Miss L Wood v QIC Trims Ltd: 3300918/2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is struck out.[2]It is just and equitable to extend the time limit in respect of the claimant’s claim of maternity or pregnancy discrimination, and that claim is within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Approved by Employment Judge Anstis 16 October 2025 Judgment sent to the parties on: 31 October 2025 For the Tribunal: Notes: Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/ Case Number: 3300918/2025 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Miss L Wood Respondent: QIC Trims Ltd Heard at: Reading On: 16 October 2025 Before:REASONS
[1]These written reasons are provided at the request of the respondent. The relevant judgment was sent to the parties on 31 October 2025 and these reasons were requested on 13 November 2025.[2]This hearing has been convened by order of EJ Michell to consider whether or not I should extend time for the claimant’s claims of unfair dismissal and pregnancy and maternity discrimination, both of which relate to her dismissal, which took effect on 30 April 2024.[3]By the end of the hearing, Ms McLachlan agreed with me that the last date for the claimant to submit an in time claim was 9 September 2024. The claimant did not express a view on the end of the time limit, but 9 September 2024 was in any event the later of the two possible dates discussed at this hearing. Her claim was submitted on 21 February 2025, approximately 5½ months out of time. Her daughter was born on 21 November 2024.[4]For the avoidance of doubt, this is not a case in which the claimant says that she was unaware of any discrimination. On the contrary, she seems to have thought right from the start that this was a discriminatory dismissal. She also contacted ACAS for early conciliation well within time, so clearly was aware of the possibility of enforcing legal rights against the respondent. The difficult is why she delayed in following up that early conciliation with a tribunal claim.[5]The claimant’s position on the reason for her being late with the claim is summed up in her witness statement in the following way: Case Number: 3300918/2025 2 “… the delay in bringing my claim and submitting the relevant evidence was due to personal circumstances surrounding my pregnancy … During this time, I was under close medical supervision and experiencing significant emotional, mental and physical strain. My primary focus was on safeguarding my health and that of my unborn child, and I was advised to avoid stress and unnecessary strain wherever possible. These circumstances made it extremely difficult for me to engage in the process of preparing and filing a claim within the original timeframe.”[6]The claimant backs this up with medical records covering the period of her pregnancy.[7]I note from that, but do not need to refer in any detail to, the claimant’s difficult personal circumstances that had affected her mental health and may well have caused her to be more than usually nervous about the pregnancy. Without wishing to underestimate those concerns, the medical records would appear to show a pregnancy well within medical norms. I understand the claimant’s daughter was in neo-natal intensive care for a week after birth, but mother and baby were then discharged from hospital.[8]The most significant piece of medical evidence is a letter from the specialist perinatal mental health service dated 12 August 2024. It appears that some time in July the claimant had been referred to them because of concerns about her mental health. An assessment carried out on 30 July 2024 recorded largely “normal” results. The claimant suggested that this was because she was at the time, “masking”.[9]The respondent points to the claimant having worked throughout this period, although the claimant says that her job was undemanding, and even then she needed time off for various medical appointments. The respondent also relies on material taken from the claimant’s Facebook page. This largely post-dates the birth of her child. The claimant has objected to that material being used by the respondent. I can well understand that a person’s Facebook page may not be an entirely accurate and candid account of matters, and I have not found those extracts to be of assistance in reaching my decision.[10]The first question is whether, in terms of the unfair dismissal time limit, it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to bring her claim within time.[11]I understand that this was a difficult time for the claimant and that she was nervous about her pregnancy. She says that medical advice was to avoid stress. When questioned on that she produced the letter that she relied on for that, but that does not mention avoiding stress.[12]The claimant was, in the period up to the birth of her daughter, able to hold down a job, which even if undemanding would have involved some stresses, strains and paperwork. She was also able to undertake early conciliation. If Case Number: 3300918/2025 3 there were, as there may well have been, difficult times, there was also periods that were not so difficult, as detailed in the mental health assessment. My finding is that she could have submitted her claim within the normal time limit, and accordingly she has not shown that it was not reasonably practicable for her to bring the claim within the time limit. Accordingly her claim of unfair dismissal must be struck out as the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to consider it.[13]A much more difficult question arises in relation to the discrimination claims, where I can extend time if it is “just and equitable” to do so. Saying that the claimant could have brough her claim within time does not rule out a just and equitable extension of time.[14]The law says that I have a broad discretion in considering whether or not to extend time. Relevant factors will include the reason for and length of the delay and the respective prejudice to the parties if time is or is not extended.