Mr Darman Singh RawatClaimantArena Lounge UK LimitedRespondent
Before
Employment Judge L WilsonIn person for claimantDate 7 August 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s application for an extension of time succeeds.[2]The Claimant’s claim for unfair constructive dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed.[3]The Claimant’s claim for breach of contract is not well-founded and is dismissed.[4]The Claimant’s claim for Holiday Pay succeeds.[5]The Remedy hearing has already been listed on 2 September 2025 in person. That hearing remains unchanged. A Hindi interpreter is required at that hearing.
REASONS
[1]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent, an Indian restaurant, as Head Chef. The Claimant was responsible for planning, managing and overseeing food production, as well as managing the kitchen operation at the restaurant. He has brought a claim for Unfair Constructive Dismissal, Breach of Contract and Holiday Pay.[2]The last day the Claimant attended work was on 4 February 2024.[3]The Claimant contacted ACAS on 28 March 2024. The Date of Issue of the ACAS Certificate was on 2 April 2024. A claim for Unfair Constructive Dismissal, Breach of Contract and unpaid Holiday Pay was presented on 15 May 2024. The ET1 claim form was accompanied by a two-page statement of case.[4]The correct name of the Respondent is Arena Lounge Limited. No claims against Mr Tarlok Manko were presented.[5]A response was provided by the Respondent in form ET3 dated 16 September 2024. The Respondent defended the proceedings on the basis that there had been no breach of contract of employment, no constructive dismissal and that Payroll was stopped when the claimant walked out of work without notice.[6]No Preliminary Hearing took place, but the parties were ordered to comply with various case management directions in the Written Orders. Proceedings[7]The Final Hearing was initially fixed to take place on 22 and 23 April 2025 but this was postponed at the Claimant’s request until 20 and 21 May 2025, because he was away in India at the time. The May hearing was also postponed at the Claimant’s request because he was unwell, and re-fixed on 16 and 17 July 2025. On 15 July 2025 the Respondent’s Representative telephoned and emailed the Tribunal asking for the Final Hearing to be converted into a Preliminary Hearing instead, in order to address a number of matters, including non-compliance by the Claimant with Case Management Orders, particularly to provide the Written Remedy in time, and that the Claim was brought Out of Time.[8]On 15 July 2025 Acting Regional Employment Judge Tynan directed both parties to attend on 16 July 2025 as scheduled, when all matters could be addressed by the Tribunal.[9]At the Hearing on 16 July 2025, the Respondent Representative repeated her request to convert the Hearing into a Preliminary Hearing so that the Time Limit issue and other issues could be addressed. The Respondent Representative informed the Tribunal that the Claimant’s son had sent the Respondent a lot of emails in the past few days, relevant to the Final Hearing and that, although the Respondent has prepared a Final Bundle, this is only available electronically. The Respondent Representative candidly accepted that it is not unusual to receive late correspondence from an unrepresented litigant, that the Respondent was not prejudiced by the failure by the Claimant to provide the schedule of remedy or by the late emails from the Claimant’s son. The Claimant had travelled a number of hours to attend, together with his wife and son in support, and wanted the case to be resolved.[10]The Tribunal concluded that in all the circumstances it was in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed. All witnesses were in physical attendance and ready to proceed and the Interpreter appeared remotely via CVP. The proceedings had been adjourned twice before and the Respondent’s Representative pragmatically accepted that there was no prejudice to the Respondent and that it was in everyone’s interest to achieve resolution.[11]Having heard preliminary submissions on the Time Limit Jurisdiction issue, the Tribunal declined to convert the hearing into a Preliminary Hearing and instead opted to address this issue as part of the Final Hearing. Time Limit: The Parties’ Positions[12]The Respondent’s Representative submits that the ET1 has been issued seven days out of time, calculated from the last date the Claimant attended work, namely 4 February 2024. The Respondent submits that the last date the claim could be brought was on 8 May 2024 and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the claim.[13]The Respondent’s Representative submitted that there is “potentially” a different time limit for the Holiday Pay claim because Holiday Pay was calculated up to the end of the financial year, namely 31 March 2024.[14]She nevertheless maintains that, because the Claimant left his employment without notice, this was viewed by the Respondent as a repudiatory breach by the Claimant and therefore the Holiday Pay time limit should be calculated from the date he left.[15]The Respondent’s Representative submits that the clock “may” start to run on 6 February 2024 in respect of the unlawful deduction breach of contract claim, because the January salary was due up to and including that date.[16]The Claimant is unrepresented. He submits that: i. If his ET1 is out of time, it was not reasonably practicable to submit it in time. ii. It was presented in a reasonable time.[17]In short, it is suggested that the Claimant has limited English and was unable to access the Tribunal process without the assistance of his son. He was unemployed at the time and could not afford legal representation.[18]The Claimant became extremely reliant upon his son to prepare the entirety of his paperwork for the Tribunal, but his son had limited availability to help him after ACAS issued the Early Conciliation certificate, due to his own professional commitments. The Claimant’s daughter in law was present in the house at times but was unable to assist to the extent that his son could do so.[19]The Respondent, by contrast, objects to the application. The Respondent contends that it was reasonably practicable for the claim to have been submitted in time. Notwithstanding the Claimant’s limited English, it was entirely possible and reasonably practicable for his claim to have been submitted in time. Jurisdiction[20]Section 111(2) Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) provides that a tribunal “shall not consider” an unfair dismissal and other employment rights claims unless it is presented in time. An unfair dismissal claim usually has to be presented to a tribunal before the end of the three-month period starting with the effective date of termination, although that deadline would be extended by participation in ACAS early conciliation. Discretion to Extend: ‘Not Reasonably Practicable’/ “Reasonable”.[21]In respect of Constructive Unfair Dismissal claims, Holiday Pay claims and Deduction from Wages Breach of Contract claims, a tribunal may only extend time for presenting a claim where it is satisfied that it was “not reasonably practicable” for the complaint to be presented in time, and that the claim was nevertheless presented “within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable”.[22]There are two limbs to this formula. Firstly, the employee must show that it was not reasonably practicable to present his claim in time. The burden of proving this rests firmly on the applicant (Porter v Bandridge Ltd [1978] IRLR 271, [1978] ICR 943, CA).[23]Second, if he succeeds in doing so, the tribunal must be satisfied that the further time beyond the primary time limit within which the claim was in fact presented was reasonable. In Tesco Stores Ltd v Kayani UKEAT/0128/16 (8 September 2016, unreported) the EAT emphasised the importance of separating out the two stages of whether it was not reasonably practicable to bring the claim within time and, if so, whether the further time within which the claim was presented was reasonable.[24]The Court of Appeal in Palmer v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] ICR 372 at [34] held that to construe the words ‘reasonably practicable’ as the equivalent of ‘reasonable’ would be to take a view too favourable to the employee; but to limit their construction to that which is reasonably capable, physically, of being done would be too restrictive. The best approach is to read ‘practicable’ as the equivalent of ‘feasible’ and to ask: ‘was it reasonably feasible to present the complaint to the Industrial Tribunal within the relevant three months?’[25]In Walls Meat Co Ltd v Khan [1979] ICR 52 at p.56, Denning LJ held that the following general test should be applied in determining the question of reasonable practicability. ‘Had the man just cause or excuse for not presenting his complaint within the prescribed time limit? Ignorance of his rights – or ignorance of the time limit – is not just cause or excuse, unless it appears that he or his advisers could not reasonably have been expected to have been aware of them. If he or his advisers could reasonably have been so expected, it was his or their fault, and he must take the consequences.’[26]In the same case (at p.61), Brandon LJ drew a distinction between a Claimant who is ignorant of the right to claim, and a Claimant who knows of the right to claim but is ignorant of the time limit: ‘While I do not, as I have said, see any difference in principle in the effect of reasonable ignorance as between the three cases to which I have referred, I do see a great deal of difference in practice in the ease or difficulty with which a finding that the relevant ignorance is reasonable may be made. Thus, where a person is reasonably ignorant of the existence of the right at all, he can hardly be found to have been acting unreasonably in not making inquiries as to how, and within what period, he should exercise it. By contrast, if he does know of the existence of the right, it may in many cases at least, though not necessarily all, be difficult for him to satisfy an industrial Tribunal that he behaved reasonably in not making such enquiries.’