Mr F Sheikh v Royal Mail Group Ltd and Others: 3306292/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3306292/2024
Between
Mr Fazal SheikhClaimantRoyal Mail Group Ltd and OthersRespondent
Before
Employment Judge L RobertsonIn person for claimantDate 24 October 2025
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s complaints pursuant to section 48 Employment Rights Act 1996 that he has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47B of that Act were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was not reasonably practicable to do so but the complaints were not presented within a further reasonable period. The complaints are therefore dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The claim form was presented on 29 June 2024. This followed a period of ACAS conciliation in respect of the extant respondents between 20 April 2024 and 1 June 2024.[2]Following a case management hearing heard by Employment Judge Young on 23 June 2025, the case had been listed for a preliminary hearing on 11 September 2025, to determine several substantive preliminary issues. Those issues were listed in the Orders made following that hearing (“the June Orders”).[3]The claimant had, at the earlier case management hearing, been represented by his wife. At the hearing before me, the claimant was representing himself, although he had the support of his wife for part of the hearing.[4]We discussed the issue of adjustments. The claimant indicated that he might need additional breaks. I invited him to ask whenever he felt that he would benefit from an additional break, including to speak to his wife in private. At the end of the hearing, he expressed his thanks to me and Ms Simcott for being patient with his condition.[5]Following preliminary discussions (the details of which are set out in further detail in separate case management orders), it was agreed that I would determine the following issues today: 5.1. Was it reasonably practicable to present the whistleblowing claim within the time limit? 5.2. If not, was it presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable?[6]In his written submissions, the claimant has conceded that the whistleblowing detriment complaints had been brought outside of the primary time limit.[7]The June Orders confirmed that the claimant was claiming about two alleged detriments – the first on 22 May 2022, and the second in early 2023. Consistent with the approach set out in the June Orders, I have assumed that there had been an act extending over a period ending with the last alleged detriment. I was satisfied that this was a reasonable approach in the circumstances as, in relation to the first alleged detriment, the claimant’s further and better particulars make clear that he was aware that Adam Hinckley had been seconded to another role for a short time from an automatic email reply dated 18 May 2022 and so no additional issues about knowledge of this alleged detriment arises. The last alleged detriment was that, in early 2023, the Greenford OPL post had become available to carry out on a temporary basis and the claimant should have been given that post but was not.[8]During the claimant's evidence, he indicated that he also wanted to complain that the subsequent appointment of Ms Wild into the Greenford OPL post on a permanent basis on or around 22 February 2024 was a whistleblowing detriment. This latter issue is being pursued as a direct race discrimination complaint. We took the time to review the claimant's claim, further particulars of claim, and his witness statement, but it was not possible to identify anything within the claim form to indicate that this latter issue was also being pursued as a whistleblowing detriment complaint. Earlier in the hearing, the parties had confirmed to me that the list of complaints in the June Orders was accurate and complete (other than in relation to an issue which is not relevant to the whistleblowing detriment complaints). No formal application to amend the claim to add this complaint had or has been made. I have therefore proceeded to determine the issues on the basis of the claimant’s two extant whistleblowing detriment complaints.[9]Directions had been made for the parties to disclose documents, for a bundle to be produced, and for witness statements to be exchanged – in each case, relating only to the issues listed for determination at the public preliminary hearing. The claimant had produced a witness statement and a hearing bundle. The respondents had produced a bundle. The respondents had not produced witness statements for this hearing because they did not intend to call any witness evidence; however, it had not informed the claimant of this and this appeared to have led to some confusion on his part. I took the time to explain to him that this was because, when looking at time limits, the focus was on the claimant and what he did or could feasibly have done. The respondents do intend to call witness evidence at the final hearing.