I said that I couldn’t give that assurance and given what we discussed previously, how could we be sure that we wanted to do that. He then started getting quite frantic asking “what’s changed?” I then pleaded with him to try to pick things up over the next 2 weeks and said that I was trying to help him, but if he wasn’t entering any time on insight and taking ages to draft the most simplest of letters, it wasn’t appropriate to consider these things. He was then shouting at me frantically about how we only come up with these things when he’s due to be appraised and that he might as well quit. At that point it was practically shabbat and my wife wanted me to put the phone down, so I had to leave it there.”

[196]Mr Abraham then, at 08:46, added (at the bottom of B2/1457): “Not so much a nutshell I guess”. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 85

[197]Then, on 30 November 2022, at 08:36, Mr Abraham wrote (at the top of B2/1458; the texts of that day to which we refer in the next two paragraphs below were on the same page) to Mr Aaron: “Kelechi on the phone to me for around 40 minutes last night, by his language it would seem he thinks that we have some sort of duty to force DN to work with him, because his contract was to work on music matters, I explained that it’s a difficult dilemma because he is heading the music department and what can we do if they are both clashing in this way”.

[198]Mr Aaron replied at 08:59: “He’s had ‘problem’ stamped all over him from day 1.”

[199]At 09:06, he added: “Well before day 1 in fact I already had an overwhelming sense of problem character when all those discussions about contract kept going on and on and on. Even then, he was wasting droves of my time and he hadn’t even started”.

[200]We pause to say that in paragraph 7 of his witness statement, on which he was heavily cross-examined by the claimant, Mr Aaron said this: “In hindsight I now know that his CV (B2 pages 82-86) omitted previous employers who he has pursued in the Tribunal. At the time, I had no idea of the nightmare that was about to unfold, and I make no apology for using the word nightmare, because that was my experience of employing the Claimant. His method of operating would appear to be that when he senses that things are not going well and/or he is not going to get his way, he suddenly unleashes a torrent of allegations involving discrimination in order to pressure the organisation to give him what he wants.”

[201]Returning to the texts on B2/1458, Mr Abraham wrote at 21:36 on the same day, 30 November 2022: “I can actually see where David Nash is coming from, as today I felt as though he was questioning me, for advising and steering the client in the right direction, which is essentially our job, literally moronic, and when he acts in that way it makes me feel unsafe around him, as he will look to create issues over what you do, as if he knows better both tactically and morally, moreover, I thought I was teaching him a lesson in how to advise and he ended up accusing me of twisting his words, because he didn’t like that he was so utterly wrong, bizarre”.

[202]Mr Aaron then wrote, at 22:35 (also at B2/1458): Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 86 “I think do send him a short email about bizarre behaviour like that”.

[203]Our attention was not drawn to an email in which either Mr Abraham or Mr Aaron did that. Given what Mr Aaron said in paragraph 30 of his witness statement (which we accepted; we set it out at the end of this paragraph), we concluded that the reason why no such email was sent was because Mr Abraham by that stage had concluded that the claimant’s employment with the first respondent should be ended, and that having discussed that with Mr Aaron, the two of them decided for good reasons to carry out an appraisal meeting with the claimant before coming to a firm conclusion on the claimant’s continued employment by the first respondent. Paragraph 30 of Mr Aaron’s witness statement was in these terms: “During one of our monthly management meetings towards the end of the year, Michael indicated that he felt we should end the Claimant’s contract. I was in agreement that the Claimant was not demonstrating a level of capability we wanted, but I suggested that to be fair we should probably let him have his appraisal and listen to anything he might want to say in response to our concerns, bearing in mind that we had promised an appraisal.” The events of 2023 up to and including the claimant’s dismissal

[204]The first relevant event of 2023 was described by Mr Abraham in paragraph 29 of his witness statement. That event had to be seen against the background of what preceded it, as described in paragraphs 26-28 of that witness statement, which as we say in paragraph 193 above, we accepted. For the sake of clarity, we now set out those three paragraphs, as part of a passage which was of central importance to the case before us. After setting out that passage, we refer to some oral evidence of Mr Abraham which supplemented what he said in the passage. “26. I started to get more concerned after some instances in December 2022. The first was where I asked the Claimant to call a client in relation to payment. The client had made a payment for further work but had not paid for the initial meeting. For some reason this led to a big debate and the Claimant kept coming back to ask why we were seeking payment. In the end, the Claimant had involved the office manager, receptionist and myself in a four-way discussion about whether or not the client had already paid. It was quite frustrating for a very simple task, so I just picked up the phone to the client and explained that he had not paid for the initial meeting, and that we required payment for it. The client understood and made the payment.27. Thereafter, when I was advising the same client, the Claimant was giving advice over me and speaking over me whilst I was speaking to the client. He did the same when I had a subsequent conversation with the opposing solicitor, and I found this extremely unprofessional. On the same matter, I asked him to draft an application to set-aside a statutory demand with supporting witness statement. I had advised that Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 87 the statutory demand which was mostly made up of a fictitious debt was clearly an abuse of process and any debt was clearly below the statutory minimum of £5,000. I explained to the Claimant the essential points to make in the application. The Claimant took an awful long time preparing a draft witness statement, which seemed to make new points that I had never discussed, but didn’t make the essential points that were absolutely necessary, otherwise the application was doomed. Moreover, there were no exhibits and no insolvency act application notice.

28. I reviewed the application with the Claimant, towards the end of the day, but it was clear that the whole application needed redrafting from scratch. The Claimant called me the following day, which was not a working day for him. I told him not to worry about it as we would have to redraft it. I then set about redrafting it. A few hours later I noticed a text message from the Claimant saying that he was dealing with it. A few minutes later I received a call from him, and I told him that that it was not necessary for him to do anything on it and that I had been dealing with it. The Claimant sounded angry and explained that he had been working on it. I told him that I had no idea and didn’t ask him to do that.

29. On January 4th 2023, it was the Claimant’s first day back after the Christmas break. He came into my office and almost immediately started remonstrating with me about why I redrafted it myself, when he was fixing it from home. I explained that I hadn’t seen the messages until shortly before he called, otherwise I would have responded and told him that I was dealing with it. The Claimant implied that I was lying and said that I must have seen the notifications. I explained that I don’t get notifications from WhatsApp, but he insisted that everyone gets notifications. I was quite shocked that the Claimant had come back from the Christmas break and was already starting it in such a negative way, essentially calling me a liar. Months later when we had the appraisal, he seemed to still believe that I must receive notifications during the appraisal. He didn’t subsequently apologise for this behaviour.

30. The series of events led me to feel that he was someone that could not be moulded and seemed to have an innate feeling that he knows better. That is not always a bad trait for a lawyer, but I felt clear that the way he went about it was not helpful and could easily lead to him taking an irresponsible action, without seeking guidance or approval.

31. I explained to Simon that I felt that it was not working out and there were now a number of instances where I felt that the Claimant had shown incapability, coupled with a feeling that he knew better that didn’t help. I did not believe he could be moulded to improve, as he thought he knew better, and I was concerned that his actions were Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 88 undermining. Furthermore, he was taking up much longer than required for any task with discussions and he would bring the whole office into these discussions, when they were completely minor points.

32. Simon said that I should note down all of these issues and that they should be discussed at an appraisal. We set a date for this to take place on 25 January 2023. I prepared my list over the Christmas holidays and emailed them to Simon on 2 January 2023, page 118-120.

33. The Claimant was quite desperate to know what would happen at the appraisal. He would regularly ask me whether it was going to be good, whenever I would work with him. On 17 January 2023, I was reviewing a letter that the Claimant had drafted. The letter was quite badly drafted and did not make a great deal of sense. After around 40 minutes of correcting the draft, the Claimant asked me what I thought of his performance. Given that he was someone I knew for many years as a family friend, I felt that he should have some understanding of the issues prior to the appraisal, rather than springing it on him. I made the decision to give him a heads up, I explained to him that I thought he would be much further along compared to the others, given his education and experience. I went on to explain that a recent piece of work was not good, and we had to redraft it and that there was no draft application notice. I commented that his draft letters lack very basic formatting and structure as well as typos.

34. I also mentioned that the Claimant’s conduct on the very first day back on 4th January was quite rude, as he had implied that I was lying, when I said that I hadn’t seen the WhatsApp message of 23 December at 11:35 until shortly before he called me at 1:38pm. The claimant then said he could prove that I had read it earlier through read receipts. I asked him to show me the read receipts there and then. He then agreed that I was right but remarked that I would have got notifications.

35. A summary of that conversation is on page 188. The conversation started pleasantly, but it was clear that the Claimant became progressively angrier about being criticised as I gave him my feedback. He left my room saying that he was trying to help me on a day that he was not working, in order to fix the application, but won’t bother trying to help me in future. 36. A short while later, the Claimant had called the office manager Aryeh Kaye into Simon Aaron’s room. He appeared to be going on about a previously raised concern about David Nash’s ethical conduct with regard to a negotiation. This was something that had already been discussed in December 2022 and Simon Aaron had emailed both parties about it. I never did understand what actually occurred on that day that caused the Claimant to discuss it again. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 89 37. It occurred to me at that time, that perhaps the Claimant having heard from me about performance concerns, decided to raise this issue as he had in mind to have a live whistleblowing concern, so that he might be able to claim any criticism of his performance at the appraisal to be something to do with his whistleblowing, rather than any concern about unethical conduct. I did mention this to Simon and his view was that the Claimant was probably trying to impress the firm about his ability to spot these issues, whereas there didn’t appear to be any real concern. At the same time, he mentioned that as David was not a lawyer, it was not a bad thing for him to have the Claimant there watching his back so to speak.”

[205]The draft email to the claimant in the email at pages B2/118-120 which Mr Abraham sent to Mr Aaron on 2 January 2023, started: “Dear Kelechi, I need to raise some issues regarding our work together on a number of cases.” It ended with this sentence: “It seems to me that much as you try very hard, and I have no doubt you have huge passion for the work, it is clear that you have a tendency to overcomplicate matters to the extent that it really doesnt help and just really takes up so much more time than it should.”

[206]Mr Abraham gave extensive oral evidence during cross-examination about the conversation which he had with the claimant on 17 January 2023. He described the circumstances which gave rise to the conversation in more detail than he did in the passage of his witness statement which we have set out in paragraph 204 above. The conversation followed Mr Abraham and the claimant having a meeting during which Mr Abraham sought to show the claimant how to write a letter on behalf of a client to a neighbour with whom the client was in a boundary dispute, i.e. a dispute about the boundary between their properties after a wall had been demolished by the neighbour. Mr Abraham described how he and the claimant on 17 January 2023, sitting in the same room, used Microsoft Teams to share a screen on both their computers, with the claimant writing at Mr Abraham’s dictation a draft letter. EJ Hyams’ notes, tidied up for present purposes, of the oral evidence of Mr Abraham in that part of the cross-examination, are as follows. ‘I was showing him and dictating at the same time; and what he drafted was bad; there were typos everywhere and it did not make much sense. It started as if we were writing to the neighbour as friends. It just went into the story; not saying we were acting for the client etc; it just went into the discussion, like writing to someone out of the blue. So I said that to the claimant as we were going through it; I was pointing these things out. About 20 minutes in he asked me what I thought of Emma Germany. She had just started [working for us]. Her mother’s maiden name was France, incidentally. I said it was quite scary what she does; he said “Really, I am quite confused; what do you mean?” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 90 I said it is scary how good she is to think that she is someone who has just come in; she is fresh out of university; this is her first job. She had done a law degree and did the Bar course the following year; or she was doing it while she was there [i.e. with the first respondent]. So he said “What do you mean, ‘scary’?” So I said that she had drafted a list of issues for me in a case with prolix pleadings and she really did a great job. The claimant said: “I can do a list of issues as well; that’s easy.” I said “Really? That’s easy? Sorry; even this letter seems to be a bit of a struggle”, and he said that letters are hard, “but lists of issues are simple; I do them all the time.” So we carried on with drafting the letter. About 20 minutes later I am seeing the typos on the screen while he is typing and he goes back to right click and spell check. And he says “What do you think of my performance?” And this was 20/30 mins after the Emma German discussion. This was a common theme of him asking what I thought of his performance as he was worried about the appraisal coming up and he was thinking about what to do; I now know he was playing his game. I felt awful telling him about this as I brought him in there; one of my favourite things was bringing in good people. I told Emma on her first day that I thought she’d be a barrister. I said to him that it was not going as well as I thought. He was not taking the weight off our shoulders as we would expect from a trainee/paralegal and I said all of those things in the email at page 163 [under the heading “Discussion on 17 January”; that passage was repeated at B2/188]. I thought he was more educated than all of us. He had done Bar finals as well as the LPC. He went quiet; he seemed quite upset; and the next thing was that after a bit of time he said to me [and Mr Abraham paused at this point and continued:]. He started to fight back; perhaps I went a bit further and started to be more critical such as by saying why are there so many typos in the work and then he said to me what about the letter we had just drafted and that it had a really good point that I had missed. And I did not think it was a good point. He thought that the client wanting compensation for the demolished wall was important and he insisted on including the point and I did not think it was necessary. But I had said okay [to it being included in the letter]. He accused me of backtracking: it got a bit heated and he accused me of backtracking; and I said are you accusing me of lying? And he asked me why I was accusing him of that and I referred back to the email [which we had discussed on] 4 January 2023 and he got angry and said that I must have seen his WhatsApp message as I get notifications; and I said I do not get them on my phone; and he said: “You know what? I am never going to go out of my way to help you at all.” And I said “No, I have got other things to do.”‘ Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 91

[207]We accepted all of that oral evidence of Mr Abraham (apart from the words “I now know he was playing his game”, which were a mixture of assertion and comment), and we accepted paragraphs 29-37 of his witness statement, which we have set out in paragraph 204 above. We also accepted that the email dated 2 January 2023 at B2/118-120 to which we refer in paragraph 205 above was what it purported to be (i.e. it was sent by Mr Abraham to Mr Aaron on that day and was as copied at those pages). One of the reasons why we did so was the messages which (we concluded) Mr Abraham sent to Mr Aaron on 18 December 2022, 4 January 2023, 9 January 2023 and 18 January 2023 at SB/76-77, which were in the following terms, taking them in chronological order.207.1 “Simon, I’m very bothered about Kelechi, and some ridiculous behaviour on his part whilst assisting me with another matter, as far as I’m concerned it’s the final straw and we have to let him go” (11:50 on 18 December 2022);

207.2 “This was a bankruptcy case, he contradicted me when I advised about something on the phone, and started giving his alternative advice, saying that what I had said was wrong and could result in the client prejudicing himself if he did it, it was complete nonsense, after that we called the solicitor on the other side and he started talking at the same, which was highly unprofessional, all leads me to the conclusion that he can’t be moulded, he will always believe he knows better, we can’t have it, its dangerous, it wastes time and will lead us into problems” (15:16 on 18 December 2022);

207.3 “He’s just come in and kelechi has already irritated me, arguing that I know he was working on Keith Jarett on that Friday. He tells me that he saw I read his whatsapp when that is not true, I only saw it in the afternoon, I didn’t ask him to do anything” (10:37 on 4 January 2023);

207.4 “All I can say is, I know you are generally cautious, but I think we have seen enough, we have been abundantly fair with him, even offering 5 days a week when zsofia left and he point blank refused, he was warned then that others may take his place, better options have come up, it’s time to let him move on” (10:41 on 4 January 2023);

207.5 “I’ve got to admit, made me feel awful afterwards to tell him that his work was poor, at first he went quiet, but then he started to complicate things, and do the usual, telling me I’m contradicting myself. small prelude for the appraisal.” (10:00 on 18 January 2023);

207.6 “with this whole David Nash thing, I wonder if he is trying to make it about whistleblowing” (10:01 on 18 January 2023). The planned appraisal meeting of 25 January 2023 and the events of the following days Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 92

[208]With apologies for the resulting length of these reasons but on the basis that the events of 25-27 January 2023 were also of central importance, we now set out what Mr Abraham said in his witness statement about those events, on the basis that with one exception, we accepted what was in the passage which we now set out. “38. On the day of the appraisal, 25 January 2023, the Claimant arrived uncharacteristically late, but in a good mood. He was slapping high fives with me, boasting that a big deal was being completed on that day and that Simon agreed that champagne be ordered to celebrate. This conversation went on for around 15-20 minutes.39. Then around 20 minutes later, the Claimant came back into the room looking annoyed. I was on the phone at the time and couldn’t speak to him, but he whispered to me that David had excluded him a from the meeting with the client. He then went to Aryeh asking him to phone David to ask that he be included. As I understand, this annoyed David because he had copied in the Claimant in the night before (page 687), so that he would be aware of the early meeting, but the Claimant had arrived late and therefore didn’t take part. Most fee earners are also logged into their emails on their phones, so would at the very least be aware of what is happening. Even if the Claimant had not seen the email, given that he seemed to be aware that the day was very important for this deal that was completing, it is surprising that he came in late and chose to chat, rather than check his emails first.

40. This kind of situation does happen often. If a paralegal arrives late and misses a notification for a meeting, perhaps because it was arranged late in the day, that would not normally cause a furore, especially given the level of fee-earner being a paralegal.

41. Simon informed me later in the afternoon, that the appraisal would not be happening, as the Claimant left the office, apparently annoyed about being left out of the meeting. I understood that David had offered to come to the office to discuss (page 128), but that the Claimant wanted to know what was being discussed in writing prior to any meeting. More recently I found out that David had already said that he would leave it for Friday (page 130), so I don’t understand why the Claimant left later that day.

42. The Claimant telephoned me later that afternoon at around 3:45pm. He was telling me that he left because he was annoyed with David Nash leaving him out of the meeting. I asked him why he didn’t want to meet David and sort out the issue, given that he wanted to come in to discuss. The Claimant said he didn’t want to meet him without knowing in writing what was going to be discussed. I considered that he was sending a message about the appraisal when he said this, i.e., that he wanted to have the concerns in writing. The Claimant suddenly Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 93 changed topic and appeared to be raising a concern about something David had said to him previously. I was trying to understand what the Claimant was saying, but he was struggling to articulate himself. I got that he said that David had used the phrase “white boys club”, but the part he was struggling with was why this was a problem, and to me it seemed like he was not sure himself. In the end he said, its fine, don’t worry about it. I asked him to call or email Simon with any concern that he had about David and that he would deal with it.

43. Later that evening, I discussed with Simon what had occurred between the Claimant and David. Simon mentioned that he didn’t understand why Kelechi was nervous about David coming in to discuss face to face, unless there was a written agenda. I mentioned that the Claimant explained the same thing on the phone, saying that he didn’t want to meet David without knowing what was on the agenda. Simon therefore thought that perhaps we should send the list of concerns that I had prepared, so that he has a chance to consider the issues before the appraisal and respond. Simon amended my draft to add further comments about work with himself, David and also the final paragraph about training contract. The email was sent to him that evening, page 131-135.

44. Thereafter, I started to receive a barrage of text messages from the Claimant, page 669-672. He was extremely unhappy about the email. He kept referring to having made a racial complaint about David. The Claimant had not raised a racial complaint about David at that point. His phone call seemed to be raising a concern, although it was not clear at all what that concern was. I explained that these were long standing concerns about his performance and nothing to do with any complaint that had not at that point been raised. I explained that if he wanted to make a complaint, he should raise it in writing with Simon, page 672.”

[209]One of the reasons why we accepted almost all of that passage was that it was borne out by the text messages to which Mr Abraham referred at B2/669-672. Another reason for accepting that passage was our acceptance, which we record in paragraph 207 above, that Mr Abraham had reluctantly raised with the claimant his, Mr Abraham’s, concerns about the claimant’s performance on 17 January 2023 and our conclusion stated in paragraph 193 above that those concerns were genuine. A further reason for accepting the accuracy of that passage (paragraphs 38-44 of Mr Abraham’s witness statement) was that it was borne out also by the emails of 25 January 2023 at B2/127-130, which ended with the claimant saying (in the email at the top of B2/130) to Mr Nash: “[Y]ou have proactively excluded me in this case. You have previously tried to justify excluding me by making up facts about me. I am quite perturbed by your unknown issue you have with me and why you did not want to Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 94 include me in any meetings with the opponent and our client today and provide me with your reasons in writing.”

[210]A further reason for accepting almost all of that passage of Mr Abraham’s witness statement was the following paragraph in the reasonably contemporaneous email of Mr Aaron to the claimant at B2/147 (it was sent on 2 February 2023 and it was in our view entirely consistent with the emails at B2/127-130 and with a common sense assessment of the situation): “As for the second point which you make about David not including you in the phone call last Wednesday, I did speak to David about that earlier this week, and he told me that after several attempts at arranging a time with Ed they managed to agree on 10am Wednesday, and David copied you into the emails which confirmed the time. David says that when 10am Wednesday arrived he had not heard from you, so he picked up the phone to Ed and got on with the call. His point was that if you strongly wanted to be involved in the call then he would have expected you to call him before 10 on Wednesday and make conferencing arrangements. But he never heard from you, and given the to and froing over finding a good time with Ed for the call, he did not want to lose the opportunity on Wednesday, and come 10am he got on with it.”

[211]The one reservation that we had about the passage of Mr Abraham’s witness statement which we have set out in paragraph 208 above was that we were able, after considering the claims of the claimant as recorded in paragraphs 9.4 and 9.6 above, and having taken into account paragraphs 29-30 of Mr Nash’s witness statement and the emails at B2/127-130 and B2/687-688, to see that what the claimant was saying was that he had been excluded from the telephone meeting at 10am on 25 January 2023 with “Ed” of Warner Chappell Music, i.e. (we concluded from for example B2/101) Ed Condon, and then from a telephone meeting with the first respondent’s relevant client (who, we concluded from for example the email at B2/142-143 which we have set out in paragraph 229 below, was Alex Morisco-Tarr trading, we concluded from B2/111, as, or via, Vibe Chemistry). We add that we saw that Mr Nash wrote in the third sentence of paragraph 29 of his witness statement that he had “subsequently tried to call [the claimant] to invite him to the [10am] meeting”, but that evidence was inconsistent with the passage from B2/147 which we have set out in the preceding paragraph above. The point that Mr Nash had not called the claimant before 10am on 25 January 2023 was put in cross-examination to Mr Nash. We were aware when Mr Nash was giving evidence that he was saying that he had tried to call the claimant, but we did not at the time realise that that evidence was inconsistent with the more or less contemporaneous email of Mr Abraham at B2/147. In any event, when Mr Nash was pressed by the claimant on the issue, Mr Nash said that he had called the claimant to let him know what was going on. The claimant then put it to Mr Nash that that call would show in his call log, and EJ Hyams asked the claimant whether he had put before us a call log to show that the call was not made. He had not. The claimant had by then already given his oral evidence and had said nothing about the emails at pages B2/687-688. Those emails were not put to him Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 95 in cross-examination, probably because he had not said in his witness statement that they were not what they purported to be. They were from Mr Nash to the client sent at 20:26 on 24 January 2023 and from the client in reply to Mr Nash sent shortly after at 20:38, into both of which the claimant had been copied. EJ Hyams therefore asked the claimant whether he had seen those emails at the time when they were sent. The claimant then said he could have done only because he had his work laptop with him at the time and that he was “not always allowed to take it home” but he also said that he did not look at his emails outside working hours. EJ Hyams then pointed out to the claimant that the emails at B2/111 showed that the claimant had himself on 1 December 2022 sent emails from his work email address late in the evening (at 22:31 and 22:53) to (respectively) Mr Nash and Mr Aaron. Shortly after the start of the claimant’s cross-examination of Mr Abraham, the latter was asked why he had sent the email at B2/131-135 to the claimant’s home email address as well as the claimant’s work email address. Mr Abraham then said that he did that to ensure that the claimant “did not have the excuse that [he] did not receive it”. It was then put to Mr Abraham by the claimant that that was done because he, the claimant, did not have access out of hours to his work email address. EJ Hyams then asked the claimant whether he had access to his work emails on his mobile telephone, and in the course of answering that question, the claimant said this: “I had [my work laptop] all the time; I was allowed to take my work laptop home; and I used it when I was at work.”

[212]In those circumstances, we concluded on the balance of probabilities that Mr Nash did not in fact call the claimant unsuccessfully before 10am, and that his evidence that he had done so was a subsequently-created memory of the sort helpfully described in paragraphs 15-22 of the judgment of Leggatt J (as he then was) in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd

[2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm)

. We concluded that the passage from the email at B2/147 which we have set out in paragraph 210 above was the most reliable evidence of what occurred in regard to the telephone meeting of 10am on 25 January 2023 but we also concluded that(1) Mr Nash expected the claimant to look at his emails sufficiently in advance of 10am to be able to make arrangements for him to join the call if he wanted to, and

(2) it was reasonable for him to expect the claimant to see the emails at B2/687- 688 at a time when it would have been possible to make such arrangements.

[213]As for what happened in regard to the telephone call which Mr Nash was going to have with the first respondent’s client (as opposed to Ed Condon of Warner Chappell Music), we saw what Mr Nash had said in paragraph 29 of his witness statement, which was as follows. “At 10:21 I emailed the Claimant attaching the call notes page 127. The Claimant subsequently got the office manager, Aryeh Kaye to call me in order to complain about excluding him from the meeting. I quite obviously had not excluded him because I took the trouble to copy him into the email which set up the meeting, and I was becoming increasingly angry at his accusations. Once again, the Claimant would raise every small issue with Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 96 management, rather than speaking with me directly first. When I wrote the email at 11.22am saying we don’t have a conference call with anyone, it is fair to say that I was angry at that point.” Did Mr Nash use the words “white boys club”?

[214]We had difficulty understanding how the claimant could have objected on his own behalf to the use of the words “white boys club”, assuming that they were said by Mr Nash. In fact, Mr Nash denied saying those words, and having heard him and the claimant give evidence, we accepted that he did not use them. We did so for the following reasons.214.1 At 21:27 on 25 January 2023, the claimant sent Mr Abraham the text message in the middle of B2/669, which was in these terms. “Did you tell Simon [i.e. Mr Aaron] about the comments David [i.e. Mr Nash] made regarding Ed and “the white club” in the context of music business negotiations?”

214.2 At 11:28 on the next day, Mr Abraham replied in the following text, which took up the rest of B2/669: “Simon was in a bit of a rush to get home as he had learning to do. We had a quick phonecall yesterday afternoon where you mentioned something David had said, regarding some of the people involved in this music matter being a white boys club and him then leaving you out of the meetings today. I was in the middle of work and we didn’t have a chance to discuss what was said in detail, who the comment was directed at or the context. Simon is happy to discuss with you later if your available. Whilst we would obviously take this matter seriously and investigate any concern you have, its obviously separate from the performance review and we were already due to sit with you yesterday afternoon. I had already noted down those concerns some weeks ago, and we already discussed a number of those issues regarding your performance last Tuesday. Let me know when would be good to speak.”

214.3 The subsequent text messages exchanged as shown on B2/670-672 included one from the claimant sent at 23:27 on 26 January 2023 (at B2/671) in these terms: “I told you something very important about David’s comment yesterday afternoon and I was quite shocked by the email you sent”. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 97

214.4 The claimant’s claimed shock at the content of the email at B2/131-135 was in our view objectively unjustified because, we concluded given what we say in paragraph 207 above, that he had been told about that content on 17 January 2023.

214.5 In addition, for the reasons which we summarise in paragraph 207 above, we concluded that the claimant’s attitude changed on 17 January 2023 from one of friendliness towards Mr Abraham to one of hostility.

214.6 We thought that it was highly unlikely that Mr Nash had said to the claimant that Warner Chappell was a “white boys club”. That was not least because it is not a phrase, or term, which we had ever heard being used. The term “old boys’ club” is one which we had heard used in the past at least on a number of occasions, but not “white boys’ club”. The claimant referred (in his email of 3 April 2023 at B2/226-227) to Baroness Casey’s report into a situation in the Metropolitan Police in which reference was made to a “boys club”, but that too was markedly different from a reference to a “white boys club”.

214.7 The context described by the claimant in the first place in which he stated in writing what he alleged Mr Nash to have said on 23 January 2023 added to our difficulty in accepting that Mr Nash referred to a white boys’ club. The context was stated in the email of 27 January 2023 at B2/141 from the claimant to Mr Aaron, which the claimant copied to Mr Abraham and Mr Kaye. The whole of that email was highly relevant, because it was, we concluded for the reasons which we have stated in paragraphs 227-228 below, written in retaliation to the email sent by Mr Abraham at B2/131- 135, but here we set out only the words in the email at B2/141 stating the context in which it was said that Mr Nash referred to a white boys’ club: ‘I spoke to David on Monday asking him to discuss Ed’s email sent on the 23 January at 14:13. During the discussion I recall David saying how Ed is being “egotistical” and being “petty” he then said that “it’s a white boy’s club” referring to Ed and music business people’s mentality in negotiations. However I was quite troubled on Wednesday by how David then changed our agreed working strategy in this particular matter which is evidenced in our emails. David then did not include me in the final meetings with Ed and our client in closing the deal. Please note I also take attendance notes. Despite my request to be included I was proactively excluded and David proceeded with an unknown strategy. This drew my attention to his previous comments on Monday and his subsequent conduct on Wednesday.’

214.8 That email was the most contemporaneous statement of the circumstances in which the claimant alleged that Mr Nash had used the words “white boys club”, so we took it as being the best evidence of what the claimant was saying to the respondents, and us, was the situation in Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 98 which those words had been used by Mr Nash. We failed to see how the claimant could reasonably have taken offence at those words, if they had been used, given the circumstances in which the claimant said (as set out at the end of the preceding subparagraph above) they were used. However, that context also contained no overt trigger for the use of those words: those words had no apparent basis in the context of the discussion which the claimant described in that email.

214.9 We came to those views irrespective of the evidence of Mr Aaron, who in fact also had difficulty understanding what the claimant was saying. In paragraph 44 of his witness statement, Mr Aaron said this, under the heading “The complaint about David”: “I observed that the incident which he [i.e. the claimant] referred to, took place on 23 January 2023, and was not something that he mentioned to me on that day or when he came into the office on 25 January 2023. In addition, it was not easy for me initially to understand the exact point that he was making.”

214.10 Mr Aaron then referred in his witness statement to the emails of 2 February 2023 between him and the claimant, at B2/147, B2/150 and B2/151. In paragraph 48 of his witness statement, Mr Aaron said that the “chain of emails between us developed exponentially, with the Claimant increasingly drawing new complaints and criticisms out of almost every comment.” He then said: “It is important to see the complete chain of emails [at B2/139-211] in order to understand how the Claimant would twist and escalate the complaints, and draw inferences that were not even present”.

214.11 We found the sequence from B2/147 to B2/199-200 (which was an email from Mr Aaron to the claimant sent on 24 February 2023) to be material here, not only because in our view it contained no cogent justification from the claimant for his complaint about the words which he claimed were used by Mr Nash on 23 January 2023 but also because, in the middle of that long sequence, in the email at B2/184-185 sent at 18:18 on 14 February 2023, Mr Aaron wrote to the claimant: ‘On the subject of the conversation about Ed Condon, David has come back to me to say that he cannot remember any conversation where he used the expression “white boys club”. He is particularly puzzled because he says that it is an expression that does not resonate with him as being part of his normal vocabulary, and he says that he is all the more puzzled because he does not actually know Ed Condon’s skin colour.’

214.12 The first time that the claimant said (as far as we could see it was by implication only) that he had made a record of the conversation about which he was now complaining, was on 16 February 2023, when he sent Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 99 (at 21:03) the email at B2/190-191. In it, he claimed that this was what was said in the conversation. ‘Kelechi- Hi David I hope all is well, I wanted to ask about the clause in Ed’s email as I really do not understand it. “we can agree to make it “non-consecutive” weeks. But for nonconsecutive then it needs to be for 4 or more non-consecutive weeks. We can do either or. So either 2 or more “consecutive weeks” or “4 or more non-consecutive weeks”.” David - it’s fucking bullshit, he does not need to add that. He is being petty and egotistical. He probably coming to his retirement age and needs to show his team that his in control. Kelechi - but what does it mean? David - He has the option to re-enter the top 10 but for 4 or more weeks or 2weeks straight, in the top 10. It’s very petty, it’s how Ed and they negotiate in the music industry. Kelechi - I really do not get it. David- it’s a mentality in the music industry, that’s just how they negotiate trying to have one over each other and that’s what Ed’s is doing, it’s a white boys club.’

214.13 The words “and that’s what Ed ... is doing, it’s a white boys club” were even more clearly incongruous, i.e. without any apparent justification or foundation, than as described in the part of the email from the claimant of 27 January 2023 at B2/141 which we have set out in paragraph 214.7 above. On 24 February 2023, Mr Aaron sent the email at B2/199-200. In it, he relayed Mr Nash’s response to the words which we have set out in the immediately preceding sub-paragraph above and then, in the light of that response (which might best be described as one of bewilderment: we set it out immediately below) asked the claimant to provide a copy of a recording of the conversation if he in fact had one. That was done in this passage. ‘David recalls a conversation about the terms of the agreement, and he says that the swearing sounds a lot like him, however he has no recollection of the comment “white boys club” even after seeing it in the context in which you placed it. He says: I have tried and tried and tried to think about this and recall events. Not just recall the specifics of a conversation on that day, but since seeing his record of that conversation, and it simply doesn’t make sense to me. Because what possible point have I tried to make here Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 100 by saying this old guy, and I don’t even know if he’s old. I’m 54 he’s probably younger than I am! It had nothing to do with colour! I don’t even think in that way. He previously mentioned that he had no idea of Ed Condon’s skin colour and little understanding of what the comment might mean as he does not recognise it as being a phrase he uses. He says that to the best of his recollection the comment did not happen. In view of his response, if you have an actual recording of it, this would certainly be the time to provide it, as it will facilitate the handling the complaint. If you have a recording please can you provide me with it.’

214.14 The claimant accepted in cross-examination that he made covert recordings of conversations which occurred during his employment with the respondent, starting at the latest on 22 February 2023, when, he agreed in cross-examination, he recorded the conversation to which he referred in the email of that date at B2/198 from him to Mr Abraham. He did not, however, put before us (and had not put before the respondents) a recording of the words set out in paragraph 214.12 above.

[215]Having come to the conclusion that Mr Nash did not use the words “white boys club”, we realised that we might need to ask ourselves whether the claimant had alleged that Mr Nash had used those words knowing that they had not been used. That was because if we concluded that he had made that allegation in the knowledge that it was false, then the allegation would not have been a protected act within the meaning of section 27(1) of the EqA 2010. That is because of section 27(3) of that Act.

[216]Given our conclusions on the claims of detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 27(1) of the EqA 2010, we did not need to come to a conclusion on the question whether or not the claimant had alleged that Mr Nash had used the words “white boys club” with a genuine belief in the truth of the allegation. We record here, however, that in deciding that question, we would have taken into account all of the factors which we have set out in paragraph 214 above and the things to which we refer in the following two paragraphs below.

[217]We concluded that the claimant had knowingly told at least one untruth to us, as shown by what we say in paragraphs 65 and 75-77 above. We came to that conclusion because in our judgment there was no room for doubt about the possibility of the claimant being told, as he wrote to us in the email which we have set out in paragraph 65 above, that he had been “advised” to “attend ... hospital with a reference number within 1hour”. The statement that the claimant had been given “a reference number” was made only 25 minutes after we had adjourned the hearing for the purpose of giving the claimant time to get some fresh air and compose himself, and the information which he was given, which we were then given the next day, contained no advice to attend hospital within an hour, and no Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 101 reference number. Those things were stated by the claimant, we concluded, in a deliberate attempt to mislead us.

[218]While the perception of a witness of the situation would not normally be relevant, this situation was markedly unusual in that the sequence of events shown by the emails at B2/139-211 was in our view aptly described by Mr Aaron in paragraphs 49 and 50 of his witness statement, which were in the following terms. “49. Michael and I were of the view that the Claimant was probably making the complaint about David as a diversionary tactic because he was aware that we were due to have an appraisal and he knew that we had concerns about his performance, he had not raised the allegation at the time of his conversation with David but only after the subsequent developments. In addition, the way the complaint was expressed at the time, implied that David was being critical of someone outside our firm for being racist, rather than implying racist intent on the part of David himself. It wasn’t until many weeks later that the Claimant redefined how he perceived the alleged comment by David. 50. My view was only reinforced by the way that the Claimant dragged out the complaint and sought to make further complaints at every turn, even though I was simply trying to clarify the allegation. I was very open to the idea that David might have made the alleged comment, and I wanted to get to the bottom of that, and also to understand the way in which the Claimant interpreted the comment, but I still had a sense that the Claimant’s primary motivation in making the complaint had far more to do with making it difficult for us to progress the performance review or criticise him. In addition, he was being quite difficult in helping me to understand and progress the complaint. This, in turn, expanded what was already an extremely long list of concerns that I had about the Claimant.”

[219]The majority of the specific claims of the claimant related to events which occurred between 25 August 2022 and 25/26 January 2023. We now turn to the material events which occurred after then. Material events between 27 January 2023 and 31 August 2023, when the claimant was dismissed on notice with the notice ending on 8 September 2023, and subsequently

[220]The emails at B2/139-211 to which we refer in paragraph 214.10 above were the best evidence of what occurred between 27 January 2023 and 28 February 2023. We refer in paragraph 70 above briefly to the abortive appraisal meeting of 1 March 2023 which was the subject of the emails at B2/212-222 (which covered other things also, including the possibility of the claimant having made covert recordings while working for the first respondent). Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 102

[221]Because of the generality of the claims stated by us in paragraphs 9.8, 9.9, 9.11 and 9.18 above, we do not state our findings of fact below on the sequence of events which occurred after 25 January 2023 in the same detail as we state our findings of fact above about what happened on and before that date. That does not mean that we failed to take into account the detailed factual evidence before us about what happened after 25 January 2023. Far from it. In addition and in any event, most of the evidence was in documentary form or evidenced by extensive documentation, so there was no doubt about what happened in most respects.

[222]At our request, after 5 November 2025, the respondents compiled a detailed chronology. That chronology was then put before the claimant and us as pages SB/57-66. For the avoidance of doubt, and for the sake of clarity, but also with a view to brevity, we now set out the sequence of events between 29 January 2023 and 8 September 2023 largely as described in that chronology (despite a small overlap with what we say above about the situation shown by the documents at B2/139-211), but with several minor textual corrections and three new entries (created by us) at the start. Date Event B2 page(s) 27 January 2023 Claimant sends (at 09:26) email to Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron responding to the email at B2/131-135 139 27 January 2023 Mr Aaron replies 140 27 January 2023 Claimant responds 141 29 January 2023 DN [i.e. Mr Nash’s] complaint re KN [i.e. the claimant] 142-143 2-8 February 2023 Ongoing correspondence about the grievance. 146-161 8 February 2023 KN first mentions dyslexia to SA [i.e. Mr Aaron] 161 8 February 2023 MA [i.e. Mr Abraham] emails KN summarising the phone discussion of 8 February 2023 and also the discussion of 17 January 2023. 162-164 10-14 February 2023 Ongoing correspondence about the grievance 165-177 14 February 2023 SA asks for medical information 178 14 February 2023 Ongoing correspondence about the grievance 178-194 Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 103 Date Event B2 page(s) 16 February 2023 KN provides transcript of the “white boys club” conversation 190-191 22 February 2023 KN email re having called solicitors on other side instead of EON 198, 685, 857- 878, 987- 988 24 February 2023 SA asks if KN wants to proceed with the complaint through a formal or informal route Asked if he had a recording of the incident, he did not answer until 22nd May. 199 - 200 27 February 2023 Appraisal Date – meeting never happened, as KN left as said it was too late and refused to attend appraisal Issues about desk 202-211 1 March 2023 Appraisal Date – SA wanted to start by discussing health issues raised by KN and explaining to him what an appraisal is, as he was overly worried about it, but KN came in and collapsed. 212-214 6 March 2023 SA chase[s] for answer on recording and if KH [i.e. Mr Harris] can be at the meeting 215-218 7 March 2023 SA chase[s] for medical information 219 7 March 2023 - 9 May 2023 Statement[s] of Fitness for Work from KN’s doctor 37-39 7-8 March 2023 Ongoing correspondence 220-221 14 March 2023 SA says OH [i.e. occupational health] not reasonable and would like to speak to GP [i.e. the claimant’s medical general practitioner] 222 28 March 2023 SA chases up again on informal meeting 224 Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 104 Date Event B2 page(s) 4/5 April 2023 Agree to reasonable adjustments for Appraisal 230, 233 4 April 2023 SA chase[s] for answer on formal / informal process and if KH can be at the meeting 228-229 5 April 2023 Agreed to informal route to deal with Grievance and KH can be there 231 3 May 2023 Informal meeting to resolve complaint (Recording provided by Claimant entitled ‘informal meeting’. Claimant’s transcript on 1305-1345) 232-246 1305-1345 9 May 2023 AK [i.e. Mr Kaye] told KN “Spoke to Simon he would like to wrap up the informal meeting before the appraisal so no to Friday”. 246, 247- 251, 253 18 May 2023 Further informal grievance meeting, 18-22 May 2023 KN further complains of duress and intimidation if appraisal not held immediately, wants to bring SA and MA into informal complaint meeting 252 - 261 22 May 2023 Contacted by ACAS 22 May 2023 SA presses on recording KN responds saying that he has not made any covert recordings 262-266 267 25 May 2023 MA emails requesting that the Claimant respond to the list of concerns, KN refuses 283-291 Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 105 Date Event B2 page(s) 31 May 2023 KN states that BSB Pupillage was promised [by] the firm MA asks for detail in writing for this assertion KN continues to make assertions that the firm wanted to do this MA asks whether it was promised or implied KN responds saying that we revoked undertaking MA asks whether it was a promise, implied or an undertaking 293 294 295 296 297 298 1 June 2023 SA replies expressing concern over allegation of breach of promise or undertaking and that this is a trust and confidence issue to be discussed at the appraisal 306 2 June 2023 KN responds saying that the promise was revoked. Also asks whether this has anything to do with the racial complaint. 316 6-27 June 2023 Email correspondence between KH and KN which leads KH to take the view that we should proceed with a formal grievance as the informal process is not leading to a resolution 318-336, 338-340 30 June 2023 First ET claim made 5 July 2023 Emails re reasonable adjustments 362, 365 5 July 2023 PV [i.e. Ms Varsani] sends email re safari 364 10 July 2023 KN complains about both partners regarding PV email containing picture of monkey 367 12 July 2023 Formal Grievance meeting 631-642 18 July 2023 WP [i.e. without prejudice] chat with SA Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 106 Date Event B2 page(s) 21 July 2023 Reasonable adjustment pre appraisal email 396 24, 26 & 31 July 2023 Appraisal Dates (3 days) Transcripts Discussion re dyslexia Discussion re bar training Discussion re 17th January 40-67 689-995 938-953 958-979 979-988 3 August 2023 Informed being placed on zero hours from 7 August 2023 404 3 August 2023 SA confirmed appraisal now finished 408 3 August 2023 KN setting out potential remedies 413 4 August 2023 Further complaint re work suspension 417 7 August 2023 Respondent submits Grounds of Resistance 31 August 2023 Letter terminating employment 68-69 8 September 2023 Termination date

[223]The respondents’ chronology continued by describing the events up to and including the first hearing before us. Here, it is necessary to refer only to the events which occurred after 8 September 2023 and up to 13 February 2024. Those events are as follows. Date Event B2 page(s) 26 September 2023 Post termination grievances sent to KH 494-496 3 November 2023 KH meeting with KN 643-655 Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 107 Date Event B2 page(s) 20 November 2023 First preliminary hearing before EJ Carney. Claimant’s anonymity application refused. Ordered to provide further and better particulars. 18 December 2023 Claimant serves further and better particulars 12 January 2024 Respondents serve response to first further and better particulars. 19 January 2024 Grievance outcome letter 70-76 26 January 2024 Request for appeal of grievance outcome 583-591 31 January 2024 Second ET claim made 13 February 2024 Aborted meeting with KN and Grievance appeal discontinued after KN asked for no more communication. Claimant has provided a recording entitled ‘new recording’. 656-657

outcome

[224]We read with care and took into account all of the documents referred to in that table. We added rows for the first three because we found the documents to which we refer in those rows to be of particular importance. In the first one, at B2/139, the claimant wrote that there were “a lot of inaccuracies in the below email which I will address point by point”, but it appears to us that the claimant never did respond to the statements in the email at B2/131-135 in writing, despite sending the email at B2/141 to which we refer in some detail in paragraph 214.7 above and to which we return in the next paragraph below. In the second email, at B2/140, Mr Aaron wrote this: “Michael had noted down his areas of concern some weeks ago and mentioned them to me, and I had mentioned mine to him. We were supposed to talk with you on Wednesday but given that you went home it was felt that we might as well use the opportunity to let you see ahead of our rescheduled meeting the points we had in mind. This might also enable a more productive discussion as you have a chance to reflect on them. I gather that Michael had given you a heads up on some of those points the week before.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 108

[225]The email of 27 January 2023 at B2/141 from the claimant to Mr Aaron contained, above the paragraph which we have set out in paragraph 214.7 above, this sentence: “I can confirm not all the details in Michael’s email was explained to me prior, they also appear inaccurate, and quite conclusive to my detriment as per his second to last paragraph.” That “second to last paragraph” was on B2/134 and was in these terms. “In short, whilst we all like you as a person, we feel that you are not showing the capabilities from someone that we would commit to in terms of a training contract. It follows from this that we would not propose to undertake the even greater burden of having to setup a new structure to accommodate a bar pupillage, which of course is not something that we are setup for.”

[226]Under the heading “David Nash” on B2/141, the claimant said: “In regards to Davids matter. I took the [name redacted] enquiry and was managing the matter in which David was assisting. This was confirmed in his email to the opponent’s. As the case progressed David began to use any opportunity to kick me out of the case. I had also raised to Simon and Arye ethical concerns regarding my observation with David. I have highlighted to Simon further ethical concerns regarding David following his suggestion directly to our client to engage with him in unethical bad practices. Please note David did not allow the team to review his email before he sent it to the client, implicating me in such email. After I informed Simon immediately of my concerns Simon emailed David to the effect that such practices is wrong. Despite David agreeing to Simon’s email, he still sent another email ccing (despite me disapproval) asking the client to respond to potentially engaging with David in bad practices.”

[227]We say in paragraph 214.7 above that we concluded that that email was sent in retaliation to the email of B2/131-135 in which Mr Abraham for the first time formally and at length set out in writing the respondents’ concerns about the claimant’s work and by implication his potential for the future. We came to that conclusion for the following reasons.227.1 It was inaccurate and presumptuous to say that the claimant was “managing the matter in which David was assisting”. Suggesting that that was shown by Mr Nash’s “email to the opponent’s” was adventurous and wrong. The emails did not, and were highly unlikely, to show that.

227.2 The proposition that “As the case progressed [Mr Nash] began to use any opportunity to kick [the claimant] out of the case” was based on an assumption that Mr Nash was bent on “kick[ing]” the claimant “out of the case”, which was somewhat inconsistent with the proposition that Mr Nash was assisting the claimant. Even if we viewed the assertion in the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 109 light of the reality, which was that Mr Nash was leading the case (in fact we concluded that he was conducting it), we found it hard to see how Mr Nash could “kick” the claimant “out of the case”: rather, he could only ask Mr Aaron to remove the claimant from the case, and, as the emails, texts and evidence which we have set out in paragraphs 154, 164-167 and 191 above showed, Mr Aaron had already persuaded Mr Nash several times to continue to work with the claimant.

227.3 The final paragraph in the extract which we have set out in paragraph 226 above was in our view a completely inaccurate description of what had occurred. Apart from the reference to “the team” meaning in the circumstances “me”, i.e. the claimant (who was assisting Mr Nash and did not need to be involved in approving an email which Mr Nash drafted unless Mr Nash wanted the claimant’s input into it rather than simply sending it to him to keep him informed), if the claimant was not involved in reviewing the email, then he could not conceivably be “implicated” in its sending, assuming that there was something wrong in its being sent. And in any event, Mr Aaron did not “email [Mr Nash] to the effect that such practices is [sic] wrong”. As it happened, of course, Mr Aaron knew well what he had written, as he sent the email, so he would not have been misled, but the description of what Mr Aaron had written to Mr Nash was in our view intended to paint a false picture.

227.4 The email at B2/146 of 2 February 2023 from the claimant to Mr Aaron contained an explicit assertion of a claim of detrimental treatment because of a claimed public interest disclosure in the form of the penultimate paragraph, which consisted of this sentence: “Can you clarify why a determination that lead [i.e. led] to a detriment was made by Michael in his below email [which was plainly the email at B2/131-135] after I had left work due to not feeling well last week?” So, the claimant was saying there that the content of the email at B2/131-135 (presumably the claimant meant by that the criticisms of his performance in that email) had led to a determination that the first respondent

(1) could not commit to offering a training contract to the claimant, i.e. an intending solicitor’s training contract, and

(2) “would not propose to undertake the even greater burden of having to setup a new structure to accommodate a bar pupillage”, which the first respondent was “of course” not set up to do.

[228]Given those factors, we concluded that the email at page B2/141 was contrived and that the reason for that contrivance was the intention of the claimant to make claims of(1) whistleblowing detriment and

(2) a breach of the EqA 2010 by Mr Nash in (it was the claimant’s allegation) referring to a “white boys club” in retaliation to the trenchant criticisms of his (the claimant’s) conduct and performance stated in the email at B2/131-135.

[229]The fourth document referred to in the chronology was the email at B2/142-143 from Mr Nash to Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham, sent on 29 January 2023. It was Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 110 headed “Formal complaint”. Despite our acute consciousness of the desirability of brevity, we now set out its text in full because of its importance evidentially. ‘Dear Simon and Michael, I am not sure how to address this matter. To be accused of an act of oppression in any way is devastating, and yet that is what has been levelled against me by Kelechi Nwabueze. To continue willingly and happily, building a working relationship with the accuser is difficult, but it is what I have done. Kelechi has repeatedly spoken to me in a fashion that has left me feeling: 1. Inadequate in my abilities and capabilities as a member of this team and as an individual. 2. Unsafe to speak freely and without reproach in the workplace, whilst exploring theories, methods our options in a matter and the thinking of our opponents. 3. Insecure to work with issues concerning my clients. 4. Vulnerable to personal and professional attack and criticism. And yet, when he has brought music to me https://soundcloud.app.goo.gl/EzWZjsqQPwkQPK3Z8 that is his own and has nothing to do with our working relationship, I willingly listened to it and gave my professional opinion(s). With the hopes of starting and encouraging a “connection” to build a solid working relationship. It has always been with the hope that it would develop a “friendship” in as much as can be had in the workplace, and a platform to appreciate him and for him to appreciate my talents and abilities, and create a working understanding of each other, Even though I have felt it inappropriate (at the very least). We have spent several months dwelling on a single matter (Alex Morisco- Tarr/Warner Chappell Music), whilst neglecting other matters/clients, and we have clashed on many occasions, due to a differing approach and understanding of a short-form contract and it’s terms & conditions offered in the agreement. Kelechi has struggled to comprehend the very basics of a music publishing agreement, in my opinion, and this has led to endless emails, zooms, telephone conversations, all of which have been billed and added to our clients invoice, without my consent. This single matter has dragged on for months and cost our client thousands of pounds. Far in excess to the original quotation of £2,000.00. Which was a reasonable quote for the initial review and negotiation of a short-form agreement, and a quote that was given by me with my clear understanding Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 111 that further work could be ours, if we had delivered a successful outcome to Alex. In all this time I have endeavoured to encourage and develop, explain my understandings and interpretations, share my views (if and wherever possible) and support the opinions of Kelechi. However, it has resulted in accusations and allegations that I am now “floored” by, and cannot accept or allow to be left unaddressed. I cannot continue to work in an environment where I am genuinely frightened. In 39 years in the workplace, I have never made a request of this nature. Nevertheless, I must ask you what I must do to make an official complaint against Kelechi Nwabueze for his accusations of oppression? I am devastated beyond words, that anyone would make such an accusation against me, and use (in my view) one of the single most offensive words in the human language! Thank you Simon, and I continue to express my sincere apologies. With everlasting regret. David A.Nash Consultant/Music Publisher’.

[230]We saw that at B2/147, in Mr Aaron’s email to the claimant of 2 February 2023, Mr Aaron said this. “‘As I said this morning, at the moment both of you seem to be deeply upset with the other, you are complaining about him, he is complaining about you, and it is not lending itself to a good working relationship. While things might be different in a large firm where for example if we had 100 people working in a music department I could say to you “don’t work with him now, I’m going to place you with her instead”, unfortunately we do not have that option and so at present I am leaning towards the view that I should not have you work on music matters and instead do other areas of work where you can be with other fee earners. There seems to me to be too many personality issues between you and David and for whatever reason it is just not working out well.’

[231]That was in our view a completely understandable and objectively-justified approach to the situation as it appeared to Mr Aaron.

[232]The claimed events which occurred subsequently consisted in many cases of the sending of an email or a text. There was no need for a finding of fact by us about Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 112 those documents unless it was asserted to us that the copy of the document in the bundle was not genuine, i.e. was not what it purported to be, or was an inaccurate representation of the facts which it purported to reflect or describe. No such submission was made to us and no factual proposition to that effect was put in cross-examination. We therefore say no more here about those documents, and we refer to them below only in responding to the particular complaints of the claimant which we have set out in paragraph 9 above. Our findings of fact relating to the sending on 18 January 2023 by Mr Cooper to the claimant of the newspaper article regarding the Duke & Duchess of Sussex’s complaints related to race entitled “History won’t be kind to Prince Harry” at B2/123-126

[233]There were, however, some further areas of factual inquiry which we had to address. The first one arose because of the complaint which we have set out in paragraph 9.26 above. Mr Cooper gave oral evidence about the sending of the newspaper article at B2/123-126. That article was written by Mr Jeremy Paxman, who for many years presented the BBC2 television programme entitled “Newsnight”, and had at its head this “Comment”: “History won’t be kind to Prince Harry The Prince’s most deadly sin appears to have been his breaking of the code of omerta in talking about his private feelings”.

[234]Mr Cooper’s witness statement contained this passage, on which he was pressed in cross-examination. ‘5. The first conversation we had about Prince Harry and Meghan Markle was at the office Christmas party in 2022. In a conversation with me and Maria, who dealt with our firm’s accounts, he [i.e. the claimant, to whom Mr Cooper referred in his witness statement as “Kelechi”] brought up the subject of the Netflix series that had just been released on TV and media channels about why they left the Royal family. He was very persuasive that Maria and I should watch this series, as it showed the Royal family in a poor light and with a culture of racism. Maria and I stated that we were not keen to watch the series as we did not believe that Harry and Meghan had a positive intention in this. My recollection was that the conversation was good humoured and we agreed to have differing views on the subject. 6. When we returned to work after the festive break Kelechi continued to bring up the conversation that I should watch this programme and actually persuaded me to watch 2 episodes which shows that I have an open mindset. Personally I did not find it very interesting and was not willing to watch any more, although Kelechi continued to try to persuade me to watch the entire series, as the final episode would prove how badly they had been treated by other members of the “Firm.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 113 7. These conversations led to me sending Kelechi the “offending article” by Jeremy Paxman in the Telegraph on 18 January 2023. I attach the article with my Email (SJC2) which states “This is how I see it.” These words show that the article was not sent to him out of the blue, but as a follow-up to the many friendly discussions we had about this. 8. The article is very balanced in my view. It essentially states that the issue is rivalry between two brothers, which Jeremy Paxman says is common in many families, and Harry’s resentment at being “the spare.” In fact the article is not very favourable to King Charles or Donald Trump, and I cannot see how in any way this article can be seen as racist, or part of a hostile climate in the firm. 9. I do not recall him being upset or angry in any way about the article at the time, and we continued to work together, and have friendly conversations about work and matters outside for about 6 months after that.’

[235]We accepted that evidence. During the claimant’s cross-examination of Mr Cooper, in answering questions asked of him (the claimant) by EJ Hyams, the claimant made it clear that it was his complaint that Mr Cooper sent the article “as a covert means of saying that if you raise race then history won’t be kind to you”. EJ Hyams then asked Mr Cooper whether that was the reason why he sent the article, and he said that it was not and that him sending the article “had absolutely nothing to do with that”. Mr Cooper was then asked by the claimant: “So why did you send it to me?” and Mr Cooper replied: “As we were having a lot of discussions and I sent it to you for a balanced view; you had your opinion and I and others had mine; I am quite offended to be called racist actually.”

[236]The claimant then put it to Mr Cooper that he (the claimant) did not believe that the discussion about the circumstances of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle was a nice one, and Mr Cooper said: “The first time I had any idea that you found [the article] offensive was when I saw it in the bundle.”

[237]We accepted that further evidence of Mr Cooper. We read the article at B2/123- 126 with particular care. We saw that it made no mention of race or racism. The claimant wanted to ask Mr Cooper words to this effect: but if someone says that there is a culture of racism, then why do you say that there is not? However, there was very little time left for cross-examination of Mr Cooper by then, and EJ Hyams stopped the claimant asking that question as(1) Mr Cooper had given his answer to the question why he had sent the article, and the reason for sending it was a matter for submissions rather than debate with the witness, and

(2) the claimant Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 114 had not yet put to Mr Cooper any questions about the latter’s criticisms of the claimant’s work, to which the claimant then turned.

[238]So, when deliberating, we asked ourselves whether what Mr Cooper did by sending the claimant the article at B2/123-126 could have been related to the claimant’s race within the meaning of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010, or done because of the claimant’s (black African) race within the meaning of section 13 of that Act. We concluded without any difficulty that it might have been so related or done.

[239]We also had to (because of section 26 of the EqA 2010, the relevant part of which we have set out in paragraph 289 below) consider whether being sent the article by Mr Cooper was unwanted by the claimant and, if it was, whether Mr Cooper’s intention in sending it was to violate the claimant’s dignity or create for him an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment, or, if it was not done for that purpose, whether, bearing in mind section 26(4) of the EqA 2010, it had that effect.

[240]In that regard, we took into account the following passage in Mr Abraham’s witness statement, which we accepted. “79. In relation to the comments about Prince Harry and Meghan I was quite surprised as it was the Claimant that used to constantly talk about his connections to the Royal Family. It was a familiar pattern that the Claimant would often claim to know famous people and talked about them as if they were friends that knew him personally. Names he would mention often included Boris Johnson, Lady Hale, P Diddy, the queen’s lady in waiting. He would often claim to know the inside track and would say his opinions. I recall one conversation in which he was insisting that Lady Susan Hussey was not at all racist, and the proof was that Prince Harry and Meghan said that they like her. I remember asking him at the time, that surely it was offensive to continuously ask someone where they are from and not accept the answer that they are British. The Claimant disagreed with this. I remember at the time in September 2022 that he was a strong supporter of Liz Truss and continued to defend her after she resigned page 668. He claimed to be in touch with Boris Johnson’s nephew and said he had the inside track on why he didn’t run for the leadership after her resignation. 80. I personally was not very interested in the Prince Harry and Meghan Markle story, but at the time of the Netflix documentary, in December 2022 and continuing into January 2022 [i.e. 2023], I would often see him engaging everyone in what looked like a chatshow, where he was talking about the issue. It all seemed good humoured and he looked like he was very much enjoying it, even though I didn’t engage in it. It did seem to take up too much time and distract the office from work. The Claimants relationship with Simon Cooper was excellent at all times, and he would always tell me that he really liked Simon and that he was pleased with Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 115 his work. There were no complaints about anything that Simon Cooper did whilst the Claimant worked at the firm. I was therefore very surprised about the claim that Simon Cooper harassed the Claimant by sending him an article about the Royal Family. The email and article are on page 118-122 and it has no connection to race.”

[241]There was no doubt in our minds that there is a very real possibility (almost, if not actually, a moral certainty) that some people in the United Kingdom in discussing the life of Prince Harry and his wife, Meghan Markle, who is of black ethnic origin, are more critical of Prince Harry than they would have been if his wife were, say, white and British. But that did not mean that the discussions which Mr Cooper had with the claimant were tainted by any kind of discrimination by Mr Cooper because of Meghan Markle’s race. Nor did it mean that what Mr Cooper said to the claimant was to any extent less favourable treatment of the claimant because of race (whether the claimant’s or Ms Markle’s). On the evidence before us and on the balance of probabilities, we concluded that Mr Cooper sent the article to the claimant to show that a respected journalist, who in our experience had been seen when interviewing politicians on Newsnight to be fairly ruthless towards and highly critical of high-profile politicians, and who might therefore have been expected to call out racism if he saw it, had not seen it and had instead seen what for present purposes we will call an innocent explanation for the criticisms of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle’s interactions with news media.

[242]Would Mr Cooper have done that if the claimant had been, say, white and British, and had been saying that the situation was one in which racism was being exhibited? In addressing that question, we first asked ourselves whether there was anything in the facts before us from which we could draw the inference that Mr Cooper would not have done that if the claimant had been white and British. (By referring to the possibility of drawing that inference, we mean to summarise the effect of the words of section 136(2) of the EqA 2010 which we have set out in paragraph 285 below. All references to the possibility of drawing an inference below are to be read in the same way.) We found that there was not. We then asked ourselves the simple question why Mr Cooper sent the claimant the article, and we concluded that it was indeed as Mr Cooper said to us as we record in paragraph 235 above, namely that it was to put before the claimant “a balanced view”, and with a view to encouraging the claimant to see that there was an alternative, and apparently objectively-justified, view of the situation which did not involve race discrimination. Mr Cooper’s use of the claimant’s work on one occasion: the factual situation which gave rise to the claim stated in paragraph 9.8 above

[243]Having, in paragraphs 11-13 of his witness statement, described how the claimant started to assist Mr Cooper working on wills and lasting powers of attorney in about February/March 2023, and how he, Mr Cooper, had found the claimant’s work to have “numerous fundamental mistakes and typos in the Drafts he prepared which [Mr Cooper] rectified” (and we accepted those paragraphs), Mr Cooper said this (it was paragraph 14 of his witness statement). Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 116 “Around that time (late June ‘23) I was admitted to hospital with gall bladder infection, which led to surgery to remove my gall bladder in July 2023. Therefore I was in and out of work, and I accept that this may have caused me not to check the 1st Drafts of the documents he prepared as thoroughly as I would normally have done. I recall that Kelechi and I had a conversation around that time where I politely expressed my concerns about the basic errors, omissions and typos in [h]is 1st drafts, and that as a Trainee barrister I would not expect such basic errors in documents drafted by him. He informed me that he suffered from dyslexia, something he had not mentioned to me before. I immediately informed Simon Aaron and Aryeh Kaye, who advised me that they were looking into this.”

[244]We accepted that evidence of Mr Cooper. It was not seriously challenged by the claimant, who said nothing about that aspect of the matter in his witness statement in any event. What the claimant said to Mr Cooper in cross-examination was to the effect that there was a complaint from a client, which Mr Cooper remembered, remembering that it was about the drafting of a will, and that it was about the claimant’s drafting. Mr Cooper agreed. The claimant then asked whether Mr Cooper approved the draft before it went to the client, and Mr Cooper said (as noted by EJ Hyams): “I was ill at the time and had to go to hospital as I had gall bladder surgery; so I may not have checked it more thoroughly; I held my hands up to that one.”

[245]We saw that in paragraph 81 of his witness statement, Mr Abraham said this about the claimant’s work done for Mr Cooper. “[N]o complaints were made about this matter [of the sending by Mr Cooper under cover of the email at B2/122 to the claimant of the article about Prince Harry and Meghan Markle at B2/123-126] or about the Claimant working with Simon Cooper at any time during the Claimant’s employment. Simon Cooper had in fact been extremely supportive of the Claimant during his employment, and praised a letter he had drafted, pages 39, 666 and 951. There is no evidence that Mr Cooper had set the Claimant up to fail. The issue of a complaint about the client’s draft will was barely discussed at the appraisal page 889-890 and certainly did not play any major factor in the decision making. It was one of many examples of some poor drafting.”

[246]We thought (and saw from their written closing submissions that the respondents agreed) that the cross-references to B2/39, B2/666 and B2/951 were erroneous, and that the correct references were B2/43, B2/670 and B2/955 respectively. In our view, all of the documents at those pages bore out what Mr Abraham said in that passage. So did the discussion recorded at B2/889-890. Were the criticisms of the claimant’s performance set out in the email of 25 January 2023 at B2/131-135 objectively justified? Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 117

[247]At this point it was convenient to stand back and ask ourselves whether the criticisms of the claimant’s performance set out in the email of 25 January 2023 at B2/131-135 were objectively justified. We had already (as stated in paragraph 193 above) come to the conclusion that those criticisms were genuinely believed by Mr Abraham. Having(1) heard and seen Mr Aaron, Mr Nash, Mr Abraham, Mr Cooper and the claimant give evidence, and

(2) having read the emails referred to in the chronology which we have set out in paragraph 222 above, we concluded that those criticisms were objectively justified both at the time when they were made and, given our acceptance of Mr Cooper’s evidence to which we refer in paragraphs 243 and 244 above, subsequently. We also concluded that they were made and stated in the email at B2/131-135 purely out of a desire to be fair to the claimant and because Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron had decided that the claimant’s employment with the first respondent could not continue unless something emerged from the claimant’s appraisal which changed their view. Ms Varsani’s email of 5 July 2023

[248]On 5 July 2023, Ms Varsani sent the short email at B2/364 concerning an “office day out” at Woburn Safari which was to be on 2 August 2023. At the bottom of the page was a picture of a monkey with the words “Before you speak, listen. Before you act, think. Before you give up, try. Before you shit, make sure there’s toilet paper.” We inferred that that was intended to be a humourous picture. In paragraph 76 of his witness statement, the claimant described that as an “inappropriate caption”. The claimant then said this, after stating the text of the caption. “I felt that the caption was inappropriate and unprofessional, and I felt that the picture of a monkey was inappropriate. I do not believe that this image was associated to the day trip to the Safari Park and I believed that the staff member who sent the email may have been aware of my complaint of race discrimination as she worked with Michael and Simon, who I had reported the complaint to initially. I believed that management was aware of the racial issues involved and therefore should have been more sensitive to such emails being sent out, particularly one using foul language. I wished for the email to be removed or retracted, but it seems that management refused to do so.”

[249]Ms Varsani’s evidence on this was very brief. She said in the third and final paragraph of her witness statement that she had sent with her email of 5 July 2023 “a picture of a monkey as that was an animal to be found at a safari.” She continued: “I did a basic internet search to find ‘safari jokes’ and that is what came up, see page 375 of the disclosure bundle. There was no racial or offensive motivation behind including the monkey at all. It was intended as a fun picture for a trip to a safari park.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 118

[250]On 10 July 2023, the claimant sent the email at B2/367, in which he wrote (after saying several things about his then-current grievance): “Furthermore, I am gravely concerned about the manner in which management has addressed various issues, such as the email sent by a staff member to the entire team on 5 July 2023 at 5:07pm. In this email, a highly offensive image of a monkey was featured, accompanied by foul language. This imagery is not only overwhelmingly inappropriate, but it also perpetuates harmful stereotypes that deeply offend black Africans. It is disheartening that Simon and/or Michael failed to recall this email promptly, and there doesn’t appear to be any visible action taken to rectify this situation, considering its potential for causing offence.”

[251]That was (said Mr Abraham in paragraph 57 of his witness statement) the first time that the claimant had raised the issue: “The Claimant had not raised that he was offended by the email neither to Priya or any of the partners, nor the office manager, prior to making the complaint.” The claimant did not challenge that evidence, and we accepted it. In paragraphs 59 and 60 of his witness statement, Mr Abraham said this. ‘59. I can understand instances where an email like that if it were sent to or directed at one black or Asian member of staff would be offensive, but the intention of the email was quite clear and Priya, who is herself of Indian and Mauritian origin clearly did not mean offence to the Claimant. The way that the complaint is framed against the partners is particularly strange, i.e, we should have taken action before the Claimant had even said anything about it. 60. I did suggest to Priya that she apologise if anything caused offence, because I believe its always good to apologise if someone claims offence particularly in a work situation, simply to de-escalate tensions page 376-377. Priya for her part did not agree to do so, and I don’t believe she can be criticised for that stance, as she is entitled to feel that she has done nothing wrong. She also sent us her search history, which shows that she searched on the day for “monkey safari jokes” page 375.’

[252]In fact, the search history (for 5 July 2023) at B2/375 showed that Ms Varsani had searched for “one line safari jokes”, “Funny Jungle Puns”, “safari jokes” and “jungle jokes”, but not “monkey safari jokes”.

[253]On 12 July 2023, Ms Varsani wrote (in the email in the middle of B2/376) to Mr Abraham in response to his implicit suggestion (in his email of 12 July 2023 at B2/376-377) that she might “apologise for offence caused, even if there was absolutely no intention to offend whatsoever”: “I don’t have the or energy [sic] to email him back apologising for making a joke about a monkey when planning a trip to the zoo. Hey [sic] made a certain connection in his brain which in itself is racist. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 119 For exams [presumably she meant “example”] I [should not] talk about snow bc a white person would be offended? Iv got SRA exams and come to work to work, not worry about silly employees who want to waste time.”

[254]Mr Aaron responded several hours later, in the email at the top of B2/376, to both Mr Abraham and Ms Varsani: “I do not consider that an apology is required. It was in the context of a trip to the safari park, and in particular, a park where monkeys are the key attraction known for jumping over cars. Not only was there no racist intent, it was not racist even in its implication. A monkey is not an invented creature made up for some kind of racist purpose, it is an actual animal and a feature of the safari park. No further discussion of the subject is needed.”

[255]Shortly before Ms Varsani gave evidence (which was nearly at the end of the hearing day on 18 December 2025), the respondents disclosed an email from Ms Varsani to Mr Kaye, Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron, copied to two other email addresses only (one of which was of a lady whose first name was Munira, and the other of which was “enquiries”, so the email was not sent to the claimant or to all of the staff of the first respondent’s offices), in which she wrote that she, Munira, and “Katie” (whose email address was probably “enquiries”) had “come up with an amazing plan” for the office day out, and included a link to the Woburn Safari website. At the end of the email was a picture of a (different) monkey under the words: “Lets monkey around!!!!”. The claimant’s appraisal, its ending, and its aftermath

[256]We record here that we accepted the following evidence of Mr Aaron in paragraph 88 of his witness statement: “I emailed the Claimant on 3 August 2023, to confirm that the appraisal had concluded page 408. The Claimant only raised the issue of him not signing it after the termination of his employment on 31 August 2023 page 447. His comments [sic; the words in question were these; “Can you clarify that you have terminated my contract without allowing me to sign my formal appraisal and agree to the facts placed in my formal appraisal?] implies that the signature is an agreement of facts, whereas it is not the case that there is a negotiation of the facts after an appraisal.”

[257]We also accepted the next paragraph of Mr Aaron’s witness statement, which responded to the request stated in B2/447 to be provided with a copy of the recording of the three appraisal meetings. Paragraph 89 of Mr Aaron’s witness statement was as follows. “At the time of the appraisal, it was my view that the Claimant would be provided with a copy of the recording in due course. However, it was only a few weeks later that I discovered the Claimant’s history of bringing many Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 120 claims in the Employment Tribunal and I was concerned about the risk of client confidentiality being breached. I explained this in great detail to the Claimant in two emails on 7 September page 464 – 465 and 471.”

[258]We saw that on 7 September 2023, Mr Aaron said this in his email at B2/471. “In relation to the release of the appraisal recording, in view of the additional information that has come to my attention in the last couple of days, my opinion as to the level of risk in terms of breach of client confidentiality is now so high, that I am not happy to release anything until I have had an opportunity to study the case reports of the previous claims brought by you in the county court and ET. Therefore it is in your hands to deliver those case reports to me if you wish to speed up my consideration of matters.”

[259]In his email of 4 September 2023 to the claimant at B2/452, to which we return in paragraph 267 below, Mr Aaron said this about the appraisal meeting and its recording. “In relation to the recording of the appraisal I will consider the matter further once I have spoken to the Law Society for the reasons previously explained. You still have not addressed the reasons for your failure to hand over the recording of the meeting with Kevin. We have explained our reasons for the problem with handing over the recording held by us, and those reasons are simple to understand, whereas you have outright failed to explain your own refusal. The appraisal certainly did last for around 16 hours over a span of 3 days. If it was not above 16 hours then it certainly was not far below, and it was on 24th, 26th and 31st July. I do not consider that Michael made any racial gesture as you seek to suggest, and I made it very clear at the time that I saw Michael’s gesture as representing the excitement that he was portraying when he described the aftermath of a particular phone call. Indeed it would be quite alarming if Michael had sought to make a racial gesture in the middle of an appraisal in front of Aryeh and myself, and I think it is very unfortunate that you sought to interpret matters in that way and draw attention away from the substance of the appraisal. Please confirm if you would like Kevin to continue his investigation of the various matters, including this one?”

[260]In paragraph 114 of his witness statement, Mr Aaron said this: “[T]he suggestion that Michael carried out a racial gesture during the appraisal is ludicrous. The Claimant has since 31 October 2023 had a copy of the video which captures the moment where Michael was emphasising what happened on a particular day where the Claimant was gesturing with his hands, excited about a conversation he had with HMRC. It is clear that Michael was not doing a racial gesture as the waving of hands is not Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 121 exclusive to a particular race. When the Claimant said that he found it offensive, Michael apologised for any offence that may have been caused. He also made clear that it was a million miles from his mind. The Claimant was seeking to distract from the appraisal by trying to have a long discussion about it. It was made clear to him that he could make that complaint after the appraisal, but he should not distract from it.”

[261]During the hearing, we were sent and viewed copies of recordings of parts the appraisal meeting of 24, 26 and 31 July 2023. We saw and re-watched several times the incident when Mr Abraham did something which the claimant said was a racially offensive gesture. Mr Abraham said this about that incident in his witness statement. ‘63. At the point where I was describing the stern conversation with HMRC on the bankruptcy matter, the Claimant denied that it was a heated conversation. I explained that my observation was that he came into my room waving his hand from side to side, saying “woah, that was some conversation with HMRC, they refused to waive statutory interest, but I immediately countered them”. The Claimant said that I was stereotyping him. I was not stereotyping him or carrying out a racial gesture. I was totally repeating my recollection of the conversation and demonstrating how he was excited about it. 64. I had a distressing and sinking feeling as the accusation was made, as I knew that the Claimant would look to make accusations at any opportunity and it was clear that he would now try to completely distract from the appraisal. To de-escalate the situation, I said that if anything I had done had caused offence, this was a million miles from my mind and I apologise. The conversation moved on, but after lunch, the Claimant was continuing to take issue with the matter. He was trying to turn the appraisal into a discussion about his supposed offence at the alleged “gangster rapper gesture”. I made clear to him that if he wants to make a complaint he should do so after the appraisal, but right now, if he was going to distract from the appraisal, then we would have to make our decision on the papers. The Claimant didn’t raise it again, other than some occasional references, but the appraisal moved on.’

[262]The video spoke for itself, of course, and what we saw was Mr Abraham demonstrating to the claimant what he had seen the claimant do on one occasion. It looked like an “Ali G” type of gesture (which we understood to be waving one’s hand up and down). It was not mimicry and it was not in any way in our judgment denigratory. It was no more than saying, by a physical action rather than words, how the claimant had shown his jubilation at the manner in which he had in his view dealt effectively with HMRC.

[263]Paragraph 90 of Mr Aaron’s witness statement was also relevant. It was as follows. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 122 “As for the allegation that Michael had applied a more onerous appraisal, the Claimant is referring to the email on page 283, where Michael asked for a written response to some documents as a preliminary stage of the appraisal. This was because the Claimant was insisting that it should take place immediately, and I did not consider it appropriate to hold it in the midst of the informal complaint process. The Claimant objected and this was not insisted upon, as per my email on page 302.”

[264]In the email at B2/283, which was dated 25 May 2023, Mr Abraham said this: “You have made clear that you want the appraisal to start. Given that you seem quite enthusiastic about making a start, and also comments made about your wanting to know what would be discussed at the appraisal, we have considered how we can accommodate this. We want to give you the opportunity to be able to participate fully in this appraisal and to gain a full understanding of your strengths and weaknesses. This will enable us to assess your ability to perform at this organisation and any reasonably allowable adjustments that we could make in order to assist with your performance. In order to accommodate your request, we have decided that we can start the appraisal with the preliminaries. We will therefore begin the appraisal with written preliminaries, and ask for your written response to some documents in advance of the actual meeting. Those documents include the attached appraisal form and my email of concerns about your performance, which was sent to you on 25 January 2023 (copy attached). Obviously there will be more issues which we would add prior to the meeting (due to work done since January), and we would give you the opportunity to provide your response to those.”

[265]Mr Aaron’s email at B2/302 was sent on 31 May 2023 and its material text was as follows. ‘You still appear to be confusing the 25 January email for the appraisal. The email was not the appraisal. The email was setting out a number of concerns arising from matters that you had worked on, that were going to be discussed during the appraisal. The appraisal obviously does and would follow the appraisal format. During the appraisal we examine cases that a fee earner works on to illustrate any areas of concern. Michael had begun to list issues that he was concerned about, and I know for a fact he had, because I saw a draft list of concerns from him in early January, and I know that he continued to build a list ahead of the appraisal that was meant to take place on 25 January. When we did not end up sitting down together that day, Michael decided that he would send you the list of concerns anyway, as it would give you a chance to reflect Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 123 on those matters before we sat down, which might lead to a more productive discussion as you would have a chance to consider your response. The appraisal is not exclusively about that list, nor exclusively about case matters in general. So, when you say of Michael’s email “why didn’t he also raise positive comments” this misses the purpose of the email. Please also note, Michael asked me if I had matters where I had concerns and I also relayed to Michael points from David Nash as you had spent a lot of time with him. You know that the appraisal has not taken place, otherwise why would we be having all this discussion about having an appraisal. That being so, I am concerned that you seem to be side-tracking from the substantive discussion instead of getting on with answering the points in that email of 25 January. That list of casework, among others, is something we will be looking at during the appraisal so you may wish to crack on with addressing the points. If you don’t want to address it, that is up to you, but I cannot see how failing to address it is going to assist your appraisal. Regarding the use of a personal email, I have had a quick look and it appears that it was sent to both emails, work and personal, which is indeed what we appear to be doing with all emails that involve your employment (as opposed to the progress of client matters). I cannot see how it differs from the multitude of email exchanges we have had in recent months. If you want something else now, please clarify which email address you want employment-related emails to be sent.” The reasons for the claimant’s dismissal

[266]The reasons for the claimant’s dismissal were set out in the letter at B2/68-69. Mr Aaron expounded on those reasons in paragraphs 92-98 of his witness statement. We accepted those paragraphs and, because of that acceptance but also because of our conclusions stated in paragraphs 335-337 below, we concluded that the letter at B2/68-69 set out the real reasons why the claimant was dismissed. In fact, we concluded that they were the only reasons for the claimant’s dismissal. In our view(1) the claimant’s race,

(2) the fact that he had done protected acts within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010 (including making his first claim in these proceedings), and

(3) the fact that the claimant had asserted that there was a risk of deception (as analysed by us in paragraphs 318-320 below) had no effect (whatsoever) on the decision to dismiss the claimant, whom Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham genuinely perceived

266.1 to have acted dishonestly “due [said Mr Aaron in paragraph 96 of his witness statement] to the fact that the Claimant had untruthfully asserted that we had undertaken to give him Bar training”;

266.2 to lack competence as evidenced by (as Mr Aaron said in paragraph 94 of his witness statement) “many instances of poorly completed work”; and Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 124

266.3 to have done very little work of economic value as (said Mr Aaron also in paragraph 94 of his witness statement) there was “very little time recorded” by the claimant, in the following circumstances: “There were 3 months where he had recorded a total of 1 unit (6 minutes) per month as set out in the termination letter page 68 – 69 and shown on the time recording charts on page 77. The total units recorded for the entire employment is 686, whereas for the same period, a different paralegal, Ayse Salih had recorded 10,909 units. A trainee solicitor, Priya Varsani had recorded 10,521 units during the same period page 78-79.”

[267]The claimant sought to appeal the decision to terminate his employment with the first respondent, but Mr Aaron refused him an opportunity to do so, in the opening words of the email from him to the claimant of 4 September 2023 at B2/452: “Thank you for your email. There is no appeal against our decision to terminate the contract.” The manner in which the first respondent considered the claimant’s grievances

[268]The claimant pursued a grievance first informally and then formally, in the manner described to us in particular by Mr Harris. The claimant then sought to add allegations to his previous allegations with a view to those additional allegations being treated as part of his original grievance. Mr Abraham described that process in paragraph 68 of his witness statement, which was (and with regret we say this) another key piece of evidence which we needed to set out rather than summarise or merely refer to. It was as follows. “After his termination, the Claimant continued to send aggressive correspondence to us with accusations. On 4 September 2023 at around 10pm, I saw an email from him, where he was directly accusing me of being racist page 454. It was distressing to receive this email and within the response to Simon and Aryeh, I said that I have experienced racism myself, that my own mother and some of my own brothers probably have darker skin tone then him page 456. This email had been copied to the Claimant, who responded by accusing me of attacking his skin tone. To be clear this was quite obviously not an attack on his skin tone and it is merely drawing upon my own experience and my own family, all individuals that the Claimant is familiar with, and in response to very upsetting attacks by the Claimant. The Claimant’s conduct was clearly designed to cause distress and alarm. At the grievance appeal meeting, which the Claimant terminated within around 10 minutes, he said that he had complained to the police about what he called an attack on his skintone page 657.”

[269]Mr Harris dismissed the claimant’s grievances in the letter dated 19 January 2024 at B2/70-76. The grievance was about (and as far as we could see, only about) the things which were the subject of the claims made in these proceedings. The Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 125 letter spoke for itself, but we set out one part of it here as it is the subject of the claim stated in paragraph 9.21 above. At B2/75, Mr Harris said this. “The firm was planning a staff trip to Woburn Safari Park and as part of the emails planning the trip, Priya sent an email containing a picture of monkey with comments. In your view the email and picture were offensive to black Africans, and you were disappointed with Michael and Simon’s reaction to the photograph. During the meeting on 12 July, I asked why it was offensive and you began an explanation about the use of monkey picture to caricature black people. Given that I am myself black and a discrimination lawyer, it was somewhat strange that you felt the need to explain this. When I pressed you for an explanation as to why it was offensive you replied, ‘everyone is aware that monkeys are offensive to black Africans.’ You also complained that ‘management should be aware of stereotypes which can be harmful’ and that you would not want anyone to ‘send you a monkey because of the historical association.’ Having looked at the image and discussed it with you I cannot see how you can conclude that the image is supposed to be a caricature of black Africans or offensive to black Africans. It is clearly a joke connected with the staff outing to the safari park. As the image was not offensive, I do not think that Michael or Simon can be criticised for not taking any action over it. Once you did complain, Michael did in fact suggest that Priya apologise for any offence caused. I therefore do not uphold your grievance in relation to the photograph of the monkey and the email.”

[270]We saw too that what Mr Harris said in paragraphs 13, 14, 17 and 18 of his witness statement about the matter was entirely consistent with that passage of the letter: “13. On 5 July 2023 Priya Varsani sent an email to all the firm’s staff about a trip to the Woburn Safari park [364]. Included in the email was an image of a chimpanzee with text. When I received the email I did not give the image any thought or regard it as offensive. 14. On 10 July 2023 I emailed the Claimant to arrange a formal meeting to discuss his grievance [366]. I received a reply from the Claimant the same day which added a further complaint relating to the email that Priya had sent on 5 July. The Claimant stated that the image was highly offensive and that it perpetuates harmful stereotypes that deeply offend black Africans. However, the complaint was not about Priya who had sent the email but was about Simon and Michael failing to take any action on the email [367]. I emailed him back on 11 July to arrange a time, and asked him to send the email that he was complaining about [368]. In my email I said that I had not seen the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 126 email, which cannot have been correct. I think at the time I was not sure what email the Claimant was referring to and did not immediately connect his complaint to Priya’s email as it seemed innocuous. ... 17. I understand that the Claimant is saying that I did not let him explain the monkey picture and why it was offensive and this minimised his experience. The notes in regard to this particular aspect of the grievance start at page 636. I did not understand why he thought that the image, in the context of Priya trying to arrange a visit to a zoo, was offensive. There was an extensive back on forth regarding the issue and I admit I became frustrated and lost my temper slightly as he was not answering the question. The Claimant kept raising that monkeys had been used as a racist description of black people. I was well aware of this and did not need it explaining. What I wanted to know is why the image was offensive to him as it didn’t seem to have any connection with black Africans. The Claimant was unable to explain this. 18. The Claimant also seemed to try and make the issue about Michael and Simon A failing to step in, and that he didn’t have an issue with Priya. I had a hard time understanding, if it was a racist image, why it wasn’t a complaint against Priya for sending it and what about the image meant that management should have stepped in. Although we discussed the issue at length the Claimant wasn’t able to explain it. At one point he said that everyone is aware that monkeys are offensive to black Africans or words to that effect.”

[271]The final substantive part of the letter at B2/70-76 was relevant to the claims stated in paragraphs 9.17 and 9.19 above. That final part was as follows. “It has been suggested to me that your complaints were not made in good faith and were made in order to distract from a negative appraisal or so you could argue that this was because you had raised complaints. I have considered the matter carefully. I note that you did raise issues regarding David before you learned from Michael on 17 January 2023 that there were concerns about your performance. Before that date there doesn’t seem to have been any suggestion that your employment may not continue. I am therefore not convinced that you raised issues in bad faith initially. However, I note that you only complained about David Nash’s comment after the date of your appraisal and your conversation with Michael on 17 January 2023 and the email from him on 25 January 2023. I can see that in your email exchanges with Simon following 27 January 2023 you raised an increasing number of issues with him regarding his actions, the process, training contracts and other matters. I think you began to raise issues because you believed they would give you leverage against the firm. I think Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 127 you managed to persuade yourself that your complaints were valid. I am not therefore certain that they were not made, as far you were concerned, in good faith. Objectively you should have known that some of your complaints were not valid. For example, clearly you have never been offered or guaranteed a training contract. Your complaints about the monkey picture are different. You were very insistent that your complaint was not against Priya and that you were not saying that Priya had any bad intent. If the image is offensive, then clearly there should be some consideration of disciplinary action against Priya for sending an offensive racist image. You refused to accept this, and it was clear that your complaint was against Simon and Michael. I think that you were using the email as a way of attacking Simon and Michael and attempting to argue that they were indifferent to racism. At the time you were in an ongoing dispute regarding your appraisal, and I believe you thought the allegation might assist you. That is why you were at pains to frame it as a complaint against Simon and Michael rather than Priya. I do not think that your complaint about the email and picture were clearly made in good faith. Any allegation of discrimination is serious, and it should have been obvious to you that as Priya sent the email your complaint was by implication an allegation against Priya, which could lead to her dismissal. I believe that making a false allegation of discrimination against another employee to further your own agenda is a breach of trust. If you had remained employed, I would have recommended that the firm consider disciplinary action against you in respect of the complaint about the monkey picture.”

[272]We concluded that the letter at B2/70-76 was an accurate statement of the conclusions to which Mr Harris came in determining the claimant’s grievance(s) and we accepted what Mr Harris said to us both via his witness statement and in his oral evidence.

[273]When he was cross-examined about not giving the claimant the identity of the person who alleged bad faith, Mr Harris said (as noted by EJ Hyams, with the words in square brackets not noted but inserted to make sense of the notes) this: “You knew the matters had been raised. You knew who I was speaking to. You knew that it was said that the allegations had been made in bad faith. If you said in a meeting that you could not explain what was what if you were not told who had alleged it [then I would have considered that]. I thought you could explain further what was said without it being said [who had made the allegation of bad faith].”

[274]We saw that on 8 November 2023, Mr Harris wrote to the claimant in the email at B2/533: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 128 “What has been suggested is that you have made complaints about discrimination which were not made in good faith. Further, that you made these complaints as you know the outcome of your appraisal would be poor. You can reply to my email with anything you wish me to take into account or we can arrange a further meeting. Please confirm how you wish to proceed.”

[275]The claimant’s evidence on the grievance process was best seen in the following passage of his witness statement. “105. On 01 October 2023, I received an email form Kevin that stated that he would not be addressing any grievances I submitted since I ceased to be an employee.106. A meeting was arranged for 14 December 2023 regarding the grievances that I had made. Myself, Aryeh and Kevin were diarised to attend. I found this unusual, as Kevin did not usually deal with complaints and furthermore he had been involved substantially in discussions of pupillage opportunities. I did not feel it was appropriate for him to be involved in these discussions.

107. In order to engage in the grievance, I made a request for Reasonable adjustments via email. Simon had previously made an allegation that I was using my Dyslexia ‘as a tactic’ and explained that I found this to be offensive. I explained in this email that it is a medical (in terms of impairment) fact that Dyslexia has an impact on situations such as a grievance meeting. I explained that if the meeting continued and I was not provided with the requested adjustment by 12pm on 11 December 2023, the matter will be further reported to both regulators, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) and the Bar Standards Board (BSB), whom I copied into this email correspondence. I included both bodies as Kevin was regulated by the BSB and other members of management regulated by the SRA. I was hoping, by copying them into correspondence, this would put them on notice of how the management of the firm was behaving and I was hoping they may be able to provide me with some advice to resolve this as I felt isolated by their conduct.

108. The adjustments that I requested involved providing further information regarding my grievance in a clear, written format to allow me to review and process the information at my own pace, ensuring that I can process the information given and have a comprehensive understanding of the situation in order to engage with the meeting.

109. I also requested, as a reasonable adjustment, to understand more about the allegation that my complaints were not made in good faith. I found this comment to be inappropriate and believed that this was Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 129 part of the firm’s retaliation, and this comment was used in an attempt to discredit my valid complaints. I requested to know who suggested that my complaints were not made in good faith, when this assertion was made, the reason why this suggestion was made and any evidence to support that this assertion was accurate and identifying which complaints of mine are being referred to as not being made in good faith. I explained that this information would assist in providing a specific starting point for understanding the situation, reducing ambiguity, and making it easier for me with dyslexia to follow the discussion and respond accordingly. I believed this was a reasonable adjustment, but in any event, I would still require this information to assist me in understanding and addressing the issue that had been raised.

110. On 13 December 2023, Kevin confirmed via email that they do not agree with my account of events and would not agree to meet on 14 December 2023, as I had allegedly placed conditions on the meeting which Kevin stated he did not agree to. I did not agree with this statement, as I do not believe I had placed conditions on the meeting and had instead made a request for reasonable adjustments to enable me to participate in the meeting.

111. It was therefore concluded that Kevin would make a decision regarding my grievance on the basis of the information he already has. I believe this was to avoid providing a response to my more recent complaints. I did not think this was appropriate as I believed that there was outstanding matters that still needed to be discussed, such as dealing with the issue of my complaints not being made in good faith. 112 . I provided an email response on 14 December 2023 regarding my belief that Kevin, Simon and Michael delayed addressing my complaint first raised in January 2023 about the racial conduct of David. I stated that if the firm had the authority to make such decisions regarding my complaint stating that they are out of time, then they also had the power to resolve my complaint months ago, rather than taking a year to provide me with a response. I found this to be hypocritical that they were denying me an opportunity to raise complaints and enforcing strict deadlines, when they have taken so long to process my complaint.”

[276]We record here that we accepted the evidence of Mr Harris in paragraphs 36-45 of his witness statement. We note here that in paragraph 36 of his witness statement, Mr Harris said this: “On 17 October 2023 there was further correspondence between us regarding the grievance [514-20]. The Claimant was still pushing for more issues to be included in his grievance and so I wrote a detailed email, repeating the reason for my decision, but saying he would have an Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 130 opportunity to explain any delay in providing his additional grievances [520]. I do not believe he gave any explanation for any delay in any email or in our subsequent meeting. At this time having conducted the interviews with the other witnesses I thought that there was an issue as to whether the grievances had been brought in good faith. Issues were raised regarding the timing of the grievances and the Claimant’s appraisal. The complaint about Priya’s email was also difficult to understand as something that had genuinely caused offence. I therefore believed that I would have to consider the issue of whether the complaints had been made in good faith.” What happened about the appraisal video?

[277]Finally in regard to the facts, we note here that while, as we record in paragraph 260 above, Mr Aaron’s evidence (which was not challenged in this regard) was that the claimant had since 31 October 2023 had “a copy of the video which captures the moment where [Mr Abraham] was emphasising what happened on a particular day where the Claimant was gesturing with his hands, excited about a conversation he had with HMRC”, it was the claimant’s case that he was not given the whole of the recording of that appraisal. It was many hours long, and we were told during the liability hearing that it could not be sent as whole digitally, or at least not conveniently.

[278]We looked in any event for the claimant’s reasons for wanting the video. The main one had to be the desire to use the part which was provided to him on 31 October 2023. That was confirmed by what the claimant said in paragraph 93 of his witness statement. He had asked in his email of 31 August 2023 at B2/447 for a copy of “the recording of the appraisal that was agreed to be provided to me”. He did not say there why he was pressing that request. However, in paragraph 93 of his witness statement he said that he pressed for the recording in that email “believing that [the agreement to provide the recording] had been revoked on the basis that I could not see Michael’s racial gesture directed towards me, as I believed that this would support my claim of racial discrimination.”

[279]We saw that in paragraph 90 of his witness statement, the claimant said that he had “not been provided with the recording to corroborate any of the issues that were raised”, but there was in the bundle a complete transcript of the recording, made by “Bristol Transcription & Translation Services”. That was dated in the index “25/04/2025”. We therefore concluded that the transcription was sent to the claimant on or after that date.

[280]The claimant said nothing about that aspect of the claim in his witness statement, or in such submissions as he did in the end make to us. Relevant law The law of disability discrimination Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 131

Relevant law

[281]While it is not necessary to identify a particular label for an impairment within the meaning of section 6 of the EqA 2010, it is necessary for a claimant to satisfy the tribunal on a balance of probabilities that he or she has such an impairment. That is clear both as a matter of principle and because of what Mummery LJ said in paragraph 26 of his judgment in McNicol v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd

[2002] EWCA Civ 1074

[2002] ICR 1498

, with which the other two judges in that case (Wall J and Sir Andrew Morritt V-C) agreed, namely: ‘As to the function of the tribunal it was submitted that it should adopt an inquisitorial and more proactive role in disability discrimination cases, as they can be complex and involve applicants, whose impairment leads them to minimise or to offer inaccurate diagnoses of their conditions and of the effects of their impairment. I do not think that it would be helpful to describe the role the employment tribunal as “inquisitorial” or as “proactive”. Its role is to adjudicate on disputes between the parties on issues of fact and law. I agree with the guidance recently given by Lindsay J in Morgan v Staffordshire University

[2002] ICR 475

,483, para 20. The onus is on the [claimant] to prove the impairment on the conventional balance of probabilities. In many cases there will be no issue about impairment. If there is an issue on impairment, evidence will be needed to prove impairment. Some will be difficult borderline cases. It is not, however, the duty of the tribunal to obtain evidence or to ensure that adequate medical evidence is obtained by the parties. That is a matter for the parties and their advisers. Sensible and sensitive use of the tribunal’s flexible and informal procedures and its case management powers enable it to do justice on this issue by reminding the parties at the directions hearing of the need in most cases for qualified and informed medical evidence, bearing in mind that an unrepresented person may need some explanation about what is involved and what is required and also bearing in mind the cost of obtaining such evidence, the need to keep costs down and the limited resources available to many parties in the employment tribunal. The tribunal may also grant an adjournment where it is appropriate for evidence to be obtained on the issue of impairment.”

[282]That case was decided against a slightly different factual background from the current one, in that there was then a requirement that any mental impairment was “a clinically well-recognised illness”. That requirement was abolished when the EqA 2010 was enacted, but dyslexia is not normally regarded as a mental illness, so that abolition was irrelevant.

[283]If a claimant satisfies an employment tribunal that he or she had an impairment within the meaning of section 6 of, and Schedule 1 to, the EqA 2010 at a material time, then an obligation to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of that Act will have arisen where a provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”) was applied by the employer which put the claimant “at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled.” As long as the employer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the disability and the manner in which the disability was likely to put the claimant Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 132 at a substantial disadvantage (see paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 to the EqA 2010), there will have been a duty, imposed by a combination of sections 20, 21 and 39(5) of the EqA 2010, “to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage”. Whether or not it would have been reasonable to make the adjustment sought is a matter for the tribunal to determine, taking an objective approach, and is not to be determined by reference to the “range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer” approach applicable in the law of unfair dismissal: Smith v Churchill Stairlifts plc

[2006] ICR 524

. Claims of direct discrimination because of a protected characteristic within the meaning of the EqA 2010

[284]Section 13 of the EqA 2010 provides: “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.”

[285]Proving a person’s motivation is usually difficult, for obvious reasons. That is why section 136 of the EqA 2010 was enacted. It provides: “(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.”

[286]When applying section 136, it is possible, when considering whether or not there are facts from which it would be possible to draw the inference that the respondent did what is alleged to have been less favourable treatment because of a protected characteristic, to take into account the respondent’s evidence about, but not its explanation for, the treatment. That is clear from paragraphs 19-47 of the judgment of Lord Leggatt JSC (with which Lord Hodge, Lord Briggs, Lady Arden and Lord Hamblin agreed) in the Supreme Court in Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd

[2021] UKSC 33

[2021] ICR 1263

[287]However, as the House of Lords said in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] ICR 337

, in some cases the best way to approach the question whether or not there has been for example direct discrimination within the meaning of section 13 of the EqA 2010 is by asking what was the reason why the conduct or omission in question occurred.

[288]If there is no evidence from which the inference could be drawn that a claimant’s treatment was to any extent because of a protected characteristic, then the claim of direct discrimination is likely, if not very likely, to fail. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 133 Claims of harassment within the meaning of section 26(1) and (4) of the EqA 2010

[289]Section 26 of the EqA 2010 provides: “(1) A person(a) (A) harasses another

(b) (B) if– (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of– (i) violating B’s dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. ... (4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account– (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case;

[290]Most of the time, conduct will be related to a protected characteristic only if it is done to any extent because of that characteristic within the meaning of section 13 of the EqA 2010. In paragraphs 24 and 25 of His Honour Judge (“HHJ”) James Tayler’s judgment sitting in the EAT in Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire

[2025] IRLR 184

,this was said: “24. Treatment may be related to a protected characteristic where it is ‘because of’ the protected characteristic, but that is not the only way conduct can be related to a protected characteristic, and there may be circumstances in which harassment occurs where the protected characteristic did not motivate the harasser. 25. Take, for example, a person who unknowingly uses a word that is offensive to people who have a relevant protected characteristic because it is historically linked to oppression of people who have the protected characteristic. The fact that the person, when using the word, did not know that it had such a meaning or connotation, would not prevent the word used being related to the protected characteristic. That does not necessarily mean the person who used the word would be liable for harassment, because it would still be necessary to consider whether the conduct violated the complainant’s dignity. If the use of the Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 134 word had that effect but not that purpose, the Employment Tribunal would go on to consider the factors in sub-para (4) of s 26 EQA. That said, there could be circumstances in which, even though a word was used without knowledge of the offensive connotations, having considered the factors in subpara (4), the perception of the recipient, other circumstances and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect, the use of the word would nonetheless amount to harassment under s 26 EQA.”

[291]The provisions of section 26 of the EqA 2010 have been considered by appellate courts on a number of occasions in helpful ways, including(1) by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] ICR 724

and

(2) by the Court of Appeal in Land Registry v Grant (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening)

[2011] ICR 1390

, where Elias LJ said in relation to the claimed harassment in that case: “[The claimed] effect cannot amount to a violation of dignity, nor can it properly be described as creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.”

[292]In paragraph 22 of Dhaliwal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Underhill P presiding) said this: “We accept that not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person’s dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.”

[293]In Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board v Hughes (unreported;

UKEAT/0179/13/JOJ

, 28 February 2014), the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Langstaff P presiding) said this in paragraphs 12 and 13 of its judgment having just set out paragraph 22 of the judgment in Dhaliwal: ‘12. We wholeheartedly agree. The word “violating” is a strong word. Offending against dignity, hurting it, is insufficient. “Violating” may be a word the strength of which is sometimes overlooked. The same might be said of the words “intimidating” etc. All look for effects which are serious and marked, and not those which are, though real, truly of lesser consequence. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 135 13. It was agreed, too, that context was very important in determining the question of environment and effect. Thus, as Elias LJ said in Grant, context is important. As this Tribunal said, in Warby v Wunda Group plc, UKEAT 0434/11, 27 January 2012: “…we accept that the cases require a Tribunal to have regard to context. Words that are hostile may contain a reference to a particular characteristic of the person to whom and against whom they are spoken. Generally a Tribunal might conclude that in consequence the words themselves are that upon which there must be focus and that they are discriminatory, but a Tribunal, in our view, is not obliged to do so. The words are to be seen in context;”.’

[294]Dhaliwal is authority for the proposition that the intent of the impugned conduct is relevant. That was said at the end of the following passage in the judgment of that case, the whole of which (including the footnotes, which we have integrated into the text by inserting them in square brackets and putting them into italics) was in our view helpful: ‘14. Secondly, it is important to note the formal breakdown of “element (2)” into two alternative bases of liability—”purpose” and “effect”. That means that a respondent may be held liable on the basis that the effect of his conduct has been to produce the proscribed consequences even if that was not his purpose; and, conversely, that he may be liable if he acted for the purposes of producing the proscribed consequences but did not in fact do so (or in any event has not been shown to have done so) [Those alternative forms of liability could be described, from the perpetrator’s point of view, as “objective” and “subjective”; but using that terminology risks confusion with the separate question whether the effect on the victim should be judged “subjectively” or “objectively”—as to which, see para 15.]. It might be thought that successful claims of the latter kind will be rare, since in a case where the respondent has intended [We use “intend” as the equivalent verb to the noun “purpose” used in the statute: “purpose” as a verb has an archaic ring. In this context at least there is no real difference between the terms “purpose” and “intention”.] to bring about the proscribed consequences, and his conduct has had a sufficient impact on the claimant for her to bring proceedings, it would be prima facie surprising if the tribunal were not to find that those consequences had occurred. For that reason we suspect that in most cases the primary focus will be on the effect of the unwanted conduct rather than on the respondent’s purpose (though that does not necessarily exclude consideration of the respondent’s mental processes because of “element (3)” as discussed below). 15. Thirdly, although the proviso in subsection (2) is rather clumsily expressed, its broad thrust seems to us to be clear. A respondent should not be held liable merely because his conduct has had the effect of producing a proscribed consequence: it should be reasonable that that consequence has occurred. That, as Mr Majumdar rightly submitted to us, creates an objective Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 136 standard. However, he suggested that, that being so, the phrase “having regard to … the perception of that other person” was liable to cause confusion and to lead tribunals to apply a “subjective” test by the back door. We do not believe that there is a real difficulty here. The proscribed consequences are, of their nature, concerned with the feelings of the putative victim: that is, the victim must have felt, or perceived, her dignity to have been violated or an adverse environment to have been created. That can, if you like, be described as introducing a “subjective” element; but overall the criterion is objective because what the tribunal is required to consider is whether, if the claimant has experienced those feelings or perceptions, it was reasonable for her to do so. Thus if, for example, the tribunal believes that the claimant was unreasonably prone to take offence, then, even if she did genuinely feel her dignity to have been violated, there will have been no harassment within the meaning of the section. Whether it was reasonable for a claimant to have felt her dignity to have been violated is quintessentially a matter for the factual assessment of the tribunal. It will be important for it to have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the context of the conduct in question. One question that may be material is whether it should reasonably have been apparent whether the conduct was, or was not, intended to cause offence (or, more precisely, to produce the proscribed consequences): the same remark may have a very different weight if it was evidently innocently intended than if it was evidently intended to hurt. [This is not to reintroduce a requirement of “purpose” by the back door: the point is not that the perpetrator cannot be liable unless he intended to cause offence but rather that, if he evidently did not intend to, it may not be reasonable for the claimant to have taken offence.]’ Victimisation

[295]Section 27 of the EqA 2010 provides: “(1) A person(a) (A) victimises another person

(b) (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because– (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. (2) Each of the following is a protected act– (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act;

(d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 137 (3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.”

[296]Section 136 of the EqA 2010 and the principles stated in paragraphs 286-288 above apply to the determination of a claim of victimisation. While in our view that was clear as a matter of principle, we record here that it is supported by what Underhill LJ said in paragraph 49 of his judgment in Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Bailey

[2017] EWCA Civ 425

(with which the other two members of the court agreed). There, Underhill LJ indicated (in our view clearly) that claims of direct discrimination within the meaning of section 13 of the EqA 2010 and of victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of that Act require what is in substance the same approach when determining “what was the reason why the respondent did the act complained of”.

[297]In paragraph 36 of HHJ James Tayler’s judgment in Carozzi, where the employer refused to give the claimant some notes of a meeting and it was claimed that that was victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010, this was said: “The correct question for the Employment Tribunal in this case was whether the decision not to provide the notes was to a material degree influenced by the fact that a complaint of unlawful discrimination had or might be made.”

[298]The employment tribunal in that case decided that the refusal to give the claimant the notes in question was not detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. In paragraph 37 of his judgment, HHJ Tayler said this: “The Tribunal also concluded that the treatment could not be detrimental. Derbyshire [i.e. St Helens Borough Council v Derbyshire & Ors

[2007] UKHL 16

[2007] ICR 841

] makes it clear that the test for detriment is whether an employee might reasonably consider themselves to be disadvantaged in the workplace as a result of the treatment. While in Khan [i.e. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan

[2001] UKHL 48

[2001] ICR 1065

] it was held that an employer taking reasonable steps to preserve its position in discrimination proceedings is not detrimental treatment of the potential claimant, the analysis of the Employment Tribunal in this case did not consider whether the parties thought that there were likely to be Employment Tribunal proceedings. The Employment Tribunal did not consider whether an employee who brings a grievance that might resolve issues with an employer, without the need for any tribunal proceedings, might reasonably consider themselves disadvantaged by not being provided with the notes of a meeting. Accordingly, I conclude that the Employment Tribunal erred in law in determining this complaint of victimisation. The complaint is remitted for redetermination.” “Whistleblowing” claims – i.e. claims of detrimental treatment for the making of a protected public interest disclosure Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 138

[299]A claim of detrimental treatment for “whistleblowing” is made under section 47B of the ERA 1996, which provides that a worker “has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.” In order to succeed in claiming such detrimental treatment, an employee must show that he or she made a disclosure falling within section 43A of the ERA 1996. That means a disclosure falling within section 43B of that Act that is made in accordance with sections 43C-43H of that Act (and making the disclosure to one’s employer is within sections 43C-34H). Section 43B provides so far as relevant: ‘In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following—(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject,

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,

(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or

(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.’

[300]The approach which is required to be taken by an employment tribunal when it is applying that section was stated most clearly and helpfully by the Court of Appeal in Chesterton Global Limited v Nurmohamed

[2017] EWCA Civ 979

[2018] ICR 731

. In paragraph 8 of his judgment (with which Beatson and Black LJJ can be taken to have agreed: see paragraphs 40-45 of the report), Underhill LJ said this: “Those provisions were subject to some exegesis by this Court in Babula v Waltham Forest College

[2007] EWCA Civ 174

[2007] ICR 1026

. Two points in particular are emphasised in that case, though in truth both are clear from the terms of the section itself:(1) The definition has both a subjective and an objective element: see in particular paras. 81-82 of the judgment of Wall LJ (pp. 1045-6). The subjective element is that the worker must believe that the information disclosed tends to show one of the six matters listed in sub-section (1). The objective element is that that belief must be reasonable. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 139

(2) A belief may be reasonable even if it is wrong. That is well illustrated by the facts of Babula, where an employee disclosed information about what he believed to be an act of criminal incitement to religious hatred, which would fall within head (a) of section 43B(1). There was in fact at the time no such offence, but it was held that the disclosure nonetheless qualified because it was reasonable for the employee to believe that there was.”

[301]If a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43A of the ERA 1996 is made, then section 48(2) of that Act places on the respondent the burden of proving “the ground on which any act, or deliberate failure to act, was done”. However, a detriment within the meaning of that section must (applying Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah

[1980] ICR 13

) be something which a reasonable person would say was a detriment.

[302]We observe that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rice v Wicked Vision Ltd

[2025] EWCA Civ 1466

shows that we were obliged to apply the decision of the Court of Appeal in Timis v Osipov

[2018] EWCA Civ 2321

;

[2019] ICR 655

(‘Osipov’) here, so that even if we found that the principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal was not that he had made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996, he could make a claim of detrimental treatment in the form of the termination of his employment, i.e. his dismissal. Our conclusions on the claims made here

[303]We now state our conclusions on the claims made by the claimant here. The issues stated in paragraph 9.1 above: the claim that there was a suspension on 25 August 2022 of the claimant “from working on ... music matters” and that that suspension was detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 47B of the ERA 1996, or direct discrimination because of race, or harassment

[304]The claimant was not suspended from working on music matters on 25 August 2022, or at any time subsequently. What happened was that Mr Nash wrote the email to which we refer in paragraph 164 above, and was unwilling to continue to work with the claimant, so that if the email had been given effect then the claimant would not have been doing any work in relation to “music matters”. So, the characterisation of the event was wrong, but that did not matter, since it did not affect the real issues, which were whether or not in doing that Mr Nash304.1 treated the claimant detrimentally to any extent because the claimant had made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 47B of the ERA 1996;

304.2 treated the claimant less favourably than he would have done if the claimant had been, say, white and British; or, if not,

304.3 did something that was related to the claimant’s race and was done with the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating for him an Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 140 intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment, and if not then whether it had that effect. Did the claimant, in saying something to Mr Aaron on 25 August 2022, as alleged in paragraph 2.1.1 of the list of issues on B1/121, make a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996?

[305]We therefore now consider whether the claimant had, in saying something to Mr Aaron on 25 August 2022, as alleged in paragraph 2.1.1 of the list of issues on B1/121, made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996. What was that thing? We concluded that it was best determined from the emails and evidence which we have set out or referred to in paragraphs 157- 163 above. The list of issues at B1/121 made it clear that the claimant was alleging only that he had made statements (only two, in fact, not three: see paragraph 8.1 above) that “a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation”. We could not see that it was being alleged by the claimant that a legal obligation had, or might have, been broken, unless it was a breach of the implied term that we have set out in paragraph 159.2 above, i.e. the duty to act in the best interests of the client. We had considerable difficulty seeing how what Mr Nash did as shown by what we say in paragraphs 157-163 above could have been a breach of that legal obligation. Partly for that reason but also because of the circumstances which were shown by what was in those paragraphs, we concluded that the claimant could not reasonably have believed that Mr Nash had broken a legal obligation by suggesting that the client consider the use of the services of Believe. In other words, if the claimant did genuinely believe that such a suggestion was a breach of a contractual obligation owed by the first respondent to the client (or Mr Nash in the law of negligence), then that belief was not reasonable.

[306]That meant that the claim of detrimental treatment contrary to section 47B of the ERA 1996 had to fail in so far as it relied on the first claimed disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996.

[307]We therefore turn to the claim that Mr Nash’s statement that he no longer wanted to work the claimant, as stated in the email which we have set out in paragraph 164 above, was at least to a material extent made because of the claimant’s race. There was nothing whatsoever in the facts as we found them from which we could draw the inference that it was. And in any event, having(1) considered all of the uncontested (and apparently incontestible) factual material before us, including as described or set out in paragraphs 157-163 above, and

(2) the oral evidence of Mr Nash, we concluded that the real reason why Mr Nash did not want to work with the claimant any more was (1) the claimant’s conduct, (2) the claimant’s manner, and

(3) the fact that, far from helping Mr Nash, the claimant was slowing him down and causing difficulties in the relationships between him (Mr Nash) and the clients of the first respondent with whom he (Mr Nash) dealt.

[308]Given that finding, we asked ourselves, applying the approach required to be taken by paragraphs 24 and 25 of Carozzi, which we have set out in paragraph Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 141 290 above, was the manner in which Mr Nash acted at that time related to the claimant’s race for the purposes of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010? We could see nothing on the facts as found by us from which the inference could be drawn that it was. Nor was there anything which might otherwise mean that Mr Nash’s unwillingness to work with the claimant was related to the claimant’s race.

[309]For all of those reasons, the claims which we have stated in paragraph9.1 above did not succeed. The claim stated in paragraph

9.2 above

[310]There was no doubt that Mr Nash wrote an email in which he said the things stated in paragraph 9.2 above. We have set out the material part of that email in paragraph 163 above. For the same reasons as those which we state in paragraphs 307-308 above in relation to the claims of direct discrimination because of race or harassment stated in paragraph 9.1 above, but applied to the content of that email, we concluded that this claim did not succeed. The claims stated in paragraph 9.3 above

[311]The issues stated in paragraph 9.3 above are in substance a repeat of those which are stated in paragraph 9.1 above, but applied instead to the content of the emails at B2/104-105, to which we refer in paragraphs 153 and 155 above. The email at B2/105 showed that the claimant was not, as claimed in paragraphs 3.1.2 and 8.1.3 of the list of issues at B1/122 and B1/124 respectively, sent a “written communication indicating that collaboration with [Mr Nash] would cease”.

[312]This claim failed on the facts. If it had been about the content of the emails at B2/104-105, then it would have failed for the same reasons as those stated in paragraphs 307-308 above. The claims stated in paragraph 9.4 above

[313]The claimant claimed in these proceedings that on 23 January 2023, Mr Nash referred to there being a white boys club at Warner Chappell Music. Not that the claimant was not present at a meeting with Warner Chappell Music on that day when, without direct discrimination or harassment, he would have been. We therefore assumed that this was a claim that the claimant had been unlawfully excluded from the 10am telephone call with Mr Condon of Warner Chappell Music on 25 January 2023. It made sense to us to deal with this claim alongside the claim stated in paragraph 9.6 above, because they were part of a continuous sequence of events. We therefore do that in paragraphs 316-332 below. The claims stated in paragraph 9.5 above

[314]The claimant was not saying by the time of the hearing before us that Mr Nash on 23 January 2023 referred to the first respondent as a white boys club. Rather, he was saying that Mr Nash referred to Warner Chappell Music as a white boys club. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 142 Reading it, however, as a claim that by referring to Warner Chappell Music as a white boys club, Mr Nash treated the claimant less favourably than he would have done if the claimant had been, say, white and British, it made no sense to us.

[315]In any event, we concluded for the reasons stated in paragraph 214 above that Mr Nash did not use those words. If only for that reason, this claim failed. The claims stated in paragraphs 9.4 and 9.6 above

[316]Our findings of fact about what happened before and at the 10am telephone meeting of 25 January 2023 with Mr Ed Condon of Warner Chappell Music to which the claims made as stated in paragraphs 9.4 and 9.6 above relate are set out in paragraphs 208-212 above and 329 below.

[317]Those claims were based in part on the proposition that the claimant had made a second public interest disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996. Given our conclusion stated in paragraph 306 above, the claim stated in paragraphs 9.4 and 9.6 above of detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 47B of that Act could succeed only if the claimant’s second claimed public interest disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of that Act was found by us to be such a disclosure. So, was it? Did the claimant on 19 December 2022 make an allegation to Mr Aaron which in his (the claimant’s) reasonable belief was made in the public interest and tended to show that a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he or she was subject?

[318]The claimed public interest disclosure was, we concluded, as recorded by us in paragraphs 170-173 above. We concluded that there was in the circumstances in question a real possibility that Mr Nash would, by implying that the first respondent’s client for whom he was acting at the time was interested in entering into a new contract with what we will call “the other side” when he was not in reality so interested, be deceiving the other side. However, it was not clear whether or not such deceit, if it occurred, would have been likely to cause loss to the other side.

[319]Nevertheless, we came to the conclusion that the claimant had a reasonable belief that there was a risk that Mr Nash would say or do something in the continuing negotiations with the client’s then-current agent which might be the tort of deceit (but not a crime as we did not think that anyone could reasonably think in the circumstances that the acts of Mr Nash were, or might be, dishonest).

[320]On that basis, the claimant did make the qualifying disclosure referred to in paragraph 2.1.1.3 of the list of issues at B1/121. What occurred on 25 January 2023 in regard to the telephone meeting at 10.00am? Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 143

[321]We have stated in paragraphs 208-212 above our conclusions about what happened in regard to the telephone meeting of 10am on 25 January 2023 from which it is the claimant’s claim he was excluded: the passage from the email at B2/147 which we have set out in paragraph 210 above stated precisely what occurred.

[322]Given that the claimant worked only two days a week and that Mr Nash (and emphatically not the claimant) was responsible for the work which led to the telephone call at 10am on 25 January 2023, we concluded that what Mr Nash did as stated in that passage was entirely apt and reasonable. We concluded that the claimant’s arrival at work at 10am on that day without having checked his emails to see what Mr Nash was doing at that time was either part of a contrivance, or it was simply the result of him not looking at his emails before getting to work.

[323]However, whatever was the true reason why the claimant did not ask to be part of the telephone call at 10am, we concluded that Mr Nash did not exclude him from that telephone call. That was, in fact, we concluded, an inescapable conclusion given the emails at B2/687-688, in which the claimant was informed in advance of the telephone call.

[324]On that basis, the claim stated in paragraph 9.4 above failed. However, we concluded that we should nevertheless ask ourselves whether what Mr Nash did as shown by the emails at B2/687-688 was to any material extent tainted by(1) the fact that the claimant had made the protected disclosure which we have determined in paragraphs 318-320 above he made,

(2) direct discrimination because of race, or

(3) harassment with the protected characteristic being race. We do that in paragraphs 327-331 below.

[325]As for the claim stated in paragraph 9.6 above, we read it as relating to the email at the bottom of B2/127, in which Mr Nash said this to the claimant (the email was sent to the claimant): “I have a call scheduled with [name redacted] later today and will update.” Why Mr Nash did that was in issue here. However, he did not exclude the claimant from that call, otherwise he would not have told the claimant about the call. In our view, it was reasonable for Mr Nash to assume that the claimant was not going to participate in the call in the circumstance that the claimant had not sought to be involved in the 10am call with “Ed” of Warner Chappell Music, i.e. Ed Condon.

[326]In addition, we concluded that Mr Nash had by then been persuaded to continue to work with the claimant on three occasions (as shown by what we say in paragraphs 154, 164, and 190-192 above), and that the relationship between them was difficult for the reasons which we state first in paragraphs 307 and 308 above.

[327]Was Mr Nash’s conduct shown by the emails at B2/687-688 and by his failure shown by the email at the bottom of B2/127 to invite the claimant expressly to participate in a telephone conversation that he, Mr Nash, was planning to have with a client, directly discriminatory because of race or harassment? In our Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 144 judgment, there was nothing (i.e. we found no facts) in the circumstances which existed between August 2022 and 25 January 2023 to justify drawing the inference that the claimant’s race was to any material extent a factor in the manner in which Mr Nash acted towards the claimant on 24 and 25 January 2023 in relation to what we will call the Warner Chappell Music matter. Nor was there anything in the facts from which we could in our judgment conclude that the manner in which Mr Nash acted on those days towards the claimant was related to the claimant’s race for the purposes of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010.

[328]What about the fact that the claimant made the protected disclosure which we have concluded (as stated in paragraphs 318-320 above) he did make? There was nothing in the facts as found by us so far from which we could draw the inference that Mr Nash was in any way influenced by the fact that the claimant had made that protected disclosure when he, Mr Nash, copied into the claimant the emails at B2/687-688, since we concluded that in doing that, Mr Nash quite reasonably thought that he was doing as much as he needed to do to keep the claimant involved in the Warner Chappell Music matter.

[329]However, so far we had not assessed the impact of what Mr Nash said in paragraph 29 of his witness statement, which we have set out in paragraph 213 above. That paragraph was, we concluded, an honest and straightforward statement by Mr Nash of what was in his mind on 25 January 2023 and how the claimant’s acts up to that day had affected his thoughts. We concluded from it the following things.329.1 Up to Mr Kaye calling Mr Nash as described in paragraph 29 of the latter’s witness statement “in order to complain about excluding [the claimant] from the meeting”, i.e. the telephone call at 10am with Ed Condon of Warner Chappell Music, what the claimant said to Mr Aaron on 19 December 2022 about the possibility of negotiations with the client’s thencurrent agent being deceitful was merely one of a number of things which the claimant had “raise[d] ... with management, rather than speaking directly to [Mr Nash] first”.

329.2 Mr Nash was not concerned about the fact that the claimant had objected that it was possible that he, Mr Nash, might be assisting the first respondent’s client to deceive the other side. Mr Nash was only concerned about the fact that the claimant had raised the issue with Mr Aaron without first discussing it with Mr Nash. That was the same thing that the claimant had done as recorded by Mr Nash in the email at B2/96 which we have set out in paragraph 163 above: it was a repetition of “running to teacher”.

329.3 That concern was in our view entirely understandable. In our view the claimant’s raising what he perceived as an ethical concern with Mr Aaron without first discussing it with Mr Nash was highly likely to be irritating, and the claimant did the same thing again in the email at B2/114. The Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 145 claimant doing that on a series of occasions had made Mr Nash, as he said in paragraph 29 of his witness statement, “increasingly angry”.

329.4 The fact that the claimant then caused Mr Kaye to call Mr Nash to accuse Mr Nash on behalf of the claimant of excluding the claimant from the 10am telephone meeting with Mr Condon must have been (and Mr Nash said very clearly that it was) highly irritating. We saw and heard Mr Nash give evidence, and we concluded that anger was not his normal mode of operation: he seemed to us to be a pleasant and good-willed person.

329.5 In those circumstances, we concluded that the fact that the claimant had made the one protected disclosure which we concluded that he had in fact made, namely as stated by us in paragraphs 318-320 above, had no effect at all on Mr Nash’s straightforward refusal (shown by his email to the claimant at the top of B2/128) to include the claimant in the planned telephone call with the lay client in the afternoon of 25 January 2023. The cause of that refusal was329.5.1 the manner in which the claimant had on previous occasions raised “every small issue with management”, i.e. a number of issues, only one of which was the protected disclosure, coupled with

329.5.2 the fact that the claimant had now caused Mr Kaye to allege to Mr Nash that Mr Nash had excluded the claimant from the 10am telephone meeting, when

(1) Mr Nash could not on any view reasonably be said to have not done that,

(2) it was plainly the claimant’s failure to read his emails in advance of the day, which was plainly a choice of his, which had led to any failure by him to see that there was a 10am telephone call to which he could reasonably ask to be invited, and

(3) the claimant had now alleged to the first respondent that Mr Nash had done wrong without first raising the issue with Mr Nash.

[330]In our view what the claimant did that morning by procuring Mr Kaye to call Mr Nash and complain that Mr Nash had excluded the claimant from that telephone call would have at least upset most people and would probably have made them angry. It certainly made Mr Nash “angry”, as he said in paragraph 29 of his witness statement. We in any event concluded that the main reason why Mr Nash made it clear to the claimant that he was not being invited to participate in the telephone meeting which Mr Nash was going to have later that day with the client was the fact that the claimant had complained to Mr Kaye that Mr Nash had excluded the claimant from the 10am telephone call and procured Mr Kaye to call Mr Nash to accuse him of doing that. Mr Nash’s anger at that happening was even greater than it would have otherwise been because of the claimant’s history of “running to teacher”, as Mr Nash put it in the email at B2/96. That history was the secondary reason why Mr Nash made it clear to the claimant that he was not being invited to participate in the telephone meeting which Mr Nash was going to have later that day with the client. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 146

[331]In all of the circumstances, we concluded that the protected disclosure to which we refer in paragraphs 318-320 above had no material effect on Mr Nash’s decision not to invite the claimant to the telephone meeting which he was going to have with the client later on 25 January 2023.

[332]For all of the reasons stated in paragraphs 327-331 above, the claims described in paragraphs 9.4 and 9.6 above all failed. The claims stated in paragraph 9.7 above

[333]The claims stated in paragraph 9.7 above were at the core of this case. We start by saying that Mr Abraham did not, in sending the email at B2/131-135, “[deny] the claimant career development opportunities”. Rather, in saying what Mr Abraham did say, as set out in paragraph 225 above, which were the words on which the claimant relied in this regard, Mr Abraham did no more than tell the claimant that the first respondent acting via Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron had formed the view that the claimant was not exhibiting sufficient ability for the first respondent to be willing to offer him a training contract, still less to set up a “new structure to accommodate a bar pupillage”. The real issue here was whether in arriving at that view, Mr Abraham and/or Mr Aaron had been influenced to any material extent by333.1 the fact that the claimant had made the protected disclosure which we describe in paragraphs 318-319 above,

333.2 the claimant’s race, or

333.3 the fact that the claimant had alleged that Mr Nash had on 23 January 2023 referred to Warner Chappell Music as being (or to Mr Condon as being part of) a white boys club.

[334]We say that on the basis that we could see nothing overt or otherwise which could have justified us in concluding that that conduct was related to the race of the claimant within the meaning of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010, so that the claim of harassment added nothing to the claim of direct discrimination. We have taken the same approach below unless otherwise stated. Therefore, in relation to all of the claimant’s claims stated in paragraph 8.1 on B1/124-125, unless there was in the circumstances something more than an assertion of a connection in the mind of the alleged harasser between the conduct of which complaint was made and the protected characteristic of race, we have either said that there was nothing overt to relate the conduct in question to race and treated the claim as being in effect one of direct discrimination within the meaning of section 13 of the EqA 2010, or we have not referred to the claim of harassment within the meaning of section 26 of that Act at all.

[335]In coming to a conclusion on the claims stated in paragraph 9.7 above, we took into account the following things: Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 147335.1 the texts between Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron set out in paragraphs 175- 178 above;

335.2 the emails to which we refer in paragraphs 185-186 above;

335.3 the text messages between Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron set out in paragraphs 190-192 above;

335.4 our acceptance, stated in paragraph 153 above, of the evidence of Mr Nash set out in that paragraph;

335.5 the emails to which we refer in paragraph 154 above;

335.6 our acceptance, stated in paragraph 165 above, of the evidence of Mr Aaron set out in that paragraph;

335.7 Mr Nash’s email of 28 November 2022 set out in paragraph 166 above;

335.8 our acceptance, stated paragraphs 167 and 168 above, of the evidence of Mr Aaron and Mr Nash set out in those paragraphs;

335.9 the text messages between Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron and the other evidence which we have referred to or set out in paragraphs 194-203 above;

335.10 our acceptance, stated in paragraph 207 above, of paragraphs 29-35 of the witness statement of Mr Abraham (including the content of B2/118- 120 and B2/188), which we have set out in paragraph 204 above;

335.11 our acceptance, also stated in paragraph 207 above, of the evidence of Mr Abraham to which we refer in paragraph 206 above;

335.12 the messages at SB/76-77 to which we refer in paragraphs 207.1-207.6 above, which as stated in paragraph 207 above we accepted were what they purported to be; and

335.13 our conclusions stated in paragraph 247 above, including that the criticisms of the claimant’s performance set out in the email of 25 January 2023 at B2/131-135 were objectively justified.

[336]We could see nothing in the facts as found by us, including those to which we refer in paragraph 335 above, from which we could draw the inference that the claimant’s race had a material effect on the decision to state what is set out in paragraph 225 above.

[337]The same was true of the protected disclosure which we have found as stated in paragraphs 318-320 above: we could see nothing in the facts as found by us, Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 148 including those to which we refer in paragraph 335 above, from which we could draw the inference that the fact that the claimant had made that disclosure had a material effect on the decision to state what is set out in paragraph 225 above.

[338]It was also true of the allegation of the claimant that Mr Nash had referred to a white boys club. That allegation was first made, we concluded, in the manner described in paragraph 42 of the witness statement of Mr Abraham, which we have set out in paragraph 208 above and which we accepted. (That acceptance can be seen from what we say in paragraphs 208-212 above.) So, the claimant was unable (for very good reason in our view: that is for the reasons stated in paragraphs 214.7-214.9 and 214.11-214.13 above) at that time to explain why it was a concern for Mr Nash to have referred to a white boys club. Only a relatively short time after the reference to a white boys club as described in paragraph 42 of Mr Abraham’s witness statement was made (and that reference was made during a telephone conversation which started at about 3.45pm), Mr Abraham sent the email at B2/131-135 from which the text set out in paragraph 225 above was drawn. That email was sent at 20:27 on 25 January 2023.

[339]In those circumstances, we could see nothing in the facts as found by us, including those to which we refer in paragraph 335 above, from which we could draw the inference that the fact that the claimant had referred to Mr Nash as having referred to a white boys club had a material effect on the decision to state what is set out in paragraph 225 above.

[340]The factors which we have set out in paragraph 335 above were very powerful, if not overwhelming, evidence, that what Mr Abraham said in his email of 27 January 2023 which we have set out in paragraph 225 above was influenced in no way by anything other than genuine and objectively justified concerns about the claimant’s performance.

[341]In any event, for all of the reasons stated in the immediately preceding paragraphs above (paragraphs 335-340), we concluded that the only reason why Mr Aaron wrote the words set out in paragraph 225 above was the claimant’s performance.

[342]For all of those reasons, the claims made as stated in paragraph 9.7 above did not succeed. The claims stated in paragraph 9.8 above

[343]There was in the facts as found by us (as recorded in paragraphs 243-246 above) nothing from which we could draw the inference that the claimant was blamed by Mr Cooper for work mistakes having previously checked and approved the claimant’s work, so that he set the claimant up to fail, as alleged in paragraph 9.8 above(1) because of the claimant’s race, or

(2) because the claimant had said that Mr Nash had on 23 January 2023 referred to a white boys club. (That was the only thing which the claimant claimed, as stated in paragraph 9.1 at B2/126, was a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010 which occurred before Mr Cooper went into hospital which was, as he said in the witness Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 149 statement evidence which we have set out in paragraph 243 above, which we accepted, “late June ‘23”.) What happened is as stated by us in paragraphs 243 and 244 above. In doing what Mr Cooper did in fact do, we concluded, he treated the claimant in precisely the same way that he would have done if the claimant had been, say, white and British, and without taking into account in any way the fact that the claimant had asserted that Mr Nash had referred to a white boys club. This claim therefore failed. The claims stated in paragraph 9.9 above

[344]We saw nothing in the facts as found by us from which we could draw the inference that Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron did not support the claimant, develop his skills, or give him positive feedback to any material extent because of his race or because he had at any time referred in any way to the protection of the EqA 2010. If only for that reason, the claim stated in paragraph 9.9 above did not succeed. The claim stated in paragraph 9.10 above

[345]We disagreed with the implicit assertion of the claimant in the claim stated in paragraph 9.10 above that there was a need for Mr Aaron and/or Mr Abraham to “take immediate action on the claimant’s complaint about the monkey picture and caption” to which we refer in paragraph 248 above. We have in paragraphs 248- 255 above described the evidence before us relating to that picture and caption. We were unable to accept the claimant’s implicit assertion that the image and caption were, or might reasonably be regarded as being, offensive to a person of black African origin. We accepted that there was here a possibility of claiming that there was a connection in the mind of Ms Varsani between(1) the image and caption and

(2) race, but the claim here was of a race-related or motivated failure by Mr Aaron and/or Mr Abraham to take immediate action about the email of 5 July 2023 which Ms Varsani sent.

[346]If the claimant had been white and British then he could not have said that the email was offensive to him because of his race: only that it was offensive because it was in his view denigratory towards persons of black African ethnic origin.

[347]We could see no good reason to refuse to accept any part of the evidence before us as described in paragraphs 249 and 251-255 above, and the claimant did not appear to challenge the parts of that evidence on which he was not himself relying. Most of the evidence to which we refer in those paragraphs was in documentary form or was supported by the contemporaneous documentation. We therefore accepted that evidence. The evidence of the claimant to which we refer in paragraphs 248 and 250 above consisted largely of assertions, and was not about what was in the minds of Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham. In those circumstances, there was on the facts before us nothing from which we could draw the inference that Mr Aaron or Mr Abraham, by not taking immediate action in relation to the email at page B2/364, treated the claimant less favourably because of his race than they would have done if he had been white and British, or because he had Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 150 asserted breaches of the EqA 2010 through Mr Nash referring to a white boys club, or because he had, on 30 June 2023, made his first claim in these proceedings.

[348]We thought very carefully about the claim of a breach of section 26(1) (read with section 26(4)) of the EqA 2010. Having heard and seen Ms Varsani give evidence, we agreed with what Mr Abraham said in paragraph 59 of his witness statement, which we have set out in paragraph 251 above, and what Mr Aaron said as recorded in paragraph 254 above, to the effect that Ms Varsani (in the words of paragraph 59 of Mr Abraham’s witness statement) “clearly did not mean offence to the Claimant”. Having heard and seen both Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron give evidence, we could see no facts before us from which we could draw the inference that their intention was to violate the claimant’s dignity or create for him an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. In any event, we concluded from that evidence and the facts before us that they did not have that intention. Did the picture and caption have the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating for him an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”, bearing in mind section 26(4)? In our judgment, especially, but not only, bearing in mind the case law to which we refer in paragraphs 290-294 above, we concluded that that picture and caption did not have that effect. As a result, the failure by Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron to take immediate action in response to the email at page B2/364 could not reasonably be concluded by us to have had that effect, but in any event, we concluded that that failure did not have that effect.

[349]Those conclusions meant that the claims stated in paragraph 9.10 above failed. The claim stated in paragraph 9.11 above

[350]There was no evidence whatsoever to support the proposition that Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron applied a different and more onerous appraisal process to the claimant than they would have done if the claimant had been, say, white and British, or than if the claimant had not alleged that Mr Nash had referred to a white boys club. If and to the extent that the appraisal process differed from that which was applied to Ms Varsani, then it did so purely for the reasons given by Mr Aaron in paragraphs 82-90 of his witness statement (which we accepted not least because they were borne out by the documents to which Mr Aaron made reference in those paragraphs). The appraisal process was in any event in our view not the main issue; rather, it was whether Mr Aaron’s and Mr Abraham’s view of the claimant’s performance was(1) to any material extent less favourable than it would have been if the claimant had not been of black African origin or

(2) detrimental to the claimant because the claimant had made a claim that Mr Nash had referred to a white boys club, or made his first claim in these proceedings. There was here nothing in the facts as found by us from which we could draw the inference that it was so less favourable or detrimental, and in our judgment very strong evidence that the appraisal was well-judged and balanced. For those reasons, we concluded that this claim was not well-founded. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 151 The claim stated in paragraph 9.12 above

[351]The proposition that the claimant needed to sign his appraisal outcome and that “[n]ot permitting him to sign his appraisal outcome” was(1) less favourable treatment of him because of his race, or

(2) victimisation, was difficult to accept without any analysis of the evidence. The claimant was unable to say in what way it was detrimental to him in any event. Turning to the evidence, there was nothing on the facts found by us from which we could draw the inference that the claimant’s race or the fact that he had asserted one or more breaches of the EqA 2010 (including by asserting that Mr Nash referring to a white boys club was such a breach) had to any material extent caused the first respondent, Mr Aaron or Mr Abraham to fail to give the claimant an opportunity to sign his appraisal form. We agreed with Mr Aaron’s analysis of this aspect of the claimant’s case which we have set out in paragraph 256 above. We were, when we deliberated, driven to the conclusion that the claimant’s complaint here was made for the sake simply of complaining and not as a genuine complaint, or grievance. In any event, this claim failed. The claims stated in paragraph 9.13 above

[352]The claim that it was(1) direct discrimination because of race,

(2) harassment with the protected characteristic to which the unwanted conduct was related being race, and/or

(3) victimisation not to offer the claimant more hours after 3 August 2023 was not supported by anything in the facts as found by us which justified the drawing of the inference that not offering the claimant more work was because of any one of those things. In any event, the email exchange at B2/404 between the claimant and Mr Kaye, which explained the first respondent’s decision to “exercise the zero-hour option for the time being, at least during remainder of August (i.e. from week commencing 7th August)”, contained a cogent and understandable factual basis for the decision to exercise that option. In addition, that decision followed what we found as a fact was the complete disenchantment of the respondents with the claimant which led to the decision (which was the subject of the claim stated in paragraph 9.14 above) to terminate the claimant’s zero-hours contract under which the claimant was employed by the first respondent, so that if the latter decision was (1) tainted by direct discrimination because of race, (2) harassment with the protected characteristic to which the unwanted conduct was related being race, and/or (3) victimisation, then the claim stated in paragraph 9.13 was likely to be so tainted also.

[353]Mr Aaron’s evidence in chief in relation to the claims stated in paragraph 9.13 above was in paragraph 91 of his witness statement, where, after referring to the lack of a contractual obligation to offer the claimant work, he said that(1) Mr Abraham was going on holiday on 7 August 2023,

(2) he, Mr Aaron, was “going on holiday soon after that”, and

(3) that “[t]his was all explained in the email informing [the claimant] of it on page 404”. That email ended with Mr Kaye saying “and we will review this at the end of August depending on the firm’s needs.” Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 152

[354]In part for the reasons for our conclusion on the claimant’s claims in relation to his dismissal (to which we turn immediately below), but in any event, we concluded that the real and only reasons for not offering the claimant work after 3 August 2023 were(1) the fact that Mr Aaron and Mr Abraham were not going to be available to supervise the claimant’s work during the period from then until the end of August 2023,

(2) the fact that they did not think that the claimant could safely work unsupervised, and

(3) they had it in mind to dismiss him for legitimate, i.e. non-discriminatory, reasons. The claims stated in paragraph 9.13 above therefore failed. The claim stated in paragraph 9.14 above

[355]We have already stated our conclusion on the real reasons for the claimant’s dismissal. We do that in paragraph 266 above. We add for the avoidance of doubt that in our judgment there was nothing in the facts found by us from which we could have concluded in the absence of any other explanation that the claimant’s dismissal was tainted by direct discrimination because of his race, or victimisation, and there was nothing in the circumstances which connected his dismissal with his race of a sort which went beyond the mental element required for a claim of direct discrimination (i.e. of the sort referred to by HHJ James Tayler in Carozzi to which we refer in paragraph 290 above).

[356]In any event, the claim stated in paragraph 9.14 above had to, and did fail. The claim stated in paragraph 9.15 above

[357]Not allowing the claimant an appeal against the decision to dismiss him was in our judgment the logical and inevitable consequence of(1) the decision to dismiss the claimant,

(2) the reasons (as found by us) for that decision, and

(3) the fact that it was made by the only two partners of the first respondent, who quite understandably were not going to outsource to a third party the power to decide whether or not the claimant’s employment was to continue.

[358]As a result, there was in the circumstances nothing from which we could have concluded in the absence of any other explanation that the decision not to permit the claimant to appeal against his dismissal was tainted by direct discrimination because of his race, or victimisation, and there was nothing in the circumstances which connected that decision with his race of a sort which went beyond the mental element required for a claim of direct discrimination (i.e. of the sort referred to by HHJ James Tayler in Carozzi to which we refer in paragraph 290 above).

[359]Accordingly, in our judgment the decision not to permit the claimant to appeal against the decision to dismiss him was not directly discriminatory because of his race, or harassment within the meaning of section 26(1) and (4) of the EqA 2010, or victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of that Act. The claim stated in paragraph 9.15 above therefore did not succeed. The claims stated in paragraphs 9.16-9.22 above; some general conclusions Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 153

[360]We consider here some basic issues relating to all of the individual claims raised about the manner in which Mr Harris considered and determined the claimant’s grievance. We do so in part because we could not see how there could be anything more than a claim that in approaching the claimant’s grievance, Mr Harris either discriminated against the claimant directly because of race, or harassed him with the protected characteristic for the purposes of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010 being race, or victimised him within the meaning of section 27 of that Act. Separating out the particular things on which the claimant relied and making them the subject of specific claims in our view was unhelpful. Nevertheless, that is how the claims were put, and we state our conclusions on them below.

[361]Before we do that, however, we record that the claimant’s witness statement, which contained much argument and relatively little direct evidence, referred to the manner in which Mr Harris dealt with the grievance by reference in the main to the documents in the bundle. We have set out the material passage of the claimant’s witness statement in paragraph 275 above. One thing that was additional to what was in the documents in the bundle was that the claimant said in paragraph 106 of his witness statement that he found it “unusual” that Mr Harris was going to conduct the grievance meeting of 14 December 2023, “as Kevin did not usually deal with complaints and furthermore he had been involved substantially in discussions of pupillage opportunities.” We could not see in the circumstances before us, including the small size of the first respondent’s organisation and Mr Harris’s position in that organisation, any objectively good reason why Mr Harris should not have conducted that grievance meeting.

[362]As for what was said in paragraph 107 of the claimant’s witness statement ,we could not see how dyslexia could affect an employee’s ability to participate in a grievance meeting. In any event, the mere assertion of dyslexia and that a particular step would be a reasonable one does not mean that there is a need to take that step. In the circumstance that the claimant had not even by the time of the liability hearing before us produced any expert evidence to support the proposition that he was dyslexic and, if so, in what way the effects of dyslexia as experienced by him could be ameliorated, we found his threat to complain to the SRA and the BSB to be somewhat premature. If this tribunal had found that there had been a breach of the EqA 2010 then that would have been the time, if at all, to refer the situation to the SRA or the BSB.

[363]And as for the implied proposition (to be derived from what was said in paragraph 107 of the claimant’s witness statement) that it was wrong to say that the claimant was asserting that he was dyslexic “as a tactic”, in the absence of any cogent evidence before the respondents to support the proposition that the claimant was dyslexic it was in our view objectively justifiable to assert that the claimant was asserting that he was dyslexic as a tactic. Indeed, we concluded that the assertion that the assertion of the claimant that he was dyslexic was a tactic, was objectively justified in the circumstances as we found them to be. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 154

[364]Similarly, it was unjustified to assert, as the claimant described in paragraph 109 of his witness statement, that it was “a reasonable adjustment, to understand more about the allegation that my complaints were not made in good faith”. The fact (if it was one) that the claimant “found this comment to be inappropriate and believed that this was part of the firm’s retaliation” was irrelevant. The issue was ultimately one for this tribunal, and it did not matter who had alleged, or believed, that the claimant’s complaints were not made in good faith: either they were made in good faith or they were not (which, we repeat, was a matter for this tribunal). The claimant’s next words showed in our view the fallacy of his pursuance of his grievances which were ultimately a matter for this tribunal: he said that “this comment [by which he presumably meant the allegation that he had made his complaints in bad faith] was used in an attempt to discredit my valid complaints”. The issue was whether those complaints were valid, and ultimately that was a matter for this tribunal.

[365]As a matter of principle, we add, no employer is obliged to find in favour of an employee who makes a complaint under a grievance procedure that the employer has, for example, discriminated against the employee directly within the meaning of section 13 of the EqA 2010. There is no obligation imposed by the EqA 2010 to give the employee a route for complaining by stating a grievance. The only obligation which that Act imposes is to avoid breaching the provisions of the Act when following a grievance procedure, but that means not for example dealing with a grievance in a way which is less favourable because of a protected characteristic than the way in which the employer would have dealt with the grievance if the employee had not had that protected characteristic.

[366]So, “adding the question whether the claimant’s complaints had been made in good faith to issues to be considered as part of the claimant’s grievance” would have been directly discriminatory only if that question would not have been added if the claimant had not been black and of African ethnic origin. Envisaging comparable circumstances was hard, however, so the only possible claim in that regard might well be that366.1 adding that question was related to the fact that the claimant was black and of African ethnic origin, or

366.2 it was done with the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating for him an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment, and if not then that it had that effect, or

366.3 it was victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010.

[367]However, as a result of section 27(3) of the EqA 2010, it is a defence to a claim of victimisation within the meaning of section 27 that the claim of a protected act was false and made in bad faith. So, an employer who decides to consider as part of a grievance procedure that an employee has made a false allegation and done so in bad faith is doing no more than considering at that stage the evidence which might ultimately be put before an employment tribunal. If it is acceptable for an Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 155 employee as part of a grievance procedure to assert a breach of the EqA 2010, then it must be acceptable for the employer to assert that it is not such a breach because the factual allegation on which the assertion of the employee is based is not true and that the employee’s assertion was made in bad faith.

[368]In any event, our conclusions on the claims stated in paragraphs 9.16-9.22 above were as follows. The claim made in paragraph 9.16 above

[369]We saw nothing on the facts before us from which we could conclude in the absence of any other explanation that adding the question whether the claimant’s complaints in relation to the email with the monkey picture and caption to which we refer in paragraph 248 above had been made in good faith to the issues to be considered as part of the claimant’s grievance was done because of the claimant’s race, or was done because the claimant had previously done a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. We saw nothing in the facts as found by us from which we could conclude in the absence of any other explanation that such adding was related to the claimant’s race for the purposes of section 26(1) of that Act.

[370]In any event, we concluded that the adding of that question was done with objective justification, and, we concluded, it was done purely because it was the genuine belief of (we found) Mr Abraham, Mr Aaron and Mr Harris that the claimant’s complaint in relation to the monkey picture and caption to which we refer in paragraph 248 above was made in bad faith.

[371]The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.16 above was therefore in our view not well-founded. The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.17 above

[372]Similarly, we saw nothing on the facts before us to from which we could conclude in the absence of any other explanation that refusing to tell the claimant who had alleged that he had not acted in good faith in making his complaint relating to the monkey picture and caption to which we refer in paragraph 248 above was done because the claimant had previously done a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010.

[373]In any event, we concluded that that refusal occurred purely because it was the genuine belief of (we found) Mr Abraham, Mr Aaron and Mr Harris that the claimant did not need to know who had alleged that he had acted in bad faith (so that the refusal in no way occurred because the claimant had done one or more protected acts). In addition, looking at the situation objectively, the claimant did not need to know who had alleged that he had acted in bad faith in order to respond effectively to the allegation that he had so acted. As a result, it was not, in our judgment, detrimental to him within the meaning of section 27(1) of the EqA 2010 not to be told who had made that allegation. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 156

[374]The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.17 above was therefore in our view not well-founded. The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.18 above

[375]We saw nothing on the facts before us to from which we could conclude in the absence of any other explanation that not upholding the claimant’s grievance was done because of the claimant’s race, or was done because the claimant had previously done a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. We saw nothing overt to justify the conclusion that the dismissal of the claimant’s grievance was related to the claimant’s race for the purposes of section 26(1) of that Act.

[376]In any event, we concluded that Mr Harris’s decision on the claimant’s grievance was arrived at purely because Mr Harris genuinely believed that it was not wellfounded.

[377]The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.18 above was therefore in our view not well-founded. The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.19 above

[378]The same was true of the finding by Mr Harris that the claimant had not acted in good faith by making the complaint to which we refer in paragraph 250 above: we saw nothing on the facts before us from which we could conclude in the absence of any other explanation that that finding was made because of the claimant’s race, or was made because the claimant had previously done a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. We saw nothing overt to justify the assertion that the conclusion that the claimant had not in that regard acted in good faith was related to the claimant’s race for the purposes of section 26(1) of that Act.

[379]In any event, we concluded that Mr Harris’s decision that the claimant had not acted in good faith in that regard was arrived at purely because Mr Harris genuinely believed that the claimant had not acted in good faith.

[380]The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.19 above was therefore in our view not well-founded. The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.20 above

[381]We understood the claims stated in paragraph 9.20 above about Mr Harris’s “failing to address the claimant’s complaints” to be about his refusal to deal in the grievance procedure with the claimant’s complaints raised after he had been dismissed. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 157

[382]We saw nothing on the facts before us from which we could conclude in the absence of any other explanation that Mr Harris refused to deal in the grievance procedure with the claimant’s complaints raised after he had been dismissed because of the claimant’s race, or because the claimant had previously done a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. We saw nothing overt to justify the assertion that that refusal was related to the claimant’s race for the purposes of section 26(1) of that Act.

[383]In any event, we concluded that Mr Harris’s decision not to deal in the grievance procedure with the claimant’s complaints raised after he had been dismissed was in no way tainted by either the claimant’s race or the fact that he had done one or more protected acts within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. We came to that conclusion in part because there is no obligation imposed by the EqA 2010 to consider a grievance at any time and because we could see that the claimant’s adding, after the ending of his employment, to his existing grievance of new allegations was unjustified in the circumstance that the primary purpose of a grievance is to obtain redress in continuing employment. We also came to that conclusion because it was consistent with what we found to be Mr Harris’s own contemporaneous understanding, which was as stated(1) in the contemporaneous email at B2/488 (dated 19 September 2023), and

(2) in the final paragraph on B2/70 (which was the first page of the letter stating the outcome of the grievance procedure), which was in these terms: “Since we met your employment has been terminated and on 26 September 2023 you sent me a further email with 21 grievances. Some of these had previously been raised or were part of those previously raised, but some were new. As you were no longer an employee, you did not have a right to raise a grievance and I therefore did not accept them as being part of the ongoing grievance investigation. An employee usually has several days to appeal a decision to dismiss, and I believed by analogy it was reasonable for there to be a time limit.”

[384]The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.20 above was therefore in our view not well-founded. The claim stated in paragraph 9.21 above

[385]We concluded that the claim that Mr Harris did not let “the claimant, who is of Black African heritage, explain why the monkey picture and caption [to which we refer in paragraph 248 above] was offensive to him” and “minimis[ed] his experience” was simply not well-founded on the facts. Mr Harris did not refuse to let the claimant explain why he was saying that the picture and caption were offensive to him, and he did not minimise the claimant’s experience. We say that because of the facts which we have found in paragraphs 269-272 above. The claim made as stated in paragraph 9.21 above was therefore in our view not wellfounded. The claim stated in paragraph 9.22 above Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 158

[386]There was nothing on the facts before us from which we could have concluded in the absence of any other explanation that Mr Harris had asserted that the claimant had ‘raised dyslexia as a “distraction” and/or a “tactic”‘ as an act of victimisation within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010. Rather, it was an assertion for which there was in our judgment objective justification, and, we concluded, it was made purely because it was the genuine belief of (we found) Mr Harris that the claimant’s raising of dyslexia was done with a view to distracting and as a tactic.

[387]The claim stated in paragraph 9.22 above therefore did not succeed. The claim stated in paragraph 9.23 above

[388]By the time of the events which Mr Aaron described in the emails of 4 and 7 September 2023 which we have set out in paragraphs 258 and 259 above (i.e. the email of 4 September 2023 at B2/452 and the email of 7 September 2023 at B2/471), the claimant had been given notice of dismissal: the claimant’s request for “the recording of the appraisal that was agreed to be provided to me”, made in the email sent at 13:34 on 31 August 2023 at the top of B2/447 was made in response to the sending by Mr Kaye at 12:01 on that day of the letter at B2/68-69 giving notice of the termination of the claimant’s contract of employment. The claimant had by then made his first claim in these proceedings. In the opening words of Mr Aaron’s email to the claimant of 4 September 2023 at B2/452, Mr Aaron had (as we record in paragraph 267 above) informed the claimant that there was no appeal against the decision to terminate his (the claimant’s) contract of employment. Mr Aaron’s conscious reasons for not sending the claimant the recordings of the appraisals were, we concluded, as Mr Aaron stated in the passage of his witness statement which we have set out in paragraph 257 above.

[389]By the time that Mr Aaron sent his emails of 4 and 7 September 2023 at B2/452 and B2/471, the only reason why the claimant could reasonably be said to have benefited from having the recordings of the three appraisal meetings was to further his claims to this tribunal. We considered that the guidance provided by what HHJ James Tayler said which we have set out in paragraphs 297-298 above showed that the first respondent might at that point, without breaching section 27 of the EqA 2010, have decided not to give the claimant the recordings except as part of the process of disclosure and inspection in these proceedings. However, we concluded that(1) the sole reason for Mr Aaron’s reluctance to send the claimant the recordings was as Mr Aaron stated in the passage of his witness statement which we have set out in paragraph 257 above, and

(2) Mr Aaron’s and Mr Abrahams’ loss of trust in the claimant was the sole cause of the initial failure by the first respondent to send the claimant the recordings. We also concluded that the claimant could not reasonably consider himself to have been disadvantaged here (i.e. treated detrimentally within the meaning of section 27(1) of the EqA 2010) by what the respondents did in fact do given that he (the claimant) was (as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 114 of Mr Aaron’s witness statement, which we have set out in paragraph 260 above and which we accepted) on 31 October 2023 sent the one part of the recording which he could Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 159 reasonably say he needed for the purposes of these proceedings, and given that at that time his employment had been terminated.

[390]For those reasons (stated in the two preceding paragraphs above), we concluded that the claim stated in paragraph 9.23 was not well-founded. The claim stated in paragraph 9.24 above

[391]The claim stated in paragraph 9.24 above (“Making disclosure of the appraisal video contingent upon the claimant disclosing his recordings of grievance meetings”) was in apparent conflict with the claim stated in paragraph 9.23 above. That was because if the first respondent made disclosure of the video contingent on the claimant disclosing his recordings of grievance meetings, then the first respondent did not refuse to provide the claimant with a copy of the video. In any event, what happened in regard to the recordings (as opposed to the video) was best seen in the email from Mr Harris of 13 October 2023 at B2/512, where he said this: “I am concerned that you are not able to explain what the technical issues are that prevent you sharing the recording. If you have been able to produce a transcript it would seem that you have been able to view the recording. I am unable to accept a transcript that I am not able to verify with the original recording. I will therefore proceed on the basis of Aryeh’s notes. To be blunt I am concerned that you are not producing the record in an attempt to gain some kind of tactical advantage in the litigation you have commenced. It would be therefore be a good idea to give a better explanation for not being able to produce the recording, otherwise I will draw my own conclusions.”

[392]The claimant did not address this claim in his witness statement, and he said nothing to us about it otherwise. There was therefore no evidence before us to support the claim. It therefore did not succeed. The claim stated in paragraph 9.25 above

[393]Similarly, the claim stated in paragraph 9.25 above, which was that the respondents informed “the claimant that the appraisal video recordings would not be released to him because he would use these to advance his claims”, was not the subject of any oral evidence by the claimant. If and to the extent that that was said to the claimant, then it must have been said in correspondence. Our attention was drawn to no such correspondence, and we ourselves came across no such correspondence when reading the documents put before us. This claim also therefore failed for evidential reasons. The claims stated in paragraph 9.26 above

[394]We accepted that in the circumstances the sending of the article at B2/123-126 was capable of being related to race. That was because of the claimant’s assertion of racism described in paragraph 5 of Mr Cooper’s witness statement, Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 160 which we have set out in paragraph 234 above. We therefore asked ourselves whether Mr Cooper’s purpose in sending that article to the claimant was to violate the claimant’s dignity or create for him an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment, and, if it was not done for that purpose, whether it had that effect. We have implicitly answered the first part of that question in paragraph 241 above: no. It was not. The purpose was as Mr Cooper said (as we record in paragraph 235 above): to give a balanced view. So, we asked ourselves, did the sending of that article have the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating for him an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment? After careful consideration, we concluded that it did not do so.

[395]As for the claim of direct discrimination because of race made as stated in paragraph 9.26 above, given our factual conclusions stated in paragraph 242 above, we concluded that Mr Cooper’s sending of the email and article at B2/122- 126 was not done in any way because of the protected characteristic of race.

[396]Accordingly, the claims stated in paragraph 9.26 above failed. The claim of unfair dismissal within the meaning of section 103A of the ERA 1996

[397]Given our findings stated in paragraph 266 above, the claimant’s dismissal was not at all (let alone principally) because he had made a protected disclosure within the meaning of section 43B of the ERA 1996. Accordingly, the claim of unfair dismissal within the meaning of section 103A of that Act did not succeed. The claim of a failure to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of the EqA 2010

[398]The claimant did not until 30 January 2026 (see paragraph 105 above) put before us or the respondents any expert evidence of any sort which was(1) to the effect that he had dyslexia and

(2) about how that dyslexia affected his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. All that the respondents knew at all material times after 8 February 2023 (that being the first time that the claimant said that he was dyslexic, as we record in the table in paragraph in paragraph 222 above) was that the claimant was saying that he was dyslexic. He did not say in what way the respondents might have taken steps which might have helped him to work sufficiently effectively to be considered for a position as trainee solicitor until 5 July 2023 (as recorded in the table set out in paragraph 222 above). In fact, we saw that the emails of that day at pages 362 and 365 were of a very general sort and were not tailored to the claimant. The cause of the shortcomings in the claimant’s written work was not at that time the subject of any expert evidence. Nor was there before the respondents any credible evidence of any step the taking of which might reasonably have been thought to be capable of diminishing the difficulties which the claimant had in reading and writing. For all of those reasons, we dismissed the claimant’s claim of a failure to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of the EqA 2010. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 161 The claim that when the claims were made here, the claimant had not had a written statement of employment particulars within the meaning of section 1 of the ERA 1996 or of a change to such particulars within the meaning of section 4 of that Act

[399]The document to which we refer in paragraph 149 above did not state that the claimant was to work in any particular department of the first respondent’s business. It merely stated that he was responsible to Mr Abraham and Mr Aaron and that he was required to “[assist] the fee earners and in particular Michael Abraham and Simon Aaron with Civil Litigation and Music Law” and that he “[might] be asked to help in other areas”. Plainly, the claimant could be asked to work wherever in the first respondent’s organisation either Mr Abraham or Mr Aaron thought it best for him to work. Therefore, there was here no failure to comply with the requirements of sections 1 and 4 of the ERA 1996. Both for that reason and because no other claim was successful, the claim under section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 had to be, and was, dismissed by us. In

Conclusion

[400]In conclusion, none of the claimant’s claims succeeded. They therefore all had to be, and were, dismissed by us. Approved by Employment Judge Hyams Date: 11 February 2026 SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 11 February 2026 ............................................................................ ............................................................................ FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant Respondents Mr K Nwabueze v(1) Simons Rodkin Solicitors LLP

(2) Mr Simon Aaron

(3) Mr Michael Abraham

(4) Mr David Nash CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION Under rule 67, the judgment sent to the parties on 11 February 2026 is corrected by (1) the deletion of the word “not” in the fourth line of paragraph 329.5.2 of the reasons for that judgment, (2) the deletion of the word “to” in the first line of paragraph 372 of those reasons, and (3) the deletion of the word “to” in the first line of paragraph 375 of those reasons. Approved by Employment Judge Hyams Date: 11 February 2026 SENT TO THE PARTIES ON 18 February 2026 ............................................................................ FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant Respondents Mr K Nwabueze v (1) Simons Rodkin Solicitors LLP (2) Mr Simon Aaron (3) Mr Michael Abraham (4) Mr David Nash Heard at: Watford, in person and via Cloud Video Platform (“CVP”) On: In public on 3-5 November and 15-18 December 2025 and in private on 6 November and 5-6 February 2026 Before: Employment Judge Hyams Members: Ms C Baggs Mr R Jewell Representation: For the claimant: In person For the respondent: Mr Michael Magier, of counsel CORRECTED UNANIMOUS RESERVED JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY

Relevant law

[1]The claimant’s claim that he was treated detrimentally within the meaning of section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) does not succeed and is dismissed.

[2]The claimant’s claim that he was dismissed unfairly within the meaning of section 103A of the ERA 1996 does not succeed and is dismissed.

[3]The claimant’s claim that the first respondent failed to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”), contrary to section 39(5) of that Act, does not succeed and is dismissed.

[4]The claimant’s claim of harassment within the meaning of section 26(1) of the EqA 2010, contrary to section 40 of that Act, does not succeed and is dismissed. Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 2

[5]The claimant’s claim that he was discriminated against directly because of his race, contrary to sections 13 and 39(2) of the EqA 2010, does not succeed and is dismissed.

[6]The claimant’s claim that he was victimised within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010, contrary to section 39(4) of the EqA 2010, does not succeed and is dismissed.

[7]The claimant’s claim under section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 fails and is dismissed.

(1) something which was said in a discussion with Mr Aaron of 25 August 2022, and

(2) something which the claimant said to Mr Aaron on 19 December 2022;

8.3 that there had been a failure to make a reasonable adjustment within the meaning of section 20(3) of the ERA 1996, for the claimant’s claimed disability of dyslexia;

8.5 that the claimant had been victimised within the meaning of section 27 of the EqA 2010 because of the making by him of one or more of the claimed protected acts set out in paragraph

9.1 on page B1/126 (the most Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 6 controversial of which was in paragraph 9.1.1, which was that the claimant had ‘lodged a verbal complaint on 25 January 2023 to Michael Abraham stating that the claimant had reported that the second respondent [sic: it must have been meant to be a reference to Mr Nash, who was by the time of the writing of that list the fourth respondent; while we have not corrected references to the second respondent in the same way below, we have treated allegations in the list of issues relating to the second respondent as allegations relating to Mr Nash] had made about certain individuals involved in the music matter being part of a “white boys club”‘), the claimed detrimental acts (of which there were 18) being set out in paragraph

9.2 on pages B1/127-128; and

3.1.1 and 8.1.2, so it was claimed that this was

(1) detrimental treatment within the meaning of section 47B of the ERA 1996,

(2) direct discrimination because of race, and/or

9.3 On 31 October 2022, the “claimant received written communication indicating that collaboration with the second respondent would cease.” That was issues

3.1.2 and 8.1.3.

9.4 On 23 or 25 January 2023, the claimant was “excluded from a meeting with Warner Music Chappell”. That was issues

3.1.3 and 8.1.5. We read that as a reference to a meeting with “Warner Chappell Music”, and in reality it was Case Numbers: 3307551/2023 & 3301414/2024 7 a reference to a telephone call with Mr Ed Condon of Warner Chappell Music. (We saw no justification for the redaction of the names of clients of the first respondent.)