[27]The Court of Appeal in Marks & Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan [2005] EWCA Civ 470 also set out a number of legal principles distilled from a review of case law. One such principle is that Section 111(2) ERA 1996 should be given a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee. Time Limit: Determination[28]Calculating the Time Limits on the various claims requires consideration of numerous factors, and can potentially be confusing to a litigant in person.[29]In respect of the Unfair Dismissal Claim and Holiday Pay Claim, time runs from the “effective date of termination”, which in this case was the last date on which the Claimant worked, namely 4 February 2024 and, but for any early conciliation extension, the time limit was 3 May 2024[30]The effect of early conciliation is that 29 March to 2 April is ignored, which is 5 days, so the actual time limit is therefore 8 May 2024[31]The Unlawful Deduction claim runs from 6 March 2024, because that is the date by which the payment of the February 2024 salary had to be made. The 6 February 2024 was the last date upon which the January 2024 salary was due.[32]In considering whether it was reasonably practicable for Mr Rawat to present his claims within the limitation period, I have read the entirety of the Full Bundle, comprising 157 pages (within which the Claimant’s Bundle is subsumed in its entirety), plus the witness statements of the Claimant, Mr Tarlok Manko and Mr Tejpreet Gill.[33]I have also read a number of emails between the parties and the Tribunal. I have also heard evidence from the Claimant, who confirmed the contents of his witness statement, and thereafter gave evidence regarding the substantive claims as well as to the reason for the delay in submitting the claim form.[34]I also heard evidence from the Respondent witnesses, Mr Tarlok Manko, Director of the Respondent, and Mr Tejpreet Gill, family member of Mr Manku and who occasionally provided voluntary support to Mr Manku with operational activities at the restaurant. I heard and carefully considered submissions from both parties in support of their respective positions.[35]The reasons for the delayed presentation of the claim form are largely uncontroversial. It is accepted by the Respondent that the Claimant speaks limited English, to such an extent that accessing and communicating with the Tribunal without an interpreter was beyond his capabilities. He was unrepresented throughout proceedings and had become extremely reliant upon his son, Mr Deepak Rawat.[36]The Respondent did not seek to challenge Mr Rawat’s evidence as to his reliance upon his son, which was evident to the Tribunal throughout the Full Hearing, his son having sat in the public gallery throughout the two-day Hearing and visibly assisting the Claimant to manage the electronic bundle on a number of occasions. It is the Claimant’s son’s email address on the Tribunal record and it is he, not the Claimant, who has been liaising electronically with the Respondent. Neither did the Respondent challenge the Claimant’s evidence as to the long hours his son was working during the relevant period, keeping him outside of the family home for the majority of the working day.[37]The Respondent relies upon the information contained within the Early Conciliation Certificate as evidence of the fact that presentation of the Claim was reasonably practicable prior to the expiration date.[38]However, the certificate is printed in English and no Hindi translation was provided. Consequently, Mr Rawat was reliant upon the translation skills of family members, principally his son, in order to understand the text in the certificate.[39]In all the circumstances, I conclude that it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to have been filed by 8 May 2024. I further conclude that the delay of seven days (and five days for the Breach of Contract claim) was reasonable in all the circumstances.[40]Consequently, the Claimant’s application for an extension of time in respect of the claims succeeds. The Law Constructive Dismissal and Breach of Contract
The Law
[41]The law in this matter is relatively straightforward. Section 95(1)(c) Employment Rights Act 1996 states that there is a dismissal where the employee terminates the contract with or without notice in circumstances such that he or she is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct. This form of dismissal is commonly referred to as constructive dismissal. In order to claim constructive dismissal, an employee must establish that there was a fundamental breach of contract on the part of the employer, the employer’s breach caused the employee to resign, and the employee did not delay too long before resigning thus affirming the contract and losing the right to claim constructive dismissal. In the leading case in this area, Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp 1978 ICR 221, CA, the Court of Appeal ruled that, for an employer’s conduct to give rise to a constructive dismissal, it must involve a repudiatory breach of contract.[42]In Frenkel Topping Limited v King UKEAT/0106/15/LA21 July 2015 the EAT chaired by Langstaff P put the matter this way (in paragraphs 14-15): “14. The test of what is repudiatory in contract has been expressed in different words at different times. They are, however, to the same effect. In Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] IRLR 347 it was “conduct with which an employee could not be expected to put up”. In the more modern formulation, adopted in Tullett Prebon plc v BGC Brokers LP & Ors [2011] IRLR 420, is that the employer (in that case, but the same applies to an employee) must demonstrate objectively by its behaviour that it is abandoning and altogether refusing to perform the contract. These again are words which indicate the strength of the term. 15. Despite the stringency of the test, it is nonetheless well accepted that certain behaviours on the part of employers will amount to such a breach. Thus in Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland [2010] ICR 908 CA Sedley LJ observed that a failure to pay the agreed amount of wage on time would almost always be a repudiatory breach …...”[43]The importance of pay was also emphasised in Cantor Fitzgerald v Callaghan [1999] IRLR 234, where the Court of Appeal said that it was difficult to exaggerate the crucial importance of pay in any contract of employment (paragraph 35). In paragraph 41, the Court went on to say that: “…the question whether non-payment of agreed wages, or interference by an employer with a salary package, is or is not fundamental to the continued existence of a contract of employment, depends on the critical distinction to be drawn between an employer’s failure to pay, or delay in pay, agreed remuneration, and his deliberate refusal to do so. Where the failure to delay constitutes a breach of contract, depending on the circumstances, this may represent no more than a temporary fault in the employer’s technology, an accounting error or simple mistake, or illness, or accident or unexpected events…If so, it would be open to the Court to conclude that the breach did not go to the root of the contract. On the other hand if the failure or delay in payment were repeated and persistent, perhaps also unexplained, the Court might be driven to conclude that the breach or breaches were indeed repudiatory.” Holiday Pay Breach of Contract[44]Where there is no express term in the contract entitling the employee to pay in lieu of any unused holiday on termination, no such term could be implied (Morley v Heritage plc 1993 IRLR 400, CA). Working Time Regulations[45]The law in this area is governed by the Working Time Regulations 1998 (‘the Regulations’). All workers are entitled to 5.6 weeks’ paid holiday in each leave year, comprising 4 weeks per year under Regulation 13 and an additional leave period of 1.6 weeks a year under Regulation 13A(2).[46]Regulation 13A(3) states that there is a maximum aggregate entitlement of 28 days.[47]A worker may also be entitled to enhanced holiday rights under their contract of employment or contract for personal service[48]Unless a worker has a contractual right to take public holidays in addition to their statutory entitlement, these are included in that entitlement.[49]Regulation 14 deals with the calculation of pay where holidays have accrued, applicable at the end of employment. It gives workers a right to payment in lieu for any outstanding holiday entitlement on termination. However, the right to pay in lieu only applies to the statutory annual entitlement of 5.6 weeks, and only to untaken leave outstanding from the worker’s final leave year.[50]Regulation 16 provides that a worker is entitled to be paid at the rate of a week’s pay in respect of each week of annual leave to which he or she is entitled under Regulation 13 (basic leave) or Regulation 13A (additional leave).[51]Sections 221 to 224 Employment Rights Act 1996 provides the calculation method for working out what a week’s pay is.[52]The worker can only claim for the period of 2 prior years as a result of the Deduction from Wages (Limitation) Regulations 2014 SI 2014/3322.[53]In Robinson-Steele v RD Retail Services Ltd and others 2006 ICR 932 ECJ, it was argued that payment for annual leave must take place at the time the holiday is actually taken. Arrangements to the contrary would either constitute a payment in lieu of annual leave contrary to Article 7(2) of the Working Time Directive (WTD), or be prohibited as a mechanism that imposes obstructions or restrictions on taking leave. Furthermore, in their view, the rolled-up holiday pay system discourages workers from taking annual leave at all. The ECJ said that it is unlawful for an employer simply to designate part of the remuneration that a worker already receives for work done as holiday pay.
Findings of Fact
[54]Having heard and read the evidence in full, the Tribunal reached the following findings of fact. Overall, the Tribunal preferred the evidence of the Respondent witnesses, Mr Tarlok Manko and Mr Tejpreet Gill, who were both credible and consistent throughout their evidence. The Tribunal found that they both strived to answer each question posed of them in order to assist the Tribunal. In contrast, and making every reasonable allowance for the Claimant’s linguistic difficulties and the passage of time, the Tribunal considered that the Claimant prevaricated on a lot of questions, failing to answer them either because he had no answer to give or none that would stand up to scrutiny. Many of the answers he gave were internally inconsistent and were undermined by the documentary evidence in the case as well as by the voice note played to the Tribunal by the Claimant during his cross examination of Mr Manko. £10,000[55]Both parties agreed that the Respondent transferred £10,000 into the Claimant’s bank account in January 2023. The reason and circumstances for this were in dispute. I reject the Claimant’s assertion that the £10,000 was given to him in January 2023 as payment in lieu of a pay rise and/or Holiday Pay. I find as a fact that the Claimant borrowed a £10,000 loan from the Respondent at a time when he was experiencing financial difficulties.[56]I have no difficulty in making this finding. The Respondent’s oral evidence is supported by the following evidence: i. The Online Banking Transaction Reference records the payment as “Arena Loan” (page [46] of the bundle). ii. The Claimant acknowledged it was a loan multiple times in his letter to the Respondent dated 12 March 2024. In the same letter, he expressed that this sum was borrowed and understood that it was due to be repaid (page [48] of the bundle). iii. The Claimant sent the Respondent a voice note on 4 February 2024 referring to the outstanding amount of £5,834.95 still owed by him to the Respondent [66]. iv. The Claimant sent the Respondent a WhatsApp message in February 2024 setting out that money is still owed to the Respondent. In evidence, the Claimant had no explanation for writing “-£2500”. The natural and ordinary meaning of this text is that the minus sign represented an amount to be substituted [66]. v. The Claimant sent the Respondent a WhatsApp message on 5 February 2024 telling the Respondent to “take your money”. vi. No document or record supports the Claimant’s assertion that this represented a payment in lieu of a pay rise.[57]I do not accept the Claimant’s assertion that this loan was made without agreement of a repayment timeframe. I accept the evidence of the Respondent witnesses that at the time the loan was made in January 2023, the Claimant agreed verbally that he would pay back the Respondent within 3 months. The amount loaned was a significant amount and I am persuaded by the evidence of Mr Manku that he agreed to loan Mr Rawat this money because he was reassured that it would be paid back by the end of the tax period, namely April 2023.[58]I do not accept that the Claimant’s assertion that at a meeting dated 31 December 2023, Mr Tejpreet Gill agreed with the Claimant that the Claimant’s holiday pay would offset a portion of the loan, with the balance repaid in instalments. Mr Gill is a family member of the Director at the Respondent Organisation and is not a Director or Manager in the business. Mr Gill had no authority to reach such an agreement even if he had been so inclined. I was persuaded by Mr Gill’s evidence that no such agreement was reached. As Mr Manku’s relative, Mr Gill had Mr Manku’s financial needs firmly in mind and his priority was to protect the Respondent’s business needs. I accept his evidence that he would not have acted to the Respondent’s detriment by reaching such an agreement with Mr Rawat.[59]For the avoidance of doubt, I reject the Claimant’s contention that the Respondent promised to match the same offer as Ponsbourne Hotel, make him a partner of the company or give him shares of the Respondent company. The Claimant undoubtedly wanted these things but both Mr Manku and Mr Gill were clear and consistent in their evidence that no such agreements were ever reached. I am persuaded by their evidence. Deduction from Salary[60]The Parties are agreed that at the point in time when the Claimant left work on 4 February 2024 he had not been paid his January 2024 or February 2024 salary.[61]It is agreed between the parties that by 4 February 2024, the Claimant had not re-paid any of the £10,000 loaned to him the previous year. I accept the Respondent’s evidence that it was 9 months overdue and that they had been seeking repayment for a number of months. In particular, in the meeting dated 31 December 2023, Mr Gill asked Mr Rawat when the money would be repaid. Mr Rawat’s request to Mr Gill to persuade Mr Manku to offset this sum was refused by Mr Gill. The Respondent continued to chase the outstanding loan and warned Mr Rawat that they would have no choice but to deduct it from his salary, as per the terms of the contract. Mr Rawat continued to ignore their request.[62]I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the January salary could be paid up to and including 6 February 2024, as per the terms of the contract and custom. This evidence was not in fact challenged by the Claimant, although Mr Rawat relies upon the fact other colleagues had been paid by then.[63]I also accept the Respondent’ evidence that the January salary had not been paid by 4 February in the hope that this would persuade the Claimant to re-pay the loan. When he walked out of work on 4 February without notice, the decision was then taken by the Respondent to withhold the January salary in order to recoup some of the outstanding loan. The decision was subsequently taken to withhold the 4 days on which the Claimant worked in February to recoup more of the outstanding loan.[64]I am persuaded that the Respondent was entitled to withhold the Claimant’s salary, for the following reasons: i. The Contract of Employment signed by the Claimant on 31 August 2020 explicitly permitted the Respondent to deduct the Claimant’s salary ‘any sums owed to the Company by [him] including, but not limited to, outstanding loans’ (page [43] of the bundle). ii. The Claimant was on notice that this clause of the contract would be put into effect if the loan was not repaid in January 2024.[65]In his oral evidence, the Claimant sought to distance himself from the Contract of Employment, at pages [38]-[45] of the Bundle. I reject the Claimant’s assertion that he did not sign the Contract contained at pages [38]-[43] and that the final two pages at [44] and [45] pertain to a different Contract. His signature is on the final two pages of the Contract, which are the only places on the Contract where a signature is requested. His signature is visible through the page; it can be seen on page [43], which illustrates that this document was double sided when scanned into the Bundle. The Claimant’s contention that the Respondent placed the signed page on top of a blank piece of paper whilst photocopying or scanning the document does not bear scrutiny. I am not persuaded that the Respondent falsified the Contract. This assertion by the Claimant lacks credibility and is an attempt to distance himself from the Clause on Deduction from Wages, which permits the Respondent to deduct unpaid loans from the Claimant’s salary. Conclusions Constructive Dismissal
Conclusions
[66]As the case law summarised above indicates, the term of the contract as to pay is a crucial term. As the Court of Appeal held in Callaghan, failure to pay an employee will not always amount to a repudiatory breach of contract.[67]I reject that the Claimant was Constructively Dismissed as claimed. I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the Claimant walked out of the restaurant on 4 February 2024 with the intention of forcing Mr Manko to waive the loan repayment which was owed to him. The Claimant left without notice at a time when one of the chefs was on annual leave, rendering the Respondent’s business vulnerable. As the Head Chef, the Claimant was aware that the business was under pressure at peak season where they were fully booked and so in need of a chef. He hoped that by walking out of the door, the Respondent would give in to his demands of a pay increase and to waive the loan.[68]As per the Tribunal’s findings above, the terms of the contract permitted Respondent to deduct the Claimant’s January salary (and in due course the February salary), which was not in fact yet due by the time the Claimant left his employment. The Claimant was on notice of this following the December 2023 meeting but nevertheless chose not to repay any of the loan, in full knowledge that this would trigger the Respondent to deduct his salary.[69]Consequently, there was no breach of contract by the Respondent and he was not constructively dismissed. In the absence of any repudiatory breach the claimant's decision to resign cannot be construed as a dismissal. It was his choice that the contract ended on 4 February 2024.[70]This claim consequently fails. Breach of Contract[71]For all the reasons cited above under ‘Constructive Dismissal’, there was no breach of contract and this claim fails. As per the Tribunal’s findings above, the terms of the contract permitted the Respondent to deduct the Claimant’s January salary (and in due course the February salary) in order to recoup the unpaid loan made to the Claimant the previous year. Holiday Pay[72]It is agreed between the parties that the Holiday Pay period falls between 1 April and 31 March each year and that the Claimant did not take any holiday in 2023 or 2024. It is also agreed between the parties that the Claimant has not received Holiday Pay for any of those periods.[73]The Contract of Employment is silent as to whether Holiday Pay can be carried over from one year to the next. It states that, Employees are entitled to take twenty one (21) days paid annual leave. Annual leave needs to be requested with your manager at least four (4) weeks in advance [41].[74]There is no express term in the contract entitling the employee to Holiday Pay in lieu of any unused holiday on termination.[75]It is agreed between the parties that the period of 21 days was increased to 28 days verbally, following discussions between Mr Rawat and Mr Manko, on a date unknown[76]I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the Respondent’s custom and policy is not to carry over Holiday Pay from one year to the next, save at their discretion. I accept that Mr Manko never exercised his discretion in favour of rolling over the Claimant’s Holiday Pay from one year to another.[77]Consequently, there was no Breach of Contract.[78]No statutory exception applies permitting the Claimant to carry over his Holiday Pay.[79]Neverthelss, the Holiday Pay period for 2023-2024 fell to be paid at the point that the Claimant left his employment, under the Working Time Regulations.[80]If the amount cannot be agreed between the parties, it will be resolved at the Remedy Hearing. Miscellaneous Matters[81]The Claimant raised a number of miscellaneous matters which did not form part of the claim. As they had no bearings on the Tribunal’s findings, they do not form part of this Decision. Approved by: