B Singh v Concentrix CVG Intelligent Contact Ltd: 3201737/2023
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3201737/2023
Between
B SinghClaimantConcentrix CVG Intelligent Contact LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge S PoveyIn person for claimantMS WALKER (instructed by COUNSEL) for respondentDate 6 August 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaint of constructive unfair dismissal is not made out and is dismissed.[2]The complaint of discrimination arising from disability is not made out and is dismissed.[3]The complaints of breaches of the duty to make reasonable adjustments are not made out and are dismissed.[4]The complaints of harassment by reason of disability are not made out and are dismissed.[5]The complaints of victimisation are not made out and are dismissed.
REASONS
[1]At the culmination of the hearing on 2 May 2025, I made further case management directions (explained below) and reserved judgment. These are my decisions and reasons. - 1 -
Background
[2]This is a claim brought by Belinda Singh (‘the Claimant’) against her former employer, Concentrix CVG Intelligent Contact Limited (‘the Respondent’). Following a period of ACAS Early Conciliation (from 19 July 2023 to 30 August 2023), the claim was presented to the Employment Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) on 22 September 2023[3]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a Customer Service Advisor from 4 June 2021 until her resignation with effect from 14 September 2023. The Claimant brings complaints of constructive unfair dismissal and discrimination on grounds of disability. The complaints are resisted in their entirety by the Respondent.[4]Following case management hearings, the parties agreed a List of Issues. At the outset of the hearing before me, it was amended by consent, with the addition of a further factual allegation, which the Claimant relied upon as a complaint of both harassment and victimisation, as follows: 4.1. On 17 May 2023, Mohammed Amin alleged that the Claimant had failed to attend a fictitious meeting on 11 May 2023.[5]At the hearing on 29, 30 April, 1 & 2 May 2025, I heard oral evidence from the Claimant and, for the Respondent, I heard from Matthew Green (Senior Manager), Sophie Lees (Team Leader) and Mohammed Amin (Senior Team Leader). Each witness adopted their written statements. I was provided with an indexed, paginated bundle of documents (‘the Bundle’), a neutral chronology and a cast list. I also received submissions from Ms Walker for the Respondent and from the Claimant.[6]On the final day of the hearing, and prior to the parties making submissions, the Claimant alleged for the first time that she believed both the Respondent and its solicitors had tampered with the evidence. She made specific reference to a document in the Bundle (at [395] – [408]) and alleged that parts of it had been deliberately removed or omitted. The Claimant relied upon other documents in the Bundle to support her allegation. Given the seriousness of the allegation and the fact that it had not been raised previously, I afforded the Respondent and it’s solicitors time after the conclusion of the hearing to submit any evidence they wished to in rebuttable of the allegation. Thereafter, it was agreed that I would decide the Claimant’s allegation as part of my reserved decision and reasons. I set out my determination of the allegation within my Analysis & Conclusions, below.[7]The Claimant was a litigant in person. I explained the process and procedures to her, checked her understanding, encouraged her to ask questions and gave guidance throughout. I was satisfied that the Claimant was able to fully engage in the process and present her claim to the best of abilities. Indeed, I was impressed by the Claimant’s clarity - 2 - and focus, her understanding of the importance of the issues in the case and the adept and professional manner in which she questioned the Respondent’s witnesses.[8]I was grateful to Ms Walker and the Claimant for the assistance they provided and the work they had undoubtedly undertaken both before and during the hearing. I was also grateful to all the witnesses, including the Claimant, who attended and answered the questions asked of them.[9]I found that all the witnesses I heard from tried to assist the Tribunal to the best of their abilities. I did not find that any witness was obstructive or deceitful. They all genuinely believed in their testimony and were prepared to concede matters of which they had no or limited recollection. However, there were a number of factual disputes between the Claimant and the Respondent’s witnesses which I had to resolve. I did so based upon the evidence provided and mindful that the events discussed occurred between two to three years ago.[10]I was also reminded of the limitations and challenges of memory. I will explain why I have preferred one account to another. It will invariably have been because of my assessment of evidence which arose much closer in time to the events in dispute. However, those whose accounts are not accepted have not lied or been in any way deceitful. What they have done, at most, is misremembered, a trait which is far more common that many realise. I also recognised that recollections, even inaccurate ones, can become more certain and more entrenched when challenged, as is the case in grievances and in tribunal proceedings that, like here, involve factual disputes.[11]The discomfort felt when those recollections are challenged is common and natural. It is sometimes referred to as cognitive dissonance. It may be felt upon reading this judgment. Any such discomfort should not be mistaken for criticism of any of the witnesses. As already explained, each witness recalled what they genuinely believed to have happened.[12]I have only made findings required to determine complaints brought by the Claimant. A number of other matters were raised by both parties in the course of their oral and written evidence. I have not engaged with those, save where they were relevant to the determination of the issues.[13]I have taken all the evidence I have seen and heard and the parties respective submissions into account in reaching my decision. The Law Constructive unfair dismissal
The Law
[14]An employee is dismissed where he “terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which - 3 - he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct” (per section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996).[15]The phrase "constructive dismissal" is not referred to in the Employment Rights Act 1996, but is "a colloquial label for a repudiatory breach of contract by the employer which is accepted by the employee, bringing the contract to an end" (per Elsevier Ltd v Munro [2014] EWHC 2648 (QB)).[16]The fact that the Claimant disagreed with some or all of what the Respondent did or did not do is not enough to establish a breach of contract, still less a fundamental breach. What is required is evidence that the Respondent has committed a repudiatory breach of contract, classically described by Lord Denning MR in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp 1978 ICR 221, CA, as follows If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed.[17]Implied into every employment contract is the term of mutual trust and confidence between employer and employee. Due to the nature of the trust and confidence term, every breach of it goes to the root of the contract and is therefore repudiatory (per Morrow v Safeway Stores [2002] IRLR 9).[18]Whether or not the Respondent acted in a manner that fundamentally breached the Claimant’s contract of employment (such that she was entitled to resign and claim to have been dismissed) is to be judged objectively, having regard to the evidence. The fact that the Claimant believes her contract was breached does not mean that it was, no matter how strongly that view is held. Similarly, the fact that the Respondent did not intend to breach the contract of employment is irrelevant.[19]The Claimant must resign because of the breach and must not delay too long, as she will be deemed to have affirmed or waived the breach (that is, signalled his acceptance in law that the contract is continuing) and lose the right to claim constructive dismissal. Discrimination: legal provisions[20]Section 39(2) of the Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA 2010’) states: An employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's (B)— (a) as to B's terms of employment; - 4 -(b) in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service;(c) by dismissing B;(d) by subjecting B to any other detriment.[21]Disability is a protected characteristic (per section 4 of the EqA 2010). Section 6 of the EqA 2010 defines disability for the purposes of the Act.[22]Discrimination arising from disability is defined by section 15 of the EqA 2010 as follows:(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.[23]There are two distinct steps to the test to be applied in determining whether discrimination arising from disability has occurred (per Basildon & Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v Weerasinghe UKEAT/0397/14): 23.1. Did the claimant's disability cause, have the consequence of, or result in, "something"? 23.2. Did the employer treat the claimant unfavourably because of that "something"?[24]In Pnaiser v NHS England [2016] IRLR 170, the Employment Appeals Tribunal summarised the proper approach to claims for discrimination arising from disability as follows: 24.1. The Tribunal must identify whether the claimant was treated unfavourably and by whom. 24.2. It then has to determine what caused that treatment, focusing on the reason in the mind of the alleged discriminator. The motive of the alleged discriminator in acting as they did is irrelevant. 24.3. The Tribunal must then determine whether the reason was "something arising in consequence of [the claimant's] disability", which could describe a range of causal links. That stage of the - 5 - causation test involves an objective question and does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged discriminator. 24.4. The knowledge required is of the disability, not knowledge that the "something" leading to the unfavourable treatment was a consequence of the disability.[25]Section 20 sets out the duties to make reasonable adjustments in respect of disabled persons. So far as relevant, section 20 states:(1) Where this Act imposes a duty to make reasonable adjustments on a person, this section, sections 21 and 22 and the applicable Schedule apply; and for those purposes, a person on whom the duty is imposed is referred to as A.(2) The duty comprises the following … requirements.(3) The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage.[26]Schedule 8 to the EqA 2010 provides more details as to the duty to make reasonable adjustments. In addition, section 212 of the EqA 2010 defines “substantial” as “more than minor or trivial.”[27]What constitutes a PCP should be construed broadly, It includes formal and informal practices, policies and arrangements and may in certain cases include one-off decisions (per Lamb v The Business Academy Bexley UKEAT/0226/15). However, it is not appropriate to interpret the phrase "provision, criterion or practice" so as to encompass all one-off decisions made by employers during the course of dealings with particular employees (per Ishola v Transport for London [2020] EWCA Civ 112).[28]If a person fails to comply with the duty to make reasonable adjustments, that person discriminates against the disabled person (per section 21 of the EqA 2010).[29]Section 26(1) of the EqA 2010 defines harassment as follows: A person(a) (A) harasses another(b) (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or - 6 - (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.[30]To amount to harassment, A's conduct must have the purpose or effect of violating B's dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. Where B claims that the conduct had this effect (although this was not A's purpose), the Tribunal must consider whether it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.[31]If A's unwanted conduct has the purpose of violating B's dignity or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B, the test for harassment will be met. There is no need to consider if it has the proscribed effect, and the reasonableness of B's perception is not relevant.[32]Section 27(1) of the EqA 2010 defines victimisation as subjecting someone to detriment because they have (ort it is believed they have) done a protected act. There must be a link between the detrimental treatment and the protected act. It must be the real reason for the treatment, although that can include detriment which is not consciously motivated (see, for example, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Bailey [2017] EWCA Civ 425; Peninsula Business Service Ltd v Baker UKEAT/0241/16).[33]A protected act is defined by section 27(2) of the EqA 2010, as follows: Each of the following is a protected act—(a) bringing proceedings under this Act;(b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act;(c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act;(d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act. Discrimination: standard & burden of proof[34]The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof in discrimination complaints has two stages, as follows (per section 136 of the EqA 2010, Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd 2021 ICR 1263, SC; Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] IRLR 246 and Igen Ltd (formerly Leeds Careers Guidance) v Wong 2005 ICR 931, CA): 34.1. The Claimant has to prove facts from which the Tribunal could infer that discrimination has taken place; - 7 - 34.2. If so, the burden ‘shifts’ to the Respondent to prove that the treatment in question was in no way because of a protected characteristic. Findings of Fact
Background
[35]The Respondent provides outsourcing services to global companies. Those services include handling inbound calls from customers of its client companies.[36]Upon joining the Respondent on 4 June 2021, the Claimant initially worked as a Customer Service Advisor on the Virgin Media account. The post was home-based and full-time at 40 hours per week. The Claimant transferred to the HSBC/First Direct account with effect from 21 March 2022. That post was also home-based and full-time (also 40 hours per week). The Claimant dealt with inbound calls from First Direct’s customers.[37]The Claimant has sarcoidosis/neuro-sarcoidosis. It was not in dispute that she was disabled (as defined by section 6 of the EqA 2010, at the relevant time) or that the Respondent was aware of her disabilities.[38]The Respondent operated an Attendance Policy (at [372] – [389] of the Bundle). So far as relevant, the policy explained how absences had to be notified, when and how incapacity to work had to be evidenced, returning to work procedures, sanctions for non-compliance with the policy, reasonable adjustments for those with disabilities and absence management (which included details of the trigger point system, at [378] – [379]).[39]The Attendance Policy also included the following requirements of managers and employees, regarding Return to Work Meetings (at [376] of the Bundle]): Upon their return to work, employees must be asked to attend a Return to Work Meeting with their manager (or another manager if their manager is not available). The manager should carry out these meetings on the day the employee returns to work, or as soon as possible after this date. Return to Work Meetings are an important part of the absence management process, allowing the manager and employee to discuss the period of sick leave and consider how improvements to attendance might be supported.[40]The Respondent operated a Grievance Policy (at [390] – [294] of the Bundle). It included the following provision about grievance meetings (at [382] of the Bundle); - 8 - Grievance meetings (and grievance appeal meetings) are formal meetings in which the employee has the right to be accompanied by another person. The employee’s companion can be:• A work colleague• A representative of a trade union (of which the employee is a member). The trade union representative will be required to provide proof of their position.• A support worker, if required as a reasonable adjustment for an employee with a disability[41]The Respondent had a bonus scheme. Its operation was explained by Mr Amin in his written evidence (at Paragraph 15): The monthly bonus structure during the time the Claimant was on the account consisted of two elements. The first element was the qualifying criteria to be eligible for bonus and then the second element was based on achieving the client specific campaign metrics. The qualifying criteria consists of: o Attendance - minimum expectation of 92% o Quality - Minimum Score of 72% o Utilisation - Above 80% for the month o Mandatory Learning to be completed within the required timescales to a ‘Pass’ Level o Zero negative disciplinary outcomes.[42]Mr Amin’s written evidence went on to detail the client-specific metrics to be achieved to qualify for a bonus and the amounts awarded. So far as relevant, performance expectations included the following (also at Paragraph 15 of his statement): 42.1. 95 – 100% attendance, and the measure that “[S]ickness absence and lateness will impact attendance”; and 42.2. Call lengths of less than 340 seconds.[43]It was not in dispute that absences due to hospital appointments were disregarded by the Respondent in calculating the attendance metric of the bonus scheme (in that they did not count against an employee). In addition, Mr Amin explained in his oral evidence that managers would also look at mitigating factors if someone had not achieved the minimum bonus metrics, which could result in adjustments to the operation of the scheme. - 9 -[44]Between July 2021 and May 2022, the Claimant had a number of shortterm absences and attended a Return to Work Meeting on 13 May 2022. During that meeting, the Claimant was reminded of the provisions of the Attendance Policy, as follows (at [79] of the Bundle): As you will be aware Concentrix has an absence policy. Should you have 3 periods of absence within a 6-month period that would trigger a letter of concern and should you have 5 periods of absence within 12 months that would trigger a disciplinary. As this would be your 4th one, should you have one more within the 12-month period that would trigger a disciplinary.[45]The Claimant was absent again in June 2022 and August 2022. On or around 4 August 2022, the Respondent referred the Claimant to Occupational Health (OH). At a Return to Work Meeting on 10 August 2022 with Ms Lees, the following exchange took place (at [87] of the Bundle): What interventions can be put in place by Concentrix? (e.g. phased return, Occupational Health referral, WRAP, etc.) SL: We are currently in the process of your OH referral, what other support do you need from me as your manager or the business? BS: No not really. SL: Happy for you to have additional Comfort Breaks if you need to support with your RTW and if you struggle during the full day tomorrow, please reach out to me.[46]In addition, and in accordance with the Attendance Policy, a letter of concern was issued to the Claimant, dated 10 August 2022 (at [88] of the Bundle). The letter included the following: We need to make you aware that further absences could result in you being invited to attend a formal disciplinary meeting which may lead to a written warning being issued to you.[47]On 23 August 2022, the OH report was received (at [90] – [91] of the Bundle). It included the following recommendations: Current Fitness for Work In my opinion, [the Claimant] is fit for work with the following adjustments: o Her breaks should be regularly spaced throughout the day. Try to avoid short work periods between breaks and then longer work periods between breaks. o She may require increased call times due to the cognitive impact on her. - 10 - o She would benefit from counselling. If this is available through any employee EAP, I have advised she should access this or failing this discuss this with her GP. o She is likely to take higher levels of short-term sickness absence than an average employee. This should be considered when reviewing sickness absence levels.[48]Ms Lees met with the Claimant on 31 August 2022 to talk through the contents of the OH report (at [95] – [98] of the Bundle). During the meeting, and in line with the OH recommendations, Ms Lees confirmed the following adjustments: 48.1. The Claimant’s permitted call times were increased from 340 seconds to 380 seconds (having regard to her average call times during the previous weeks); 48.2. The Claimant’s breaks were spread out across the working day (11.30am, 1pm & 4pm); 48.3. If future short-term absences triggered the Attendance Policy, regard would be had to the Claimant’s underlying health issue; and 48.4. The Claimant would be supported to make a flexible working application.[49]The Claimant agreed with all the proposed adjustments and expressed her thanks to Ms Lees.[50]As agreed, the Claimant submitted a flexible working application on 6 September 2022, wherein she sought to reduce her weekly hours from 40 to 32 (spread over four days per week, 9.30am – 6pm). The application was approved by Mr Green on 12 September 2022 and took effect immediately (at [102] of the Bundle).[51]During early November 2022, and upon return from annual leave, the Claimant informed Ms Lees that she was struggling with her health. It was agreed to implement a temporary arrangement, whereby the Claimant would finish her shift at 2pm and take the rest of the time as annual leave. This was later amended at the Claimant’s request, to afford the Claimant a longer break during her shift (see [106] – [109] of the Bundle and Paragraphs 27 – 29 of Ms Lees’ witness statement).[52]The Claimant was absent again from 15 to 18 November 2022. A Return to Work Meeting was held on 18 November 2022 (at [110] – [111] of the Bundle). The Claimant reported that eight-hour days were too much. As such, and also on 18 November 2022, the Claimant made a second flexible working application, requesting a 20-hour working week as follows (at [113]): - 11 - 4 days per week @ 5 ½ hours with 30 minute unpaid lunch Week 1 Mon, Tue, Thurs & Fri 9.30-3 Week 2 Tue, Wed, Fri & Sat 9.30-3[53]Also on 18 November 2022, and in accordance with the Attendance Policy, the Claimant was invited to a disciplinary hearing, scheduled for 21 November 2022, to discuss her absences (at [115] – [116] of the Bundle).[54]Finally, and again on 18 November 2022, the Claimant commenced a further period of sickness absence. This became a long-term absence, the Claimant not returning to work until 10 February 2023. The scheduled disciplinary on 21 November 2022 did not go ahead. However, the flexible working application was approved in principle (as confirmed by Ms Lees in the wellbeing meeting of 4 February 2023, at [120] of the Bundle).[55]On 8 February 2023, Ms Lees conducted a wellbeing meeting with the Claimant. Prior to the meeting, the Claimant had indicated to the Respondent that she would like to return to work for two weeks, initially working 12 hours per week, increasing to 16 hours per week thereafter (per her email of 3 February 2023, at [137] – [138] of the Bundle). Ms Lees confirmed that the Claimant’s request to work 20 hours per week had been agreed and the Claimant confirmed that her intention was to undertake a phased return to work. This was also agreed to by Ms Lees, as follows (at [121]): SL: I would like to confirm that we have agreed for you to return back to the business on 10/02/2023 and the first 2 weeks (until 23.02.23) you will work 09:30-13:00 with a 30 min unpaid lunch. You will use 2 hours holiday per day to increase total paid hours to 20 per week. Then from 24.02.23 you will work 09:30-14:00 with a 30 min unpaid lunch. You will use 1 hour holiday per day to increase total paid hours to 20 per week. We will then have a further meeting to review this on 07.03.23 (after 2 weeks) with the intention for you to return to your contracted flexi-working agreement. Is that ok? BS: Yes[56]The Claimant returned to work on 10 February 2023. She attended a Return to Work Meeting with Ms Lees, where the agreed phased return was re-stated. The Claimant informed Ms Lees that she did not require any additional support (at [125] of the Bundle).[57]The Claimant was off work again on 2 March 2023 due to a migraine. On 3 March 2023, she attended another Return to Work Meeting with Rebecca Ashworth (her team manager), where the following exchange took place (at [127] of the Bundle): RA: Is there anything work related that may have contributed towards this [migraine]? - 12 - BS: No. I am struggling a little though, the tiredness and pain sitting in the chair all day. RA: I know you are due to return to your normal hours next week, how do you feel about that? BS: I do not feel I can go back to full hours next week. The pain is making me really moody. The time off did ease the pain, but now I have returned it seems to have kicked it all off again. I think It is sitting in the chair. RA: Do you feel as though there is anything else we can do as a business to help you? BS: Not really. I don’t know to be honest. I feel as though sitting down or standing up would cause me issues either way. RA: We will arrange another wellbeing meeting, to discuss our options. We will discuss the hours next week too. Do you feel fully fit to resume your duties today? BS: Yes. RA: Is there anything else you’d like to talk about before you go to taking calls? BS: No, thank you. I will wait for the wellbeing meeting.[58]The Claimant was absent again from 8 March 2023 until 27 March 2023 (although this period included two weeks planned annual leave). She attended a Return to Work Meeting on 27 March 2023 with Ms Ashworth and Andrew Kinghorn (another of the team managers). The meeting was conducted over Zoom. The Claimant was due to work her maximum hours of 20 per week, which was discussed with Ms Ashworth. It was agreed to arrange a further wellbeing meeting. In addition, the Claimant was informed that she had again hit the trigger point under the Attendance Policy for there to be a disciplinary meeting (at [129] of the Bundle).[59]The Claimant subsequently alleged in her grievance (see below) that the meeting on 27 March 2023 was interrupted by other team members joining (per her grievance letter of 16 May 2023, at [231] of the Bundle). She raised concerns that this was “a blatant disregard of my privacy”. Mr Kinghorn was interviewed as part of the Respondent’s investigations into the Claimant’s grievance and was asked about this incident, as follows (per his interview of 27 June 2023, at [279]): Do you recall other team members joining part way through the welfare call? Not specifically, but I know [the Claimant] uses her personal ID for the zoom meetings which explains why people were joining part way. - 13 -[60]The matter was addressed further by the Respondent as part of the Claimant’s grievance appeal outcome (see below), wherein the following findings and recommendations were made (per the grievance appeal outcome letter of 31 July 2023, at [356] of the Bundle, emphasis retained): 20. Your private wellbeing meeting was interrupted by other members of the team joining the call link. Findings The panel agree that the setting for the meeting should have been private in which a separate meeting ID should have been sent to maintain confidentiality. It has been established that the meeting was ended abruptly on the team noticing additional employees joining the session for the scheduled team meeting. We understand this was not the intention from the manager holding the meeting but this could have been prevented if the meeting was planned accordingly. Recommendations Feedback will be provided to the employees linked to this point. A briefing will also be shared with the remainder of the team leaders on the account to avoid any such cases happening again.
Findings
[61]Mr Green also made enquiries about the allegation and recalled in his witness statement a conversation he had with Ms Ashworth about the meeting, which included the following, unchallenged evidence (at Paragraph 39): …Rebecca [Ashworth] said to me that she asked the Claimant to join the meeting invite early so that the wellbeing conversation could take place. Rebecca advised me that the conversation had lasted longer than first planned for and she noticed that a member of her team had joined the meeting at the scheduled meeting time. Rebecca said to me it was at that point the conversation with the Claimant was abruptly ended to ensure confidentiality. Rebecca said to me that she is confident that no personal matters were overheard as the tool used which was Microsoft Zoom prompts you when a new member joins the meeting which was immediately noted by herself and the Claimant. It would not have been apparent to the team member joining that Rebecca and the Claimant had been discussing any private matter because the invitation for the meeting referred to a general team catch up.[62]On 31 March 2023, the Claimant and Ms Ashworth held a wellbeing meeting (at [140] – [141], also attended by Mr Kinghorn). There was a discussion about the Claimant’s working hours (which were at 20 hours per week) and what other support the Claimant felt she needed from the Respondent. The Claimant was told that 20 hours per week were the minimum weekly hours available to staff on the First Direct account and she enquired about any other campaigns that were available with less hours. The Claimant also expressed her concern that the wellbeing meeting had not taken place before she moved up to 20 hours per week - 14 - and that, despite the phased return, she had felt rushed back into working 20 hours per week.[63]During the same meeting, the Claimant was asked about a hospital appointment she had on 5 April 2023. There was a discussion about how long the Claimant was saying she needed to attend the appointment, with the Claimant explaining about the difficulties with finding parking and the unpredictability of whether she would be actually seen at the time allotted for her appointment. That interaction was also raised by the Claimant within her grievance (see below), wherein it was found that although the Claimant had booked annual leave to attend the appointment, it was in fact be coded as manager-approved absence, such that she would retain her annual leave and her absence would have no impact on her attendance record. That was also the reason why the Claimant was asked about the appointment and the time she needed to be able to attend it (per Mr Green’s statement, at Paragraph 35).[64]Also on 31 March 2023, the Claimant was invited to attend a disciplinary meeting, scheduled for 4 April 2023, to discuss her levels of absence over the previous 12 months (at [142] of the Bundle).[65]The disciplinary meeting started as planned on 4 April 2023. In her evidence, Ms Lees explained the initial aim of the meeting, as follows (per Paragraph 35 of her witness statement): …At the point we started the meeting it was yet to be established if the absences that contributed to the trigger were directly related to the Claimant’s medical condition and it was my intention to understand this during the meeting. If it was to become apparent that the absences had a direct link to the Claimant’s medical condition, the likely outcome of the disciplinary meeting would have been for no further action to be taken. The Claimant was made aware of this prior to the meeting also…[66]However, at the start of the meeting, the Claimant asked for the hearing to be recorded or be allowed someone to accompany her because of her disabilities. As the Respondent’s policy did not permit recording, it was agreed to reschedule the hearing to enable the Claimant to be accompanied by a support worker. It was also agreed that the Claimant would provide details of her support worker to the Respondent.[67]It was not in dispute that the disciplinary hearing was never rescheduled and no further disciplinary action was taken against the Claimant.[68]In her grievance (see below), the Claimant referred to an email exchange between herself and Ms Ashworth, following the postponed disciplinary hearing, where Ms Ashworth asked the Claimant when she would like the meeting rescheduled and whether she had had any success in finding someone to accompany her (at [236] of the Bundle). The emails referred to in the Claimant’s grievance were not in evidence, - 15 - although she characterised this exchange as a “constant barrage of repeating questions.”[69]The Claimant commenced another period of sickness absence on 11 April 2023.[70]On 13 April 2023, the Claimant submitted a letter to Ms Lees and Ms Ashworth, wherein she detailed her feelings and concerns (at [161] – [166] of the Bundle). The letter included concerns the Claimant had about her hours, what she perceived as negativity towards her of reducing her hours and her view that she was not being adequately supported or engaged with. The letter was known for the purposes of the litigation as ‘the informal complaint’.[71]It was agreed to arrange a wellbeing meeting with the Claimant to discuss the concerns she had raised in the informal complaint. That meeting took place on 18 April 2023 between the Claimant, Mr Amin (as Senior Team Leader) and Sandra Karlsson (Peoples Solutions Generalist). That was also the date of the Claimant’s return to work, after being absent from 11 April 2023.[72]At the outset of the meeting, Mr Amin explained the purpose of meeting with the Claimant (at [169] of the Bundle): So we wanted to speak with you, as Sandra [Karlsson] mentioned, you have raised some concerns that we take serious and want to make sure we address. We want to ask you some questions, and understand what has taken place, as well as discuss potential solutions and alternatives for the future.[73]Mr Amin discussed and explained why there was a minimum 20-hour requirement on the First Direct account but also said that “maybe we need to look to explore what campaigns we have that can accommodate your needs better” (at [170] of the Bundle). In addition, the Claimant stated that Ms Lees and Ms Ashworth had been “supportive where they can, I know they have been very supportive too” and recounted a time when Ms Lees had spent time talking with the Claimant, which had been beneficial (at [172]). At the same time, the Claimant thought that Ms Lees had not appreciated the time it took to attend hospital appointments (also at [172]).[74]Ms Karlsson explained to the Claimant why the Respondent did not allow meetings to be recorded (at [173] of the Bundle).[75]Mr Amin agreed to put in place temporary measures, whilst looking for suitable alternative accounts that the Claimant could be moved to. Those measures were aimed at continuing to support the Claimant in her current role and included the following (per Paragraph 7 of Ms Amin’s witness statement and [173] – [175] of the Bundle): - 16 - 75.1. The Claimant would work from 9.30 – 13.00, with two 15-minute, unpaid breaks. The rest of her shift (from 13.00 – 15.00) would be logged as unpaid time off; 75.2. The Claimant could work up to the end of her shift, as and when she felt able to do so and would be paid accordingly; and 75.3. Any coaching or 1-2-1s would be scheduled for between 13.00 and 15.00 and the Claimant would be paid accordingly.[76]A Return to Work Meeting was also held on 18 April 2023 between the Claimant and Ms Lees (at [176] – [177] of the Bundle). The Claimant confirmed that she was fit to return to work and that her absence had been linked to her underlying health condition. Ms Lees asked the Claimant if she required any additional support, to which the Claimant replied as follows (at [177]): Additional breaks to walk around more. 2 mins every hour was recommended by the hospital. But I am happy to have 15 mins after 1st hour and another 15 mins after 2nd hour rather than 30 mins together in the day.[77]By 20 April 2023, Mr Amin had identified a possible alternative campaign which could be more suited to the Claimant’s needs (per his email of 20 April 2023, at [181] of the Bundle). It was agreed for the Claimant to meet with Ms Lees and Ms Karlsson the following day to discuss further (as Mr Amin was on leave).[78]That meeting took place as scheduled on 21 April 2023 (at [182] – [184] of the Bundle). The proposed campaign was with BT. The hours were 09:30 – 14:15 Monday, Tuesday and Thursday (which had been created to support the Claimant’s request not to work more than two consecutive days) and 08:30 – 13:45 on Saturday. The Claimant did not believe that the proposal worked for her, because the hours were longer and required her to work on Saturdays (which she was unable to do because of family commitments).[79]On 24 April 2023, the Claimant was absent due to ill-health. In her email notifying the Respondent of her absence, she also asked for her informal complaint of 13 April 2023 to be escalated to a formal grievance (at [187] of the Bundle). Later that day, the Claimant reported to the Respondent that, despite notifying her absence, she had been telephoned by Anne Hurst (Team Manger), asking why she was not in work (at [188]). Later that same day, Ms Karlsson emailed the Claimant to explain that her original email regarding her absence had “landed in my junk mail, due to it coming from an external email that I had not received emails from before, hence why I did not see it” (at [191]).[80]A wellbeing meeting was arranged for 26 April 2023 but the Claimant was too unwell to attend. On 27 April 2023, Mr Amin asked the Claimant - 17 - to provide “all the details in relation to your grievance”, after which a meeting would be arranged to discuss the grievance and try and find a resolution (per Mr Amin’s email to the Claimant at [196] of the Bundle).[81]On 12 May 2023, Mr Amin invited the Claimant to the re-arranged wellbeing meeting, scheduled for 3:30pm on 15 May 2023 (at [201] – [202] of the Bundle). A Teams invite was sent to the Claimant, which she neither accepted nor rejected. A separate email on 12 May 2023 from Mr Amin to the Claimant about the proposed meeting was not responded to. Due to technical issues, Mr Amin and Ms Karlsson attended the meeting on 15 May 2023 at 15:38. The Claimant was not there (at [201] – [204] of the Bundle).[82]Mr Amin emailed the Claimant again on 15 May 2025 (at [205] of the Bundle). It was proposed to re-arrange the wellbeing again, this time to 11:00 on 17 May 2023. The Claimant was also reminded to provided details of her grievance (per the request of 27 April 2023). The Claimant responded later that day, to explain that she had attended the meeting on 15 May 2023 and waited until 3:35pm, before leaving as “I am feeling so ill and it did not look like the meeting was going ahead” (at [206] of the Bundle).[83]In reply, Mr Amin informed the Claimant of the technical issues they had experienced and understood why the Claimant left the meeting as she was feeling unwell. He also apologised to the Claimant (at [206] of the Bundle). Mr Amin concluded his email to the Claimant of 15 May 2023 as follows: We look forward to catching up with you on Wednesday [17 May 2023] and as mentioned earlier if you need anything in the meantime, please reach out.[84]At 10.40am on 17 May 2023, the Claimant sent the following email to Mr Amin (at [218] of the Bundle): After further advice, I have decided that it would probably be best not to have this meeting today, but to concentrate on getting my grievance raised as a matter of urgency. I am currently seeking support in regard to the grievance letter and will get that over to you both at the earliest chance.[85]Mr Amin replied to the Claimant at 10:49am (also at [218] of the Bundle): The meeting this morning is purely a wellbeing meeting and would be separate from any grievance meeting. Therefore, there is no urgency for you to have the grievance letter ready for this meeting. - 18 - Once the grievance letter has been completed then a separate meeting would be set up to discuss and progress with the grievance. Can you confirm that you will still be able to join today’s call based on what I have explained above.[86]The Claimant replied at 11:07am, which included the following (at [221] of the Bundle): I understand it is totally separate [sic], but need to prioritise that. The reason this has changed and I have decided against the meeting today is purely the response regarding the Monday meeting. Firstly you originally stated that I had not attended the meeting. Following me providing evidence that I had actually attended and waited 5 minutes before leaving as there was no sign of either yourself or Sandra attending. Your response was that you both had IT issues and were late. If this was me having IT issues then I would have been expected to make contact to let you know. Neither of you had the decency to notify me but then in your response you have stated that I left due to not feeling well. I left because neither of you were in attendance. This shows the levels of manipulation of the truths throughout my time with First Direct which has led to my mental health problems. My grievance includes many more examples, which is why that needs to take priority. I have no faith in the First Direct management anymore and feel that it is just creating an uncomfortable working environment.[87]Later that day, Mr Amin sent the Claimant another email (at [216] – [216] of the Bundle). He re-arranged the wellbeing meeting for a third time, this time to 11:00 on 31 May 2023. He reminded the Claimant that under the terms of the Attendance Policy, employees were required to attend wellbeing meetings (per the Attendance Policy, at [382] of the Bundle). He provided the Claimant with details of the formal grievance process.[88]By a letter dated 17 May 2023, Mr Amin provided the Claimant with written confirmation of the wellbeing meeting scheduled for 11:00am on 31 May 2023 (at [226] – [227] of the Bundle). That letter included the following paragraph: I would like to remind you this is the third attempt at arranging a wellbeing meeting. To date you have not attended previously scheduled meetings on Thursday 11th May 2023 and Wednesday 17th May 2023. One meeting, on the 15th May 2023, did not go ahead due to Sandra and myself being 8 min late, and at that stage you had joined and left the meeting. We were late to the meeting due to a technical issue.[89]On 24 May 2023, the Claimant submitted her formal grievance, by way of a letter addressed to Mr Green and dated 16 May 2023 (at [229] – [239] of the Bundle). - 19 -[90]The Claimant did not respond to the Teams invite to the wellbeing meeting scheduled for 31 May 2023. The meeting therefore did not go ahead. In addition, the Respondent agreed to the Claimant’s request to put verbal wellbeing meetings on hold, but did not avoid its responsibilities to maintain contact with the Claimant and ensure it was kept informed of her wellbeing (per Mr Amin’s email to the Claimant of 19 June 2023, at [271] of the Bundle).[91]As regards the Claimant’s grievance: 91.1. Kyle Williams (Operations Manager) was appointed to investigate and determine the grievance; 91.2. On 6 June 2023, the Claimant met with Mr Williams (at [261] – [269] of the Bundle); and 91.3. Mr Williams met with and interviewed Mr Amin (on 7 June 2023, at [242] – [244]), Ms Ashworth (on 9 June 2023, at [249] – [255]), Ms Lees (on 22 June 2023, at [275] – [276]) and Mr Kinghorn (on 27 June 2023, at [279] – [280]).[92]On 28 June 2023, Mr Williams met with the Claimant again and read out his grievance decision (at [285] of the Bundle). A copy of the decision was also provided to the Claimant (at [283] – 284]). Of the five points identified by Mr Williams as being raised by the Claimant, one was upheld, three were partially upheld and one was not upheld. The Claimant was informed that she had the right to appeal against the decision.[93]On 4 July 2023, the Claimant submitted her appeal against the grievance outcome decision (at [288] – [289] of the Bundle). On 10 July 2023, Mr Green invited the Claimant to an appeal meeting, scheduled for 11 July 2023 (at [290] of the Bundle) and confirmed that he would be chairing the meeting, with Leanne McKee (Senior Manager, People Solutions).[94]The appeal meeting took place as scheduled on 11 July 2023 (at [293] – [301] of the Bundle). It was adjourned and reconvened on 14 July 2023 (at [301] – [303]).[95]On 19 July 2023, the Claimant started ACAS Early Conciliation (at [51] of the Bundle).[96]By a letter dated 31 July 2023, Mr Green provided the Claimant with the panel’s decision on her appeal (at [350] – [357]). The letter considered 23 separate points raised by the Claimant, detailed the findings made by the panel and, where appropriate, the recommendations made.[97]By an email on 17 August 2023, the Claimant gave notice of her resignation (at [358] – [359] of the Bundle), which, with four weeks - 20 - notice, took effect on 14 September 2023. The Claimant gave the following reasons for resigning: I feel that I have been forced into this position due to the constant and ongoing discrimination caused by a consistent stream of purposeful actions, issues, mistakes, miscommunications, etc, that has not been dealt with adequately or fully throughout the initial process of my informal complaint and then subsequently my formal grievance and appeal, has led to a total breakdown of my trust in the company. The constant contradictory attitude from management towards myself has just led to a hostile working environment and has caused so much damage to my mental health and would be too unbearable to return.[98]On 18 August 2023, Mr Green, on behalf of the Respondent, acknowledged and accepted the Claimant’s resignation (at [358] of the Bundle). Her employed terminated on 14 September 2023. Analysis & Conclusions Allegation of Evidence Tampering[99]As noted above, the Claimant alleged that the Respondent and its solicitors had tampered with evidence in the Bundle. Specifically, and as confirmed by the Claimant, the allegation was that the Respondent and its solicitors had colluded to deliberately, wilfully and knowingly remove an entry from the document which appeared at [395] – [408] of the Bundle. That document recorded the Claimant’s attendance at, and absences from, work for the period from 1 April 2022 to 28 April 2023.[100]The Claimant alleged that on 17 February 2023, she was absent from work due to a hospital appointment. However, the above-mentioned document contained no entries whatsoever for 17 February 2023. It was the absence of this entry which the Claimant alleged had been removed deliberately by the Respondent, in collusion with its solicitors.[101]The Claimant relied upon her grievance letter of 16 May 2023, to show that there had been an entry on the system for 17 February 2023 (as she referred to it in her grievance, at [230] of the Bundle) but that the entry had since been removed.[102]In response to the allegation of evidence tampering, I received statements from Jane Bradshaw (the Respondent’s Senior Manager, People Solutions) and from Timothy Russell, the solicitor with conduct of the litigation, as well as supporting documentary evidence. In summary, the response to the allegation was as follows: 102.1. The Respondent had identified an error in its records, such that the two hours worked by the Claimant on 17 February 2023 did not appear on its records. The sums due to the Claimant as a result are to be paid forthwith; - 21 - 102.2. The omission of this information was an oversight by the Respondent. It was not deliberate nor was any information removed, deliberately or otherwise; and 102.3. The Claimant raised no issues with her pay at the time nor did she raise any issues with the accuracy or provenance of the specific document when it was provided to her as part of the trial bundle in or around October 2024 (ahead of the originally listed final hearing).[103]In my judgment, there is no evidence to support the allegation of collusion, evidence tampering or removal of records. Rather, and as was acknowledged by the Respondent, there was an error in its record system. That was a far more plausible explanation for why the entries for 17 February 2023 were missing. In contrast, and despite what the Claimant may believe, there was no good reason for the Respondent and its solicitors to deliberately alter or remove documents, in circumstances where the same would be career-ending for the solicitor and lead to likely prosecution for contempt of court of the Respondent’s officers, in circumstances where the document and entry in question were of limited and peripheral relevance to the issues in the case.[104]It was not enough that the Claimant may have believed that evidence had been tampered with. Such a serious allegation must be supported by robust evidence. The Claimant failed to do anything other than convey a suspicion, for which the evidence simply did not exist.[105]For those reasons, I did not find that the Respondent or its solicitors, whether in collusion or alone, acted inappropriately as alleged or at all. There was no tapering with the evidence and no deliberately removal or omission of any entries or documents. The Substantive Issues[106]I considered and determined the issues, as agreed by the parties in the List of Issues (at [36] – [41] of the Bundle) and as amended at the start of the hearing. I have only determined those issues which relate to liability (that is, whether or not the complaints of unfair dismissal and discrimination have been made out). Unfair dismissal[107]It was not in dispute that the Claimant resigned with effect from 14 September 2023. She alleged that the Respondent did the following, which she relied upon to argue that it had breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence: 107.1. Failed to put in place suitable working arrangements (in particular as regards working hours) despite agreeing to do so; - 22 - 107.2. Subjected the Claimant to discrimination and harassment; and 107.3. Failed to deal with the grievance policy properly.[108]It was not the case that the Respondent failed to put in place suitable working arrangements. As found above, and with specific reference to working hours, the Respondent agreed to reduce the Claimant’s hours from 40 per week, to 32 per week (following her flexible working request), to 20 hours per week (following the second flexible working request). In addition, the Respondent put in place a phased return, in agreement with the Claimant, following her return to work from long term absence in February 2023 and also worked with her to ensure that her breaks during the day reflected her wishes and enabled her to manage her health condition.[109]It followed that there was no breach of the Claimant’s contract in respect of how the Respondent managed her working arrangements.[110]Similarly, it was simply not the case that the Respondent failed to deal with the Claimant’s grievance properly or adhere to its own policy on dealing with her grievance. The Respondent took the concerns raised by the Claimant seriously. Mr Williams undertook a thorough and comprehensive investigation and provided the Claimant with a cogent, reasoned decision. Significantly, a number of the Claimant’s grievances were upheld by Mr Williams.[111]The appeal panel of Mr Greem and Ms McKee approached the grievance appeal with a similar rigour, meeting with the Claimant on two occasions to fully understand what they were required to determine. Their undoubted understanding of the Claimant’s appeal was exemplified by the appeal outcome decision letter of 31 July 2023, where 23 separate points raised by the Claimant were clearly and cogently addressed, with the findings and conclusions fully reasoned.[112]The Claimant may not agree with the grievance or grievance appeal outcomes. However, it was not the case that the manner in which her grievances were considered and determined was a breach of the Respondent’s own policy, still less a breach, fundamental or otherwise, of the Claimant’s contract of employment.[113]For reasons that will be explained below, I also concluded that the allegations of discrimination and harassment were not made out and, by extension, there were no breaches of the Claimant’s contract as a result.[114]Drawing those findings and conclusions together, whether considered individually or cumulatively, there was no breach of the Claimant’s contract of employment by the Respondent, as pleaded. That means that the Claimant’s resignation was not, and could not be, a dismissal. - 23 - As the Claimant was not dismissed, her complaint of unfair dismissal cannot be made out and is dismissed. Discrimination arising from disability[115]The Claimant identified the following alleged unfavourable treatment (Paragraph 3.1 of the List of Issues, at [38] of the Bundle): Did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably by failing to pay a productivity related bonus?[116]It was not in dispute that the Respondent paid the Claimant a bonus, when she met the requirements under the bonus scheme. In addition, the permitted call lengths were increased for the Claimant in August 2022 (from 340 seconds to 380 seconds) and hospital appointments were disregarded from the calculation of the Claimant’s attendance levels.[117]When the Claimant failed to meet the required metrics (as adjusted), it was also not in dispute that she was not paid a bonus. That included the whole of her period of long term sickness absence (from 18 November 2022 until her return to work on 10 February 2023).[118]The Claimant relied upon two things arising from her disability – taking longer on calls due to cognitive delay and being absent from work for hospital appointments (Paragraph 3.2 of the List of Issues, at [38] of the Bundle). I did not understand either to be disputed by the Respondent.[119]However, as noted above, the Respondent ignored hospital appointments in assessing the attendance metric under the bonus scheme and adjusted the Claimant’s personal metrics as regards call times upwards from August 2022.[120]In my judgment, the unfavourable treatment complained of by the Claimant was not because of something arising from her disability. Her absence from work to attend hospital appointments was a factor expressly ignored by the Respondent when calculating attendance for the bonus scheme. However, the Claimant’s short and long term absences did impact upon her attendance figures and, by extension, on her entitlement to bonus payments.[121]When the Claimant attended work and met the bonus metrics, she was paid a bonus. When she was absent to such a level that she was not entitled to a bonus, she did not receive one. But that was the same for all employees and it was not contended by the Claimant that she should be entitled to a bonus when she was not at work.[122]The Respondent also adjusted the bonus scheme for the Claimant’s benefit to reflect that she took longer on calls. To that end, any failure to qualify for the bonus was not because of the Claimant’s longer call - 24 - times, as that had been explicitly addressed and adjusted by the Respondent.[123]It followed that, to the extent that those occasions when the Claimant did not qualifying for a bonus was unfavourable treatment, it was not because of something arising from her disability. For those reasons, the complaint was not made out and is dismissed. Breach of the duty to make reasonable adjustments[124]The Claimant relied upon seven purported provisions, criterion or practices (‘PCPs’). I considered each in turn: Requiring employees to work full-time or their contracted hours[125]There was no requirement for employees to work full-time (as detailed above, the Claimant’s hours were reduced upon her request from 40 to 32 to 20). She was also not required to work her contracted hours (as evidenced by the phased return to work, which was implemented on her return from long-term sickness absence). As such, the alleged PCP was factually incorrect, was not a PCP operated by the Respondent and was not applied to the Claimant. Requiring employees to work for six hours in order to have a break[126]There was no requirement for employees to work for six hours before they could take a break. As found above, the Claimant was provided with regular breaks during her working hours, which routinely fell short of six hours per day and the length and timing of those breaks were adjusted to suit the Claimant’s health issues. The alleged PCP was not one operated by the Respondent and nor was it ever applied to the Claimant. Setting out working times in a schedule without taking account of hospital appointments[127]Again, this was factually inaccurate. As found, the Respondent did expressly take account of hospital appointments, which were recorded as approved absences, with no adverse consequences on the Claimant’s attendance records. There was no such PCP operated by the Respondent or applied to the Claimant. Requiring employees to return to work after sickness on their contracted hours[128]As found, no such PCP was applied to the Claimant. Instead, and at her request, her hours were first reduced following a flexible working request (from 40 to 32 per week) and then reduced again upon further application (from 32 to 20). When the Claimant returned from long-term sickness absence, the Respondent put in place a phased return to work plan, whereby she was not required to return immediately on 20 hours - 25 - per week but build up her hours gradually. There as no such PCP operated by the Respondent or applied to the Claimant. Operating an absence management policy which is triggered by five periods of absence within a 12 month period[129]The Respondent did operate an Attendance Policy which included this trigger and the Attendance Policy was a PCP. Not recording meetings and not allowing employees to be accompanied other than by a trade union representative or work colleague[130]The Respondent did not record meetings or allow meetings to be recorded. That was a PCP operated by the Respondent.[131]However, so far as relevant to the issues in this case, it was not accurate to allege that the Respondent did not allow anyone other that colleagues and trade union representatives to accompany employees. The Grievance Policy expressly allowed for an employee’s companion to be a support worker. It was therefore factually inaccurate to assert that the Respondent operated a PCP which limited who could accompany employees at meetings to colleagues or trade union representatives. In addition, the disciplinary hearing on 4 April 2023 was adjourned precisely because the Claimant wanted to be accompanied by a support worker and in accordance with the Respondent’s own polices. Paying bonuses based on performance criteria including productivity[132]The Respondent did operate a bonus scheme which was based on performance including productivity and the same was a PCP.[133]It followed that of the seven alleged PCPs relied upon by the Claimant, only the following were found to actually be operated by the Respondent: 133.1. Operating an absence management policy which was triggered by five periods of absence within a 12 month period; 133.2. Not recording meetings; and 133.3. Paying bonuses based on performance criteria including productivity.[134]However, and as correctly highlighted in Ms Walker’s submissions, the PCPs were, to varying degrees, applied to the Claimant with adjustments, as follows: 134.1. Despite regular falling within the triggers within the Attendance Policy for interventions and action, the Respondent did not blindly follow or apply the policy to the Claimant. Rather, it consistently looked at how it could support the Claimant to return to and - 26 - remain in work (including exploring alternative contracts for her to work on, approving flexible working requests, implementing OH recommendations and engaging fully with her grievances). The Claimant was never disciplined (the disciplinary hearing was postponed and never rearranged) and the Respondent adopted a flexible, supportive and practical mindset in managing the Claimant’s absences; 134.2. As already discussed, the bonus metrics were adjusted to accommodate the Claimant’s disability and when the grievance process identified errors in the payment of those bonuses, the Respondent immediately remedied the oversights and ensured the Claimant was paid all the bonuses she was entitled to; and 134.3. Whilst the Respondent did not permit the recording of meetings, it did ensure that a notetaker attended all meetings and employees were provided with copies of those notes for approval.[135]The Claimant alleged that the PCPs put her at substantial disadvantage because of her disability in the following ways (Paragraph 4.3 of the List of Issues, at [39] of the Bundle): 135.1. She could not remain seated for more than two and half hours; 135.2. She had cognitive delay requiring support in meetings and it took her longer to complete calls; and 135.3. She had more frequent short sickness absences.[136]The application of the PCPs which actually existed and were applied to the Claimant did not cause her any disadvantage because she was unable to remain seated for longer than two and half hours. In reality, that was an alleged disadvantaged that arose from a PCP which, for reasons explained above, did not in fact exist.[137]The cognitive delay was recognised by the Respondent and led to it increasing the Claimant’s permitted call times, which by extension ensured that she was placed at no material disadvantage under the applicable metric within the bonus scheme.[138]Had the Respondent applied its Attendance Policy to the letter, the Claimant would have been at a disadvantage by reason of her frequent short-term sickness absences. But, as explained, that was not what the Respondent did. Instead, it adopted a flexible, nuanced and supportive approach to the management of the Claimant’s absences, such that any disadvantage which may have arisen was alleviate and moderated to such a degree that it all but disappeared. - 27 -[139]For all those reasons, the PCPs which the Respondent operated were applied to the Claimant in a manner which did not place her at substantial disadvantage. As there was no substantial disadvantage, there was no duty to make any or any further reasonable adjustments to the PCPs. AS there was no duty on the Respondent, there could be no breach of duty. The complaint was not made out and it is dismissed.[140]For the sake of completeness, and as I saw and heard evidence and submissions on them, I considered the reasonable adjustments proposed by the Claimant (Paragraph 4.5, at [39] of the Bundle), notwithstanding my conclusions that the Respondent was under no duty to make further adjustments.[141]I considered each proposed adjustment in turn and found that all of them, without exception, had been implemented by the Respondent in any event, as follows: Adjusting her working hours[142]The Respondent did adjust the Claimant’s working hours, both by way of flexible working requests and phased returns to work. Allowing a break after a period shorter than six hours[143]The Respondent did allow the Claimant to take breaks after a period shorter than six hours. Amending the schedule not to show hours taken for agreed hospital appointments as AWOL (absent without leave)[144]The Respondent did amend its records and working practices to ensure that hospital attendances were recorded as approved absences, as opposed to absent without leave. Allowing a phased return to work[145]The Respondent did allow and implement a phased return to work for the Claimant. Amending the threshold for the absence management policy to disregard absences due to disability or increasing the threshold to take account of more frequent absences due to disability[146]The Respondent continually and consistently amended and flexed the Attendance Policy to allow for and accommodate the Claimant’s disability-related absences. Recording meetings or allowing her to be accompanied by a charity representative or family member - 28 -[147]The Respondent did not record meetings but ensured that a note taker was in attendance and the Claimant always had the opportunity to review and correct the notes of meetings.[148]In addition, the Respondent did not stipulate who the support worker was who could accompany the Claimant to formal meetings (whether disciplinary or grievance). It was entirely a matter for the Claimant whether she brought a relative or charity worker with her as her support worker. Adjusting performance metrics for the bonus to accommodate the impact of her disability[149]The Respondent did adjust the performance metrics of the bonus scheme to accommodate the impact of the Claimant’s disability (by increasing her call times). Harassment[150]The Claimant raised 10 allegations of harassment (Paragraph 5.1 of the List of Issues, at [39] – [40] of the Bundle). I considered and determined each in turn. On 31 March 2023, Rebecca Ashworth and Andrew Kinghorn questioning the Claimant inappropriately regarding her hospital appointment on 5 April 2023 for which she had requested annual leave.[151]As found above, the Claimant was asked questions about this one hospital appointment. In reality, the Respondent was seeking to understand what the appointment entailed, before acting in support of the Claimant by recording the same as authorised absence, as opposed to annual leave.[152]This issue was specifically considered by the Respondent as part of the Claimant’s grievance appeal, finding that “the line of questioning lacked compassion and a direct line of questioning should have been used” (at [343] of the Bundle). However, the appeal panel went on to conclude that this was caused by Ms Ashworth’s inexperience and apologised to the Claimant.[153]Whilst there may have been criticisms of how that questioning was undertaken (as acknowledged by the Respondent per the grievance appeal), the underlying intent was clear – to seek to support the Claimant and, in particular, authorise her absence to attend the appointment without losing any of her annual leave entitlement.[154]In those circumstances, the same could not objectively be characterised as inappropriate, still less an act of harassment. - 29 - On 7, 8 and 11 April 2023, being chased and harassed for information already provided to Rebecca Ashworth in November 2022.[155]This was reference to the email exchange between the Claimant and Ms Ashworth, which took place immediately following the postponed disciplinary hearing of 4 April 2023. As noted above, the emails themselves were not in evidence. Instead, there was reference to the exchange within the Claimant’s grievance of 16 May 2023. In addition, the Claimant referred to the exchange in her witness statement (at Paragraph 13e).[156]I reminded myself that the reason for postponing the disciplinary meeting on 4 April 2023 was to enable the Claimant to arrange to be accompanied. In that context, there was nothing inherently unusual in the Respondent following that up with the Claimant and seeking an update from her. There was nothing in that which objectively could be considered to have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s Sending the meeting invitation for a confidential return to work meeting following the Claimant’s sickness absence to the whole team.[157]This was a reference to the meeting on 27 March 2023, when the Claimant had been asked to attend earlier to discuss her return to work, before the start of a general catch up meeting with the rest of the team. As found above, one member of the team entered the meeting (being held on Zoom) before the Claimant’s meeting with Ms Ashworth had concluded. The matter was investigated and led to recommendations arising out of the Claimant’s grievance appeal.[158]However, what was clear from the evidence was that the allegation of harassment was factually inaccurate. There was no evidence that any members of the Claimant’s team were invited to attend her confidential Return to Work Meeting. Rather, the meeting was billed as a general catch up for the whole team, with the Claimant attending before the catch-up meeting was scheduled to begin, for the purpose of undertaking her Return to Work Meeting in private with Ms Ashworth.[159]At most, the Claimant’s meeting overran, someone joined for the catchup meting and, quite properly, Ms Ashworth immediately ended the Claimant’s confidential meeting. As found in the grievance appeal, there was no intent on the part of Ms Ashworth, it was an unfortunate accident and could have been avoided with better planning.[160]When considered objectively, it did not have the purpose or effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, - 30 - Threatening disciplinary proceedings in respect of the Claimant’s absences.[161]It was not in dispute that disciplinary action was raised with the Claimant, given the number of times she had triggered the Attendance Policy, or that a disciplinary meeting was arranged (which was postponed to enable the Claimant to arrange for someone to attend with her). It was not in dispute that the disciplinary process was never restarted.[162]In my judgment, it was not correct to characterise the Respondent’s actions as threatening. Ms Lees’ evidence in this regard was instructive. She explained in her written evidence how, after taking further advice from HR, there was still much which the Respondent needed to understand about the Claimant’s absences, even at the start of the disciplinary meeting on 4 April 2023 (per Paragraph 35 of her statement): At the point we started the meeting it was yet to be established if the absences that contributed to the trigger were directly related to the Claimant’s medical condition and it was my intention to understand this during the meeting. If it was to become apparent that the absences had a direct link to the Claimant’s medical condition, the likely outcome of the disciplinary meeting would have been for no further action to be taken. The Claimant was made aware of this prior to the meeting also.[163]Absence management is a legitimate and reasonable endeavour for any employer. The Respondent was acting in accordance with its policy and the meeting of 4 April 2023 was part of a broader strategy to enable and support the Claimant back into the workplace. There was nothing threatening about the actions it took, either in arranging and beginning the disciplinary meeting on 4 April 2023 or more generally.[164]As such, the allegation is not made out and the conduct complained of, when viewed in context and objectively, fell some way short of meeting the threshold to make out a complaint of harassment. Holding meetings with two members of the Respondent and the Claimant unrepresented and unaccompanied.[165]In her oral submissions, the Claimant confirmed that this related to the disciplinary meeting on 4 April 2023 (she did not challenge the Respondent’s submission that, as evidenced, the Claimant never asked to be accompanied to any other meetings, whether return to work or wellbeing meetings).[166]As detailed above, at the outset of the disciplinary meeting, the Claimant asked either to have the proceedings recorded or be allowed to have someone attend with her. As meetings were not recorded, the Respondent adjourned the meeting to enable the Claimant to arrange to be accompanied. - 31 -[167]In addition, ahead of the meeting, the Claimant had been sent a copy of the Respondent’s disciplinary policy (per the letter of invitation of 31 March 2023, at [142] of the Bundle). It was reasonable to conclude that the policy informed the Claimant of her right to be accompanied and/or represented at the disciplinary meeting.[168]As such, the fact that the Claimant was unaccompanied and unrepresented at the meeting on 4 April 2023 was not a result of any action or omission on the part of the Respondent. In addition, when the Claimant asked to be accompanied, the Respondent immediately stopped the meeting and allowed the Claimant time to arrange this.[169]As such, in no sense, when viewed in context and objectively, could the Respondent’s actions before and during the disciplinary meeting on 4 April 2023 remotely have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s Harassing the Claimant to attend meetings and then failing to attend, accusing her of not attending.[170]In her oral submissions, the Claimant confirmed that this allegation of harassment was in respect of the Return to Work Meeting on 15 May 2023.[171]As already noted, Return to Work Meetings were an important part of the Respondent’s Attendance Policy. The Claimant had commenced a further period of sickness absence and been unable to attend the Return to Work Meeting scheduled for 26 April 2023 (due to ill-health). A further meeting was scheduled for 15 May 2023 and as explained above, there was some confusion about who had attended the meeting and when. The Claimant failed to respond to arrangements for a subsequent meeting scheduled for 31 May 2023.[172]There was no evidence that the Claimant was harassed to attend Return to Work Meetings. She was fully aware of the provisions of the Attendance Policy, had attended Return to Work Meetings in the past and, viewed objectively, those meetings had been supportive, constructive and effective.[173]Mr Amin thought that the Claimant had not attended the meeting on 15 May 2023. He himself attended eight minutes late because of technical issues, by which time the Claimant had joined and then left the meeting, a fact he was understandably unaware of. Mr Amin’s belief that the Claimant had failed to attend the meeting on 15 May 2023 must be viewed in the context of the Claimant not attending the previous meeting scheduled for 26 April 2023 and not responding to the invite to the meeting on 15 May 2023 (which included a follow up email on 12 May 2023). In addition, as soon as Mr Amin was made aware by the Claimant - 32 - that she had attended the 15 May 2023, he apologised to her (per his email of 15 May 2023, at [206] of the Bundle).[174]When viewed in context, it was simply not the case that the Claimant was “accused” of not attending the meeting on 15 May 2023. It was an error and a misunderstanding by Mr Amin, for which he apologised later the same day. There was no intent or malice on the part of Mr Amin specifically or the Respondent generally. The events of 15 May 2023 did not, in any objective or conceivable way, have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, Harassing the claimant to attend meetings when she was off sick.[175]In her oral submissions, the Claimant clarified that this allegation of harassment related to the period after 15 May 2023 and the submission of her grievance. She specifically reference Mr Williams allegedly harassing her to attend meetings and return to work. As noted above, Mr Williams investigated and determined the Claimant’s grievance.[176]In my judgment, it was difficult to reconcile the Claimant’s allegation with the facts as found. On 17 May 2023, the Claimant informed Mr Amin that she would not be attending wellbeing meetings, instead focussing on her grievance. The Claimant did not respond to the arrangements to meet on 31 May 2023 and that meeting did not go ahead. These were wellbeing meetings, the purpose of which was to discuss and explore the Claimant’s health and welfare and the support which could be provided for her. Given the purpose of those meetings (and the history of the Respondent engaging with the Claimant’s wellbeing and providing support), it was difficult to understand how one could feel “harassed” into attending such a meeting.[177]In any event, the Respondent agreed to pause verbal wellbeing meetings at the Claimant’s request, whilst still, quite properly, ensuring that it remained aware and informed of her health, albeit by way of requests for written information.[178]As for Mr Williams, he met with the Claimant for the purposes of investigating her grievance, a meeting which was wholly appropriate, given his task of investigating and determining the Claimant’s grievance.[179]This issue of being harassed to attend meetings was previously raised by the Claimant in her grievance appeal. Mr Green’s findings as at 31 July 2023 were consistent with the evidence in this case, as follows (at [353] – 354] of the Bundle): The panel has been able to establish that the wellbeing meetings were agreed to be completed by written submission around the 19th June at your request. You were sent a number of questions on the 19/06/2023 by Mohammed [Amin] which were not responded too which was subsequently - 33 - followed up on the 23/06/2023 as you had not responded to the questions raised. The mail was then followed up by Sandra [Karlsson] on the 26/06/2023 and it was explained that the Grievance and LTS [Long Term Sickness] policy are separate and we as a business are required to meet with staff currently on LTS. This was during a time in which your sick note had expired, meaning you were considered as absent without correct certification. The panel was able to establish that subsequent meetings which were requested by Kyle [Williams] after your initial grievance were removed whilst your appeal was taking place. The panel feel that the timescales and follow ups which were raised by the operations team were reasonable.[180]In the circumstances, the Claimant was not harassed to attend meetings. Rather, reasonable and proper details were sought from her about her absence, in a manner which was reflective of her wishes, whilst ensuring that the Respondent was able to manage its business and adhere to its Attendance Policy.[181]As such, in no conceivable way, when viewed in context and objectively, could the Respondent’s actions in this regard have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, Rebecca Ashworth not communicating with the Claimant[182]The basis of this allegation was detailed in the Claimant’s witness statement (at Paragraph 14a): Since submitting the informal complaint on 13/04/23…, I did not have any contact with Rebecca Ashworth whatsoever. No acknowledgement to emails, urgent procedure enquiries, response to reported IT issues, or any usual monthly 121 meetings or catch ups. Rebecca has also confirmed this…[183]The Claimant specifically relied upon the minutes of Ms Ashworth’s meeting with Mr Williams of 9 June 2023 (undertaken as part of Mr Williams investigations into the Claimant’s grievance, and at [249] – [255] of the Bundle).[184]Ms Ashworth’s recollection of her relationship with the Claimant, provided in and around the time of the events in question (i.e. on 9 June 2023), painted a different picture to that was now being alleged by the Claimant. Variously, Ms Ashworth reported the following regarding her relationship with the Claimant: 184.1. “We have always been really close so yeah our relationship has been really good. Its jut I feel towards the end she was more reserved than she normally was” (at [250]); - 34 - 184.2. “She didn’t seem as talkative. The communication wasn’t really there towards the end. There were times, she would have system issues and not reach out. When she was off sick I was putting her down as AWOL as I couldn’t get hold of her and she wasn’t answering me. I felt that maybe she didn’t want to speak to me. I didn’t know why. I knew she was having some issues with other people and she didn’t want to speak to other people but she always, always wanted to speak to me. I think she even requested to move to my team as she was close to me” (at 250]) 184.3. In respect of the meeting of 31 March 2023, “[F]rom that meeting nothing really happened in terms of next steps. I didn’t see or speak to Belinda after this meeting. I think it was Mo [Amin] who said he will be dealing with it from now on” (at [251] – [252]).[185]Ms Ashworth’s interview with Mr Williams was consistent with Mr Amin’s written evidence, where he explained that he became directly involved upon receipt of the Claimant’s informal complaint, although day-to-day management remained with Ms Ashworth (at Paragraph 6 of his statement). He also referred to becoming involved in the Claimant’s wellbeing meetings after the informal complaint was made, during his interview with Mr Williams on 6 June 2023, as part of the grievance investigations (at [242] of the Bundle).[186]Thereafter, as found, Mr Amin conducted the wellbeing meetings with the Claimant (although he did refer to Ms Ashworth attempting to call the Claimant when she was unaware of the reason for her not attending work on 24 April 2023, at Paragraph 10 of his statement and discussed further, below).[187]As part of the Claimant’s grievance appeal, Mr Green considered whether, as alleged, there was a hostile environment from Ms Ashworth toward the Claimant after she made her informal complaint. He concluded, as at 31 July 2023, that the appeal panel “were unable to evidence a change in relationship after the feedback was received” (at [352] of the Bundle).[188]Contrary to the Claimant’s belief, Ms Ashworth did not cease communicating with her, following the submission of her informal compliant or at all. Instead, Mr Amin became more directly involved in managing the Claimant’s absence, in addition to addressing the informal complaints she had raised.[189]It was also abundantly clear that, even if the receipt of the Claimant’s informal complaint resulted in Ms Ashworth taking less of a role in the management of the Claimant, the Respondent’s actions in this regard could not, when considered objectively, have had the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, - 35 - Ann Hurst harassing the Claimant on 24 April 2024 for notifying her sickness absence to Mohammed Amin and Sandra instead of Rebecca Ashworth.[190]It was not in dispute that Ms Hurst telephoned the Claimant on 24 April 2023 to find out why she was not in work. Yet again, the factual context of that call was key.[191]At 9.01am on 24 April 2023, the Claimant emailed Ms Karlsson and Ms Lees, notifying them that was unwell and not up to working her shift that day (at [187] of the Bundle). It was not in dispute that neither Ms Karlsson nor Ms Lees were or had ever been the Claimant’s team manager. That was still Ms Ashworth (and/or Mr Kinghorn). The Claimant did not contact Ms Ashworth or Mr Kinghorn nor copy either of them into the email she sent to Ms Karlsson and Ms Lees.[192]It was also not in dispute that both Ms Hurst and Ms Ashworth attempted to contact the Claimant during the day of 24 April 2023, culminating with the Claimant and Ms Hurst speaking sometime in the afternoon (per the Claimant’s email to Ms Karlsson and Mr Amin of 3:12pm on 24 April 2023, at [188] of the Bundle).[193]At 4:32pm, Ms Karlsson provided an explanation for why the Claimant was being contacted by her managers (at [191] of the Bundle): Please note that your first email today 9am had landed in my junk mail, due to it coming from an external email that I had not received emails from before, hence why I did not see it. When I saw your second email, that didn't go to my junk mail, I was searching through all emails to understand why it had been missed.[194]Mr Amin confirmed that the same email, which the Claimant and forwarded on to him, had also arrived in his junk folder and been missed (per his email to the Claimant at [190] – [191] of the Bundle). Mr Amin also detailed in his witness statement a subsequent conversation he had with Ms Hurst, who informed him that Ms Ashworth had asked her to contact the Claimant as they were, at the time, unaware as to why she was not in work (per Paragraph 10 of his statement). That was wholly consistent with the explanation on the day in question that the Claimant’s email at 9:01am had been missed.[195]In my judgment, the explanation provided by the Respondent, at the time of the events in question, was far more plausible than a suggestion that Ms Hurst was attempting to harass the Claimant as alleged or at all.[196]For those reasons, whatever the Claimant may believe, there was no intent nor any objectively justified effect of the phone calls on 24 April 2023 that came close to reaching the threshold of making out a complaint of harassment. - 36 - On 17 May 2023, Mohammed Amin alleged that the Claimant had failed to attend a fictitious meeting on 11 May 2023.[197]Mr Amin’s letter to the Claimant on 17 May 2023 referred to her not attending a meeting scheduled for 11 May 2023 (at [226] of the Bundle). It was not in dispute that there never was a meeting scheduled with the Claimant for 11 May 2023.[198]In his oral evidence, Mr Amin was asked about the reference to a meeting scheduled for 11 May 2023. He explained that it was an error and believed the information had been provided to him by the Respondent’s HR team. He did not question it at the time as he was aware that there had been interactions between the Claimant and HR and was not sure if there had been separate meetings. However, he acknowledged that the reference was misplaced as there had never been a meeting scheduled for 11 May 2023.[199]The Claimant made mention of the fact that the meeting of 11 May 2023 was fictional in her grievance meeting with Mr Williams on 6 June 2023 (at [265] of the Bundle). It was also considered by the panel as part of the Claimant’s grievance appeal, concluding as at 31 July 2023 that “the panel was unable find evidence that this was an attempt to discredit you” (at [352] of the Bundle).[200]The Claimant alleged that including this non-existent meeting in the letter of 17 May 2023 was an act of harassment on the part of Mr Amin. However, when considered in context, there was no plausible evidence that Mr Amin specifically or the Respondent more generally was seeking in writing the letter to violate the Claimant’s dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant. It was, as explained, an error. Indeed, the real purpose of the letter was to arrange a further wellbeing meeting, the purpose of which was to once again support the Claimant in returning and remaining in work.[201]When considered objectively and in the context of what else the Respondent was doing and proposing to do at the time to support the Claimant (and, at her request, prioritise investigating her grievance), the error in the letter did not have the effect either of violating the Claimant’s Conclusion: harassment complaints[202]As explained above, I found that none of the complaints raised by the Claimant constituted harassment, whether considered individually or cumulatively. Her perceptions of what occurred and why were either erroneous, misplaced or both. Whatever subjective feelings she may have, they were not objectively justified on the basis of the facts as found. - 37 -[203]The Respondent did not harass the Claimant, as alleged or at all, the complaints were not made out and are dismissed. Victimisation[204]The protected act relied upon by the Claimant was the informal complaint which she made on 13 April 2023 (at [163] – [166] of the Bundle). In their respective oral submissions, the parties left it for me to decide whether that complaint met the definition of a protected act for the purposes of section 27(2) of the EqA 2010.[205]I was reminded of the importance of interpreting, construing and applying the provisions of the EqA 2010 widely. Having read the Claimant’s informal complaint of 13 April 2023 several times, I concluded that it did constitute a protected act, not least because it sufficiently made allegations (both specific and in general terms) that provisions of the EqA 2010 had been breached during her employment (by way of just one example, the Claimant alleged that the manner in which her illness and absences had been handled was “an underhand way of pressuring me to leave or return to increasing hours”, at [165] of the Bundle).[206]The Claimant relied on two alleged detriments, which she said she had been subjected to as a result of making the informal complaint on 13 April 2023, namely: 206.1. That Ms Ashworth ceased all communication with the Claimant after that date; and 206.2. On 17 May 2023, Mr Amin alleged that the Claimant had failed to attend a fictitious meeting on 11 May 2023.[207]As explained above, Ms Ashworth did not cease all communications with the Claimant. Instead, Mr Amin took a more involved role in manging the Claimant’s complaint and her absences. Given those findings and conclusions, it was not the case that the Claimant was subjected to the detriment as pleaded or any detriment regarding the involvement of Mr Amin and lesser involvement of Ms Ashworth, following receipt of the complaints on 13 April 2023.[208]In any event, the informal complaint involved allegations against Ms Ashworth. It was right and proper for the Respondent to bring Mr Amin in to both seek to address the complaints and take a more active role in managing and supporting the Claimant. In that sense, the notion that the Claimant was subjected to detriment by Ms Ashworth taking a lesser role was fanciful.[209]As also explained above, Mr Amin’s reference in his letter of 17 May 2023 to the meeting of 11 May 2023 was an error. Mr Amin acted in - 38 - good faith, based on information provided to him by HR, albeit information which was, in part, inaccurate.[210]In those circumstances, the reason for referring to the fictitious meeting could not possibly have been as a result of the Claimant making her informal complaint of 13 April 2023. Even if the reference to the meeting was detrimental to the Claimant (in the sense that reference was being made to her non-attendance at a meeting which was never scheduled), it was in no way because of, in response to or motivated by her informal complaint.[211]A complaint of victimisation is only made out if the Claimant was subjected to detriment as a result of a protected act. In this case, the Claimant was either not subjected to detriment or any detriment was not because she made a protected act.[212]For those reasons, the complaints of victimisation were not made out and are dismissed. Approved by: