Ms K Hollingworth v Cambridge Housing Society Ltd T/a Cambridge Housing Society Group: 3305008/2022
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3305008/2022
Between
Ms K HollingworthClaimantCambridge Housing Society Ltd t/a Cambridge Housing Society GroupRespondent
Before
Employment Judge TynanIn person for claimantMs K Anderson (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 13 October 2025
JUDGMENT
on APPLICATION for RECONSIDERATION Upon the Claimant’s application dated 11 April 2025 to reconsider the judgment dated 26 March 2025 (sent to the parties on 28 March 2025) under Rule 69 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024), the Tribunal determines that it is not necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider its judgment.
REASONS
[1]Any page references in these Reasons are to the 545-page preliminary hearing bundle (“the Bundle”).[2]On 26 March 2025, I determined that the Claimant had failed to establish that at the material time to which her claim relates, namely June 2019 to March 2022, she was disabled by reason of autism spectrum condition, dyslexia, PTSD, stress/anxiety and/or asthma. Subsequently, on 11 April 2025 the Claimant emailed the Tribunal stating that she wished to appeal that part of my decision relating to asthma and stress. Although any appeal is a matter for the Employment Appeal Tribunal, I have treated her email as an application for reconsideration of the judgment. As such, the application has been submitted within the prescribed 14-day time limit for making such an application. 1 of 4[3]Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024 empowers the Tribunal, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, to reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. Any suggestion that a Tribunal has made an error of law or that its findings were perverse is generally a matter for appeal – Ebury Partners UK Limited v Acton Davis [2023] EAT 40.[4]In Outasight VB Limited v Brown UKEAT/0253/14, the Employment Appeal Tribunal considered the Tribunal’s powers under Rule 70 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. At paragraphs 27 to 38 of her judgment, Her Honour Judge Eady QC, as she then was, set out the legal principles which govern reconsideration applications, and observed: “The interests of justice have thus long allowed for a broad discretion, albeit one that must be exercised judicially, which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, insofar as possible, be finality of litigation.”[5]The need to have due regard to the interests of both parties was recognised by the Employment Appeal Tribunal over 20 years earlier in Redding v EMI Leisure Ltd EAT/262/81 in which it was said: “…When you boil down what is said on [the Claimant’s] behalf, it really comes to this: that she did not do herself justice at the hearing so justice requires that there should be a second hearing so that she may. Now, “justice” means justice to both parties. It is not said, and, as we see, cannot be said that any conduct of the case by the employers here caused [the Claimant] not to do herself justice. It was, we are afraid, her own experience in the situation…”[6]The reconsideration procedure can be used to correct any error that occurs in the course of the proceedings, whether or not it is a significant error. An important consideration is whether or not a decision has been reached after a procedural mishap, meaning that a party has been denied a fair and proper opportunity to put their case. Reconsideration should not ordinarily be used to correct alleged errors where the parties were afforded that opportunity.[7]In my judgment, the Claimant was afforded a fair and proper opportunity to put her case in March this year, with a range of adjustments in place in an effort to put the parties on an equal footing. In particular, although the Claimant had failed to comply with orders made by Employment Judge Ord in June 2023 to serve a disability impact statement and disclose copies of her medical records, at the hearing on 30 April 2024 I not only gave the Claimant a further opportunity to comply but also allowed her a considerable period in which to comply, namely until December 2024 to disclose her medical records and until January 2025 to serve her disability impact statement. Although she submitted a copy of her GP medical records to the Tribunal, the Claimant failed to prepare a disability impact statement. By March this year, she had effectively had 18 months in which to prepare a statement about her claimed disabilities. Rather than simply dismiss her claim to be disabled by reason of the conditions relied 2 of 4 upon, I went on to adjudicate the matter on the strength of the Claimant’s oral evidence and submissions.