[15]The delay is 5½ months, which I would consider to be a mid-length of delay. It is not so trivial that it can easily be disregarded nor so long as to obviously be of decisive significance. The reasons for it have been referred to earlier in this decision.[16]The respondent has not drawn any attention to any particular prejudice to which it would be subject if the claimant continued, such as witnesses or documents no longer being available. Of course, for the claimant if time was not to be extended she would lose the only claim available to her.[17]The balance here is difficult to strike, but I have decided to exercise my discretion in favour of an extension of time on the discrimination claim. While possible for the claimant to bring the claim I do accept that she was in difficulty in doing so. The delay is not excessive. The respondent has not suggested any particular prejudice to which it would be subject on an extension of time (by which I mean no prejudice beyond having to address the claim) and in those circumstances I will extend time. Approved by Employment Judge Anstis 18 November 2025 Reasons sent to the parties on: 19 November 2025 For the Tribunal Case Number: 3300918/2025 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Miss L Wood Respondent: QIC Trims Ltd[1]At a hearing on 16 October 2025 I decided that the claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal should be struck out, but that it was just and equitable to extend the time limit for a claim of pregnancy or maternity discrimination. That hearing was attended by three members of staff of the respondent, one of whom spoke on its behalf. The resulting judgment was sent to the parties on 31 October 2025.[2]On 13 November 2025 the respondent applied for written reasons for my decision, which were provided on 19 November 2025.[3]On 31 January 2026 the respondent wrote applying for reconsideration along with an application to extend time for the reconsideration application. As the claimant points out, an application for reconsideration should have been made by 3 December 2025 so the application is almost two months out of time.[4]The first point for me to consider is whether I should extend time. If time is not extended, then the reconsideration application cannot be considered.[5]The terms of the application to extend time are as follows: “1. The written reasons were sent to the Respondent on 19th November 2025. The Respondent was not able to apply for reconsideration within the 14 day deadline due to the holiday of the Director responsible for dealing with this claim. Case Number: 3300918/2025 2 2. The Director is also retiring from the business and upon reading the email from the tribunal this month [which would be January], passed it to the new CEO who has recently begun working for the Respondent. 3. This application for reconsideration, and this request for an extension of the deadline is being made as soon as was possible after the new CEO was able to read the correspondence and take advice. 4. There would be significant prejudice to the Respondent in not allowing this application to be made outside of the 14 day time limit … 5. In not allowing the application for reconsideration out of time, the Respondent will be left with no other recourse, given that the Claimant bringing her claim out of time cannot be reviewed at the final hearing.”.[6]The claimant makes a number of good points in her response to the application, including in particular that it will seldom if ever be good grounds for reconsideration that a party did not appreciate what would be relevant or necessary for them to prove in respect of the decision in question.[7]The most immediate problem for the respondent is that even on its own case the relevant director did not make any arrangements for matters to be dealt with in their absence and apparently no-one paid any attention to the reasons from their arrival in early December through to some unspecified time in January. The claimant also makes the point that the director in whose name the application is made has been registered as a director for many years at Companies House and remains a director, so it is not at all clear who the “Director” referred to in the application may be.[8]The respondent made an application for written reasons and apparently made no provision for what may or may not happen on receipt of those reasons. On its own case no action at all was taken on the reasons for around a month. No dates have been given of when the relevant director returned to work, when in January the reasons were read or when the CEO read the reasons and took advice, but it seems to me that whatever those dates may be they are unlikely to give much weight to the respondent’s application to extend time for their reconsideration application. The longer the Director’s absence the more difficult it is to understand why they did not make arrangements for matters to be dealt with in their absence, and the longer the reasons were with the CEO the more difficult it is to understand why the application was not made earlier.[9]The respondent refers in general terms to the prejudice to the parties that an extension or refusal of an extension of time would cause. I am not persuaded that that makes a difference in this case. The respondent’s underlying application appears to depend on matters that either were or should have been argued at the hearing in question, and which cannot be revisited now, or Case Number: 3300918/2025 3 perhaps arguments concerning errors of law, which can be addressed by way of an appeal (see below).[10]The application for an extension of time, and therefore the reconsideration application itself, is refused.[11]Finally, I note the respondent’s point that “they will be left with no other recourse”. They say that advice (presumably legal advice) has been taken. It is not clear why that advice did not identify the possibility of an appeal, if they consider that there are errors of law in the decision. Approved by