C Nku v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: 3304233/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3304233/2024

Between

Caroline NkuClaimant

The Commissioner of Police of the MetropolisRespondent

Before

Employment Judge L Wilson

Ms Sophie Sheerin (instructed by Counsel) for claimant

Mr James Chegwidden (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 28 June 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The complaint of direct race discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[2]The complaint of direct sex discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[3]The complaint of indirect race discrimination is well-founded and succeeds.

[4]The complaint of indirect sex discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[5]Remedies will be determined at a hearing on a date to be fixed.

REASONS

[1]The Claimant has been employed by the Metropolitan Police since March 2007, first as a Police Community Support Officer, then as a Police Constable and then as a Police Sergeant. The Claimant passed her Sergeant’s examinations in 2021. She secured a posting to that rank. A fraudster hacked the claimant’s WhatsApp account and sent out a plea for money to various contacts, including other police officers. One of the police recipients sent out money (presumably to the fraudster), believing it to be a genuine request by the claimant. This was subsequently reported to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) as a potential fraud by the Claimant. The IOPC directed that it should be investigated locally. The Claimant’s promotion was rescinded as a result. After approximately three months, the local investigation determined that there was no case to answer and the Claimant was promoted with back pay.

[2]The Claimant is still employed by the Respondent.

[3]The Tribunal apologises to the parties for the delay in finalising this Judgment and Reasons and we are grateful to the parties for their patience.

Issues

[4]The Claimant brought claims for direct race and sex discrimination, contrary to section

[13]Equality Act 2010; and indirect race and sex discrimination contrary to section 19 Equality Act 2010. 5. The Claimant is a black African woman. 6. At a Case Management Hearing dated 4 December 2025 before Employment Judge (EJ) Housego, a List of Issues was agreed between the parties. Upon the order of EJ Housego, the Claimant served further and better particulars dated 23 July 2025, which were considered at a Preliminary Hearing on 14 January 2026 before EJ Hutchings. In the Case Management Order following that hearing, EJ Hutchings recorded that, ‘Parties agreed at the December 2024 hearing, and respective counsels confirmed to me at this hearing, that the allegation that “An assumption was made by the person or people who referred the Claimant for gross misconduct investigation” is part of the claim and is referred to in the Particulars of Claim’. Consequently, no application to amend was required and a final List of Issues was agreed between the parties, as follows: Preliminary 1. What are the claims beings pursued by the Claimant?a. Direct race and/ or sex discrimination, contrary to section 13 Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”); and/ or alternatively

b. Indirect race and/or sex discrimination, contrary to section 19 Equality Act 2010 (“EqA 2010”). The Claimant is a black African woman. The Claimant’s Claims Direct Race Discrimination 2. Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the following treatment: hack; b. The failure to examine the particular circumstances of her case before her promotion was rescinded;

c. The failure to allow the Claimant to be represented by her Federation Representative at the Independent Review Panel;

d. The failure of the panel to consider the Claimant’s written submissions on 08 February 2024;

e. From September 2023 to November 2023 PS Julie Wade made an assumption as to the Claimant’s guilt in relation to the misconduct allegation. The Claimant says the reasons PS Wade this assumption were: i. at a conference on 12 September 2023 at which the claimant and PS Wade were present when the Casey Report 2023 was discussed, the claimant says PS Wade stayed silent when a white, female officer said she had never seen race or sex discrimination in the MET; and ii. in the witness statement PS Wade provided to the conduct investigation, PS Wade stated an inaccurate explanation as to how the claimant obtained PS Wade’s telephone number, something the claimant consider [sic] evidence of PS Wade’s hostility to her race and sex. 3. Did the Respondent treat the Claimant as alleged less favourably than it treated or would have treated the comparators? The Claimant relies upon a hypothetical comparator. 4. If so, can the Claimant prove primary facts from which the Tribunal could properly and fairly conclude that the difference in treatment was because of the protected characteristic of race? 5. If so, what is the Respondent’s explanation? Can it prove a nondiscriminatory reason for any proven treatment? Direct Sex Discrimination 6. Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the following treatment: hack; b. The failure to examine the particular circumstances of her case before her [promotion] was rescinded; c. The failure to allow the Claimant to be represented by her Federation Representative at the Independent Review Panel on 08 February 2024; d. The failure of the panel to consider the Claimant’s written submissions on that date; e. From September 2023 to November 2023 PS Julie Wade, as the person who referred the Claimant for gross misconduct investigation made an assumption investigation [sic], and at the panel on 08 February 2024, as to Claimant’s guilt in relation to the misconduct allegation. The Claimant says the reasons PS Wade this assumption were: i. at a conference on 12 September 2023 at which the claimant and PS Wade were present when the Casey Report 2023 was discussed, the claimant says PS Wade stayed silent when a white, female officer said she had never seen race or sex discrimination in the MET; and ii. in the witness statement PS Wade provided to the conduct investigation, PS Wade stated an inaccurate explanation as to how the claimant obtained PS Wade’s telephone number, something the claimant consider [sic] evidence of PS Wade’s hostility to her race and sex. 7. Did the Respondent treat the Claimant less favourably than it treated or would have treated the comparators? The Claimant relies upon the following actual/hypothetical comparators: a. As to 6(a) above, she relies upon an actual comparator, Akiwumi Akir, who is male and was subject to a WhatsApp hack but was not referred to a misconduct hearing. b. As to 6(c), she relies upon an actual comparator, namely Iqbal Meah who was allowed a Police Federation representative in similar circumstances. c. In relation to 6(b), 6(d) and 6(e) above, she relies upon a hypothetical comparator. 8. If so, can the Claimant prove primary facts from which the Tribunal could properly and fairly conclude that the difference in treatment was because of the protected characteristic of sex? 9. If so, what is the Respondent’s explanation? Can it prove a nondiscriminatory reason for any proven treatment? Indirect Race Discrimination 10. Did the Respondent apply the following provision, criterion and/or practice (‘the PCP’) generally, namely: a. ‘That promotions cannot take place if officers are under investigation’ [for gross misconduct]. The Respondent says (at 123 Grounds of Resistance) that promotion in such circumstances “is highly unlikely” but not absolute so “cannot” is not accurate. 11. Did the application of the PCP put black officers at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons who are not black? 12. Did the application of the PCP put the Claimant at that disadvantage in that: a. The Claimant faced misconduct allegations. b. Can the Respondent show that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? c. The Respondent says (paragraph 24 of the Grounds of Resistance) that its legitimate aim is the securement of the trust of the public with regards

(1) trust, professional standards and integrity in upholding the law; and

(2) trust in the Respondent’s internal processes and investigations. d. The Respondent says that deferring promotion of officers in this situation is proportionate pending the outcome of the investigation into the alleged misconduct. Indirect Sex Discrimination 13. Did the Respondent apply the following provision, criterion and/or practice (‘the PCP’) generally, namely: a. ‘That promotions cannot take place if officers are under investigation’ [for gross misconduct] (The Respondent says as above)

Preliminary

[14]Did the application of the PCP put women at a particular disadvantage when compared with men?

[15]Did the application of the PCP put the Claimant at that disadvantage in that the Claimant’s promotion was immediately rescinded?

[16]Can the Respondent show that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? (The Respondent’s position is as above.)

Remedy

[17]In the event that the Claimant’s claim succeeds in part or in full;a. Is the Claimant entitled to an award for injury to feelings, if so what level of award should be provided?

b. What financial losses has the Claimant suffered as a consequence of the discriminatory acts? Specifically, is the Claimant entitled to remuneration for the Claimant’s promotion being rescinded? The Evidence 7. The hearing was conducted in person with both parties and all witnesses in attendance at the Watford Employment Tribunal. No reasonable adjustments were requested by either party for themselves or any of their witnesses. 8. The Tribunal had a hearing bundle of 1002 pages, together with a helpful chronology and ‘cast list’ and ‘further and better particulars’. 9. The Tribunal had witness statements and heard evidence from the following individuals: 9.1. The Claimant herself. 9.2. Ms Derean Roach, Black Police Network Administrator, who was called on behalf of the Claimant. 9.3. Police Sergeant Julie Wade, who was a recipient of the scam WhatsApp messages purportedly from the Claimant. 9.4. Mr Matthew Simmons, Temporary Assistant Director, Promotion Review Panel Chair. 9.5. Detective Chief Inspector Katie Rumph, former member of Directorate of Professional Standards and the Appropriate Authority in relation to gross misconduct allegations. 9.6. Police Constable Spencer Littlechild, Directorate of Professional Standards, Investigating Officer. 9.7. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Cundy, who addressed the Claimant’s appeal of the Promotion Review Panel. 10. Ms Sheerin and Mr Chegwidden provided the Tribunal with written submissions, supplemented by oral submissions, for which the Tribunal is grateful. Findings of Fact Preliminary Matters 11. In reaching our findings of fact, we have been particularly assisted by the documentary material in this case, including many emails between relevant persons. Much of the underlying facts were not in dispute. Where matters were in dispute, we have addressed them specifically. Otherwise the facts stated can be taken as either not challenged or as clear from the documents themselves. 12. One of the significant documents placed before the Tribunal was the Police Officer Promotion Standard Operating Procedure Version 2.15. We were informed that this is not the most up-to-date version or the version that was in force at the relevant time. Nevertheless, the parties were agreed that in so far as the paragraphs are relevant to the present case, the wording is either identical or there is no material difference. We have therefore approached this document on that basis. Police Conduct Regulations, National Police Promotion Framework and the Casey Review 13. The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 provide a statutory framework for managing police conduct, complaints and disciplinary proceedings. They apply to all police officers in England and Wales, including the Metropolitan Police Service. They set out Standards of Professional Behaviour, including (but not limited to) the requirement for police officers to be honest, act with integrity and not to compromise or abuse their position; to act with fairness and impartiality and not to discriminate unlawfully or unfairly; to behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it; and to report, challenge or take action against the conduct of colleagues which has fallen below the Standards of Professional Behaviour. It was agreed between the parties that these are core values of the Metropolitan Police Service. 14. The parties agreed that the Regulations aim to maintain public confidence in policing and to ensure officers meet professional standards, amongst other things. It was also agreed between the parties that the promotion of police officers has an impact on public trust and confidence. The Tribunal agrees with this. 15. The Tribunal was provided with the College of Policing National Police Promotion Framework Operating Manual dated January 2022, as an agreed document. In the absence of dispute, the Tribunal accepts the content of the manual where relevant to this case. The manual outlines the procedures for the implementation of the National Police Promotion Framework (NPPF). 16. Police forces are mandated under the 2020 Regulations to comply with the NPPF. Pursuant to §1.6 of the NPFF, forces operating under the framework must understand their legal duties under the Equality Act 2010. In particular, they must consider the need to eliminating discrimination and advancing equality of opportunity with due regard to the protected characteristics. 17. Paragraph 1.7 of the NPFF recognises that female officers, officers from minority ethnic backgrounds and officers with other protected characteristics are underrepresented in supervisory ranks.

Preliminary Matters

[18]Pursuant to §3.8.1 of the NPFF, when police officers become the subject of criminal or misconduct investigations during the promotion process, “forces must examine the particular circumstances of the investigation and decide whether the officer should be removed from the promotion process or whether it is possible for them to proceed”.

[19]In the wake of a number of incidents and scandals that led to grave levels of public concern about policing nationally, the Metropolitan Police Service appointed Baroness Louise Casey to lead an independent review of its culture and standards of behaviour (the “Casey Review”). The Casey Review was completed in March 2023, when the Final Report and Recommendations were published. The Tribunal had the benefit of the entirety of the Report.

[20]The findings of the Casey Review were not disputed by the Respondent and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts the findings where they are relevant to the considerations before us.

[21]In her foreword, Baroness Casey expressed that, “Policing attracts the best of humanity” and paid homage to the many officers “who uphold the highest of standards and who put themselves at risk in order to protect the rest of us”. Nevertheless, she made a finding of institutional racism and sexism in the Metropolitan Police Service. She found that black officers are 81% more likely to be in the misconduct system than their white counterparts. She also found that the Metropolitan Police Service has become less effective, is less trusted and that public confidence has dipped below 50%. Again, these figures were not in dispute.

[22]Later in 2023, the Metropolitan Police Service launched Phase 1 of a “New Met for London”, linked to the Casey Review. This was designed to give police officers and staff greater training, as part of a cultural reform programme. Around the same time, and as part of the cultural reform activity, the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) worked with staff associations to introduce greater fact finding when dealing with officers subject to misconduct allegations. This was piloted from September 2023 and a new “extended fact finding” process was fully introduced in March 2024. It is agreed between the parties that the purpose of this was to improve proportionality of decision making after the pilot proved successful. Tribunal Findings

[23]The facts of this case start with the Claimant, a serving police officer of good character, falling under suspicion for committing a fraud, of which she was herself the victim.

[24]The Claimant is from Cameroon, West Africa. She grew up in Cameroon and attended all her schooling there up until University.

[25]The Claimant joined the Metropolitan Police in March 2007 as a Police Community Support Officer and in September 2009 became a Police Constable. In December 2022 she was successful in passing the Metropolitan Police Service Sergeant’s promotion process. She was due to be posted to her new role in the Central North Borough Command Unit (BCU) Neighbourhood Team on 27 December 2023 from her role in the Safer Transport Team (STT) at Islington Police Station. She was moved early to her new role at Shoreditch Police Station on attachment on 20 November 2023.

[26]On 11 September 2023, whilst still working as a Police Constable (PC) in the Safer Transport Team, the Claimant was a victim of a WhatsApp ‘hack’, whereby a fraudster hacked her WhatsApp account and sent out a plea for money to various contacts. One of the recipients, also a Metropolitan Police Officer, sent £150 (presumably to the fraudster). On the night that it happened, the Claimant made a disclaimer on Facebook and sent messages on Messenger stating that her WhatsApp had been compromised and asking her contacts not to interact with it. She reported the account to WhatsApp and attended a mobile phone shop in an effort to block the number. She was told that changing the number would not stop the hacker, so she obtained a new number.

[27]Between 12 and 15 September 2023, the Claimant attended a Metropolitan Police training course in Hendon for ‘First Line Leaders’. There she met Police Sergeant (PS) Julie Wade, who was attending the same course. The course covered, amongst other things, matters to do with leadership, past leadership in the Metropolitan Police Service and leadership failings. The Independent Review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service conducted by Baroness Casey formed part of the course. During the course, a white officer made comments about never seeing institutional racism or sexism in the police service and asked about the figures set out in the Casey Review. The Claimant challenged this and PS Wade participated in the ongoing discussion, adding that she had not seen or experienced institutional racism or sexism during her 34 years of police service.

[28]On 14 September 2023, Day 3 of the course, PS Wade received a telephone call (not a WhatsApp call) from the Claimant using Telephone number ending 1317 (T1317), asking PS Wade to let the tutor know that she was running late. The Claimant attended for the afternoon session. WhatsApp Incident

[29]At 16:09 PS Wade received a series of WhatsApp messages from T1317, in which the author sent pleasantries to PS Wade and at 16:13, sent the following message: “Please I need a favor [sic] from you [praying hand emoji].”

[30]PS Wade did not reply. PS Wade recognised the WhatsApp profile picture to be that of the Claimant.

[31]The following morning, at 11:27, at the request of the course tutor, PS Wade messaged T1317, using WhatsApp, about the Claimant’s attendance at the course. The Claimant arrived moments later, and no discussion took place about any of the WhatsApp messages.

[32]At 20:16, PS Wade received a WhatsApp message from T1317 saying “Ok”, followed immediately by, “Please I need a favor [sic] from you [praying hand emoji]”. Believing that she was engaging with the Claimant, PS Wade replied, asking what was needed, to which the author (who was, unbeknown to PS Wade, not in fact the Claimant) responded across two WhatsApp messages, as follows: 20:39: “Actually I’m trying to make an urgent transfer to someone it’s not going through.” 20:40: “I don’t know if you can help me make the transfer to the person I will definitely refund it back tomorrow before noon.”

[33]PS Wade responded, “Sorry I can’t help”, to which she received, “You are too stingy” in response.

[34]PS Wade considered the request “odd” and on Wednesday 20 September 2023 called her line manager, Police Inspector (Insp) Mark Ridgers about the WhatsApp messages. Insp Ridgers instructed PS Wade to collate information about this and send it onto him.

[35]On Friday 22nd September 2023, PS Wade spoke to a colleague, Acting Police Sergeant Mehmet Zabelaj, about the messages. APS Zabelaj told PS Wade that he had received the same message and had sent money in response. He also told PS Wade that he had discussed the matter with PS Victor Onwubuke and that it was apparent that most of the members of the Safer Transport Team at Shoreditch Police Station, where the Claimant was originally based, had received similar messages from the same number, each requesting a financial “favor” [sic].

[36]We find as a fact that PS Zabelaj did tell PS Wade, at that stage, about the Claimant’s explanation to him. It is not credible that he would have only told her half the story, especially as he had told APS Victor Onwubuke about his conversation with the Claimant. Moreover, PS Wade’s later email exchange with Insp Mark Ridgers implies that she did have knowledge of the Claimant’s explanation, namely that she was herself victim of a scam.

[37]At 12:49 on 22 September 2023, PS Wade emailed Insp Ridgers, informing him that PS Zabelaj has informed her that “he was scammed by Caroline Nku’s number”; that she has asked him to send Insp Ridgers the details; that he has spoken to the Claimant about it; and that he sent money but his bank has refunded it.

[38]Thereafter, PS Wade received screenshots from colleagues, and she emailed Insp Ridgers with updates, informing him that “several of the team have been victim of the scam from PC Nku’s whatsapp including Victor [Onwubuke] who has spoken with her I believe”. PS Wade informed Insp Ridgers that she has asked the affected people to email her with screenshots. Insp Ridgers requested the screenshots and expressed the following opinion to PS Wade: “My understanding is – you cannot be logged into WhatsApp with 2 separate accounts – if this is a scam, which I am starting to doubt – then Caroline would not be able to continue to use that account as well as the scammers if that makes sense.”

[39]In response, PS Wade confirmed her belief that A/PS Victor Onwubuke has spoken to the Claimant and can provide more information, as well as her understanding as to which teams had been affected.

[40]Also on 22 September 2023, following his discussion with PS Zabelaj, A/PS Onwubuke sent an email to Insp Mark Ridgers explaining that he had received a request for money from the Claimant’s mobile number and exhibited the screenshot of the WhatsApp exchange. Submission to the Professional Standards Unit

[41]At a time unknown on 22 September 2023, Insp Ridgers submitted a Form 5020A 5x5x5 Information Intelligence Report to the Professional Standards Unit (“PSU”).

[42]The Evaluation field within that Intelligence Report was not completed and it contained factual errors. Insp Ridgers erroneously set out in that report that PS Wade spoke to the Claimant “via WhatsApp yet moments later received the request for money from her”. It is not in dispute that his assertions were wrong, as the documentary evidence reveals.

[43]Insp Ridgers also set out in parenthesis that he had conducted “brief research”, from which he concluded that, “(WhatsApp’s encryption will not allow you to log in to the same account from different devices/locations and will alert the user when messages are sent)”. He did not cite the source of this research, and it is accepted by the Respondent that this, too, was wrong. Insp Ridgers attached the screenshots of the WhatsApp messages from PS Wade, PS Zabelaj and APS Onwubuke. Insp Ridgers set out that he had tried to make enquiries with the Claimant’s line manager (Mike Lohan) to ascertain “if she has reported anything”, but that the line manager is on leave. Insp Ridgers requested checks to be conducted on the Telephone Number and financial checks to be made: ‘including associates on her vetting to see if there are any links to the bank account or name Deborah Ballen Gregory. Or indeed if Caroline has reported any scam or recent theft etc. It could of course be a genuine scam – but it is puzzling how she uses the same number and account the messages are being sent from”.

[44]At 10:21 on Monday 25 September 2023, Insp Ridgers emailed the Professional Standards Unit with an update to his 5020 Intelligence Report, in which he attached emails from members of his team and set out the following: ‘I spoke briefly with a supervisor on her current CN team and he was not aware of such texts his staff have received. It appears Caroline did mention something about a strange message she received to her Sergeant – Mike Lohan, but he was off Friday and I was unable to confirm further details’.

[45]At no stage did Insp Ridgers include the explanation given to PS Zabelaj that the Claimant was herself a victim of a scam.

[46]At 10:51 on Monday 25 September 2023, PC David Smith from the PSU sent an email to the DPS Intelligence Bureau, in the following terms: ‘May we respectfully request consideration for [Intelligence Bureau] colleagues to undertake some intelligence research on financials etc. the fact finding is complete and we await further directions once considered.’

[47]In essence, the Tribunal finds that the factual basis for the PSU referral was materially incomplete. The Tribunal finds on the evidence that there had been no renewed attempt to contact Mike Lohan, no additional research over and above Insp Ridgers “brief” research, nor any checks made as to the source or accuracy of his contentions (which are accepted to have been flawed). On that basis, we find that PC Smith was incorrect in asserting that, “the fact finding is complete”. Directorate of Professional Standards

[48]On 16 November 2023, the Intelligence Bureau confirmed that the matter had been passed to the relevant team within the Directorate of Professional Standards (“DPS”) for further investigation.

[49]Meanwhile, whilst this was going on, the Claimant started her attachment to Shoreditch Police Station as a Police Sergeant (albeit not yet formally deployed, which was due to take place on 27 December 2023).

[50]At 08:10 on 22 November 2023, PS Robert Frost (Complaints Resolution Unit at DPS) emailed the DPS Appropriate Authority, setting out his summary of the allegation against the Claimant and alleged circumstances. He assessed the allegations as amounting to a criminal offence, namely fraud, by the Claimant.

[51]Within the allegation summary, PS Frost corrected the American spelling of “favor” that was contained within the WhatsApp messages, to the correct English spelling of “favour”. He did not alert the Appropriate Authority of this error or his correction to it. He also stated that colleagues had been communicating with the Claimant, as opposed to the correct factual position which was that they had been communicating with the Claimant’s telephone number. Likewise, he asserted that the Claimant engaged with colleagues requesting money, rather than stating that the requests had been sent from the Claimant’s telephone. In summary, the Tribunal considers that the allegation was framed on the basis of untested assumptions. The Tribunal is satisfied that this document demonstrates that a number of assumptions were made by PS Frost.

[52]PS Frost’s summary contained the Claimant’s explanation that her WhatsApp was stolen, but also contained the same factual errors as those contained in Insp Ridgers’ 5020A Intelligence Report, namely that the Claimant continued to use the same number and that WhatsApp encryption will not allow users to log into the same account from different devices/ locations and will alert the user when messages are sent.

[53]PS Frost’s summary also contained the same factual error that PS Wade had spoken to the Claimant via WhatsApp moments before receiving the request for money. PS Frost attached a statement from PS Wade, which has not been provided to the Employment Tribunal.

[54]PS Frost asserted that these factors, “would cast some doubt on the premise that the account had been hacked, compounded by the fact that WhatsApp has end to end encryption”.

[55]PS Frost did not conduct any fact-checking of Insp Ridgers’ observations and accepted them without scrutiny.

[56]Like Insp Ridgers’ report, PS Frost did not set out the source or the research underlying the claims about WhatsApp. Nor did he attach the screenshot from APS Onwubuke. The reason for filtering out this evidence is unclear to the Tribunal.

[57]PS Frost rejected the Claimant’s explanation on the balance of probabilities and concluded that the matter amounts to Gross Misconduct.

[58]On 22 November 2023, in the role of the DPS Appropriate Authority, Insp Roland Colohan reviewed the intelligence report and associated attachments sent by PS Frost, which were limited to the screenshots of the message sent to PC Zabelaj and PS Wade. Insp Colohan determined that there is an indication that the Claimant has committed a criminal offence, namely fraud pursuant to sections 1 and 2 Fraud Act 2006. 59. ‘Indication’ is defined at §10.7 of the Statutory Guidance on the Police Complaints System as having ‘its plain English definition’. The Guidance provides that in making the decision about whether there is an indication, ‘the Appropriate Authority should consider whether the circumstances, and the evidence readily available, show or reasonably imply that a person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings, or that there may have been the infringement of a person’s rights under Articles 2 or 3. This decision should take account of the facts being asserted by the complainant, alongside any readily available evidence, and not focus solely on what the complainant says those facts amount to. Where a complainant alleges, for example, that an offence has been committed without explaining what has been done that they believe constitutes that offence, the appropriate authority should seek further information and clarification from the complainant before making the decision regarding whether there is an indication. 10.8. When making the decision about whether there is an ‘indication’ the appropriate authority can review evidence that is readily available, but it should not take preliminary investigative steps in order to make this decision. Therefore, the appropriate authority should not, for example, obtain accounts from officers or other witnesses, or instruct an expert. If what is alleged in a complaint is undermined by contemporaneous real objective evidence (i.e. evidence from things as distinct from persons, such as CCTV/ body worn video), or is inherently unlikely, there is unlikely to be an indication. 10.9. Where there is doubt whether or not there is an ‘indication’, this may suggest that it is reasonable and proportionate to investigate. Where a decision is made that there is no indication, but during subsequent handling the complaint handler considers that the indication test may now be met, the complaint handler should highlight the matter to the appropriate authority to consider whether the complaint must now be investigated.’

[60]We find that in reaching his decision that there is an indication that the Claimant has committed a criminal offence, namely fraud, Insp Colohan did not take into account exculpatory material, which was clear from the intelligence report: 60.1. The American spelling; 60.2. The Claimant’s claim that she was the victim of a scam; 60.3. The lack of statement from the Claimant’s line manager, after one failed attempt by Insp Ridgers; 60.4. The lack of evidential basis for Insp Ridgers’ and PS Frost’s opinions and contentions (which were in fact wrong). Independent Office for Police Conduct/ Local Misconduct Investigation

[61]At 12 noon on 22 November 2023, the Claimant was reported to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (“the IOPC”). The referral form included the Claimant’s name, sex (female) and a box for ethnic origin (not known). This referral again contained the factual inaccuracies referred to above, as well as the corrected spelling of “favour” instead of “favor”, without alerting the reader of the change. There was a reference to the Claimant’s explanation that her WhatsApp was stolen. The referral form failed to include the source of the erroneous WhatsApp research purporting to “cast some doubt on the premise that the account had been hacked”. The nature of the complaint was recorded as “corruption/perjury”.

[62]On 27 November 2023, the IOPC determined that the matter should be investigated locally.

[63]Upon receipt, PC Spencer Littlechild was appointed as Investigating Officer. He completed an Investigation Plan on 30 November 2023 under the supervision of ADS Lisa Brown.

[64]On 13 December 2023, PC Littlechild then completed the Investigator’s and Complaint Handlers Special Procedures and Severity Assessment form under the supervision of DI Samantha Townsend. The ‘circumstances’ were in the same terms as in the summaries of Insp Ridgers, PS Frosts and Insp Colohan; they contained the corrected spelling of “favour” and the same errors as to WhatsApp hacking, encryption and alert messages.

[65]PC Littlechild conducted his own independent research into WhatsApp and noted, under Culpability, that: ‘I believe the culpability is low in this matter due to the fact PC Nku whatsApp could have been hacked. The messages are very standard and one reply from PC Nku phone number states “You Are Stingy”. Research has been carried out and research suggest [sic] that you can be scammed if you have WhatsApp, which would match PC Nku explanation that her Whatsapp was hacked however PC Nku is still using WhatsApp at the time of the information received.’

[66]Under the list of aggravating factors, PC Littlechild referred to a number of historic allegations against the Claimant as to past behaviour. None of those past complaints involved a lack of dishonesty or integrity, and all but one of which had resulted in no further action or were not upheld. Under Mitigating Factors, PC Littlechild stated that, “PC Caroline Nku has not been interviewed. At this stage I see no real mitigating factors’.

[67]PC Littlechild failed to identify the return of the money to PC Zabelaj as a mitigating factor, along with the fact there had been no public complaint. Nor did PC Littlechild identify the Claimant’s good character (the historic allegations not having been upheld) and her long service as mitigating factors. There was no analysis by PC Littlechild as to whether the requests for money on the face of the WhatsApp messages in fact gave an indication of a fraud involving dishonesty, as opposed to a mere request for money.

[68]Two days later, on 15 December 2023, PC Littlechild issued the Claimant with a Regulation 17 Notice Form 163, notifying her that she was under investigation for Gross Misconduct. The Regulation 17 Notice contained a brief summary of the allegations, as well as the words of the caution, namely: Whilst you do not have to say anything, it may harm your case if you do not mention when interviewed, or when providing any information (under Regulations 18(1), or 31(2) or (3) or 54 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 or Regulation 20 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct Regulations 2020) something which you later rely on in any misconduct proceedings, accelerated hearing or appeal proceedings.

[69]The Regulation 17 Notice notified the Claimant that the severity assessment determined that, if proved, the alleged conduct would amount to Gross Misconduct and that this may result in her attendance at a Misconduct Hearing. It also notified the Claimant that the alleged conduct may breach the Discreditable Conduct Standard of Professional Behaviour.

[70]The attached standard Explanatory Notes included the following (amongst other matters): 2. The fact that you have been given this notice does not necessarily mean that misconduct proceedings will be taken against you but is to safeguard your interests. It is given in order that you have the opportunity to secure any documentation or other material or make any notes that may assist you in responding to the allegations. 5. Within 10 working days, beginning with the first working day after the terms of reference or notice that those terms of reference cannot be provided, are given, you may provide a written or oral statement relating to any matter under investigation. You or your police friend may provide any relevant documents to the investigator who must consider those documents. Failure to provide a response to this notice may lead to an adverse inference being drawn in any subsequent misconduct proceedings, accelerated misconduct hearing or appeal. 11. You should understand that any decision as to whether there is a case to answer that you may have breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour and whether the matter should be referred to misconduct proceedings, will be based on an objective assessment of all the evidence. If the case is referred to misconduct proceedings, the decision at the meeting or hearing will be determined on the standard of proof required in civil cases, which is the balance of probabilities.

[71]It is accepted by the Respondent that the ‘lines of enquiry’ entries within the Regulation 17 Notice self-evidently relate to an entirely different case.

[72]On the same day, assisted by Mike Lohan, the Claimant signed the acknowledgement of receipt and completed the Regulation 18 response, in which she expressed her anger at receiving the Regulation 17 Notice. She stated that she was a victim of this scam and that her whole family, friends and colleagues had been affected by it. She stated that she had no access to her WhatsApp account for days and that she had attended the Three mobile phone shop to change her number, and contacted WhatsApp via email through their complaints system. She confirmed that she obtained a new mobile number after her WhatsApp account was “stolen”.

[73]In evidence, PC Littlechild accepted that he declined to take any account of the Claimant’s Regulation 18 response. In evidence, he sought to justify this on the basis that “she would need to provide it through the Federation Representative”. He stated that what an officer says on the Regulation 18 response is “up to them” and that “normally they say I have no comment to make. If the Federation Representative provides information that would feature in my report.”

[74]When it was put to PC Littlechild on behalf of the Claimant that she had largely been overlooked in terms of the account and evidence she could provide, PC Littlechild said in evidence that, “That’s down to the Fed Rep speaking to the officer; the Federation Representative would normally speak to a solicitor and set out questions to be passed onto me”.

[75]PC Littlechild could not point to any rule or guidance underpinning his assertion that only representations made by a Federation Representative fell to be considered. The Tribunal finds that PC Littlechild’s determination that he would only consider representations advanced via a Federation Representative is in breach of Regulation 18(2): Reg. 18(1)(a) the officer concerned may provide a written or oral statement relating to any matter under investigation to the investigator, including any mitigating circumstances relevant to any such matter, an

(b) the officer concerned or the officer's police friend may provide any relevant documents to the investigator. Reg. 18(2) The investigator must, as part of the investigation, consider any such statement or document and must make a record of having received it.

[76]The Tribunal also finds that PC Littlechild’s decision to disregard the Claimant’s Regulation 18 response is contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Regulation Explanatory Notes, specifically §11.

[77]A number of MG11 witness statements were obtained by PC Littlechild between 15 December 2023 and 12 January 2024 from the recipients of the WhatsApp messages, pursuant to section 9 Criminal Justice Act 1967. There is no evidence of PC Littlechild conducting any further investigation thereafter (i.e. from 12 January 2024 onwards).

[78]The Tribunal finds that the statements are self-evidently inconsistent with PC Littlechild’s evidence to us that “several of the officers and colleagues who received messages expressed doubts about PS Nku’s claim that her WhatsApp account had been compromised, noting that WhatsApp does not allow logins from multiple devices”.

[79]On the contrary, within those statements, the Claimant’s colleagues expressed their belief that the Claimant was not the perpetrator of any fraudulent activity and that she was herself the victim of the hack.

[80]The only individual to have expressed any doubt about the Claimant’s integrity was Insp Mark Ridgers in an email, but from whom no MG11 was obtained.

[81]Not only is PC Littlechild’s contention about several of the Claimant’s colleague expressing doubts about her claims, inconsistent with the MG11s he gathered, but also inconsistent with his own analysis as set out in his investigation report.

[82]We were unable to accept the credibility of PC Littlechild in consequence of these factors. Promotion Rescission

[83]Meanwhile, the Human Resources (HR) Department learnt of the Misconduct Investigation involving the Claimant. At 17:41 on 18 December 2023 Stasiak Oleszko Iwona (Workforce Planning and Deployment Officer at HQ Human Resources), sent the following email to the Workforce Deployment Administration unit and the Local Resource Planning Meeting Management team: Dear team, Please rescind [the Claimant’s] promotional posting. Officer to remain as PC at their current [Operational Command Unit].

[84]Within two hours, A/PS Jones (Central North) emailed the Central North Collation Unit stating that the Claimant ‘is no longer being posted to [Central North Borough Command Unit] this month.

[85]Chief Inspector Godhania MSc (Central North BCU Neighbourhood Policing) emailed A/PS Jones in response, alerting him that the Claimant has already been in her new post at Central North for approximately four weeks. In that email, Ch Insp Godhania confirmed his understanding that the Claimant “is currently on gross misconduct” and requested a conversation in order to discuss and manage the Claimant’s welfare.

[86]A/PS Jones replied to this by email, stating that although the Claimant had moved to the new team early, this was only on attachment rather than her official posting, and that, “Officer’s can’t be promoted if they are under investigation” (emphasis added). A/PS Jones followed this up in an email dated 31 December 2023, in which he referred to rescinding the Claimant’s posting “as promotions cannot take place if officers are under investigation”.

[87]In summary, the Tribunal rejects the proposition that investigation automatically prevents promotion. It is inconsistent with the Police Officer Promotion Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which provides guidance and structure for promotion of Metropolitan Police Officers. In particular, §13 provides that in cases where there is a misconduct matter in which the ‘finding’ stage has not yet been reached, there is no automatic bar from the promotion or selection process and that the OCU Commander should carefully review the circumstances, bearing in mind that the investigation may find in favour of an officer. There is no written guidance within the SOP or elsewhere that officers cannot be promoted if they are under investigation. A/PS Jones has wrongfully conflated the guidance on officers who have been sanctioned (addressed at §13.5, §13.8 and §13.8.1), with those officers who are under investigation (§13.2 to §13.4).

[88]On 20 December 2023, Stasiak Oleszko Iwona’s direction to rescind the Claimant’s promotion, was actioned. Chief Inspector Godhania called the Claimant and told her that her post as Sergeant was being rescinded. The Claimant was immediately removed from her attachment at Shoreditch Police Station and returned to Islington Police Station as a Police Constable.

[89]The Tribunal is satisfied on all the written evidence that Chief Inspector Godhania rescinded the Claimant’s promotion because of the instruction received by Stasiak Oleszko Iwona and that no analysis had been conducted into any individual circumstances before that decision was taken. The Respondent did not suggest otherwise.

[90]That same day, one of the Claimant’s colleagues, PS Elliott Breachwood, informed the Claimant about Promotion Review Panels, as set out in the Standard Operating Procedures.

[91]PS Breachwood also informed the Claimant that he knew a male Inspector named Akiwumi Akir, who had also been a victim of a WhatsApp hack and who had not been accused of gross misconduct.

[92]Mr Akir has not provided a Witness Statement for these Employment Tribunal proceedings, did not appear before the Employment Tribunal and there is no information about him in the material placed before us. The Claimant said in evidence that Mr Akir had initially told her he would assist her claim but later changed his mind, and she also said in evidence that Mr Akir does not assist her with her race discrimination claim. PC Breachwood has not appeared before the Tribunal either and the witnesses who did appear have provided no information about Mr Akir. There is no documentary evidence about him. In these circumstances, we are unable to reach any conclusion as to whether Mr Akir was in fact a victim of a WhatsApp hack, the circumstances surrounding this or whether or not he was accused of gross misconduct.

[93]On the same day as being informed about Promotion Review Panels by PC Breachwood, the Claimant contacted Detective Inspector (DI) Iqbal Meah (Professionalism Headquarters, Central Outreach Team and London Race Action Plan), who helped her through the process.

[94]It is agreed between the parties that DI Meah, a male Metropolitan Police Officer, had himself been subject to an investigation previously and that his promotion to DI had been paused pending the outcome. He had raised concerns at that time that his treatment was based on his race and appealed that decision to DAC Cundy. One of his grounds of appeal had been that he was denied a Police Federation Representative. That ground was not upheld, as a Central Federation Representative had attended. Limited other details were given to the Tribunal about DI Meah’s case and we make no findings in respect of it, other than where they are directly relevant to the Claimant.

[95]Having been contacted by the Claimant, on 21 December 2025 DI Meah emailed AnneMarie Moore in her capacity as Workforce Planning Lead at HQ Human Resources), copying in Commander James Harman (Professionalism HQ), as well as the Claimant; the Claimant’s first and second line managers PS Mike Lohan and Insp Orros; PS Breachwood; and PC Michael O’Grady, whom DI Meah referred to as the Claimant’s Federation Representative. In that email, DI Meah indicated that the Claimant had asked him to escalate matters on her behalf. He raised several enquiries, including who made the decision to rescind the Claimant’s promotion; whether a Promotion Review Panel had been held and details thereof; what was the rationale for the decision to rescind the Claimant’s promotion; and why the Claimant had not been informed of her right to appeal the decision. DI Meah also set out that the Claimant maintains her innocence and asked for a fact finding to take place. He also stated that the Claimant feels she is being treated unfairly because she is a “Black African Female”. DI Meah referenced the Casey Review and expressed that “the same thing” happened to him in April 2023. He made a number of references to the Police Promotion SOP.

[96]The Respondent asserts that DI Iqbal’s reference to the Police Promotion SOP is erroneous because there were no findings by the Promotion Review Panel by this stage. We do not agree that it was erroneous. The SOP explicitly states at page 2 that, “This SOP applies with immediate effect to all processes to promote police officers up to and inclusive of the rank of Chief Superintendent across the Met Business Groups… All police officers and police staff, including the extended police family and those working voluntarily or under contract to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) or the Commissioner must be aware of, and are required to, comply with all relevant Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) policy and associated procedures.”

[97]The SOP also makes clear that it applies in particular to officers and staff in a number of specified roles, although the list is not intended to be exhaustive.

[98]Whilst §13.11 of the SOP addresses Promotion Review Panels, we are satisfied from the evidence cited above that the SOP itself (though not that paragraph at that stage) applied equally to Stasiak Oleszko Iwona, A/PS Jones and Chief Inspector Ham Godhania and that their decision to automatically rescind the Claimant’s promotion was not made in accordance with the SOP. We therefore do not agree that DI Iqbal’s request for confirmation as to who made the decision to rescind the Claimant’s promotion or his reference to this SOP were in any way erroneous.

[99]There was no response to DI Meah’s emails until 3 January 2024, when Shanee McCoy from Professional Standards spoke to him and then followed this up with an email to Chief Superintendent Hannah Wheeler (Head of Career Management, HQ Human Resources), forwarding DI Meah’s email to her and suggesting that ‘perhaps we can discuss this at the next exceptional panel’.

[100]The next morning, DI Meah emailed Chief Superintendent Wheeler. In that email, DI Meah reminded Ch Supt Wheelar of the importance of these issues to the Met’s values around Accountability and Respect. He recited the same questions he had posed to Anne-Marie Moore and drew her attention to the Police Promotion SOP, including to the first page which states, amongst other things, that police promotions will be “nondiscriminatory”. DI Meah explained that it was important in terms of scrutiny and transparency for a nominated representative to attend any Promotion Review Panel with the Claimant, in the event one is held. DI Meah also indicated his belief that, “Non-compliance with the Promotion SOP adversely impacts Black, Asian and minority officers as they are more likely to [be] subject to Misconduct Investigations (see Casey Review). To ensure there is no discrimination, I ask immediate steps are taken to ensure compliance with the Promotion SOP”. Promotion Review Panel

[101]On 5 January 2024, Chief Superintendent Wheeler responded to DI Meah, informing him that the next Promotion Review Panel is scheduled for 22 January 2024 and that the Claimant’s case will be discussed and that any questions relating to the case can be addressed then. Ch Supt Wheeler did not answer any of the questions posed by DI Meah.

[102]DI Meah replied to Ch Supt Wheeler on 6 January 2024, asking whether the Claimant is permitted to have a representative attend on 22 January 2024. He also sought clarity on the circumstances surrounding the decision to rescind the Claimant’s promotion, given that a Promotion Review Panel has not yet taken place and that there “is no default position that promotions are put on hold until misconduct investigation are concluded”. DI Meah also expressed that, “There would be no value in holding a Promotion Review Panel if the outcome is already predetermined. You need to judge each case on its merits. I say this, because you all took this view when wrongly assessing my case previously”.

[103]Chief Superintendent Wheeler replied on 8 January 2024 stating that she would not enter into any further emails about this as this is information pertaining to another officer.

[104]The Tribunal finds that this was an excuse by Chief Superintendent Wheeler not to engage with the issue, as she had already been willing to email DI Meah about the Claimant and there had been no change in circumstances to now prevent her from discussing the Claimant with DI Meah.

[105]In that email, Chief Superintendent Wheeler also indicated that any further enquiries can be directed to Matt Simmons (Head of Workforce Planning and Deployment, HR) as she was due to commence a planned leave of absence.

[106]On 9 January 2024 DI Meah emailed Mr Simmons accordingly, copying in the Claimant and explaining that he has the Claimant’s consent to email on her behalf and that he is supporting the Claimant “to ensure fair process and adherence to the Promotion SOP”. DI Meah then set out the same matters and posed the same questions as per his previous emails.

[107]There was no reply and DI Meah followed this email up again on 12 January 2024 and again on 15 January 2024, copying in the Claimant as well as her nominated Federation Representative, Michael O’Grady.

[108]On 16 January, Mr Simmons replied, addressing his email to the Claimant directly, copying in both DI Meah and PC O’Grady, describing them both as her “representatives”. In that email, Mr Simmons confirmed that the next Promotion Review Panel is scheduled for 22 January 2024 and that he would be chairing it. He indicated he would be happy to consider any written representations from herself or her Federation Representative and that he would “quickly and thoroughly review [her] circumstances”. He offered to defer the panel by a week to allow her time to consider her representations.

[109]On 18 January 2024, the Claimant responded directly, copying in her Federation Representative PC O’Grady, asking for the Panel to be deferred to give her sufficient time to prepare. The Claimant requested a nominated representative to be present at the panel. Mr Simmons responded that evening, indicating that a central Federation Representative would be present and that individuals do not attend but that “we’ll consider your written representations”. He also indicated that her Federation Representative was able to speak with the Central representative beforehand if he so wished.

[110]On 22 January 2024, DI Meah responded to that email, again copying in the Claimant and PC O’Grady, as well as PC Breachwood. DI Meah stated that he spoke to the Claimant that morning and asked if she is “permitted to have a Police Friend/Fed Rep of her choice attend the promotion review panel when it is held next week”. DI Meah informed Mr Simmons that he had been permitted to have a “representative/observer” of his choice attend his own PRP the previous year. As indicated above, DI Meah had not in fact been permitted to have a nominated Federation Representative attend his Panel, although an Observer had attended on his behalf.

[111]DI Meah queried whether the Central Federation Representative who would be attending the Claimant’s Panel was a particular named individual and raised concerns about that individual’s impartiality.

[112]Mr Simmons replied on 23 January 2024, undertaking to discuss this with Commander Harman and gave reassurance that the Panel would consider the representations made by individuals.

[113]Later that afternoon, DI Meah emailed Mr Simmons, again copying in the Claimant, PC O’Grady and Mr Breachwood. He attached a 6-page document, containing embedded Word and PDF documents, which he described as “Caroline’s written submissions for the promotion review panel”. DI Meah asserted that the attached documents, “demonstrate Caroline is the victim of hacking, whereby her WhatsApp account was compromised with fraudsters gaining control of her account. There are also links to various websites which shows this is a common tactic used [by] fraudsters to obtain money from victims who believe they are sending money to someone they know e.g. a family member or a work colleague”.

[114]DI Meah advised that he can send the attachments separately if there is any difficulty in opening them, and he reiterated the Claimant’s desire to have a Federation Representative or Police Friend of her choice attend the Promotion Review Panel.

[115]No response was received and DI Meah followed this up again on 26 January 2024 and again on 30 January 2024, copying in the same people as before as well as Mr Simmons’ superior, Karen Graham. On 30 January 2024, PC O’Grady emailed Mr Simmons, copying in the same people, confirming his status as the Claimant’s Federation Representative and endorsing the contents of DI Meah’s email.

[116]Mr Simmons responded on 30 January 2024, addressing his email to “all”. He indicated he was still awaiting an update from Commander Harman and told them that the Panel would sit on 8 February 2024 and that “as a minimum we will consider the written representations”. He confirmed that there will be a central Federation representative present and that he was waiting for clarification as to whether a local Federation representative was able to attend. He did not name the Central Federation representative as requested, nor did he address the query as to whether a police friend could attend the meeting.

[117]Mr Simmons sent a further email to all parties on 2 February, setting out that DI Meah’s panel meeting in August 2023 was an “exceptional meeting” and therefore the approach taken was different to that of the Claimant’s Panel. Mr Simmons stated that individual Federation Representatives are “not permitted”. He did not refer to any Statutory or other prohibition justifying this assertion.

[118]The Tribunal does not accept Mr Simmons’ assertion that there was a prohibition on nominated Federation Representatives attending Promotion Review Panels. That contention is not supported by any of the documentary evidence or by any other witness. Paragraph 13.11 of the Promotion SOP sets out individuals who may be part of the panel, including “Police Federation”. It does not specify that this may only be a Central Federation Representation.

[119]In evidence, Mr Simmons stated that it would be “logistically difficult” for local Federation Representatives to attend, which he accepted is not the same as not being permitted to attend and he did not stand by his earlier assertion to DI Meah that they were in fact prohibited.

[120]DI Meah sent a further email to Mr Simmons on 5 February 2024, in which he repeated his earlier questions and concerns that the SOP had not been followed and raised a number of further questions on behalf of the Claimant, including seeking confirmation as to why her promotion had been rescinded before the Promotion Review Panel and what was the date of the December 2023 Promotion Review Panel.

[121]Mr Simmons responded the following day, in which he addressed some of DI Meah’s questions. In particular, he stated that although panels are held regularly, “there are sometimes occasions where information changes or is flagged in between panels that needs to be considered prior to promoting someone. The Cmss has been clear that our leaders are held to an even higher standard and we need to pause to allow us to consider the circumstances with DPS prior to promoting. On rare occasions this can be just prior to a promotion posting”.

[122]In essence, the evidence demonstrates a default practice of pausing promotions in all such cases. The Tribunal is satisfied from the overall context of this email, read alongside the other emails and the action taken, that Mr Simmons’ reference to a “need to pause” was him expressing a view that it was necessary to automatically pause promotions when there is a gross misconduct allegation. As indicated above, that approach is inconsistent with the Police Promotion SOP, particularly §13.2, which uses “may” not “must” and commends a more individualised approach before promotion is to be paused.

[123]Likewise, the Tribunal is satisfied on the evidence that this is a higher test than that set out in §13.11 of the Police Promotion SOP, which provides that if the allegations are for gross misconduct, the Promotion Review Panel “is likely” to recommend one of three possible outcomes; this is not mandatory.

[124]On Thursday 8 February 2024, the Promotion Review Panel met, chaired by Mr Simmons. Mr Simmons told the Tribunal in evidence that all the Panel members were white and that the composition included the Central Federation Representative that DI Meah had expressed concern about in his emails. Mr Simmons confirmed that no observers had been permitted to attend, and no Staff Support Association (S.A.M.U.R.A.I.) was present. The Police Promotion SOP provides that the relevant S.A.M.U.R.A.I may provide context in respect of a candidate under consideration at the Review Panel, where this would assist the panel. The Tribunal finds that Mr Simmons did not give any thought as to whether the panel may have been so assisted.

[125]Notwithstanding the email exchanges which had been taking place about the Claimant’s Promotion Review Panel since 21 December 2023 between DI Meah and various individuals including Mr Simmons, and notwithstanding that the Claimant had been copied into these exchanges and had been responded to by Mr Simmons directly, the Panel declined to consider the Claimant’s written representations at that meeting. This decision was contrary to Mr Simmons’ assurances to the Claimant on 16, 18, 23 and 30 January that the Panel would consider any representations from her or her representative. Instead, the Panel postponed consideration of the Claimant’s case in order to check that the Claimant consented to them reading her submissions.

[126]The same Panel, again chaired by Mr Simmons, reconvened on the evening of Monday 12 February 2024 and discussed the Claimant’s case.

[127]In summary, the Tribunal considered that Mr Simmons’ account was inconsistent both internally and with the contemporaneous documents. We did not find his evidence about what occurred at that Panel meeting to be credible. In particular, the Tribunal does not accept Mr Simmons’ contention that the Panel considered the Claimant’s representations “in full” at the Panel meeting. Neither does the Tribunal accept that Mr Simmons considered the Claimant’s representations in full in advance of the Panel meeting. Although in his email dated 9 February 2024, Mr Simmons stated that he has asked the Panel to consider the representations ahead of 12 February, there is no corresponding evidence that this was done. His email dated 14 February 2024 makes no reference to the representations having been considered in advance. Neither does his outcome letter dated 15 February 2024, as would be expected had this been done. The Claimant’s representations were lengthy and proper consideration of them required cross referencing to multiple supporting documents embedded into a word document. The same attachments were later sent by DI Meah to DAC Stuart Cundy (addressed further below), who was unable to open some of the attachments, at least one of which was corrupted. The Tribunal finds this undermines Mr Simmons’ contention that he opened and read everything, as there is no good reason for the attachments to have been corrupted when emailed to DAC Cundy but not to have been equally corrupted when sent to Mr Simmons. In evidence, Mr Simmons demonstrated limited knowledge of the Claimant’s representations and the content of the supporting material, which we would expect him to be more familiar with had he considered them in full.

[128]In evidence, Mr Simmons told the Tribunal that when a Promotion Review Panel is dealing with an officer subject to Gross Misconduct allegations, “we always pause promotion until resolved”. He clarified that he is aware of one or two historic cases, which pre-date him, where an officer has been promoted whilst subject to a Gross Misconduct allegation, but that these involved “really exceptional circumstances” and that this has never happened since he has been Chair. The Tribunal is satisfied that this demonstrates the default approach adopted by Mr Simmons and that he imposed an “exceptional circumstances” test, contrary to the Police Promotion SOP.

[129]The decision of the Panel was recorded on an Excel Spreadsheet, which the Tribunal has had the opportunity to consider. Mr Simmons gave evidence that the left side of the Excel spreadsheet was populated by the DPS member of the Promotion Review Panel and that he populated the “Rationale” on the right side of the Excel spreadsheet. The date in which this information was populated is not known.

[130]In essence, the Panel proceeded on an incomplete and inaccurate summary of the evidence. We find that the “Summary of Allegations” presented by DPS in the spreadsheet is not an accurate reflection of the evidence compiled by the time of the Panel meeting. It is inconsistent with the MG11’s gathered by PC Littlechild as part of his investigation. In particular, the evidence did not establish that the Claimant had sent WhatsApp messages to colleagues (but rather that the messages had been sent from her WhatsApp account). The evidence of the Claimant’s colleagues that they believed her to be a victim not a perpetrator was not referred to within the spreadsheet. Neither was the Claimant’s Regulation 18 response, her explanation about her WhatsApp account being compromised and the action she had taken in consequence, nor was her good character referenced. The Tribunal is satisfied that none of these matters were referenced anywhere on the Excel spreadsheet because they were not taken into account and the Panel did not “review” them in accordance with §13.11 of the Police Promotion SOP.

[131]By 12 February 2024, PC Littlechild was due to have notified the Claimant of the progress of the misconduct investigation at least twice (4 weeks from 15 December 2023 having been 12 January 2024 and a further 4 weeks from then being 9 February 2024], pursuant to Regulation 17. We find this was not done. There is no evidence of this update having been given and PC Littlechild did not suggest it had been. No reason was given to the Claimant for this failure, nor indeed to the Tribunal. Promotion Review Panel Outcome Letter

[132]On 14 February 2024 Matt Simmons sent an outcome letter to the Claimant (erroneously dated 15 February 2024), setting out the Panel’s decision to place her promotion on hold pending the Gross Misconduct Investigation. He attached separately the Promotion Review Panel’s answers to some of the questions the Claimant had raised via email (265).

[133]That letter repeated the same inaccuracies as those contained in the spreadsheet in respect of the evidence gathered around the WhatsApp communications. Within that outcome letter, Mr Simmons informed the Claimant that, “The panel concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances that would result in the need to promote the individual now”. [Emphasis added].

[134]In summary, the outcome letter does not reflect a full consideration of the Claimant’s case. The letter does not record the Claimant’s character having been taken into account, nor the fact that she informed people of the WhatsApp fraud or the concerns of witnesses that the Claimant might have been the victim rather than perpetrator. There was passing reference to the Claimant representations within the letter, but the substance of her representations was not set out or addressed. We did not find Mr Simmons’ evidence on this point credible. Had the Claimant’s character and the substance of her representations been taken into account as he contended, this would have been detailed within the body of the letter as the other matters were. We find the Panel Review Panel Meetings were not a true review of the circumstances or that the Panel carefully considered the Claimant’s individual circumstances as asserted by Mr Simmons in evidence, and as required by the National Police Promotion Framework and Police Promotion SOP.

[135]The outcome letter stated that there were “no exceptional circumstances”. We find that this introduces a test not supported by the SOP.

[136]The Tribunal finds that in applying an “exceptional circumstances” test, Mr Simmons may have erroneously conflated the SOP guidance on Unsatisfactory Performance Procedures (UPP), addressed at §13.6 of the SOP, with the lower approach at §13.2 required for officers subject to a complaint pre-finding stage, such as the Claimant.

[137]The Tribunal is satisfied from the email exchanges and outcome letter, that Mr Simmons was personally aware of the practice adopted by the HR Workforce Planning and Deployment Team to automatically pause promotions when a gross misconduct investigation opens, pending consideration by the Promotion Review Panel.

[138]The Tribunal is also satisfied from the email exchanges and outcome letter that Mr Simmons was personally aware of, and acknowledged, that, “communication should be better” and the necessity for “better information sharing processes between HR and DPS”. (265).

[139]We find that there was insufficient information sharing between HR and DPS concerning the Claimant’s investigation to enable the Promotion Review Panel to run effectively, as illustrated by the spreadsheet. We are also satisfied from the above email exchange that the Promotion Review Panel as a whole, and Mr Simmons as an individual, had adopted a default approach to pause promotions pending the outcome of a Misconduct Investigation. Appeal

[140]Following receipt of Mr Simmons’ outcome letter, the Claimant exercised her right to appeal against the decision of the Promotion Review Panel on 20 February 2024 to Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Cundy QPM, DAC Professionalism (256), on the grounds that the decision was an abuse of process and perverse.

[141]On 21 February 2024 DI Meah wrote a letter to DAC Cundy in support of the Claimant (261). DI Meah also attached a number of documents, including the Claimant’s written representations to the Promotion Review Panel dated 23 January 2024; Mr Simmons’ decision letter dated 15 February 2024; Mr Simmons response to the Claimant’s questions dated 15 February 2024; email correspondence with HR and DPS starting 21 December 2023; the College of Police Promotion Framework and the Police Promotion SOP, from which he quoted specific guidance. DI Meah referenced the Casey Review, including the findings that black officers are 81% more likely to face misconduct compared to white officers.

[142]DI Meah reminded DAC Cundy that he had personally dealt with DI Meah’s appeal and that the findings had included the following: “There is an abuse of process by the Promotion Review Panel who stated that all gross misconduct cases are put on hold, unless there is an exceptional justification”.

[143]DAC Cundy gave evidence before the Tribunal, and he did not dispute that part of the evidence. It was not challenged by the Respondent, and the Tribunal accepts that what is set out in DI Meah’s email is a fair reflection of DAC Cundy’s findings in DI Meah’s appeal, as to the approach taken by the Promotion Review Panel in 2023. The Tribunal finds that this was the same approach taken by the Promotion Review Panel in 2024, as demonstrated by Mr Simmons’ emails to the Claimant.

[144]The following day, DAC Cundy emailed DCS Katie Lilburn, Chief Superintendent responsible for DPS (323). DAC Cundy raised his concerns that, “the gross misconduct investigation may not be justified as it appears the officer is a victim of a crime (as opposed to a perpetrator)”. DAC Cundy requested DCS Lilburn to assess “whether the necessary fact finding was undertaken” and expressed that, “we know there is disproportionality within the misconduct system”.

[145]An hour and a half later, having reviewed the Claimant’s representations, DCS Lilburn emailed colleagues from DPS (Chief Inspector Willers and Detective Superintendent Smithson), in which she raised concerns as to whether a Gross Misconduct Investigation should ever have been opened against the Claimant. DCS Lilburn stated that, “this case would have been ideal for an Extended Fact Find – as there is clearly a lot of material already in existence with this, which would tend to point to no conduct”.

[146]DCS Lilburn further expressed that in her opinion, it would have been reasonable to ask the Professional Standards Unit to undertake more fact finding and asked her colleagues to review the stage reached by PC Littlechild in his investigation.

[147]In response, Ch Insp Willers purported to conduct a review of the initial recording decision by Insp Colohan. In his email response to DCS Lilburn at 11:04 on 22 February 2024 setting out his observations, Ch Insp Willers confirmed that it was known “on day 1” that the Claimant was claiming to be the victim of a WhatsApp hack.

[148]As part of his observations, Ch Insp Willers stated that “several officers” were contesting the Claimant’s claim “on the basis that WhatsApp does not allow log ins from other devices”. The Tribunal finds this was a repeat of the error made months earlier by Insp Ridgers and adopted by PS Frost and Insp Colohan and was inconsistent with the MG11s obtained by PC Littlechild.

[149]The Tribunal finds that Ch Insp Willer’s description of the Claimant’s account being outside the realms of fact-finding “because it is an account rather than a fact”, failed to acknowledge that her document clearly signposted a number of facts not just assertions and contained links to open-source research supporting her claims, which were readily available.

[150]DCS Lilburn relayed Ch Insp Willers’ response back to DAC Cundy on the same day (325). In that, DCS Lilburn repeated the same inaccuracies which have featured throughout, namely that “several officers” were disputing the Claimant’s claim. As we have referred to earlier, the Tribunal finds that the only reference to anyone disputing the Claimant’s claim was Insp Ridgers.

[151]In essence, no independent review of the original decision was carried out. We find on the documentary evidence before us that neither DCS Lilburn nor Ch Insp Willer’s undertook a “review” of the original recording decision as purported but appeared to have simply looked at it and sought to explain the decision reached. No analysis of the steps taken by the AA was conducted.

[152]In summary, the same unsupported assumptions were repeated throughout the decision-making process. We find this unquestioning acceptance of contentions that originated from Insp Ridgers’ Intelligence Report, permeated through the Respondent’s approach towards the allegations made against the claimant. Insp Ridgers’ comments in the Intelligence Report were adopted time and again and were given disproportionate weight throughout both investigations.

[153]At 15:09 on 22 February 2024, DS Smithson responded to DCS Lilburn’s request for him to review the status of the Gross Misconduct Investigation, confirming that he had spoken to the IO (PC Littlechild).

[154]PC Littlechild’s evidence to the Tribunal was silent as to this contact by DS Smithson. Gross Misconduct Decision

[155]Having considered whether there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable disciplinary panel could, on the balance of probabilities, have made a finding of gross misconduct, PC Littlechild concluded on 22 February 2024 that there was no case to answer and that the available evidence supported the view that the Claimant’s WhatsApp account had been compromised.

[156]DS Smithson relayed PC Littlechild’s decision to DCS Lilburn and indicated that in light of this information, DPS have no reason to recommend that the Claimant should not be promoted.

[157]Consequent to this, DAC Cundy contacted PC Nku by telephone to update her on the news and followed it up with an email (334). In that email, DAC Cundy stated that he had provided her representations (ie those she had submitted to Matt Simmons dated 23 January 2024) to DPS and that “it is this information that has led to them immediately reviewing your case”.

[158]We consider that this statement is at odds with Mr Simmons’ evidence to the Tribunal that the Promotion Review Panel had considered the Claimant’s representations in full at the 12 February meeting; a member of the DPS was present at that Panel meeting, so had it been the case that the Panel had considered the Claimant’s 23 January written representations at that meeting, then there would have been nothing new in the information shared with the DPS by DAC Cundy such as to prompt an immediate review of her case. This again undermines the credibility of Mr Simmons as a witness. Promotion Review Panel Second Determination

[159]DAC Cundy subsequently stopped the Promotion Review Panel appeal process and wrote to Mr Simmons requesting that a new Promotion Review Panel consider “all the new information that is now available”. DAC Cundy recommended that the Claimant should be promoted and that HR should seek to convene a Promotion Review Panel at the earliest opportunity in order to review the Panel decision for the Claimant. DAC Cundy also provided Mr Simmons with his Appeal Outcome report.

[160]In that report, DAC Cundy referenced the DPS “new approach to fact finding”, the Promotion SOP, the College of Policing National Police Promotion Framework, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) guiding principles and values, as set out in the “New Met for London”. DAC Cundy expressed concern that, having read the Claimant’s representations, he was concerned that the gross misconduct investigation “may not be proportionate” as it appears that the Claimant was a victim, not perpetrator. He acknowledged that “there is disproportionality within the police misconduct system” and expressed that “the MPS is committed to understanding the reasons and taking the necessary action to reduce disproportionality”. Amongst his learning recommendations, DAC Cundy stated that, “DPS have recently commenced a new “fact finding” process, as part of its approach to assessing new conduct allegations. There have been a number of cases and concerns raised, both within Professionalism and by officers/ staff subject of misconduct investigations, about the proportionality of investigations. Based on an assessment of these cases, officer/staff concerns and the work to reduce disproportionality in the misconduct system, DPS have been working with staff associations to introduce greater fact finding through the DPS gateway team. My assessment is that if this new approach had been in place when the MM/1 for PC Nku was first received, she would have been engaged by DPS and directly shared much of the material that was provided as part of this appeal. My initial assessment based on what I have read, is that inadequate information on the MM/1 appears to have driven the sequence of events.”

[161]DAC recommended that if, as part of the Promotion Review Panel process, HR receive documentation that is relevant to a misconduct investigation, they should immediately share it with DPS for an assessment and any action required. He further recommended that the DPS representative attending the Promotion Review Panel should ensure that they have the appropriate level of information to inform the panel’s decision.

[162]On 6 March 2024 Mr Simmons responded to DAC Cundy stating that he agrees and that the Promotion Review Panel would be meeting on Thursday “so will formally capture and then post Caroline”.

[163]The Promotion Review Panel met again on 7 March 2024 and determined that the Claimant “should not remain on hold and can now be posted and promoted” following the DPS decision that there is no case to answer.

[164]On 8 March 2024, DI Rumph formally notified the Claimant that the misconduct investigation had been completed and assessed as “no case to answer”.

[165]The Claimant was posted accordingly and remains in post as a Police Sergeant.

Relevant Law

[166]The legal framework was agreed between the parties and is summarised below. Direct Discrimination

[167]The Claimant brings a direct discrimination claim in which she relies on section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (‘the Act’), which provides that “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others”.

[168]Under section 23(1) of the Act, where a comparison is made, there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. It is possible to compare with an actual or hypothetical comparator.

[169]In order to find discrimination has occurred, there must be some evidential basis on which we can infer that the Claimant’s protected characteristic is the cause of the less favourable treatment. We can take into account a number of factors including an examination of circumstantial evidence.

[170]The Tribunal must consider whether the fact that the Claimant had the relevant protected characteristic had more than a trivial influence on the mind of the decision maker. The influence can be conscious or unconscious. It need not be the main or sole reason but must have a significant (i.e. not trivial) influence and so amount to an effective reason for the cause of the treatment.

[171]In Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL, Lord Rodger at paragraph 125, intimated that the key to a claim of direct discrimination will, generally be the determination of the reason for the treatment in issue: whether it was “because of” the relevant protected characteristic.

[172]The burden of proof is set out in section 136 of the Equality Act 2010: “(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision”.

[173]This is a two-staged test. The approach to be adopted in applying section 136 is as laid down in Igen Ltd v Wong; Chamberlin Solicitors v Emokpae; Brunel University v Webster

[2005] EWCA Civ 142

[2005] ICR 931

(largely endorsing the principles set out in Barton v Investec Securities Ltd

[2003] ICR 1205

EAT) and approved by the Supreme Court in Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd

[2021] UKSC 33

[174]In short, to the extent that the Tribunal is satisfied (on a balance of probabilities) that the Claimant has established facts from which it could, in the absence of an adequate explanation, conclude that the respondent had committed an act of unlawful discrimination (having regard to all the evidence, and drawing such inferences as are legitimate from its primary findings of fact at that preliminary stage), it will be for the respondent to prove (again, on the balance of probabilities) that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever because of the relevant protected characteristic. In discharging this burden, a respondent would normally be expected to adduce cogent evidence that the relevant protected characteristic was not the reason for the treatment in question.

[175]In considering whether the Claimant has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Tribunal must have regard to all the evidence, not just that adduced by the Claimant (Efobi).

[176]In the case of Reynolds v CLFIS (UK) Limited

[2015] EWCA Civ 439

the Court of Appeal considered whether, for the purposes of establishing whether direct discrimination has taken place, a tribunal should consider the mental processes of those employees who have significantly influenced the alleged discriminatory outcome, or only those of the actual decision-maker. The Court of Appeal stated, “…it is a fundamental principle of the discrimination legislation that liability can only attach to an employer where an individual employee or agent for whose act he is responsible has done an act which satisfies the definition of discrimination. That means that the individual employee who did the relevant act (that is, effected the dismissal) must have been motivated by the protected characteristic.”

[177]Each individual act alleged to form part of the continuing act must actually be discriminatory. If any of those alleged acts are not established on the facts or are found not to be discriminatory, they cannot form part of the continuing act. Indirect Discrimination

[178]The Claimant also brings an indirect discrimination claim, in which she relies on section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 (‘the Act’), which provides that, “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discrimination in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of Bs”. Pursuant to s19(2), “a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it,

(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”

Conclusions

[179]The Tribunal made the following decisions on the basis of the material before us, taking into account contemporaneous documents, where they exist and the conduct of those concerned at the time.

[180]We resolved such conflicts of evidence as arose on the balance of probabilities, meaning more likely than not, taking into account our assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the consistency of their evidence with the surrounding facts. The following decisions were taken in relation to each of the claims listed on the list of issues, based on our Findings of Fact detailed above.

[181]The Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s stated protected characteristic of race and sex, namely a black woman, which was not disputed. Direct Discrimination

[182]Where appropriate, we have addressed the race and sex claims together, although they were each given separate consideration by the Tribunal.

[183]In summary, when addressing each of the Direct Discrimination allegations, the Tribunal reminded itself that the burden of proof under section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 requires careful consideration of whether the Claimant has established facts from which the Tribunal could properly conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that discrimination has occurred.

[184]The Tribunal recognises that the findings of fact in this case disclose a number of serious procedural and evidential failings on the part of the Respondent. These include the repetition of inaccurate assumptions originating from the initial intelligence report (see findings under Submission to the Professional Standards Unit), failures to consider exculpatory material (see findings under Directorate of Professional Standards and Promotion Review Panel, including the omission of material from the spreadsheet and outcome letter), and the operation of a default or blanket approach to promotion decisions inconsistent with the Respondent’s own procedures (see findings under Promotion Recission and Promotion Review Panel). The Tribunal also took into account the wider context, including the undisputed evidence from the Casey Review of disproportionality affecting black officers within the misconduct system (see findings under Police Conduct Regulations, National Police Promotion Framework and the Casey Review).

[185]However, the existence of procedural unfairness, flawed decision-making, or even systemic shortcomings does not, of itself, establish discrimination. The statutory question is whether the less favourable treatment was because of the protected characteristic.

[186]In the present case, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Claimant established facts from which it could properly infer that race or sex had a material influence, whether conscious or unconscious, on the decision-makers in question. The evidence demonstrates that the treatment complained of was driven by a combination of erroneous assumptions, inadequate fact-finding, and the operation of a blanket or default approach to misconduct investigations and promotions. Those features applied irrespective of the Claimant’s race or sex.

[187]Importantly, there was no evidential basis upon which the Tribunal could conclude that a comparator without the Claimant’s protected characteristics would have been treated more favourably in materially similar circumstances (see findings under Promotion Rescission, where no comparative evidence was available, including the absence of evidence in respect of Akiwumi Akir). Nor was there evidence that any of the relevant decision-makers expressed, adopted or operated by reference to considerations relating to the Claimant’s race or sex (see findings under Tribunal Findings and PS Wade), whether explicitly or implicitly.

[188]Whilst the Tribunal accepts that systemic disproportionality forms part of the relevant background, it does not follow, without more, that the treatment of this individual Claimant was caused by her protected characteristics. The Tribunal must guard against conflating evidence of structural disadvantage with proof of discriminatory motivation in an individual case.

[189]In those circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the Claimant has not discharged the burden at stage one. Accordingly, the burden does not shift to the Respondent to provide an explanation, and the claims of direct race and sex discrimination fail.

[190]This rationale applies to each of the pleaded allegations in (a) to (e) below and so is not repeated under each heading. Hack

[191]The Claimant’s case advanced a broad, effects-based formulation; it was submitted on her behalf that the investigation, the rescission of her promotion, and associated decisions, are actionable detriments forming a continuous course of discriminatory treatment. The Respondent adopted a narrow, formulistic construction and drew a rigid distinction between “investigation” under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020; and “misconduct proceedings”, defined strictly as a misconduct meeting or hearing following referral under Regulation 23. On that basis, the Respondent contended that a central pleaded allegation—institution of gross misconduct proceedings—is factually wrong because the process never passed the Regulation 23 threshold.

[192]The Tribunal reminded itself that the question under section 13 of the 2010 Act is whether the Claimant was subjected to a detriment, not whether the employer labelled the process in a particular way. The Respondent did not at any stage raise that use of the word “proceedings” ought to be given its Reg. 23 definition, until its concluding submissions. As referred to above, in the hearing before EJ Hutchings, parties agreed that the claim related to treatment connected to the “gross misconduct investigation”.

[193]It is not in dispute that the Claimant was subject to an investigation, including a gross misconduct investigation, in relation to the WhatsApp hack.

[194]The Tribunal found that, even if “proceedings” within the meaning of Reg. 23 were not instituted, being placed under investigation and having one’s promotion rescinded or paused is capable of amounting to “treatment” and so the claim is not defeated by the use of the term ‘proceedings’. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent is not prejudiced by this, as the evidence centred around the gross misconduct investigation.

[195]The Tribunal considered whether this amounted to less favourable treatment of the Claimant because of the Claimant’s race and/or sex.

[196]For the race complaint, the Claimant relies on a hypothetical white male officer. For the sex complaint, the Claimant relies on two comparators, namely Akiwumi Akir and a hypothetical white male officer.

[197]The Respondent’s case is that there is no evidence that the investigation was connected to the Claimant’s race and/or sex. We accepted the Respondent’s submissions on this point. No evidence was provided to the Tribunal in respect of Akiwumi Akir. Reminding ourselves of the burden of proof, we found that the Claimant has not proved sufficient facts on which the Tribunal could decide in the absence of any other explanation that this conduct was related to the Claimant’s race and/or sex and was less favourable treatment. Accordingly, this allegation fails. b. Failure to examine the particular circumstances of the Claimant’s case before her promotion was rescinded

[198]The Respondent disputed that any such treatment occurred.

[199]As detailed in our Findings of Fact above, the Tribunal found that the Respondent did fail to examine the particular circumstances of the Claimant’s case before her promotion was rescinded. The decision to rescind was first made by Stasiak Oleszko Iwona and actioned by A/PS Jones and Chief Inspector Godhania. That decision was made because the Claimant was subject to a gross misconduct investigation. No analysis had been conducted into the circumstances of the Claimant’s case before reaching the decision to do so.

[200]The subsequent decision to rescind the Claimant’s promotion was taken by the Promotion Review Panel, chaired by Matt Simmons. Again, that decision was taken because the Claimant was subject to a gross misconduct investigation without recourse to the particular circumstances of her case.

[201]The Tribunal considered whether this amounted to less favourable treatment of the Claimant because of the Claimant’s race and/or sex. The Claimant relies on a hypothetical white male officer in respect of both complaints.

[202]The Respondent’s case is that there is no evidence that the investigation was connected to the Claimant’s race and/or sex. We accepted the Respondent’s submissions on this point, as explained in our rationale above. We found that the Claimant has not proved sufficient facts on which the Tribunal could decide in the absence of any other explanation that this conduct was related to the Claimant’s race and/or sex and was less favourable treatment. Accordingly, this allegation fails. c. Failure to allow the Claimant to be represented by her Federation Representative at the Independent Review Panel.

[203]It was not in dispute that the Claimant was represented by a Central Federation Representative but was not permitted to be represented by her nominated Federation Representative, PS O’Grady, at the Promotion Review Panel. It is not in dispute that nothing turns on the wording “Independent” as opposed to “Promotion” Review Panel.

[204]The Tribunal considered whether this amounted to less favourable treatment of the Claimant because of the Claimant’s race and/or sex.

[205]For the race complaint, the Claimant relies on a hypothetical white male officer. For the sex complaint, the Claimant relies on an actual comparator, namely DI Meah.

[206]The Respondent’s case is that this did not amount to less favourable treatment. The Respondent asserted that the evidence showed that no one, including DI Meah, was allowed to be represented by their own nominated Federation Representative and that there is no evidence to conclude that the Claimant was denied a local Federation Representative because of her race and/ or sex. DI Meah was represented by a Central Federation Representative in the same way as the Claimant was.

[207]The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent. We found that the Claimant has not proved sufficient facts on which the Tribunal could decide in the absence of any other explanation that the denial of a local Federation Representative was related to the Claimant’s race and/or sex and was less favourable treatment. Accordingly, this allegation fails. d. Failure of the panel to consider the Claimant’s written submissions on 8 February 2024

[208]It is not in dispute that the Respondent failed to consider the Claimant’s written submissions on 8 February 2024.

[209]Here, the Claimant relies on a hypothetical white male officer for both complaints.

[210]The Respondent disputes that this amounted to “less” favourable treatment, asserting that the submissions were not considered out of fairness towards the Claimant; the Claimant had not provided explicit consent for the Panel to consider them, so it was in the Claimant's interests for her explicit consent to be obtained before taken them into account. The Claimant’s consent was obtained and the Panel reconvened on 12 February 2024, so there was no detriment.

[211]In accordance with our rationale articulated above, we found that the Claimant has not proved sufficient facts on which the Tribunal could decide in the absence of any other explanation that this conduct was related to the Claimant’s race and/or sex and was less favourable treatment. Accordingly, this allegation fails. e. An assumption was made as to the Claimant’s Guilt by PS Julie Wade in relation to the misconduct allegation/ WhatsApp scam.

[212]The parties fundamentally disagreed on whether PS Wade’s alleged assumption of the Claimant’s guilt is legally relevant. The Claimant characterised the assumption as discriminatory treatment and a causal driver of subsequent events. The Respondent advanced that factually, no such assumption was made and that legally, even it was, a “mere belief” is not “treatment” for section 13 purposes and is not attributable to the employer absent decision-making authority.

[213]The Tribunal concluded that if PS Wade’s actions of reporting the Claimant and the manner in which she framed the evidence, were influenced by discriminatory assumptions, and if those actions materially contributed to the initiation of the investigation or subsequent decisions, then the assumption of guilt (if proved) could become legally relevant as part of a chain of causation rather than as freestanding treatment. In those circumstances, the treatment alleged was capable of being less favourable treatment.

[214]The Claimant relies on a hypothetical white male officer for both complaints.

[215]The Tribunal is not satisfied that PS Wade made an assumption as to the Claimant’s guilt. In her email correspondence to PI Ridgers in which she reported the “scam messages”, PS Wade did not attribute them to the Claimant directly, but instead to the Claimant’s number and to the Claimant’s WhatsApp account.

[216]Moreover, we are not satisfied that the Claimant has shown that, in the event that PS Wade had made an assumption of guilt, that the reason for it was race and/or sex. The Tribunal reminded itself that unfavourable treatment of itself was not enough; discrimination requires operative causation of treatment, not merely the existence of a biased thought and that stereotypes alone are insufficient. None of PS Wade’s email exchanges referred to the Claimant’s race or sex; she did not make any derogatory comments about the Claimant’s protected characteristics and there was no evidence that PS Wade related the misconduct allegation or the WhatsApp messages to the Claimant’s race or sex. We have not been provided with the witness statement that PS Wade provided to the conduct investigation. We do not accept that PS Wade’s silence or conduct at the training course in Hendon in September 2023, including comments that she had not seen or experienced institutional racism or sexism during her 34 years of police service, establish an evidential link between an alleged assumption of guilt and the Claimant’s race or sex or that it establishes less favourable treatment. We went on to consider whether any upstream contributor in the chain introduced bias, including Insp Ridgers. We are not satisfied that any discriminatory motivation is evidenced anywhere in the chain. Reminding ourselves of the burden of proof and for the same reasons articulated above, this allegation fails. Indirect Race Discrimination

[217]The Claimant contended that the Respondent applied the following provision, criterion and/or practice (‘the PCP’): ‘Promotions cannot take place if officers are under investigation’ [for gross misconduct].

[218]The Respondent disputed this, arguing that promotion in such circumstances “is highly unlikely” but not absolute, so “cannot” is not accurate.

[219]We are satisfied from the written and oral evidence of the witnesses that the Respondent did apply the PCP in the terms asserted by the Claimant.

[220]The Tribunal reminded itself that there is no legal requirement for a PCP to be an absolute rule (British Airways v Starmer

[2015] IRLR 862

[221]As set out in our Findings of Fact, we found that the first decision to rescind, made by Stasiak Oleszko Iwona and actioned by A/PS Jones and Chief Inspector Godhania, was because the Claimant was subject to a gross misconduct investigation and was reached without recourse to any other factors. In his email exchanges with his colleagues in December 2023, A/PS Jones explicitly stated, “Officer’s can’t be promoted if they are under investigation”, and that “promotions cannot take place if officers are under investigation”. We are satisfied that this is reflective of the default position taken by the local team at that time.

[222]We are also satisfied that the subsequent decision to rescind the Claimant’s promotion made by the Promotion Review Panel, chaired by Matt Simmons, was again because the Claimant was subject to a gross misconduct investigation. Mr Simmons effectively admitted so much in evidence when he told the Tribunal that “we always pause promotion until resolved” (albeit he later sought to qualify this answer). Mr Simmons’ outcome letter to the Claimant also demonstrated that he imposed an “exceptional circumstances” default test not reflective of the Police Promotion Standard Operating Procedures and amounted to a PCP that promotions cannot take place if officers are under investigation for gross misconduct.

[223]The Tribunal is satisfied on the written and oral evidence that the application of the PCP put black officers at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons who are not black. It is not in dispute that black officers are 81% more likely to be in the misconduct system than white counterparts, as detailed in the Casey Review and acknowledged by DAC Cundy. We are satisfied from this evidence that black officers were therefore put at a particular disadvantage to white officers; because of overrepresentation in the misconduct system from the point of entry onwards, they were more likely to have their promotion paused or rescinded.

[224]The Tribunal is satisfied that the application of the PCP put the Claimant at that disadvantage, in that she faced misconduct allegations and her promotion was automatically rescinded, first by the local team and then by the Promotion Review Panel, without recourse to her individual circumstances. In consequence, the Claimant was required to revert to her substantive rank as a Constable, including moving back to her old team having been posted early on an attachment.

[225]The Tribunal carefully considered whether the Respondent has shown that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

[226]The Tribunal accepts that the Respondent’s stated aims are legitimate, namely the maintenance of public confidence in policing, including confidence in the integrity, professionalism and standards of those promoted, and in the Respondent’s internal misconduct processes.

[227]The Tribunal then considered whether the application of the PCP to the Claimant and more generally was proportionate. In doing so, we applied the well-established structured approach, namely: whether the PCP is rationally connected to the aim; whether a less discriminatory means could have been used; and whether, balancing the discriminatory impact against the importance of the aim, the PCP strikes a fair balance.

[228]The Tribunal accepts that there is, in principle, a rational connection between pausing promotions of officers subject to misconduct investigations and the maintenance of public confidence. It is capable of being legitimate for an employer, particularly a police force, to take steps to ensure that individuals promoted to positions of greater authority are not, at that time, subject to unresolved allegations of serious misconduct.

[229]However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the PCP, as applied in practice, was no more than reasonably necessary to achieve that aim.

[230]First, the Tribunal found as a fact that the Respondent operated, in substance, a default position whereby promotions were automatically paused where a gross misconduct investigation was in place, subject only to “exceptional circumstances”. That approach did not involve any meaningful consideration of the individual circumstances of the officer concerned. It is inconsistent with the Police Promotion SOP and the National Police Promotion Framework, both of which expressly require an assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. The PCP therefore operated in a rigid and blanket manner.

[231]Secondly, the Tribunal is satisfied that less discriminatory alternatives were both available and already embedded within the Respondent’s own policy framework. In particular, the SOP requires decision-makers to examine the individual circumstances, including the nature of the allegation, the available evidence, and the possibility that the investigation may ultimately exculpate the officer. The evidence also demonstrated the development of “extended fact finding” processes designed to ensure that decisions are based on a more informed and proportionate evidential footing at an early stage. These mechanisms provide a less intrusive means of achieving the same aim, whilst mitigating the discriminatory impact.

[232]Thirdly, the Tribunal considered the discriminatory impact of the PCP. In circumstances where black officers are significantly overrepresented within the misconduct system, a practice of automatically pausing promotion upon entry into that system will inevitably bear more heavily on that group. The effect is to transmit disproportionality at the point of misconduct entry into downstream career progression. The impact on the Claimant was significant and immediate, resulting in the rescission of her promotion, removal from her role, and reputational and professional consequences.

[233]Balancing these factors, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Respondent has demonstrated that the PCP struck a fair balance between the needs of the Respondent and the discriminatory impact on black officers, including the Claimant. The Tribunal finds that the automatic or near-automatic application of the PCP, without an individualised and evidence-based assessment, went further than was reasonably necessary to achieve the Respondent’s legitimate aims.

[234]Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the PCP was not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Indirect Sex Discrimination

[235]The Tribunal considered the same questions in respect of the Claimant’s complaint of indirect sex discrimination, arising from the same PCP.

[236]The Tribunal is not satisfied that the application of the PCP put women at a particular disadvantage when compared with men. The evidence established that black female officers are underrepresented in supervisory ranks. However, it does not follow that more women were subject to misconduct allegations. The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent’s contention that the Claimant’s indirect sex discrimination claim is not made out on the evidence and accordingly this allegation fails.

Remedy

[237]A one-day remedy hearing in person at the Watford Employment Tribunal is needed. Case Management Orders

[238]The Claimant is to file an updated schedule of loss and witness statement by 3 August 2026, on the Tribunal, copying in the Respondent. The witness statement should set out specifically her injury to feelings caused by the indirect race discrimination allegation that the Tribunal have found to be successful. Approved by: Employment Judge EJ Wilson 28th Day of June 2026 30 June 2026 Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation practice-directions/