[8]The Claimant suggests that relevant medical evidence regarding asthma and stress was omitted from the Bundle, but does not point to any procedural mishap that may have led to this. She was provided with a copy of the Bundle by the Respondent in good time for the hearing on 25 March 2025 so had a reasonable opportunity to check that it contained all the documents that she wished to rely upon. In any event, the Fit Notes now adduced by her (pages 537 to 543 of the Bundle) had been summarised within a broader summary of the medical evidence at pages 437 to 439 of the March Hearing Bundle. The Fit Notes themselves add nothing to that summary which evidenced to me when I considered the issue in March that the Claimant had experienced symptoms of low mood and/or anxiety derived from a reaction to adverse circumstances such as problems at work and adverse life events, rather than because she was depressed. In accordance with the principles in J v DLA Piper UK LLP UKEAT0263/09/RN, I determined that this was a situation that did not meet the definition of disability.[9]The other piece of evidence sought to be relied upon by the Claimant is an extract from her GP records from March 2020, in which there is reference to the Claimant have felt a bit short of breath and being a known asthmatic. It seems she had developed a dry cough in the early days of the Covid pandemic and consulted her GP about this. Having reviewed the extensive medical documents lodged by the Claimant with the Tribunal on 4 and 14 December 2024, I cannot see the extract within those documents, which suggests that the Claimant is responsible for its omission from the Bundle. Be that as it may, the extract contains no further information about the Claimant’s asthma, specifically on the critical issue of whether it had had a significant adverse effect on her ability to undertake normal day to day activities. In that regard, I noted in my judgment that when the Claimant was assessed by the Respondent’s occupational health practitioner in 2021 she reported that her asthma was well controlled. She did not report any adverse effects and has not identified any such effects in her evidence to the Tribunal. I note that having had a further opportunity to reflect on the matter since 25 March, the Claimant has still not identified any adverse effects in terms of her ability to carry out her normal day to day activities.[10]If the Claimant feels that she did not do herself justice in these matters on 25 March, that is not the fault of the Respondent or the Tribunal. The Tribunal has gone to some lengths to ensure the Claimant’s voice has been heard. It is not necessary in the interests of justice to re-visit the disability issue or to afford the Claimant a second hearing on issues that were first identified in June 2023 as requiring adjudication and in respect of which she received a fair and thorough hearing on 25 March this year.[11]For all these reasons, the Claimant’s application to reconsider the judgment is refused. 3 of 4 Approved by: JUDGMENT striking out the claim having been sent to the parties on 28 October 2025 and written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60(4) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the following reasons are provided:
Introduction
[19]I do not accept Mr Kohanzad’s proposition that the power can only be triggered where a fair trial is rendered impossible in an absolute sense. That approach would not take account of all the factors that are relevant to a fair trial which the Court of Appeal in Arrow Nominees [2000] 2 BCLC 167 set out. These include, as I have already mentioned, the undue expenditure of time and money; the demands of other litigants; and the finite resources of the court. These are factors which are consistent with taking into account the overriding objective. If Mr Kohanzad’s proposition were correct, then these considerations would all be subordinated to the feasibility of conducting a trial whilst the memories of witnesses remain sufficiently intact to deal with the issues. In my judgment, the question of fairness in this context is not confined to that issue alone, albeit that it is an important one to take into account. It would almost always be possible to have a trial of 3 of 12 the issues if enough time and resources are thrown at it and if scant regard were paid to the consequences of delay and costs for the other parties. However, it would clearly be inconsistent with the notion of fairness generally, and the overriding objective, if the fairness question had to be considered without regard to such matters.[20]Mr Kohanzad’s reliance on rule 37(1)(e) does not assist him; that is a specific provision, it seems to me, where the tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of a claim, or part of a claim, that may arise because of undue delay or failure to prosecute the claim over a very substantial length of time, or for other reasons. However, that provision does not circumscribe the kinds of circumstances in which a tribunal may conclude that a fair trial is not possible in the context of an application made under rule 37(1)(b) or (c), where the issue is unreasonable conduct on the part of a party or failure to comply with the tribunal’s orders or the Rules.[21]In this case, the tribunal was entitled, in my judgment, to accept the parties’ joint position that a fair trial was not possible at any point in the fiveday trial window. That was sufficient to trigger the power to strike out. Whether or not the power is exercised will depend on the proportionality of taking that step.” The Claimant’s request to postpone the final hearing10. The Respondent’s application to strike out the claim is submitted on the back of the Claimant’s application made on 27 August 2025 to postpone the final hearing. The application seems to have been prompted by my direction that the parties update the Tribunal as to whether my various case management orders had been complied with. The final hearing was listed over 10 days commencing on 6 October 2025. I granted the postponement on 25 September 2025, the parties having been notified in advance of the hearing that in the event the postponement application was pursued and granted, I would go on to consider whether the claim should be struck out pursuant to rule 38 of the 2024 Rules.11. My reasons for granting the Claimant’s postponement application, which had been made more than seven days before the first day of the final hearing, were threefold. Firstly, the Claimant had not prepared her case; as I shall come back to, she had not disclosed her documents to the Respondent or prepared a witness statement of her evidence. Secondly, she was in possession of a Fit Note from her GP (albeit which stated that she may be fit for work taking account of the GP’s advice that she required support with complex administrative tasks). Thirdly, her application was supported by Nick Allenby, a therapist at NHS Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Talking Therapies, who wrote in a letter dated 24 September 2025: “Due to the amount of stressors Kerryanne has experienced over the last few months, Kerryanne has struggled to maintain her normal routine and to complete the necessary administration asked by the court. This is 4 of 12 compounded by her ADHD which compromises her executive functioning, which is needed for planning, organizing and managing time.”12. I should clarify that the documents submitted by the Claimant in support of her postponement request were only submitted by her the day before the hearing on 25 September 2025. Rule 38 of the 2024 Rules Rule 38(1)(b)13. Whilst I accept that the Claimant’s conduct of the proceedings has, at times, been unhelpful, I do not consider the Claimant’s conduct of the proceedings specifically relied upon by the Respondent warrants her claim being struck out under rule 38(1)(b). I take on board that the Respondent has been frustrated by the seemingly flippant tone of certain communications they have received from the Claimant, including the following two emails from 1 August 2025 when they sought to agree the exchange of witness statements: “Please don’t worry about sending any witness statements today. I have been busy consulting on a complex case of late. Surrounding Neglect and Acts of Omission (Care Act 2014). As well as coercision and control from people in positions of trust. But alongside, hidden disabilities. No too dissimilar from what I witnessed at 82 Russell Street actually. A lack of understanding, inaction. My PA, has also been off work. So I am a little behind schedule. Have 5mins to yourself on me instead, maybe. Put the kettle on. Have a brew perhaps.” And, “I note, you note. What you want to note. Acknowledge, what you want, to acknowledge. But thanks. It made me smile. Predictable or not. Why won’t you acknowledge the consulting work I am doing? Does it not fit your clients narrative? I can consult solicitors on such cases too. Apparently. Let me know if you would like any help. I clearly know the case better than your clients do. They, don’t even know the ACAS definition of bullying. Just went straight to the Oxford dictionary I reckon. Lord knows where they went for their safeguarding training. Not the same place as me that’s for sure. 5 of 12 Best wishes, Kerryanne Hollingworth PS its your day off isn’t it? Step away and look after yourself sir. It is Friday, after all.” Whilst the emails were undoubtedly unhelpful, a tribunal should not mark its disapproval of such conduct by taking the draconic step of striking out a claim. To do so would be to punish the Claimant, but also to lose sight of the legal principles above. Indeed, in so far as it might be suggested that the emails evidence an impulsive or irritable response on the part of the Claimant, linked to her ADHD, I would in any event need to make due allowance for this. Rule 38(1)(c) and (d)14. I have focused instead on whether the Claimant has complied with the Tribunal’s orders and/or actively pursued her claim and, if she has not, the reasons for this as well as the impact and implications for these proceedings.15. In her written submissions, Ms Anderson sets out the Claimant’s history of noncompliance with the Tribunal’s various orders in some detail. In summary, the first case management hearing listed for 5 January 2023 was postponed on fairly short notice at the Claimant’s request to enable her to seek legal advice. It was re-listed on 16 March 2023, but that hearing could not go ahead as a few days before the hearing the Claimant submitted an application to make substantial amendments to her claim. The hearing was postponed again and re-listed on 22 June 2023. The day before that hearing the Claimant submitted a substantial document, running I believe to 29 pages, containing information regarding the whistleblowing complaints she wanted to add. However, it was in a narrative form. The hearing went ahead on 22 June 2023 when Employment Judge Ord ordered the Claimant to provide information regarding her proposed whistleblowing complaints in a structured, more focused format. She was given until 3 August 2023 to comply, but in the event only purported to comply at 7.44am on 9 November 2023, this being the morning of the next scheduled hearing before Employment Judge Ord. She was also late in complying with a separate order to provide further information about her claim, but even then the information provided by her was incomplete and only finally forthcoming in May this year when I finally teased it out of her in the course of a further case management preliminary hearing. Orders were also made on 22 June 2023 for the Claimant to serve a disability impact statement and copies of her relevant medical records on the Respondent by 31 August 2023, on the basis that should the Respondent not concede this, the hearing on 9 November 2023 would be to determine whether the Claimant was disabled at the material time. However, the Claimant failed to prepare a disability impact statement and submitted just one medical document to the Respondent late on 2 November 2023.16. Given her failure to comply with the various orders that had been made on 22 June 2023, the hearing on 9 November 2023 was not effective. Employment Judge Ord directed that unless the Claimant provided particulars of her proposed whistleblowing claim in the prescribed format by 26 January 2024, her application 6 of 12 to add that claim would not be considered. She failed to do so, with the result that her application was dismissed on 4 March 2024. She then belatedly submitted an appeal in respect of Employment Judge Ord’s order of 9 November 2023. The appeal was dismissed. In the meantime, the Claimant remained in breach of Employment Judge Ord’s order to serve a disability impact statement, notwithstanding the date for compliance had been put back to 26 January 2024.17. At the hearing on 9 November 2023, the Claimant made Employment Judge Ord aware that in June that year she had contacted HMCTS to request assistance by way of a Tribunal appointed intermediary. Having discussed the matter further with the parties, the judge made an order for an urgent assessment by an intermediary.18. In his record of the 9 November 2023 hearing, Employment Judge Ord clarified that the conditions relied upon by the Claimant in support of her claim to be disabled were learning difficulties, ADHD, autism, dyslexia, PTSD, stress / anxiety and asthma.19. The case came before me for the first time on 30 April 2024 when the Claimant was supported by an intermediary (as she has been in every subsequent hearing). In view of the emerging picture as to the Claimant’s communication issues as set out in the intermediary assessment, I concluded that she should not be sanctioned further in respect of her breaches of the Tribunal’s orders to date. Instead, I sought to get the case back on track, albeit I agreed to the Claimant’s request to pause the proceedings for a period of six months to enable her to focus on group and one-toone therapy she was then undertaking and also so that she could be on hand in September 2024 to settle her son in at school following the summer holidays. Her son has complex needs. I facilitated this pause in the proceedings on the understanding that it would not prejudice the final hearing. I discussed this with the Claimant during the hearing and included the following note in my written record of the hearing: “I have explained to the Claimant that if there are further delays which mean that the Final Hearing cannot go ahead next year, that might call into question whether a fair trial is still possible. The Particulars of Claim refer to events dating back to January 2020. By the time of the Final Hearing in October 2025, nearly six years will have elapsed since some of the alleged events relied upon by the Claimant. I gave the Claimant examples of the ways in which witness evidence can be affected by delays, even where the witness is being asked about an email or other document which they wrote. The longer the time between the events complained of and the date of any final hearing, the greater the risk that a witness is unable to recall, or accurately recall, the events or document in question or any relevant context. I have explained to the Claimant that in exceptional cases, the whole or part of a claim can be struck out if it is no longer possible for there to be a fair trial. I mentioned the case of Emuemukoro v Croma Vigilant (Scotland) Ltd EA-2020-06.”20. Notwithstanding that the proceedings were paused at the Claimant’s request, she has failed to comply with the Tribunal’s further orders. The first step she was required to take was to prepare a schedule of loss by 17 October 2024. She failed 7 of 12 to do so. Instead, on 19 November 2024 she submitted an application to add a claim of sex discrimination, without any particulars. Ahead of a further case management preliminary hearing on 9 May 2025, the Claimant wrote on 8 May 2025 to say that she was unable to detail a schedule of loss. She eventually served a document entitled “provisional Schedule of Loss” on 25 May 2025, over seven months late. 21. At the hearing on 30 April 2024, I ordered the Claimant to disclose her relevant medical records and other medical evidence by 12 December 2024. I took considerable care both at the hearing and in the written record of hearing to explain the reasons for that order and my further order that the Claimant provide a disability impact statement by 22 January 2025. Notwithstanding the Claimant had therefore effectively been allowed over 18 months in total to finally provide her evidence in support of her claim to be disabled, she still did not comply with my orders. Rather than simply dismiss the Claimant’s claim to be disabled by reason of the conditions sought to be relied upon, I went on to determine the matter at a public preliminary hearing on 24 and 25 March 2025 at which I permitted the Claimant to give evidence in the absence of a written statement and also afforded her an opportunity to make submissions. With the exception of ADHD, which the Respondent conceded, I did not uphold the Claimant’s claim to be disabled by reason of the other conditions relied upon by her. Given how the Claimant had presented in the course of the hearing, particularly as I was giving my judgment, I made an order for the Claimant to provide limited further information about her claim, but otherwise listed the case for another case management hearing on 9 May 2025 and signposted the issues that would be discussed at that hearing so that the Claimant would have a further opportunity to prepare for it.[22]I had made various case management orders on 30 April 2024 to ensure the case was ready for the final hearing commencing on 6 October 2025. In my summary of the further case management discussions that took place on 9 May this year I wrote: “Although I was able to decide the disability issue notwithstanding the Claimant had failed to prepare a disability impact statement, the Tribunal’s duty of adjustment is unlikely to extend to excusing the Claimant from setting out her complaints in concrete detail, serving a Schedule of Loss, disclosing documents she has about the case, or providing a written statement of her evidence.” I went on to vary my case management orders from 30 April 2024 given that the Claimant was already in breach of them. However, I sought to keep matters on track, particularly in view of the concerns I had expressed in 2024 that a fair trial could be jeopardised if the final hearing did not go ahead as planned.[23]I ordered the parties to disclose any additional documents to one another by no later than 20 June 2025. The Claimant has still not complied with my order. She tells me that she has a “vast” number of documents (in excess of 1,700 pages in total), but that the documents still need to be sorted out in readiness to be disclosed. My understanding is that she has not begun this task or the preparation of a list. Witness statements were ordered to be exchanged by no later than 1 8 of 12 August 2025. I have referred already to the Claimant’s emails to the Respondent’s solicitors on that date in response to their efforts to agree an exchange. The Claimant has confirmed that she has not made a start on drafting her witness statement and is unable to say when she thinks she might do so, though as a minimum seeks a further six-month pause in the proceedings.[24]Putting aside that the Claimant has sought to expand the ambit of her claim through the addition of further complaints, other than attending the various hearings to date, there is little evidence of the Claimant actively pursuing her claim. I recognise the potentially significant difficulties and obstacles faced by the Claimant as a result of her ADHD and difficult personal and family circumstances. I touched upon these in the record of the 9 May hearing. Her cognitive impairments are well documented in the intermediary assessment and elsewhere. It is fair to say that the Respondent and I have made all the running in terms of understanding the Claimant’s complaints and identifying the issues in the case. It has taken more than two years for the issues in the case to be finally defined. Two and a half years on from the first case management hearing, the Claimant has still not disclosed her documents or begun to prepare a witness statement. She is saying that it will be at least another six months before she can begin to engage with these tasks. Given her record of non-compliance, I am not optimistic that the position is likely to change in six months’ time. Mr Allenby’s description in September this year of the difficulties faced by the Claimant in fact describes a long-term, ongoing situation. Whilst I note that the Claimant has been without a personal assistant for a number of weeks, that does not explain her long standing non-compliance with the Tribunal’s various orders. She says that the funding available to her covers up to four hours of support each week and that she relies upon an assistant to coach her in terms of her basic day-to-day activities and in navigating some of the issues that have arisen in relation to her son who now lives away from home. There is little or no evidence that an assistant will have the capacity or indeed the skillset and experience to assist her with these proceedings. There is certainly no evidence or even suggestion by the Claimant that her previous assistant helped her with these proceedings. On the contrary, the Claimant failed to comply with my orders even when she had a personal assistant.[25]I am satisfied that the threshold test has been met under rule 38(1)(c) and (d) of the 2024 Rules such that I should go on to consider whether a fair trial is still possible and, if not, whether it would be proportionate to strike out the claim. Is a fair trial still possible?[26]The Claimant accepts, as it seems to me she is bound to, that a fair trial is no longer possible within the allocated trial window. She was clear on 25 September 2025 that she could not proceed even if the start of the hearing was delayed, the issues narrowed or further adjustments made to the hearing.[27]I do not think it could be confidently asserted by the Claimant that a fair trial, even in the absolute terms proposed by Counsel for the appellant in Emuemukoro, is still possible. This is a highly fact sensitive case, the outcome of which will be materially influenced by the Tribunal’s assessment of the witness evidence. As I noted on 30 April 2024, even where contemporaneous documents are available to the Respondent’s witnesses to help prompt their recollections, they will still be 9 of 12 expected to provide further background and context when asked about the events in question or as to what they meant when they wrote certain emails and authored other documents, as well as what they understood the Claimant or others to be saying. Although they have prepared their written statements for the final hearing which capture their essential evidence, it will now be late 2027 at the earliest before the Respondent’s witnesses are potentially asked to explain or even justify things they may have written up to seven years earlier. To give just one example, the Claimant alleges that on 29 November 2019 her line manager, Mr Goodier failed to respond to her email in which she had asked whether someone would like to collaborate with her on the ‘pinpoint presentation’. This and a number of her other complaints were only finally particularised during the hearing on 9 May this year. Even then, Mr Goodier does not yet know what evidence the Claimant will give about this matter. Even if the Claimant finally provides a witness statement in approximately six months’ time, Mr Goodier will be endeavouring to cast his mind back some six and a half years to provide his further instructions on the Claimant’s evidence. It is an unsatisfactory state of affairs and carries with it a substantial risk of unfairness to the Respondent. Is it proportionate to strike out the claim?[28]Although a much less weighty consideration, I cannot entirely disregard that two of the Respondent’s witnesses, Mary Caning and Nigel Hewlett, left the Respondent’s employment in 2022, and a third witness, Stephen Hills, retires at the end of October 2025. Ms Anderson was careful not to suggest that these witnesses are ‘lost’ to it, but I accept that delaying the final hearing for a further two years or more introduces an element of additional uncertainty for the Respondent. If any one or more of the three individuals becomes a ‘reluctant’ witness, whether for example because their residual loyalty to the Respondent diminishes over time or because their personal circumstances change, this might weigh heavily on the Respondent’s assessment of its ongoing prospects and shift the balance in any settlement discussions.[29]Aside from the potential forensic prejudice already referred to, I have particular regard to the wasted costs that have been occasioned by the Claimant’s application to postpone the final hearing. Pending my decision on the Claimant’s contested application to postpone the final hearing, which I was only in a position to decide on 25 September 2025, the Respondent was understandably unable to stand Counsel down. Although I granted a postponement, I do not consider that the Respondent acted unreasonably in resisting the Claimant’s application to postpone the hearing, not least given the observations I made in April 2024. The Respondent has incurred a brief fee of over £10,000 for the final hearing and I accept will incur a second substantial brief fee should the case be re-listed in 2027 or 2028, as Counsel will effectively need to read back into the case and prepare afresh for the final hearing. There will also be further costs associated with the Claimant’s outstanding disclosure and the preparation of a revised hearing bundle, even if the costs of reviewing the Claimant’s witness statement would have been incurred in any event. In my experience, delays of this kind inevitably result in additional costs that would not have been incurred had the hearing gone ahead, for example because witnesses have to be contacted for their available dates for any new hearing and contacted again in the lead up to the hearing when they may 10 of 12 inevitably have further questions of the legal representatives whose time will be charged to their client. It is essentially irrelevant in this regard that the Respondent has the benefit of legal expenses insurance, since I am bound to have regard to the insurer’s interests in the matter. In any event, Ms Anderson says that the Respondent’s costs to date are approximately £87,000 and the limit of its costs indemnity is £100,000, in which case Counsel’s further brief fee and daily refresher, and the solicitors’ further costs in the case will inevitably take the Respondent’s total costs beyond the limit of its indemnity. The Respondent is a charitable organisation, meaning that any legal costs incurred in excess of the indemnity will inevitably impact its core charitable activities.[30]Nor do I lose sight of the needs and interests of other litigants. Although I will likely be allocated case management hearings in place of this case and also be able to catch up on any outstanding orders or judgments, it remains the case that two full days have been lost. Ten days were set aside in total for this case which might have been allocated to other multi-day cases. Such cases cannot be listed at a moment’s notice, meaning that a valuable block of hearing time has been lost.[31]As I have said, I am not confident that the Claimant will comply with any further case management orders I might make for disclosure, finalisation of an agreed revised hearing bundle or preparation and service of her witness statement. I remind myself again of His Honour Judge Tayler’s observation in Leeks that, “if there has been repeated default in the past it is common for it to be repeated in the future, particularly if the party in default does not persuade the Employment Tribunal that their approach will change.” In the course of this hearing the Claimant has referred to an ongoing “fight” to secure her son the support she considers he requires. I proceed on the basis that the Claimant’s failure to comply with the Tribunal’s orders to date does not reflect wilful disobedience on her part, but instead is explicable by reference to her ADHD and personal and family issues. These have been a constant feature throughout these proceedings and I expect them to continue to impact her ability to engage with these proceedings. In which case, I consider there to be a material risk that a further allocation of ten days will be wasted, with a further knock-on effect on other cases and litigants as well as further wasted time and costs for the Respondent.[32]In weighing up whether it would be proportionate to strike out the claim, I cannot disregard that the Claimant volunteered in the course of her evidence and submissions that at least two legal professionals, possibly Counsel, have advised her that her claim does not have good prospects of success, that is to say less than a fifty percent chance of success. Her disclosure of this information, which was not sought by myself or Ms Anderson, further undermines whatever claim the Claimant might make that the interests of justice are served by allowing her to pursue her claim notwithstanding her failure to date to actively pursue it.[33]I have considered whether a more proportionate approach would be to make unless orders, but rule this out. The Claimant has been given various opportunities to pursue her claim and supported to do so through a range of adjustments, including the support of an intermediary over the last 18 months. This is not a case of a recalcitrant claimant who needs to recognise the error of their ways and supported (or pressured) to do so under threat of an unless order. Employment Judge Ord made an unless order in November 2023, but it was to no effect. The 11 of 12 Claimant simply could not comply with his orders. She has been largely unable to comply with my orders however much time, understanding and support she has been given. Whilst I can empathise with the Claimant in terms of the situation in which she finds herself, I am unwilling to ‘kick the can down the road’. After two and a half years I conclude that there is no realistic prospect of the Claimant’s level of engagement changing. In these circumstances I consider that it is proportionate to strike out her claim. Approved by: