Mr M Basharat v London Luton Airport Operations Ltd: 3302477/2023
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3302477/2023
Between
Mr M BasharatClaimantLondon Luton Airport Operations LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge TynanMs N Webber (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 8 January 2025
REASONS
[1]I gave an oral judgment on the disability issue on 31 October 2024, including detailed reasons. Ms Slater requested written reasons on the Claimant’s behalf immediately after the judgment had been given. I apologise to the parties that these have been slightly delayed. I finalised them at the end of November but unfortunately then experienced a family bereavement and have only recently returned to work.[2]The Claimant presented a Claim Form to the Employment Tribunals on 10 March 2023 in which he claimed that he had been unfairly dismissed by the Respondent, as well as discriminated against on the grounds of race and 1 of 13 disability. His claim of race discrimination has already been dismissed following its withdrawal.[3]The Claimant claims to be disabled within the meaning of s.6 of the Equality Act 2010 by reason of carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and stress, anxiety and depression. His discrimination complaints are in respect of two discrete periods of time: the two claimed impairments are not relied upon in combination. As regards the CTS, the relevant period of time is December 2019 to 5 February 2020; and as regards the stress, anxiety and depression, the relevant period of time is 19 October to 7 November 2022. The events in question are separated in time by over two years. The Respondent disputes that the Claimant was disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 during either period.[4]I was provided with a 159 page Bundle for the hearing. The Bundle includes the Claimant’s revised Disability Impact Statement which he adopted as his evidence at Tribunal.
THE LAW
[5]Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010, provides as follows: Disability (1) A person (P) has a disability if- (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long term adverse effect on P’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities.[6]Section 212 of the Equality Act 2010, clarifies that: (1) In this Act… ‘Substantial’ means more than minor or trivial.[7]There are supplementary provisions in relation to the definition of disability in Schedule 1 of the 2010 Act.[8]Guidance was issued in 2011 by the Secretary of State regarding matters to be taken into account by Employment Tribunals in determining questions relating to the definition of disability. I am required to take into account any aspect of the Guidance which appears to be relevant. Paragraph A2 of the Guidance contains a helpful analysis of Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010: Main elements of the definition of disability- A1 … A2 This means that, in general: 2 of 13• the person must have an impairment that is either physical or mental;• the impairment must have adverse effects which are substantial;• the substantial adverse effects must be long term; and• the long term substantial adverse effects must be effects on normal day to day activities. All of the factors above must be considered when determining whether a person is disabled.[9]Paragraph 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010, includes the following clarification: Long term effects-(1) The effect of an impairment is long term if- (a) it has lasted for at least 12 months; (b) it is likely to last for at least 12 months; or (c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected.(2) If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities, it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur.[10]Paragraph C3 of the Guidance (which reflects the House of Lords’ decision in Boyle v SCA Packaging Ltd (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) [2009] ICR 1056, HL) confirms that ‘likely’ should be interpreted as meaning ‘it could well happen’, something that is a real possibility but not necessarily ‘more probable than not’.[11]The issue of how long an impairment is likely to last and/or whether it is likely to recur should be determined at the date of the alleged discriminatory act(s) and not as at the date of the Tribunal hearing — McDougall v Richmond Adult Community College 2008 ICR 431, CA and All Answers Ltd. v Mr W and Ms R [2021] EWCA Civ 606 – so that a Tribunal will potentially fall into error if it has regard to subsequent events when reaching a decision as to what was likely at the relevant time. In deciding therefore whether the effects of any conditions or impairments which the Claimant had were likely to last 12 months or more and/or to recur, I must focus in particular upon any contemporaneous evidence from the relevant time. That could include evidence prior to the events in question, particularly if this sheds some light on how long he had had the impairments in question, their effects, and how those effects might be felt in the future.[12]Paragraph B5 of the Guidance recognises that depression is typically an impairment with fluctuating or recurring effects.[13]Someone who has suffered from a combination of impairments with different effects and to different extents over a period of time, which may have overlapped, can still be regarded as disabled. Whilst I am familiar with the 3 of 13 section of the Guidance dealing with the cumulative effect of impairments, beginning at paragraph B4, there has been no need for me to consider its provisions again within these proceedings because, as I say, the impairments are relied upon by the Claimant separately rather than in combination.[14]It is well established that the onus of proving a disability is on the Claimant, on the balance of probabilities (Morgan v Staffordshire University [2002] IRLR 190). It is not for the Respondent to prove that the Claimant was not disabled at the relevant times.[15]In J v DLA Piper UK LLP UKEAT0263/09/RN, Underhill J, as he then was, drew a distinction between symptoms of low mood and anxiety caused by clinical depression, which was a situation likely to meet the definition of disability, and those derived from a reaction to adverse circumstances such as problems at work, or adverse life events, which was not. He acknowledged that the borderline between those two states of affairs may be blurred, but gave guidance as follows: “We accept that it may be a difficult distinction to apply in a particular case and the difficulty can be exacerbated by the looseness of which some medical professionals and some lay people use such terms as depression, clinical or otherwise, anxiety and stress. Fortunately, however, we would not expect those difficulties often to cause a real problem in the context of a claim under the Act. This is because of the long term effect requirement. If as we recommend at paragraph 42 above, the Tribunal starts by considering the adverse effects issue and finds that the Claimant’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities has been substantially impaired by symptoms characteristic of depression for 12 months or more, it would in most cases be likely to conclude that he or she was indeed suffering clinical depression, rather than simply a reaction to adverse circumstances. It is a common sense observation that such reactions are not normally long lived.”[16]The decisions in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Morris UKEAT_0436_10, Dunham v Ashford Windows [2005] IRLR 608 and Herry v Dudley Metropolitan Council and another [2017] ICR 610 serve to highlight the potential importance of expert medical evidence in disability discrimination cases. The Claimant has not secured any medical report for these proceedings. The main source of information available to me are his GP records and occupational health assessments undertaken at the request of the Respondent.[17]In Morris, Underhill J, then President of the EAT said: [55] The burden of proving disability lies on the Claimant. There is no rule of law that that burden can only be discharged by adducing firsthand expert evidence, but difficult questions frequently arise in relation to mental impairment, and in Morgan v Staffordshire University [2002] IRLR 190, [2002] ICR 475 this tribunal, Lindsay P presiding, observed that “the existence or not of a mental impairment is very much a matter for qualified and informed medical opinion” (see para 20(5), at p 485A-B); and it was held in that case that reference to the Applicant's GP notes 4 of 13 was insufficient to establish that she was suffering from a disabling depression (see in particular paras 18-20, at pp 482-4).[18]Whilst the primary issue under consideration in Dunham was whether evidence should be accepted from a psychologist rather than a doctor, the EAT observed that, “in the case of mental illness medical evidence as to the nature of that illness is likely to be expected”.[19]In Herry, Judge David Richardson, sitting in the EAT, returned to Underhill J’s guidance in DLA Piper UK LLP. He said: “56 Although reactions to adverse circumstances are indeed not normally long-lived, experience shows that there is a class of case where a reaction to circumstances perceived as adverse can become entrenched; where the person concerned will not give way or compromise over an issue at work, and refuses to return to work, yet in other respects suffers no or little apparent adverse effect on normal dayto-day activities. A doctor may be more likely to refer to the presentation of such an entrenched position as stress than as anxiety or depression. An Employment Tribunal is not bound to find that there is a mental impairment in such a case. Unhappiness with a decision or a colleague, a tendency to nurse grievances, or a refusal to compromise (if these or similar findings are made by an Employment Tribunal) are not of themselves mental impairments: they may simply reflect a person’s character or personality. Any medical evidence in support of a diagnosis of mental impairment must of course be considered by an Employment Tribunal with great care; so must any evidence of adverse effect over and above an unwillingness to return to work until an issue is resolved to the employee’s satisfaction; but in the end the question whether there is a mental impairment is one for the Employment Tribunal to assess.” THE CLAIMANT’S CONCERNS[20]On 29 October 2024, Ms Slater emailed the Tribunal on behalf of the Claimant, expressing his concerns following the hearing on 7 October 2024. It is a detailed email, but one of the Claimant’s principal concerns is said to be ‘guidance’ I gave on 21 August 2024. Mrs Slater wrote: “This guidance he feels stopped him including information that even though he might not have been questioned on it by the Respondent, it would have been accepted as his evidence; even with the difficulties in presenting his oral evidence due to his mental health issues. By removing a lot of the background information from in his previous impact statement and not providing full details leading up to and after the two relevant periods; he feels that relevant evidence was kept from the Tribunal and caused some detriment or disadvantage. All he wanted was a fair hearing and he believes that your guidance and clarity was to aid a fair hearing; but which inadvertently meant that his evidence before the 5 of 13 Tribunal for consideration was restricted due to the content of his impact statement.”[21]I was careful on 21 August 2024 not to proffer any advice. The record of hearing confirms that I alerted Ms Slater to the 2011 Guidance. Although this is not documented in the record of hearing, I also drew her attention to All Answers Ltd as the Disability Impact Statement that had been submitted for the hearing seemed to me to address the effects of the Claimant’s claimed conditions / impairments as at the date of the Statement rather than in each case by reference to the two periods of time with which I am concerned. As this was potentially fatal in terms of his claim to have been disabled at the relevant times, I felt it was important he should be afforded an opportunity to address this significant gap in his evidence. I encouraged the Claimant to focus any further evidence in particular on the relevant periods in time but I certainly did not mandate what evidence was to be adduced or say that the Claimant could not include relevant background or more recent evidence if he felt this may be important; this was a matter for the Claimant as I believe paragraph 1.1 of my Order makes clear.[22]In her email, Ms Slater also said that the Claimant was concerned about the way his mental health affected him during the proceedings, specifically that, “he was unable to process a lot of information jumping from one thing to the next and struggled with concentrating, following and remembering things.” She referred to how he Respondent had allegedly spoken to the Claimant and harassed, belittled and embarrassed him in front of others, before going on to say: “At the hearing he felt like the Respondent’s counsel was being allowed to do these things again to him in the witness box, where he didn’t feel that they were just asking questions; and had no regard to his current mental state. He felt he was being deliberately badgered and harassed to get him flustered and confused; which due to his known mental state was unfair and unjust. He believes the Respondent knew from his allegations of how the Respondent treated him in his claim, that being questioned in that way would have a significant effect on his mental health and ability to cope with the proceedings; which it clearly did. The relentless badgering and repeating of allegations saying he was lying, made him very anxious and was very stressful. To the point where he was giving different answers to the same question asked later or in a slightly different way without realising it at times out of sheer panic and anxiety he stated afterwards. Mr Basharat said that he began feeling like he was back at LLA with Managers trying to push him over the edge and force him out. He was subjected to hours of questioning by the Respondent before and after lunch at the hearing.”[23]The Claimant gave evidence for a little over two hours in total on 7 October. In the course of his evidence we broke for lunch for one hour. I did not observe 6 of 13 the Claimant to be anxious or to be exhibiting any obvious signs of mental distress. Whilst he did not give evidence uninterrupted for two hours, he did not in any event ask for an extra break in addition to the lunch break.[24]I reject the Claimant’s assertion that Ms Webber badgered him and the further suggestion that she and/or the Respondent resolved to question him in such a way that might be detrimental to him in terms of his mental wellbeing. If that is his perception in the matter, it is not objectively well-founded. Ms Webber’s conduct of the hearing was beyond reproach. She was focused in her cross examination of the Claimant, but always polite and respectful in her interactions with him. She did not accuse the Claimant of lying, let alone do so repeatedly. She had a duty to advance the Respondent’s case and in my judgement did so according to the standards expected of her profession. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS[25]In Gestmin SGPS S.A. v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited & Anor. [2013] ECHC3560 (Comm), Mr Justice Leggatt, as he then was, made observations about the distorting effects of litigation on the reliability of oral evidence. In particular he stressed the importance of contemporaneous documents when making findings of fact. He highlighted the risk that past beliefs may be revised to make them more consistent with present beliefs. That may be the case even though a witness is endeavouring to provide a truthful and accurate account of events as they recall them. In my experience the vast majority of witnesses seek to tell the truth, the Claimant being no exception in that regard. But the fact that the Claimant has endeavoured to provide a truthful account does not mean I can necessarily rely upon what he says, particularly where, as here, the evidence in his Disability Impact Statement and, more so, his evidence at Tribunal is at odds with the contemporaneous evidence in the form of his GP and other medical records. I am mindful that the Claimant has been required to identify how two separate health conditions of his have affected him at two very specific points in time, respectively some five and two years ago. CTS[26]The Respondent accepts that the Claimant’s CTS amounts to a physical impairment and that at times it can affect the Claimant’s ability to carry out day to day activities, but the Respondent submits that there is limited evidence as to the effect on the Claimant’s activities at the relevant time, including whether any effects were long term within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010.[27]CTS is recorded within the “minor past” section of the Claimant’s GP notes (page 118). There are two entries dated 11 December 2018 and 9 March 2020. That does not of course mean that the Claimant only first experienced symptoms of CTS on 11 December 2018, since people will often not consult their GP until they have experienced symptoms indicative of an impairment or condition over a period of time. How soon they consult their doctor after first experiencing particular symptoms may depend upon a range of factors including the severity of the condition, whether they have co-morbidities, how robust their mental health is, their tolerance for pain, and their ability to secure 7 of 13 an appointment with a doctor as well as any necessary time off work to attend the appointment.[28]The detailed GP records are at page 141 onwards of the Bundle. By 8 February 2019 the Claimant was assessed, or at least reported, as having moderate to severe CTS bilaterally. There is no evidence as to when he first experienced symptoms indicative of CTS. He had a steroid injection to his right wrist, and was issued with a two week Fit Note and advised to rest. There is nothing in his medical records to indicate whether the Claimant was expected to make a full recovery. On 25 February 2019, the Claimant’s GP noted that he was reporting sharp pains in his right wrist. Whilst he was advised to rest, no further Fit Note was issued. The consultation concluded on the basis that the Claimant would let the GP surgery know if he wanted an ‘Amended Duties Fit Note’. That strongly supports that the pain was not in fact then at a level that it was impacting the Claimant’s ability to work, or to undertake his normal day to day activities but that this could be kept under review.[29]It may be assumed that the condition settled down as there are no relevant entries in his medical records for some months thereafter. The Claimant consulted his GP on 24 October 2019 in connection with indigestion or reflux issues, when he was prescribed Lansoprazole and Naproxen. He also reported a flare up and tingling and numbness to his right wrist, but there is no note to indicate he was experiencing pain and his GP specifically noted that there was no loss of hand function at that time. I find that there was no adverse impact at that time in terms of his normal day to day activities.[30]The Claimant consulted his GP again on 13 November 2019. Whilst he referred to pains in his hands, his principal reason for consulting his GP was headaches which he attributed to lack of sleep potentially linked to shift working. Although the Claimant made reference to his work involving heavy lifting and pushing loads, he was not reporting any impaired ability to perform his job, or indeed any other impact on his ability to undertake normal day to day activities. That is further indicated by the fact he was prescribed Zopiclone for the difficulties in sleeping he was then experiencing, but nothing for pain management.[31]Although there is reference on 13 November 2019 to the Claimant wanting “the letter”, which is possibly a reference to the ‘Amended Duties Fit Note’ that he had discussed with his GP some months earlier, the GP records provide no further indication as to whether any such letter might be expected to address any workplace duties that had the potential to aggravate the Claimant’s CTS or his shift working pattern, or indeed both issues.[32]The Claimant seems to have had a more detailed discussion with his GP on 17 December 2019. His GP notes (page 136) suggest that the duties in respect of which adjustments might be sought were lifting and pushing heavy luggage.[33]During a further consultation on 24 December 2019, the Claimant reported that he had difficulty working late shifts due to health issues, and that he was unable to use his right hand for any length of time. 8 of 13[34]When the Claimant consulted his GP again on 27 January 2020, the CTS was noted to be in his left hand, with some symptoms reoccurring in his right hand. The effect, if any, upon normal day to day activities was not documented.[35]The Claimant consulted his GP on 6 February 2020, the day after the date of the last of the matters about which complaint is made with reference to CTS. There is no record of CTS having been discussed during the consultation, rather mental health concerns and alleged work place stress and bullying.[36]CTS was briefly mentioned during a further consultation on 13 February 2020 and in further detail on 9 March 2020 when the Claimant reported that symptoms of numbness had returned and that he felt unsafe driving due to his symptoms. He did not say, or at least it was not noted by his GP, when he first began to feel unsafe driving, including whether this coincided with a second steroid injection, this time to his left wrist / hand.[37]In his Disability Impact Statement, the Claimant states that in terms of his CTS he was symptom free between February and October 2019. That accords with his medical records. He says that he took precautions to ensure that he did not overdo things and put additional strain or pressure on his hands / wrists. In my judgement he did what could reasonably be expected of him to manage his condition. He goes on to set out what he says were the effects of the CTS before, during and after the relevant period with which I am concerned (pages 154 and 155 of the Bundle). He describes 10 effects, including an inability to garden, difficulties with personal care and pain if he held a mobile phone for even a few minutes. I find that the Claimant has confused the position as it may be now or even as it was over the intervening years, with how it was between December 2019 and February 2020. None of the effects he now describes were noted by his doctor during what I calculate to have been 14 consultations over the space of 14 months. I think it highly improbable, as the Claimant suggested at Tribunal, that he discussed those various impacts with his GP who then failed to capture then in the Claimant’s medical records. The only recorded impact on non-work related activities is on driving, albeit only noted on 9 March 2020, some four weeks after the end of the relevant period with which I am concerned. Even then, the issue was noted to be that the Claimant felt unsafe to drive rather than that his driving was in fact impaired. I note in particular that the Claimant was given dietary and lifestyle advice on 9 March 2020, but seemingly not encouraged by his GP to limit his driving or to stop driving altogether, advice that was only issued at a later date. The Claimant does not refer to difficulties with driving in his Disability Impact Statement.[38]The Claimant does not meet the statutory definition just by reason that he has had CTS over a period of time. Instead, the question under section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 is whether the relevant impairment has had a substantial and long term adverse effect on an employee’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities. I am not entirely confident that the Claimant has fully understood this: for example, in the second paragraph of his Disability Impact Statement he seems to assert that he was disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 throughout the period February to October 2019 even though he was symptom free. 9 of 13[39]Looking at the position between December 2019 and 5 February 2020, the Claimant had symptoms consistent with recurrent CTS during that period. By 17 December 2019 he was reporting difficulty in performing the duties of his job, specifically lifting and pushing heavy luggage, but as I say he did not relate this at the time to other difficulties in his normal day to day activities. The position on 24 December 2019 was more specifically an inability to use his right hand for any length of time. The Claimant was seen by the Respondent’s occupational health advisors on 8 January 2020, when it was identified that he could remain at work on restricted duties and that he should not work on the x-ray machines, or off-loading trays since these tasks respectively involved the use of a mouse and pulling or lifting trays containing luggage and passengers’ personal belongings. In my judgement, these two restrictions went beyond the precautions that an employee might reasonably be expected to take to manage a condition or to prevent its reoccurrence and, in combination with what was reported on 24 December 2019, began to indicate a potentially more than minor or trivial impact upon the Claimant’s work based activities. The first question is whether those activities can be said to be normal day to day activities. Paragraph D4 of the Statutory Guidance states that “normal” should be given its ordinary everyday meaning. In my judgement, using a computer mouse is a normal every day activity, likewise, moving and lifting heavy items, even if it is not a normal activity to move and lift trays containing luggage. In his Disability Impact Statement the Claimant states that he could not carry bags of shopping. In my judgement his impaired ability to undertake his full work duties by December 2019/January 2020, reflected outside the workplace by his inability to carry shopping bags, was more than minor or trivial. It is also consistent with the Claimant having reported to his GP on 24 December 2019 that he could not use his right hand for any length of time.[40]Nevertheless, in my further judgement, whether as at 8 January 2020 or thereafter through to 5 February 2020, the effects just described cannot be said at that time to be likely to last for at least 12 months. By 5 February 2020 they had only been impacting the Claimant’s normal day to day activities to the requisite level such as to potentially qualify as a disability, for a period of three weeks (or for eight weeks, if the entry in the Claimant’s GP records from 30 November 2019 could be said to support the conclusion that he was by then impaired in terms of his ability to move and lift heavy items). Although the CTS itself was then recurrent, its effects were not; the effects identified in late December 2019/early January 2020 did not represent the reoccurrence of an impaired ability to undertake day to day activities such as to bring the situation within paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010, since there is no evidence of an impaired ability to undertake day to day activities throughout the period December 2018 to October 2019. Accordingly, in order for the Claimant to establish that he was disabled by reason of CTS at any point during the relevant period, he must establish that the effects in question were likely to last for at least 12 months. That question is not to be answered with the benefit of hindsight, but instead on the strength of how things looked at the time and also having regard to any available sources of information as to the likely course of the condition. It may be both the Claimant’s and Ms Slater’s inexperience in the matter, but they have failed to place relevant evidence before the Tribunal in this regard. The nature of the condition and its typical effects are not described 10 of 13 in the occupational health reports, or in the Claimant’s GP records, in the sense of how long flare ups typically last, whether a person can usually expect to make a full recovery and how effective steroid injections and other interventions or strategies are in addressing the condition and/or its symptoms. I have not been provided with sources of information from the NHS or elsewhere to enable me to come to an informed view as to what can ‘well happen’ when a person develops CTS. McDougall and All Answers Ltd serve as a reminder that I would fall into error if I sought to answer the question of what was likely at the relevant time by looking at how things in fact worked out i.e, with the benefit of hindsight. I have every sympathy with a claimant in Mr Basharat’s position, since the law on this particular aspect of the legal definition of disability may seem counter-intuitive. Within the limits of my judicial impartiality, I endeavoured to point the Claimant and Ms Slater in the right direction on 21 August 2024. In the final analysis, the Claimant has failed to establish that between December 2019 and 5 February 2020 his inability to use a mouse and to move and lift heavy items, including luggage and shopping, was likely to be affected for at least 12 months, namely through much of the remainder of 2020. He has therefore failed to establish that as at the relevant time, namely between December 2019 and 5 February 2020, he was disabled by reason of CTS. Stress, anxiety and depression[41]As regards the Claimant’s claim to be disabled by reason of stress, anxiety and depression, in my judgement this is a case which falls squarely into the type of case described in J v DLA Piper UK LLP as a reaction to adverse circumstances.[42]The Claimant experienced work related stress over an extended period in 2020, as a result of alleged stress, bullying and racial harassment at work. After November 2020 he did not consult his GP again about such matters until 10 March 2022, namely on his first day back at work after an 18-moth period of sabbatical leave. He told his GP that on his return from leave that he had been bullied by his manager. He reported experiencing harassment and racism in the workplace during a further consultation on 4 April 2022 and was certified with work related stress. Citalopram was prescribed on 26 April 2022. Work related stress continued to be the principal reason given by the Claimant’s GP when certifying the Claimant’s ongoing unfitness to work during the remainder of the year, including during the short period of time with which the Tribunal is concerned.[43]There is no reference to stress, anxiety and depression within the significant past section in the Claimant’s medical records. The first reference to mental health issues in his GP records is on 6 February 2020. The issue then was identified as stress at work, namely a reaction to the Claimant’s work situation and perceived bullying at work. On 26 February 2020 the Claimant told his GP he was stressed at the thought of going back to work. He continued to report work related stress in further consultations on 10 March, 28 March and 30 April 2020. On 1 September 2020 the Claimant commenced a period of sabbatical leave. There is no evidence that he consulted his GP about mental health issues in the period leading up to his sabbatical, though he did consult his GP again on 30 November 2020 when he reported that he was still suffering from 11 of 13 stress and anxiety. Thereafter the Claimant seemingly did not consult his doctor again about any mental health issues until he returned to work in 2022. From the page numbering in the bottom right-hand corner of his medical records, it seems that 5 pages of notes and records have been excluded, covering the period between November 2020 and 7 February 2022. It suggests to me that the Claimant was in regular contact with his GP over that period about issues unrelated to stress, anxiety and depression, and indeed CTS, since the five pages of records would otherwise have been disclosed and included within the Bundle.[44]In my judgement, the Claimant’s medical records evidence that this is a case of a person reacting to adverse circumstances in the workplace, who may have experienced some limited impact in terms of sleep but otherwise who experienced no obvious effects in terms of his day to day activities. Once the Claimant was removed from the situation of stress, his symptoms abated and he had no further need to consult his GP in the matter. When one reads the notes from the consultation on 4 April 2022 (page 129), the same picture emerges as in 2020, namely that the Claimant was stressed and anxious because he perceived he was being bullied by his manager. I conclude that the workplace issues had become entrenched in the Claimant’s mind. He went on long term sick leave within just a few weeks of returning from sabbatical leave and remained absent from work for several months until he resigned his employment. All the while he was absent on sick leave, the issues at work remained unresolved and I find acted as an impediment in terms of his return to work. However, his medical records do not indicate any deterioration in his underlying mental health which was consistently and largely documented to be work related stress, mental stress, or stress and anxiety. The Claimant first reported that he felt depressed and anxious in February 2023, some two to three months after he had resigned his employment with the Respondent. However, his GP noted that his impression was that the Claimant had an anxiety state. He went on to issue a Fit Note certifying him unfit for work due to stress at work anxiety, suggesting once more that the Claimant was continuing to react to adverse circumstances in the workplace, albeit he was by then working at Heathrow Airport: he told his GP that he was being harassed and bullied in his new workplace. The fact that he perceived the issues in his new workplace to be similar to the issues he had experienced when working for the Respondent adds to the overall impression of the Claimant having an entrenched view about workplaces in general.[45]On 26 May 2023 the Claimant was diagnosed with a mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. This was some six months or so after he had left the Respondent’s employment, and six to seven months on from the period in time with which I am concerned. For the reasons I have already set out, that diagnosis does not assist in terms of coming to a judgment as to whether he was disabled some seven months earlier.[46]Whilst the Claimant undoubtedly experienced an adverse reaction to unresolved issues in the workplace, in my judgement however deeply held or entrenched his feelings were, in other respects there was little or no adverse effect upon his normal day to day activities. I am reinforced in that conclusion by the absence of any medical report from the Claimant’s GP in support of a 12 of 13 diagnosis of a mental impairment with more than minor or trivial long term adverse effects.[47]I recognise, of course, that prolonged exposure to problems at work and adverse life events can undermine a person’s resilience such that their symptoms may ultimately reflect and evidence the existence and manifestation of an underlying mental impairment which is having a substantial, adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day to day activities. Whether or not that was the case by May 2023, the Claimant has not satisfied me on the balance of probabilities that he had a disabling impairment by 7 November 2022, let alone that any effects were likely to last for up to 12 months.[48]For all these reasons the Claimant has failed to discharge the burden upon him of establishing that he was disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 at the relevant times. In the circumstances I shall strike out his disability discrimination claims on the grounds that they have no reasonable prospect of success.