Ms T Ibirogba v Pareto Law Ltd and Barclays Bank plc: 3305541/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3305541/2024

Between

Ms T IbirogbaClaimant

Pareto Law Ltd and Barclays Bank plcRespondent

Before

Employment Judge S Moore

In person for claimant

Date 16 April 2025

REASONS

[1]The First Respondent is a recruitment business and recruitment agency. The Claimant was employed by the First Respondent from 31 March 2023 until 11 January 2024 when she was dismissed for gross misconduct. She was seconded to the Second Respondent as an accounts manager from 5 April 2023 until her dismissal.

[2]Early Conciliation took place between 18 March 2024 and 29 April 2024.

[3]On 30 May 2024 the Claimant presented a claim in the Tribunal making complaints of race discrimination pursuant to the Equality Act 2010 (EqA), breach of contract (wrongful dismissal) and for holiday pay and arrears of pay.

[4]This was an application by the Second Respondent to consider whether the claims against it should be struck out on the grounds they have no reasonable prospect of success or alternatively whether the Claimant should be ordered to pay a deposit as a condition of continuing to advance the allegations on the grounds they have little reasonable prospect of success (pursuant, respectively, to rules 38 and 40 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024).

[5]The Claimant’s claim is that as part of her role she worked remotely 3 days per week. Between 14 and 22 December 2023 she travelled abroad on annual leave and on 15 December 2023, when she was not on annual leave, attempted to login on her work laptop but was unable to do so and informed the Second Respondent.

[6]The Claimant’s secondment with the Second Respondent was subsequently terminated and she was subjected to a disciplinary procedure by the First Respondent which resulted in her being dismissed on 11 January 2024 with immediate effect.

[7]The Claimant subsequently appealed her dismissal and her appeal was successful. Although the First Respondent admits wrongful dismissal it appears the Claimant was not reinstated and in any event her secondment to the Second Respondent remained terminated.

[8]As regards the claim for breach of contract (wrongful dismissal) for arrears of pay, and holiday pay the position is that the Claimant’s contract was with the First Respondent, and she did not have any contractual arrangement with the Second Respondent. Accordingly, although the Second Respondent was the source of payments owed to her, her remedy for any mistakes in relation to those payments can only be with the First Respondent. I am therefore satisfied that the claims for breach of contract, for arrears of pay and for holiday pay should be struck out as against the Second Respondent on the grounds they have no reasonable prospect of success (although of course those claims remain as against the First Respondent).

[9]As regards the claim for race discrimination, Mr Brown argued this claim should also be struck out as the Second Respondent, not being the Claimant’s employer, had not been responsible for disciplining or dismissing the Claimant. Further the Claimant had not pleaded any other clear act of detriment to which she says she was subjected by the Second Respondent.

[10]Mr Brown also contended that on its face the claim was one day out of time as the latest date it could have been presented was 29 May 2024, whereas it was in fact presented on 30 May 2024.

[11]I note that the Second Respondent has admitted in its response that it is a principal and the Claimant a contract worker within the meaning of s.41 EqA, which means the Second Respondent was prohibited by s.41(1)(d) from discriminating against the Claimant by subjecting her to any detriment.

[12]In this respect, in her claim form the Claimant has contended that the process by which she was dismissed was unfair and discriminatory and that she was dismissed by the First and Second Respondent. She has also contended that other staff who had worked abroad were not dismissed or victimized and that their positions with the Second Respondent remained intact. While it is true to say, given the contractual arrangements, that the Second Respondent was not the entity that technically dismissed the Claimant, it is plain from her claim form that she is complaining about the process by which her secondment with the Second Respondent was terminated and she was subjected to a disciplinary procedure and dismissed by the First Respondent, both matters being inextricably linked. It is further plain that she is alleging that that process was not just unfair but tainted by race discrimination.

[13]Further, while the precise way in which the claim of race discrimination is put still needs to be fully articulated that deficiency is a function of, first, the fact that this hearing was listed before any Case Management Hearing identifying the claims and issues in the case (which should, in my judgment have happened first) and, secondly, the fact that the Claimant will probably not have been privy to communications between the First and Second Respondent and will not have known who said what to whom and when, only that her secondment at the Second Respondent and her employment with the First Respondent were both terminated.

[14]I am therefore satisfied that the Claimant has pleaded acts of detriment against the Second Respondent capable of amounting to race discrimination within the meaning of s.41(1)(d) EqA and I am not satisfied that that claim has no reasonable prospect of success and should be struck out or that it stands little reasonable prospect of success and a deposit order should be made as a condition of continuing to advance it.

[15]This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the claim appears, on the face of it, to be one day out of time. The Claimant has an argument as to why her claim was in fact lodged in time, but in any event, even if she is wrong about that, the tribunal has jurisdiction to extend time (in respect of a complaint of race discrimination) in circumstances where it considers it is just and equitable to do so, and given that the claim was only one day out of time it cannot be said there is little or no reasonable prospect of that discretion being exercised in the Claimant’s favour when all the evidence at the hearing is heard. Approved By: