Mrs J Souza v Mr G Harries-Jones and Mrs S Harries-Jones T/a The Galaxie Hotel: 3307421/2018

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3307421/2018

Between

Mrs J SouzaClaimant

Mr G Harries-Jones and Mrs S Harries-Jones T/a The Galaxie HotelRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Milner-Moore

Members

Ms S Hughes

Mr D Palmer

In person for claimant

Date 7 June 2020

JUDGMENT

[1]The respondent failed to carry out a risk assessment in respect of the risks faced by the claimant as a pregnant employee. This was unfavourable treatment because of pregnancy and contravened sections 18 and 39(2)(d) of the Equality Act 2010.

[2]The claimant is awarded compensation for injury to feelings in the sum of £1,500 and interest in the sum of £277.48.

[3]The tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear complaints under section 47(c) and Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. These claims were filed outside the relevant statutory time limits.

REASONS

[1]The claims being advanced were of direct pregnancy discrimination (section 18 Equality Act 2010) and detrimental treatment under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), S47(c) and automatically unfair dismissal under s.99 ERA.

The issues

[2]The issues arising for determination in relation to those claims were set out in a case management order made following a hearing on 29 March 2019 before Employment Judge George. The issues arising for determination were as follows:

[3]Equality Act s.18 Pregnancy and maternity discrimination3.1 Did the respondent treat the claimant as follows?3.1.1 Failing to carry out a risk assessment in respect of the claimant as a pregnant worker.

3.1.2 Requiring the claimant to clean more rooms.

3.1.3 Comparing the claimant unfavourably to her co-workers by saying that she was not as active and could not carry out as much work as them.

3.1.4 Complaining that she went to the toilet too often.

3.1.5 Dismissing the claimant.

3.2 Did the unfavourable treatment take place in a protected period and/or was it an implementation of a decision taken in the protected period?

3.3 Was any unfavourable treatment because of pregnancy or of illness suffered as a result of it?

[4]Section 47(C) of the Employment Rights Act 4.1 Did the respondent subject the claimant to a detriment by the matters set out above? If so, then was that detriment an act, or a deliberate failure to act, done for a reason which relates to pregnancy?

[5]Section 99 Employment Rights Act 5.1 Did the respondent dismiss the claimant? If so, then was the reason, or principal reason for the dismissal related to pregnancy?

[6]The claimant’s claims were filed outside the relevant statutory time limits as set out in sections 123(1) (a) and (b) of the Equality Act and section 48(3)(a) and (b) and 11(2) (a) and (b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and so it will be necessary for the tribunal to consider whether there was continuing conduct extending over a period and/or a similar series of similar acts or failures and whether or not it would be reasonably practicable for the claim to have been presented within the primary time limit and whether, if not, it had been presented within such further period as was reasonable and whether time should be extended on a just and equitable basis.

[7]Employment Judge George’s note made clear that any claim arising out of dismissal should have been brought by 4 May 2018 so that the claim was potentially out of time (the ET1 having been filed on 24 May 2018 following a period of ACAS conciliation between 17 March 2018 and 20 March 2018).

[8]Detailed orders were made by Employment Judge George and a copy of her case management order was sent to both parties. The claimant has produced a witness statement and schedule of loss together with a letter from the CAB which confirms that she attended there for advice. The respondent failed to produce any witness statements or to produce any documents save for a letter that was handed to the claimant on 9 February after her employment terminated. It was suggested that the hearing should be postponed and/or that the respondent should be permitted to lead oral evidence in chief. We declined to postpone the hearing and considered whether or not the respondent’s defence should be struck out on grounds of non-compliance with case management orders but we decided that this would be disproportionate and would not be in the interest of justice. However, we did not consider that it would be fair to the claimant to allow the respondent to adduce witness evidence beyond that set out in the grounds of resistance by way of evidence in chief. Therefore, the respondent’s three witnesses were permitted to swear an oath confirming the correctness of the matters set out in the grounds of resistance, the claimant was given an opportunity to put questions to them and some questions were put by the employment tribunal.

[9]In the light of the evidence we heard we made the following factual findings.

Findings of fact

[10]The claimant began her employment with the respondents, Mr and Mrs Harries-Jones, on 22 August 2017. The respondents operate a hotel in North Oxford. The claimant was employed by the respondent as a Cleaner. She worked as a part of a team of two with another cleaner, N, cleaning and tidying the hotel rooms. The claimant’s husband was also employed in the hotel cooking breakfasts and offering some assistance to the cleaning staff once he had finished his breakfast duties. The Harries-Jones employed a number of individuals as Cleaners, Cooks, Receptionists and so on. A number of the employees are Portuguese speakers. The claimant herself, speaks Portuguese and has very little English. She gave evidence at the hearing via an interpreter. Mr Harries-Jones was in regular attendance at the premises but left the day-to-day management of the cleaning staff to Ms Heijink, who was employed as the Manager of the staff at the hotel. Ms Heijink speaks English and speaks Portuguese fluently. Mr Harries-Jones speaks no Portuguese.

[11]On or around 24 November 2017, the claimant notified Ms Heijink that she was pregnant. Ms Heijink congratulated her on her pregnancy. A short time later, the claimant showed Ms Heijink a doctor’s appointment card recording that she had an antenatal appointment.

[12]The respondents employed women of childbearing age. They had employed other pregnant employees before the claimant became pregnant and the claimant herself was of childbearing age. The respondent had not conducted any risk assessment of the health and safety risks faced by its staff in relation to the working environment generally, nor any specific assessment of the risk to the health and safety of any female staff of childbearing age who might become pregnant.

[13]When made aware of the claimant’s pregnancy Ms Heijink agreed that the claimant would not be required to use chemicals when cleaning the bathroom and would not be required to lift heavy objects. That was the full extent of the evaluation of risk that the respondent undertook. There was no detailed consideration of precisely what the claimant’s work involved, no analysis of whether there were any other risks that her working environment might expose her to or whether she might need other adjustments, for example, more frequent breaks or the provision of additional equipment in order to carry out her functions. The respondent did not provide any guidance as to the maximum weight that the claimant could safely lift.

[14]After that discussion, the claimant’s working arrangements were modified. The claimant was not required to lift anything that she considered heavy; either her N or her husband would assist her by carrying anything “heavy”. The claimant was also not required to use any chemicals and only used water to clean the bathrooms. There is no evidence that the claimant asked for any other adjustments to her working arrangements in light of her pregnancy, or that she raised any concerns that there were any other aspects of the workplace that were a risk to her health and safety in light of her pregnancy.

[15]On or around 21 January 2018, the claimant and her husband were staying overnight in one of the guest rooms at the hotel. They did so with the respondents’ permission on the basis that it would make it easier for the claimant’s husband to cook breakfasts for the hotel guests the next morning. During the night, the claimant left the room in which she was sleeping and went to sleep elsewhere. Her husband became concerned when he woke and was unable to find her. He began knocking on doors whilst looking for her and woke at least one other guest. He resigned as a result of these matters.

[16]The claimant says that Ms Heijink was critical of the frequency of the number of visits that she made to the toilet once she became pregnant. Ms Heijink was managing all of the employees of the hotel and although she would, from time to time, go see the cleaning staff during breaks or would go to visit them to check on progress, she was not in a position to monitor the amount of time that the claimant was spending on visits to the toilet. We considered it unlikely that she made such criticisms.

[17]The claimant also said in her claim form that Ms Heijink compared her performance with her co-workers and was critical of the claimant for performing at a lower rate. It was an accepted fact that all the cleaners were expected to clean four rooms an hour (unless they were required to change bed linens in which case it would take longer). In her statement the claimant said that Ms Heijink had spoken to her on two occasions on 30 and 31 January about the amount of work she had performed. However, the claimant was not singled out, on either of those occasions, both she and her cleaning partner, N, were criticised as a team for not having done enough rooms by reference to the established expectation that cleaners would usually clean four rooms an hour.

[18]The claimant says, in her claim form that she was asked to clean more rooms. However, the only evidence the claimant gave on this point related to the events on 31 January 2018. On 31 January 2018, the claimant and her cleaning partner were criticised for having cleaned only two rooms. N had suffered a bereavement shortly beforehand. She was distressed and, as a result, N and the claimant had cleaned only two rooms by the time of their morning break. When Ms Heijink encountered them during the morning break she asked them how many rooms that they had cleaned and was told that they had done two. It is not a matter of dispute that Ms Heijink then asked them to clean one further room.

[19]After Ms Heijink made the request that the claimant and N clean one more room, the claimant was aggrieved and shouted at Ms Heijink. As a result, Ms Heijink went to find Mr Harries-Jones and the claimant had a further discussion with both of them. There is a dispute about what happened during that discussion and whether the claimant was dismissed or whether she resigned.

[20]It was not disputed that during the discussion the following things occurred: claimant made adverse comments regarding the cleanliness of the hotel, said that she would not stay there, she took off her apron and shook Mr HarriesJones hand. Mr Harries-Jones believed that these matters indicated that the claimant had resigned. However, the claimant was speaking in Portuguese at the time to Ms Heijink and he had no means of understanding what the claimant was actually saying. Ms Heijink maintained that the claimant did resign but she did not claim that the claimant had explicitly stated that she was resigning. The claimant’s evidence was that Ms Heijink told her, “if you are not happy here you can go”, or words to that effect. The claimant then asked if she was being sacked and Ms Heijink said yes.

[21]The claimant went to see the CAB on 1 February 2018. A letter produced by the CAB records that the claimant attended seeking advice because she considered that she had been unfairly dismissed because of her pregnancy.

[22]We found that the claimant did not resign on 31 January 2018. We found that she was dismissed by Ms Heijink following a heated exchange. We considered that it was unlikely that the claimant would have resigned given that her husband was unemployed and she was pregnant. This is also consistent with her account, to the CAB shortly afterwards, which was that she had been dismissed and with the efforts that she made subsequently to get her job back.

[23]The claimant was advised by the CAB that she had three months to bring a claim but the CAB advised her to contact the hotel to see if matters could be resolved by agreement. They said that, if not, she would need to contact ACAS before bringing a claim. They provided contact details for ACAS.

[24]The claimant contacted the hotel and Mr Harries-Jones agreed to have a meeting with her. The meeting took place on 2 February 2018 and the claimant was accompanied by an interpreter. Mr Harries-Jones was accompanied by Ms Heijink. The claimant made clear during that meeting that she had understood herself to have been dismissed on 31 January 2018. The respondents were therefore aware that she had not resigned and that she wanted to come back to work. The claimant also asked about her maternity pay. The claimant apologised to Mr Harries-Jones regarding the comments that she had made but did not apologise to Ms Heijink. The respondent went away to consider matters.On 9 February 2018, a further meeting took place. The respondent, by this time, had decided against reinstating the claimant on the basis that she had not apologised to Ms Heijink. The claimant did not apologise to Ms Heijink in the meeting of 9 February and so was not reinstated.

[25]We accepted Mr Harries-Jones’ evidence that he considered that he could not reinstate the claimant unless she apologised to Ms Heijink as the two could not have worked together effectively and it would have undermined Ms Heijink, who was a long serving employee. He did not consider that there was any alternative work that he could offer the claimant which would not have required her to work with Ms Heijink, given the claimant’s inability to speak English.

[26]The claimant was given a letter by the respondents recording that she would not be reinstated and explaining that because she had not been employee for long enough to qualify for SMP she would need to make a claim for maternity allowance.

[27]The claimant contacted ACAS on 17 March 2018. Her conciliation certificate was issued on 20 March 2018. The claimant stated that she had mistakenly believed that ACAS was the conduit for making an ET claim and she did not understand that she needed to do anything further once she had contacted ACAS. We considered it likely that the claimant misunderstood the position given her very limited command of English and the fact that she was relying on a friend to interpret the advice that was being provided to her.

[28]The claimant had expected to hear about the ET claim and became concerned that she had heard nothing further. She contacted ACAS again and, at that point, it seems to have become clear to her that she needed to lodge an ET1 with the Tribunal directly. The claimant could not confirm exactly when that discussion with ACAS had taken place but she believes it was in either late April or early May. At that point, depending on the precise timing of the call, the claimant may still have been in time to file her ET1. However, the claimant waited for around three weeks before filing the ET1 on 24 May 2018. The claimant needed assistance from an English-speaker to file the ET1. However the claimant did not put forward any specific evidence explaining the delay that occurred between her becoming aware that she needed to file an ET1 in late April/early May and the actual lodging of the claim on 24 May. The respondent has put forward no evidence that it suffered any prejudice as a result of any delay.

The law

[29]Time limits 29.1 The primary time limit for bringing a claim under the Equality Act is that set out at s.123(1). “Proceedings may not be brought after the end of(a) The period of three months starting with the date which the complaint relates, or

(b) Such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[30]The tribunal has a broad discretion in considering whether or not it is just and equitable to extend time. However, it is for a claimant to satisfy a tribunal that it is appropriate to exercise discretion in her favour.

[31]Under the Employment Rights Act the time limit is that set out at sections 48(3)(a) and 111(2) Employment Rights Act: “The employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented(a) Before the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates. Where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures the last of them, or

(b) Within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to have been presented before the end of that period of three months.”

[32]Section 18(2) Equality Act 2010: “A person A discriminates against a woman if, in the protected period in relation to her pregnancy of hers, he treats her unfavourably;(a) Because of the pregnancy, or

(b) Because of illness suffered as a result of it”

[33]As the Code of Practice on Employment makes clear, in order to establish that treatment is “because of” pregnancy “ 8.19 It is not necessary to show that the treatment was unfavourable compared with the treatment of a man, with that of a woman who is not pregnant or with any other worker. However, evidence of how others have been treated may be useful to help determine if the unfavourable treatment is in fact related to pregnancy or maternity leave ….. 8.20 A woman’s pregnancy or maternity leave does not have to be the only reason for her treatment but it does have to be an important factor or effective cause”.

[34]Section 136 Equality Act 2010 states: “(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.”

[35]Section 47(c) Employment Rights Act 1996;(1) An employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done for a prescribed reason.

(2) A prescribed reason is one which is prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State and which relates to (a) pregnancy, childbirth and maternity, section 99 Employment Rights Act; “1. An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this part as unfairly dismissed if: (a) The reason or principal reason for the dismissal is of a prescribed kind, or (b) The dismissal takes place in prescribed circumstances. 4. In this section prescribed means prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State, and 5. A reason or set of circumstances prescribed under this section must relate to pregnancy, childbirth or maternity.”

[36]The management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 sets out the employer’s obligations in relation to the assessment of health and safety risks to staff and pregnant staff. Regulation 3 states: “Risk assessment 1. Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of;(a) The risk to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are at work, and

(b) The risk to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory provisions. 6. Here the employer employs five or more employees he shall record; (a) The significant findings of the assessment; and (b) Any group of his employees identified by it as being especially at risk.”

[37]Regulation 10: Information for employees 1. Every employer shall provide his employees with comprehensible and relevant information on;(a) The risk to their health and safety identified by the assessment.

(b) The preventive and protective measures….”

[38]Regulation 16: Risk assessment in respect of new or expectant mothers 1. Where(a) The persons working in an undertaking include women of childbearing age; and

(b) The work is of a kind which could involve risk, by reason of her condition, to the health and safety of a new or expectant mother, or to that of her baby from any processes or working conditions or physical, biological or chemical agents including those specified in annexes 1 and 2 of counsel directive 92-85-EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements and the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breast feeding [as amended by directive 2014-27-EU]. The assessment required by Regulation 3.1 should also include an assessment of such risk. 2. Where, in the case of an individual employee, the taking of any other action the employer is required to take under the relevant statutory provisions would not avoid the risk referred to in paragraph 1, the employer shall if it is reasonable to do so and would avoid such risks or to her working conditions or hours of work”.

[39]Regulation 18: Notification by new or expectant mothers 1. Nothing in paragraph 2 or 3 of Regulation 16 shall require the employer to take any action in relation to an employee until she has notified the employer in writing that she is pregnant… 2. Nothing in paragraph 2 or 3 of Regulation 16… shall require the employer to maintain action taken in relation to an employee (a) In a case (1) To which Regulation 16, 2 or 3 relates and (2) Where the employee has notified her employer that she is pregnant, where she has failed within a reasonable time of being requested to do so in writing by her employer, to produce for the employer’s inspection a certificate from a registered medical practitioner or a registered midwife showing that she is pregnant.

[40]A failure to conduct a suitable and sufficient risk assessment may amount to unfavourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy (Hardman v Mallen) unless the employer is in the position to show that, in fact, the workplace poses no risk to the health and safety of a new or expectant mother or to that of her baby (Madarassy v Nomura). The case of Stephenson Withy v Skinner establishes that the process of conducting a health and safety risk assessment is a thought process and one that is best conducted following consultation with the employee themselves. The risk assessment must be recorded in writing but can be communicated orally to the individual. What is a suitable and sufficient assessment is for the employment tribunal to assess.

Conclusions

[41]Time limits41.1 Although the claim was filed 20 days late, we have concluded that it would be just and equitable to extend time for the claimant’s complaints under the Equality Act 2010. The claimant took prompt steps to get guidance from the CAB, attending the CAB on 1 February 2018, immediately after her dismissal. Whilst she was made aware of the three-month time limit she mistakenly believed that she had complied with the time limit by contacting ACAS. We considered this to be an excusable misunderstanding in circumstances where she was reliant on a third party to translate to her the advice that she was receiving. When she did not hear anything further in relation to the claim, she took steps to try and establish the position by contacting ACAS in either late April or early May. A few weeks’ further delay occurred before she filed her ET1. Some delay was understandable on the basis that the claimant was being required to complete a form in a different language and needed assistance to do so. Significantly no prejudice resulted to the respondent as a result of the delay. We recognise that time limits are strict and it is for the claimant to persuade us that it is just and equitable to extend. However, given the circumstances which we have detailed we consider that it is just and equitable to extend time for the purposes of the complaint of pregnancy discrimination.

41.2 Under sections 48(3)(a) and 111(2), the Employment Rights Act the test is different. The question is whether it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to have complied with the time limit and, if it was not, whether the claim was filed within such further period as was reasonable. We consider that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have complied with the time limit and that, having failed to do so, she did not file the claim within such further period as was reasonable. Dealing first with reasonable practicability, she was aware as a result of her dealings with the CAB that there was a three-month time limit for submission of a claim. Whilst she initially misunderstood ACAS’s role in the filing of an employment tribunal complaint, that misunderstanding was corrected when she contacted ACAS to clarify matters. There was no reason why she could not have contacted ACAS to clarify the position earlier than she did. The claimant was not able to recall precisely when she contacted ACAS again but believed it was in late April/early May. If so she may still have been able to submit a claim in time. Having become aware that the claim had not been filed and that she was either in danger of missing the deadline for submitting a claim or had just missed it, she did not take any immediate action to put her claim in. Dealing with the second question, whether the claim was filed within such further period as was reasonable; whilst she may have needed assistance to complete the ET1 form, the claimant has put forward no detailed evidence to explain why, once she became aware of her error, she delayed for almost three weeks before submitting the form. We do not therefore consider that the claimant has show that the claim was filed within such further period as was reasonable. Given that conclusion, only the complaints of pregnancy and maternity discrimination under section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 can proceed.

[42]Section 18 of the Equality Act42.1 All of the acts complained of occurred within the “protected period”. We have concluded that the respondents did treat the claimant unfavourably by failing to carry out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment.

42.2 The respondents were aware that they employed women of child bearing age in the hotel. They were also aware of the fact that the work being carried out by hotel cleaners was work of a kind which could potentially involve risk to the health and safety of expectant mothers. However, they failed to carry out any suitable and sufficient risk assessment in relation to those risks as they were required to do under Regulation 16(1) and 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations. There was no systematic analysis of the activities that the cleaners engaged in or attempt to identify the risks that might arise as a result of those activities.

42.3 Furthermore, once the claimant made the respondent aware that she was pregnant, beyond a brief discussion with Ms Heijink regarding the use of chemicals and carrying heavy weights, the respondent undertook no further more detailed risk assessment in relation to the activities that the claimant personally engaged in, nor of the risks posed to her health and safety as a result of those activities. The respondent provided no guidance as to what would be a safe weight for the claimant to lift and did not consider whether there were any other aspects of the claimant’s role (beyond the use of cleaning chemicals) which might involve risk to health and safety, so that adjustments to the claimant’s work might avoid such risks.

42.4 In light of the authority in Hardman v Mallen, we consider that this was unfavourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy. We do not consider it is open to the respondent to argue that this was a workplace in which there were no risks posed such that the obligation to undertake a risk assessment did not arise at all.

42.5 We have concluded that the claimant was not required to clean more rooms because of her pregnancy. The only detailed evidence given by the claimant as to a requirement to clean additional rooms relates to the events of 31 January 2018, when Ms Heijink asked the claimant and N to clean a third room. The request was not that they clean more rooms than usual; they were usually expected to clean four by the morning break, had cleaned two and were being asked to clean a third. We considered that the request was not made because of the claimant’s pregnancy but because the claimant and N together, had failed to meet the respondent’s usual expectations as to the number of rooms to be cleaned. The reason why they had fallen behind that day was due to N’s bereavement not the claimant’s pregnancy.

42.6 We did not find that Ms Heijink commented that the claimant went to the toilet too often. As to the allegation that the claimant’s work rate was criticised. We concluded that the respondent did raise an issue when the claimant and N had cleaned less than the usual number of rooms. However, we found no evidence to suggest that this was in anyway motivated by, or related to, the claimant’s pregnancy. On the particular occasion on 31 January 2018, when the claimant and N were criticised and asked to do more, it was N’s bereavement that had caused them to fall behind rather than anything relating to the claimant’s pregnancy.

42.7 We have found that the claimant was dismissed by Ms Heijink. It was unlikely that the claimant would have resigned in the circumstances: her own husband had just lost his job, she was pregnant and aware that this would impact on her ability to find new employment. We also had regard to the fact that the claimant went to see the CAB the very next day and that she subsequently made efforts to get her job back.

42.8 However, although we found that Ms Heijink dismissed the claimant on 31 January 2018, we considered that the respondent has shown that the dismissal was not on grounds of the claimant’s pregnancy. The claimant was dismissed because she had engaged in a heated discussion with Ms Heijink and had made comments that were critical of the hotel. This offended Ms Heijink and, as a result, during discussions with the claimant, she sacked her. Mr Harries Jones agreed to meet the claimant and considered reinstating her but decided against doing so. We accepted that this was because he was concerned that the claimant and Ms Heijink could not work together effectively unless the claimant apologised to her and the claimant had not done so. The claimant’s pregnancy did not form part of the motivation for either the dismissal nor the subsequent decision not to reinstate her.

[43]Having concluded that only one aspect of the claims of pregnancy discrimination succeeded, we heard evidence from the claimant in relation to the injury to feelings that she had suffered as a result of that matter.

[44]Injury to feelings44.1 The claimant gave evidence that she had felt anxious about the fact that the respondent had been asking her to use cleaning products and that she had been using these before she became pregnant without knowing whether or not they might have implications for her pregnancy. She felt particularly vulnerable because it was her first pregnancy, because she was not in her own country and she was concerned about how to work safely whilst pregnant.

44.2 The respondent suggested that this was only a one-off act of discrimination and so should attract an order of compensation at the bottom of the lower Vento band (The relevant band at that time being £900 to £8,800). The claimant did not propose any specific figure but said that she disagreed with this assessment.

44.3 We concluded that an award of £1,500 for injury to feelings would be appropriate having had regard to the following matters: We accepted that the claimant had been caused anxiety and worry by concerns about the safety of her working arrangements at the respondent and that she was, in some respects, vulnerable because of her inability to speak English and to satisfy herself by reading chemical labels or by escalating concerns to Mr Harries-Jones. However, we also considered that there were a number of mitigating factors. The duration of the alleged discrimination was a period of just over three months. Although the respondent had not undertaken any systematic risk assessment in relation to the claimant’s pregnancy or in relation to the situation of pregnant employees or employees of childbearing age generally, when the claimant made it aware that she was pregnant, the respondent did alter the claimant’s working arrangements. The claimant accepted, when giving evidence, that she was not required to use any chemicals and that she was not required to lift heavy items after notifying of her pregnancy. The claimant did not state that there were any other aspects of her working arrangements that caused her any specific concern, or that she had been required to undertake any activities by the respondent that she considered to be a risk to her health and safety as a pregnant individual.

44.4 In light of these matters we therefore considered that an award in the sum of £1,500 was an appropriate amount to reflect the anxiety caused to the claimant over that three-month period. We calculated that the sum of £277.48 was payable by way of interest in relation to that sum. The same was the produce of the application of 8% interest over a period of one year three months and twenty four days. This was the period from the date of the discriminatory act (which we considered to be 24 November 2017, on the basis that this was the date on which the claimant made the respondent aware of her pregnancy) up to the date of today’s hearing.