Ms R Perera v Jamie Briggs Removals and Storage Ltd: 3302628/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3302628/2024
Ms R PereraClaimantJamie Briggs Removals and Storage LtdRespondent
Employment Judge MJ SmithIn person for claimantDate 25 March 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s claim of unlawful deduction from wages, contrary to section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, is not well-founded and is therefore dismissed.[2]The claimant’s claim of breach of contract is not well founded and is therefore dismissed.

REASONS

[1]This is a claim of the unlawful deduction from wages contrary to section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) arising from a failure to pay commission which it is the claimant’s case was owed to her by the respondent.[2]In addition, the claimant claims breach of contract arising from a failure to pay commission which it is the claimant’s case was owed to her by the respondent. The claimant also claims damages for breach of contract arising from a failure to pay her commission payments which it is the claimant’s case were owed to her by the respondent and of which she was denied by the failure to give her notice.[3]The respondent is a removals and storage company with a variety of clients including well known commercial enterprises. The claimant was employed by the respondent as its Managing Director. The claimant was so employed from 7 February 2022 until 2 October 2023, when she was dismissed by a letter of that date dismissing her with immediate effect but giving her pay in lieu of notice.[4]The claimant contacted early conciliation via ACAS on 19 December 2023 and an early conciliation notice was issued on 30 January 2024. On 28 February 2024 the claimant presented a claim for unauthorised deduction of wages, breach of contract and notice pay to the tribunal. The procedural background[5]At the start of the hearing before me, so on 13 January 2025, the claimant made an application to strike out the response pursuant to Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. The application was made under the following paragraphs of Rule 38(1): (1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c) for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d) that it has not been actively pursued; (e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). Claim No: 3302628/2024 3[6]The claimant had raised the matter of such an application earlier in the proceedings in particular at the previous listing for final hearing on 15 October 2024.[7]Ms McIntosh on behalf of the respondent made representations having had time to review the application on the morning of the hearing. The application was resisted on all grounds.[8]The claimant set out specific dates in her application where she alleged that the respondent had missed deadlines and failed to comply with orders of the tribunal. The claimant put forward written representations in support of her application which were supplemented by oral representations at the hearing.[9]The respondent responded to the written representations of the claimant orally at the hearing and made reference to relevant case law. The respondent provided explanations for any delays and submitted that it was possible to have a fair trial within the listing time of two days.[10]Having heard from both parties I considered when strike out should be used and whether a fair hearing was possible in the time available.[11]I dismissed the application under Employment Tribunal Rule 38(1) for the response to be struck out. I did so because striking out is a draconian measure and because in my view there was no risk of an unfair trial. The provision of the documents required in the Case Management Order dated 21 October 2024 meant that it was still possible to have a fair trial within the trial window given the listing of two days. I took into account the Claimant only being able to access the bundle the Friday before the hearing date and that there were eighty-five additional pages in the bundle.

Law

[12]Section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 13.— Right not to suffer unauthorised deductions. (1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless— (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker's contract, or (b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction. Claim No: 3302628/2024 4[13]Section 27(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 27.— Meaning of “wages” etc.(1) In this Part “wages” , in relation to a worker, means any sums payable to the worker in connection with his employment, including— (a) any fee, bonus, commission, holiday pay or other emolument referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract or otherwise,… but excluding any payments within subsection (2).(2) Those payments are— (e) any payment to the worker otherwise than in his capacity as a worker. The evidence before me[14]I was provided with a bundle for the final hearing provided by the respondent. There were witness statements from the claimant, Mr Jamie Briggs and Mrs Julie Briggs. I was further provided with a bonus calculation from the claimant in respect of the additional evidence provided by the respondent in the bundle. I heard evidence from the claimant, Mrs Julie Briggs and Mr Jamie Briggs.[15]Having heard the evidence and read such documents as were referred to in the hearing bundle and taking into account the bonus calculation provided by the claimant I made the following findings of fact. My findings of fact[16]The claimant was employed as a Managing Director by the respondent and commenced her employment on 7 February 2022 with her employment being terminated on 2 October 2023.[17]The claimant received an offer letter dated 21 December 2021 from the respondent and then signed a contract with the Respondent on 20 May 2022. The claimant asserted that under the terms of the contract she was entitled to 3 months’ notice upon completion of a probationary 6 month period. This was not disputed by the respondent and I found that this was an accurate reflection of the claimant’s contract of employment.[18]The claimant asserted that under a bonus scheme agreed with the respondent she was entitled to a bonus for the financial year 2022-2023 and bonuses for Q1 and Q2 of the financial year 2023-2024. The claimant asserted that this was set out in her Claim No: 3302628/2024 5 offer letter which was incorporated into the contract and in subsequent conversations with the respondent. The claimant asserted that her claim was under the uncapped bonus scheme which was linked to the net profit of the business rather than the bonus scheme linked to performance criteria.[19]The relevant term of the offer letter is set out below: ‘Upon reflection and after discussion and consideration within the family we definitely want to put in place a fair bonus scheme for the post of Managing Director. As you know this is a new post for our company and therefore, we have not had a bonus scheme previously in place. We hope that when you start with JBR that there will be just over a quarter of this financial year left. With your induction period of three months taking us all but up to the end of the financial year, it does not seem appropriate to link any performance bonus to this period. We would like to offer a one-off payment of £4,000 if you successfully complete this period. Successful means you stay with the company and that you like us and we like you! Also, during this period, we would work on the Budget for the financial year 1st July 2022 to 20th June 2023. We will offer a scheme for the Managing Directors role with the opportunity to earn up to £30,000 bonus based on the achievement of agreed criteria. We will also offer a scheme that will not have any limits and be linked to net profit over and above the figure set in the budget. Having taken advice, we have run some scenarios based on the past two years performance and from the results, these additional amounts would have been circa £12,000 per annum.’[20]The claimant was provided with the employee handbook which contained a term expressly incorporated into the contract in relation to pay in lieu of notice set out below: ‘At the absolute discretion of the Company, payment in lieu of working notice may be made, and all benefits owing, including holidays, car allowance and private medical insurance, are paid as accrued at the actual date of termination. This is an express written term of your contract of employment.’ There were no such express terms in the Handbook relating to payment of commission and/or bonus. Claim No: 3302628/2024 6[21]I heard evidence from the claimant and two witnesses for the respondent, Mrs Julie Briggs and Mr Jamie Briggs. The claimant was permitted to expand upon her witness statement in order to address issues in the bundle which had not been known to the claimant at the time of writing her statement due to late receipt of the bundle.[22]The claimant asserted that the offer letter formed part of the contract. The respondent disputed this and denied that any bonus referred to in the offer letter was payable as it did not form part of the contract. The respondent’s case was that the claimant was not entitled to any bonus as the offer letter did not form part of the contract and the contract was silent on the matter. The respondent relied on a term of the contract which provided: ‘These Terms and Conditions of Employment annul any previous agreement whether verbal or written given to you at any time.’[23]In cross examination the respondent admitted that there had been discussions about the bonus between the date of the offer letter and the signing of the contract. I found that this was indeed the case and that the terms of the bonus set out in the offer letter were incorporated into the contract. Even if this were not the case, there was evidence provided in emails that there were discussions about the two bonus schemes set out in the offer letter such that this amounted to a variation of the terms of the contract to include the two bonus schemes.[24]The claimant’s claim relates only to the uncapped bonus scheme which is fifty per cent of the net profit against the budget. I found that this bonus was a term of the contract for the reasons set out above.[25]I found as a matter of fact that the claimant was due benefits owing as part of her pay in lieu of notice. The word ‘benefit’ is not defined within the contract. The contract set out separate terms for car allowance and IT provision. The Employee Handbook set out the definition of ‘benefit’ which included discretionary bonus schemes and that ‘Benefits are non-contractual and are provided by the Company in its absolute discretion’. This did not cover the bonus scheme linked to net profit. I found that this scheme was a benefit within the meaning of the contract as this term had been varied by agreement between the claimant and the respondent to include a net profit bonus scheme.[26]The employee handbook allowed for a deduction of wages in certain circumstances and I found that this term was expressly incorporated into the contract. Claim No: 3302628/2024 7[27]Section 27(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 defines ‘wages’ as ‘any sums payable to the worker in connection with his employment’. In the case of Delaney v Staples (t/a De Montfort Recruitment) 1993 ICR 483, HL, it was held that payments in lieu of notice are not wages within the meaning of the Act because they are not payments in respect of a subsisting contract of employment but refer to a period after the termination of the employment relationship.[28]The Claimant was therefore not entitled to make a claim of unauthorised deduction of wages for any period after 2 October 2023 as this would amount to payment in lieu of notice which are not wages within the meaning of the Act.[29]The claimant asserted that she accepted a payment of £22,000 as her bonus for financial year 2022-2023. I found that the claimant had been paid £22,000 as a bonus.[30]The claimant was paid in lieu of notice for a period of three months after the termination of her employment which comprised her basic salary and benefits namely bonus, holiday pay, car and mobile telephone allowance. Both the claimant and respondent accepted this and I found that the claimant had received all salary due to her as pay in lieu of notice. I found that the claimant had received all car allowance due as pay in lieu of notice. I found that the claimant had received all mobile telephone allowance due as pay in lieu of notice. I found that the claimant had received all holiday pay due as pay in lieu of notice.[31]The claimant asserted that the figures provided to her for financial year 2022-2023 were incorrect and that these figures now show a shortfall in her bonus for that year amounting to £77,717.50 for the Jamie Briggs Removals (JBR) company. The claimant also asserted that an additional bonus for this period for another company under her management namely Hangar Storage and Logistics (HSL) had not been paid. The claimant asserted that she was not paid her bonus for Q1 July to September 2023 and Q2 October to December 2023 of financial year 2023-2024 and that these sums were due on the basis of the second scheme as there was a net profit by the business during the relevant period. The claimant provided calculations in the bundle and in a separate spreadsheet showing how she arrived at the calculations of her bonus.[32]The respondent asserted that if the claimant was entitled to a bonus the amount of £22,000 is the only amount payable for financial year 2022-2023 for JBR. The respondent denied that any bonus is due in relation to HSL under the contract. The Claim No: 3302628/2024 8 r espondent asserted that if any bonus was due then it was not properly payable because either the claimant was not responsible for HSL or the company did not make a profit such as to warrant any bonus being payable.[33]In the annual review of 26 February 2023 it was acknowledged that the claimant had been Managing Director of both JBR and HSL since joining the company. It was admitted in cross examination of Mr Briggs that both JBR and HSL fell within the claimant’s remit during the period of her employment. There was an email dated 13 June 2023 showing that the claimant had HSL within her remit until at least the date of the email. I found that the claimant was responsible for HSL between the start and end date of her employment with the respondent and, therefore, it fell within the second bonus scheme at fifty percent of net profit over budget.[34]The respondent asserted that there was no net profit for either company in that financial year and that no sums were due to the claimant. The respondent maintained that the basis for the calculations had been provided. The respondent asserted that any discrepancy in the figures was as a result of the fluid nature of the business. The respondent disputed that there was any deliberate attempt to edit or change any figures.[35]In relation to financial year 2022 to 2023 it was agreed that a cross management charge of £245,000 was applied between HSL and JBR. It was paid from HSL to JBR as part of an accounting measure.[36]It was accepted by all parties that this payment could only be calculated as income once such that it appeared either as income for JBR or HSL.[37]The claimant did not accept the figures provided by the respondent in relation to expenses claimed such as electricity bills. The claimant asserted that there was an attempt to deprive her of a bonus by inflating expenses in relation to both JBR and HSL which resulted in the operating profit varying across a number of documents. The respondent denied that this was the case and stated that any changes in figures were accounted for by additional expenses and / or invoices such that the final accounts were the ones representing the true financial situation in respect of both JBR and HSL.[38]The final accounts which were submitted on behalf of HSL to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) showed an operating profit of £42,042 for the financial year 2022 to 2023. The final accounts which were submitted on behalf of JBR to HMRC showed an operating profit of £281,049 for the financial year 2022 to 2023. This took Claim No: 3302628/2024 9 account of the £245,000 cross management charge paid by HSL to JBR and amounted to a total profit for both businesses of £323,091.[39]The figure provided by the respondent for the budget of JBR was £113,077 and the figure for HSL was £243,853. This amounted to a total budget of £356,930 for both businesses. The Claimant disputed both budget figures and asserted that the budget was less than was set out by the Respondent.[40]I based the figures on the accounts as submitted to HMRC given the need for such accounts to be an accurate reflection of the business and the fact that the accounts had been prepared by an accountant.[41]The uncapped bonus scheme meant that the claimant was entitled to fifty per cent of the net profits of both companies against the budget. When the operating profit took account of the budget it showed a loss of -£33,839 such that there was no bonus properly payable to the Claimant for the financial year 2022 to 2023.[42]The figures provided by the respondent showed a profit figure for JBR and HSL of £141,940 with an assumed budget figure of £104,155. This was a difference of £37,785. At fifty per cent of the difference this gave a bonus figure of £18,892.50. As per subsequent conversations £2,500 was payable for achieving the target of a net profit against the budget figure. This gave a total of £21,392.50 as a bonus.[43]This gave a total bonus across the financial years 2022 to 2023 and 2023 to 2024 of £21,392.50. The Claimant was paid a bonus figure of £22,000 meaning that no further sums were properly payable. Any sum due was payable at the discretion of JBR as set out in the Employment Handbook which was incorporated as an express term of the contract.[44]If there were additional sums due to the claimant it was admitted that she had agreed to a sum of £22,000 as settlement for any bonus owed to her to ‘avoid continued back and forth’ as set out in an email dated 7 September 2023 from the Claimant to Mr Jamie Briggs. As such, no further sums were payable to the Claimant.[45]Under the terms of the contract the claimant was entitled to a bonus until the date of her termination namely 2 October 2023 which was the end of Q1 of the financial year 2023 to 2024. Claim No: 3302628/2024 10

Conclusions

[46]I found that the claimant was not entitled to a bonus for Q2 of the financial year 2023 to 2024 as this accrued after the termination of her employment.[47]I found that the claimant had received such bonus as was due for the financial year 2022 to 2023 and Q1 of the financial year 2023 to 2024.[48]I found that the claim for unlawful deduction of wages was not well-founded and therefore had to be dismissed. The respondent had not unlawfully deducted any wages and did not owe any further sums to the claimant.[49]I found that the claim for breach of contract was not well-founded and therefore had to be dismissed. Approved by Employment Judge MJ Smith 25 March 2025 Judgment sent to the parties on: 28 April 2025 For the Tribunal: Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/ Claim No: 3302628/2024 11 Case Number: 3302628/2024 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Ruth Perera Respondent: Jamie Briggs Removals and Storage Ltd RECONSIDERATION The claimant’s application dated 10 May 2025 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 28 April 2025 is refused and the judgment is confirmed.

Conclusions

[1]The claimant made an application to reconsider the Judgment dated 25 March 2025 and sent to the parties on 28 April 2025. The claimant lodged that request to the tribunal on 10 May 2025.[2]The judgment related to a claim for wrongful dismissal and unlawful deduction of wages. There was an application made by the claimant to strike out the entirety of the response at the start of the final hearing under: Rule 38(1) (b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c) for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d) that it has not been actively pursued; (e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out).[3]The conclusions are set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the same document. The reasons given by the claimant and respondent in relation to the application to strike Case Number: 3302628/2024 2 out are set out in paragraphs 6 to 9 of that judgment. This is summarised below for ease of reference:[6]The claimant had raised the matter of such an application earlier in the proceedings in particular at the previous listing for final hearing on 15 October 2024.[7]Ms McIntosh on behalf of the respondent made representations having had time to review the application on the morning of the hearing. The application was resisted on all grounds.[8]The claimant set out specific dates in her application where she alleged that the respondent had missed deadlines and failed to comply with orders of the tribunal. The claimant put forward written representations in support of her application which were supplemented by oral representations at the

hearing.

[9]The respondent responded to the written representations of the claimant orally at the hearing and made reference to relevant case law. The respondent provided explanations for any delays and submitted that it was possible to have a fair trial within the listing time of two days. 4. The relevant parts of the judgment setting out the claimant’s case are at paragraphs 17 to 26, 30 to 31 and 37. The reasons given are summarised at paragraphs 27 to 29 and 35 to 45. 5. The claimant has requested reconsideration of the claim on the basis of a number of issues which are set out below: 1. Failure to acknowledge or address the wrongful dismissal claim as part of the judgment. The wrongful dismissal claim was a central element of my case, clearly set out in my claim form and supporting submissions. However, the judgment contains no reference to this claim and it was not determined. This omission leaves a key aspect of the claim unresolved. I respectfully request reconsideration of this ground in the interests of justice, in accordance with Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024. 2. Procedural concerns regarding the Strike-Out application. I respectfully submit that the judgment did not engage with the specific grounds I raised under rule 38 (grounds b, c and d) in support of my strike-out application. While Case Number: 3302628/2024 3 the judge concluded that a fair trial was still possible, this conclusion was reached without first addressing whether there had been procedural irregularities or unreasonable conduct by the Respondent that could justify strike-out under these grounds. This may amount to a procedural omission, as these matters were clearly raised in my application and supporting submissions in detail. There were a number of serious breaches which directly impacted my preparation for the case. In accordance with Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024, I ask the Tribunal to reconsider this part of the judgment. 3.Procedural Irregularity regarding Amended Response form. I respectfully submit that there was a procedural irregularity in the handling of the amended response. The Tribunal’s order of 5 December 2024 (confirmed at the 15 October 2024 hearing) set a clear deadline for its filing, which the Respondent failed to meet despite seeking deadline extensions. Instead the amended response was simply introduced just two days before the hearing as part of the new hearing bundle… I therefore submit that the late and procedurally improper inclusion of this material, and the Tribunal’s reliance on it, constituted a procedural irregularity affecting the fairness of proceedings. I respectfully request reconsideration under Rule 68. 4. Removal and Replacement of documents in the hearing bundle. I respectfully submit that a procedural error occurred in the handling of the hearing bundle which significantly affected the fairness of the proceedings. Specifically, the Respondent removed key documents from the agreed previous bundle without my consent. Most notably, the original, unedited 2022-2023 profit and loss statement for JBR, which I had relied upon when preparing my amended claim and witness statement as this was the only bundle available to me at the time… 5. Reliance on unilaterally included documents and Amended Response without adequate opportunity to contest. I respectfully submit that there was a procedural irregularity in the way the Tribunal considered the assertion that, when the operating profit took account of the budget it showed a loss of - £33,839 such that there was no bonus properly payable to me for the financial year 2022 to 2023. This assertion appears to have been based on combining figures from both companies as well as facts drawn from the amended response and additional documents unilaterally included in the hearing bundle by the Respondent just two days before the hearing. I was not given adequate opportunity to contest, respond or challenge the legal or factual basis for such Case Number: 3302628/2024 4 a combined method which I believe was procedurally unfair. The extremely short time frame of two days was insufficient to properly review and respond to newly presented material that ultimately proved central to the Tribunal’s decision… 6. Scope of Bonus payment – Procedural fairness and material misunderstanding. I respectfully submit that there may have been a procedural irregularity and material misunderstanding in the Tribunal’s conclusion that the £22,000 payment I received based on JBR calculation in respect of 2022-2023 settled any bonus entitlement in full. This conclusion does not appear to be supported by any clear evidence, and I was not given an opportunity to respond to any suggestion that it covered potential bonus payments for HSL for the same period or future periods…Additionally the judgment found the bonus to be contractual and linked to net profit. However, reliance on the discretionary clause from the Employment Handbook in assessing whether future bonuses were owed appears inconsistent with that finding… The Law 6. Rule 68(1) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 states that: The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. 7. Rule 69 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 states that: Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of—(a) the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was sent to the parties, or(b) the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. 8. Under the previous version of the Rules a number of reasons could be invoked, i.e:a. that an administrative error had resulted in a wrong decision;b. that the party did not receive notice of the hearing;c. that the decision was made in the absence of the party;d. that new evidence was available, and finally; and/ore. that the interests of justice required a review. Case Number: 3302628/2024 5 9. Now, all of these situations are covered by the single “interests of justice” test. Where I refer to case law, it will be pursuant to the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013, albeit they are applicable to the simplification provided for by Rule 68. For example, in Outasight VB Ltd v Brown 2015 ICR D11, EAT, her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was) explained that the specific grounds were unnecessary because any consideration of an application under one of those grounds would have taken the interests of justice into account.

The Law

[10]In Stevenson v Golden Wonder Ltd 1977 IRLR 474, EAT, Lord McDonald said of the old review provisions that they were ‘not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence can be rehearsed with different emphasis, or further evidence adduced which was available before’. Case law under the Tribunal Rules 2013 demonstrates that courts and tribunals view the reconsideration provisions in the same manner.[11]The tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases ‘fairly and justly’ - rule 3. This includes:a. ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;b. dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues;c. avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;d. avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues; ande. saving expense.[12]In Outasight VB Ltd v Brown 2015 ICR D11, EAT, Her Honour Judge Eady QC accepted that the wording ‘necessary in the interests of justice’ in what is now Rule 68, allows employment tribunals a broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration of a judgment is appropriate in the circumstances. However, this discretion must be exercised judicially, ‘which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation’.[13]Whilst it is not completely analogous, the case of Redding v EMI Leisure Ltd EAT 262/81 has some relevance here: the claimant appealed against an employment tribunal’s rejection of their application for a review of its judgment. They argued that it was in the interests of justice to do so because they had not understood the case against they and had failed to do themselves justice when presenting their claim. The EAT observed that: ‘When you boil down what is said on [the claimant’s] Case Number: 3302628/2024 6 behalf, it really comes down to this: that she did not do herself justice at the hearing, so justice requires that there should be a second hearing so that she may. Now, justice means justice to both parties. It is not said, and, as we see it, cannot be said that any conduct of the case by the employers here caused [the claimant] not to do herself justice. It was, we are afraid, her own inexperience in the situation.’[14]The 2004 Tribunal Rules provided that a decision could be reviewed on the ground that it ‘was wrongly made as a result of an administrative error’. In Sodexho Ltd v Gibbons 2005 ICR 1647, EAT, the claimant had given the wrong postcode for his solicitor when completing the ET1, and this led to a delay in serving a deposit order on the claimant’s solicitor, which ultimately led to the tribunal striking out the claim for non-payment of the deposit. In upholding the tribunal’s decision to review the striking-out order, the EAT held that ‘administrative error’ included errors by the parties as well as by tribunal staff (but not tribunal judges). The dictionary definition of ‘administrative’ as ‘pertaining to the management of affairs’ was apt to include completion of the ET1 form by the claimant. Therefore, the tribunal was entitled to review the decision on this ground. This specific ground could also form part of the interests of justice test (as already explained above).[15]I can summarise the reasons provided by the claimant for the reconsideration as being:a. Failure to address the wrongful dismissal claim; andb. Errors in procedure during the hearing.[16]Taking submission (a) first of the reconsideration request made by the claimant, which relates to a failure to deal with the wrongful dismissal claim. The wrongful dismissal claim was a claim for damages for breach of contract arising from a failure to give notice. The claimant was paid her salary as set out in the claim form. The remainder of the claim was for bonus payments to which she asserted she was entitled stating that, as per the claim form, ‘Therefore my payment in lieu of notice should have made allowance for this and included this figure’.[17]I cannot see any additional or new evidence provided by the claimant here that was not already explored at the time of the hearing. Neither can I find any specific error in law on the part of the Tribunal. In short, the position set out by the claimant is the same as explained at the time of the hearing. Case Number: 3302628/2024 7[18]Dealing next with part (b), these issues were explored in detail at the outset and during the course of the final hearing.[19]I cannot see any additional or new evidence provided by the claimant here that was not already explored at the time of the hearing. Neither can I find any specific administrative error on the part of the Tribunal. In short, the position set out by the claimant is the same as explained at the time of the hearing.[20]I am very mindful of the overriding objective and ensuring that both parties are on equal footing and seeking flexibility. Whilst the claimant was not represented, much time was taken during the hearing to ensure that the claimant was able to put forward her case in evidence and in submissions.

Conclusion

[21]I need to balance the interests of both parties and consider the importance of their being finality to the proceedings in question (Outasight VB Ltd v Brown 2015 ICR D11, EAT). I cannot find any new evidence, error or any other reason with which to reconsider this judgment.[22]I have considered carefully Stevenson v Golden Wonder Ltd 1977 IRLR 474, EAT, that the reasons provided in the application for reconsideration are the same, or similarly worded, reasons and evidence already fully explored in the final hearing.[23]The request for reconsideration is refused and the judgment is confirmed. Approved By: