Mr R Walton v UK Atomic Energy Authority: 3304909/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3304909/2023

Between

Mr R WaltonClaimant

UK Atomic Energy AuthorityRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Shastri-Hurst

In person for claimant

Mr G Grahame (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Mr G Graham (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 31 October 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The respondent’s application to strike out the claim is rejected.

[2]The claimant’s application to strike out the response is rejected.

REASONS

[1]There were various preliminary hearings in this matter and a previous claim made by the claimant in April 2023 is also relevant to our determination. In summary, the claimant’s previous claim was a claim for public interest disclosure detriments. That claim was dismissed after orders were made in July 2024 for deposits to be paid as a condition of the claim proceeding. The deposits were not paid and the claim was therefore dismissed. The claimant then amended that claim to bring this claim after an assignment with the respondent was terminated in September 2024.

[2]At a preliminary hearing in February 2025 a list of issues was agreed for this claim. I will not read those out now as we deal with the tests as set out in that list of issues in our conclusion. Case Number: 3304909/2023 2

[3]In summary, the claimant claims that he made three public interest disclosures in November 2022, March 2023 and April 2023 which led to the termination of an assignment later in 2024.

[4]A summary of the position before the first claim was contained in the July 2024 preliminary hearing summary and it might be helpful to read that now. It appears at page 120 of the bundle and reads: “The respondent is an executive non-departmental public body responsible for researching and developing nuclear fusion and related technologies. The claimant worked as an agency on a site run by the respondent called CCFE (Culham Centre for Fusion Energy). He worked on that site for 17 years until 2005 and then again from October 2021 to March 2022 for around five months as an agency support worker via an employment agency, Rullion”.

[5]We return to what happened later in our fact findings set out below.

[6]In this judgment we refer to the disagreement between the parties, to put it as simply as possible, which is about an item the claimant claimed he had designed called the “RF Window” in the late 1990s as being used by the respondent without permission, as the intellectual property (IP) issue.

The hearing

[7]The hearing was by CVP and happily we had hardly any technological issues. There were some preliminary matters about documents. There had been communication with the employment tribunal about these disputes which led, for the most part, to the bundle containing most of what the claimant requested even if the respondent considered they were not relevant documents.

[8]Three items remained in dispute. Two were matters entitled “Without Prejudice” and were from the claimant to the respondent concerning the IP dispute. One was dated 9 May 2021 and one 7 November 2022. The other document were emails between the respondent and legal adviser around May 2021 to which, the respondent says, legal professional privilege attaches. These disputed documents are referred to as items 5,6 and 7 as they appeared in a request from the claimant. The tribunal heard from the claimant and the respondent’s representatives and agreed to allow items 5 and 6 to be seen by the tribunal but not item 7 because it clearly was protected by legal professional privilege.

[9]The tribunal read the claimant’s long witness statement. There were also six witness statements from the respondent. These were of similar lengths, 4 or 5 pages long, and referred to relevant pages in the bundle as did the claimant’s.

[10]The bundle was over 500 pages but, as is often the case, we considered only those which touched directly on the issues and to which we were referred during the hearing. We finished the oral evidence, which included cross examination, on day 2 of the hearing, and after discussing matters with the parties, it was agreed the respondent’s representative would send his skeleton argument to the tribunal and the claimant early the next day. We then met to hear submissions, deliberated and gave oral judgment on the fourth day. Case Number: 3304909/2023 3

The facts

[11]These then are the facts that we find which are relevant for our determination. We have seen several letters sent in the IP issue between the claimant’s then solicitors and the respondent. The claimant himself responded to various of these letters addressing various people at the respondent and its solicitors. We want to make it clear that this tribunal cannot make findings about any of those issues and must confine our findings of fact and our conclusions to issues over which the tribunal has jurisdiction as set out in the list of issues.

[12]First, there is some background on the respondent, known hereafter as “UKAEA”. It is involved in research and developing nuclear fusion technology at a site in Oxfordshire near Culham. There are many people involved in this research; we heard that one of the witnesses was responsible for up to 700 people. Many of those people working there are resourced through external agencies. These people are referred to as “ASWs” by the respondent.

[13]The particular projects which this tribunal heard about were named “Jet” and “Step” projects. The respondent often also worked with partner organisations in the field and had EU connections through Eurotom.

[14]As stated above, the claimant had a long association with the respondent working for them over many years but with gaps, through various agencies. He worked as a Mechanical Engineer specialising in nuclear fusion research for energy.

[15]During 2022 the claimant began to formally assert copyright with respect of the “RF Window” design although he also said that he had raised it earlier with several individuals at the respondent. For instance, we have seen emails in 2011 between the claimant and the Head of Theory and Modelling at Culham on the subject.

[16]In August 2022, solicitors instructed by the claimant, (page 315, PDF 322), sent a letter to the respondent and to five or six of its partners which included ITER in France, Eurotom in Luxembourg and others, asserting copyright of “RF Window”. This gave details of the proposed claim and asked for undertakings from the recipients stating that legal action would be taken if these undertakings were not given. On behalf of this respondent, solicitors replied on 30 September 2022. In essence, they denied the IP claims.

[17]The claimant had been appointed to an assignment by an agency named Assystem in early October 2022. That was terminated by them in a letter (PDF 36), on 14 October 2022, stating that the respondent had raised “outstanding legal matters” and that Assystem had been made aware of “unprofessional conduct in a client meeting”.

[18]The claimant wrote to a separate body, United Kingdom Research and Innovation (UKRI), which body replied on 20 October 2022. The claimant was referred to some general guidelines in one of its policies and provided a link to that as well as making him aware of whistleblowing provisions. That led the claimant to read those policies and see that there was a mechanism for an Case Number: 3304909/2023 4 assessment or an investigation where there was an issue about research ownership.

[19]On 3 November 2022, the claimant wrote an email to Ms Hawkes, who is Head of HR at Culham (page 350 PDF). This is the first alleged disclosure. It is worth reading some extracts from that. The claimant starts by saying that he is raising a whistleblowing complaint under the Public Interest Disclosure Act and goes on under a heading entitled “My concern is as follows” with this:- “I believe the UKAEA has committee and continues to plagiarize my work and commit fraud by misrepresentation and is continuing to perpetrate the said fraud now. It has covered-up the fraud and has committed a series of reprisals against me over a 17 year period in order to defraud me as explained below. I believe there exists on site a project known as the “ITER RF Window Project” which seeks to exploit work originated by me, and is the object of the said plagiary and misrepresentation. I believe UKAEA continues to fail in its duty under its public policy to independently assess my numerous complaints of plagiarism including this one, as explained below, in order to cover-up its fraud. I believe the purpose of the reprisals against me is the same.”

[20]There is then a heading “Details of my complaint” which reads as follows:- “In October this year, I found employment with a company called Assystem as a Principal Mechanical Engineer. I was based on a site run by UKAEA at Culham. After nine days of employment, my line manager said that UKAEA would not allow me access to any building under their control because of a “legal” issue. Practically all of the buildings on the site are under UKAEA’s control. My manager said he therefore had no choice but to terminate the contract. HR confirmed UKAEA’s interference in writing the next day. (See termination of employment attached). I have since asked them what the legal issue was without explanation. Assystem tell me that the UKAEA employee, who made a second claim of unprofessional conduct against me does not want to be named, and will not elaborate what the said unprofessional conduct was.”

[21]The claimant goes on after another paragraph to read:- “I believe the so called “legal” issue is in fact a complaint made by my legal representative concerning plagiarism copyright infringement, unrelated to my employment with Assystem. Since 2006 UKAEA has published a series of scientific papers and online posts, attributing work originated by me, to themselves as authors, without my knowledge or permission. I made complaints regarding misrepresentation in 2011, June 2020 and August 2022 (see attachments).”

[22]The claimant then goes on to describe some of the history with respect to what he calls “reprisals” and refers the recipient of the letter to the “policy and guidelines on the governance of good research conduct” which had been shown to him by UKRI.

[23]He finally says that this is what he wants: Case Number: 3304909/2023 5 “I seek protection from and reversal of UKAEA’s policy on ongoing plagiary, fraud, cover up and serial reprisal against me. And I seek to have the independent assessment of my present claim of plagiary required by public policy statement.”

[24]The employment tribunal finds as a fact that, on balance, there are sufficient details contained within that email to amount to the provision of information (rather than an allegation). There are clearly some specifics about the claimant’s concerns. We return to the question of whether the claimant had a reasonable belief in what they tended to show and whether it was in the public interest later.

[25]The claimant had also written to another of the respondent’s partners (we assume), named Europa, on 7 November, raising the IP issue.

[26]On 8 March 2023, the claimant’s solicitors sent another letter to the respondent’s solicitors in answer to theirs of September 2022, now referencing the UKRI’s policy on governance and asking for an investigation under that policy.

[27]On 15 March 2023, the claimant sent another email to Ms Hawkes. This is said to be the second disclosure. It is not necessary to quote all of that document now. It appears at PDF 361, and mirrors much of what was said and has been quoted above in the November 2022 email.

[28]In relation to this document, the claimant in his witness statement, relies on five parts of that letter. This is at page 8 of his witness statement. These are:- Item 1: “I believe the UKAEA has committed and continues to plagiarize my work and commit fraud by misrepresentation and is continuing to perpetrate the said fraud now.” Item 2: “It has covered up the fraud and has committed a series of reprisals against me over a 17 year period in order to defraud me.” Item 3: “I believe there exists on site a project known as the ITR RF Window Project which seeks to exploit work originated by me and is the object of the said plagiary and misrepresentation”. Item 4: “These are criminal acts and I believe that it is always it the public interest that criminal activity of publicly funded bodies is stopped” Item 6: “I believe it is in the public interest that one publicly funded body does not defraud another.”

[29]The other items refer to the November 2022 document.

[30]As far as 3 November 2022 email is concerned, part of which is quoted above, the claimant relies upon Item 5 on page 8 of his witness statement: “Since 2005 UKAEA has conducted a series of reprisals against me… dismissed again from the stat job that I just started with Assystem. The reason for my dismissal this time was that UKAEA had raised the said legal issue” Case Number: 3304909/2023 6

[31]And at item 7: “The UKAEA’s behaviour is not at all consistent with their published policy guidelines, Policy and Guidelines on the Governance of Good Research Conduct.”

[32]That seems to be what the claimant says is the information contained both within the 15 March 2023 document and indeed, the November 2022 document.

[33]Again, on balance, the tribunal finds that there are sufficient details contained within that document for that to amount to a disclosure of information (rather than an allegation) and, as said previously, we will come to the claimant’s reasonable belief later.

[34]On 28 April 2023, the claimant brought his first claim in the tribunal mentioned above. I will not read that document as much of it repeats the claimant’s allegations about his IP concerns said by him to amount to plagiarism, misrepresentation and fraud. In the witness statement for this claim the claimant states that the information contained there is “repeated slanderous allegation of my improper behaviour”. That is also at page 8 of his witness statement.

[35]Communications continued with respect to the IP dispute and in connection with that earlier employment tribunal claim.

[36]In early August 2024, an agency called Design Services Ltd which worked through the respondent’s framework agreement with various agencies for supply of engineers, put forward the claimant’s CV to another organisation, Baker Hicks, for an assignment in “fusion futures – ITER Steplike Launcher Project.” This work would involve optioneering and considering the ITER design. Mr Craig, who was himself an ASW, wrote the job specification and interviewed the claimant for the role. The claimant commenced the assignment around 15 August. Some issues arose almost immediately.

[37]To summarise, once the claimant began the assignment, Mr Craig found that although he was an excellent engineer, he was challenging to work with. This aspect was not taken very far although Mr Craig did speak to Mr Ralph, who was the person with knowledge of the framework, that is the agency processes for supplying staff. There was further communication between Mr Craig and Mr Ralph about whether conflicts of interest have been mentioned when the claimant was assigned to the project. Mr Ralph was the person to communicate with Baker Hicks about that assignment.

[38]In the meantime, Mr Walden, who was the Step project Chief Engineer and who was aware of the IP dispute, noticed the claimant at the premises and began to raise questions about it. He was concerned that UKAEA might not be happy as he believed the IP issue had not been resolved. He spoke to Mr Shannon, who was Director of Integrated Engineering where the claimant was based, and said he would check. Mr Walden had known the claimant for many years and was aware of the dispute having been mentioned in 2010 and again in 2020. Mr Walden also spoke to Mr Milnes, who had known the claimant for even longer but was not aware he had started this assignment in August. Mr Milnes was Case Number: 3304909/2023 7 aware of the IP dispute but not the details and he had also spoken about what he called the claimant’s disruptive behaviour to Mr Walden.

[39]At this point, Ms Turner became involved. She was a Business Operations Manager covering matters of business services, security and wellbeing, as well as the relationship between the Step Programme and UKAEA. She spoke to Mr Walden and became aware of the IP dispute. She was concerned because Mr Walden, as Chief Engineer, was asking that the claimant be removed. She said she would speak to Mr Shannon. She also spoke to Mr Helland, who was acting as the claimant’s line manager, and Mr Milnes, and it was decided that legal advice was needed before termination of the assignment could be considered. Mr Walden continued to be concerned about the claimant’s presence.

[40]Ms Turner took the decision to terminate the claimant’s assignment and instructed Mr Shannon to take that forward. The claimant was told on 11 September 2024 that his assignment was ending.

[41]The claimant was told that the reason was because there was an ongoing legal dispute. He did raise various questions through the agency who confirmed that reason. He also stated that he would not continue his copyright claim if the decision to end the assignment was reversed. It is true to say that other reasons were given for ending the assignment including references to the claimant’s failure to disclose the IP dispute (identified as a conflict of interest) and his attitude and behaviour. Ms Turner’s reason was that Mr Walden did not want him on site and that was, in essence, because of the IP dispute which had not been resolved.

[42]All six of the respondent’s witnesses said that they were unaware of the alleged disclosures. They had no knowledge of the emails of November 2022, March 2023 and the ET claim. The claimant can produce no evidence to show that they had such knowledge. He appeared to accept the evidence that they did not know of them. He did not seek to suggest that anyone who did have knowledge passed that information on to any of the people who were involved in terminating his employment. They knew of the IP dispute but that had been going on for many years. They did not know of his two emails to Ms Hawkes or the employment tribunal claim.

[43]As I have indicated, the tribunal claim was amended to include the termination of the assignment on 11 September 2024 as a detriment, and the disclosures relied upon were agreed to be the three with which we are concerned. Law and submissions

[44]The public interest disclosure provisions are now contained in the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). For this case the relevant sections are at sections 43B, 43C and 47B. The relevant parts read as follows:- 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection. (1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— Case Number: 3304909/2023 8 (a)that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b)that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c)that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d)that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e)that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f)that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 43C Disclosure to employer or other responsible person. (1)A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure (a)to his employer, or (b)where the worker reasonably believes that the relevant failure relates solely or mainly to— (i)the conduct of a person other than his employer, or (ii)any other matter for which a person other than his employer has legal responsibility, to that other person. (2)A worker who, in accordance with a procedure whose use by him is authorised by his employer, makes a qualifying disclosure to a person other than his employer, is to be treated for the purposes of this Part as making the qualifying disclosure to his employer.] 47B Protected disclosures. (1)A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure. (1A)A worker (“W”) has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, done— (a)by another worker of W's employer in the course of that other worker's employment, or (b)by an agent of W's employer with the employer's authority, on the ground that W has made a protected disclosure. Case Number: 3304909/2023 9

[45]Several cases in the higher courts have considered aspects of these statutory provisions. When considering whether there has been a ‘disclosure’ within the meaning of s43(B)(1) the employee must disclose ‘information’. It is not sufficient that the employee has made an ‘allegation’ Cavendish Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld

UKEAT/0195/09/DM

. Our task is to assess what was said and decide whether it amounts to the disclosure of information. As far as the test under section 47B is concerned, we are guided by Fecitt and others v NHS Manchester

[2012] IRLR 64

where the Court of Appeal made it clear that, where a worker has shown that they made a protected disclosure, it is for the respondent to show that any detriment was “in no sense whatsoever” connected to the making of that disclosure.

[46]Our task is to consider what was said and apply the tests as set out in the list of issues. The tests to be applied were not in dispute. As indicated, the respondent’s representative made submissions in writing and the claimant responded to that briefly in writing. The respondent’s representative submitted that none of the three disclosures relied upon were protected as they did not disclose information which tended to show any of the matters under s43B ERA and were not, in the reasonable belief of the claimant, made in the public interest. The first two alleged disclosures were made in accordance with section 43C ERA but the third, the employment tribunal claim, was not. Even if they were protected, the respondent’s representative submitted, the decision to end the assignment was in no sense whatsoever connected to those disclosures, not least because those involved had no knowledge of the disclosures and there was no suggestion of any improper influence by anyone who did have knowledge.

[47]The claimant also provided short submissions. He submitted that the respondent failed to comply with a legal obligation when it failed to investigate the plagiarism and fraud allegations. He mentioned concealment but that was not a matter about which any evidence had been heard, nor was it in the list of issues. He submitted that the detriment was causally linked because of the mention of “ongoing legal action” and that legal advice had been taken by the decision maker.

[48]Our first task then is to look at each alleged public interest disclosure in turn and consider the following:49.1 Does it disclose information rather than making bold allegations.

49.2 Whether, if there is information that is, in the reasonable belief of the worker at the time tends to show, in this case that either a criminal offence is being committed or is likely to be committed, or whether there is a breach of legal obligation.

49.3 We also have to consider if, again in the claimant’s reasonable belief, this information is in the public interest.

49.4 If it is, we then consider whether any public interest disclosures as found to be qualifying under section 43B are also protected under 43C, that there has been a report to an employer (or other prescribed people or organisations set out in later sections in very limited circumstances which do not apply here). Case Number: 3304909/2023 10

49.5 Then, if there are both qualifying and protected disclosures, whether the respondent can show that there was no connection between those disclosures and the decision to terminate the assignment.

Conclusions

[49]We first consider the first and second alleged disclosures and they can be taken together in this case as they are very similar. We have already said that we have found that they contain sufficient information rather than allegations so that issue 2.1.2 is satisfied, that is, the claimant disclosed information.

[50]We would then move to issues 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 which are questions of whether the claimant believed the disclosure of information was in the public interest and, if so, whether that belief was reasonable. However, we have decided to take first the question of the claimant’s reasonable belief in what the information tended to show. These appear at issues 2.1.5 and 2.1.6. The question is whether the claimant reasonably believed that the information tended to show that a criminal offence has been committed, was being or is likely to be committed; whether a person failed, was failing or is likely to fail to comply with a legal obligation, or there was deliberate concealment of information.

[51]We accept that the claimant had that belief about the information contained within the November 2022 and March 2023 documents with respect to the possibility that there was a failure to comply with a legal obligation. That is the information on plagiarism, misrepresentation and failure to conduct an investigation under the UKRI policy. The claimant does not have to show that there was such a failure only that he believed it and that the belief was reasonable.

[52]We do not accept that he had a reasonable belief that a criminal offence had been committed or was likely to be committed nor that there had been deliberate concealment of information about which we have had very little, if any, evidence. The claimant does not have to show there was a criminal offence but although he may have had that belief that there was fraud, we do not accept, on the evidence before us, that that belief was reasonable. The IP discussions had been ongoing for some time, there was no suggestion that the police needed to be involved, only that there would be some sort of resolution in civil proceedings.

[53]The claimant has therefore shown that for the first two disclosures, both the emails of November 2022 and March 2023, did contain information that he reasonably believed tended to show a breach of a legal obligation.

[54]However, we now move on to the second part, these appear at issues 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. That is, were either of those disclosures, in the claimant’s reasonable belief, in the public interest?

[55]The tribunal does not accept that the claimant had that belief or that it was reasonable for him to think that it was in the public interest. Just because the respondent may have public funding, does not mean that everything raised as being of concern to people who work there would necessarily be in the public interest. This is a matter clearly about the claimant’s own belief in a personal IP matter. It is entirely his own concern and if of little interest to anyone else, or, at Case Number: 3304909/2023 11 most, very limited interest to people working in the field. The claimant did not believe that the information was in the public interest or, if he did, that was not a reasonable belief for him to hold. We also add that the claimant was prepared to give up any rights to this matter to secure work. This does not suggest that he genuinely believed either of these disclosures was in the public interest.

[56]We move on then to decide on the third disclosure, that is the first employment tribunal claim. Here there are even more problems for the claimant. He relies on what he calls, for this disclosure, “slanderous allegations” made around October 2022. The tribunal finds that that is not a disclosure of information, it is an allegation. And, in any event, it could not, in his belief, amount to a criminal matter. At most, it has the potential to amount to a breach of a legal obligation being a civil matter. In any event, the claimant could not possibly consider that matter to be in the public interest. So that disclosure has not been made out.

[57]It is worth adding here a matter which is not in the list of issues that this alleged disclosure, even if it had been found to be one, was not made either to the respondent or to anyone else provided for in s 43C ERA. So, even if it had been a qualifying disclosure, it was not protected.

[58]We have found that the first two matters raised as protected disclosures were not qualifying disclosures as they were not made in the public interest. That means that the claimant has failed to show that he has made protected and qualifying disclosures under the provisions in section 43B ERA. Strictly speaking, that would be the end therefore of this claim.

[59]However, for completeness, we consider if these disclosures had been both qualifying and protected disclosures, whether there was a detriment and whether there was any causal link between that detriment and those disclosures. These are the issues set out at 3.1 to 3.3.

[60]Firstly, we are asked to confirm that the respondent did terminate the claimant’s assignment. Of course, that is right. That is issue 3.1.1. The tribunal agrees that that amounts to a detriment and that is at issue 3.2.

[61]The question that remains is whether that was made on the ground that the claimant had made a protected disclosure and that is at issue 3.3. The burden rests on the respondent to show that there was no connection whatsoever between the disclosures and the detriment. Still, the claimant has significant problems to overcome. The tribunal accepts that it has heard from the witnesses involved in the termination of the claimant’s assignment in September 2024. As stated, and apparently accepted by the claimant, those individuals did not know about the alleged disclosures. So, even the disclosures had amounted to qualifying and protected disclosures, they cannot have been a material factor in the decision to terminate the claimant’s assignment. Nor did the claimant suggest any influence from any person who did have knowledge of the disclosures.

[62]The claimant’s claims must therefore fail as he cannot show that he has made any protected disclosures and, even if he had, they were not causally linked to the detriment he relies upon. His claims therefore must fail and are dismissed. Case Number: 3304909/2023 12 Approved by: Employment Judge Manley 6 January 2026

Introduction

[1]The claimant’s claim for a detriment (termination of an assignment) arising from having made protected public interest disclosures brought against the respondent was heard by a full tribunal over 4 days in October 2025. His claim was unsuccessful for the reasons given orally and in the written reasons provided when requested.

[2]The claimant has sent several communications since the hearing, all of which have been responded to by the respondent’s representatives. In letters attached to emails of 20 November 2025, 27 November 2025 and 11 December 2025 the claimant appeared to be asking for reconsideration and/or that he be allowed to amend his claim (or perhaps bring a new claim alleging a breach of the Agency Worker’s regulations).

[3]After written reasons were sent to the parties in early January, the claimant made an application for reconsideration by email on 13 January 2026. That application also appeared to include an application that the claimant be allowed to rely on a letter of 9 May 2021 as a further alleged public interest disclosure. This letter was referred to in the hearing but was Case No. 3313343/22 2 not one of the alleged public interest disclosures relied upon by the claimant at the hearing.

[4]As stated, the respondent’s representatives have replied to all these communications with the last letter I have seen being sent as an attachment to an email of 9 February 2026. In summary, the respondent objects to the claimant’s applications (except, of course, where he applied for written reasons). This means that I have looked at eight relatively detailed documents when considering the claimant’s applications. However, as the claimant has referred to the written reasons in his clear application for reconsideration of 13 January 2026, I have particularly concentrated on that application, taking into account the respondent’s representatives’ response of 9 February 2026.

[5]In the document accompanying the email of 13 January 2026, the claimant states that reconsideration should take place in the interests of justice. He states that certain material findings of fact only “crystallised” in the oral judgment of 31 October 2025 and the reasons provided on 6 January 2026. He refers to paragraph 41 of the judgment which refers to one of the witnesses not wanting him on site because the IP issue was not resolved. The claimant states that he does not ask the tribunal to re-open findings of fact and that he accepts them as far as they relate to the alleged disclosures pleaded in his ET1. What he seeks to argue is that the letter of 9 May 2021 amounted to a public interest disclosure and that only became clear to the claimant after the tribunal had referred to the IP dispute as being, in his words “the operative reason for dismissal”. In essence, as I understand his application now, he is asking that the tribunal reconsider the judgment to include that letter as being one of the alleged public interest disclosures.

[6]In its letter of 9 February 2026, the respondent’s representatives say that the claimant’s application is not a valid reconsideration application because he is, in effect, trying to amend a claim that has been dismissed. The claimant is asking the tribunal to allow him to amend a dismissed claim to include a new alleged public interest disclosure. In the alternative, the respondent says, even if it is a valid application for reconsideration, it should be refused as the letter of 9 May 2021, if it had been considered by the tribunal, would have been found not to be protected for the same, or similar reasons, to the tribunal’s conclusions with respect to those alleged public interest disclosures which were considered at the hearing. They refer to the tribunal’s reasons at paragraph 55 with respect to whether the disclosures were in made in the public interest. The tribunal found that the claimant did not believe disclosure was in the public interest and, if he did, that belief was not reasonable. Rules

[7]The relevant employment tribunal rules for this application read as follows: RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGMENTS Case No. 3313343/22 3 Application for reconsideration 69. Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of— (a)the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was sent to the parties, or (b)the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. Process for reconsideration 70.—(1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application. (4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. (5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application.

[8]In essence, my first task is to consider whether the application has been made in time under Rule 69. I accept that the application appears to have been made in time, having been made on 13 January 2026.

[9]I should then consider whether there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked. If I decide that, I must, under Rule 70 (2) refuse the application and inform the parties. If I do not refuse the application, I must consider the matter at a hearing unless that is not necessary in the interests of justice.

Conclusions

[10]I consider that there are no reasonable prospects of the judgment being varied or revoked and must refuse it under Rule 70 (2). This was a full hearing over 4 days. The claimant does not take issue with the tribunal’s findings about the three alleged public interest disclosures considered at the hearing. As stated, those we found not to have been made in the public interest. We also found that, even it they had been made in the Case No. 3313343/22 4 public interest, they were not a material factor in the decision to terminate his assignment in September 2024.

[11]The claimant is now seeking to rely on another alleged disclosure made in 2021 which was not mentioned in his ET1 nor in the list of issues. That letter of 9 May 2021 raises the same concerns about the IP dispute as those alleged disclosures that the tribunal has already considered and determined. What is more, there is no evidence that the witnesses who were involved in the decision to terminate his assignment in September 2024 had any more knowledge about that document than they did about the disclosures the claimant relied upon at the hearing.

[12]I agree with the respondent that the application does not appear to be one asking for reconsideration but rather that the tribunal consider a different aspect not pleaded before. It may be an application to amend which cannot be granted once the claim is dismissed. I have decided to go on to consider the application for reconsideration in any event so that the parties are clear about my determination.

[13]The first important point is that there should be finality in litigation. The claimant brought claims relying on what he argued were three protected disclosures. These were discussed in a preliminary hearing and incorporated in the list of issues. The tribunal read the documents, heard evidence and determined the issues. It cannot be in the interests of justice to now go back to allow a further alleged disclosure made more than three years before the termination of the claimant’s assignment, to be considered. The claimant provides no reason as to why he did not seek to rely on that earlier alleged disclosure as clearly he was fully aware of it.

[14]There is no new evidence which has come to light. I can see no prospect of the tribunal coming to a different view of that alleged disclosure being made in the public interest or that there was any chance of it being a material factor in the termination of his assignment.

[15]The claimant is, understandably, disappointed in the outcome, but it cannot be in the interests of justice to reconsider that which has been fully considered and determined by a full tribunal over a four-day hearing. There is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked. The application for reconsideration is refused. Approved by