Mr G EmokpaeClaimantForemost Care UK LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge O’DempseyN Aghayere (instructed by solicitor) for respondentDate 19 September 2025
JUDGMENT
The claimant satisfied section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 at all material times. JUDGMENT[1]The Respondent’s application to strike out the claim is dismissed. Approved by
REASONS
[1]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent from 1 April 2023 until, at the latest, 16 January 2024 as a Domiciliary Care Assistant. There is some debate about the exact date of the termination of his employment. I will address that in my factual findings but it is of no real relevance to the claim.[2]After a period of ACAS conciliation, the Claimant presented his claim form on 25 March 2024 making two allegations of disability discrimination. These were clarified at a preliminary hearing to be claims of discrimination arising from disability and discrimination by way of a failure to make reasonable adjustments. In relation to the allegation of discrimination arising from disability, the Claimant claims that he was dismissed due to a sickness absence caused by his disability. The purported failure to make reasonable adjustments related to an alleged refusal to permit the Claimant to work only on 3 days in any week.[3]In determining the claim, I considered a file extending to some 149 pages. Some additional documents were supplied separately, notably a health questionnaire completed by the Claimant during the application process for employment with the Respondent, consisting of four pages. I also had some screenshots that had been provided in relation to a strike out application that I dismissed yesterday, at the outset of the hearing.[4]I also referred to a file of witness statements including statements from the Claimant and from a human resources advisor for the Respondent (the “HR Advisor”). I heard from both of those witnesses at the hearing and am very grateful for their input.[5]When I make findings of facts, I have done so on the balance of probabilities, considering all of the information that was available to me. That includes the documents within the file and what the witnesses said at the hearing. The evidence on disability[6]A preliminary hearing had been held in May this year to determine whether the Claimant should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 so far as these proceedings are concerned. The Tribunal decided that he should be considered disabled, but the only information available to me about that decision was the judgment. It was in very short form, simply declaring that the Claimant was disabled “at all material times”. This must include May 2023 as this is when the Claimant says that the Respondent refused his request to work on only 3 days of any week. The Tribunal’s reasons were given orally at that hearing and they had not been requested in writing so there was no further information available to me. This is not intended as a criticism; there was no obvious reason for the parties to request such reasons and require the Tribunal to spend time preparing them when there are many other cases waiting to be progressed. However, it made it difficult for me to ascertain the basis to the decision, the impairment that the Claimant suffered and the nature of the substantial and longterm adverse effects it caused. At the hearing it was agreed by the parties that the Claimant’s disability was caused by a physical impairment, notably the presence of a lipoma on his back, and its effects on him (principally with respect to mobility and pain).[7]On the basis of what I have seen and heard (which may well be less extensive than the evidence previously before the Tribunal, but includes what appears to be a full set of the Claimant’s medical records), it is not inherently obvious to me why the Tribunal found that the adverse effects of the lipoma were “substantial and long-term” such as to have amounted to a disability as defined in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. Schedule 1, paragraph 2, of that Act states that “longterm” means the substantial adverse effects must have subsisted, or be likely to subsist, for over 12 months. Again, no criticism is intended and it is not for me to reconsider or review that previous decision. I accept it. That previous decision is not directly relevant to my decision as the Claimant’s disability is not in issue before me. However, the background to the Claimant’s disability, what he likely told the Respondent about it (a matter about which I had to make findings), and what the Respondent was reasonably capable of ascertaining from that information is directly relevant to my decision, in that I have to assess whether the Respondent could reasonably have been aware of the Claimant’s disability at the relevant times. Accordingly, I have felt it necessary to dwell somewhat on the available evidence around the Claimant’s health condition. This includes considering whether, even if the Respondent knew of the Claimant’s lipoma and its effects, it could be expected to realise such effects amounted to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. If all the Respondent could reasonably be expected to know was that the lipoma amounted to a short-term and transient health issue, it would consequently have no real or implied knowledge that its effects amounted to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.
The facts
[8]As a preliminary observation, I note that the disclosure and preparation of documents for the hearing appeared not to have been as complete as it could have been. It is for the parties to choose what documents they wish to rely on and to present before the Tribunal. However, when there are clear gaps in correspondence relating to key contested issues, it is far more helpful if the Tribunal has access to all relevant correspondence from the time, certainly in a case such as this where the available documentation was particularly limited. I will highlight during my findings of fact where there appear to be gaps in the correspondence. Ultimately, it was not an issue that prevented my fair determination of the claim, however.[9]Doing the best that I could from the documents available and from the witness statements, I found the relevant facts to be as follows.[10]The Claimant is a foreign national who requires a visa to be lawfully resident and working in the UK. Up until early 2023 he was living in the UK on a student visa and was undertaking part-time work, including in at least 2 supermarkets – he mentioned Tesco and Sainsbury’s at the hearing. In early 2023, he applied for a full-time job with the Respondent.[11]The full-time role the Claimant applied for was as a domiciliary care assistant. The Claimant, having some medical background from when he was living in Nigeria, was aware that that sort of job was physically demanding. The Claimant said that he felt that he was able to perform the role successfully, full-time, when he applied for it. However, the Claimant was suffering with a lipoma at the time (essentially a lump on his back, towards the base of his neck). The medical records that I was presented with address the history of the Claimant’s lipoma and I will return to them.[12]The Claimant said at the hearing that he had experienced no issues due to his lipoma in his then-current job as a concierge or indeed in his previous supermarket jobs that he had undertaken as a student.[13]At around the same time as applying for the job, on 1 March 2023, the Claimant had an appointment with his GP to investigate his lipoma. The records state as follows: “has lipoma. had scan @ Lewisham last year – nil on EMIS now unable to sleep and move neck and constant headache since march last year. says has noticed changes – increase in size and now feels pain in that area. pain is worse on moving neck can feel tingling in hair and gets the pain then when gets neck pain also gets pain in [blank] had a scan noticed 1 month ago would like it removed says it is reducing quality of his life taking paracetamol works in concierge”.[14]Prior to this, the medical records show that the Claimant attended GP appointments in late 2022 and early 2023, but they made no reference to any particular symptoms the Claimant was suffering from any lipoma. Although the GP records the Claimant saying he had had a previous scan, the GP found no reference to one on the Claimant’s digital patient record. He also records the Claimant as saying he had only noticed the lipoma 1 month ago.[15]The GP referred the Claimant to the “lump and bumps clinic” to consider removal. I assume the reference to adverse symptoms persisting for a year and to the previous scan were an important part of the Tribunal’s reasons for concluding that the Claimant’s lipoma had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities “at all material times” (including in May 2023), thus amounting to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.[16]Shortly after this GP appointment, on 13 March 2023, during the application process to join the Respondent, the Claimant completed a health questionnaire. He completed it stating that he had no significant health issues. He answered “no” to the following questions:a. Do you have any physical limitations that may affect your ability to work?b. Do you have any difficulty in standing, bending, lifting or other movements?c. Are there any reasons to your knowledge that you may be unfit to work in the role you have applied for?[17]The Claimant made no reference to his lipoma or to any mobility issues it might be causing him. The form was not “blank” however; the Claimant had ticked “no” to most questions and stated that he had suffered “stress/anxiety lasted few days” in response to a question about that. That was all the health questionnaire recorded. A declaration was included at the foot of the form as follows. “Declaration I declare that all the above statements are true and complete to the best of my knowledge. I understand that any false declaration could lead to the termination of my contract”.[18]During the interview for his post, no further medical information was given. The Claimant’s application was then accepted. He was awarded a certificate of sponsorship to work 40 hours per week for the Respondent, which allowed the Claimant to obtain a visa to live and work in the UK.[19]The Claimant completed the required training for his role and shadowing of a colleague in April 2023. He says that, around that time (in mid-April), he raised in broad terms with one of the directors of the Respondent that he may experience some health difficulties in performing the role. He says he was offered a meeting to discuss the matter but no meeting was forthcoming. I had no objective evidence about that, but I see no reason to doubt that there was an informal conversation between the Claimant and a director. However, it is of very limited relevance as I found that such an informal conversation would have been brief and vague, hence the reference to a further meeting. As the Claimant’s health condition was not discussed in any detail, the Respondent would not have been aware of its nature, severity and effects.[20]The Claimant then started his new role. He initially expected to work three days, Monday 24 to Wednesday 26 April 2023, have Thursday off work, then work on the Friday. In fact, he was asked to work on that Thursday due to a colleague’s illness. He did so.[21]The Claimant found that he was working longer hours than he had expected to be working and that was taking a toll on his health. He felt unable to work on the Friday and he let the Respondent know by WhatsApp message, early in the morning. The Claimant never returned to work. He never presented a fit note in relation to that period, or for any period until early 2024, as I will come on to in due course.[22]The Respondent wrote to the Claimant on 5 May 2023 to say that it hoped that he felt better. Rather bizarrely, there was no reference in that exchange to when he may be able to return to work. The exchange showed, principally, that the Respondent was asking the Claimant for some information about his CV and his current address.[23]On 14 May 2023, the Claimant was asked to attend the Respondent’s office the next day. The Claimant ended up meeting with the Respondent on 17 May to discuss his situation, after a further GP appointment earlier that day.[24]The GP record from that day shows that the Claimant had been given an appointment with a surgeon for January 2024 and was seeking an earlier date. The records state “worsening symptoms – burning pain in area of lipoma past 6 months”.[25]His appointment with the surgeon was brought forward to on or around 7 June 2023. The surgeon wrote a letter to the Claimant’s GP on that date, stating that the Claimant was “generally fit and well” and had been added to the waiting list for a surgical excision of his lipoma “as a day case”. The surgery was initially scheduled for January 2024, but shortly prior this was pushed back to February 2024. Nothing in any of the medical records suggested any of the Claimant’s symptoms of lack of mobility and pain were likely to last beyond the excision. All this letter of 7 June 2023 mentioned was that the Claimant “has been troubled with a symptomatic lipoma on the back of his neck for the past 14 months”.[26]The issue that appeared to me most in dispute between the parties was what happened in the meeting between the Claimant and Respondent on 17 May 2023. The Claimant says that he outlined the issues his lipoma was causing him. He says that he asked to be allowed to work only three days in any week, with a rest day between every working day. The Respondent disagrees, saying that it was given no specific information about the Claimant’s health condition, save that he found the requirement to move between different people’s homes regularly to be stressful, which was preventing him from doing his job. The Respondent says that no discussion took place about his working pattern as the parties had instead agreed that the Claimant would leave his job and would provide a resignation letter to the Respondent. The Respondent says that it took no further action in relation to requesting any fit notes because it was expecting the Claimant to promptly resign.[27]There was no detailed record from any party about what was actually said at that meeting and no minutes of that meeting were presented to me. All that I had available by way of objective evidence was a series of WhatsApp messages from around that time and some follow-up emails.[28]On 18 May 2023 the Claimant wrote: “Good evening, Please what form is that? Send to my email [giving his email address]. Can’t make it to the office. Thanks”.[29]This is one of those instances where I have not been given a full and complete record of an exchange. Plainly, there were earlier messages on or around that date asking the Claimant to come into the office and discussing a form that he needed to complete. I was not provided with them.[30]The response and follow-up exchange was on 23 May 2023 as follows: Respondent: “Okay but I need that email we discussed about pls” Claimant: “No problem” Respondent: “You need to put our record straight” Claimant: “What record?” Respondent: “You don’t work with us anymore. You need to be off our record” Claimant: “I understand and i will do as we discussed last time” Respondent: “Am expecting the email today” Claimant: “Sorry, don’t have that time with all the evidences appended Except you just want me to type to you that I don’t work with you anymore. What I discussed with Mr Patrick was to get a medical report from my GP add it to the email as evidence why I can’t work with you anymore” Respondent: “Exactly That’s all we discussed” Claimant: “So that’s going to take some time. Although, my surgery has been rebooked for next month.” Respondent: “What will take time?” Claimant: “Getting the report” Respondent: “Just send the email first Put the reason you can’t work with us You can attach the GP appointment and indicate it is for the surgery” Claimant: “No problem I will do that before the close of the day or tomorrow” Respondent: “I will appreciate it today, thanks”.[31]The Claimant then “blocked” the person with whom he had been liaising. I note the reference to the rescheduled surgery was clearly to the appointment referred to above of around 7 June 2023.[32]The following day, after the person with whom the Claimant was communicating was “blocked” on WhatsApp, the HR Advisor wrote a WhatsApp message to the Claimant from a different number and also sent him an email. The WhatsApp exchange is at pages 114 to 116 of the file. The email was provided at page 135. The email was as follows. There does not seem to be any, or at least any substantial, difference between the two forms of words. “Dear Gregory Hope this email finds you well? This is a reminder about our discussion with you concerning your employment with our company on Wednesday 17th May 2023 which you said you can no longer continue based on your health. We have also observed that your health won’t permit you to be active on the job, as one’s health is of utmost importance. Kindly send him your withdrawal letter to enable us to do the needful. awaiting your prompt response. Thank you”.[33]The Claimant responded to that: “I have reached out to the girl who introduced me to the company and have requested for a refund of ten thousand pounds (£10,000) which I paid to be issued the COS [certificate of sponsorship]. Until I hear from her and she tells me the way forward, I won’t be granting your withdrawal letter. You can go ahead and do whatever you have to do as I have no obligation to consent to any request from you until mine is dealt with accordingly. Sorry if this is not the response you desired to hear as the fund is very important to me as the reputation of your company is to you. Accept my apologies”.[34]The following week, on 2 June 2023, the HR Advisor chased up saying: “Dear Gregory Hope you are doing well? As a follow-up to your last mail, I need to clarify here that we are not a party in this COS payment arrangement. However, as discussed and agreed at our meeting with you on 17th of May 2023, kindly send us your GP report concerning your inability to take up employment with our company to enable us to put our record straight. Awaiting your prompt response”.[35]I found these exchanges rather cryptic. It was difficult to make sound determinations about what in fact had happened at the meeting on 17 May and what each party’s real motivations throughout may have been. It appears the Claimant had paid somebody £10,000 to secure his certificate of sponsorship to obtain a work visa and his email suggests that he believed the Respondent had some knowledge of the arrangement, but may not have been directly responsible. The HR Advisor denies that the Respondent was “a party” to that arrangement, but doesn’t deny all knowledge of it.[36]All that was clear to me was that the HR Advisor’s account was not entirely accurate. I was told by her at the hearing that the Claimant had only raised “stress” as the health issue and that he could not work because of that. She said that no medical reports had been sought about that. However, that contradicts the WhatsApp messages from the time, which refer both to surgery and to a medical report that the Respondent said had been “discussed”. Surgery would have no obvious connection to “stress”. Furthermore, the account that I was given at the hearing does not sit comfortably beside the Respondent’s own statement of case in its ET3 response form that included the following wording: “The Claimant did not send in the required correspondence, instead he sent an email requesting for less working hours due to his health condition and informed the company that he had an appointment for a surgery”.[37]The “correspondence” referred to was an explanation of “why he can no longer work”. So, it’s clear to me that the Respondent had asked the Claimant for further correspondence explaining his health condition. I ought to add that this was another occasion on which I appear to have lacked copies of relevant correspondence – I did not see the email referred to in the ET3 response form.[38]On the other hand, the Claimant’s account that he had raised his physical difficulties, mentioned his surgery, and that he had requested an adjustment to his working pattern, were all supported by the contemporaneous documentation. It seems unlikely he would have decided to share this information only after the meeting, when he had been to see his GP the same morning.[39]Accordingly, and the only finding that I need to make, is that the Claimant did raise the issue of his lipoma and that that was causing him some physical symptoms, which the stress of his work was exacerbating. It was in any event an obvious subject to have discussed at the meeting because the Claimant had been off work for three weeks after only having worked 4 days. Naturally and logically the Respondent would have asked the Claimant how he was feeling and what issue he had been suffering. However, I find that the Claimant was focused on how he was currently feeling, without explaining the length of time he had been suffering. He had shortly before signed a health questionnaire saying that he had no physical health conditions, which said that he could be dismissed for providing misleading information. Additionally, from what he said at the hearing and the WhatsApp messages, he was obviously not keen on resigning or losing his job (in fact wanted to continue working, subject to an amended working pattern). He would have had a clear reason to minimise his symptoms, at least to an extent, to reassure the Respondent of his ability to work. So, I find that he would not have, and did not, explain that his symptoms had significantly preexisted that date (or if so, the extent of his symptoms, which is what matters for this case). Indeed, the Claimant had only recently (just over 2 months prior) sought medical advice about his lipoma for the first time and said at the hearing that he had been able to perform his previous work without difficulty. If the Claimant had stated that he had been suffering significantly for any great period of time preceding his employment, I would have expected the issue of him not having raised that in the health questionnaire to have been raised by the Respondent at that meeting, but no-one suggested it had been so I found it had not.[40]I also find that, at the meeting, the Claimant raised that he was due to have surgery on the lipoma, scheduled for January 2024, but that he had sought an earlier date that very morning. It may be that the January 2024 appointment was in fact only a preliminary consultation, but the Claimant did not seem to appreciate that, or at least I found that he did not inform the Respondent of that (in similar vein to the WhatsApp message he sent a week later on 23 May 2023, stating that his surgery “has been rebooked for next month”, when in fact it was only a preliminary consultation). I also find that he explored working fewer days with the Respondent. The ET3 response form accepts that he asked that, although only afterwards. In reality, whether it was at the meeting or shortly afterwards is of no importance to my determination. The Respondent rejected the request at the meeting (or shortly thereafter), which is why the Claimant did not return to work and why he brings his complaint in this regard.[41]After that meeting in May 2023 and the exchange that took place afterwards, it seems that nothing further took place until September 2023. It is rather unclear why that would have been the case. At the hearing, the HR Advisor said the Respondent had not wanted to dismiss the Claimant. It had wanted the Claimant to resign and had been having difficulty corresponding with him. This was not disputed by the Claimant, who said that during that period he was suffering with heightened anxiety and therefore was not engaging with the Respondent.[42]Again, I feel a little disappointed not to have been given a fuller picture of what happened during that time. Plainly, something did happen and further exchanges did take place. The Respondent said in its ET3 response form that: “The Company was patient with the Claimant and requested further information about his surgery and when he would be ready to return back to work. The Claimant was not forth coming with a response then finally gave a date for his medical appointment in December 2023. This was then cancelled with no new date”.[43]I have not seen any correspondence referring to any surgery that might have been planned for December 2023, nor have I seen any correspondence showing that the Respondent had sought any such information from the Claimant.[44]The Claimant also says in his ET1 claim form, and repeated at the hearing, that he had been engaging with somebody called “Mr Henry” who was a recruitment consultant and who had asked him to send a doctor’s letter to the Respondent. He did so on 23 September 2023. That letter was the letter dated 7 June 2023 referred to above that confirmed his appointment for surgery in January 2024.[45]From the evidence that was available, I concluded the reason why the Claimant’s employment was not terminated during this period is that the Respondent had tolerated not having been given full information from the Claimant and decided simply not to take any particular action during that time. This was likely to be in part because it had some sympathy for the Claimant, who required surgery, and it did not want to trouble him further as he had already said he was stressed by the situation.[46]I say all this a little hesitantly. In May 2023, the Respondent’s priority was to obtain a resignation letter. When that was not forthcoming, it felt it was important for it to have a copy of the Claimant’s medical reports for its “records”. None were provided for almost 4 months. It is worth noting that I was given no information at the hearing about the arrangements for the Claimant’s certificate of sponsorship and the role of the third party “girl” involved (who was referred to by the Claimant). I also considered it rather surprising that the Claimant’s absence was undocumented (for instance, by fit note). It had been largely ignored to begin with by the Respondent, despite the Claimant only recently starting his new job. All of this took place in the context of a sponsorship regime that typically involves numerous relatively onerous obligations on an employer, with strict sanctions for non-compliance. In light of all this, I certainly could not exclude that the arrangements surrounding the Claimant’s certificate of sponsorship may well have been an important part of the general context. Ultimately, however, that matter is irrelevant to these proceedings, so I considered it no further and made no particular findings about it. The exact reason why the Respondent tolerated the Claimant’s absence is unimportant for this claim.[47]After receiving the doctor’s letter dated 7 June 2023, stating that the Claimant was “generally fit and well”, the Respondent finally became more concerned about compliance with Home Office requirements in relation to the Claimant’s sponsorship. The HR Advisor sought advice from the Home Office about what to do in light of the Claimant’s extended sick leave. The Respondent was aware of an exception from the usual requirement to pay sponsored workers when they are on sick leave, but had understandable concerns about the length of time that the Claimant had been off work.[48]The Respondent received advice from the Home Office which, again, was not included within the file for the hearing. It decided to act upon it in early December 2023. I have seen a letter dated 1 December which was included at page 138 of the file. In that letter the Respondent wrote: “We write to update you with the response we received on your behalf from the Home Office. We sincerely wish you a successful surgery in January, 2024 as you have earlier informed us. In light of this development, we would like you to confirm the following: 1. The date, time and location of your surgery (with a documented evidence) 2. Your availability for full time work complying with the terms and conditions of your contracted hours after the surgery. We would like you to bear in mind that should you not be able to work full time after your surgery; we would not be able to sponsor you anymore and your certificate of sponsorship would be withdrawn. We would advice that you vary your leave through other alternatives means by seeking legal advice”.[49]There is no reason for me to believe that that was not an accurate interpretation of the advice the Respondent had received from the Home Office (or at least that that was the Respondent’s understanding of that advice), so I accepted it was.[50]The Claimant responded to that letter on 4 December providing another copy of the 7 June letter referring to his surgery being scheduled for January 2024. Again, the Claimant’s response was not in the file before me, but it was referred to in a reply from the Respondent dated 6 December 2023, which was included at page 139 of the file. That email was as follows: “Dear Gregory, You wrote to us on the 4th December, 2023 informing us that you would advise us of your resumption date after your surgery in January, 2024 as stated below: ...”.[51]The Claimant had simply said that nothing had changed in relation to his surgery and that he could not inform the Respondent of when he would resume work until the surgery had taken place.[52]The Respondent then wrote: “In our last mail to you, we requested documentation evidence from an NHS hospital or GP confirming the date of your surgery and also if you would be available for fulltime work afterwards. You have failed to do so and only referred us to the NHS letter you sent to us dated 7th June, 2023. The letter states thus [the excerpt highlighted the phrase “He is generally fit and well”] As the report states that you are “fit and well” and you have failed to give us precise information from the NHS or GP Surgery about your surgery date and current health condition. It is with regret (as we have been advised) to notify you that your appointment would be terminated after 7 days and your sponsorship withdrawn. You have the right to appeal against this decision in writing within the next five working days”.[53]That letter seemed to ignore that the Claimant had given a response to the particular questions that had been asked of him. However, it is also clear that the Respondent had noted that the surgeon’s letter dated 7 June had recorded that the Claimant was “generally fit and well” and that nothing had changed since then (or at least the Respondent had not been provided any more recent information about his health). Much emphasis at the hearing before me was placed on the fact that the Respondent had largely lost faith in the Claimant since receiving this letter and no follow-up medical report (e.g. a fit note), due to this phrase. As the Claimant provided no further evidence to suggest that phrase was incorrect, I found that that was the real basis for dismissing the Claimant – that he had misled the Respondent or, at the least, failed to provide proof of his current health condition and ongoing inability to work. The Respondent was obviously aware that the Claimant had largely or entirely failed to communicate with the Respondent to provide any updates on his health condition for months, not even presenting a fit note.[54]The Respondent’s witness said at the hearing that this letter of 6 December 2023 amounted to the Claimant’s dismissal letter and it certainly reads like that. Peculiarly, the Respondent’s actual position in the claim is that the Claimant was dismissed later on, on 16 January 2024. That is certainly what was recorded in the ET3 response form. Ultimately, the point matters little because the proceedings have been brought within three months of whichever date is to be taken as the date of dismissal (taking account of ACAS conciliation), which means the complaint relating to the Claimant’s dismissal is “in time” either way.[55]The Claimant did not appeal pursuant to the invitation in the Respondent’s letter. However, when his surgery was cancelled a few days before it was due to take place in January 2024, he did (for the first time) send a fit note to the Respondent. It covered the period from 12 January to 2 February 2024 and referred to the cancellation of the Claimant’s surgery.[56]In response to that fit note, a further dismissal letter was sent on 16 January 2024, which was included at page 124 of the file. There was no reference in that letter to the Claimant having already been dismissed or his sponsorship already terminated. The letter simply recorded: “After careful consideration in relation to our duties in order to comply with the UK Immigration Law that covers sponsorship duties, we regret to inform you that we can no longer sponsor you as a Skilled Worker with Foremost Care UK and as such, your employment is terminated with immediate effect”.[57]Day surgery ultimately took place on 19 February 2024. Upon his discharge from hospital the same day, the Claimant was advised to arrange a practice nurse appointment to check his wound within 5-7 days. He did so on 26 February 2024. The healthcare professional he saw replaced the dressing, noting that the wound “had healed well”. The new dressing was applied “for protection only” and the Claimant was advised he could remove it within a few days. No record is made of the Claimant complaining about any ongoing symptoms. He was invited to return if he had “any other concerns”. He did not.[58]I surmised that the excision of the lipoma was intended to remedy the cause of the Claimant’s disability such that he would no longer suffer any resultant substantial adverse effects. In reaching this conclusion, I noted that none of the healthcare professionals at any time raised any other or related concerns, appeared to consider that the excision was a relatively straightforward procedure that could be (and was) achieved in day surgery with very limited follow-up care, and the Claimant himself did not report any ongoing symptoms either in his appointment a week after the surgery or subsequently. The only consideration of real relevance to my decision is that this is the sort of health issue that a reasonable person with no specialist medical knowledge would likely understand to be capable of remedy by surgery.
The relevant law
[59]The relevant legislation that I had to apply was the Equality Act 2010.[60]The first relevant section is section 6, relating to disability. It is as follows: “6 Disability (1) A person (P) has a disability if— (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”.[61]Sub-section 6 provides as follows: “(6) Schedule 1 (disability: supplementary provision) has effect”.[62]Schedule 1, insofar as relevant, says as follows: “2 Long-term effects (1) The effect of an impairment is long-term if— (a) it has lasted for at least 12 months, (b) it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or (c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected”.[63]Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 is as follows: “15 Discrimination arising from disability(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability”.[64]Section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 is as follows: “20 Duty to make adjustments(1) Where this Act imposes a duty to make reasonable adjustments on a person, this section, sections 21 and 22 and the applicable Schedule apply; and for those purposes, a person on whom the duty is imposed is referred to as A.(2) The duty comprises the following three requirements.(3) The first requirement [which is the only one relevant to these proceedings] is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. … (13) The applicable Schedule is, in relation to the Part of this Act specified in the first column of the Table, the Schedule specified in the second column. As far as these proceedings are concerned, Part 5 (work) is the specified Part, which correlates to Schedule 8.[65]Schedule 8, so far as relevant, has the following paragraph 20: “Lack of knowledge of disability, etc. 20 (1) A is not subject to a duty to make reasonable adjustments if A does not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know— … (b) in any case referred to in Part 2 of this Schedule [which includes in relation to an employee], that an interested disabled person has a disability and is likely to be placed at the disadvantage referred to in the first, second or third requirement”.[66]Section 123 of the Equality Act 2010 addresses time limits for bringing a claim and is as follows: “123 Time limits (1) Subject to section 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. … (3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it”.[67]Section 140B refers to the period of ACAS conciliation. It is not relevant for the purposes of these proceedings.
The issues
[68]A list of issues was recorded at the preliminary hearing which took place earlier this year. The parties agreed that the list of issues accurately encapsulated the complaints and the issues to be decided. I will not repeat its contents.[69]Overall, the complaints were two-fold. Whether:a. firstly, the refusal to allow the Claimant to work three days per week (on alternative days) amounted to disability discrimination on the basis that it was a failure to make reasonable adjustments; andb. secondly, whether, assuming the Claimant’s sickness absence arose from his disability, he was discriminated against because of that in being dismissed.[70]An additional issue for me to consider was whether the claim to have suffered discrimination due to a failure to make reasonable adjustments had been brought in time, and, if not, whether it was just and equitable for me to extend time for the Claimant to bring it.[71]In relation to both claims, the main issue was whether the Respondent had knowledge of the Claimant’s disability. There was little exploration at the hearing of any of the other issues. As it turns out, this issue alone led me to dismiss the claim, so I did not need to determine any others. Nevertheless, I will make certain additional observations.
Conclusions
[72]I will start by dealing with the point that was common to both complaints and which in fact disposes of both. This is whether the Respondent had knowledge of the Claimant’s disability. This was the main thrust to the Respondent’s submissions.[73]I outlined at the start of my judgment that I have had some difficulty in understanding the previous Tribunal’s decision regarding the Claimant’s disability. Clearly, it was not for me to re-open that determination and I did not. It is important to note that, at that stage, the Tribunal was considering the matter very much from the Claimant’s perspective. On the basis of the evidence he gave, the Tribunal found that the Claimant should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 at all relevant times.[74]At this hearing, the principal task for me to undertake was to assess the situation from the Respondent’s perspective; considering what understanding the Respondent had (or should reasonably have had) of the Claimant’s health condition and whether it could appreciate that it amounted to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. I found it insightful to trace back the chronology to establish what the Respondent could have known about the Claimant’s condition and when.[75]The starting point was that the Respondent had no information about the Claimant’s condition prior to offering him employment. In the health questionnaire he had filled in during his application he did not mention it. He did not raise it whilst he was training and shadowing. All he did was make vague reference to a health issue, in passing, to one of the Respondent’s directors in April, but without providing any details. Having just started work having declared he had no health issues, there is absolutely nothing so far that would have made the Respondent (or anyone in a similar position) aware of the Claimant’s disability.[76]After having worked 4 days, on Friday 28 April 2023 the Claimant abruptly went off work sick. Such things can happen. Little detail was given by the Claimant. Again, there was no reason why the Respondent would suspect that this absence resulted from a long-standing health issue, whether a disability or not.[77]Although the Claimant then stayed off work for a period, there was no obvious reason why the Respondent’s state of knowledge (or any other employer’s) would have changed during that period. I have commented that it seems peculiar for an employer to have requested no further information about a new employee’s sickness absence that extended to over 2 weeks, but it still had no reason to suspect that he might have been disabled.[78]The Claimant was called to a meeting on 17 May 2023 and I have made some findings about what was said then. I have accepted that the Claimant mentioned his lipoma, its current effects on him that had been exacerbated by the stress of the job, and that he was due to have surgery. However, he did not say that any significant symptoms had lasted for any significant period. I have accepted that he requested an adjustment to his working pattern, notably rest days. It was therefore at this meeting that the Respondent became aware for the first time of the Claimant’s health condition. The Respondent was made aware at the same time that the lipoma was to be addressed by surgery. The Claimant had just that morning been to see his GP to request an earlier date for a consultation with his surgeon. Whether or not he knew at that point whether his appointment would be brought forward, within a week – on 23 May 2023 – the Claimant informed the Respondent by WhatsApp that his surgery had been brought forward to “next month”, i.e. June 2023. That this was only an appointment with the surgeon, rather than the date for surgery itself is rather irrelevant – the Claimant had possibly believed, and definitely informed the Respondent, that it was for surgery. I found he had said the same thing about the original surgeon’s appointment scheduled in January 2024 – i.e. that it was for the surgery itself, not a preliminary appointment.[79]I have found that this sort of health issue is of the sort that a reasonable employer would expect to be addressed satisfactorily by surgery. Accordingly, there was no reason why the Respondent would have believed the Claimant’s lipoma would continue to cause symptoms for any lengthy period of time and it did not. In summary, it had no knowledge (nor could it reasonably have had) that the Claimant had in fact been suffering adversely for some time, nor did it expect him to continue doing so after surgery that was expected at the latest within 8 months (i.e. January 2024) (nor could it reasonably have so anticipated). Within a week, the Respondent was informed the surgery had been successfully brought forward to the next month – June 2023.[80]Even though the Tribunal has concluded that the Claimant should be considered disabled at that time, the sort of analysis that the Tribunal would have gone through is plainly not akin to the analysis that the Respondent undertook in the meeting on 17 May 2023, nor can it be expected to have done so. It plainly did not have access to all of the information and evidence that the Tribunal did. It is fanciful, in my mind, to suggest that any employer holding a short meeting with a new employee about a sickness absence of around 2 weeks would have been able to (or should be expected to) form a similar conclusion to the Tribunal in the context of a formal litigation process, about whether the Claimant was to be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.[81]Even if I am wrong about that, and the Respondent is to be considered as having had sufficient information to believe that the Claimant’s condition could amount to a disability, it is clear to me that the Respondent could not have been reasonably expected to know that it was “long-term”, i.e. likely to have lasted or be likely to last for at least 12 months. This is because of the planned surgery, that was due to take place, as far as the Respondent was aware, within 8 months (later revised to one month). In its reasonable view, the Respondent believed the Claimant’s health condition was transient. Even taking into account that the surgery did not in fact take place until February 2024 (which, of course, the Respondent could not have known), that was still well within 12 months from the date of the meeting on 17 May 2023 (and its knowledge of any significant symptoms).[82]At this point, the Respondent had seen no objective medical evidence. In September 2023 the Respondent received a letter from the Claimant’s surgeon to say that he was “generally fit and well”. Nothing in that letter suggests that the Claimant had any disability. It only says that he had been “troubled” by the lipoma for 14 months. Although a longer period than he had told the Respondent, there was nothing to suggest any significant symptoms (such as to amount to a disability) had lasted for that long. There was no reason for the Respondent to believe anything other than what it had been informed by the Claimant, i.e. that any significant symptoms only began since starting his employment. From that point onwards there was no further basis on which to impute any knowledge of the Claimant’s disability to the Respondent.[83]Accordingly, I find that the Respondent had no knowledge that the Claimant’s condition amounted to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 at any time, nor could it reasonably have had. Therefore, the entire claim must fail on that basis alone.[84]Additionally, there are other reasons why each complaint must be dismissed in my view and I will deal with them in turn.[85]In relation to the complaint of a failure to make reasonable adjustments, the main point I raise is time limits. It is important to identify the date of the decision to refuse the adjustment sought, which was in or around May 2023. It is immaterial whether that was at, or shortly after, the meeting on 17 May 2023. The time period for bringing this complaint would therefore have expired in or around August 2023 or, possibly, into September 2023. Similarly, if its decision to refuse the adjustment to the Claimant’s working pattern should somehow be considered to not have been made immediately, plainly within a few weeks, by September latest, the Respondent would have reasonably been expected to have acted on the request (s.123(4) of the Equality Act 2010). Three months from any date in September would end in December 2023. The Claimant did not contact ACAS in order to commence proceedings until February 2024.[86]The Claimant’s main argument as to why it would be just and equitable to hear the complaint regardless was that he was not aware of his rights and he only considered them further after he had been dismissed and was contemplating bringing a Tribunal claim.[87]I find it very important to consider the specific words of section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. They specify that it must be “just and equitable” to extend time. Equitable principles are founded in a notion that is often referred to as having “clean hands”. What that means is that if somebody is wishing to escape the effects of what they might perceive to be a relatively harsh application of the law (such as a time bar in discrimination cases), then they should come to the Tribunal being innocent of any wrongdoing and transparent about it. The difficulty that this case presents to me is that I do not find that the Claimant has come to the Tribunal in such a position. In light of the medical records and evidence, the Claimant’s actions can be considered, broadly, in one of two ways.[88]Firstly, that he misled the Respondent from the outset of his employment by incorrectly filling out its health questionnaire. He wrote that he was suffering no serious physical or mobility issues at that point when in fact he says that he had a physical impairment that caused him substantial and long-term adverse effects sufficient to amount to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. He had been to his GP two weeks’ prior complaining of an inability to sleep and pain when he moves his neck. Even if he did not consider these issues sufficient to affect his work, he clearly should have made them known to the Respondent. He did not simply return the questionnaire without a thought; he mentioned he had suffered from “stress/anxiety”. The questionnaire suggests he did not consider that especially serious, whereas clearly his physical issues were; he had just been to his GP to report them and to seek further medical attention. The Respondent asked 2 questions about the Claimant’s physical condition and mobility, and a general question about “anything else” that might impact his ability to work. It is an important matter, bearing in mind that being a domiciliary care assistant can be a very physical role, as the Claimant appreciated. The Claimant mentioned at the hearing that he may have minimised his condition in order not to prejudice his chances of employment. If that’s true, it’s not clear why he mentioned his stress/anxiety. More importantly, it is unclear what he then expected to happen, apart from finding the role difficult to perform. Seeking and obtaining a job that you cannot easily perform, without letting your putative employer know about a health condition and how you can manage it alongside your work, is bound to create difficulties down the line. In this case, it did so within 4 days.[89]It is also important to stress that the Claimant is a medical professional. He knew that he was applying for a job caring for vulnerable people. He would be acutely aware of his own responsibilities in relation to those service users and that it was a requirement that he be healthy enough to allow him to safely perform his duties without putting either himself or those under his care at risk of accident. He would also have known that the Respondent would have had its own responsibilities in relation to those matters. So, specifically for this sort of work, it was decidedly dishonest to seek employment on the basis of a misleading health questionnaire.[90]A matter that was not addressed at the hearing, but may be of some relevance, is the Claimant’s immigration status. It appears that he was willing to spend £10,000 to secure the certificate of sponsorship that the role would provide. I have not made any findings that the Claimant misled the Respondent in part with this in mind, it doesn’t matter to the case, but plainly it would not have made his position any more acceptable if so.[91]The other way in which the Claimant’s conduct can be considered is that he could have exaggerated the effects of his health condition before the Tribunal in order to obtain a finding that he should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 entitling him to bring a claim to have suffered disability discrimination. This would be supported by the health questionnaire and the Claimant’s statements that he felt capable of performing what he knew was a physically demanding job.[92]I suspect that the first applies, not least in light of the GP records. But, either way, it is deceitful conduct. Knowingly misleading a potential employer at the outset of an employment relationship in relation to health or disability is unacceptable conduct (especially in a healthcare context). It goes without saying that doing it before the Tribunal is also. Whichever way one looks at the matter, it is clear to me that the Claimant has certainly not come to this Tribunal innocent of any wrongdoing. In these circumstances, I firmly believe that it would not be equitable to extend time for bringing this complaint and dismiss the complaint on this basis also.[93]I shall not make any further comment in relation to the reasonable adjustments claim as there was little explanation at the hearing about the substantial disadvantage that the Claimant was put to. Also there was little evidence before me from the Respondent about whether an adjusted working pattern could be accommodated or not, although it correctly noted that it would not constitute the full-time role for which the Claimant had been employed (despite his protestations to the contrary) and for which he had been given a certificate of sponsorship.[94]In relation to the discrimination arising from disability complaint, in addition to the Respondent’s lack of knowledge of the Claimant’s disability, I have found that the Respondent’s decision to dismiss the Claimant was due to his lack of candour in relation to his health condition and Home Office advice concerning his sickness absence. It was not due simply to the fact that he was on sick leave. The Respondent tolerated the Claimant not having provided any medical report or fit note for months. If it had intended to dismiss him on the basis of his sick leave then he would have been dismissed far earlier. Matters only developed when the Respondent finally received a medical report in late September (dated from 7 June) saying that the Claimant was “generally fit and well”. This led to the Respondent doubting the reliability of the Claimant’s statements and seeking advice from the Home Office. By early December, the Respondent had heard back from the Home Office. It may have felt under some pressure in relation to how rigorously it had followed Home Office guidance, I do not know. Either way it felt entirely misled by the Claimant, to whom it had extended a great deal of patience. It was the Claimant’s conduct around his sickness absence that led to his dismissal rather than the absence itself.[95]I shall not make any comment about sub-section 1(b) of section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, which refers to the Respondent showing that the treatment, in this case the dismissal, would otherwise have been a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. A legitimate aim may have been compliance with Home Office guidelines in relation to the sponsorship scheme. However, I was given very little information about that scheme and what the Home Office actually advised the Respondent about it. Approved by:
Conclusions
[1]The application for reconsideration of the judgment dated 19 September 2025 is refused.[2]The Respondent’s application for costs is refused.[3]At a hearing that concluded on 19 September 2025, I dismissed the Claimant’s claim to have suffered disability discrimination contrary to sections 15 and 20-21 of the Equality Act 2010.[4]The Claimant has sought reconsideration of this decision in accordance with Part 12 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the “Rules”). The guiding principle for me to consider is whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the judgment. Finality of judicial decisions is an important component of the interests of justice.[5]If I consider that the Claimant has no reasonable prospect of having the judgment varied or revoked, Rule 70(2) states that I must refuse the application. Due to the length and detail provided in the Claimant’s application, I decided to seek the Respondent’s observations before considering that matter further.[6]Upon consideration of all of the documents, I determined that there was no reasonable prospect of the judgment (i.e. the dismissal of the claim) being varied or revoked. This is because my core finding was that the Respondent had no knowledge (whether real or constructive) of the Claimant’s disability. This was a finding of fact that was reasonable on the evidence. Both parties had the opportunity to present their case in this respect and the Tribunal must be slow to reconsider such findings. The Claimant has not presented any submissions or evidence that my finding was clearly wrong. That issue alone was determinative of the claim.[7]The Claimant had greater prospects of establishing that I might consider varying or revoking my conclusion it was not just and equitable to permit the “reasonable adjustments” claim to proceed outside the 3-month period for presenting it laid down in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. However, that issue did not affect the outcome of the claim so it was plainly not proportionate or necessary in the interests of justice to list a hearing of that matter or to request any further submissions on it, especially in light of the detail the Claimant had already provided.[8]I will address the Claimant’s submissions in the order they were presented. Section 60, Equality Act 2010[9]Firstly, the Claimant refers to section 60 of the Equality Act 2010, which prohibits a potential employer from making enquiries as to the health of an applicant for work. The matter was not raised at the hearing. The citation was also partial, omitting to record, firstly, that any contravention is a matter for the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the first instance and, secondly, that a potential employer is permitted to ask questions about an applicant’s ability to perform the job applied for (see sub-section (6)).[10]The context was my reference to a health questionnaire the Claimant completed at the outset of his employment indicating that he had no mobility or physical issues that would impact on his ability to perform his duties (see paragraphs 16-17 of the reasons for my judgment (the “Reasons”)). No questions were obviously irrelevant or unnecessary in establishing whether the Claimant could be charged with caring for vulnerable people. It appears the questionnaire was completed after the Claimant had already been offered employment, I may have found it was before; the precise timing was irrelevant to my decision.[11]The relevance of the matter was two-fold:(1) establishing whether the Respondent had knowledge of the Claimant’s disability (see paragraphs 39 and 75 of the Reasons) and(2) considering whether it would be just and equitable to allow the “reasonable adjustments” claim to proceed (paragraphs 88-89 of the Reasons).[12]The first point was simply a matter of fact; nothing in the questionnaire informed the Respondent of the Claimant’s health condition or disability. Section 60 of the Equality Act 2010 is more relevant to the second point to that extent that, if the Respondent should not have asked the questions, it might render any dishonesty in the Claimant’s completion of the questionnaire more excusable. However, as mentioned above, they were in my view sensible and necessary questions to ask when considering the physical and professional domiciliary care role the Claimant was due to perform. Additionally, paragraph 89 of the Reasons addresses the importance of the Claimant’s honesty and transparency about his physical limitations bearing in mind the nature of his role caring for vulnerable people, a role he knew was physically demanding. Accordingly, the reference to section 60 of the Equality Act 2010 does not change my analysis that it was not just and equitable to allow the “reasonable adjustments” claim to proceed.[13]It is worth highlighting again that this was, in any event, not the main reason for dismissing the “reasonable adjustments” claim.[14]As to the remainder of the Claimant’s submissions, they largely amount to bare assertions that demonstrate a misunderstanding of the law or the decision or a failure to have properly read it in context, fairly and as a whole. None of the submissions come close to establishing it is necessary in the interests of justice to revoke or vary it. Failure to consider evidence[15]It is clear from the Reasons that I thoroughly considered the available evidence and made findings on the balance of probabilities. Only if any of those findings were manifestly unsound will an application for reconsideration be able to succeed.[16]The Claimant appears to fail to appreciate the difference between the Respondent having knowledge of the Claimant’s health condition (lipoma) and knowledge that it amounts to a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. The Respondent only knew about the former (see paragraphs 74- 80 of the Reasons). The Claimant rightly says he was under no obligation to inform the Respondent of his lipoma’s effects on him, or that he believes they amounted to a disability, or to provide relevant medical records. However, as he did not, he cannot then expect the Respondent to know about his disability and complain that the Respondent discriminated against him because of it. Certificate of sponsorship[17]The timing of the certificate of sponsorship or visa application/grant was of no relevance to my decision, as specifically stated in paragraphs 46 and 90 of the Reasons. Failure to recognise previous Tribunal finding[18]The Tribunal had previously determined that the Claimant should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 at all relevant times. The details and reasons for that finding were unclear. Nevertheless, I accepted it, as is clear from paragraphs 7, 15, 73, 74 and 80. There was no “departure” from that finding. Failure to find “constructive” knowledge[19]As stated above and at paragraphs 74-80 of the Reasons, I found that the Respondent had no knowledge, nor could it reasonably have had, of the Claimant’s disability. This was a finding of fact that I was entitled to make on the evidence. Knowledge of a lipoma does not amount to knowledge of a disability for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. This requires knowledge of the severity of its effects and their long-term nature. Even had the Respondent known of the effects, it could not have appreciated they had lasted, or would be likely to last, for over 12 months (see paragraphs 81-82 of the Reasons). Therefore, the Respondent could not have known that the Claimant should be considered disabled.[20]The Claimant’s concern amounts to a disagreement about the assessment of the evidence, which is not a good reason to reconsider my decision. Dishonesty[21]The Claimant rightly notes his honesty in completing the health questionnaire was not especially relevant to the decision. It was only relevant to whether it would be just and equitable to allow him to present his “reasonable adjustments” claim outside the 3-month time limit provided for in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. That claim failed principally on the basis the Respondent had no knowledge of the Claimant’s disability. The limitation issue was merely an additional reason, albeit logically antecedent. This does not provide a good reason for me to reconsider my decision. Exactly when the questionnaire was completed prior to the Claimant starting work was entirely irrelevant; whether it was before or after obtaining his certificate of sponsorship would not alter my decision or analysis. Doctor’s letter, June 2023[22]This argument is misconceived. The doctor’s letter stating the Claimant was “fit and well” did not alter the Tribunal’s decision that the Claimant was disabled. It simply supported my finding that the Respondent did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that the Claimant was disabled. Erroneous assessment of disability[23]The Tribunal did not consider at this hearing whether the Claimant should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. It had already been established at the previous hearing (as referred to above). Erroneous assessment of long-term nature of symptoms[24]The Tribunal did not consider at this hearing whether the Claimant should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. It had already been established at the previous hearing (as referred to above).[25]The reference to the long-term effects of the Claimant’s health condition in paragraphs 81-82 of the Reasons was to the Respondent’s knowledge of the duration of the symptoms (which would only have been relevant if I was wrong to conclude the Respondent was not aware of the severity of the symptoms). The Claimant’s argument therefore, even if correct, is not a good reason for me to reconsider my decision. In any event, there was nothing arguably wrong in law about the Tribunal’s assessment. As the Respondent did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that the Claimant’s symptoms had lasted, or were likely to last, for over 12 months, it could not reasonably have known he should be considered disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010.[26]The Claimant suggests that he continued to suffer symptoms after his operation in 2024. I am sorry to hear that. The physiotherapist’s letter of 3 March 2025 (a year after the operation) that he has only now provided to me suggests those symptoms would be capable of remedy within 12 weeks by exercise. I hope that proved to be the case. This cannot and does not affect my analysis of what the Respondent knew, or could reasonably have known, at the relevant time (between May 2023 and January 2024). Incomplete evidence[27]It is a matter for the parties to ensure they present the evidence they wish to rely on to the Tribunal. The Tribunal will only exceptionally reconsider its decision on the provision of further evidence once a decision has been made. This amounts to allowing the party a second chance to pursue their case. The interests of justice strongly support the finality of judicial decisions. I expressly considered whether I was satisfied that a fair determination could be made on the available evidence, despite “gaps” and concluded that I could (paragraph 8 of the Reasons).[28]I have considered the difficulties the Claimant said he encountered with the Respondent in preparing the hearing file. This does not fundamentally alter the analysis. In any event, the additional documents provided to me in the course of this application do nothing to detract from my findings and would not have led to a different outcome. The existence of the ultrasound scan was not known to the Respondent at the relevant time. The appeal email dated 6 December 2023 does not alter my findings about the Respondent’s knowledge of the Claimant’s health condition and especially the timescales involved with regard to his surgery, even if it transpires that the email was indeed sent. The first decision to dismiss the Claimant had already been made by this point, so could not have been because of his disability. Home Office guidance[29]Both complaints were dismissed on the basis of the Respondent’s lack of knowledge of the Claimant’s disability. A secondary issue in the claim to have suffered discrimination arising from disability was the reason for the Claimant’s dismissal. As this was secondary, arguments about it would not constitute a good reason to reconsider my judgment. In any event, I concluded that the reason the Respondent dismissed the Claimant was due to it having lost faith in him (paragraphs 53 and 94 of the Reasons). I did not have enough information about the Home Office guidance to make any conclusions about the impact that might have had on the decision, save to note that I could not exclude it. It was therefore not material to my decision. Sponsorship funding[30]As mentioned above, the matter of sponsorship (or its funding) was not relevant to my decision. Further medical evidence[31]The issue of the Claimant’s disability was resolved prior to the hearing before me. The key issue for me was the Respondent’s knowledge of that. Any medical evidence or conditions/diagnoses that arose after the Claimant’s dismissal can have no bearing on the Respondent’s knowledge of his disability at the relevant time.[32]Overall, nothing in the application or further evidence provided comes close to establishing that my decision needs to be reconsidered, so it is plainly not in the interests of justice for me to do so.[33]In relation to the Respondent’s application for a costs order, the basis of that was distinctly unclear, amounting to two concluding words in its submissions. The starting point is that the Tribunal is a “costs neutral” jurisdiction and there is no basis for me to depart from that at this stage. Approved by