Mrs H S Parhar v Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council: 3303977/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3303977/2024

Between

Mrs Harvinder Sarohi PARHARClaimant

Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council RECORD OF A PRELIMINARY HEARINGRespondent

Before

First Tier Tribunal Judge Davison sitting as an Employment Judge

Ms J Majitha Counsel for respondent

Date 12 December 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s application to amend her claim to include claims of constructive unfair dismissal, victimisation and whistleblowing is refused.

REASONS

[1]The relevant background to the application to amend the claim can be summarised as follows. On 15 April 2024 an ET1 was received. The claimant stated, at paragraph 8.1 of the same, that she wished to bring claims of race and disability discrimination. The summary facts to the claim were set in an appended document.

[2]In the document appended to the ET 1 the claimant asserts, ‘I have also spoken to Protect in regards to whistleblowing, spoken to the Housing Regulator and the Health and safety executive (all without mentioning the Council by name) Protect have agreed I can whistleblow on the council…..’

[3]From this I find that the claimant had discussed the possibility of which claims could be advanced prior to the service of the ET 1, the possibility of a whistleblowing claim was raised but then not specifically made in the ET1.

[4]Following a preliminary hearing, on 5 December 2024, the Tribunal, in order to better understand the nature of the claims being advanced, made various Orders 1 of 5 regarding details of the claims that the claimant may wish to advance. Nothing specific was provided.

[5]The claim was listed for a final hearing in September 2025. This hearing did not take place due to the lack of an available Judge. However, on 28 August 2025 the claimant had filed an ‘Application to amend the particulars of Claim’. This asserted that the claimant, as a litigant in person, had failed to fully set out and identify the statutory provisions relied upon “though the factual matrix has always been set out.” It was asserted that the amended grounds attached “do not raise new factual allegations.” The claimant’s representative accepted at the hearing that this was not a correct categorisation of the amendment application. It was not a simple rebadging exercise of already pleaded facts. On multiple occasions he stated that the claims as initially pleaded were unclear and this was an application to add new claims and raise new factual matters.

[6]The amended particulars of claim are at page 34 of the bundle prepared for the hearing. I find that these are not particularised. By way of example the victimisation claim states no more than “the suspension and fraud investigation were reprisals for raising a protected act (complaint of racial abuse).” There are no specifics as to when this protected act was made, to whom it was made or any of the usual detail that would be required.

[7]The claimant has also filed a list of issues for the preliminary hearing. This expands upon the amended particulars of claim but again is lacking any specific detail. Again by way of example when considering the section 15 claim the claimant advances issues such as “denial of reasonable access to evidence” and “withholding adjustments”. Without stating what evidence she has been denied access to or what adjustments were withheld. The claim is lacking any specifics against which the respondent could reply.

[8]The above is a brief summary of the events leading up to the application. The full details were in the bundle provided for the hearing.

[9]In the case of Selkent Bus Company Limited v Moore

[1996] ICR 836

the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) set out the test to be applied by a Tribunal in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant an amendment. It said the Tribunal should take into account all the circumstances and should balance the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. The EAT in Selkent also set out a list of factors which are certainly relevant, which are usually referred to as the “Selkent factors”. In brief they are:(1) The nature of the amendment i.e. whether the amendment sought is one of the minor matters or is a substantive alteration pleading a new cause of action;

(2) The applicability of time limits. If a new complaint of cause of action is proposed to be added by way of amendment it is essential for the Tribunal to consider whether that complaint is out of time and if so whether the time limit should be extended; and 2 of 5

(3) The timing and manner of the application. An application should not be refused solely because there has been a delay in making it. There are no time limits laid down in the rules for making amendments, but delay is a discretionary factor. It is relevant to consider why the application was not made earlier and why it is now being made (for example the discovery of new facts or new information).

[10]In the case of Vaughan v Modality Partnership

UKEAT/0147/20/BA

the EAT reminded parties and Tribunals that the core test in considering applications to amend is the balance of injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the application. The exercise starts with the parties making submissions on the specific practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment. That balancing exercise is fundamental. The Selkent factors should not be treated as if they are a list to be checked off.

[11]The issue of amendment applications was more recently discussed in CX v Secretary of State for Justice

[2025] EAT 114

[12]All the above guidance has been considered in assessing this application. Analysis of the practical impact of granting or refusing the application must be undertaken. In determining whether to grant an application to amend, an employment tribunal must always carry out a careful balancing exercise of all the relevant factors, having regard to the interests of justice and to the relative hardship that would be caused to the parties by granting or refusing the amendment.

[13]The hardship and injustice test is a balancing exercise. Lady Smith noted in Trimble and anor v North Lanarkshire Council and anor EATS 0048/12 that it is inevitable that each party will point to there being a downside for them if the proposed amendment is allowed or not allowed.

[14]I have considered the original ET 1 claim form and the documents provided in support of the application to amend. i) nature of the amendment

[15]I find the substantive amendments sought are not of clerical or typographical nature. It is a change to the heads of claim to constructive unfair dismissal, victimisation and whistleblowing. Additional facts concerning events are being relied upon and further factual evidence would need to be provided to substantiate the claims. Whilst there is some overlap as the claimant alleges that the victimisation she alleges links to her disability and/ or race claim. The proposed amendments do change the basis of the existing claims. The hearing listed in April 2026 for 3 days would almost certainly have to be vacated, more evidence provided and further legal issues to be considered if the amendment were granted. I therefore find the amendment is not clerical or typographical but far more substantive. I find the amendment is not therefore a minor change. ii) applicability of time limits 3 of 5

[16]The application would be out of time given that it is a substantive new head of claim. In order for it to be admitted the time limit would have to be extended on a just and equitable basis. The claimant had spoke to an organisation prior to lodging her ET1, has had assistance at various times since. It is now some time since the ET1 was lodged and the claim was set down for a final hearing. I find these claims to be out of time, this is not in dispute, but in the circumstances I do not find it would be just and equitable to extend time. iii) the timing and manner of the application

[17]An application should not be refused solely because there has been a delay in making it as amendments may be made at any stage of the proceedings. Delay in making the application is, however, a discretionary factor. It is relevant to consider why the application was not made earlier and why it is now being made.

[18]The Presidential Guidance on General Case Management for England and Wales notes the Selkent provisions are not intended to be an exhaustive list. There may thus be additional factors to consider in any particular case (Conteh v First Security Guards Ltd EAT 0144/16).

[19]I have therefore considered all matters advanced including the Selkent provisions. As noted the claimant’s grounds for seeking an amendment are lack of legal understanding at the time of lodging her claim as a litigant in person.

[20]As noted above in Vaughan v Modality Partnership

2021 ICR 535

, EAT, His Honour Judge James Tayler emphasised that the core test in considering applications to amend is the balance of injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the application. The parties must therefore make submissions on the specific practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment. The claimant’s representative stated that the claimant would be prohibited from raising heads of claim that were, at least in part, apparent in her ET 1. She would therefore be denied justice.

[21]The claimant’s representative stated there was no real hardship caused to the respondent or prejudice if the application were to be granted. Whilst some additional facts would need consideration these matters can be accommodated and so the overall balance lay in the claimant’s favour. For the respondent, a detailed grounds of resistance had been served dated 2 September 2025. Having reviewed these factors I find that there have been several additional factual elements advanced by the claimant. There is a lack of detail to the claims now advanced. I also find it of note that an Employment Judge had directed that any further claims needed to be clarified over 12 months ago.

[22]The claimant can advance her claims for race and disability discrimination and any facts that go to establish the same can be relied upon. She still therefore has claims to advance. If the hearing date scheduled in April 2026 is lost the matter may well not be relisted for many months, this can affect the memory of those involved, leave the matters hanging over everyone concerned and delay the 4 of 5 outcome of the hearing. The respondent would also be put to a great deal more work in addressing, in particular, the allegations of whistleblowing.

[23]I finally note the timing of this application, it was not served until very shortly before the listing of the final hearing. Although this hearing was adjourned the claimant has had assistance initially through Protect and a Trade Union representative was mentioned. The hearing is listed for 3 days in April 2006. Whilst arguably the hearing could be delayed and costs awarded to the respondent for any inconvenience and delay caused (although it is possible that the claimant would have insufficient funds to be able to pay), for the reason given above and in considering all matters in the overall balance, the Selkent factors and the others listed above, I refuse the application to amend. The fact that the claimant is a litigant in person does not excuse her failure to set out the narrative on which she wishes to advance her claims. Further, as noted above the Tribunal had also considered the same and provided a further opportunity for the claimant to clarify the claim she wished to advance over 12 months ago. To allow such substantive amendments, at this late stage, I find would unfairly tip the balance of injustice and hardship against the respondent.

[24]The application to amend is therefore refused. Approved by: First Tier Tribunal Judge Davison sitting as an