Employment Judge Cotton, sitting alone.In person for claimantMs Swords-Kieley (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 19 December 2023
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s claim that he was subjected to detriments contrary to section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 for having made one or more public interest disclosures are dismissed because they were not brought in time.[2]The claimant’s claim that he was automatically unfairly dismissed contrary to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is struck out because it has no reasonable prospect of success.
REASONS
Introduction
[1]The claimant was employed, as an employee, by the respondent, an IT consultancy service provider which provides specialise IT consultancy services to clients globally, as a Lead Consultant from 28 June 2015 until 17 November 2021. He was ‘assigned’ to a client of the respondent, Santander, from 28 June 2015 to 20 April 2021.[2]Early conciliation started on 16 February 2022 and ended on 18 February 2022. The claim form was presented on 12 March 2022.[3]This claim concerns unfair dismissal contrary to section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘the 1996 Act”); automatically unfair dismissal for having made a public interest disclosure, contrary to section 103A of the 1996 Act; and public interest disclosure detriment contrary to section 47B(1) of the 1996 Act.[4]The purpose of this open preliminary hearing included the determination of the following matters:-4.1 Whether the claimant should be permitted to amend his claim:-4.1.1 To add a claim of wrongful dismissal, ie dismissal without notice.4.1.2 To add the following detriments to his list of public disclosure detriments:-4.1.2.1 the detriment of not getting paid a bonus which he was expecting to get in April to May 2021.4.1.2.2 the detriment of the respondent delaying sending to the claimant his P45 until14 December 2021, after the claimant had escalated the matter to the CEO.4.2 Whether the claimant’s claim for public interest disclosure detriment and – if the amendment request is allowed – wrongful dismissal should be dismissed as being out of time.4.3 On the respondent’s written application dated 6 February 2023, and copied into the claimant, whether the following aspects of his claim should be struck out or made the subject of a Deposit Order pursuant to Rules 37 or Rule 39 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure on the basis that they have little or no reasonable prospect of success:-4.3.1 His claim for public interest disclosure detriment.4.3.2 His claim for automatically unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A of the 1996 Act. Public interest disclosure detriment claim - limitation[5]I first considered whether the claimant’s claim that he was subjected to a number of detriments for having made a public interest disclosure, as originally pleaded, should be dismissed because it is out of time.[6]Section 48(3) of the 1996 Act says that the tribunal shall not consider a complaint of public interest disclosure detriment unless it is presented before the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the compliant relates or, where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them; or within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of 3 months.[7]The claimant says that the respondent subjected him to detriments for having said, to a colleague the following words on the telephone on 23 February 2021: ‘Should I commit suicide or kill my family to make you happy?’ The alleged detriments were:-7.1 On 20 April 2021, terminating his assignment to Santander and disabling his access to the Santander systems without prior notice.7.2 On 30 June 2021, in a grievance report, telling the claimant that(i) he was not a team player,(ii) he diverted the topic when his conduct was talked about and(iii) he threatened team members in a reply to the claimant’s grievance of 4 June 2021.7.3 From 20 April 2021, the claimant’s line manager, Mr Alagappan, did not talk to the claimant or respond to his correspondence.[8]The detriment at 7.3 above concerns a failure to act. Unless there is evidence to the contrary – which there is not in this case – a failure to act occurs when the employer does an act inconsistent with doing the failed act; if no such inconsistent act is done, the employer will be taken to have decided on a failure to act when the period expires within which it might reasonably have been expected to do the failed act. In the absence of an inconsistent act, I find that Mr Alagappan might reasonably have been expected to talk to the claimant by 11 May 2021 - three weeks after his assignment with Santanter was terminated. This takes account of the possibility of delay due to other work commitments or annual leave.[9]On this basis, the very latest date by which the claimant should have brought his detriment claims is 30 September 2021 – three months from the date of the last detriment complained of (30 June 2021). His claim was brought on 12 March 2022, therefore the claims are significantly out of time.[10]The claimant gave evidence about why it was not reasonably practicable to bring his claims prior to 12 March 2022. He said that he had been waiting for the outcome of his grievance. He said he did not seek legal advice. He referred to his poor mental health and the stress he had suffered due to his treatment from the respondent; he suffered also from heart problems; his wife was out of the country during February 2022, leaving him to take care of his children alone. He said that March 2022 was the earliest date that it was reasonable for him to bring his claim.[11]The respondent said that the evidence for physical or mental illness was not present. The bundle included one sick note, which appears to say that the claimant was not fit for work, due to work related stress and anxiety, on 6 March 2021 or from 6 April 2021 to 9 April 2021. The sick note is confusing, because it is dated 31 March 2021. However, the time period is prior to any of the detriments, and only concerns a matter of days. Findings with reasons[12]I find that the claimant has failed to demonstrate that it was not reasonably practicable for him to bring his claims for public interest disclosure in time. test sets a high threshold.[13]The question is whether it was reasonably feasible for the claimant to have brought the claim in time. The test sets a high threshold. The claimant did not explain clearly why it wasn’t. He referred in quite vague terms to factors which he felt had hindered him. He mentioned illness, but provided no evidence that he was ill at the relevant time. In relation to his grievance, the law is clear that awaiting the outcome of a grievance or appeal against a grievance decision is not in itself a sufficient reason in this context. I heard no cogent evidence to explain why he did not seek legal advice.[14]I then considered whether the claim was presented within a further period that was reasonable. That is to say, was the period between the expiry of the time limit and the eventual presentation of the claim reasonable in the circumstances. I find that the claimant has failed to satisfy me that it was. He did not give a full and convincing explanation of the reasons for his delay, or explain why he did not seek legal advice, or why he did not bring the claim at least soon after he knew the outcome of his grievance (30 June 2021.) Although his wife was away, leaving him to manage the household, this was not until February 2022.[15]In conclusion, the claimant’s claim for public interest disclosure detriment was not presented within the time limit, or within a reasonable further period; therefore, it should be dismissed. Claimant’s application to amend his claim[16]I then considered the claimant’s applications to amend his claim.[17]As set out in a Case Management Order dated 5 December 2022, the claimant applied to amend his claim to:-17.1.1 Add, as a public interest detriment, the detriment of not getting paid a bonus which he was expecting to get in April to May 2021.17.1.2 Add, as a public interest detriment, the detriment of the respondent delaying sending to the claimant his P45 until14 December 2021, after the claimant had escalated the matter to the CEO.17.1.3 Add a claim for wrongful dismissal – that the claimant was entitled to one month’s notice pay and did not receive this.[18]The case of Selkent Bus Co v Moore 1996 ICR 836, EAT, sets out the factors the Tribunal should take into account when considering whether to allow an amendment. These factors are the nature of the amendment, the applicability of time limits, and the timing and manner of the application. Crucially, the Tribunal must balance the injustice or hardship of allowing or refusing the amendment, and take all the relevant circumstances into account. Amendments concerning detriments Bonus[19]The claimant said that he had expected to receive a bonus of about £500 in April or May 2021, but had not received it. Refusing this amendment would deprive him of the opportunity to argue his case, with the potential of receiving this sum from the respondent. `[20]The respondent said that this claim was first raised in December 2022 and, if allowed, would take effect on 6 March 2023; therefore it was significantly out of time. They said that it was unparticularised and confused, and therefore difficult to respond to. They were baffled by the application because the claimant had been entitled to only one bonus, and that was in August, and he received it. The respondent said that they do not give bonuses in April or May.[21]I find that the amendment should not be granted because the balance of hardship favours the respondent, and because it is significantly out of time.[22]The claimant said he would have expected to receive the bonus by 31 May 2021. On that basis, the claim should have been brought by 30 August 2021 and, if allowed, would take effect from 6 March 2023. Therefore it is almost a year out of time.[23]The alleged detriment of not getting a bonus is an entirely new factual and legal area which will need to be explored and understood by the respondent. During that period, records may have been lost or be difficult to exhume; memories will have faded. Since the claimant’s other claims for public interest disclosure detriment have been dismissed for being out of time, allowing this amendment would re-introduce the claim, requiring the respondent to defend it. Delay in sending P45[24]The claimant said that the respondent failed to send him his P45 until 14 December 2021, when his employment terminated on 17 November 2021; and that this failure to act was because he had made a public interest disclosure. Because of this, he was unable to look for work during that period.[25]A refusal of this amendment application would mean the claimant could not seek damages referable to this loss.[26]The respondent acknowledged that the claimant had mentioned in his claim that his P45 was sent on 14 or 15 December 2021, but he did not at that time suggest that this was a detriment or was unlawful in some other way. The respondent did not accept that the claimant did or would have sought work during that period, so as to have suffered any loss.[27]I find that the amendment should be refused because the balance of hardship favours the respondent, and it is significantly out of time.[28]As regards the date upon which the alleged detriment took place – the claimant said that it was a continuing ‘failure to act’ which ended on 14 December 2021. Even on this basis, it should have been brought by 14 March 2022. When asked why he had not included this in his original claim, he said that he had only thought of it later. This amendment raises a new area of factual enquiry which the respondent would have to explore and which might not be straightforward – by now, the reasons for the delay may be difficult to determine. Also, since the claimant’s other claims for public interest disclosure detriment have been dismissed for being out of time, allowing this amendment would re-introduce the claim, requiring the respondent to defend it. Amendment to introduce claim for wrongful dismissal[29]The claimant applied to add a claim that he was dismissed without the one month’s notice to which he said he was entitled.[30]I decided that the claimant should not be granted leave to amend for the following reasons:-30.1 The claim would be significantly out of time. Article 7 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction Order says that a breach of contract claim must be presented within three months from the termination date – in this case, 17 November 2021. The respondent said that, taking early conciliation into account, the latest day for making the claim was 1 May 2022. It was first raised, formally, at the case management hearing on 5 December 2022. The claimant’s reason for this was that he was in a poor mental state at the time that he submitted his application, and had not sought indepth legal advice. However, he was sufficiently well, and wellinformed, to bring his main claim.30.2 I balanced the hardship which the respondent would suffer were the amendment to be allowed against the hardship the claimant would suffer were the amendment to be refused, and concluded that the balance of hardship favours the respondent. This is because:-30.2.1 The respondent would have to defend an entirely new claim they had not expected to defend – one which would involve new areas of factual and legal enquiry. The legal position on notice is likely to be complicated by the fact that the respondent is a wholly-owned subsidiary of an India-based company, ITC Infotech Ltd, which may, arguably, have concurrently employed the claimant.30.2.2 These difficulties would be exacerbated by the fact that the claim is poorly particularised. The claimant does not indicate when he should have received his notice pay. It was common ground that he was at home on full pay from 20 April to 17 November 2021, while his grievance and appeal were investigated (a period described by the claimant as ‘gardening ‘leave’ and by the respondent as ‘rolling notice’). The question of how this period should be characterised would need to be explored. Strike out application – automatically unfair dismissal contrary to section 103A of the Employment rights Act.[31]Having decided that the claimant’s claims for public interest disclosure detriment are out of time, I do not need to determine the respondent’s application that they should be struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success. However, the claim for automatically unfair dismissal is a distinct claim.[32]The law says that, in considering whether to strike out a claim or part of a claim, the case advanced must be considered at its highest. The power to strike out should only be used in the plainest and most obvious of cases. The threshold is a high one. In cases of public interest disclosure in particular, a strike out should be exceptional. For example, in the case of Ezsias v North Glamorgan Trust 2007 ICR 1126, it was found that, in whistleblowing cases where the central facts are in dispute, the case should be struck out for having no reasonable prospect of success only in exceptional circumstances.[33]The task of the tribunal at this stage is not to make substantive findings about whether the alleged disclosure was a qualifying disclosure ie, whether it included information, or whether the claimant subjectively believed that the information tended to show a relevant failure, or whether this was reasonable, or whether the claimant subjectively believed his disclosure to be in the public interest and whether this was objectively reasonable.[34]As noted above, the claimant claims that the respondent subjected him to detriments for having said, to a colleague, Mr Anandram Kaipa, the following words on the telephone on 23 February 2021: ‘Should I commit suicide or kill my family to make you happy?’ He says that this was a disclosure which he believed tended to show that the health and safety of an individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered; and that it led to the termination of his assignment with Santander on 20 April 2021 and, ultimately, to his dismissal from the respondent on 17 November 2021.[35]In an undated document headed ‘chronological details of my claim’, provided in June 2022, the claimant writes that the subject of the relevant telephone conversation was Mr Kaipa’s escalation of the claimant’s mistake in failing to copy him in on a particular email. Mr Kaipa had believed this was deliberate; the claimant said it was a mistake. The claimant says that, after a prolonged discussion of 20-30 minutes, the claimant asked ‘Should I kill my family to please you? Should I commit suicide because I failed to copy you on just one email and you are not even accepting my apology even when its not a mistake.’ He claims that the termination of the assignment at Santander (on 20 April 2021) and, ultimately, his dismissal by the respondent on 17 November 2021, was ‘a direct effect of this use of suicide clause in the aforementioned call.’[36]During the hearing, I took evidence from the claimant about the context in which this question was asked. He confirmed that it was asked during a telephone conversation about his failure to copy Mr Kaipa into an email, apparently a protracted conversation which became heated.[37]The respondent denies that the claimant said these words to Mr Kaipa. Therefore, this is a case in which the central facts are in dispute. However, even if the words were said, and taking into account the context in which they are alleged to have been said, there is no reasonable prospect of a tribunal finding that they constituted a disclosure of information within the meaning of section 43B(1) of the 1996 Act. The case of Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 846 says that whatever is disclosed must contain sufficient information to be capable of tending to show one of the matters set out in section 43B(1). Although this is an evaluative judgement to be made in light of all the facts of the case, what the claimant describes as a disclosure was a question. There is nothing to suggest that he might have believed that it included factual information capable of showing any of the matters listed in section 43B(1), including the endangerment of health and safety – apart from, perhaps, the safety of himself and his family at his own hand. If the claimant’s question includes any information at all, it is indirect information about his own frustration about a management-related discussion, or his state of mind at the time.[38]Accordingly, this part of the claimant’s claim should be struck out because it has no reasonable prospect of success. The claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal[39]The claimant’s claim that he was unfairly dismissed contrary to section 94 of the 1996 Act proceeds. The issues are set out in a separate case management order issued following the preliminary hearing.[1]By a Notice of Hearing dated 4 May 2023 this hearing was listed as a public preliminary hearing to determine the respondent’s application made on 4 April 2023 that the claimant’s claim be struck out on the basis that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by the claimant is scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious pursuant to rule 37(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013.[2]This application was listed to be heard on 18 July 2023. Due to the nonattendance of the claimant because of ill health the hearing was adjourned to this hearing.
Background
[3]The respondent is an IT consultancy service provider which provides specialised IT consultancy services to clients globally. The claimant was employed by the respondent as a Lead Software Consultant from 28 June 2021 (having been seconded to the respondent from ITC Infotech India Ltd) until 17 November 2021, when his employment was terminated on the grounds of redundancy. Early conciliation started on 16 February 2022 and a Conciliation Certificate was issued on 18 February 2022. A Claim Form (ET1) was presented on 12 March 2022. The claimant brought claims for ordinary Unfair Dismissal; Whistleblowing Detriments; Automatically Unfair Dismissal for making protected disclosures. The respondent submitted its response on 19 April 2022 contesting the claims.[4]At a public preliminary hearing held on 6 March 2023 EJ Cotton dismissed the claims for Whistleblowing Detriments and Automatically Unfair Dismissal. The only claim that is before the Tribunal is for ordinary unfair dismissal. At this hearing EJ Cotton made case management orders and also vacated the final hearing listed for 3-7 June 2024.[5]By a Notice of Hearing dated 28 March 2023 the final hearing was listed for 3 days commencing on 10 January 2024 to 12 January 2024.[6]At the open preliminary hearing held on 18 July 2023, EJ Anstis varied the case management orders as follows; disclosure to be completed by 13 October 2023; final bundle to be prepared and paginated by 10 November 2023, and witness statements to be exchanged by 7 December 2023.[7]At the preliminary hearings held before EJ Cotton (6 March 2023) and EJ Anstis on 18 July 2023, the claimant was cautioned about his conduct. EJ Anstis stated that; “The claimant must bear in mind that any behaviour of his (of the kind complained about by the respondent) between now and the resumed hearing may be relevant to the question of whether his claim should or should not be struck out”. Preliminary Hearing[8]The claimant was in attendance. The respondent was represented by Miss Swords Kieley of Counsel.[9]I was presented with two bundle of documents, one which was a supplementary bundle prepared by the respondent solicitors, which contained copies of the pleadings; tribunal orders and correspondence; and the claimant’s emails; messages and publications made on WhatsApp; Twitter and other social media platforms.[10]I did not hear oral evidence from the claimant or any one for the respondent. Miss Swords Kieley provided a skeleton argument which formed her representations and legal submissions. The claimant made no representations but gave his response to questions I asked of him. Due to losing time because of the claimant’s conduct, there was insufficient time to give an oral judgment. Claimant’s conduct during this hearing[11]During the course of Miss Swords Kieley making her representations, I observed the claimant was crying, and in an agitated and distressed state. I offered the claimant a short break which he declined. However, the claimant then had an emotional outburst. In a loud and incoherent manner the claimant claimed that he and his children had been threatened by the respondent; that they feared for their lives as they will be killed in India, if they are forced to return. He said he had evidence of the alleged threats made. I was able to calm the claimant to allow Miss Swords Kieley to complete her representations.[12]After Miss Swords Kieley finished, the claimant had another emotional outburst. This time he appeared to be deeply distressed and mentioned he was having a panic attack because his blood pressure was very high. He picked up a blood pressure machine and started taking his blood pressure and put the monitor showing the reading on screen. The claimant’s wife was in the room and gave him a glass of water and tried to calm him down. During this outburst the claimant continued to make accusations against the respondent and claimed he and his family were suffering. The claimant firmly believed he and his family life was under threat from the respondent. I had to warn the claimant that because of his behaviour I was seriously considering adjourning the hearing, and that I was only prepared to continue if he assured me that he was prepared to continue in a calm, respectful and reasonable manner. He insisted he wanted to continue. He did then compose himself and was able to continue without further disruption. Respondent’s application & representations[13]In summary Miss Swords Kieley made the following representations, in support of the application;(a) Miss Swords Kieley, in her skeleton argument set out at Paras 21 to 26 the content and extent of the claimant’s allegations and intimidation, which refers to the respondent being a terrorist company; who has tormented his children; accusing the respondent of fraud, torture, harassment, wanting to kill him and his family who are in danger from them; and being involved in immigration crimes, financial and money laundering; and their being a conspiracy to make him return to India because they want to murder him and his family.(b) Despite the warnings given to the claimant about his future conduct at previous hearings by EJ Cotton and EJ Anstis, the claimant has ignored these warnings and has continued with his false, derogatory, malicious and threatening allegations towards the respondent, and Manager Jitendra Mohan. In fact, the claimant’s conduct has worsened.(c) The allegations are baseless, spurious and are denied. They have been made to mislead or lie to the Tribunal, even though they have no bearing whatsoever on the unfair dismissal complaint.(d) The claimant’s conduct is overwhelmingly prejudicial to the respondent and has rendered a fair trial impossible, for the following reasons; (i) The respondent cannot be expected to tolerate being privately and publicly subject to such serious, baseless and spurious allegations as part of these proceedings; (ii) The respondent (and its legal representatives) cannot fairly be expected to continue to conduct this litigation in the face of the series and spurious allegations repeatedly made against them; (iii) The respondent’s witnesses are distressed by the nature of the allegations made against them, which may affect the willingness and ability to give evidence in due course; (iv) The claimant is unwilling to use these proceedings to determine the claim actually before this tribunal; (v) The claimant has attempted to misrepresent the respondent to the Tribunal which has caused overwhelming prejudice to the respondent. (vi) Due to the claimant’s unreasonable approach to this litigation the respondent has been caused to incur significant and unnecessary costs.(e) The claimant’s conduct today is a good indicator of how he is likely to behave at a final hearing and not deal with his claim.[14]Overall, the claimant has behaved scandalously, unreasonably and vexatiously in these proceedings. Claimant’s representations[15]The claimant did not say much to oppose the application. I therefore asked him a series of questions to understand and ascertain his position. I summarise his replies below.[16]First, he denied sending and posting the messages and making the allegations. After further questions, he claimed he did not know he was sending/posting the messages, and did not know he was doing anything wrong. He added at the time he was not well and suffering from mental health issues. The claimant confirmed he was not taking any medication and neither did not produce any documentary evidence concerning his health issues.[17]In reply to my question, why should the claim not be struck out, he replied, his actions and conduct is not intentional; that he has been suffering with his mental health and now has anxiety and depression, which he claimed has been caused by his dismissal which has destroyed his life. He assured me that he has now withdrawn from using social media and refrained from posting messages and publications against the respondent.[18]He was not prepared to withdraw his claim and has every intention to continue with it to a conclusion. The legal framework[19]In my deliberations I gave consideration to the applicable legal framework and the case law referred to by Miss Swords Kieley.[20]Rule 37(1) of the Employment Tribunal (Rules of Procedure) 2013 provides that at any stage of the proceedings, either on its own motion or on the application of a party, a Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response on any of the following grounds:-(a) that is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of either party has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious.[21]Rule 37(2) provides a claim or response may not be struck out unless the party in question has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing.
Conclusion
[22]In my deliberation I have taken into account the respondent submissions, the relevant legal framework and case law.[23]I have born in mind the guidance in the cases of Abegaze v Shrewsbury College of Arts & Technology [2010] IRLR 236; Bolch v Chapman (2004) IRLR 140, and De Keyser Ltd v Wilson (2001) IRLR 324. I must consider not only whether there has been default, but also whether, as a result of that behaviour, there cannot be a fair trial and whether strike out is a proportionate sanction.[24]I also recognise that striking out a claim is one of the most draconian powers a Tribunal can exercise, since it brings the claim to an end and prevents a claimant’s case being determined on its merits.[25]I have concluded that the claimant’s conduct has been unreasonable and therefore falls within Rule 37(1)(b). There is no justifiable reason for the behaviour displayed by the claimant, whatever maybe his views about being dismissed by the respondent. His behaviour has been inexcusable. He has disregarded the warnings given by EJ Cotton and EJ Anstis.[26]Nonetheless, I do conclude that it would not be appropriate to strike out the claim, for the reasons that a strike out is not a proportionate sanction as I consider a fair trial remains possible. I find that the claimant’s messages and postings are of a personal nature directed towards the respondent and others. It appears these have been made to discredit and tarnish the reputation of the respondent, and to avoid having to return to India now that his employment has come to an end. It appears the claimant has a strong fear of returning to India. This issue has no direct relevance to the legal issues to be determined by the Tribunal in this claim. Further, in the messages and postings referred to by Miss Swords Kieley, there is no reference made about these proceedings or about the respondent witnesses, to support the assertion that the respondent has been caused “overwhelming prejudice” and that a fair trial is not possible. Neither do I accept that the respondent has been put to incur significant and unnecessary costs.[27]In the context of this claim, (i.e unfair dismissal) the burden of proof is on the respondent to satisfy the Tribunal of the principal reason for dismissal, namely redundancy. I am not satisfied that the claimant’s conduct as displayed and complained of, is relevant or would be taken into account by the Tribunal in determining the reason and fairness of the dismissal.[28]I also note it is not being argued that compliance with the case management orders and preparation for the trial is not possible.[29]Therefore the application for a strike out is refused. Orders[30]At the request of Miss Swords Kieley, the case management orders made at the last hearing on 18 July 2022 are varied as set out below. The claimant did not oppose this request.(i) Disclosure of documents to be completed by 13 November 2023;(ii) Final hearing bundle to be prepared and paginated by the Respondent by 10 December 2023.(iii) Witness statements to be exchanged by no later than 4pm on 31 December 2023.[31]The parties are reminded to comply with the case management orders and that the services of ACAS is available for assistance in any settlement discussions.[32]The claimant is, once again, warned about his future conduct leading up to the final hearing.[33]I apologise to the parties for the delay in sending out this Judgment.