[10]As set out above, the issues to be determined today had been narrowed from that set out in the June Orders. The parties agreed that the following documents were the only ones relevant to the issues to be determined today and so I would only take those into account: 10.1. The claim form and the claimant’s further particulars (called ‘F Sheikh clarification of claims’); 10.2. The response forms; 10.3. The June Orders; 10.4. Pages 31-37 of the claimant’s witness statement (I have also had regard to the pages in the claimant’s hearing bundle to which he refers in those pages of his statement); and 10.5. Pages 39-56 of the claimant’s hearing bundle (called ‘my evidence for my witness statements’); and 10.6. Page 311 of the respondent’s hearing bundle.[11]The parties had submitted different versions of the evidence for today’s hearing in the days leading up to the hearing before me. The respondents had redacted some parts of documents as they referred to privileged (without prejudice) content and for GDPR reasons. The claimant said that he had only received the respondent’s bundle with redactions two days before the hearing and he had not had a proper opportunity to check the redactions. Taking into account the claimant’s concerns, it was agreed that I would take into account the documents listed above without the redactions. Neither Ms Simcott nor the claimant intended to refer to the privileged documents today.[12]In light of the issue at paragraph 8 above being raised during the claimant’s oral evidence in the afternoon, there was insufficient time for submissions, deliberations and an oral decision. It was agreed that the parties would submit written submissions and that judgment would be reserved.[13]Both parties filed written submissions after the hearing had concluded. At the same time, the claimant also filed an additional attachment called ‘claimant supporting evidence for time limit extension’, and his submissions referred to documents which must have been part of that evidence bundle (as the page numbers did not correlate with either party’s hearing bundle). Employment Judge Young had provided information to the claimant about the issues to be considered at today’s hearing. The June Orders had made it clear that it was for the claimant to persuade the Judge to extend the time limit and specified matters which the documents and his witness statement would need to cover. The parties had had ample opportunity to disclose the relevant documents and produce witness statements before the hearing. As set out above, at the hearing we had agreed which documents I would take into account. This additional attachment was submitted after the hearing such that there was no opportunity for its contents to be tested in evidence. I have not therefore taken its contents into account.[14]The background to this complaint was that the first respondent had operated a restructuring exercise in or around April 2022, as part of which there were opportunities for voluntary redundancy (“VR”). The claimant’s application for voluntary redundancy had not been accepted and he disagreed with the outcome. In the restructuring exercise, it appears that the claimant was appointed to a CCOM role within the first respondent’s C&D team: the claimant also disagreed with this outcome and considered that he should have been allocated to a hub closer to his home. I make no findings of fact in relation to this background: it is not necessary for me to do so and I have not heard evidence about these matters.
FINDINGS OF FACT
[15]Having considered all the evidence before me, I find the following facts on a balance of probabilities. Some of my findings on disputed factual issues are dealt with further in my conclusions. The parties will note that not all the matters that they told me about are recorded in my findings of fact. That is because I have limited them to points that are relevant to the legal issues which are to be determined by me.[16]It is common ground that the claimant suffered from depression and anxiety from around May 2022, and he began a period of long-term sickness absence. Around the same time, the claimant’s fifth child was born prematurely and it took his wife around 9 months to recover from the difficult birth, during which time the claimant was providing more support to his wife and children at home than usual.[17]On or around 3 August 2022, the claimant raised a complaint. The first respondent dealt with this as a grievance, as part of which the claimant’s complaints about the VR selection process were considered. In determining the preliminary issues before me, it was not necessary for me to make detailed findings about the complaint. The claimant participated in an interview about his complaint on or around 11 November 2022. The outcome was given on or around 23 December 2022. The claimant appealed on or around 30 December 2022.[18]As part of the appeal, the first respondent considered the claimant’s medical conditions and offered to allow the claimant to participate in the appeal process in writing. The claimant chose to proceed in writing. Questions were sent to him on or around 25 May 2023 and he responded in around 11 pages on or around 21 June 2023. As part of the appeal process, the claimant raised additional concerns which were incorporated into the appeal process.[19]The claimant’s whistleblowing detriment complaint in question was that he had suffered a detriment in that, in early 2023, he was not offered the Greenford OPL role. This complaint related to the claimant’s allegation that, in early 2023, a temporary vacancy became available for the Greenford OPL role. The claimant was told that the Greenford OPL role was carried out by an individual other than the claimant on a temporary basis for around one year until Karen Wild was appointed to the role on a permanent basis and started working in the role in or around March 2024 (as set out above, the claimant’s complaint about the permanent appointment is being pursued as a separate direct race discrimination complaint).[20]The claimant was unable to be more specific about when, in early 2023, the temporary vacancy for the Greenford OPL role became available and someone was appointed to the temporary role. This was because he had been on long term sickness absence since around May 2022 and so he was hearing of appointments via his colleagues. He was clear in oral evidence that it, “must have been early 2023.” However, he was not told of the temporary appointment until early 2024. I accept the claimant’s evidence that he was aware that someone else had been appointed into the temporary vacancy for the Greenford OPL role by 22 February 2024.[21]The outcome of the grievance appeal was given to the claimant on or around 11 December 2023. Although the claimant made one or more subsequent complaints, the claimant accepted that the internal processes relating to his formal grievance were exhausted at this point. Although the claimant’s submissions suggest that the internal processes were on-going until 11 April 2024, I do not accept this suggestion as his submissions suggest that this related to settlement negotiations (not the formal complaint process) and it is contrary to the claimant’s clear oral evidence about when the internal process ended.[22]The claimant had input from his trade union throughout the above processes, although he was unhappy about the support he had received. The claimant’s claim makes clear that Neel Mehta, union representative, was involved in the claimant’s case from the beginning. The claimant sent nine emails to Paul Vines, union representative, about his case – these were sent on 6 November 2022, 26 January 2023, 25 November 2023 and 12 December 2023. On or around 12 December 2023, the claimant sent an email to Paul Vines about the lack of support he had received from the trade union and asking why Mr Vines had told the claimant’s union representative not to commit to represent the claimant in the Employment Tribunal. The claimant also spoke to Mr Vines twice.[23]I find that claimant’s trade union did inform him about the possibility of bringing an Employment Tribunal claim and the existence of time limits at an early stage, and that they did not tell him that he must exhaust the internal procedures before he could bring an Employment Tribunal claim. I do not accept the claimant’s evidence to the contrary because: 23.1. The claimant was inconsistent in his position about whether and when he knew that there was a possibility of bringing an Employment Tribunal claim and about the existence of time limits. His position was also inconsistent about whether the union told him that he must first exhaust internal procedures before bringing a claim. 23.2. When the issue of time limits was discussed at the case management hearing in June 2025, the claimant told Employment Judge Young that he did not know about the time issue. The claimant’s witness statement also states that, “I was unaware of the strict time limits, and no one – including my employer or union – informed me of these. I acted in good faith and submitted my claims as soon as I became aware of my rights.” Both of these statements were incorrect, given the advice he had received in April 2024 from the trade union (as to which, see below) and the claimant’s acceptance in oral evidence that, as at 9 April 2024, he would have known the time limits for bringing a claim. 23.3. He gave oral evidence that he had not known about the possibility of bringing an ET claim but went on to say that the trade union’s advice was that he could not bring an Employment Tribunal claim without first exhausting the first respondent’s internal processes. When asked about when the trade union had told him that he must exhaust the internal process before he did anything else, he gave oral evidence that he was given advice from the start that he had to exhaust the internal process and he could not go to the Employment Tribunal without exhausting the internal process. He also gave evidence that his trade union representative had told him that the trade union’s position was that the claimant’s case was weak and he would not win. 23.4. In the claimant’s submissions, he states that his union, “never advised [him] to raise any grievances.” This is inconsistent with the claimant’s other evidence about the content of the union’s advice. 23.5. The possibility of the claimant bringing an Employment Tribunal claim was in the contemplation of both him and his union at the time of the matters complained about, as evidenced by the claimant’s email to Mr Vines on 12 December 2023 referring to Employment Tribunal claims. 23.6. Trade union representatives can reasonably be expected to know the applicable time limits and that the time for bringing a detriment claim starts to run when the detriment happens, not after an internal process is followed, and to advise their members accordingly. The claimant’s position is implausible and unsupported by written correspondence from his union representatives.[24]Taking into account my findings above and the content of the email to Mr Vines on 12 December 2023, I find that the claimant was aware of the possibility of bringing an Employment Tribunal claim by that point and that the union had told him about the applicable time limits by that point.[25]Even if the claimant were not aware of the applicable time limits by that point, he was aware by then of the possibility of bringing an Employment Tribunal claim and could have asked for advice from his trade union about the applicable time limits or he or his wife could have researched time limits on the internet.[26]The claimant considers that the union was working against him and everything was orchestrated, but that in and of itself does not assist me in deciding why the claimant did not bring this claim earlier. I have made findings about the matters relevant to the determination of the issues before me. Although the claimant is concerned about the redaction of documents during the grievance process, my findings are not affected by the redactions.[27]On 22 February 2024, the claimant sent an email running to around 6 pages in which he sought to report corruption, discrimination, favouritism and putting staff and members of the public at risk and asked questions which he considered to relate to those issues. On 7 March 2024, the claimant sent an email in which he stated that he would like to take a grievance out against Anthony Thorne. This email was around 2.5 pages.[28]The claimant had disclosed a letter which he had been sent by his trade union dated 9 April 2024. This letter confirmed the advice that he was given by telephone on 8 April 2024.[29]The letter states, in so far as relevant, that “there is a limitation period of 3 months from the act of discrimination to start a claim. A claim of discrimination based on the failure to offer voluntary redundancy in 2022 is out of time and cannot now succeed; and a claim for Public Interest Disclosure (commonly known as whistleblowing) is unlikely to succeed on these facts. That is because there must be a complaint which has a ‘public interest.’”[30]It also states: “If you wish to pursue a claim despite my advice and without the assistance of the Union, it is your responsibility to present your claim to the employment tribunal before the relevant time limit. It is your responsibility to ensure the deadline date is not missed. The claim form is called an ET1.” The letter referred to the gov.uk website where he could find the form ET1.[31]The letter made clear to the claimant that the author would be closing their file. As this letter confirms advice given to the claimant on 8 April 2024, on that date he was aware that claims must be brought within 3 months of an act of discrimination; the trade union would not be assisting him with any claim; and that he was responsible for bringing any claim within the relevant time limit. Although the letter does not specifically refer to time limits for whistleblowing complaints, it was made clear to him that claims must be brought within the relevant time limit. Possible detriment complaints were discussed on 8 April and I find on balance that in turn time limits for detriment complaints would have been discussed. The claimant accepted in oral evidence that, as at 9 April 2024, he would have known the time limits for bringing a claim.[32]He subsequently made a complaint to the trade union with a view to them agreeing to support him with his case. He has also contacted more than one firm of solicitors to try to find one that will take on his case, but he said that he could not give a date when he contacted the first such firm.[33]ACAS conciliation was commenced in respect of the extant respondents on 20 April 2024 and ended on 1 June 2024. The claim form was presented on 29 June 2024.[34]I accept that the claimant was suffering from symptoms of depression and anxiety at the time of the matters complained about and in the period ending with the presentation of this claim. Although the claimant was unfit for work during this period, there was no medical evidence before me about the impact that the claimant’s symptoms may have had on his ability to present a claim to the Employment Tribunal. There was also no persuasive evidence that the claimant’s health was different when he presented his claim to that when he became aware of the alleged detriment.[35]The claimant did not provide a cogent explanation as to why it took him from 22 February 2024 until 20 April 2024 to commence ACAS early conciliation, and from 1 June 2024 (when early conciliation ended) to 29 June 2024 to present his claim.[36]There was no evidence that the respondents informed the claimant or his union representative about the applicable time limits, nor that they misled either of them about the applicable time limits. Whilst the grievance process took several months to conclude, there was no evidence that the respondents did anything to impede, discourage or prevent the claimant from presenting his claim in time. RELEVANT LAW CLAIMANT’S APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME LIMITS FOR HIS EXISTING TRIBUNAL CLAIM OF PROTECTED DISCLOSURE DETRIMENT
RELEVANT LAW
[37]The time limit for presenting a whistleblowing detriment claim is set out at section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”), the relevant sections of which are as follows:[48]Complaints to employment tribunals. …. (1A) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47B. …. (3) An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them, or(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months. (4) For the purposes of subsection (3)— (a) where an act extends over a period, the “date of the act” means the last day of that period, and (b) a deliberate failure to act shall be treated as done when it was decided on; and, in the absence of evidence establishing the contrary, an employer, a temporary work agency or a hirer shall be taken to decide on a failure to act when he does an act inconsistent with doing the failed act or, if he has done no such inconsistent act, when the period expires within which he might reasonably have been expected to do the failed act if it was to be done. 38. I have not included the provisions relating to an extension of time for early conciliation as early conciliation was not commenced within the primary time limit. 39. Following Palmer and anor v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council 1984 ICR 372, the term ‘reasonably practicable’ means something like ‘reasonably feasible’. As Lady Smith in Asda Stores Ltd v Kauser EAT 0165/07 explained: ‘the relevant test is not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but to ask whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done’. 40. The onus of proving that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time rests on the claimant (Porter v Bandridge Ltd [1978] IRC 943 CA). 41. Following Marks and Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan [2005] EWCA Civ 470, [2005] ICR 1293, the question of what is reasonably practicable should be given, "a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee.” 42. In Schultz v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd 1999 ICR 1202, CA, the Court of Appeal accepted that illness may justify the late submission of claims. The Court held, “whenever a question arises as to whether a particular step or action was reasonably practicable or feasible, the injection of the qualification of reasonableness requires the answer to be given against the background of the surrounding circumstances and the aim to be achieved … in assessing whether or not something could or should have been done within the limitation period, while looking at the period as a whole, attention will in the ordinary way focus upon the closing rather than the early stages.” In those circumstances, medical evidence is not essential but is desirable: Norbert Dentressangle Logistics Ltd v Hutton EATS 0011/13. 43. In Bodha v Hampshire Area Health Authority 1982 ICR 200, EAT, it was held that the existence of an impending internal appeal was not in itself sufficient to justify a finding that it was not reasonably practicable to present a complaint to a tribunal within the time limit. This view was expressly approved by the Court of Appeal in Palmer and anor v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council 1984 ICR 372, CA. 44. If an individual relies on skilled advisers (such as solicitors or union representatives), then ignorance of time limits does not render it not reasonably practicable to present a claim in time if it arises from the fault of the complainant in not making such inquiries as he should reasonably in all the circumstances have made, or from the fault of his solicitors or other professional advisers in not giving him such information as they should reasonably in all the circumstances have given him (Walls Meat Co Ltd v Khan [1978] IRLR 499). 45. If the Tribunal decides that it was ‘not reasonably practicable’ to present a claim within the prescribed time limit, the Tribunal must then go on to decide whether the claim was presented ‘within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable’. 46. To conclude that the claim has been presented within ‘such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable’, the Tribunal does not need to be satisfied that the claimant presented his claim as soon as reasonably practicable after the time limit expired. Rather, this test requires the Tribunal to apply a less stringent test of whether claim was presented within a reasonable time after the time limit expired: University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust v Williams EAT 0291/12. 47. This requires an objective consideration of the factors causing the delay and what period should reasonably be allowed in the circumstances for proceedings to be instituted, having regard to the strong public interest in claims being brought promptly and within a primary limitation period of three months. If a period is, on that basis, objectively unreasonable, then the fact that the delay is caused by the claimant’s advisers rather than him or herself makes no difference to that conclusion: Cullinane v Balfour Beatty Engineering Services Ltd and anor EAT 0537/10. CONCLUSIONS 48. I considered the legal principles set out above, in addition to those set out in the parties’ written submissions. I have not reproduced the contents of those submissions in this Judgment in the interests of brevity. Suffice it to say that I fully considered all the submissions made, together with the statutory and caselaw referred to (other than an Employment Tribunal decision referred to by the claimant which I have been unable to locate, but which would not be binding on me in any event), and the parties can be assured that they were all taken into account in coming to my decision.[49]The relevant complaints are for whistleblowing detriment pursuant to section 48 ERA.[50]Pursuant to section 48 ERA, the ‘primary time limit’ for bringing a whistleblowing detriment complaint is, in summary, three months beginning with the date of the act complained about. The appointment of another person (and not the claimant) to the temporary Greenford OPL vacancy was the act complained about. Although the claimant did not know exactly when someone else had been appointed to the temporary Greenford OPL vacancy, he had been told that it was in early 2023. The claimant’s lack of specific knowledge might well give him some difficulty if this complaint were to proceed. Nevertheless, taking the claimant’s case at its highest out of an abundance of caution, for the appointment to have taken place in early 2023, it must have taken place on or before 30 June 2023. The primary time limit therefore expired on or before 29 September 2023. ACAS conciliation was not commenced until after the primary time limit expired and does not therefore have any effect on the primary time limit. As the claim was not presented until 29 June 2024, it was presented 8 months outside of the primary time limit.[51]Although the claimant’s witness statement states that his complaints are in time on the basis that there was a continuing course of conduct culminating in his dismissal on 16 June 2025, that is not the test I have to apply. Whilst I understand from the claimant that he has brought two later claims about different or subsequent allegations, they do not extend the time limit for this claim. Similarly, complaints made pursuant to the Equality Act 2010 are not relevant to whether the whistleblowing detriment complaints made pursuant to the ERA are in time. The claimant has also suggested that his alleged protected disclosure made on 22 February 2024 would be in time; however, the time limit runs from the date of the alleged act of detriment and not the date of the alleged protected disclosure. As set out above, the claimant has conceded in his written submissions that his whistleblowing detriments were presented outside of the primary time limit. Was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be brought in time?[52]I accepted the claimant’s evidence that he was not aware that someone else had been appointed to the temporary vacancy for the Greenford OPL role until early 2024 but that he was aware of this by 22 February 2024. Again, taking the claimant’s claim at its highest out of an abundance of caution, I conclude that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to have presented his complaint in time because he was not told about the appointment until after the primary time limit expired. If not, was it brought within such further period as is reasonable?[53]Although the claimant has referred to it being ‘just and equitable’ to extend time for presenting this complaint, that is not the test for complaints under the ERA. Similarly, under the ERA there is no general principle that a prospective claimant has 3 months from acquiring sufficient knowledge about a prospective claim to present his claim to the Tribunal. Further, the ACAS early conciliation process does not apply to extend the time limit here, because the time limit had already expired. I do not need to be satisfied that the claimant presented his claim as soon as reasonably practicable after the time limit expired. Rather, I must consider whether the claim was presented within an objectively reasonable time after the time limit expired.[54]It was not reasonable for the claimant to bring his whistleblowing detriment claim relating to the Greenford OPL temporary vacancy until he knew about it. Taking the claimant’s claim at its highest out of an abundance of caution, by 22 February 2024, the claimant had been told about it and had sufficient knowledge of the alleged detriment to be able to bring a claim. The only alleged protected disclosure upon which he could rely for this complaint was made in May 2022 (the other alleged protected disclosures were made after the alleged detriment and, as a matter of principle, cannot be relied upon as being the reason for it). The internal grievance and appeal process had been concluded by then, in December 2023.[55]I found that the claimant was aware of the possibility of bringing an Employment Tribunal claim and given accurate advice about the applicable time limits by his trade union by 12 December 2023. That being the case, the claimant knew by 22 February 2024 or should reasonably have known that his whistleblowing detriment complaint was already at least 4 months out of time, but he did not commence ACAS conciliation in respect of the relevant respondents for almost two months, until 20 April 2024. Had the claimant been unclear about the time limits, he had ample opportunity to seek advice from the trade union about that. Alternatively, he or his wife could reasonably have researched the time limit on the internet. Even after the claimant was advised specifically by his trade union about the time limits for bringing claims to the Employment Tribunal on 8 April 2024, he still waited almost a further two weeks to commence ACAS conciliation in respect of the relevant respondents, until 20 April 2024.[56]I found that the claimant did not provide a cogent explanation as to why it took him from 22 February 2024 until 20 April 2024 to commence ACAS early conciliation. I consider that given all of the facts I have found above, it was reasonable for him to commence early conciliation by 7 March 2024 - two weeks after he found out about the alleged detriment. It would have been the work of a moment. I conclude that the extra time taken to start early conciliation was not reasonable.[57]Early conciliation lasted for over 5 weeks. After early conciliation ended on 1 June 2024, the claim form was not presented for a further four weeks. The claim form was presented on 29 June 2024.[58]As I have found that the claimant entered early conciliation knowing of the applicable time limits, and the extent to which his complaint was already out of time, then it was reasonable for him to act reasonably soon after it was clear that the case would not settle through early conciliation. The Cullinane case reminds Tribunals that there is a strong public interest in claims being brought promptly and that the reasonableness of the time taken is to be assessed in the context that the primary limitation period is only three months. Whilst the claim form is a relatively lengthy narrative (the particulars of claim run to just over 15 pages), in the light of my earlier conclusions, I conclude that the claimant did not provide a cogent explanation as to why it took another four weeks from receipt of the early conciliation certificate for him to present his claim. Allowing for the claimant to draft and submit his claim, and recognising that he is not legally represented, I consider that it was reasonable for him to present his claim within two weeks of receipt of the early conciliation certificate. He could have submitted his claim in a more simplistic form. I conclude that, given all of the facts I have found, the extra time taken to present the claim after the end of early conciliation was not objectively reasonable.[59]Although the claimant was suffering from depression and anxiety throughout the period of time in question and was unfit for work, there was no medical evidence about the impact that his symptoms might have had on his ability to start early conciliation or present a claim sooner. Whilst suffering from those symptoms, he had been able to raise grievances, participate in the grievance process and send detailed items of correspondence (including an email running to around 6 pages on 22 February 2024 and an email running to around 2.5 pages on 7 March 2024). He was also able to liaise with his trade union representatives, including by telephone and by sending email correspondence. His wife took around 9 months to recover from the birth of their fifth child and so, by around February 2023, she would have recovered and her health would not have impacted the claimant’s ability to start early conciliation or present a claim sooner. There was also no persuasive evidence that the claimant’s health was different when he presented his claim to that when he became aware of the alleged detriment.[60]It was not for the respondents to advise the claimant about the applicable time limits for bringing a claim against them. I found that they did not mislead the claimant or his trade union representative about the applicable time limits nor did they do anything to impede, discourage or prevent the claimant from presenting claim in time and so my conclusions are unaffected.[61]Even if the claimant had not been given accurate advice by his trade union about the applicable time limits, there is no evidence here to suggest that by 22 February 2024 either the claimant or his advisers could not reasonably have been aware of the time limits relevant to the claimant’s detriment complaints. He was aware of the possibility of bringing an Employment Tribunal claim and ought reasonably to have sought information and advice about how to enforce his rights, such that any ignorance of the time limits would not have been reasonable. It was reasonably open to the claimant to follow up with his trade union or for him or his wife to research the matter themselves. Therefore, even if the claimant had not been given accurate advice by his trade union about the applicable time limits, I would not have found it objectively reasonable to have delayed in starting early conciliation and presenting a claim in the way that he did.
CONCLUSIONS
[62]The claimant’s complaints pursuant to section 48 Employment Rights Act 1996 that he has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47B of that Act were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was not reasonably practicable to do so but the complaints were not presented within a further reasonable period. The complaints are therefore dismissed.[63]This judgment does not affect the claimant’s complaints pursuant to the Equality Act 2010. Approved by: