Ms S Jones v Revolution Zero CIC and others: 3304162/2020 and others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3304162/2020
Between
Ms S JonesClaimantRevolution Zero CIC and othersRespondent
Before
Employment Judge SkehanIn person for claimantDate 14 March 2022
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant is not a disabled person as defined within the Equality Act 2010 by reason of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The claimant’s claims for disability discrimination contrary to section 13 (direct discrimination), section 15 (discrimination arising from disability), section 19 (indirect discrimination), and sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010 (failure to make reasonable adjustments) are unsuccessful and dismissed.[2]The claimant’s claim for victimisation contrary to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010, together with the other claims identified within the separate case management summary will proceed to a final hearing currently listed for 25 April to 28 April 2022.
REASONS
[3]This hearing was listed as a video hearing. At the commencement of the hearing, the claimant had IT problems. While we were unable to resolve these IT problems, the claimant was able to fully participate within the hearing by telephone and informed the tribunal that she was happy to proceed on that basis. It was agreed with both parties that the ‘relevant time’ in this matter is between 1 November 2018 and 2 October 2020. I was provided with a bundle of documentation stretching to 380 pages.[4]The claimant gave evidence by reference to her impact statement and she was cross-examined. I was also provided with the claimant’s GP notes and a report from Prof. Long dated May 2021 The evidence can be summarised as set out below.[5]The claimant is relying upon the condition of post-traumatic stress disorder. Her condition was first formally diagnosed by Prof Long in May 2021 but I was referred to previous mentions within her medical records of suspected PTSD and the symptoms of PTSD.[6]She has suffered from anxiety since childhood as well as sleep disorders, phobias, panic attacks and tachycardia. She had a major episode in March 2016, triggered by the award ceremony incident, which made her seek intervention of the mental health services through Northampton changing minds.[7]She has relied upon medication (Propranol, diazepam for anxiety and zopiclone for insomnia for decades.) During the course of cross-examination the claimant said: 7.1. during the relevant period she was prescribed diazepam for anxiety on six separate occasions in November and December 2018, April 2019 and March July and September 2020. Each prescription was for 2 to 5 days’ worth of tablets. The claimant did not necessarily take the entire course when prescribed. She might feel that they were needed one day but not the next. 7.2. the claimant had taken Sertraline for a two-week period only [noted at a GP appointment to November 2018]. 7.3. the claimant had, but did not take propranolol. 7.4. The claimant agreed that over the two-year period she was not taking very much medication. She said she wished to manage her anxiety without medication, and while her doctor encouraged her to take antidepressants, she preferred to manage her low mood/depression in other ways. The claimant referred to calming methods. 7.5. The claimant agreed that she attended her GP on two occasions in November 2018, on one occasion in June 2019 and not at all in 2020. 7.6. The claimant said that she was meeting with a therapist on a regular basis during the relevant time. The claimant has attended CBT sessions in person and over the phone. There was medical evidence in the bundle referring to CBT, but no actual notes of the therapy. The claimant said that the aim of the sessions were to help the claimant work through trauma that she has suffered historically. [It is noted that serious childhood trauma was recorded within Prof Long’s report.] However, as the claimant experienced problems at work, her CBT sessions focused on helping her cope at work as the treatment from the respondent had exacerbated her symptoms. This meant that the claimant has not fully dealt with the cause of her initial trauma.[8]The claimant says that her condition affects how she travels, communication and sleep. She says that she suffers: 8.1. Tachycardia - being tiredness, chest pain and a pounding heartbeat; the GP records note that the claimant has been sent for cardiology assessment, and claimant says that no cardiology cause has been found. 8.2. Trouble sleeping, insomnia, nightmares causing tiredness and stress; being unable to fall asleep because of anxiety and agitation; difficulty sleeping and poor quality sleep because of frequent nightmares; sleep behaviour disorder in the form of sleepwalking. waking up at a slight noise and not getting back to sleep because of having to make checks inside and outside of the home. Checking everything before leaving the house. 8.3. avoidance behaviour - described as not being able to drive outside of her comfort zone for fear of flashbacks being triggered and certain roads are avoided completely. The claimant explained that: 8.3.1. she had been driving for 20 years and was able to drive. She drove to the shops, to doctors, for shopping, for work, to see friends and to drop her daughter to friends. The claimant said she had never driven on motorways. She can drive on dual carriageways and does drive on the A45. She accepted that she could get anywhere in the country without using a motorway. 8.3.2. The claimant says that these days her comfort zone is a 6 mile radius. She tends to make the same journeys. For longer journeys she would choose to take public transport. 8.3.3. The claimant was asked what she cannot do and said: 8.3.3.1. there was one occasion when she was asked to make a journey for work. She wanted to drive. She set up the maps. She was frozen by anxiety and could not do so. 8.3.3.2. The claimant says that there are some’s trigger points in certain places that cause her anxiety. When the landscape changes it can trigger her anxiety. The roads she avoids completely are motorways, and some roads that have no landmark and are isolated. The claimant said that she avoids busy roads at certain points of the day. 8.3.4. The claimant said that she does not have any issue with public transport, unless incredibly busy. She gave the example that she would not use a crowded London tube. 8.4. The claimant said that she does not like speaking in front of an audience. She gave an example of an incident in 2016 where she had been nominated for an award that sparked severe anxiety. The claimant said she does not want to speak in front of a large group and does not put herself in those situations. The claimant recalled a further incident when she was asked to speak to people on health and safety without a chance to prepare. The claimant agreed that public speaking and unplanned interviews were not day-to-day activities. 8.5. An avoidance of busy shopping centres packed public spaces depending on levels of anxiety: 8.5.1. the claimant describes avoiding crowded shopping centres. She said that if she went to a car park and saw that it was full, she would choose not to go in and go somewhere else. If she could see walking into a supermarket that it was packed or too busy again, she would go somewhere else. She would shop in places that were not crowded. 8.5.2. The claimant said that she d avoided packed public places. When asked for an example she said that she would suffer with high anxiety should she go to an indoor concert in the standing area. She has been to concerts in the seated area. When leaving she would choose to leave area or wait until the end to avoid an anxiety inducing situation. 8.5.3. The claimant said that when going to see school productions, she would ‘hang back’ if parents were grouping around. She agreed that she would be able to have a look at whatever was on show. 8.6. A need to know who was attending meetings and be informed of changes in advance to avoid anxiety: 8.6.1. the claimant explained that she struggles to concentrate when there are changes that she was not anticipating. She referred to the last case management hearing when information was provided 15 minutes before the hearing. 8.6.2. The claimant referred to a situation during the redundancy consultation where a volunteer was required to attend. The claimant felt that the volunteer should not be involved and this caused her anxiety. The meeting was thereafter cancelled. 8.7. Trouble with concentration to the extent that she needs a quiet place to work and receive phone calls and have meetings and needs to have clear written instructions. She had difficulty retaining information when it is not provided in writing. 8.7.1. The claimant explained that she was unable to work in a chaotic environment. She was referring to the respondent’s work environment and stressed that this was not slight background noise but chaotic. The claimant explained that she had a quiet space at the back of the respondent’s services are needed to use it to look at paperwork/take calls and do jobs that require concentration. 8.8. Trouble with concentration to the extent that she needs a quiet place to work and receive phone calls and have meetings and needs to have clear written instructions. She had difficulty retaining information when it is not provided in writing. 8.8.1. The claimant explained that this related to her complaint that when working for the respondent she had a job description. The respondent moved the goalposts. They were adding tasks to her role that were not her responsibility. The claimant agreed that she did not need written instructions in daily life. The claimant agreed that there was no medical evidence linking any requirement for written instructions to her PTSD. 8.9. Hypervigilance and panic attacks - triggered by being around random, hostile and chaotic behaviour of other people. The claimant did not provide any details in relation to the effect of these matters on her day-to-day life. Prof Long indicated that the claimant was able to manage symptoms of panic attacks at an earlier stage. 8.10. Acne rosacea and recurring proctitis. The claimant agreed that neither of these conditions are said to have a detrimental impact on her normal day-to-day activities. Deliberations[9]The definition of disability can be found in section 6(1), Equality Act 2010: "A person (P) has a disability if P has a physical or mental impairment, and the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities". "Substantial" means "more than minor or trivial".[10]The claimant has a formal diagnosis from Prof. Long of PTSD from May 2021. Prof. Long’s report attributes the claimants PTSD to substantial and serious trauma suffered by the claimant as a child and references incidents within her adult life. The claimant suspected that she had PTSD prior to her diagnosis and there are references to potential PTSD, without formal diagnosis prior to May 2021. In the circumstances I conclude the balance of probability that the claimant has been diagnosed with PTSD from May 2021 and further, this condition was more likely to exist than not during the relevant period being 1 November 2018 and 2 October 2020. I therefore conclude that the claimant had a mental impairment during the relevant period.[11]I have considered the effect of any medication or treatment on the claimant’s condition. The claimant had taken some medication during the relevant period. She agreed during the course of cross-examination that she had not taking very much medication and it could be seen from the prescriptions that she was likely to have taken medication on less than 30 days over a 23 month period. I conclude that the effect of the medication on the claimant’s ability to undertake day-to-day activities during the relevant period was minimal.[12]I also considered the effect of the claimant’s ongoing therapy. I was not provided with any therapy notes. The claimant says that the aim of the sessions was to help the claimant work through trauma that she has suffered historically and conflict with the respondent. There was no evidence to suggest that the claimant’s therapy had any identifiable effect on the claimant’s ability to undertake day-to-day activities or that the claimant’s ability to undertake day-to-day activities had changed. I therefore conclude that this is not a case where the tribunal must identify and ignore the effect of medical or other treatment.[13]The next question is whether or not this impairment had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-today activities. The claimant has shown that any adverse effect would be ‘longterm’. The guidance to the Equality Act provides some help in assessing what day-to-day activities are. It says that, day-to-day activities are things people do on a regular or daily basis, and examples include shopping, reading and writing, having a conversation or using the telephone, watching television, getting washed and dressed, preparing and eating food, carrying out household tasks, walking and travelling by various forms of transport, and taking part in social activities. Normal day-to-day activities can include general work-related activities, and study and education related activities, such as interacting with colleagues, following instructions, using a computer, driving, carrying out interviews, preparing written documents, and keeping to a timetable or a shift pattern. In assessing the claimant’s ability to carry out her normal day-to-day activities I have sought to focus on what the claimant cannot do.[14]Driving: The claimant does not drive on motorways. The claimant avoids dual carriageways at certain times of the day out they are likely to be busy. The claimant avoids certain roads that she considers isolated. The claimant referred to a single incident where anxiety prevented her from making a journey. The claimant agreed during the course of cross-examination that she was able to drive on roads other than motorways. It is difficult to assess the claimant’s as the claimant’s evidence was that she does not tend to or need to drive outside of her familiar trips. The claimant chooses to take public transport for longer trips and conceded during the course of crossexamination that there was nowhere that she could not get to even while avoiding motorways. In assessing the entirety of information available, I conclude that: 14.1. the driving that the claimant cannot do does not form part of day-today activities. 14.2. If I am wrong, the claimant’s avoidance strategy, such as taking a less busy route, are steps that can be reasonably taken by the claimant to modify her behaviour to reduce the effects of the impairment of normal day-to-day activities. A dislike or tendency for people to avoid motorways or particular busy roads is not unusual and steps to avoid these situations are reasonably taken by people without PTSD. This results in a situation whereby the effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities is no longer ‘substantial’.[15]Busy/crowded places. The claimant referred to using a very busy/crowded London tube. The situation was hypothetical one as the claimant lives in Northampton. The claimant states that she could not attend a busy concert in the standing area. She clarified that she could and had attended concerts in the seating area. The claimant avoided busy shopping centers, saying that she would shop at quieter places or at quieter times. I conclude that: 15.1. Accessing crowded areas to the extent of a standing area of a concert/ very busy shops /shopping centers/does form part of ‘normal day-to-day activities’. 15.2. If I am wrong, the claimant’s avoidance strategy, such as choosing to attend a seated rather than standing concert, to shop in a quieter shop or at a less busy time, are steps that can be reasonably taken by the claimant to modify her behaviour to reduce the effects of the impairment on normal day-to-day activities. I have considered the extent to which it is reasonable to expect the claimant to place such restrictions on her working and personal life. The claimant explained in the course of crossexamination that she had easy access to shops that were not too large or crowded. A dislike of very crowded places is common and these are common avoidance techniques of people who do not like or have difficulty with crowded spaces. This results in a situation whereby the effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities cannot be considered ‘substantial’.[16]Public speaking/unplanned interviews. The claimant’s main example in relation to this relates to the incident in 2016 where the claimant was nominated for an award. The second example provided was an unplanned interview where the claimant did not have a chance to properly prepare. The claimant conceded during the course of cross-examination that these were not normal day-to-day activities and I conclude that these types of activities do not fall into the category of ‘normal day-to-day activities’.[17]Need to know who is attending meetings /dealing with changes/ struggling to concentrate. The claimant refers to an example within the redundancy process where an unexpected person was present. The claimant refers to difficulty with a late change before the last tribunal hearing. Within submissions the claimant said that she had difficulty in remembering the respondent’s counsel’s submissions during this hearing. I was not referred to any medical evidence that links this stated inability to the claimant’s PTSD and conclude that the claimant has not shown that this difficulty is linked to her PTSD. If I am wrong, consider that occasions such as ‘redundancy consultation exercises and litigation hearings do not fall within ‘normal day-today activities’.[18]Inability to work in a chaotic environment. This appeared to be a report of alleged unreasonable/unjustifiable/discriminatory behaviour on the part of the respondent in requesting the claimant to undertake work that requires concentration in a highly unsuitable workplace. There was no medical evidence linking the claimants PTSD to this inability. In assessing whether or not the claimant is a disabled person, I conclude on the balance of probability that an ‘inability to work in a chaotic environment’ does not arise from the claimants PTSD, nor is it a normal day-to-day activity, in that it is something that most people would be unable to do;[19]Requirement for clear written instructions. This also appeared to be a report of alleged unreasonable/unjustifiable/discriminatory behaviour on the part of the respondent in unreasonably adding tasks to the claimant’s role. The claimant conceded that she did not need to clear written instructions in any other areas of her activities. There was no medical evidence suggesting that there was a link to PTSD. I conclude on the balance of probability that an ‘the claimant’s requirement for written instructions to the extent that it exists does not arise from the claimant’s PTSD. Further, nor do I consider that dealing with an employer who is perceived to ‘move the goalposts’ a normal day-to-day activity.[20]Other symptoms. While the claimant told the tribunal that she suffered from tachycardia and various sleep related conditions, hypervigilance and panic attacks, no detail is provided. There are references to panic attacks in the claimant’s earlier medical notes but no evidence was provided by the claimant detailing panic attacks during the relevant time or/and any effect on her ability to carry out normal day to day activities. The claimant suffered from acne rosacea and recurring proctitis however she agreed that neither of these conditions are said to have a detrimental impact on her day-to-day activities.[21]In light of the above I conclude that the claimant is not a disabled person as defined within the Equality Act 2010.[22]While this hearing did not deal with the respondent’s knowledge. For the sake of completeness, I note that in the event I had concluded that the claimant was a disabled person by reference to PTSD as she has alleged, there would be an obvious question to be answered in relation to the respondent’s possible knowledge of such a condition in circumstances where the claimant only received a diagnosis of that condition following the termination of her employment.[23]The claimant requested written reasons for the decision at the conclusion of the hearing.
Introduction
[1]The background to this Preliminary Hearing is as follows:[2]The Respondent is a small, not for profit organisation that distributes excess food to a shop and two cafes. The Claimant was employed by them as a Project Co-ordinatory between 1 November 2018 and 2 October 2020.[3]At a Preliminary Hearing on 21 January 2021: i. The first claim (presented on 23 April 2020) was identified as a claim of disability discrimination and 26 allegations of discrimination were set out. ii. The second claim (presented on 14 June 2020) was identified as a claim of victimisation, alleged by the Claimant to be as a result of submitting her first claim. Eight allegations of detriment were set out. iii. The allegations of discrimination and victimisation were recorded with blanks regarding certain times and dates, and the Claimant was ordered to provide that missing information by 9 April 2021. On 4 April 2021, the Claimant provided that information, setting out in more detail each of the 26 allegations of discrimination and 8 allegations of victimisation.[4]At a Preliminary Hearing on 24 May 2021: iv. The third claim (presented 30 December 2020) was identified as a claim for holiday pay, disability discrimination and unfair dismissal. The Claimant has less than two years’ service but said the reason for her dismissal was that she had made a protected disclosure. The Case Management Summary records the Claimant as saying the protected disclosure was that she had reported to the Information Commissioner that she had been incorrectly identified on the First Respondent’s website as its data controller.[5]At a Preliminary Hearing on 8 July 2021: v. It was found that the Claimant was not a disabled person within the Equality Act 2010 and her claims of disability discrimination were struck out. vi. As regards the claim of victimisation, in addition to the initial 8 allegations of detriment, a further 8 allegations of detriment were identified (albeit in general form). The protected acts were said to be the lodging of an appeal on 20 January 2020 against the outcome of the Claimant’s first grievance and the issue of the first tribunal claim on 23 April 2020. vii. The issues in the claim for holiday pay were identified. viii. As regards her claim for automatic unfair dismissal, the Claimant identified the protected disclosure as being that she had wrongly been identified as the data protection officer by the Respondents but stated she did not believe she had suffered any detriment or that the disclosure was the reason for the termination of her employment. The Claimant was told by the Judge that there did not appear to be a basis for her claim, and she was ordered to state on what grounds she believed she had such a claim within 14 days of receipt of the record of the Preliminary Hearing and why it should not be struck out. ix. The matter was set down for hearing for 4 days from 25-28 April 2022 at the Cambridge Employment Tribunal.[6]By email dated 21 July 2021 the Claimant alleged she had made complaints about health and safety and food safety during the period between 2019 and September 2020, and that she had raised concerns with Environmental Health when she did not receive a satisfactory response from the First Respondent.[7]By email dated 11 August 2021 the Claimant stated she wished to rely on protected disclosures of raising public interest disclosures about food safety with Northampton Environmental Health on 19 June 2020 as the reason for her redundancy, and therefore her claim should not be struck out. Further, the claim was not time-barred as she was made redundant on 2 October 2020 and her (third) claim was submitted on 30 December 2020. She also stated that she wished to rely on complaints made to the Second and Third Respondents about lack of hot running water, various food safety requirements (such as temperatures of chilled foods, and the keeping of food records), the First Respondent’s liability insurance, and blocked fire exits during her furlough. The Claimant repeated some of the alleged acts of detriment previously relied upon in her victimisation claim. It was unclear if, or to what extent, those alleged acts were sought to be relied upon as detriments for making protected disclosures.[8]By letter of 16 August 2021, the Respondents noted that there had already been three Preliminary Hearings in the matter and that in the Case Management Order dated 15 July 2021 (pertaining to the Preliminary Hearing on 8 July 2021) the Tribunal had ordered that the parties cooperate and seek to agree a final list of issues within 21 days of receiving that order. However, in the light of the Claimant’s email of 11 August 2021, that order was impossible to comply with. The Respondents submitted that the Claimant was attempting to tailor her claims at each step of the tribunal process, depending upon the content of the Respondents’ responses and the Tribunal’s judgments. It noted that the Claimant’s application to amend the claim was being made nearly 8 months after receipt of the first Case Management Order in which the detriment claims were identified as disability discrimination claims and one month after the Preliminary Hearing at which the Tribunal found the Claimant was not a disabled person within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010, resulting in those allegations being stuck out. The Respondent made an application to strike out the claims.[9]On 3 September 2021 the Respondents wrote to the Claimant putting her on notice that should she continue to pursue her claims for automatic unfair dismissal, victimisation and loss of wages, they would make an application for costs.[10]On 5 December 2021, the matter was listed for an Open Preliminary Hearing to:(i) Consider any application to amend the claim;(ii) Seek to finalise a comprehensive list of issues;(iii) Consider whether either by application of a party or on the tribunal’s own initiative if appropriate, any claim or part of a claim should be: i. Made subject to a deposit order in accordance with rule 39 ii. Struck out in accordance with rule 37.[11]By email of 18 February 2022, the Claimant sent through a list of what she described as ‘Final Issues’. Of the list of allegations of discrimination and victimisation identified at the first Preliminary Hearing, 16 were now said to be detriments for reporting health and safety issues, four were said to be detriments (included being selected for redundancy) for health and safety disclosures, and eight were said to be acts that had happened after raising a health and safety issue by text message. Only three/four matters were identified as being detriments for doing a protected act within the meaning of s.27 Equality Act. Amendment[12]At the hearing, the Claimant sought to amend her claim in two respects: - To bring a claim of automatic unfair dismissal under s. 103A Employment Rights Act, on the basis that the reason or principal reason for dismissal was that she made the alleged protected disclosures referred to in her emails of 21 July 2021, 11 August 2021 and 18 February 2022 (which, for ease of reference, will be referred to generically as health and safety disclosures). - To bring a claim of being subjected to detriments under s. 47B Employment Rights Act for making protected health and safety disclosures.[13]The first point, as Mr Ratledge submitted, is that the precise scope of the amendments sought still remain unclear (Ladbrokes Racing Ltd v Traynor EAT 0067/06). The allegations appear to rely on many alleged protected disclosures made over a protracted period, namely between 2019 to September 2020, and the Claimant hasn’t provided details of the content of the alleged disclosures, to whom they were made and when, or how they are said to constitute protected disclosures. It follows that I could not properly make an order allowing the amendments without the provision of significant further particulars identifying the essential elements of the new claims sought to be made.[14]As regards the claim for automatic unfair dismissal for health and safety disclosures, the Claimant says she referred to this claim in her third ET1. In this respect the Claimant refers to part of the Claim Form that says, in the course of a narrative account of the redundancy process, “We were told that all stock was being given away to the most needy due to the pandemic and because of health and safety concerns…” This is plainly not an allegation that the Claimant was dismissed because she had raised health and safety concerns. Further, as stated above, the second Preliminary Hearing records the Claimant as having stated that the protected disclosure relied upon in the context of her unfair dismissal claim was that she had reported to the Information Commissioner that she was incorrectly identified on the First Respondent’s website as its data controller, and this was the basis for, and subject of, the discussion about the claim for automatic unfair dismissal at the third Preliminary Hearing. I therefore find that the claim for automatic unfair dismissal on the ground of making health and safety disclosures is a new cause of action that has been brought out of time.[15]As regards the detriments claims, the Claimant relies on a section of the narrative contained in box 9.2 of her first claim headed “What compensation are you seeking?” which states “When I tried to report health and safety concerns I was blocked and the focus was turned to my work”. She also points to the following sentences contained in her lengthy particulars provided on 8 April 2021: “My communications with Tracy McCormick were also blocked after raising several food safety issues. Instead of my concerns the H & S role was taken away from me. I was instructed not to communicate with Tracey.” Notably, however, the Claimant ticked only the box headed ‘disability discrimination’ on the Claim Form and the claim was identified at the first Preliminary Hearing as being a disability discrimination claim; the two sentences referred to above were in fact provided as further particulars of the seventh listed allegation of discrimination, namely “Since November [dates] 2019 the claimant was prevented [by who] from supporting staff [which staff] [in what way]”. The Claimant didn’t state that she had intended, or wanted, to bring a claim of being subjected to detriments on grounds of making disclosures about health and safety at any of the three previous Preliminary Hearings (only seeking to do so once her claims for disability discrimination had been struck out). I therefore consider that the first claim was neither brought nor understood as such a claim and that the claim for detriments now being brought is also a new claim.[16]In any event, the claims the Claimant is now seeking to bring plainly do not depend simply on facts already contained in the claim form but range much wider than that. It is clear from the Claimant’s emails referred to above that the amendments sought would be substantial and would change very significantly the scope of the factual enquiry needing to be undertaken by the Tribunal. The case is set down for a 4-day hearing between 25-28 April 2022 (about 6 weeks away). If the amendments were made, aside from the difficulty of attempting to pin down the Claimant’s (new) case, the Respondents would need to serve an amended response, conduct a further disclosure exercise, and prepare to meet an entirely different case from the one anticipated when the matter was set down for hearing. It is almost inevitable that the hearing would need to be vacated and relisted for a hearing much later in the year, or, more likely, next year.[17]Finally, not only are the amendments being sought at a very late stage in the day, but after the Tribunal has already conducted three Preliminary Hearings concerning this matter. The Claimant told me she had been confused between a protected act for the purposes of s. 27 of the Equality Act 2010 and a protected disclosure for the purposes of the s. 47B Employment Rights Act 1996, and I realise both that the law is complicated and that she is a litigant in person. However it is apparent from the records of the previous Preliminary Hearings that the three different judges conducting them went to great lengths to help the Claimant articulate and formulate her claim, and at no time does she appear to have told them that she thought that what happened to her in the work place, culminating in her dismissal on grounds of redundancy, happened because she made complaints about health and safety, or food safety – which wouldn’t have required her to have a knowledge of the law.[18]It follows that I consider the balance of hardship and injustice is plainly against allowing the amendments, and the application to amend the claim is dismissed.[19]It follows that there is no basis for the claim of unfair dismissal and I strike out that claim. Application for strike-out/deposit order[20]As regards her claim of victimisation under s. 27 Equality Act 2010, the Claimant stated that she was now only relying on the three or four detriments set out in her email of 18 February 2022 (four allegations set out in three bullet points). After discussion, these were clarified as follows:(1) On 25 January 2020 the Second Respondent delayed an offer of mediation and support from occupational health until after the Claimant’s appeal against the outcome of the first grievance had been heard. The protected act is said to be the Claimant’s appeal against the outcome of her first grievance (which outcome she received on 14 January 2020).(2) On 18 March 2020 the Claimant was offered a large piece of work by Rebecca Taylor which was withdrawn on 19 March 2020. The protected act is said to be the Claimant’s 3rd grievance dated 18 March 2020.(3) On 20 March 2020 the Claimant was placed on paid leave by Rebecca Taylor. The protected act is said to be the Claimant’s 4th grievance dated 20 March 2020.(4) On 13 May 2020, Rebecca Taylor withdrew an offer of mediation. The protected act is said to be the lodging of the Claimant’s First Tribunal claim on 23 April 2020.[21]As regards her holiday pay, the Claimant maintained that she had not been paid the correct holiday pay and that she had worked bank holidays for which she had not been paid.[22]Mr Ratledge sought to strike out the victimisation claim and claim for holiday pay on the basis the claims had no reasonable prospect of success and argued in the alternative that a deposit order should be paid on the grounds they had little reasonable prospect of success. In this respect he submitted the Claimant had not articulated a link between the alleged detriments and the alleged protected acts, and that the third alleged detriment was not capable of constituting a detriment. As regards the claim for holiday pay, he submitted the Respondents had provided an answer to the Claimant’s claims and she was wrong to believe she was still owed pay.[23]I reject those submissions. Without any consideration of the evidence it is not possible to say that the remaining claims have no or little prospect of success. Whether or not the Claimant was subjected to the alleged detriments and if so, whether that was because she had done a protected act within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 will depend upon what the Claimant and the Respondents’ witness say about those matters at the hearing. Further I do not accept that being placed on paid leave cannot amount to a detriment – being excluded from a workplace one wants to attend, may very well constitute a detriment, even if paid. As regards the claim for holiday pay, again, without evidence, I cannot say the claim has no or little reasonable prospect of success simply because the Respondents tell me it has.[24]Accordingly, the application to strike the claims of victimisation and holiday pay, and/or for a deposit order, is dismissed.[25]Finally, I record that Case Management Orders were made at the conclusion of the hearing which are set out in a separate document.