Mr M Coltofean and Others v Royal Harwich Yacht Club: 3300596/2024 and Others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3300596/2024

Between

(1) Mr M Coltofean (2) Ms M Banasiak (3) Ms E Dos Santos RochaClaimant

Royal Harwich Yacht ClubRespondent

Before

Employment Judge R Wood; Ms A Buck; Ms A Bray

Date 4 January 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimants were not unfairly dismissed by the respondent.

[2]The claimants were not directly discriminated against on the basis of their races by the respondent.

[1]Page numbering referred to in square brackets in these reasons are to pages in the main hearing bundle, unless otherwise stated.

[2]This is a claim which involves allegations of direct race discrimination, and unfair dismissal.

[3]The respondent (hereinafter referred to as the club) is a company which has responsibility for running a members only yacht club. It is one of the oldest yacht clubs in the country dating back to its formation in 1843. The club is located in its own premises overlooking the River Orwell at Woolverstone, Suffolk. Currently the club has approximately 650 members. There are catering and bar services on the premises.

[4]Mr Marian Coltofean (300596/2024), the first claimant (hereinafter referred to as C1) is Romanian and worked for the club from 26 April 2021 until the termination of his employment on 8 November 2023. He was bar and catering manager, and the line manager of C2 and C3, amongst others.

[5]Ms Monika Banasiak (3300597/2024) the second claimant (hereinafter referred to as C2) is Polish and worked for the club from 1 October 2011 until she was dismissed on 8 November 2023. She was a chef and also the cohabiting partner of C1 at the relevant time. It was her responsibility as chef to plan menus. Sometimes she did this in conjunction with the third claimant. This was done mainly during shifts.

[6]Ms Elisabete Dos Santos Rocha (3300598/2024), the third claimant (hereinafter referred to as C3) is Portuguese and worked for the club from 18 March 2015 until 8 November 2023. She too was a chef. All three claimants were dismissed on 8 November 2023 ostensibly for gross misconduct involving the falsification of time sheets. The claimants were the only foreign nationals in the bar and catering team.

[7]The club alleges that the dismissals were carried out for a fair reason, being misconduct, and in a fair manner, and that the decision to dismiss fell well within the band of reasonable responses for a reasonable employer. Further, that the club asserts that there is no evidential basis to conclude that the claimants’ nationalities played any role in the decision to dismiss, the sole reason being their misconduct.

[8]For their part, the claimants allege that the dismissals were motivated by the fact that they were foreign nationals i.e. not British. It is averred that the allegations of falsification of time sheets were ‘manufactured’ by the club, and that there was, and had been for some time, a well established but unwritten process accepted by the management of the club that staff could claim for hours not worked at the club. Further, that such time could be claimed without specific reference to such a claim on the face of the time sheets, and that such a claim could be made in general terms i.e. without timings which accurately reflected the extra work done in a detailed way. It was alleged that there was ‘no proper time sheets system’ in place and no express rules for making claims for extra hours. Issues

[9]The central issues for determination were set out by Mr Myers in his submissions. They appeared to us to be correct. They were not challenged at all by the claimant. We therefore adopt them for the purposes of our decision. They are as follows:a. Unfair Dismissal (Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996): i. What was the reason for each dismissal, and was it a potentially fair reason under the Employment Rights Act 1996? It is the respondent’s case that the reason was conduct, satisfying ERA 1996 s.98(2)(b); ii. If a potentially fair reason is established, did the respondent act fairly in all the circumstances (ERA 1996 s.98(4)) in treating that reason as sufficient to dismiss each claimant? This involves considering: 1. Whether the respondent followed a fair procedure and adhered to the principles of natural justice and the ACAS Code; and 2. Whether the decision to dismiss fell within the range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer. iii. Typically in such circumstances a Tribunal will assess: 1. Whether the respondent had, at the time of dismissal, a genuine belief in each claimants misconduct, based on reasonable grounds after a reasonable investigation - British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell [1980] I.C.R. 303; and 2. Whether dismissal was a sanction open to a reasonable employer in light of that misconduct - Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones

1983 ICR 17

, EAT.

b. Direct discrimination (EqA 2010): i. Have the claimants proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that their nationality was a factor in their treatment, i.e. that they were treated less favourably than real or hypothetical comparators because of race (nationality), per Equality Act 2010 s.13. Procedure, Documents and Evidence Heard

[10]The hearing took place from 15 to 22 September 2025 and was heard in person at the Employment Tribunal in Norwich (the panel made its decision on 8 December 2025-parties not present). The Tribunal first of all heard testimony from the claimants, as well as an additional witness in support of the claims, Ms Abbie Manser (bar and catering assistant). We then heard evidence from the respondent’s witnesses namely: Mrs Kathryn Deaton (club manager); Mr Simon Hewitt (former Commodore and chair of appeal hearing); Mr Mark Dean (vice Commodore and investigating officer); Mr Mike Clayton (treasurer and chair of disciplinary hearing); and Mr Laurie Vanner (commodore and investigating officer).

[11]Each of the aforesaid witnesses adopted their witness statements and confirmed that their contents were true (sometimes with amendments to the original written version). We also had an agreed bundle of documents which comprises 461 pages; some additional documents relating to a meeting between Ms Deaton and Mr Hewitt on 22 November 2023 which I have added to the main bundle as pages 462 to 465; and a supplementary bundle comprising 88 pages (submitted by the claimants). We also heard helpful submissions from Mr Coltofean and Mr Myers, who expanded upon their written closing submissions.

[12]In coming to our decision, the Tribunal had regard to all of the written and oral evidence submitted, even if a particular aspect of it is not mentioned expressly within the decision itself. Legal Framework

[13]The relevant legislation in respect of the allegations of direct discrimination is contained in the Equality Act 2010 (“the Act”).

[14]Race is a protected characteristics as defined by section 4 of the Act. Sections 39 and 40 prohibit unlawful discrimination against employees in the field of work. Section 39(2) provides that: “An employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's

(b) (B) - (a) as to B's terms of employment; (b) in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service;

(d) by subjecting B to any other detriment.”

[15]Section 136 of the Act provides that: “If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred”. This provision reverses the burden of proof if there is a prima facie case of direct discrimination.

[16]In summary, the Act provides that a person with a protected characteristic is protected at work from prohibited conduct as defined by Chapter 2 of it. In addition to the statutory provisions, Employment Tribunals are obliged to take in to account the provisions of the statutory Code of Practice on the Equality Act 2010 produced by the Commission for Equality and Human Rights.

[17]Direct discrimination is defined in section 13(1) of the Act as “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others”. The application of those principles was summarised by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in London Borough of Islington v Ladele (Liberty intervening)

EAT/0453/08

, which has since been upheld: (a) In every case the Employment Tribunal has to determine the reason why the claimant was treated as he was. In most cases this will call for some consideration of the mental processes (conscious or subconscious) of the alleged discriminator. (b) If the Employment Tribunal is satisfied that the prohibited ground is one of the reasons for the treatment, that is sufficient to establish discrimination. It need not be the only or even the main reason. It is sufficient that it is significant in the sense of being more than trivial.

(c) Direct evidence of discrimination is rare and Employment Tribunals frequently have to infer discrimination from all the material facts. The courts have adopted the two-stage test. The first stage places a burden on the claimant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. That requires the claimant to prove facts from which inferences could be drawn that the employer has treated them less favourably on the prohibited ground. If the claimant proves such facts then the second stage is engaged. At that stage the burden shifts to the employer who can only discharge the burden by proving on the balance of probabilities that the treatment was not on the prohibited ground. If they fail to establish that, the Tribunal must find that there is discrimination.

(d) The explanation for the less favourable treatment does not have to be a reasonable one. In the circumstances of a particular case unreasonable treatment may be evidence of discrimination such as to engage stage two and call for an explanation. If the employer fails to provide a non-discriminatory explanation for the unreasonable treatment, then the inference of discrimination must be drawn. The inference is then drawn not from the unreasonable treatment itself - or at least not simply from that fact - but from the failure to provide a non-discriminatory explanation for it. But if the employer shows that the reason for the less favourable treatment has nothing to do with the prohibited ground, the burden is discharged at the second stage, however unreasonable the treatment.

(e) It is not necessary in every case for an Employment Tribunal to go through the two-stage process. In some cases it may be appropriate simply to focus on the reason given by the employer (“the reason why”) and, if the Tribunal is satisfied that this discloses no discrimination, then it need not go through the exercise of considering whether the other evidence, absent the explanation, would have been capable of amounting to a prima facie case under stage one of the Igen test.

(f) It is implicit in the concept of discrimination that the claimant is treated differently than the statutory comparator is or would be treated. The determination of the comparator depends upon the reason for the difference in treatment. The question whether the claimant has received less favourable treatment is often inextricably linked with the question why the claimant was treated as she was. However, as the EAT noted (in Ladele) although comparators may be of evidential value in determining the reason why the claimant was treated as he or she was, frequently they cast no useful light on that question at all. In some instances, comparators can be misleading because there will be unlawful discrimination where the prohibited ground contributes to an act or decision even though it is not the sole or principal reason for it. If the Employment Tribunal is able to conclude that the respondent would not have treated the comparator more favourably, then it is unnecessary to determine the characteristics of the statutory comparator. 12. The relevant case law in relation to unfair dismissal is to be found in the Employment Rights Act (“ERA”) 1996 at section 98: “General (1) In determining for the purpose of this part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair it is for the employer to show– (a) the reason (or if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it- (a) relates to the capability of qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed to do, (b) relates to the conduct of the employee, (c) is that the employee was redundant, or (d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment.” When the alleged reason for dismissal is misconduct, then the Tribunal should ask itself the following questions (i) What was the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the Claimant’s dismissal? The Respondent asserts that the Claimant was dismissed for a reason related to his conduct (s.98(2)(b) ERA). (ii) If the Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant was dismissed for a reason relating to her conduct:

• Did the Respondent’s managers believe the Claimant to be guilty of gross misconduct?

• Did the Respondents’ managers have in mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief?

• At the stage at which that belief was formed on those grounds, had the Respondents’ managers carried out as much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in the circumstances? (iii) 1.4 Did the Respondents in the circumstances (including its size and administrative resources) act reasonably or unreasonably in treating said conduct as a sufficient reason for dismissing the Claimant, to be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. (iv) In the particular circumstances of this case, did the decision to dismiss fall within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted? Evidence 13. As there has been some delay in promulgating this decision, we have through it appropriate to set out the evidence we heard. What follows is a summary of the witness statements and the oral testimony we heard. In arriving at its decision, we took into account the whole of the evidence presented to us. We listened very carefully to all of the oral testimony given to us during the hearing by the various witnesses. 14. Mr Coltofean was the first to give evidence. In his statement, he explained that he began working for the Club in April 2019, initially without a formal contract, which was only provided later. It was his recollection that he only saw his contract as bar manager as part of the evidence presented by the club during the disciplinary process. His responsibilities included managing bar and catering operations, organising events, and overseeing staff. He regularly received positive feedback for his performance, including praise from the treasurer for excellent catering results. 15. C1 explained that time sheet practices were long-standing and based on trust. Staff completed time sheets monthly, often around the 20th of the month, using rota schedules and adding time for extra tasks such as shopping for supplies, menu planning, and attending meetings. These additional duties were authorised by management and had been claimed for before he joined. He stated that he sometimes asked staff to add time for these tasks and signed off their time sheets accordingly. There was no clocking-in system, and management never required reconciliation with alarm logs. 16. C1 described the disciplinary process as hostile. On 13 October 2023, C1 alleged that himself, C2 and C3 were all called to a meeting without explanation and accused of time sheet fraud. He felt humiliated and later raised a grievance citing intimidation, discrimination, and misuse of power. Despite this, he was suspended and dismissed for alleged gross misconduct in November 2023. He argued that the the process was rushed, biased, and ignored his grievance and established practices. He also claimed that other staff followed the same timesheet approach but were not investigated. 17. C1 believed the allegations were a pretext to removing him after he repeatedly raised concerns about bullying, harassment, and inconsistent treatment. He cited discriminatory treatment, noting that he and the other claimants were the only foreign nationals in the team and the only ones targeted. He concluded that the dismissal caused severe distress.

[18]C1 provided answers to the club’s questions in cross-examination. He denied that he had received his written contract of employment in June 2021. He had been given the document at [123] for the first time at the disciplinary hearing. He agreed that falsifying time sheets would amount to gross misconduct. C1 explained that the filling out of time sheets was based on trust and that there was no way of verifying the times. He agreed that he was always treated as a valued employee, and that he had been encouraged to remain when he resigned in May 2023.

[19]In relation to the emails at [147] he said it was evidence of a plan to get rid of him because he was standing up for himself. He suggested that they couldn’t get rid of the claimants in the height of summer due to the staffing implications. He denied that he had behaved inappropriately towards a Mr Bloomfield.

[20]C1 was adamant that the scenario set out in Mrs Deaton’s witness statement at paragraphs 14 and 15 was not genuine. He said it was not important to him whether staff signed off on their times on the time sheets. He confirmed it was his signature on [345]. He said he had signed to make sure that it was accurate when compared to the rota. He accepted that the reference to “overtime” at the top of the sheet meant that C3 had begun to accrue overtime i.e. she had worked in excess of her annualised hours (see below).

[21]C1 conceded that C3 had got to the end of her annualised hours on 27 August 2023 [344] but he was not aware of the rate of overtime paid after that. C2 had got to the end of her hours on 17 September 2023 [273]. C1 was reticent about admitting that he had been aware of the terms of their annualised hours contracts but eventually did so.

[22]C1 stated that the claimants had mentioned taking out the bins in both meetings, as well as shopping, meetings, and menu planning. As for the grievance he raised, he said he did not recall any instances of him being blackmailed by the club. He also admitted that he was not subjected to any verbal or written racial slurs. He said the grievance had been an expression of the way he felt at the time [183]. He said the grievance had been written by the three of them together.

[23]At the meeting on 7 November, he had explained that the time sheets were not falsified. He stated that he had not provided any further evidence after the meeting, despite being invited to do so by Mr Clayton. He said he had not used the word ‘complicit’ in the meeting, and repeated that the notes were not accurate. He objected to the way that Mrs Deaton had gone to a flag officer (Mr Dean) with concerns about C2 and C3 rather than coming to him as their line manager.

[24]He explained that he had been told on 26 April 2021 by Mrs Deaton and Simon Hewitt that he was to take the time sheets on trust. There was nothing written down as to how to deal with time sheets. He had been told to round up to the nearest quarter of an hour. He had been told there was no need to flag up things like a trip to the shops as a discrete item on the time sheet.

[25]C1 went on to tell us that C3 had filled out C2’s time sheet when she was too busy. C3 would ask if C2 had done any extra hours. C1 said that he had alleged a racial motive in the appeal hearing but it was not in the notes. He explained that he had filled out the time sheets of C3 at [SB24], as well as the time sheets for C2 at [SB30]. He later denied that he had completed the times for 22nd and 23rd on that time sheet.

[26]C2 then provided her testimony. In her witness statement she described herself as a loyal and hardworking employee who consistently received positive feedback and praise for her contributions, including recognition during the COVID-19 pandemic for flexibility and support while on furlough. She had commenced employment with the club as assistant catering manager then as catering manager, but at the relevant time was a chef.

[27]She emphasised that her duties often extended beyond contractual obligations. She regularly performed additional tasks such as shopping for supplies from local stores, collecting bakery goods, placing online food orders, menu planning at home, and attending staff meetings outside normal hours. These tasks were integral to the smooth running of the club and were, according to her, part of a long-standing practice authorised by management. C2 explained that time spent on these tasks was typically added to time sheets as rough estimates, usually amounting to about an extra hour per week.

[28]Time sheets were completed monthly, around the 20th of each month, and often based on rota schedules rather than exact start and finish times. She notes that management, including Kathryn Deaton, were aware of and accepted this process, and that she was never asked to reconcile time sheets with alarm logs.

[29]On 13 October 2023, she and her colleagues were called to a meeting without explanation and accused of falsifying time sheets. She left the meeting in tears and later raised a grievance citing race discrimination, intimidation, and misuse of power. Despite this, she was suspended and dismissed for alleged gross misconduct in November 2023. She argued the process was rushed, biased, and ignored her grievance of 17 October 2023, and the established timesheet practices. No other staff were investigated, even though similar practices were common.

[30]She alleged discriminatory treatment, stating that she and the other claimants were the only foreign nationals in the bar and catering team and the only ones targeted. She also highlighted inconsistencies, such as other employees being rewarded with paid break times while she was dismissed for minor discrepancies. She explained that the disciplinary process was fundamentally flawed and pre-judged. For example, Mrs Deaton, who was directly involved in timesheet approvals, was not interviewed or asked to provide a statement during the investigation.

[31]C2 argued that no other team member of the bar and catering department was investigated or asked to provide a statement regarding the established practices despite the fact that all followed the same timesheet submission practices. She stated that all the other employees followed the same practice, as per Abbie Manser’s witness statement.

[32]C2 also answered questions in cross-examination. She had been in the UK since 2004. She said she had not filled out her time sheet everyday. She too agreed there had been no racial slur as alleged in her grievance. She thought the outcome of the disciplinary hearing was predetermined. She confirmed she had said the things at items 1-4 on [194-195] but had said other things too. She had raised a previous incident of stealing hours re. Claire Lowe just before Covid. She had been told they were not there to talk about that. Claire had been British.

[33]C2 accepted that C3 had filled out her time sheets. She had told C3 to add a little bit for deliveries etc. She would add 15-30 minutes. She would add rounded minutes. It would be in the same week. She never made specific mention of these tasks. It was how she had filled out her time sheet for 13 years. She denied that C1 had filled out her time sheets.

[34]She lived in Shotley and C3 lived in Ipswich. They lived about 40 minutes apart. In reaction to her grievance at [260] she said she had brought up discrimination and blackmail. She said she had been to work at 4.15 on 21 September 2023. That was the only day they had had a function after Mrs Deaton came back to work with a broken arm on 10 September 2023. She suggested that Mrs Deaton had not alarmed the club that day. She said the notes of the meeting on 7 November 2023 were not accurate.

[35]C2 went onto explain that she had filled out her time sheet once a month. This meant that she had to rely on the rota when she did so. Times after 20th were as per rota because the time sheets were submitted to Mrs Deaton on that day. As far as she was concerned, there was never any attempt to reconcile the times afterwards.

[36]Next was Ms. Dos Santos Rocha (C3) who gave similar evidence in her witness statement to that of C2. She said she was employed by the club for nearly nine years as a chef. She too described herself as a loyal and dedicated employee who consistently received positive feedback and never faced issues until the events leading to her dismissal. She highlights her honesty, citing an occasion when she reported a payroll error that overpaid her.

[37]She asserted that she regularly performed additional tasks such as collecting bread and bakery goods from local suppliers, shopping for supplies, menu planning at home, attending staff meetings outside normal hours, and bin management. These tasks were authorised by management. Time spent on these tasks was added to time sheets as rough estimates, typically based on trust and the rota schedule. Time sheets were completed monthly, around the 20th of each month, and management—including Kathryn Deaton—was aware of and accepted this process.

[38]When questioned, C3 also confirmed that she was never the subject of racial slurs, but she said she had been discriminated against. ‘Slur’ had been C1’s word. She said she had raised Claire Lowe in the meeting. She agreed the note of what she said at [342] was accurate. She suggested that C1 had not filled out her time sheets but that she had filled out C2’s time sheets. If she added 30 minutes for herself then she would also added 30 minutes for C2 as well. She did not check the minutes. She had been on a cruise from 16-30 September 2023. She confirmed that [380] was an accurate record.

[39]The next person to give evidence was Mrs Abbie Manser, who did so on behalf of the claimants. In her witness statement she explained that she had been employed by the club as a bar and catering assistant. On 9 November 2023, Laurie Vanner instructed her and another catering assistant, Carla, to add two hours of paid break time to their time sheets. This was done, she suggested, as a gesture of appreciation for their hard work. Ms Manser had found this unusual given the issues relating to the claimants, which was ongoing.

[40]She said she followed the same time sheet submission process as C2 and C3. When she was asked to perform additional tasks, such as collecting supplies on her way to work, she would add an extra hour or half an hour to her timesheet to account for the time spent. She stated that this was a common practice and other team members she worked with did the same. She would send the time sheet to C1 and he would then approve it each month. She made reference to pages 31-32 of the supplementary bundle. Despite her starting and finishing at various times, including evenings, she explained that she was never questioned by the club’s management about the accuracy of her time sheets. She would collect mayonnaise or other essentials on her way to work and just add the time to the end of the shift, consistent with the rest of the team.

[41]In cross-examination, Ms Manser said she had not been told to change the way she filled out time sheets and carried on doing it in the same way. Carla Green was doing it in the same way. Ms Manser had left to join the NHS in February 2024. She had been told not to add breaks to the time sheets. She had gone out to get ketchup and mayonnaise once every 2-3 weeks. Volunteers took over in the kitchen after October 2023.

[42]Mrs Deaton gave evidence first of all for the respondent. In her witness statement she explained that she served as Club Manager at the Club from 2016 until April 2024. In her statement, she explained the employment arrangements for the claimants and addressed allegations about timesheet discrepancies. C2 and C3 worked under annualised hours contracts, meaning they received a fixed monthly salary regardless of hours worked, with additional pay only for hours beyond their annual targets. She explained that time sheets were used to track progress against these targets, not to calculate monthly pay. C1 as Bar and Catering Manager, was responsible for signing off these time sheets.

[43]Mrs Deaton described how she discovered inconsistencies between the times recorded on time sheets and the club’s alarm logs, which showed when the building alarm was turned on or deactivated (i.e. when the building was open or not). These discrepancies suggested that the claimants had recorded start and finish times that were not accurate. In particular, Mrs Deaton stated she had broken her arm and so was walking to and from work. She lived in the same village as the Club, and her walk home was along Marina Road leading to and from the club. On the day in question the Club had a dinner booked that evening for a local club. She was surprised that the claimants had not arrived for work before she left for home. She said she had alarmed the building out of habit and expected to pass them as she walked home, along Marina Road, but did not.

[44]As the dinner was reasonably early, starting about 7 pm, the next day Mrs Deaton had initially checked to see when the claimants had arrived at work and opened up the club. When reviewing the time sheets, the arrival times stated for the C2 and C3 were before Mrs Deaton had set the alarm and locked the club, and indeed before she had arrived home. It was this discrepancy that raised her concerns and she reported them to Mark Dean and Laurie Vanner.

[45]She denied ever authorising extra time for tasks such as menu planning or shopping and stated that the claimants failed to provide any satisfactory explanation during the investigatory meeting. She also rejected claims that the meeting was hostile or that she permitted additional hours to be claimed.

[46]Mrs Deaton noted that bread collection by one claimant was voluntary and minimal, and menu planning was part of normal duties, not extra work, and done during shifts. She contrasted the claimants’ situation with other staff, many of whom worked beyond their contracted hours without extra pay, and reiterated that zero-hours staff were paid accurately based on signed time sheets. It remained her view that the claimants deliberately falsified time sheets to increase their paid hours.

[47]Mrs Deaton answered questions in cross examination. She stated that she had been reminded today that C3 was not at work on 21/9. On the following days she had only checked the time sheets of C2. She submitted payroll to Debbie on 22nd of each month. She had not agreed to claiming time for collecting items. She did accept that occasionally food orders were made at home, mainly in the winter months. She would expect that if there was a claim on the rare occasion it happened that it would be added to the time sheet on the day it happened. She did not recall this being done. It would be a day they were not rota’d and it should appear as an anomaly which could be checked. But it never happened. She said the claimants had never made them aware they were doing extra time outside of work that they wanted paying for.

[48]When asked about it, she did recall a pre-agreed occasion when there had been a meal in Ipswich involving the claimants. She did not recall how it was dealt with on their time sheets. She accepted there were no rules to prevent claiming work off site. Both C2 and C3 did collect from shops but she had thought they were happy to do it and were not making claims.

[49]She recalled the incident in relation to Claire Lowe. She had not said that they couldn’t afford to lose her. She recalled her hours were fine. She doesn’t investigate staff until there is evidence they cannot be trusted. She said that the question of whether the claimants were entitled to be paid for trips to the shops never came up. Mrs Deaton said it may have been naive on her part. There needed to be a discussion. She had been surprised by the claimants’ reaction at the meeting and that C2 and C3 left as they did. She denied that either she or Mr Dean had shouted.

[50]For the sake of convenience, we note the comments attributed to Mrs Deaton in the document at [299], which is the note of the disciplinary hearing of C2. When asked how she allowed for hours for food collections and menu planning, she stated that mostly it would be done in work time. An exception might be the ordering of food in the winter. However, she stated that this could not account for the sort of discrepancies highlighted. She went on to explain that if extra time was claimed, that it would be put down on the time sheet on the day the work was done. We also note the comments attributed to Mrs Deaton by Mr Hewitt, who discussed the same matters as part of his enquires [462-465]. Her answers are in a very similar vein to those already mentioned.

[51]Mr Hewitt gave evidence next. He was the officer who chaired the appeal hearings. He is a former commodore of the club and one of its trustees. He described himself as having 25 years as a director at a major environmental consultancy and extensive experience managing disciplinary matters both in corporate and club settings. Mr Hewitt was asked to chair the appeal hearings because he had no prior involvement in the original disciplinary decisions. All three claimants lodged appeals which appear at [218], [303] and [372]. Each was interviewed by Mr Hewitt on 21 November 2023. The notes of the hearings are at [226], [311] and [380].

[52]Mr Hewitt described that he had had an excellent working relationship with C1 whilst he had been Commodore. He highlighted the emails at [131-134] in which C1 praised the manner in which he was treated by the flag officers of the club. After Mr Hewitt completed his review of the evidence and the claimants’ representations he concluded that the decisions made by Mr Clayton (the dismissed officer), were entirely justified given the facts of the case. He was satisfied that the claimants were guilty of falsifying time sheets and were justifiably dismissed for gross misconduct. Accordingly, he dismissed each of the claimants' appeals concluding that the dismissal for gross misconduct were procedurally and substantially fair.

[53]Mr Hewitt went on state that he was satisfied that the disciplinary investigation carried out by Mark Dean was thorough and reasonable, and that his conclusions were supported by relevant documentary evidence. He explained that he had no doubt about the quality of the evidence relied upon by the club and that C2 and C3 had deliberately submitted time sheets that claimed more hours than actually worked. He said he had not accepted their explanations for doing so. In relation to C1, he was satisfied that he had authorised the hours claimed knowing the other two claimants had not actually worked all the hours on the time sheets. Mr Hewitt also highlighted that the Club had previously gone to considerable lengths to retain C1, even offering financial assistance to prevent his resignation—a gesture that underscored the club’s good faith.

[54]In December 2023, Mr Hewitt had issued outcome letters to each claimant, explaining his reasoning and addressing their arguments point by point. [231]; [320] and [390]. Mr Hewitt rejected claims that the process was improper or based on fabricated evidence, stressing that any employee guilty of similar misconduct would have faced the same outcome. As commodore, he suggested that he had always stressed that the club expected appropriate standards of behaviour from employees and members alike, and on occasions was required to take action against members when they did not meet these standards. His long professional experience, which included significant line management responsibilities, had resulted in a keen awareness of the importance of dealing with staff disciplinary matters in a fair, thorough and even-handed manner. Mr Hewitt affirmed that the decisions were based solely on proven dishonesty, not influenced by race, discrimination, or any other factor.

[55]Mr Hewitt answered questions put to him by C1 on behalf of the claimants. He explained that his role had been to assess all of the information and to decide if the dismissals had been fair and reasonable, and also to consider whether there was any merit in the allegation of race discrimination. He stated that the substance of the issue were the time sheets and the comparison of them with the alarm log, and the suggestion that time claimed was in excess of the time spent at the club premises. The question for him was whether this extra time as authorised. The first time he had looked at the issue was in November when he had been asked to chair the appeal hearings. It was his understanding that the claimants admitted that the time sheets were not consistent with the alarm log. He had spoken to Mrs Deaton, and she had told him that she had not authorised claims for work done off the premises. He had notes of this meeting but they they were not in the hearing bundle. They were later added at the hearing [462-465] at the Tribunal’s request. He had concluded that the analysis of the raw data had been done in a fair and reasonable way.

[56]Mr Hewitt explained that he had thought there had been a good relationships between the club and the claimants. He had been saddened when this situation developed. He had taken the view that there were no grounds to look at other staff, even if they had wanted to. It was his understanding that staff should fill out time sheets in an accurate way. He said he had taken any suggestion of discrimination very seriously. He had recruited C1 and was aware he was of Romanian background. He had a good grounding in the service sector and had no problems with other nationalities. It was his judgment that there had been gross misconduct and that dismissal was justified.

[57]Mr Hewitt had concluded that C1 had been aware at the time that the hours claimed by C2 and C3 extended beyond the hours worked on the premises. In the case of C2, they were in a relationship, and came to work together in the car. In his view, it was inconceivable that C1 didn’t know the hours C2 was working. The claimants had all insisted that they had the express authority of Mrs Deaton to claim for extra duties, and they said they had further evidence of this. Mr Hewitt said he had asked for it, but it had not been forthcoming. It was his view that the extra hours claimed had been spread around so as to conceal them. He was not aware that the claimants had taken issue with the accuracy of the notes prior to the commencement of the litigation.

[58]Mr Clayton was the dismissing manager and he gave evidence next. In his witness statement he set out that he had been the treasurer of the club since December 2020, and had a background as a qualified accountant, and experience in handling disciplinary matters. On 7 November 2023, he chaired three separate hearings involving the claimants. Although the meetings were timetabled separately, each of the claimants attended all three meetings. C1 tended to assume the role of representative on behalf of C2 and C3. Mr Clayton suggested that each had access to the same documentation, and was given full opportunity to respond to the allegations. He explained that he had offered them the chance to question witnesses and clarify evidence, even accommodated their preference to have the witnesses, Mrs Deaton and Mr Dean, excluded from the hearings. This was achieved by Mr Clayton relaying questions and answers. The notes of the hearings appear at [215], [297] ,and [363].

[59]The claimants did not submit any written statements or other documents at the disciplinary hearings. In particular they did not ask Mr Clayton to consider any alternative time sheet reconciliations or calculations. During his disciplinary hearing, C1 had said he wanted to send Mr Clayton a statement after the hearing. It was explained he could do this by no later than 6pm but he said he would not be “bullied” and would send it in his “own time”. Mr Clayton explained that this was a good example of how he found C1’s approach to the hearings to be combative. C1 did not send Mr Clayton any other statements or information. He understood that none were submitted as part of his appeal. Likewise, C3 had said she had a witness statement from her “Line Manager”, being C1, which she wanted to provide in a couple of days. Mr Clayton had asked her to email it to him after the hearing so that he could take it into account [367]. Again, no statement was sent in at any time after her hearing.

[60]Mr Clayton went on to detail that C1 had argued that the alarm system was faulty and therefore the alarm logs could not be accurate or reliable. Secondly, their case was that C2 and C3 adjusted the times on their time sheets to take account of menu planning, meetings and ordering supplies from home. When asked, C1 agreed with Mr Clayton’s understanding of their cases, namely that the times on the sheets recorded the correct total hours but the times shown working were wrong. C1 said they were told to do it this way. Mr Clayton stated that C1 had admitted he had signed the time sheets as accurate and then passed them to Kathryn Deaton. At the end of the disciplinary hearing for C3, she agreed with Mr Clayton’s summary of her case that the times on her time sheets did not align with the times when the alarm was set because she had made adjustments for other activities such as collection of bread, amounting to 3 or 4 hours a month [page 367]. C3 agreed that there was no indication on the timesheet that this was the case.

[61]Mr Clayton concluded that based on the documents and the evidence given and discussed at the three disciplinary hearings, C2 and C3 were guilty of falsifying their time sheets on many occasions and, as a consequence, had claimed for more hours worked than had actually been carried out by them. He was satisfied that the claimants had failed to provide any plausible or acceptable explanations for doing this. He did not accept they were adding in times for additional tasks as they had claimed. If this was the case, Mr Clayton judged this extra time would be separately recorded. As it was not, there was no way of identifying it. Nor did he accept they were doing as instructed by Mrs Deaton or any other person.

[62]In relation to C1, Mr Clayton found that he had knowingly and dishonestly approved the falsified time sheets. Indeed, during the disciplinary hearing, he admitted that he had authorised the disputed time sheets and he knew that additional unworked hours were being added to the sheets. C1 had argued there was a problem with the accuracy of the alarm system but Mr Clayton was entirely satisfied that this was not the case. In any event, he found that C1 was not permitted or authorised, as part of his duties as manager, to permit any employee to claim extra time not worked by submitting falsified time sheets.

[63]Mr Clayton dismissed a secondary allegation of food hygiene breaches as unproven. However, he determined that the proven timesheet misconduct amounted to gross dishonesty, resulting in a total loss of trust and confidence. He decided dismissal without notice was appropriate, even considering the claimants’ length of service, as falsifying time sheets was expressly listed as gross misconduct in the staff handbook. Mr Clayton noted that the claimants failed to attend the scheduled meeting for the outcome, so he had communicated his decision by email and followed up with detailed dismissal letters on 10 November 2023, which included the right of appeal. These letters appear at [215], [294], and [370].

[64]Mr Clayton rejected any suggestion that his decisions were influenced by race or discrimination, stating that his conclusions were based solely on the facts and the claimants’ failure to provide acceptable explanations. He confirmed that any employee guilty of similar conduct would have faced the same sanction.

[65]When questioned on behalf of the claimants at the hearing before us, Mr Clayton stated he had considered the case against each of the three claimants and concluded there was a breach of trust in addition to the gross misconduct which meant that dismissal was the only option. It was his understanding that the claimants could be paid for the extras but the evidence from Mrs Deaton was that it needed to be evidenced on the time sheets. If there was a start time which varied from the time they arrived at the club then there should be a note on the time sheet about that, and the reason for it. This was what he would have expected as treasurer. He accepted that this was not enshrined in writing any where, but he had never seen seen those sorts of instructions in any other workplace, having managed people for many years. It was obvious and common sense in his opinion.

[66]Mr Clayton also explained that he didn’t accept the scale of the activities claimed by the claimants. There was limited evidence adduced by the claimants as to when they had added the extra time and why it had been added. He had been aware of the grievances. He had been aware of the claimants’ length of service. He accepted that he may have misremembered the time he had asked people to come back for the disciplinary outcome. He had telephoned all three to try to speak to them when they had not attended, but they did not answer. Mr Clayton explained that if you finish at a time, rounding up, he would expect it to be accurate on every single day. They could put extra hours in the employee signed column but he accepted Mrs Deaton’s evidence that she wasn’t expecting them to be working significant amounts of time doing these extra duties.

[67]Mr Clayton was asked about breaks by the panel. He explained that the practice with C2 and C3 was to pay them start to finish and pay them for a breaks if they had not had time to take them. It varied depending on how busy they were. It was his view that by submitting their time sheets that they were representing that they were accurate, whether they signed them or not. It was Mr Clayton’s view that if the manager authorised the time sheets then the club was happy to adopt them in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

[68]Mr Dean, the investigation officer, was next to give evidence. In his witness statement he explained that he was the current commodore of the club. The claimants worked in the club’s catering and bar service—an important but financially challenging part of its operations. C1 managed the bar and catering team, which included the other two claimants, both chefs, employed on annualised hours contracts. These contracts required accurate time sheets to ensure fair pay and compliance with agreed working hours.

[69]As part of the response to C1’s email dated 6 September 2023 to Laurie Vanner [167], it was agreed that Mr Dean meet C1, with Mr Vanner, on Friday 29 September 2023. Mr Dean’s recollection was that C1 was still concerned about the incident with Guy Welsh. However, Mr Dean also remembered that C1 admitted he had pinched the nipples of the part-time caretaker, Mr Bloomfield, yet had made a complaint about Guy Welsh for doing exactly the same to him. C1 described his actions as a “joke”. He said he was in the “wrong” and agreed that Guy had done the same to him. Given his behaviour towards Mr Bloomfield and the fact that Mr Welsh had apologised and stopped ‘fooling around’, Mr Dean had said that he considered the matter closed. It was agreed with C1 that no further action was required in connection with his complaint.

[70]During the week commencing 25 September 2023, he recalled that Mrs Deaton, reported to him her concerns about the accuracy of C2’s and C3’s time sheets whom she judged had recorded more hours than actually worked based on her observations of their arrival times.

[71]Mr Dean investigated, comparing time sheets with security alarm logs, which showed repeated overstatements of hours worked. When confronted in an investigatory meeting on 7 November 2023, C2 and C3 agreed that they had filled in the time sheets. C1 conceded that he had signed them as approved. In Mr Dean’s view, the claimants were, however, unable to give any satisfactory explanation for the time sheet discrepancies. They did not argue they had permission to do what they did or say that Kathryn Deaton had given her authority for this.

[72]It was Mr Dean’s recollection that all three claimants became very defensive, with C1 dominating the meeting. A number of explanations were given as to why they had added additional time to the time sheets, and these were noted. C2 and C3 offered to pay back any incorrect wages. Both became upset and asked if they could leave the meeting, which was agreed. C1 remained for approximately 10 more minutes before the meeting finished. Mr Dean explained that at no time during the above investigatory meeting did he accuse the claimants of committing fraud or stealing money

[73]Mr Dean stated that he had spoken with Mrs Deaton about the claimants’ argument that extra time had been included in their hours for collecting supplies etc.. He explained that she had been adamant that neither she nor anyone else had given permission for extra time spent on driving to and from the local shops or for collecting supplies to be added to the weekly time sheets. He noted that even if there was an agreement or some form of custom and practice, no such extra time was actually shown on the time sheets. Mr Dean judged it inexplicable that C2 and C3 had recorded exactly the same excessive hours for over 40% of the time on the occasions when there was a discrepancy.

[74]All three employees were suspended. Around this time, each claimant raised grievances, with C1 alleging racial discrimination and bullying. Mr Dean strongly denied these accusations, describing them as unfounded and a reaction to the investigation.

[75]On 18 October 2023 Mr Dean sent a letter to the claimants informing them that they would be invited to a disciplinary hearing and also acknowledging receipt of their grievances [186]. He noted that a large part of what the claimants had included in the grievance related to matters that had previously been raised and fully addressed with them and which were therefore considered historical in nature. However, Mr Dean explained in the letters that any complaints which were relevant to the gross misconduct allegations should be included in any representations the claimants made at the disciplinary hearings.

[76]The disciplinary hearings took place on 7 November 2023. Despite being given opportunities to respond, it was Mr Dean’s view that the claimants did not provide evidence that altered the findings. Dean maintained that falsifying time sheets amounted to dishonesty and gross misconduct, justifying dismissal. He rejected suggestions that the allegations were fabricated or discriminatory, affirming that the process followed the club’s disciplinary policy.

[77]In cross-examination, Mr Dean explained that Mrs Deaton had raised concerns with him in the week commencing 25 September 2023. She had shown him the time sheets of C2 and C3 for September. She had highlighted the discrepancy of arrival time for C2 on 21 September. She also had expressed concerns about the patterns of C2 and C3’s times, and that she had not expected them to be identical on so many occasions. Mr Dean had agreed that it justified further investigation. It had been a day or two before they had realised that they could use the alarm log as a means of comparison. He accepted that C3 was on holiday on 21 September but he had not been aware of this. His focus had been on September as a whole. He set out that the times for 21 September did not appear as one of the discrepancies relied upon by the club as the times claimed on that day were not inconsistent with the alarm log. He had spent days looking at the data and had found it onerous.

[78]He said that Mrs Deaton had confirmed that she had been unaware that staff were claiming time for collections of food etc. After 13 October meeting when the claimants had provided a number of explanation for the discrepancies, he had taken a number of additional steps. He had contacted the alarm company to ensure the alarm log was accurate. He had also carried out a further analysis of the time sheets. He found to his surprise that there were 19 occasions when C2 and C3 had overstated their times by the same amount. He felt that was sufficient for the purposes of his investigation. He was able to conclude that the matter needed to progress to a disciplinary hearing. The decision to proceed was taken by the flag officers collectively, excluding Stephanie Hemsley, who had previously expressed the view that the club should not have allowed the claimants to withdraw their resignations in June 2023 [149]. Mr Dean said there were no minutes of this meeting. They would haven taken advice from an employment lawyer. Mr Dean explained that the bar and catering function had been outsourced in January 2024, after a period when the club had tried to fill the gap left by the claimant’s departure with volunteers.

[79]Finally, we heard from Mr Vanner. In his two witness statements he explained that he served as commodore of the club from December 2022 to December 2024. On 20 May 2023, C1 telephoned him, upset and angry, claiming he had been bullied by two club members. The following day, he resigned by email, giving four weeks’ notice and expressing gratitude for his time at the club. Soon after, the other two claimants also resigned, apparently in solidarity. Mr Vanner suspected the resignations were linked to the bullying incident, though some Flag Officers speculated the trio intended to start their own catering business [147-151]. Nevertheless, Mr Vanner believed the complaint was genuine and arranged for an investigation. The inquiry confirmed that C1 had been bullied, and disciplinary action was taken against the members involved, who received final written warnings. The claimants withdrew their resignations and returned to work after the matter was resolved.

[80]In July, a new issue arose. A visitor complained that C1 had bent her spoon, which had sentimental value. Mr Vanner conducted a disciplinary hearing and issued him a first written warning, emphasising the importance of professional conduct. Mr Vanner recalled that C1 was quite emotional during the meeting explaining that his domestic arrangements with his wife were difficult. Mr Vanner offered for the Club to fund professional counselling for C1.

[81]Around the same time, C1 complained about inappropriate behaviour by a colleague, Guy Welsh. Welsh admitted to joking behaviour, apologised, and was given a verbal warning. Later, C1 admitted to similar conduct toward another staff member, a Mr Boomfield, which it was felt undermined his complaint.

[82]Mr Vanner stated that on 6 September 2023 he received an email raising further questions about the various matters set out above, and in particular sought to re-open his complaint about Guy Welsh [page 167]. On 29 September 2023, Mr Dean and Mr Vanner interviewed C1 about the concerns he had raised on 6 September. He asked if Mr Welsh’s actions had been repeated after he had been spoken to on in July. C1 stated “no” but that on one occasion Mr Welsh had “winked” at him. He asked if this had happened with any other members of staff and he stated “no”. Mr Vanner then asked if C1 had done anything similar to David Bloomfield, , the caretaker of the club. After an initial hesitation he said "yes", “once” and then corrected himself and said “probably twice”. He stated that it had been “a joke” between him and Mr Bloomfield.

[83]Mr Vanner explained that the reason why he had had asked C1 about Mr Bloomfield is that whilst he had not raised a complaint about the C1 at the time he had recently volunteered to Mrs Deaton that C1 had pinched his nipples which he had found objectionable. C1 admitted he was in the wrong and that his actions were the same as those of Mr Welsh It was agreed that no further action need be taken about Mr Welsh.

[84]On the following morning, Mr Vanner recalled that he had been approached by C1. He explained that he thought he’d annoyed Mr Vanner the previous day. Mr Vanner explained that he was merely frustrated because he had equivocated initially in relation to his actions with David Bloomfield. C1 had apparently gone on to say how much he respected Mr Vanner and how much he enjoyed working at the Club.

[85]On 17 October 2023 the claimants submitted their grievance. Mr Vanner had been irritated and disappointed at the wide ranging and unjustified nature of his allegations, many of which were clearly directed at him. Mr Vanner explained that he could not see how he had been the victim of any form of race discrimination, intimidation, humiliation, management abuse, misuse of power or blackmail. Nor could he see how he was the victim of “unequal treatment” or “racial slurs, micro-aggressions, false accusation and bullying” or an “exclusion from freedom of speech and opinion expression”. It was Mr Vanner’s view that this was the claimants’ misplaced attempt to avoid answering the time sheet discrepancies that they had been unable to answer on 13 October, and an attempt to deflect attention.

[86]In a supplementary witness statement, he admitted that he he had told Abbie Manser and Carla Green to add two hours of paid break time to their time sheets in recognition of their hard work. He had done so because he was anxious to retain staff at a difficult time. Mr Vanner told the office that he had made the gesture and to expect it on their time sheets. It had been an ad hoc gesture and not pursuant to any policy or established practice in terms of paid breaks.

[87]When cross-examined, Mr Vanner explained that he had provided a witness statement to Mr Dean on the kitchen hygiene allegations, but he had not investigated the matter beyond that. He did not recall a collective change of attitude on the part of management of the club after the claimants had withdrawn their resignations in May/June 2023, albeit that two flag officers had expressed doubts as to whether they should have been allowed to withdraw their resignations. Mr Vanner asserted that he had had the best of relationships with the claimants in his view. He stated that if the claimants had asked to be paid for extras, then it was likely it would have been approved. However, it would have needed to be explained what these extra tasks were, and there would need to be approval. Mrs Deaton had told him that she had not authorised the claims in question. Findings

[88]Based on the evidence that we heard and read, the we made the following primary findings of fact relevant to the issues that we had to determine.

[89]The club is a company which has responsibility for running a members only yacht club. Currently, it has approximately 650 members. There are catering and bar services on the premises.

[90]The club is managed by elected members who sit on the general committee. The elected flag officers, comprising of the commodore, two vice commodores, three rear commodores and a treasurer, together form the executive management of the club which is always subject to the general committee’s involvement and approval of its individual and collective areas of responsibility and decision making.

[91]At the relevant time, the respondent had about four permanent members of staff, as well as other casual staff on zero hours contracts. There were around 10 staff at the relevant time. The club was also run by a number of volunteers.

[92]In broad terms, the claimants had good relationships with the club and its officers. This included Mrs Deaton. This was acknowledged by C1 in his testimony to the Tribunal. Their wages had been increased in April 2022 as a recognition of their value to the club [132]. The claimants were actively encouraged to remain by management when they handed in their notices of resignation in May 2023.

[93]C2 and C3 worked on the basis of annualised hours. This was because of the seasonal nature of the club’s activities i.e. sailing, which was more popular in the summer months than in winter. As a consequence, C2 and C3 were both paid one twelfth of their annual salary, irrespective of their hours worked. The time sheets that they filled out each month were not used to pay their monthly salaries but in order that the club could monitor whether they were on track with their annualised hours, or whether they were ahead or behind. It was Mrs Deaton’s role to keep a running total for this purpose. She was not required to authorise the entries in C2 or C3’s time sheets. This was C1’s responsibility as their line manager. If C2 or C3 reached their annualised hours, they would be paid their basic monthly salary plus an hourly rate for all hours worked over the annualised hours.

[94]We find that it was therefore a matter of some importance to both the claimants and the club that the time sheets were filled out in a manner which accurately reflected the number of hours that C2 and C3 spent working for the club. In the Tribunal’s view, this is a matter of plain common sense. We also find that it was flagged up as a matter of importance by the club’s disciplinary process which specified that falsification of time sheets as potentially an act of gross misconduct. The claimant’s all accepted that they had knowledge of this fact.

[95]In our judgment, there was considerable advantage in C2 and/or C3 to reach their annualised hours as soon as possible. We find that the claimants were mindful of this at the relevant time. We also find that C1 was aware of the nature of C2 and C3’s contracts in this regard. At the hearing, C1 was reticent to accept that he had been aware of the fact that they had annualised hours contracts. We did not accept that he had been in any doubt of this at all. It was clear to us that he must have been fully aware. We say this for a number of reasons. Firstly some of the time sheets we have seen in this case make reference to how C2 and C3’s hours compared to their contracted annualised hours cap ([273], [274], [290], [344], [345], and pages 24, 28, 29 of the supplementary bundle). Secondly, C1 was responsible for authorising these time sheets. Thirdly, he was their line manager. Further, he lived with C2, and filled out both C2’s and C3’s time sheets on occasions (at least on his own evidence).

[96]One of C1’s duties was to ensure that time worked was accurately recorded by staff under his supervision, and to verify the time sheets they submitted. He was then required to pass them to his line manager, Mrs Deaton, the Club Manager. We are satisfied that it was not Mrs Deaton’s job to verify the times recorded by C2 and C3. She was clearly not in a position to do so. In relation to time sheets, Mrs Deaton’s primary role was to check the total hours they had worked with the annualised hours in their contracts of employment, and to ensure that they were paid appropriately if they exceeded those hours. We note that it was C2’s testimony that she had signed off on the team’s time sheets prior to the employment of C1 (she had previously been employed as catering manager).

[97]It was C1’s evidence that he was only required to check time sheets against the rota [paragraph 4 of his witness statement]. We do not agree. Whilst there are limits to what can be verified by a manager in C1’s position, and that some of the information must be taken on trust, we are satisfied that the responsibility goes beyond simply cross referring with the rota. We take the view that the responsibility is to actively monitor where possible. Of course, we accept that he did not have access to the alarm logs, and that there was no ‘clocking in’ system. Many work places are in the same position. However, we note that C1 and C2 cohabited, so it is not true to say that C1 did not have some means of verifying the accuracy of the time sheets submitted by at least C2. We also note that they often worked the same shifts, so there was ample opportunity for C1 to monitor the recording of time if he had been inclined to do so.

[98]It was the claimants’ cases that staff were authorised to carry out, and to be paid for, work which took place off the club’s premises, such as collecting supplies from local shops (including bakers and butchers) and delivering them to the kitchen. It was suggested that these tasks would often be performed between shifts or on the way to/from work. The claimants also mentioned planning events and online orders; ad hoc managerial or departmental meetings; and emptying the bins after closing. These matters are set out in some detail in documents within the supplementary bundle at pages 44-46 which suggest that C2 spent over 8 hours a month engaged in these additional duties, and C3 over 6 hours. We do not accept this evidence. We also note that none of the information in the supplementary bundle, or the evidence of Miss Manser (see below), was before the club during the disciplinary proceedings. It is fair to say that the claimants’ cases have evolved considerably since they brought their claims in the Employment Tribunal. This level; of inconsistency in the way they have put their cases has tended to undermine their credibility, and the cogency of their claims.

[99]There are text messages at page 46 of the supplemental bundle which seem to evidence a specific occasion when Mrs Deaton requested that C3 come into work, but this appears to be a request to start her shift early, not to do extra work as defined by the claimants. It does not support the claimants’ case.

[100]At pages 48 to 88 of the supplementary bundle, there is some evidence of occasions where the claimants engaged in tasks outside of normal shifts at the club’s premises. But in our view, these appear to be limited in number, and lacking the appearance of formality. Further, what is not provided is any documentary evidence that the club was aware of these tasks being performed and/or that it had agreed to pay for these tasks to be carried out outside of normal shifts. There are letters from some of the local providers. However, none have provided witness statements or given evidence at the hearing. We have been able to give these letters limited, if any, weight as the information they provide, as it could not be challenged by Mr Myers in cross-examination on behalf of the club.

[101]Of course, we have had regard to the evidence of Ms Manser on this point. We are satisfied that she was trying to be helpful to the Tribunal. However, we found her testimony to be anecdotal. She gave limited occasions when she had carried out errands outside of a normal shift, for which she says she was paid. However, we saw no evidence of any claims for such time, or as to how they were dealt with on her time sheets.

[102]We also accept that in about October 2023, Ms Manser and another member of staff (Miss Green) were told to add two hours of extra time onto their time sheets as a reward for their hard work. Mr Vanner confirmed this. However, this was clearly an example of a club officer giving a one off, express permission, to claim extra hours not actually worked. In our view, it provided little assistant in addressing the issues in this case. We were not even told how the Ms Manser and her colleague had entered these hours onto their time sheets. We note that Mr Vanner had felt the need to notify the office to what he had done, and to warn them that they may see extras claims on the employees’ time sheets. This evidence, which we accept, does not support some general ad hoc approach to claiming extra hours on the part of the club.

[103]On 21 May 2023, the claimants all gave notice of their intention to resign from their employment with the club on the grounds that they had been subjected to bullying and and harassment from club members. After receiving assurances from the club, the claimants withdraw their resignations in the beginning of June 2023. There was an investigation into the claimants’ complaints, and three members of the club were subject to final written warnings [165]. It was our view that this matter was resolved to the claimants’ satisfaction at the time, demonstrated by all three withdrawing their resignations.

[104]On 20th July 2023, C1 lodged a complaint about a club member, Guy Walsh, who it was said had repeatedly touched C1 inappropriately on the bottom and chest, and made unwelcome comments [158]. This was dealt with informally by the club [165].

[105]In August 2023, the claimant received a first written warning in relation to an incident with a customer at the club. It was admitted by the claimant that he had bent one of the customers spoons, which it was said had sentimental value. He stated that he had done it as a joke.The claimant unsuccessfully appealed the sanction [161].

[106]On 6 September 2023, C1 raised a further complaint about the way the ‘spoon’ and the ‘Guy Walsh’ incidents had been dealt with by the club and how inconsistent the processes had been [167]. There was a meeting about this complaint on 29 September 2023 [169]. Again, we are satisfied that this meeting with C1 was left with his agreement that all matters had been satisfactorily resolved. We find that on the following day, 30 September 2023, that C1 had contacted Mr Vanner to apologise that he annoyed Mr Vanner the previous day. C1 had gone on to say how much he respected Mr Vanner and how much he enjoyed working at the Club.

[107]In general terms, and prior to 13 October 2023, the claimants had a good working relationship with the club and its various officers and managers. The claimants are told us this in evidence, and it is apparent from the documentary evidence in the bundle. There was the notable exception of May/June 2023, when the claimants had all resigned, but it was our view that this was an isolated incident which had been satisfactorily revolved by the way the club had pursued their complaint, albeit perhaps little tardily.

[108]Matters relating to the C2 and C3’s time sheets first came to light, at least on the club’s evidence, on 21 September 2023. Mrs Deaton gave evidence on this issue which has caused the Tribunal considerable concern. In our view, the occasion for the investigation into the claimants’ time sheets, and the date of the commencement of that investigation, are a matter of significance, even on the club’s case. If there is an genuine and organic origin for the enquiry into the time sheets, then this goes some way to strengthening the club’s case, both in terms of unfair dismissal and discrimination.

[109]In broad terms, what is alleged by the club is that Mrs Deaton left work on a particular date, and in doing so became concerned that C2 and C3 had not yet attended the club. There was an important event at the club that evening and Mrs Deaton’s evidence was that she would have expected bar and and catering staff to be there by then. It was agreed between the parties that in leaving the club, Mrs Deaton would have been bound to have passed the claimants on arrival. Subsequently, Mrs Deaton explained that she had checked C2 and C3’s time sheets to find that they appeared to have entered arrival times prior to Mrs Deaton’s departure on that day. This caused an investigation to be made of the alarm logs which resulted in several other anomalies coming to light on the time sheets.

[110]What is curious about this case is that until the hearing before us, there had been no attempt by the parties to ascertain the date upon which Mrs Deaton’s suspicions first arose. Mr Dean first obtained the alarm logs on or about 2 October 2023 [171], so it must have been before that. There is no contemporaneous record of the meeting held between the claimants, Mr Dean and Mrs Deaton on 13 October (but see [194]), but no-one suggested that the date of the first suspicious incident was mentioned. Neither is it addressed in the suspension letter dated 18 October 2023 [186]. It is conspicuously not addressed in Mr Dean’s witness statement for the purposes of the disciplinary hearing [194].

[111]So we arrived at the hearing with this issue left unresolved. None of the witness statements tackled the date. There was a discussion and some evidence given by the claimants in the first few days dealing with this question. C1 suggested it was 22 September 2023. Mr Myers made it clear that this was not accepted by the club. Subsequently, C1 also seemed to suggest that the relevant date was 23 September 2023. It was all rather confusing and surprising because there had been no attempt to identify the relevant time sheets which had prompted the club to obtain the alarm logs.

[112]Matters came to a head when Mrs Deaton gave evidence on day three of the hearing, having been present in the public gallery and having listened to previous discussions. As stated above, her witness statement as disclosed did not give a date for the said occasion. It explained that she had alarmed the building upon leaving work, and had been surprised that the claimants were not already at work themselves. It was an occasion when she was nursing a broken arm. On the following days she had checked to see when the claimants arrived for work. She stated “I checked the folder and when reviewing the time sheets the arrival times started for the second and third claimants were before [her emphasis] I had set the alarm and locked the club, and indeed before I arrived at home. It was this discrepancy that raised my concerns and i reported them to mark Dean and Laurie Vanner” [paragraph 15].

[113]Mrs Deaton was sworn in, and asked to adopt her witness statement. She explained that she wished to make some amendments. At paragraph 14, she wished to remove reference to her alarming the building. She confirmed that she had not done so. She stated that the same paragraph should also refer to the date as 21 September 2023. At paragraph 15, she wished to correct it to refer to only the second claimant, and also the reference to her setting the alarm. We allowed the changes.

[114]By way of further explanation, she stated that she had left work at about 4.15pm, and had got home at about 4.35pm. She lived very nearby. She said she had changed her mind about her evidence having listened to the information in the Chubb report, presumably a reference to the document at [172]. This was not further explained. She also stated that she had been reminded today that the third claimant was not at work on 21 September 2023. Mrs Deaton explained that she had only checked the time sheets for C2 on the following day. She had gone on to look at the time sheets for both C2 and C3 for other occasions and found that they mirrored each other in terms of start/finish times.

[115]The Tribunal was provided with the document at [460-461], which Mrs Deaton explained were text messages she had used a few days earlier to jog her memory as to the arrangements for 21 September 2023, which was a Thursday. There had been a dinner for the Woodbridge Cruising Club at the club on that evening. The parti were eventually agreed that the relevant date was 21 September 2023.

[116]The club asserts that this issue is not important because matters moved on once the alarm logs were obtained. Indeed, it argues that 21 September is not even one of the days relied upon when disciplining the claimants because it was eliminated as it fell within the 15 minute margin for error in terms of any anomalies. We do not agree that it is unimportant. We think it is potentially relevant to the procedural fairness of the dismissals, and to the question of credibility of the club’s witnesses. We will return to this issue below.

[117]As a result of matters on 21 September 2023, Mr Dean obtained copies of the alarm logs from the service provider, Chubb Security. These logs demonstrated that on several occasions, C2 and C3’s time sheets were anomalous with times that the alarm was either turned off at the start of the shift, or when it was turned on at the end of the shift. A list of these anomalies was prepared and presented to the claimants as part of the disciplinary hearing [196-197] (“the schedules”). The club also considered it surprising that the time sheets for C2 and C3 were often identical notwithstanding that they did not live together. These were also itemised in the schedules.

[118]It is worth dwelling on this evidence for a moment, as it is clearly important in the context of this case as a whole. Over the period investigated, which was a three month period prior to between July and October 2023, C2 had entered start times on her time sheet earlier than the time when the alarm was turned off on 7 occasions. The discrepancies varied between 55 and 26 minutes. As stated, the club had not relied upon any occasions when the anomaly was not more than 15 minutes. This was because the club instructed staff to round up their times to the nearest quarter of an hour.

[119]C2’s time sheet had similar discrepancies at the end of shifts. She had recorded a time after the alarm was activated on 21 occasions. These discrepancies varied between 58 and 19 minutes. Over the period analysed, there was a total discrepancy for C2 of 896 minutes, which is nearly 15 hours.

[120]The same examination of C3’s time sheets took place. At the start of her shifts there were 3 anomalies of between 49 and 23 minutes; and at the end of the shift, 21 discrepancies of between 53 and 19 minutes. The total discrepancy for C3 was 716, nearly 12 hours. It was the Tribunal’s view that these were significant discrepancies over a relatively short period of time. There were identical discrepancies for C2 and C3 on 19 occasions in total, which appears to the Tribunal to be more than a mere coincidence. The club was justified and reasonable in coming to the same conclusions.

[121]Also, we find that it was not simply that the claimants were entering times taken from the rota. The times C2 and C3 input onto their time sheets were different from the rota on several occasions. It is also difficult to see how their hours could have correlated with each other quite so regularly by reason of extra duties, if the duties undertaken by each were not the same.

[122]On 23 September 2023, C2 was rota’d to work from 10am to 10pm [SB20]. She claimed 12 hours on her timesheet, when the alarm log time suggested that the catering and bar area was open only for 10 hours and 38 minutes. She claimed that she started work on 10am when the alarm was to deactivated until 10.55am. She further claimed to have worked until 10pm when the alarm was set on 21.33 [172]. C2’s time sheet for this day is at [290]. There is no apparent explanation for the discrepancy. We also note that C1 worked that day, according to the rota from 10am to 10pm. C1 initially accepted that he had filled out the time sheet for this day but then changed his mind about it. He did admit that he had at least signed the time sheet as a whole as accurate.

[123]We find that time sheets were submitted to Mrs Deaton on about 20th of each month. The days of the month after 20th were filled out on the time sheets initially having regard to the anticipated rota’d hours for each member of the staff. We accept Mrs Deaton’s evidence that what was expected was that if the hours varied, that staff were expected to amend their time sheets. Again, this is obvious and common sense. This was clearly necessary for C2 and C3 as they had to keep an accurate record for the purpose of their annualised hours contracts. We note that there appeared to be no attempt by C2 to reconcile the anomalies of her time sheet for 23 September (or on any other day), if that was the reason for the initial inaccuracies. The claimants agreed that they did not go back and correct their time sheets as they said this was not standard practice. We do no agree.

[124]In any event, we note that the majority of examples of anomalies relied upon by the club fell on days before the 20th of each month, and so ‘reconciliation’ issues were not relevant.

[125]Further, we are satisfied that that C1 is not correct when he explains that he was simply checking the time sheets against the rotas. As stated, there are several examples within the schedules where the times claimed by C2 and C3 are not consistent with the rota’d times.

[126]We find that the alarm system covered the kitchen area. This was not disputed. Neither was it denied by the claimants that they could not work if the alarm was activated. C1 admitted that it was often either him or other catering staff (i.e. C2 and C3) who would set and reset the alarm, albeit that others did sometimes set the alarms i.e cleaners and office staff.

[127]We are satisfied that the alarm system was working accurately. It would have been important for the alarm to be working properly. We accept the evidence that Chubb were asked to certify that the time settings were correct, and did so. The repeated suggestion by the claimants (mainly C1) that alarm system was unreliable seems to us to have been without foundation. The claimants failed to provide any supporting evidence of malfunction beyond mere assertion.

[128]The claimants provided their own reconciliation of time sheets against the alarm logs. This is in the supplemental bundle at pages 10-17. This was prepared by a friend of the claimants. We remain unsure what expertise, if any, this person has in terms of this sort of investigation. In any event, it is apparent that the schedule was prepared on the basis that it is helpful to identify days when the claimants worked less hours than the alarm was deactivated, and that these days can be used to offset the identified anomalies when they are alleged to have worked for more time than the alarm log suggests was possible.

[129]In our view this approach is erroneous. Those days when they have claimed less than the alarmed time are not ‘under claims’ as the claimants put it. They have simply claimed for the time they were actually at work on the premises, which is the norm. The point being that in the normal course of events, someone working in the bar or catering area can only have worked less, or the same time as the period when the alarm was de-activated. This analysis does not assist the claimant. If anything it shows a worrying failure to appreciate the concerns of the club in terms of time recording.

[130]On 6 October 2023, C1 submitted an email requesting that C2 and C3 move to an annual salary i.e. away from the annualised hours contracts they were currently on [173]. We do not think that much rests on this saver to observe that it puts into context C1’s reticence to admit that he was aware of C2 and C3 contractual status.

[131]On 13 October 2023, the claimants were all three called into a meeting with Mr Dean and Mrs Deaton. This was, in effect, an investigation meeting. We find that the claimants were not put on notice of the purpose of the meeting, and had not been furnished with the information relied upon by the club in advance. We accept that in the broadest terms, what was discussed in this meeting is accurately summarised in the document at [194]. It would have been desirable if there had been a contemporaneous note of such an important meeting, and that any record be more comprehensive. However, we are satisfied that the claimants had an opportunity to provide an explanation for the anomalies on the time sheets set out above. We accept that the meeting would have been challenging and embarrassing for the claimants. However, we do not accept that the representatives of the club behaved inappropriately in this meeting, or in any other. We accept the evidence of the club’s witnesses on this point, not least after having had the opportunity to assess each of their characters and demeanours. It is clear to us that if there was a protagonist at this meetings, then it appears to have been C1, however well intended he may have been.

[132]On 17 October 2023, the claimant each raised a grievance, raising race discrimination, management intimidation, misuse of power and blackmail. They also make reference to racial slurs, albeit not particularised. it cited the meeting on 13 October 2023 as an example of these issues. The three grievances are in the same terms. They appear in the bundle at [183], [220] and [334].

[133]In the Tribunal’s view, these grievances are problematic for the claimants. As stated, they are identical. We accept that they were a joint effort between the claimants, although we find that they were primarily the work of C1. In our judgment, the grievances are not a genuine attempt to express complaints at the time. The claimants all variously admitted that there had been no attempt to ‘’blackmail them by the club. Further, they also admitted that there had been no ‘racial slurs’. It is our view that these two very serious allegations were entirely fabricated by the claimants at the time of the grievance. In the context of this type of case, the apparently casual way that the claimants abandoned these allegations was very worrying and surprising.

[134]These were allegations of a serious criminal offence and race discrimination. One can hardly imagine anything more serious. They were false. The making of these allegations was consistent with the way C1 conducted much of the disciplinary process i.e. in a rather combative way. It does beggar the question as to why he would have chosen to adopt this approach if he genuinely believes that there were reasonable explanations for the discrepancies raised by the club. In the case of C2 and C3, it hardly seemed satisfactory to explain that C1 had drafted the wording of the grievances. They had put their names to it and were presumably aware that they contained accusations with vey little, if any substance. As a result, it has undermined the credibility of the claimants, and we have placed considerably less weight on their testimony as a result.

[135]We find that the grievances were largely opportunistic. The club was fair and reasonable in approaching them on this basis, especially after the letter of 6 September and the meeting of 29 September 2023 with C1. The timing of the grievances was significant. In our judgment, it was aimed at deflecting attention from the primary issue facing the claimants, namely the manner in which time sheets had been completed. Where there was some factual truth to the matters raised, we find that the claimants were rehashing old complaints which had been previous dealt with by the club.

[136]The underlying argument behind the grievances was that the club had dealt with the various issues raised by, and to do with the claimants, in an inconsistent way, and that this was evidence of a lack of fairness and/or discrimination towards the claimants, and particularly C1. We do not agree. It seems to us that the approach by the club in relation to the bullying allegation in May/June was dealt within a reasonable range. Members of the club were given a final written warning. These were very different allegations against non-employees. The claimants appeared to accept this outcome at the time. No find no relevant inconsistency of approach here.

[137]The Tribunal was at first surprised that Guy Welsh was dealt with informally given the nature of the allegations i.e. potentially of sexual assault. However, we had limited information as to the context of the allegations. We also note that C1 was not disciplined for similar behaviour towards Mr Broomfield. In large part it seems that this aspect of the case appears to have shaped the approach of Mr Vanner and the attitude to the outcome of C1. As a result, in our view there is little evidence of material inconsistent here. We note again that it was a very different situation, and different decision makers.

[138]The grievance also highlighted the ‘spoon bending’ incident. This again was a very different allegation to either those relating to the bullying, Mr Welsh, or those against the claimants relating to time sheets. It was also a different decision maker. C1 accepted what was alleged. He was given a first written warning which did not seem excessive to us. We could see no apparent or relevant inconsistency arising from the way this matter had been dealt with by the club.

[139]The claimant were suspended on 18 October 2023. As stated above, there were disciplinary hearings held for all three on 7 November 2023, chaired by Mr Clayton. In terms of the content of these hearings, the Tribunal accepts that the minutes adduced by the club are broadly accurate, and reflect the tone and content of what was stated by the participants.

[140]As stated, the claimants were dismissed on 8 November 2023 ostensibly on the grounds of gross misconduct. The letters of dismissal were sent by to the claimants by email. We are satisfied that there was a genuine attempt to hold further face to face meetings with the claimants on 8 November. We find that there was some confusion on Mr Clayton’s part as to the timing of those meetings. We also find that the claimants had not intended to attend those meetings in any event. They declined to take telephone calls from Mr Clayton when he tried to call them on 8 November to resolve the confusion. This aspect of events was not significant in our view.

[141]The claimants appealed their dismissals on 13/14 November 2023. These were chaired by Mr Hewitt. Again, we accept that the notes adduced by the club are accurate. There were repeated references by the claimants to audio recordings of the various hearings in this case. These were never adduced in evidence. The claimants were repeatedly told by the Tribunal that if they wished too rely upon them, they must make an application to do so, which would be considered by the Tribunal. No application was ever made. As a consequence, we find that these audio recordings did not exist, or if they did, that they did not support the claimants suggestion that the notes were inaccurate in any material way.

[142]The appeal hearings were held on 21/22 November 2023. Mr Hewitt upheld the dismissals by letters dated 1 December 2023.

[143]We note that there was an internal communication with the club by email dated 27 November 2023 which informed staff of the claimants’ dismissal. This was before the claimants had themselves been noticed of the outcome of their appeals. We accept that the optics of this are not ideal. However, we could see no evidence that this was evidence of pre-determination of the outcome. The hearings had been held on 21 and 22 November. The internal communication appears to have been issued in the time when the appeal outcome letters were being created. As stated, it was unfortunate, but in our view not evidence of predetermination of the appeal decision making by Mr Hewitt.

[144]In our judgment, the same applies to the rota issued post the claimants’ suspension [188-189]. We are satisfied that it was both prudent and necessary to produce a rota which excluded the claimants whilst they were suspended. We accept the explanation provided by the club that if the disciplinary or appeal process had ended successfully for the claimants then they could have been re-added to the rota. This was not significant evidence in our view.

[145]The claimants lodged their claims to the Employment Tribunal on 16 January 2024. Reasons and Decision Discrimination

[146]We make our decision guided by the list of issues which appears at [94]. We begin our considerations by looking at the race discrimination allegations. We applied the law as set out in Mr Myers’ written submissions, which appeared to us to be correct and unchallenged by the claimants. In particular, we applied the guidance in the case of Ladele. 4.2.1. Did the club do the following things: Fail to undertake a full and reasonable investigation (the claimants say a material witness was not interviewed and/or their information not used in the decision making process)

[147]At the core of the investigation in this case was the analysis of the time sheet information. As we have found above, the raw data was accurate. There was no cogent evidence from the claimants that the alarm log was unreliable beyond mere assertion by C1. We found the claimants focus on this aspect of the case to be puzzling and worrying. For large parts of the case, either during the disciplinary process, or in front of the Tribunal, the claimants seem to accept that they had regularly claimed hours which did not reflect time spent at work on the club’s premises, and which were not specifically referred to on the time sheets. In which case, the insistence by C1 that the discrepancies were in some way evidence of a defective alarm system was confusing. In fact, it seems to us to have been disingenuous, and the club officers were correct to reject this contention, having first confirmed with Chubb that the system was operating correctly.

[148]The raw data relied upon by Mr Dean, and presented to Mr Clayton and Mr Hewitt was therefore reliable. What was in issue was the explanation for the anomalies, which were significant in our view. As stated above, the club was correct to view the numerous instances when the times claimed were irreconcilable with the alarm log as concerning. The club was justified in treating the numerous instances of time when the claimants suggested that they were working when the alarm was activated as evidence of potential misconduct They were entitled to take a similar view of the instances when C2 and C3 had ‘over claimed’ exactly the same hours, particularly when looked at together with the other discrepancies. It was the combination of these types of discrepancy which added to the weight of the evidence against the claimants.

[149]In our judgment, the claimants were given ample opportunity to explain the discrepancies. They had the chance to do this on three separate occasions: the investigation meeting; the disciplinary hearings; and the appeal hearings. We accept that the raising of these matters in the investigation meeting took the claimants by surprise, and that it would have been challenging as a result. However, it is not usual for investigations meetings to adopt this approach. It is certainly not evidence of unfairness or discrimination in our view. We confess to be puzzled by the decision to hold an investigation meeting involving all three together. We think it might have been more appropriate to have held the meetings separately. That being said, we again think it falls short of being evidence which undermines the club’s case to any significant degree. The club was a reletively small organisation, with limited resources and experience of these types of matters. We note that notwithstanding the claimants’ objections to not having separate investigation meeting, all three subsequently attended each of their disciplinary and appeal hearings. We therefore find that there is some inconsistency in the way the claimants argue their case in this regard.

[150]During the meetings, we are satisfied that the claimants were given opportunity or provide their explanations. It was our impression that C1, as de facto representative for all three, put the case he chose to present in very robust terms throughout. They also each submitted a written grievance which was detailed, albeit opportunistic and not entirely genuine (as discussed above). We take the view that in the light of this, the club was justified in continuing with the disciplinary process, notwithstanding the grievances. We are satisfied that it was made clear that the claimants that they were free to raise any relevant issues also included in their grievances as part of their defence to the time sheet allegations. In our judgment, this was a fair approach in the circumstances.

[151]We find that C1’s approach to these hearings was, at times, misguided. He demonstrated a marked reluctance to focus on the relevant issues, preferring instead to discuss matters which were either unhelpful or peripheral. By way of example is C1’s determination to pursue the argument that the alarm was defective (discussed above). Further, he alleged that Mr Clayton was “corrupt” [206] because he had suggested that Mrs Deaton was ‘office manager’ and not ‘club manager’. We are at a loss to understand why her job title was relevant, or why the confusion (if there was one) rendered Mr Clayton corrupt. It appears to us that this was another serious allegation that had little, if any, foundation in fact.

[152]In so far as explanations for the discrepancies were presented by the claimants, we find that Mr Dean, Mr Clayton and Mr Hewitt considered them. This is evidenced by the content of the meetings in which the relevant chair tried repeatedly to bring C1 back to this issue. It is also evidenced in the dismissal and appeal outcome letters. It is plain that neither Mr Dean, Mr Clayton or Mr Hewitt believed the explanations, but that is not the same as failing to consider the explanations. What they did not accept was that the claimants had authority to be paid for the extra duties mentioned, or that the claimants were, in any event, performing the quantity of extra tasks which would have explained the number of discrepancies that had been identified.

[153]We are satisfied that the chairs of the meetings did consider the issues within the grievances in so far as they were relevant, including any suggestions of discrimination to the extent that it was appropriate. For the reasons set out above, we find that the grievances were unhelpful documents which contained false allegations. We are satisfied that to the limited extent it was put, discrimination as an issue was considered, but dismissed fairly quickly. We bear in mind that the claimants were at the time still standing by their allegations of blackmail and racial slurs. That these were not accepted by the club is entirely consistent with what we now know about the merit of those allegations.

[154]At the heart of the decision to dismiss the claimants was the conflict between the explanations provided by the claimants, and the information provided by Mrs Deaton. It is the claimants’ case that Mrs Deaton was not interviewed as part of the investigation and that, as a material witness, she should have been. We think this part of the claimants’ case is simply incorrect. Mrs Deaton played an active role throughout the disciplinary process. She instigated the investigation, and participated in the investigation meeting. It was also evident that she provided information both to Mr Clayton and Mr Hewitt as part of their enquiries. It might have been better if there had been a signed witness statement from Mrs Deaton. However, her input was clear. Indeed, the claimants could have put direct questions to her during the process, if they had chosen to do so. For reasons which we find puzzling, the claimants chose to exclude her from the disciplinary hearings. We are satisfied that Mr Clayton adopted the fairest process he could, in the light of this decision by the claimants i.e. by asking questions himself during short adjournments of the the meetings.

[155]As stated above, the Tribunal has had cause to anxiously scrutinise the evidence relating to Mrs Deaton’s credibility as a source of information in this case. We were not at all impressed by her testimony in some regards. It was singular in our experience for a witness to change her evidence so significantly and to attribute her change of evidence to having heard others give theirs beforehand. We heard no satisfactory explanation as to why she had, for so long, suggested that both C2 and C3 had been at work on the relevant day, and that she had consequently examined the time sheets of both on the following day, when it was apparent that C3 had not been at work on that day (as it transpired on 21 September 2023).

[156]It was our view that this was likely to have been a mistake on her part. She seemed to us to be a fundamentally honest witness otherwise. Even if we are wrong about this, then it is clear to us that the inconsistency is of limited relevance to the issues. In terms of the investigation, matters soon moved on to look at September as a whole, rather than just 21 September, and then to July and August 2023. We are satisfied that this was the focus of the investigation. Indeed, any anomaly on 21 September was not relied upon by the club in terms of the schedules.

[157]We are satisfied that the club had obtained Mrs Deaton’s evidence in relation to the nature and extent of any authorisation to carry out, and be paid for, the so called extra duties. It was also reasonable for the club to have relied upon such information. Mrs Deaton told her colleagues (and the Tribunal) that whilst some limited extra duties such as collection of bread etc, were performed by staff, that these were done on a voluntary basis and that there was no authority to be paid for them. In any event, she stated that it was her belief that if such hours were to be claimed, that they should be claimed on the same day, and clearly noted on the time sheets.

[158]We accept Mrs Deaton’s evidence on this point, notwithstanding other concerns about her testimony. On this point, she has been consistent throughout. Moreover, it seems to us to be inherently unlikely, and inconsistent with common practice, that any employer would permit claims for hours to be made in the way the claimants suggested. Taking the evidence as a whole, it was the claimants’ case that time spent, for instance collecting bread on the way to work, would be claimed on some other day, without any real attempt to properly record the extra time it had taken. There would be no relevant entry on time sheets which might enable someone to verify whether the extra task had been done, or if the claimed time was accurate and/or reasonable.

[159]Moreover, we were told that on occasions that the claimants were not even filling out their own time sheets, such that C3 would simply add the same time on to C2’s time sheet that she had added to her own, without checking with her colleague. Indeed, it was C1’s case at least, that he had on occasions filled out C2 and C3 time sheets. We were surprised that C1 could not appreciate the obvious conflict of interest this created, as their line manager, and C2's partner. The suggestion that the club was aware of this and had authorised it either expressly or by common practice, simply did not ring true. It defied our understanding of how such matters operate in the work place, and it was plain that this was the view that Mr Clayton and Mr Hewitt took. Further, we are satisfied that the club did take Mrs Deaton’s evidence into account and that it was reasonable and fair to do so in the circumstances.

[160]We acknowledge that the claimants’ have some concerns as to when and why C3 became involved in the investigation, if as is now clear, she was not at work on 21 September 2023. Was there any reason to examine C3 time sheets, and if so, what was it? We think the answer to this question lies in the way the claimants operated at the club. They functioned as a three person team. They were clearly very close, both in, and outside, work. They often communicated with the club as a collective, with C1 representing their collective interests. We note that group resignation in May 2023 in this regard, as well as C1’s request for a variation of C2’s and C3’s contractual terms. Of course, C1 and C2 were in a relationship, which probably strengthened this impression of cohesion amongst the claimants.

[161]For these reasons, it was clear to us that the club viewed them as a collective. Accordingly, we find that it was likely that if there were questions about C2 time sheets and the way they were being authorised by C1, that C3 would also be included in any broadening of the investigation, not least because she had similar work patterns to C2, and both of their time sheets were authorised by C1. It is our judgment that they were viewed and treated as a collectively not because they were all foreign nationals, but because this reflected the reality of how they worked and communicated with the club.

[162]Of course, once the investigation had been expanded to include the time sheets of both C2 and C3, the raw data made it apparent that there were discrepancies in relation to both. We are satisfied that it was the information contained within the schedules which motivated the club, and in particular the decision making of Mr Clayton and Mr Hewitt. In our judgment, it was unrelated to the fact that the claimants were not British nationals.

[163]The credibility of the claimants has also been a relevant issue. There has been a certain amount of inconsistency in the way the claimants have put their cases. The extent of the detail which we have seen i.e. the documents in the supplementary bundle, represents a very significant evolution in their arguments. In particular we note the content of pages 44-45 of that bundle, which gives considerably more detail as to the nature and extent of the alleged extra tasks than was presented to the club during the disciplinary process. We could see no satisfactory reason why such detail could not have been presented to the club (either in writing or verbally) during the process, if the explanations were genuine. We have drawn an adverse inference from this failure, namely that it is likely that these are explanations which, at least to some extent, have been concocted after the event.

[164]We also note that whilst it was a significant part of the case before us, there appeared to have been no mention of bin duties during the disciplinary process, even though this was said to account for 20 minutes of extra time per week. Again, we were puzzled as to how it might be thought that bin duties could significantly account for the alleged discrepancies. It seemed a trivial matter at best. Again, we draw adverse inferences from this inconsistency.

[165]We accept that the club appeared to have little if any written rules about filling out time sheets. We take the view that it might have been better to have spelt out some of the matters discussed within a staff handbook. However, as we have found, the key issues in dispute in this case are obvious and matters of common sense. We find that the way the claimants were filling out time sheets, or allowing them to be filled out, was clearly not appropriate. It seems that the claimants had convinced themselves that it was acceptable and permitted (to the extent that they had given it any thought). It is likely that the practice described had been going on for much longer than the three month period covered by the schedules. However, misconduct is rarely made appropriate because it continues undetected for long periods. We find in this case that the club was not aware of how time sheets were being filled out and extra hours claimed. We are satisfied that the club’s investigation of these matters was full and reasonable. This ground of less favourable treatment is not made out on the evidence. 4.2.2. Did the respondent fail to follow a proper procedure (the claimants say the procedure was different to that adopted the C1 made his complaint

[166]The answers to this question has already been address in the matters set out above and in the answer to the first question relating to the fairness and reasonableness of the investigation. There is clearly considerable overlap between the two questions.

[167]In our judgment, there was a proper procedure followed. Indeed, it was not apparent to us as to what deviation from proper procedure the claimants relied. There was little, if any cross-examination on the point. It is not really a point addressed in any detail in the other evidence or their submissions. It was our impression, looking at it in the round, that the process adopted in relation to the time sheet allegations was extensive and thorough. It is our impression that both Mr Clayton, and then Mr Hewitt, appeared to have brought objectivity to the process.

[168]The process adopted bore favourable comparison to the one adopted on other occasions by the club, to the extent that we had detailed evidence about other events. The claimants specifically rely on the process adopted when C1 made an allegation against Guy Welsh. We agree that the approach was different in that it was dealt with informally i.e. not pursuant to the club’s disciplinary procedure. However, as we have already observed, the two episodes do not seem helpful for the purposes of comparison.

[169]The complaint in relation to Mr Welsh was received by Mr Vanner. We were impressed by Mr Vanner. He appeared to have gone to some lengths to accommodate the claimants, and in particular C1, in the several months before the index matter. There appeared to be no issue that he had a good relationship with the claimants. He had received the complaint about Welsh on 20 July 2023 [158]. From what we know, it was alleged that Welsh had touched C1 on the bum several times, called him “honey”, and more recently grabbed his nipples. Others had been present on the last occasion. C1 ended his email with the observation, “I am sure his intentions are not with any purpose (I hope) but this is not acceptable and must stop”.

[170]Mr Vanner had spoken to C1 who had stated that he wanted the actions to stop. Mr Vanner also interviewed Welsh who had admitted the behaviour but suggested it had been a joke and larking about, and that he had only been responding in kind to C1. Mr Vanner told us that Welsh had apologised and said he would not repeat the behaviour. Mr Vanner suggested that he had given Welsh a verbal warning about his behaviour. Mr Vanner went on to note that he had again spoken to C1 about the outcome. C1 had appeared to accept the apology from Welsh, and all those involved regarded the matter as closed. We accept Mr Vanner’s account of how he dealt what this allegation.

[171]We take the view that the way this matter was approached by the club did leave something to be desired. It was, in our view, pretty low key compared to the potential gravity of the allegation, including as it did allegations of a potentially sexual nature. In our view, this should have resulted in a more formal approach. That being said the allegation appears to have been taken seriously; the perpetrator was interviewed; he admitted the conduct; and he was warned. We would have expected a more severe sanction, but the outcome was clearly guided by the views of C1 who saw no ill intention in Welsh’s actions. There seemed to be a tacit acceptance that it was a joke gone wrong on the part of C1 who appeared to agree the approach and outcome, at least at the time.

[172]The nature of an investigation and disciplinary process is dictated by a number of factors including the type of allegation; the complexity of it; whether there are documents involved; whether the alleged misconduct is admitted; the complexity of any defence; the numbness of witnesses etc. If the process adopted by Mr Vanner in July was different to the one adopted in October 2023, then it is partly explained by the differences in the allegations, and that decisions about the two investigations were not made by the same people. We find that what happened re. Mr Welsh told us little about the fairness or motivation of the process adopted in relation to the time sheet allegations.

[173]Indeed, we note that the Welsh incident was re-opened by C1 on 6 September and was the subject of a further interview with Mr Vanner on 29 September. Again, C1 appears to have accepted that the matter had been resolved satisfactorily. On this occasion, it seems to have been because he had also admitted similar conduct in relation to Mr Broomfield. It was our view that if it could be said that the club took a surprisingly informal approach to allegations of inappropriate touching, that C1 appears to have benefitted from it on this occasion. In our view, criticism of the club on this ground appears to have been opportunistic.

[174]We are satisfied that the club adopted a proper procedure, compliant with good practice in terms of disciplinary processes. We find that there is no support for the allegation of discrimination in this aspect of the claimants’ cases. 4.2.3 Did the respondent dismiss the claimants 4.2.4 Again, the club did refuse the claimants’ appeals

[175]The answer to both to these questions is clearly yes. The pertinent question here is whether dismissal and/or refusal of their appeals amounted to less favourable treatment and whether it was because of race. 4.3/4.4 Did any of the matters in paragraph 4.2 amount to less favourable treatment based on race?

[176]In terms of comparators, the claimants argue that they were treated less favourably than Ian McLean, David Bloomfield, Abbie Manser (incorrectly referred to on the list of issues as Mason), Carla Green, Debbie, Priscilla, Jamie, and Mrs Deaton. It is suggested that all of the staff members completed their timesheet using the same practice but were not disciplined at all. It is argued that all or any of the comparators were treated more favourably than the claimants in that they were not investigated, disciplined, or dismissed for misconduct. Clearly, the claimants were subject to less favourable treatment in that they were disciplined and dismissed. The question is whether it was as a result of their race, viewing each case separately.

[177]All of the above were British nationals and were therefore potential comparators of the claimants in the context of a race discrimination claim. It is also correct to say that none of these were investigated or disciplined in relation to their recording of hours worked. However, it is also the case that none of the above were specifically mentioned a the time as members of staff doing the same as the claimants in terms of filling out time sheets. There were some general allegations but no evidence of misconduct on the part of the comparators. The suggestion seems to be that some or all of the above should have been investigated. If they had, then it is the claimants’ case that evidence of misconduct would have been revealed.

[178]Mr McLean was berth master, and was on an annualised hours contract similar to those of C2 and C3. We were told by Mrs Deaton that he filled out a time sheet and always worked in excess of his hours. As a result, she moved to have his annual cap increased. We accept this evidence. There was never an issue about the hours he worked or how he filled out his time sheet. He was never mentioned by the claimants during the disciplinary process as being someone engaged in similar activities. We can see no reason why he would have been the subject of an investigation. The difference in treatment by the club is therefore entirely explicable.

[179]Mr Bloomfield was caretaker. He worked each friday, and filled out a time sheet. For much of the time, Mrs Deaton was able to physically see whether he worked his hours. Again, there had been no issues about his recording of hours. He name was not raised by the claimants during the process as someone adopting the same methodology as themselves in relation to time keeping. There is insufficient evidence to support the contention that he should have been investigated, or that he was guilty of misconduct.

[180]Debbie (surname unknown) was an office assistant and was salaried. She did not claim for hours in the way that C2 and C3 were required to do so. She could not claim extra hours as she was on a fixed salary. No issues had been raised about Debbie’s wages at the time of the claimants’ dismissals. She was not disciplined because there was no suspicion that she had engaged in misconduct. For that matter, there is still no evidence save for a bare assertion from the claimants. There would have been no justification for disciplining Debbie in these circumstances.

[181]Mrs Deaton was salaried and worked 31 hours a week. She said she worked in excess of her hours and never claimed for extra work and received no extra pay for covering meetings and events etc. We accept this evidence. She was clearly in a different position to the claimants. It was never suggested that she had made claims for herself. The only allegations against Mrs Deaton was that she was ‘complicit’ (to use C1’s wording) in what the claimants had been doing and/or had authorised it. The weight of evidence suggests that she was not aware and did not authorise the anomalous claims. She was also the one that had brought the matter to light and triggered the investigation. It therefore seems unlikely that she too was engaged in the same misconduct. She was questioned by Mr Dean, Mr Clayton and Mr Hewitt on the issue of authorisation. All accepted her evidence and we think it reasonable and understandable that they did. This explains why she was not disciplined by the club.

[182]During the process, the claimants made general allegations that British staff were doing the ‘same thing’, but there was no detail or corroboration of the assertion. There was a mention of previous employees called Lydia (surname unknown), and Claire Lowe, but neither is a comparator for the purposes of these claims. If it is the claimants case that their very generic allegations should have triggered investigations into all British national employees, then we do not agree. What was required from the claimants was more detailed and specific evidence of alleged misconduct relating to individual members of staff. This did not appear, despite requests of the claimants to provide such evidence.

[183]It was common ground that Ms Manser, Ms Green, Priscilla and Jamie all worked in the bar on zero hours contracts and filled out time sheets which were supervised by C1. These individuals have been mentioned only for the purposes of this litigation. There was no suggestion from the claimants at the time that any of them were falsely claiming additional hours. There was no supporting documentary evidence of these allegations adduced at the hearings. This is surprising not least because C1 was overseeing the completion of their time sheets, and approving them. In our view, it is therefore enlightening that the C1 was unable to provide specific examples of them doing the ‘same thing’ during the process itself.

[184]The evidence evolved before us. In relation to Ms Green and Ms Manser, we heard that the latter had adopted the same approach to filling out time sheets as C2 and C3. As we have already set out above, we found her evidence to lack detail and to be too anecdotal. There were limited examples of how she claimed for extra duties. She did not produce any time sheets in support of her account. Most importantly, the club had not been aware at the time of any anomalies in the way Ms Manser filled out her time sheets. As stated, she had not been mentioned by the claimants during the process as an example of other staff doing the same thing. In our judgment, it is questionable for them now to allege that the club ought to have investigated her, or Ms Green. This is one example of how the claimants’ cases have evolved significantly over time.

[185]The only significant illustration that Ms Manser was able to provide us with was how she and Ms Green had been told to add two hours onto her time sheet as a reward for their hard work. As we have found, this was not a helpful example in the context of the case. This was, if anything, an example of how the system should work according to the club i.e. the staff were given specific permission to claim for extra hours, and were told to record it on their time sheets. In our view, it was not evidence of an ad hoc system, but the opposite. It was certainly not support for the contention that Ms Manser and Ms Green were ‘doing the same thing’. Again, it is entirely understandable that the club would not have disciplined these members of staff.

[186]There were also practical problems with investigating the time sheets of other staff. In the claimant’s case, the club had been able to use the alarm logs. This was because the claimants were habitually present at the start and end of shifts in an area which was alarmed on a daily basis. Indeed, the claimants were often the ones who de-activated, and turned on, the alarms. This allowed for a useful reconciliation between the time sheets and the logs. This was not the case for other staff, either because they did not work exclusively in an alarmed part of the club, or because they were simply not habitually present at the start and/or end of shifts. Of course, some did not fill out the sheets at all. Accordingly, there were limits to which some staff could be investigated in the same way that the claimants had been.

[187]It is therefore clear to us why it was, on the evidence as to their circumstances, that the comparators pleaded were not investigated and/or disciplined. There was simply no evidence to justify doing so and/or they were not in a parallel situation with the claimants in terms of their duties and contractual status.

[188]Notwithstanding this finding, it is also helpful in this case for us to examine in general terms whether there was any other support for the proposition that any of the treatment of the claimants was motivated by race. In our judgment, there was not even a prima facie case of discrimination. The claimants rely on a number of factors. Firstly, they say that they were the only foreign nationals, and were the only ones to be dismissed. No British nationals were investigated or spoken to. They say this is at least prima facie evidence of discrimination. We do not agree, without more. This is simply evidence of correlation. It does not follow that because someone who a foreign national has ben treated less favourably, that race is the motivation for the treatment. There may other reasons, and often are.

[189]The claimants point to the lack of any attempt to included their British colleagues in the investigation and disciplinary process. However, as we have found, it is plain why others were not dealt with in the same way, and are not appropriate comparators.

[190]They also point to the inconsistent way in which claimants, particularly C1, were treated in other investigations, either against C1, or where the claimants had made complaints themselves. As we have stated above, it is our view that these other matters were entirely distinguishable from the time sheet allegations, in terms of their nature, complexity and severity. If there was any difference in treatment, it could be readily justified on grounds other than race.

[191]The claimants also place considerable reliance on Ms Manser’s testimony. In particular, they rely on the invitation from Mr Vanner to Ms Manser and Ms Green to add two hours onto their time sheets. It is argued that his is evidence of an ad hoc system of charging for extra items on time sheets of which the club was aware. However, we take the view that this was, again, of an entirely different nature to the index matters. It was authorised and transparent, and made for a specific reason i.e. to reward hard working staff. On any view, it was not a case of covertly falsifying hours. As a consequence, it provides no support at all for the claimants’ case in terms of discrimination.

[192]Neither is Ms Manser’s other evidence helpful. She told us that she claimed for extra duties in the same way as the claimants. The supplementary bundle at pages 75 to 79 suggests four occasions when she bought food items. As we have already found, there is no evidence of whether she claimed pay for buying these items, or how she claimed it on her time sheets. Neither is there any evidence that the club was aware that Ms Manser was claiming for these tasks. It takes the matter little further forward in our view. It falls short of demonstrating that the dismissals were motivated by race or that the time sheet allegations had been manipulated by the club in order to remove the claimants.

[193]It is our judgment that the disciplinary process was instead dominated by the time sheet discrepancies. The schedules contained cogent evidence of misconduct, both because of the comparison with the alarm logs, and the similarities of the times claimed by C2 and C3 These matters came to the club’s attention in largely an organic and plausible way, and was not motivated by the claimants’ races. The Tribunal accepts that it was C2’s conduct which first brought the matter to Mrs Deaton’s attention. We also find that the process which followed was reasonable and fair.

[194]Furthermore, there is nothing in the relationships between the claimants and those in management positions at the club which supports the theory that there was any animosity or ill will towards the claimants prior to October 2023. If anything, the preponderance of evidence was that the relationship was a good one, and that the club attempted to accommodate them wherever possible. If, as is suggested, the club had been searching for some kind of subterfuge in order to get rid of the claimants, then they could have done so in May, when the claimants resigned. In C1’s case, they might also have dismissed him when he bent the customer’s spoon, or when he admitted inappropriately touching Mr Bloomfield. Instead, steps were taken to keep the claimants in the employment of the respondent.

[195]In addition, for the reasons stated, the accounts provided by the claimants in support of their claims were significantly undermined by inconsistencies in their evidence. Indeed, on their own testimony, they had lodged grievances which contained false allegations of racial slurs and blackmail. This had the tenancy to reduce the credibility of the claims that the club’s actions were at all motivated by race. We took the view that allegations of discrimination were opportunistic and without sufficient support.

[196]We therefore dismiss the claims of direct race discrimination. Unfair Dismissal

[197]The relevant issues relating to unfair dismissal appear at paragraph 1 of the list of issues. In our view, they have already be substantively answered above. 1.1 Did the club genuinely believe the claimants has committed misconduct

[198]We are satisfied that the club genuinely believed that the claimants had committed misconduct. The matters contained in the schedules were cogent and strong evidence of misconduct i.e. that they had filled out time sheets which did not reflect work done on each day. It is clear that this was the focus of the disciplinary process, and that having tested the explanations of the claimants, the club came to the view that it did not accept their explanations, namely that they had been given authority to be paid for carrying out the extra tasks. Suspicions had been raised in a plausible way, and the club had carried out a lengthy investigation of the time sheet issues. We are satisfied that the claimants’ explanation, that this was a sham allegation motivated by race was not true. 1.2 Did the club act reasonably in the circumstances

[199]In our view the club did have reasonable grounds for its belief. We come to that conclusion for all of the reasons set out above, not least that there was a strong case for misconduct. We are also satisfied that the investigation and the ensuing disciplinary process was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The claimants had been given ample opportunity to understand the case case against them, and to make all of the points they wished to make in their defence. They had each been given three meetings in which to do this. Unfortunately, they had provided inconsistent explanations and false information which eroded their credibility as witnesses. Moreover, C1 had struggled to keep a focus on the key issues when making representations on behalf of the claimants. What issues had been raised by the claimants had been properly investigated. In particular, we note that the Mrs Deaton was involved in the investigation, and questioned on more than one occasion about the explanations given by the claimants, mainly that Mrs Deaton was aware of the way in which they filled out time sheets and/or that she had given authority to claim pay for extra tasks. We find that the club was entirely reasonable in accepting Mrs Deaton’s evidence on this point, and in so doing, rejecting the claimants explanations for the alleged misconduct.

[200]Finally, was dismissal with a range of reasonable responses? We think it was. It is not for an Employment Tribunal to substitute its decision for that of an employer so long as that decision is one at which a reasonable employer could have arrived. The claimants all agreed that they had been aware that time sheet fraud amounted to potential gross misconduct according to the club’s disciplinary procedure. In each case, the allegations covered allegations of fraud over a sustained period. These were not isolated episodes. It is an aggravating feature of this case that the claimants’ acted in concert in order to submit falsified time sheets to the respondent. For all three it amounted to a breach of trust. In C1’a case, that element of the case was heightened by the fact that he was the other two’s line manager and in a particular position of trust. None of the three had demonstrated any contrition. In lodging a grievance, and in the course of defending their positions, they had made serious allegations against club members, which were false, by their own admission.

[201]In our judgment, this is a case where dismissal was plainly an appropriate sanction, notwithstanding the previous good character of C2 and C3, and the relatively good character of C1. In the light of these factors and all of the matters above, the club was entitled to take the view that it did in respect of each of the claimants.

[202]The claims of unfair dismissal are therefore also dismissed by the Tribunal.

[203]Finally, a word of apology for the delay in issuing this decision. We have attempted to keep the parties informed. It was not possible for the panel to get back together to make its decision until 8 December 2025, with a knock on effect on the speed with which this written decision could be promulgated. We hope that it has not caused too much additional anxiety. Approved by: Richard Wood